VI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ’S DELIVERY SYSTEMS

A. Background

(U) In addition to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Intelligence Community (IC) produced several intelligence assessments which addressed Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and, more specifically, Iraq’s delivery systems, including missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In December 2000, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities. The assessment was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery programs in the absence of weapons inspectors, as well as a review of what remained of the WMD arsenal and outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). In July 1998, the NIC produced an ICA, The Foreign Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat to the United States, which discussed Iraq’s development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for possible biological weapons (BW) delivery.

(U) In March 1998, September 1999, July 2000, and December 2001, the NIC produced NIEs on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015.26 These annual reports were requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to provide Congress with the latest intelligence on worldwide ballistic missile developments and threats. All of these NIEs provided an assessment of Iraq’s ballistic missile capabilities.

(U) These IC products regarding Iraq’s delivery programs were consistent in assessing that:

• Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad’s failure to fully account for destruction of prohibited missiles, suggest that Iraq retained a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles.

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26 The March 1998 report went through the same coordination and approval process as a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) but was called an annual report to Congress rather than an NIE. The July 2000 NIE was titled Foreign Responses to US National Missile Defense Deployment. This NIE described the IC’s assessments of both the foreign response to U.S. missile defense and the foreign ballistic missile threat through 2015.
• Technical analysis indicated that Iraq’s short-range al Samoud missile was capable of exceeding the 150-km range limit imposed by United Nations (UN) sanctions.

• Baghdad is using the development of shorter-range missiles, allowed under sanctions, to prepare to reconstitute a longer-range missile effort.

(U) In its 2000, 2001, and 2002 intelligence products, the IC updated its assessments and asserted that Iraq had made steady progress in developing its missile programs and was continuing to develop UAVs. The IC assessed that:

• Iraq was in the final stages of development of the al Samoud missile (2000), may be preparing to deploy the al Samoud (2001), and was deploying the al Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), both which exceed the 150-km UN range limit (2002).

• Construction and testing activity showed a clear intent to resume longer-range missile production (2000), Iraq was in the early stages of developing longer range ballistic missiles (2001), and Iraq was developing medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities (2002).

• Baghdad was continuing to develop UAVs which probably were intended as delivery platforms for biological weapons (BW). The UAVs posed a threat to Iraq’s neighbors and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf (2000, 2002).

(U) In the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction the key judgments noted that Iraq was developing a UAV, probably intended as a biological weapons (BW) delivery platform. The body of the NIE made it clear that this developmental program was for small and medium UAVs. Previous intelligence assessments had focused on Iraq’s development of larger UAVs for possible BW delivery, which Iraq had crafted from modified jet aircraft. The 2002 NIE also raised the possibility, for the first time, that Iraq’s UAVs could threaten the U.S. homeland, if they were brought in or close to, the U.S. The NIE added that Iraq was attempting to procure mapping software of the U.S. for its UAVs which “strongly suggested that Iraq was investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the U.S.”
(U) The Committee examined each of the assessments of Iraq’s delivery capabilities outlined above, and all of the available intelligence provided by the IC in support of these assessments. Committee staff also interviewed analysts from each all-source intelligence agency with a role in drafting or coordinating on the delivery section of the NIE including analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF), National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC,)

27 to hear each agency’s reasons for their assessments.

(U) All intelligence agencies agreed with the IC’s assessments in the 2002 NIE regarding Iraq’s missiles, and there were no footnotes or dissents in this section. USAF intelligence, however, disagreed on several aspects of the NIE regarding Iraq’s UAV programs, including the assessment that Iraq’s UAVs were probably intended to deliver BW. The USAF assessed that the UAVs were intended primarily for reconnaissance and not BW delivery. The discussion below outlines the intelligence supporting the IC’s assessments and discusses any disagreement or alternate judgments about those assessments.

B. Scud-Type Missiles

(U) The IC assessed that gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad’s failure to fully account for destruction of prohibited missiles strongly suggested that Iraq retained a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles. The NIE said that the covert force may contain “up to a few dozen” Scud-variant short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). UNSCOM data and reports provided to the Committee showed that the UN had been unable to account for two of 819 Scud missiles Iraq acquired from the Soviet Union, seven independently produced al Husayn Scud-type missiles, 50 conventional Scud warheads and over 500 tons of proscribed Scud propellants Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally.

(......) In addition to these accounting discrepancies, more than twenty intelligence reports from at least ten different human intelligence (HUMINT) sources of varying reliability provided to the Committee suggested that Iraq retained prohibited Scud missiles, trucks to carry and conceal them and hid the missiles, launchers, and missile components at various sites in Iraq. Some of these reports indicated that the information who “may have provided it to influence as well as inform,” but others were provided by independent sources. For example, in 1998 a source with indirect access,

27 NAIC has recently been renamed the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).
reported that components of Iraqi Scud missiles had been kept in Iraqi military installations and that other missile parts were hidden on large trucks that moved continuously in Iraq. A report said that an Iraqi general who defected wrote that Iraq retained prohibited Scud-type missiles, and a report said that Iraq was hiding about five to eight Scud missiles.

Other information provided to the Committee suggested that Iraq destroyed its Scud missiles in the years after the Gulf War. Intelligence reports describing debriefs of Hussein Kamel (Saddam Hussein’s son in law who defected from Iraq in 1995) show that Kamel told interviewers that Iraq had destroyed all of its Scud missiles. This information was not mentioned in the NIE.

Finally, it is unclear exactly how the IC established the estimate that Iraq may have retained “up to a few dozen” Scuds. Analysts told Committee staff that the number was estimated based on Scud missiles and components for which the UN could not adequately account, but the IC had no estimate of the number of components that may have been withheld from inspectors.

C. Iraq Was in the Final Stages of Development of the Al Samoud Missile (2000), May Be Preparing to Deploy the Al Samoud (2001), and Was Deploying the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, Both Which Exceed the 150-km UN Range Limit (2002)

The IC’s assessments about Iraq’s al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles changed progressively in 2000, 2001, and 2002 as intelligence reporting showed that Iraq was continuing to advance in its development of these missile systems.

Since at least 1998, the IC had assessed that the al Samoud had a range greater than the 150-km allowed by the UN. This assessment was based on information extrapolated from Iraq’s UN declarations in which Iraq provided details of the missile and engine parameters. The
system had been flight tested nine times, with five failures, at the time of the 2000 NIE, leading the IC to assess that the system was in the final stages of development.

(Protected) Intelligence provided to the Committee showed that by 2001, Iraq was progressing with development of the al Samoud, but still had not deployed the missiles. By 2002, however, Iraq had extracted the engines for 30 to 50 al Samoud missiles between mid-2000 and late 2001. Intelligence also showed that Iraq had conducted at least 25 al Samoud flight tests since 2000, the majority of which had been successful. A report from a member of the Committee assessed that in August 2002 two al Samoud missiles flew to ranges above the UN permitted range. Additional an indication that the missile had been deployed. The deployment was confirmed by Iraq’s declaration to the UN in December 2002 that it had fielded the al Samoud II.

(Protected) The NIE also judged that Iraq was developing an extended-range variant of the al Samoud missile with an assessed range of up to 300 km, and said that on 2002, the missile was flight tested beyond the 150-km range limit “perhaps as far as 300 km.”

The IC assessed that was probably the result of an Iraqi effort to enlarge the al Samoud airframe to accommodate more propellant, which could extend its range to 300 km.

(Protected) When Iraq provided its Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure to the UN in December 2002, Iraq admitted to developing an al Samoud II variant, but said the range of this variant was also 150 km. Iraq admitted that the missile had flown beyond 150 km during 13 of 23 flight tests, but only by at most 33 km. The data provided by Iraq in the declaration caused the IC to change its assessment of the possible range of the al Samoud II, which it corrected in a February 2003 NIE, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. The NIE said that Iraq’s declaration indicated that the al Samoud II has a larger diameter, which was the cause of noted by the IC during the January 2002 flight test. The NIE said, “The al Samoud data provides an alternate explanation for the flight test last year.” Iraq reported that the missile flew 171 km, and the new NIE judged, based on modeling of the new al Samoud II data, that 171 km was near the expected range.
D. Development of Medium-Range Missile Capabilities

(U) In addition to the assessment that both the al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles had ranges which exceeded the UN permitted limit of 150-km, the IC assessed in the 2002 NIE that Iraq was developing medium-range missile capabilities.

( ) [Redacted] intelligence provided to the Committee [Redacted] that Iraq was nearing completion of an engine test stand that could support testing of larger liquid engines than the al Samoud.

( ) [Redacted] intelligence [Redacted] indicated that Iraq had been trying to purchase North Korea’s Nodong MRBM. The report said that an Iraqi delegation had visited North Korea in [Redacted] 2001 where they discussed and reached agreement to purchase the Nodong missile.
There is no way to determine the reliability of the information however, a separate report provided to the Committee showed that an Iraqi delegation did visit North Korea in 2001, lending credibility to the reports. In addition, a May 2002 CIA HUMINT report of a foreign government service also indicated that while meeting at a North Korean facility to discuss missile cooperation, a Syrian missile development team met three unidentified Iraqi military officers there.

E. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

(U) The IC assessed since at least 2000 that Baghdad was developing UAVs which were probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents, and that the UAVs posed a threat to Iraq’s neighbors and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. In the 2002 NIE, the IC assessed that Iraq was developing a UAV, “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents,” which could threaten the U.S. homeland if brought close to or into the U.S. The statement that the UAV was probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents was made in the key judgments, and not in the main body of the delivery section of the NIE. The USAF disagreed with this assessment and added a footnote to the NIE which noted that it “does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare agents. The small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.” Of note, the text of the biological warfare section of the NIE was similar to the USAF footnote in stating that “although we have no information linking the current UAV development with BW delivery, this new airframe may represent another future method of BW delivery.”

(____) The NIE assessment that Iraq was developing UAVs probably intended for BW delivery was based in part on information from UN inspections and Iraqi declarations. showed that in 1995 Iraq declared that it had a pre-Gulf War project to convert MIG-21 aircraft to pilotless aircraft with a drop tank that would deliver biological agent. Iraq conducted one experiment with this aircraft in 1991, but Iraq said it dropped the project because of the war. prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had been working on a program to modify drop tanks for use on an F-1 Mirage fighter for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) dispersal, and had tested the aircraft using an anthrax simulant. Although this was a manned aircraft, IC analysts assessed that the drop tank work could have had applications for use with UAVs. also noted that Iraq had modified commercial crop sprayers for BW delivery at the Salman Pak
facility that were assessed to be suitable for the dissemination of BW agents from helicopters or slow moving fixed wing aircraft. Iraq tested this aerosol generator on a helicopter with an anthrax simulant in 1988. Finally, IC analysts pointed to that in 1991 inspectors discovered eleven drones at the Salman Pak BW research, production, and storage facility. Iraqi declarations said that these drones were intended to be used as aerial targets for anti-aircraft artillery training and reconnaissance, not for BW delivery.

(U) IC analysts told Committee staff that when Iraq began to convert 1960s Czech-built L-29 jet trainers into UAVs in 1995, they assessed that Iraq may have intended to use the L-29s for CBW delivery instead of the MIG-21s they had worked on prior to the Gulf War. The IC provided the Committee with the five reports to support the assessment that the L-29s were intended for CBW delivery, only one of which said explicitly that the L-29 UAVs were intended to deliver unconventional weapons.

The IC provided the Committee with HUMINT which said that in February 1999, Iraq was working to increase the L-29s’ payload and arm them with “special bombs.” The report said the L-29s would be flown at low altitudes to targets outside Iraq, but provided no additional information.

The IC also provided the Committee with three CIA HUMINT reports, all from the same source. The three reports all describe an L-29 deployment to Tallil, Iraq airbase in November 1997. When the L-29 unit arrived at the base, the commander of the air defense command informed the unit that their mission was to lure U.S. aircraft into a surface-to-air missile (SAM) trap. The unit’s detachment commander later told the team that their “real” mission was to penetrate Kuwait and use the L-29s to “hit and scare” the Kuwaitis and Saudi Arabsians.

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(U) The NIE also pointed to the involvement of the organization managing the L-29 program as being heavily involved in aerial spray technology and other technologies which could easily be applied to BW dissemination. A Department of Defense (DoD) HUMINT report provided to the Committee said the organization managing the UAV program was the Iraqi Air Force’s main engineering and procurement entity and was involved in many aerial activities, including an agricultural spraying program. While spray technology has potential CBW dispersal applications, it also has civilian agricultural applications. It is unclear from the information provided to the Committee whether the spray technology program was linked to the UAV program or whether the engineering company was simply engaged in several aerial research and development programs.

(U) At the time of the NIE, the IC assessed that the status of the L-29 program was unknown because, after an L-29 crash in October 2000, no flight tests had been observed by intelligence. The IC then began to focus on Iraq’s development of small UAVs, assessing that Iraq may have shifted its work to the small UAVs as a replacement for the L-29s. The IC provided the Committee with more than twenty intelligence reports from a variety of sources which showed that Iraq was developing small UAVs. None of these reports, however, suggested that the small UAVs were probably intended for biological agent delivery as assessed in the 2002 NIE key judgments.
The main body of the NIE text said that the IC was concerned about Iraq’s development of small UAVs because “Iraq in the past has configured small UAVs to deliver BW agent, according to reporting, and UNSCOM discovered eleven small UAVs at the Iraqi BW research and development (R&D), production, and storage facility at Salman Pak.” The IC provided the Committee with one CIA HUMINT report in which that during the Gulf War Iraq had stored about ten drones, designed and produced to deliver biological agents, at the Nasir State Establishment. An report provided to the Committee showed that inspectors discovered eleven drones at a separate facility in 1991, but the report did not note the intended purpose of the drones. Iraq’s 1996 Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure said the drones were intended for reconnaissance and aerial targeting, not for BW delivery. Additional information from Iraq’s declaration

Because only one of these reports suggested that Iraq had developed small UAVs to deliver BW and because the reports all discussed Iraq’s pre-Gulf War UAVs, the Committee requested that the IC provide any additional intelligence reports that demonstrated a direct link between the new small UAVs and a BW delivery role. In a written response to the Committee, the CIA said, “a large volume of reporting from multiple strongly suggested BW delivery as one of the goals for Iraq’s small UAV program.” The intelligence provided to the Committee with that response, however, did not provide any reports, dated prior to publication of the NIE, that suggested Iraq’s post-Gulf War small UAV program was being developed to deliver BW. The IC provided three additional reports dated after the publication of the NIE from a foreign government service. The first report, dated October 26, 2002, said that an Iraqi Ministry of Defense official that some of Iraq’s UAVs were loaded with “chemical materials.” The second report, dated February 27, 2003, said that Iraq intended to use UAVs to monitor, and, if necessary, attack U.S. forces and said the UAVs could be fitted with conventional or CBW warheads. The third report indicated Iraq’s UAVs were designed to be fitted with CBW, “if necessary.”
F. Other Possible Missions for the UAVs

(U) The majority IC position in the NIE did not discuss any possible missions for Iraq’s UAVs, other than CBW delivery. The United States Air Force (USAF), however, assessed that the UAVs were not being developed to deliver BW and their footnote outlined another possible purpose. The USAF said,

Iraq is developing UAVs primarily for reconnaissance rather than delivery platforms for CBW agents. The capabilities and missions of Iraq’s new UAV remains undetermined, but in this view its small size strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance. CBW delivery is an inherent capability of UAVs but probably is not the impetus for Iraq’s recent UAV programs.

(______________________________________) The USAF based this assessment on technical analysis that the small UAVs were too small to be effective CBW delivery vehicles, _________________________. USAF and the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) analysts also told Committee staff that they did not believe the intelligence reporting demonstrated any link between the small UAVs and a BW delivery mission, but did show other possible missions for the UAVs.

(U) At least eleven HUMINT reports provided to the Committee suggested that both the L-29s and the small UAVs had missions that were unrelated to BW delivery. Three reports suggested that the UAVs were intended to attack U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf, but did not mention how attacks would have been conducted. Four reports suggested the UAVs were intended to be used as cruise missiles to replace Iraq’s prohibited surface to surface missiles and two reports indicated that the purpose of the UAVs was reconnaissance. One report suggested that UAVs were being produced for air defense training and another report suggested that the UAVs were being used for both surveillance and air defense training.

(______________________________________) The IC also provided at least eight reports which showed that Iraq was trying to procure ________________________ and technical equipment. One HUMINT report mentioned that Iraq had not decided on a supplier for ________________________ for the UAV, and ________________________ reports discussed Iraqi attempts to procure several items including equipment that could be used in an airborne surveillance system. The USAF told Committee staff that Iraq’s interest in acquiring this equipment suggested that the UAVs were intended to be used for reconnaissance, but the CIA told Committee staff that
technical equipment could also be used for targeting purposes in UAVs intended for BW delivery.

(U) While the USAF was the only agency to discuss a potential mission for the UAVs other than CBW delivery, analysts from other agencies told Committee staff that they also believed Iraq’s UAVs were being developed for missions other than CBW. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Iraq UAV analyst told Committee staff that he agreed with the USAF’s footnote that the small UAVs could be used for BW delivery, but were primarily intended for other missions. When asked why he did not join the footnote, the analyst said, “its probably an example of the speed of the [NIE] process… And [the Air Force] had footnoted it. So it was out there.”

(U) DIA analysts told Committee staff that they believed Iraq’s UAVs had missions other than CBW delivery and agreed with the USAF that the small UAVs were primarily being developed for reconnaissance. The DIA, however, told Committee staff that they did not join the USAF footnote in the NIE because the body of the NIE never said that the small UAVs were intended primarily to deliver BW. The body of the NIE said only that the IC was concerned about Iraq’s development of UAVs because Iraq had “configured small UAVs” in the past for biological agent delivery. The DIA agreed with the statements in the body of the NIE and, therefore, believed a footnote would have been unnecessary.

(U) CIA analysts told Committee staff they also believed that the UAVs had missions other than CBW delivery. One CIA UAV analyst told Committee staff that, “some of Iraq’s UAVs were in fact developed for reconnaissance and as aerial targets,” and another analyst said, “our position was not that every single UAV the Iraqis were producing was for CBW delivery.” In line with this position, a 2001 intelligence assessment from the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) titled Iraq’s L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces did include discussion of other possible missions for the L-29 to include conventional weapons delivery, operation as an electronic intelligence (ELINT) platform, and reconnaissance missions. CIA analysts told Committee staff that “in retrospect” they did not believe that CIA’s assessments about the UAVs were accurately represented because the NIE did not address the reconnaissance mission.

(U) In a written response to a question from the Committee about the IC’s analysis of Iraq’s UAVs, the CIA told the Committee that, “the role of UAVs as CBW delivery systems was emphasized over their role as reconnaissance vehicles and aerial targets in the NIE assessment, as
the focus of the NIE was WMD delivery systems and not the Iraqi UAV program as a whole. We assessed that most Iraqi UAVs were designed as aerial targets and for reconnaissance missions, but those roles fell outside the scope of the Iraq WMD NIE.”

Of note, in November 2002, the NIC produced an NIE on Nontraditional Threats to the U.S. Homeland Through 2007, which did discuss other possible missions for the UAVs, although Iraqi UAVs also were not the primary focus of this intelligence assessment. The NIE said that Iraq may be modifying UAVs to deliver CBW agents, but said “[technical equipment] and other equipment being sought for this program will enable the UAVs to be employed for reconnaissance and, if the UAV is to be used as a CBW delivery vehicle, for targeting.” The USAF also included a footnote in this NIE, and this time was joined by the DIA, because the body of this NIE assessed that the UAVs may be being modified for CBW delivery. The footnote said the DIA, the USAF and the Army agreed that

“BW delivery is an inherent capability of most UAVs and that Iraq may choose to exploit this capability, but they note that the evidence is unconfirmed and is not sufficiently compelling to indicate the Iraqis have done so. There is information, however, on procurements that indicate a reconnaissance mission for the UAV program is more likely.”

G. Using UAVs to Target the U.S.

The assessment that Iraq’s UAVs could threaten the U.S. homeland if brought close to, or into, the U.S., was an analytical judgment, that Iraq’s small UAV had a capability to fly more than 500 km, and could be launched from the back of a truck, which made bringing a small UAV into or close to the U.S. homeland possible. Another intelligence report indicated that Iraq might launch small UAVs from boats, raising the IC’s concern that Iraq could bring a small UAV close to the U.S. homeland. The only intelligence reporting that demonstrated any possibility that Iraq may have intended to use the UAV’s to attack targets within the U.S was reporting that Iraq was trying to procure U.S. mapping software for its small UAVs. The NIE said the procurement effort, “strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States.”

The IC first learned that Iraq was interested in procuring the mapping software in the summer of 2001. Iraq was seeking information on various UAV components.
including for Mapping software. The software provides the user with a route planning capability overlaid on a geographic database, but is only usable for route planning in the U.S. Iraq's interest in the software did not garner significant attention from the IC until May 2002, when additional information that attempting to purchase the UAV components and the mapping software. Considered this information to be very sensitive, it did not disseminate an intelligence report to the IC on the procurement attempt, but it did notify CIA analysts about the information. CIA analysts told Committee staff that analysts from other intelligence agencies were not notified.

A CIA analyst told Committee staff that in the July to August 2002 time frame, The CIA conveyed the information to the other agency analysts on the telephone. The analysts told Committee staff that they had been unaware of the information until they received the CIA's telephone call.

NAIC and USAF analysts told Committee staff that at the time they knew enough about the mapping software to know that it is readily available with route planning software. They said they were not very concerned that Iraq was trying to procure the mapping software to target the U.S., because they did not believe that the UAVs were intended for CBW delivery use and, therefore, Iraq would have no need to use the UAVs in the U.S.

In August 2002, the CIA began to obtain additional information through a foreign government service about the Iraqi had been attempting to procure autopilots for Iraq's UAVs that the mapping software was offered with the autopilots.
This information was conveyed to CIA analysts at the time the NIE was being coordinated, but DO did not disseminate the information to other intelligence agencies outlining these issues about the mapping software in an intelligence report until November 18, 2002, almost two months after coordinating the NIE.

The CIA analysts told Committee staff that when the NIE was being coordinated, they were confronted with two possible explanations for Iraq’s attempt to procure mapping software: 1) that Iraq was attempting to obtain a mapping capability of the U.S., or 2) that it was a mistake who did not know what he was buying. Committee staff asked the CIA analysts why they assessed in the NIE that the mapping software procurement attempt “strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAV’s for missions targeting the United States,” when they knew that this was only one of two possibilities. CIA analysts told Committee staff that on the day of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) meeting, one of their analysts suggested to supervisor that the word “strongly” be removed from the NIE based on the new information that had come from a foreign government service. The analyst’s supervisor passed her comments on to the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, but the NIO did not receive the comments until he returned from the NFIB meeting where the NIE language had been approved. The NIO told Committee staff that he did raise the issue with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) after the meeting, but they decided to keep the language that had been approved believing that a bullet which said, “We are attempting to collect additional information regarding the intent of this procurement effort” addressed the analyst’s concerns.
The DCI told Committee staff that the context of this issue had been the subject of his personal attention. UAVs recently-produced by the Iraqis could either be used for reconnaissance or to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and that Saddam could use UAVs for BW delivery against targets. The DCI said: "Not good enough for me after the NFIB is closed and the state of my knowledge and all the things we'd been following with this case.” The DCI also noted that the NIE text was modified from “at least some of these UAVs are destined for missions targeted against America” to “Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States.”

In January 2003, the NIC disseminated an NIE on Nontraditional Threats to the U.S. Homeland Through 2007. The majority IC position was modified in this NIE to say that the software “could support programming of a UAV autopilot for operation in the United States.” By this time, agencies other than CIA had access to the intelligence report which said the Iraqi may have ordered the U.S. mapping software unintentionally. Based on the new information, the DIA, the USAF, and the Army all chose to include a footnote noting that they interpreted “recent reporting to mean that the purpose of the Iraqi request for route planning software and topographic database was to acquire a generic mapping capability – a goal that is not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the U.S. Homeland.”

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I. Explaining Uncertainties

(U) The NIE provided a “text box” that listed the IC’s “confidence levels for selected key judgements in this estimate.” The NIE’s key judgements were broken down into three categories of high, moderate and low confidence. Assessments related to Iraq’s delivery capabilities listed under the “High Confidence” heading were:

- “Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.”

- “We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.”

- “Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.”

(U) There were no assessments of Iraq’s delivery capabilities listed under the “Moderate Confidence” or “Low Confidence” headings.
J. Intelligence Agencies’ Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication of the NIE

(U) Analysis from individual intelligence agencies on Iraq’s missile programs was consistent between agencies and consistent with the Community products discussed earlier in this report. Committee staff, therefore, focused the discussion of individual agencies’ analysis on UAVs.

(■■■) As early as 1998, the CIA began reporting on a possible CBW delivery mission for Iraq’s UAVs and the possibility that Iraq was developing some UAVs, specifically the L-29, primarily for the BW delivery mission. In January 1998, the CIA and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)\(^\text{29}\) wrote a joint intelligence report, *Possible Iraqi Development of UAV for CBW Delivery*, in which the agencies discussed the possibility of delivery of BW agent from an Iraqi modified L-29 UAV. This report stated, “according to [ ], Iraq had developed UAVs specifically for the delivery of chemical and biological agents.” The report also mentions that Iraq had acquired or developed UAVs since the early to mid-1980s for air defense training, reconnaissance, or decoy missions.

(U) In March 1999, a second joint CIA and NIMA intelligence report, *Iraq: Final Development of Al Bai‘aa L-29 UAV as Possible CBW Delivery System*, stated, “intelligence reporting suggests that the (L-29) system may be intended for chemical or biological warfare agent delivery against U.S. military forces.” The report did not mention other possible missions for the UAVs. In June 2001, WINPAC published an intelligence assessment, *Iraq’s L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces*, which also discussed the possible threat posed by L-29s capable of delivering BW. As with the 1998 report, this assessment mentioned other possible missions for the L-29 including reconnaissance, communications monitoring, and conventional weapons delivery, although it judged that those missions were secondary to a CBW delivery role.

(U) Prior to 2002, the DIA’s finished intelligence products also discussed possible unconventional missions for Iraq’s UAVs. In May 2000, the defense intelligence assessment, *Iraq’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities*, noted that Iraq had made great progress in converting the L-29s into UAVs “possibly for biological agent delivery.” The assessment cautioned that “a definitive link between the L-29 and the Iraqi biological warfare program has yet to be established, but L-

\(^{29}\) NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

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29 aircraft could serve as line-source aerial delivery platforms to disseminate biological agents.” The report did not discuss other possible missions for the UAVs.

(U) In a February 2000 Military Intelligence Digest (MID) article, Iraq: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, the DIA assessed that “the L-29 program—probably a test bed for more advanced UAVs—has been indirectly associated with Iraq’s biological warfare program and could pose a threat to allied forces in the Persian Gulf.” The MID also noted that “Baghdad reportedly is considering several other missions for the L-29: electronic countermeasures (using the L-29 to fly electronic jammers or decoys); photographic or signals reconnaissance; communications relay to distant nodes; air defense (using the L-29 to draw Western fighters into areas covered by Iraqi air defense systems.)”

(U) The NAIC’s analysts assessed that the L-29 UAV would have been well-suited by range and payload to carry CBW agents; however, they did not believe the Iraqis had successfully completed development of the L-29 for this mission. In a March 1999 Defense Intelligence Reference Document, Iraq L-29 UAV Conversion, NAIC wrote, “possible mission applications for the L-29 UAV could include use as an aerial target, reconnaissance UAV, airborne jammer or electronic intelligence (ELINT) collector, conventional explosive delivery vehicle, test bed for development of other UAV flight systems, or as a possible delivery system for chemical or biological agents.” In this report, NAIC stated that the immediate objective of Iraq’s L-29 program was to develop the technology necessary to produce UAVs that could be used as a threat vehicle.

(U) The NAIC also briefed a slide presentation to DoD officials from August through October 2002. The presentation outlined NAIC’s view that Iraq’s L-29 UAVs were not operational and that the small UAVs were designed to carry cameras, jammers, and other equipment that suggested the UAVs were intended for battlefield reconnaissance.

(U) INR told the Committee they did not publish any intelligence products specifically on Iraq’s UAVs prior to publication of the NIE.

(U) None of the finished intelligence assessments provided to the Committee from any of the intelligence agencies discussed the reporting about Iraq’s attempts to acquire mapping software for its UAV program.
K. Delivery Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 65. The Intelligence Community assessment that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles was reasonable based on the information provided to the Committee. The estimate that Iraq retained “up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles,” was clearly explained in the body of the National Intelligence Estimate to be an assessment based “on no direct evidence” and was explained in the key judgments to be based on “gaps in Iraqi accounting to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).”

(U) Conclusion 66. The assessments that Iraq was in the final stages of development of the al Samoud missile, may be preparing to deploy the al Samoud and was deploying the al Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range ballistic missile, both which exceed the 150-km United Nations range limit, evolved in a logical progression over time, had a clear foundation in the intelligence reporting, and were reasonable judgments based on the intelligence available to the Committee.
(U) Conclusion 67. The assessment that Iraq was developing medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities was a reasonable judgment based on the intelligence provided to the Committee.

(U) Conclusion 68. The Intelligence Community assessment in the key judgments section of the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents" overstated both what was known about the mission of Iraq's small UAVs and what intelligence analysts judged about the likely mission of Iraq's small UAVs. The Air Force footnote which indicated that biological weapons (BW) delivery was a possible, though unlikely, mission more accurately reflected the body of intelligence reporting.
(U) Conclusion 69. Other than the Air Force’s dissenting footnote, the Intelligence Community failed to discuss possible conventional missions for Iraq’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) which were clearly noted in the intelligence reporting and which most analysts believed were the UAV’s primary missions.

(U) Conclusion 70. The Intelligence Community’s assessment that Iraq’s procurement of United States specific mapping software for its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) “strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States” was not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
(U) Conclusion 71. The Central Intelligence Agency's failure to share all of the intelligence reporting regarding Iraq's attempts to acquire United States mapping software with other Intelligence Community agencies left those analysts with an incomplete understanding of the issue. This lack of information sharing may have led some analysts to agree to a position that they otherwise would not have supported.