APPENDIX A

(1) We provide specific comments below, in the form of a scorecard. We flag the draft’s strengths as well as weaknesses. This scorecard is pegged to analytic merit, not persuasive power. On a range from one to five starts (asterisks), five denotes a smoking gun in terms of UN SCR 687-prohibited weapon systems. One star denotes a claim we do not consider strong, but which is plausible. A bifurcated score (e.g., “***/WEAK”) indicates that parts of the discussion are strong, other parts weak.

Introduction

-- Page 1-2. ***** Discussion of historical, outstanding issues and Iraq’s track record of noncompliance, deception, and denial. There is further discussion at the beginning of the biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile sections. These discussions might be expanded.

Iraq Deception and Denial

-- 4-5. ***/WEAK. Intercepted conversation of re hiding vehicle from inspectors. Weak re [redacted] virtually conclusive re hiding prohibited vehicle, presumably involving OFF violation. But it demonstrates Iraq’s continuing proclivity to hide proscribed equipment from inspectors--reinforcing our concerns about hidden WMD.

-- 6-7. * Information on Higher Committee: Generally valid, even though we don’t take the source’s every claim as Gospel, and the insider’s information is very general.

-- 7, last bullet. * Information from senior official in [redacted] Okay.

-- 8, first bullet. *** Orders to hide correspondence with OMI: Highly compelling, even though the high-level orders apparently cover sensitive materials not exclusive to WMD.

-- 8, second bullet. WEAK. Quasay order to remove prohibited items from palaces.

-- 8, third bullet. *** Multiple humint reports of hiding prohibited items in various homes. Compelling, even though some reports appear based on rumor and/or circular reporting, and the hidden items presumably include sensitive non-WMD documents as well as WMD items.

-- 8, last bullet. WEAK. Sensitive files being driven around in cars, in apparent shell game. Plausibility open to question.

- 423 -
-- 9, first bullet. * Computer hard drives reportedly removed from "weapons facilities." Such claims are highly credible, even though they apparently extend to non-WMD sensitive files as well. (Note: Draft states claim as fact.)

-- 9, second bullet. WEAK. Plans to hide WMD in __________. We cannot rule this out, but virtually all of the many reports come from questionable sources. Also, inspectors may have already investigated one or more such reports and found nothing.

-- 9, last bullet. WEAK. Missiles with biological warheads reportedly dispersed. This would be somewhat true in terms of short-range missiles with conventional warheads, but is questionable in terms of longer-range missiles or biological warheads.

-- 10, first bullet. * Missiles hidden __________. Authenticity of information is questionable, but claim is not implausible.

**Chemical Weapons**

-- 10-11. ***/WEAK. We support much of this discussion, but we note that decontamination vehicles--cited several times in the text--are water trucks that can have legitimate uses. A safer characterization is, "a vehicle used for chemical weapon decontamination."

-- 11. **/WEAK We agree there has been suspicious activity __________, including presence of a decontamination vehicle. We caution, however, that Iraq has given UNMOVIC what may be a plausible account for this activity--that this was an exercise involving the movement of conventional explosives; presence of a fire safety truck (water truck, which could also be used as a decontamination vehicle) is common in such an event.

-- 12, top. **/WEAK. Much of discussion is valid, but it is unlikely the Iraqis __________. This paragraph really should describe __________.

-- __________. Authenticity of information is questionable, though some of the claims are plausible. Nuclear claims are WEAK, and open to IAEA criticism. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

**Thwarting Interviews**

-- 13-14. *** Discussion is good and valid.

-- 14, last bullet. **/WEAK. Iraqi intelligence officials posing as WMD scientists. Such claims are not credible and are open to criticism, particularly by the UN inspectorates. (Interviews typically involve such topics as nuclear physics, microbiology, rocket science, and the like; and inspectors tend to be leading scientific or technical experts.) Better to state that some Iraqi intelligence officials have been part of WMD programs for we are not sure. An alternative might be: "Some 38% of WMD scientists reside in __________."
years, filling scientific positions.

-- 15, first half. * Saddam reportedly warned scientists of serious consequences if they revealed sensitive information to inspectors. Not clear the information is authentic, but it is generally credible. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 15, penultimate bullet. * WMD scientists reportedly attended pre-inspection training. Unsubstantiated but credible. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 15, last bullet. WEAK. Claim of intelligence officials posing as WMD experts. Aside from the question of plausibility, note that such claims arguably are at odds with the above-cited report of pre-inspection training by WMD personnel.

-- 16, first bullet. * Claim that intelligence agents posed Unsubstantiated, but plausible. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 16, second bullet. WEAK. Alleged false death certificate for scientist. Not implausible, but UN inspectors might question it. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 16, third bullet. * Iraqi regime prepared to execute key scientists to prevent disclosure of sensitive information. Unsubstantiated, but plausible--at least to the point where a suspiciously high number of scientists start dropping off.

-- 16, bullets four and five. WEAK. WMD personnel leaving Iraq under various circumstances to avoid interviews. Some details are highly questionable, and this reporting is arguably at odds with other claims in the draft.

-- 16-17. WEAK. Experts at one facility being substituted by workers from other facilities. Plausibility open to question.

-- 17, first full bullet. * Some officials reportedly We question report’s authenticity, but it is not implausible.

-- 17, second bullet. WEAK. 12 experts reportedly under house arrest, 70 others in prison, to prevent contact with inspectors. Highly questionable.

-- 17, third bullet. * Unidentified scientist reportedly held by authorities to prevent contact with inspectors; family threatened. We question report’s authenticity, but it is plausible.

Illegal Procurement of WMD-Related Goods
Biological Weapons

22-23. ***** We endorse the discussion of outstanding, historical issues. We suggest adding that “UNSCOM reported in 1997 that a panel of 13 experts from member states unanimously found that ‘the outstanding problems’ in Iraq’s BW declarations were numerous and grave.” (Quoted from recent CIA product.)

-- 25, first full para. *** Discussion of MIG-21 and BW delivery. We share the strong concern about Iraqi intentions for recently refurbished MIG-21s for BW purposes. However, the claim that experts agree UAVs fitted with spray tanks are “an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons” is WEAK.

-- 26 - The date of the accident asked for in the text is 1998.

-- 29, end of middle para. ****/WEAK. Smallpox indeed is a great concern: We believe there is an even chance smallpox is part of Iraq’s offensive BW inventory. But there is no solid evidence Iraq has researched smallpox for weaponization purposes.

-- 31, third bullet. ***/WEAK. This is a legitimately serious issue, but “marks on his arm” is not compelling and should be deleted; or the text should read, “UN inspectors acquired a photograph of one of the prisoners that showed biological experimentation.”

-- Page 32, last para. **/WEAK. Most of the discussion is valid, but the reference to “central” as part of Iraq’s battlefield strategy should be deleted. The use of CW was small, but not inconsequential, in comparison to the many strictly conventional attacks that claimed thousands more lives.

-- Page 34, second bullet. ***/WEAK. The text in fact should be strengthened, by deleting the word “laboratory” from the first bullet. This will strengthen our concerns about equipment being used for production.
Nuclear Weapons

-- 39-40. **** We support the focus on Saddam’s continued intent/ambition to acquire nuclear weapons; track record of deception, denial. We would add that the nuclear-weapon program has always been the jewel in the crown for Saddam.

-- 40. ****/WEAK. We support the focus on Iraq’s record in the early-to-mid 1990s of deceiving the IAEA. But most of the discussion is overstated, in our opinion, especially the suggestion that only a single defector stood in the way of an IAEA clean bill of health for Iraq.

-- 41. **/WEAK. We concur with some of the discussion of Iraq’s nuclear-weapon status.

-- 41-42. **/WEAK. On the tubes, in addition to our general remarks above, we suggest not playing the cited intercept, as it is taken out of context and is highly misleading. Meantime, we will work with our IC colleagues to fix some more egregious errors in the tubes discussion.

-- 43-44. **/WEAK. While the discussion of magnet procurements is largely valid. Nonetheless, this discussion tracks with the majority IC view.

-- 44. ***/WEAK. We support the focus on the fact that Saddam’s cadre of nuclear experts remains largely intact. However, some specific claims are WEAK, namely that many key scientists and equipment were “often hidden” and the suggestion that Iraq moved and renamed teams of personnel.

-- 45, last para. */WEAK. While we too are concerned about Saddam’s periodic meetings with nuclear personnel, we have a more mixed interpretation as to motive.
Delivery Systems

-- 47, first full para. **WEAK.** Linkage of specialty trucks to Scuds is unsubstantiated.

-- 47, middle of page. **WEAK.** Reports of missiles being transported on trucks, or moved into southern Iraq at night, come from questionable sources, in our view.

-- 48. ***/WEAK.** We support much of the discussion of al-Samouds. For the record, however, we question the claim that Iraq has developed an al-Samoud with a 300 km range. We believe it might be a garbled reference to the wider-diameter, al-Samoud II variant.

-- 49, top of page. ***/WEAK.** We agree the reporting on clandestine work on the Scud-type engine is compelling, though it is unproven and, in our view, at odds with other compelling humint. (Note: The draft states it as fact.)

-- 49, bottom. ***/WEAK.** While we agree that Iraqi contacts with North Korea are worrisome, we believe the discussion overstates the evidence of any missile link.

-- 50, first full para. *****/WEAK.** We agree that the evidence suggests work on large-diameter motor cases, though we do not believe the evidence is necessarily conclusive, contrary to what the draft suggests. (The intercepts are hardly straightforward.)

Page 55, bottom. ***/WEAK.** While we agree with much of the discussion, we are unconvinced that "...all the bad actors and terrorists who could come through Baghdad and pick-up biological weapons..." is a likely scenario unless Saddam’s regime is about to fall.

---

ii [State | WashDC 022561 | 199802071709 | (U)]
APPENDIX B

(Passed to INR Front Office, February 3, 2003; a final version was delivered to S staff.)

[Redacted] The draft we saw today at CIA is vastly improved over Friday's draft, and many or most of the incorrect or dubious claims have been removed. Earlier today, we flagged for the drafters some remaining problems that were relatively important, the drafters subsequently fixed most, but not all, of these.

[Redacted] What follows are the remaining points (in order of appearance) we find most problematic:

-- Numerous references to humint as fact. (E.g., "We know that...") We have been told that some are being adjusted, but we gather some others—such as information involving multiple-corroboration—will stay (e.g., page 7, third full para). In the Iraq context, "multiple corroboration" hardly guarantees authenticity of information.

-- Page 2, missile intercept transcript: We learned that for source/methods reasons, the officials associated with the hidden, "modified vehicle" are no longer identified as personnel, and are linked to the elite Republican Guard.

We are somewhat uncomfortable because this new, redacted text leans further toward longer-range missile equipment, whereas the actual evidence points more toward SAM equipment—even though the al-Kindi establishment, to which the vehicle is linked, has at least historically been engaged in longer-range missile work.

-- Page 4, last bullet, re key files being driven around in cars to avoid inspectors. This claim is highly questionable and promises to be targeted by critics and possibly UN inspection officials as well.

-- Page 5, first para, claim re missile brigade dispersing rocket launchers and BW warheads. This claim too is highly questionable and might be subjected to criticism by UN inspection officials.

-- Page 15, top, re nuclear acquisition timeline. We understand that the first sentence—about a UN assessment that Iraq "could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993" had the Gulf War not intervened—is being changed to reflect that this was a US, not UN assessment. We do not object to the proposed new version, as long as it is understood that this involved a "Crash Program" scenario in which Iran diverted IAFA-safeguarded, foreign-supplied highly enriched uranium, or HEU...
understands that the 1993 timeline involves diverted, foreign-supplied HEU. After all, the USG’s own assessed Iraqi timeline for indigenous bomb development was “five to seven years,” and that the Crash Program scenario is no longer viable, as all highly enriched uranium has been removed from Iraq.

-- Page 6, aluminum-tube discussion: The good news is we believe the text is far better than the “Friday version.” Our key remaining concern is the claim that the tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that “far exceeds US requirements for comparable rockets.” In fact, the most comparable US system is a tactical rocket—the US Mark 66 air-launched 70mm rocket—that uses the same, high-grade (7075-T6) aluminum, and that has specifications with similar tolerances. Note that the Mk 66 specifications are unclassified, and the Department is planning to share them with the IAEA.

We understand CIA now argues that a comparable US system is an Astros multiple-launcher rocket, said to have much looser tolerances. We believe this system is less comparable, for at least two reasons: 1) The Astros does not involve high-strength aluminum; and 2) the Iraqi rocket in question, the Nasser 81 MLR, was reverse-engineered from an Italian air-launched rocket, not an MLR system.

That said, it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the Nasser 81’s tolerances are suspiciously tight.

-- Page 17, bottom: “We know that Iraq has produced large-diameter . . . .” We have sigint information that is highly suggestive, but not necessarily conclusive. (Even a key WINPAC missile analyst agrees.) INR could live with something along the lines of, “We are quite certain that…”

Finally, one unsolicited suggestion for your consideration: After the description of Blix’s remarks, one could transition into the discussion of recent activities by saying something like: “We know Iraq is still lying on these outstanding issues, so why should we trust Iraq’s claims about lack of recent prohibited activity?”
GLOSSARY

7075-T6 aluminum: A very high strength aluminum alloy.

al Husayn: An Iraqi-produced variant of the Scud missile.

Annex III to UNSCR 687 and 707: An addendum to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707 which outlines a list of nuclear and nuclear-related items, equipment, software, related technology, and other materials considered to be designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material (i.e., items for use exclusively in nuclear activities, whether military or civilian). These items are either prohibited to Iraq or are subject to certain controls; including reporting to the International Atomic Energy Agency, by Iraq and by any state exporting such items to Iraq.

Anodize: To coat a metallic surface with a protective coating.

Atropine: A nerve agent antidote.

Beams gas centrifuge: Centrifuge developed by Dr. Jesse W. Beams (a founder of the U.S. gas centrifuge program).

Biological weapons agent: A dangerous biological pathogen. The agent must still be weaponized in order to be effectively delivered to the intended target.

Carbon fiber composite: A group of fibrous materials made of carbon that is one of the strongest and stiffest reinforcements available; used in high performance applications that require high specific strength and or stiffness.

Centrifuge: A rapidly rotating cylinder that can be used for the enrichment of uranium. The spinning cylinder concentrates the heavier isotope (U-238) of the uranium hexafluoride gas along the cylinder’s wall, while the lighter isotope (U-235 - enriched uranium) concentrates at the center of the cylinder where it can be drawn off separately.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centrifuge rotor:</td>
<td>A thin-walled vertical cylinder made from a strong material which rotates at very high speeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrifuge cascade:</td>
<td>A number of centrifuges connected in series used to obtain highly enriched uranium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromic acid:</td>
<td>A powerful oxidizing agent used to anodize metals and alloys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclosarin/GF:</td>
<td>A chemical warfare nerve agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense contingency product:</td>
<td>A DIA finished intelligence product intended to support a specific contingency, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Reference Document:</td>
<td>Analytic reports produced by the DIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive biological warfare program:</td>
<td>Effort to produce methods of protecting personnel from biological weapons, such as vaccines, antibiotics and protective clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Fox:</td>
<td>Codename for a series of air-strikes launched following the departure of United Nations weapons inspectors in 1998. The goal was to degrade Saddam Hussein’s ability to make and use WMD and proscribed missiles, diminish his ability to wage war against his neighbors, and demonstrate the consequences of violating international obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drone:</td>
<td>A pilotless aircraft operated by remote control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-use:</td>
<td>Indicating potential use in both military and civilian applications. Examples include a fermenter that is useful for both making vaccines and biological warfare agents; or a chlorine supply which can be used to help purify water supplies or produce chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic jammer:</td>
<td>Any active transmission device intended to disrupt enemy radio frequency signals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS): A process of uranium enrichment in which ions, accelerated through a vacuum in a magnetic field separate into different trajectories based on the ion’s mass and charge. Can be used to enrich uranium.

Endemic: The constant presence of a disease or infectious agent within a given geographic area.

Enriched uranium: Uranium which has been processed such that it contains a higher percentage of fissile uranium isotopes (mostly U-235) than is found in natural uranium ores.

Executive Dissem: A CIA Directorate of Operations report with limited distribution.

Fissile material: Material capable of being split by a low-energy neutron and, therefore, readily usable for the core of a nuclear weapon. The most common fissile materials used in the production of nuclear weapons are Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239.

Gas centrifuge process: A uranium enrichment process in which a feed of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas is enriched in a rapidly rotating cylinder. Each stage of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant consists of many gas centrifuge rotors.

Gas centrifuge rotors: A long, thin vertical cylinder made from strong material (aluminum, maraging steel, or graphite fiber) which rotates at high speeds about its axis.

Gaseous diffusion: A process for enriching uranium in which a feed of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas is compressed and flows through a cascade of compressors, heat exchangers, and a diffuser that houses membranes. Some of the gas molecules contain U-235 (enriched uranium), others contain U-238 (depleted uranium). The molecules with U-235 pass preferentially through the membrane micropores to form an enriched product.

Geiger counter: Radiation detection equipment.
High-speed balancing machine: A machine that spins component parts to high-rates of rotation and measures the amount and phase of imbalance on the part. It is used to test components for vibration or to correct imbalanced components.

Hoop-stress: The circumferential stress in a cylindrical form subjected to internal or external pressure.

Hydrostatic testing: Pressure tests used to test structural integrity. Often used to test the strength of missile airframes.

INTELINK: The Top Secret classified Intelligence Community intranet.

Magnetic suspension: Provides magnetic support for rotors. Often used in high-speed applications to reduce friction.

Manhattan Project: Code name for the U.S. effort to build an atomic bomb during World War II.

Maraging steel: A type of steel or iron-based alloy that is harder than normal steel and is strengthened by a process of martensitic transformation; used in electro-mechanical components where ultra-high strength is required.

Mobile erector launcher: A type of missile launcher that requires a separate towing vehicle; typical configuration is the missile erector launcher on flat-bed trailer.

Mujaheddin: A para-military force of Muslim guerilla warriors engaged in a jihad, or holy war.

Mustard agent: A chemical warfare blister agent.

Nerve agent: A family of chemical warfare agents which attack the nervous system.

Nodong: A North Korean medium-range ballistic missile.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Group of nuclear suppliers that seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, both dual-use and specially designed and prepared equipment.
Offensive biological warfare program: Effort to produce BW agents for delivery with the intent of killing or incapacitating.

Oil For Food Program: Established under UNSCR 986; allowed Iraq to sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods.

Ombudsman: An organizational appointee who investigates complaints by individuals against the organization.

Oxidizer: A substance that oxidizes another substance.

Phenol: A caustic, poisonous white soluble crystalline compound derived from benzene and used in resins, disinfectants, plastics, and pharmaceuticals; poisonous if taken internally.

SA-2: A common surface-to-air missile system.

Sarin: A highly toxic chemical nerve agent.

Simulant: A usually benign substance with similar properties as chemical and/or biological warfare agents used in lieu of the actual agents. Often used to test weapons delivery systems.

Telemetry: The science and technology of automatic data measurement and transmission, as by wire or radio, from remote sources, such as space vehicles, to a receiving station for recording and analysis.

Tensile strength: The maximum amount of tensile stress or tension that can be applied to a metal before it ceases to be elastic. If too much force is applied the material will break, become plastic, or be unable to go back to its initial shape.

U-2: Reconnaissance plane that is an intelligence collection platform.

Uranium hexafluoride (UF6): A gas used in the uranium enrichment process.

Urenco: Name for the European consortium that developed the centrifuge process of uranium enrichment.
Wahhabi: Fundamentalist movement of the Sunni form of Islam.

Weaponization: Taking biological or chemical warfare agent and placing it in an effective delivery system, such as a spray tank system or artillery shell.

Yellowcake: A yellow or brown powder produced from naturally occurring uranium minerals as a result of milling uranium ore or processing uranium-bearing solutions; uranium oxide.

Yield strength: Stress that causes plastic deformation.

Zippe centrifuge: Type of gas centrifuge designed by German scientist Dr. Gernot Zippe. This centrifuge design has influenced all gas centrifuge designs.
ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADCI</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Central Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCI/C</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDI</td>
<td>Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Arab Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANO</td>
<td>Abu Nidal Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Biological weapon(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBW</td>
<td>Chemical and biological weapon(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDC</td>
<td>Collection Concepts Development Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>CIA’s Directorate of Operations Counterproliferation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counterterrorist Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical weapon(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;D</td>
<td>Denial and deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDCI</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Central Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDI</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>CIA’s Directorate of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIJ</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>electronic intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Electro-Magnetic Isotope Separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Cyclosarin (a type of nerve agent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GON</td>
<td>Government of Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly enriched uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPSCI</td>
<td>House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hz</td>
<td>Hertz (cycles per second)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEC</td>
<td>Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEO</td>
<td>Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td>Intelligence Community Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIS</td>
<td>Iraqi Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILS</td>
<td>CIA’s Intelligence Liaison Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVO</td>
<td>IAEA’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO/UNP</td>
<td>State Department’s Bureau of International Organizations, Office of United Nations Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>Iraq Survey Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAEIC</td>
<td>Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kg</td>
<td>KIlogram(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSM</td>
<td>Khalid Shaikh Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINT</td>
<td>Measurement and signature intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEK</td>
<td>Mujahedin-e Khalq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEL</td>
<td>Mobile erector and launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Digest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mm</td>
<td>Millimeter(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRL</td>
<td>Multiple rocket launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAIC</td>
<td>Air Force’s National Air Intelligence Center (former name for National Air and Space Intelligence Center [NASIC])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, biological and chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESA</td>
<td>CIA’s Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFIB</td>
<td>National Foreign Intelligence Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (new name for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGIC</td>
<td>National Ground Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAG</td>
<td>Nuclear Interdiction Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICB</td>
<td>National Intelligence Collection Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIH</td>
<td>National Institutes of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMA</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency (former name for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>National Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMJIC</td>
<td>National Military Joint Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>State Department’s Bureau of Nonproliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMI</td>
<td>Iraqi Organization for Military Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD-P</td>
<td>Office of the UnderSecretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Department of State’s Office of Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCTEG</td>
<td>Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDB</td>
<td>Presidential Daily Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP-GC</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Palestinian Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLF</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM/rpm</td>
<td>Rotations per minute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEIB</td>
<td>Senior Executive Intelligence Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIO</td>
<td>Senior Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCM</td>
<td>Sense of the Community Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPWR</td>
<td>Senior Publish When Ready (a CIA finished intelligence product)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCI</td>
<td>Senate Select Committee on Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEL</td>
<td>Transporter, erector, and launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIN</td>
<td>Technical intelligence note (a Department of Energy finished intelligence product)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBL</td>
<td>Usama bin Ladin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDMH</td>
<td>Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (a type of missile fuel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF6</td>
<td>Uranium hexafluoride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR 687</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution prohibiting Iraq from having WMD or proscribed missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR 707</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning Iraq for violating UNSCR 687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video teleconference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**VX**  O-ethyl S-(2-isopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonothiolate (a type of nerve agent)

**WINPAC**  Director of Central's Intelligence's Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control

**WMD**  Weapons of mass destruction