



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Honorable Pat Roberts
Chairman, Select Committee
on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I again thank you and the other members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for allowing me the opportunity to appear before your committee and address the many challenges to our national security. Defense intelligence is committed to supporting our military forces and national leaders as they face those challenges. I also extend my appreciation for the opportunity to highlight the contributions of the men and women working defense intelligence, who every day demonstrate their dedication to our mission.

I am forwarding the attached in response to your 10 April letter, forwarding questions for the record from my 11 February testimony before the Committee. We have provided unclassified responses whenever possible; however, there are issues that we cannot address properly in an unclassified response. I am forwarding responses to those questions under separate cover.

Please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Sal Ferro, DIA Office of Congressional Affairs at 703-697-5101, should you have any questions regarding this correspondence.

Sincerely,

L. E. Jacoby
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director

1 enclosure a/s

cc:
Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: The New Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)

QUESTION 1: In his recent State of the Union speech, President Bush announced that he has instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, working with the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). This new center will merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture. Please elaborate on how this new Center will function.

- a) How will it be managed, and what, if any, limitations will be put on the intelligence to be shared?
- b) When do you anticipate that this Center will be fully operational as envisioned?
- c) What additional resources will be needed to fund the FBI's contribution to this Center?
- d) Is there also a plan to move the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI and the DCI's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) into one building?
- e) To what extent were you consulted about the formation of this Center prior to the President's State of the Union speech?

ANSWER A-D: Recommend these questions be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence.

ANSWER E: I was not consulted as this was a cabinet level discussion.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Intelligence Community Information Sharing

QUESTION 2: As this committee learned through our Joint Inquiry, terrorist attacks, information sharing to enhance operations among intelligence agencies was inadequate. Please describe the progress made, and the problems that still exist, in sharing information between the various intelligence agencies.

ANSWER: Over the past 18 months, we have made significant progress in improving the sharing of intelligence across the key agencies of the Intelligence Community.

DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) has benefited greatly from the National Security Agency's (NSA) provision of previously limited dissemination intelligence and development of new capabilities to collect and report on important terrorist targets. The derived information has been appropriately shared. To achieve desired transparency in sensitive areas governed by provisions of USSID 18, JITF-CT has bridged the USSID 18 policy and governance seam by integrating analysts at NSA headquarters where they enjoy broader access to data and techniques not available at JITF-CT proper. NSA has reciprocated by integrating two senior representatives and an analyst with JITF-CT who is capable of directly accessing NSA data repositories and systems. This has measurably added to JITF-CT's threat assessment, warning and counterterrorism targeting capabilities. The latter capability has produced a series of JITF-CT supported special operations forces successes in the war against terrorism.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now shares with JITF-CT sensitive sections of the FBI Director's Daily Briefing Book on a daily basis and is increasingly responsive to JITF-CT's specific requirements for insight to the foreign terrorist threat in the United States. This insight to FBI investigative efforts on international and domestic terrorism cases is critically important to JITF-CT's effectively supporting USNORTHCOM and the Defense Department's Homeland Defense and force protection mission. JITF-CT has two liaison officers with FBI headquarters where they enjoy an increasingly collaborative and productive working relationship, including insight into FBI intelligence and information. Meaningful progress is being made toward achieving a seamless intelligence effort and shared perspectives on the totality of the terrorism threat abroad and in the United States.

JITF-CT relationships with the service intelligence organizations and the US Coast Guard (USCG) have never been better or more open and collaborative. Each military service and the USCG have embedded representatives and analysts in the JITF-CT engendering cooperation and close integration of effort in the CT mission. The

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USCG and the US Air Force in particular have made exceptional contributions in the form of integrated analytical personnel. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service has struck an agreement with the JITF-CT whereby its MTAC acts as a fully-integrated maritime component of the JITF-CT. The Office of Naval Intelligence is working toward a similar arrangement. US Army INSCOM continues to provide leading edge technology cooperation and unique capabilities that JITF-CT seeks to further exploit in support of its all source analysis and targeting mission. Progress in the integration of service intelligence capabilities and the sharing of intelligence across organizational lines is well on track.

Transparency and cooperation with CIA has progressed since September 11, 2001. The Agency has provided a high volume of HUMINT reporting across the terrorism spectrum, which is a major component of JITF-CT's ability to perform its all-source mission. The DCI has opened the way for JITF-CT senior leaders to attend his daily senior staff briefings on current issues and activity. This has provided heretofore unavailable insight into developing threats, collection strategies and aspects of operations. JITF-CT analysts are being integrated into CTC's terrorism targeting and operations elements, which promises to improve transparency and closer integration of CIA and DoD planning and counterterrorism operations cooperation. JITF-CT analysts are also working effectively and transparently with CIA field operations officers associated with DoD special operations elements. At the request of Director DIA, the DCI and the Director CTC have designated a Defense Senior Executive Service officer as a CTC Deputy for Defense Intelligence to better integrate and coordinate CTC and JITF-CT and other DoD intelligence efforts. This promises to pay mutually beneficial dividends in closer working relationships and intelligence sharing.

In summary, the effectiveness of JITF-CT as DoD's authoritative all source intelligence analysis center for the anti-terrorism and counterterrorism missions is entirely dependent on the fidelity, timeliness and quality of intelligence contributed by other key intelligence gathering agencies, namely CIA, FBI and NSA. Although not all intelligence transparency objectives have been achieved, intelligence sharing and collaboration has measurably improved and continues to do so.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Intelligence Community Support to the Department of
Homeland Security

QUESTION 3:

- a) To what extent have each of your organizations committed to providing intelligence analysts and other staff to the new Department of Homeland Security? How many employees have you committed, or anticipate committing, to the new Department? For how long will these employees be on loan to the Department?
- b) Have you determined the categories of information that you will be providing to the Department of Homeland Security without a specific request from Secretary Ridge? If so, what are they?
- c) How will your commitment to the Department of Homeland Security diminish your ability to focus on other Intelligence Community priorities?

ANSWER A: DIA has seven personnel detailed to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since March of 2003. We periodically review this staffing level and the workload. We will ensure appropriate support to DHS as it stands up operations.

ANSWER B: Through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System and other secure communications links, DIA provides DHS access to homeland security-related products, data bases, and reports generated or maintained by DIA.

ANSWER C: The impact of DIA's present level of support to DHS on our ability to focus on other IC priorities is manageable.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Afghanistan

QUESTION 4:

- a) How effectively is the Karzai regime dealing with the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida?
- b) Assuming the current level of international support for the Karzai regime, how long will it take for Afghanistan to become a democratic and economically viable state?
- c) What efforts are being taken to secure Afghanistan's borders and diminish that country's appeal as a safehaven for terrorists?
- d) To what extent is President Karzai committed to eradicating Afghanistan's opium crops?

ANSWER A: Karzai's regime has been moderately effective against the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. Karzai's April 22 meeting with Pakistani President Musharraf was part of a continuing effort to encourage Islamabad's efforts to improve security along the border to prevent opposition militant groups from launching attacks from Pakistani territory. These groups' continued access to Pakistani tribal areas allows them to operate with significant support from Pakistani Pashtuns and Islamic extremist groups.

President Karzai's response is his intensified efforts to win over low- to mid-level former Taliban with an amnesty offer. However, there is significant resistance to this plan from within his government, especially by former Northern Alliance members who distrust their former rivals.

The Karzai government also has engaged resurgent Taliban groups militarily, relying on the limited capabilities of allied militia forces and the fledgling Afghan National Army (ANA).

ANSWER B: We estimate that Afghanistan probably will require at least 10-15 years, since it historically has never been either fully democratic or economically viable.

ANSWER C: President Karzai is cooperating closely with Coalition forces to eliminate terrorists while, at the same time, building a security apparatus capable of effectively preventing the reemergence of an Afghan terrorist safe-haven. The Afghani government is working to expand the Afghan National Army (ANA), its principal arm for

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providing security. The ANA's capabilities are limited by its relatively small size; currently, there are only 9 battalions (4,500 men out of a planned 70,000).

In December, Kabul signed a Friendship Treaty with all six of its neighbors to further efforts to secure and coordinate border controls. Similarly, during his 22-23 April visit to Islamabad, Karzai and Pakistani President Musharraf agreed to establish a tripartite commission and to establish a hot-line "to coordinate border security concerns." The commission will focus on reduction of cross-border incursions by Afghan and Pakistani militants operating from safe havens in Pakistan. The Pakistani government is cooperating with Coalition efforts to interdict al-Qaida members and dedicated a substantial number of Army troops to the tribal areas along the border.

ANSWER D: President Karzai called for an immediate end to Afghan poppy cultivation. The poppy destruction program is conducted exclusively by Afghan forces. Poppy eradication is the cornerstone of President Karzai's long-term agenda to eliminate the Afghan drug trade; however, he is pragmatic enough to realize the impossibility of an immediate cessation.

Poppy eradication efforts began in late 2002, but there is no independent verification of the results. Karzai's use of Afghan forces in eradication efforts has a two-fold purpose: it reduces the areas under cultivation without involving coalition forces and pays the Afghan militias involved from internationally funded counter-drug programs.

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Program

QUESTION 5: Last year, DIA informed the Committee that: "[w]e judge that North Korea has produced one, possibly two nuclear weapons."

- a) Do you still believe this is the case?
- b) What changes have you observed in North Korea's nuclear weapon program since North Korea announced that it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
- c) What information do you have that North Korea has provided ballistic missile technology, weapons of mass destruction or other support to Iraq, al-Qa'ida or other terrorists groups?
- d) What is your assessment of North Korea's intention to flight test new or existing missile systems? What is the operational status of the Taepo Dong I as a surface-to-surface missile?

ANSWER A: Yes.

ANSWER B: North Korea expelled IAEA observers from its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and it has restarted operations of its 5MWe nuclear reactor. We cannot confirm North Korea's claims that it reprocessed nearly all of the nuclear fuel that was removed from this reactor around the time of the signing of the Agreed Framework. We do not have precise information on activities at Yongbyon, but North Korea's threat that additional plutonium for new weapons has been or will be removed from the used fuel is real.

ANSWER C: I cannot respond in this forum and I am forwarding a response separately.

ANSWER D: We continue to assess that Pyongyang may be ready to test the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2), perhaps as a space launch vehicle, and perhaps in another country, with little additional warning. A flight-test of a shorter range missile also is possible at anytime.

We have no information to suggest Pyongyang intends to deploy the Taepo Dong 1 (TD-1) as a surface-to-surface missile in North Korea. We believe instead that the vehicle was a test bed for multi-stage missile technologies.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Prospects for Instability in North Korea

QUESTION 6:

- a) What are the prospects for a coup or revolution in North Korea? What are the risks of such an event spilling over into a regional conflict as the competing interests of the U.S., South Korea and China come into conflict?
- b) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next 5 years? What is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process? Under what circumstances would a war be likely?
- c) How strong is Kim Jong-il's hold on power? Who will likely succeed him?
- d) How confident are you of your assessments considering the closed nature of North Korea?

ANSWER A: We have no indicators that the Kim regime is under threat of a coup. In the event of a coup or an attempt, the likelihood of it initiating regional conflict is small.

ANSWER B: The likelihood of North-South reunification within the next 5 years is low. Reunification, in any time frame is likely to be peaceful, but not necessarily orderly. Seoul is concerned about a catastrophic collapse of the North that would burden the South's economy and security framework. None of the parties see conflict as a way of resolving Peninsula issues, so any potential for war is in miscalculation. North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship poses the greater danger.

ANSWER C: Kim Chong-il's hold on power appears secure. We lack reliable insights into the internal dynamics of his regime, however successor(s) to Kim most likely would come from the military. There are no obvious successors.

ANSWER D: We have low confidence in our assessments of prospects for instability due to the closed nature of the regime and the corresponding lack of access to key power centers. We are more confident in our assessments of the North's military capabilities.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Prospects for War Between China and Taiwan

QUESTION 7:

- a) What is the likelihood that China will attempt an invasion of Taiwan in the next five years?
- b) What factors would lead Beijing to consider a military versus a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues?
- c) What is your current assessment of China's amphibious program and future invasion capabilities?
- d) How many missiles does China possess that could strike Taiwan, what is the destructive capability of this missile force, and what is Taiwan's retaliatory missile capability?
- e) To what extent have close U.S.-Taiwan relations been an obstacle to closer U.S.-China ties?

ANSWER A: It is unlikely that China will attempt an invasion of Taiwan in the next five years, unless provoked by a major domestic or Taiwan-related incident.

ANSWER B: The most commonly cited factors include: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei, foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs, Taiwan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and internal unrest on Taiwan. China's leaders also have indicated that indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue could be justification for the use of force.

ANSWER C: DIA assesses that the PLA will have a marginal capability to mount an invasion through the remainder of the decade. China has shortfalls in amphibious lift, interoperability of PLA forces, and a logistical system. In order for an invasion to succeed, Beijing would need to conduct a multi-faceted campaign, involving air assault, airborne insertion, special operations raids, amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations and conventional missile strikes. Nevertheless, the campaign likely would succeed – barring third-party intervention – if Beijing were willing to accept the political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs of such a course of action.

ANSWER D: The following lists China's missile capabilities:

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- China's CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs, with ranges of at least 600 km and 300 km respectively, provide it with a survivable and effective conventional strike force against Taiwan.
- China has approximately 450 SRBMs already in its deployed inventory; this number will increase by over 50 missiles per year for the next few years. The accuracy and lethality of this force are increasing through the use of satellite-aided guidance systems.
- All of China's known SRBM assets are believed to be based in the Nanjing Military Region opposite Taiwan. The number of conventional ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan is expected to increase substantially over the next several years.
- The People's Liberation Army is developing variants of the CSS-6 that could employ satellite-aided navigation to enable attacks against both Okinawa and Taiwan.

China's improving capabilities, especially the growing SRBM force in southeast China, will have the net effect of improving China's ability to interfere with the operations of U.S. forces in the region and to deny access to key ports, airfields, and other bases in the region.

Taiwan's present retaliatory capability consists primarily of fighter aircraft – its inventory of over 400 fighter aircraft includes more than 325 4th-generation fighters – and possibly special operations forces. To the best of our knowledge, Taiwan has no retaliatory missile capability. Taiwan appears to have a land-attack cruise missile research and development program, which may reach IOC by mid-decade. Rumors periodically surface of a ballistic missile program, but the reliability of this data is difficult to ascertain.

ANSWER E: Taiwan is the major obstacle to closer PRC ties with the United States. China believes that the increasingly close relations between the United States and Taiwan are a factor leading Taiwan toward independence. The PRC routinely criticizes U.S. military ties with Taiwan, particularly arms sales. Nevertheless, Beijing views a positive U.S.-China relationship as important to China's economic development, which tempers PRC reaction to U.S.-Taiwan relations.

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Sino-Japanese Relations

QUESTION 8:

- a) What is the likelihood that there will be an increase in tensions between China and Japan in the next five years?
- b) What are the main factors that influence this bilateral relationship?
- c) What factors could most exacerbate tensions in this relationship?

ANSWER A: The likelihood of increased tensions within the next five years is low; however, Chinese umbrage over Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, Japan's pursuit of independent defense capabilities and Japan's continuing ties with Taiwan are likely to provoke low-level friction.

ANSWER B: The main factors that influence the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship are Japan's desire to maintain economic and political influence with the countries in the region, Japan's World War II occupation, Japan's alliance with the United States, and China's growing diplomatic, economic and military capabilities. Expanding Chinese military capabilities will become a major factor in China's influence over the bilateral relationship if future relations are viewed in balance-of-power terms.

ANSWER C: The factors that could exacerbate tensions are growing nationalism in both countries, competition for economic investment and a territorial dispute. There is risk that one or both countries will turn to nationalist rhetoric to justify political and/or military actions. Both countries will continue to vie for economic investment, creating tensions particularly as some business practices could lead to charges of favoritism or cultural biases. The territorial dispute with potential for conflict is control over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Tai).

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Pakistan

QUESTION 9:

- a) What is your assessment of the stability of Pakistan's government?
- b) To what extent are Islamic fundamentalists influencing the government's policies on the War on Terrorism and U.S. relations?
- c) How helpful has Pakistan been in the War on Terrorism?
- d) What is the status and security of Pakistan's nuclear program?
- e) To what extent are you concerned that Islamic fundamentalist elements within Pakistan's government will provide nuclear weapon technology or assistance to al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups?
- f) What would Pakistan's likely reaction be to another Indian nuclear test?
- g) How would a U.S.-led war against Iraq impact the stability of Pakistan's government?

ANSWER A: We assess the Pakistani government to be stable. Assassination presents the greatest near-term threat of instability. We remain concerned, however, that a rise in Islamic extremism among the public and political parties could serve as a catalyst for a political crisis.

ANSWER B: Islamic fundamentalists and extremist groups moderately influence the government's policies on the War on Terrorism and U.S. relations.

Anti-US sentiment limits the government's ability to collaborate with the US. Anti-US sentiment in the tribal areas on the Afghan border complicates Pakistani military efforts to apprehend terrorists and to interdict movement across the Afghan border.

ANSWER C: Pakistan is a key supporter in the Global War on Terrorism. President Musharraf's government has made bold and courageous decisions to work with the international community to fight terrorism. The government of Pakistan has given strong and sustained support on counter-terrorism matters – the arrest of senior al-Qa'ida

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operatives such as Ramzi bin al Sheehb and Khaled Shaykh Mohammed are examples of Pakistan's key role in counter-terrorism efforts.

ANSWER D: Pakistan can monitor and account for its stockpile of nuclear weapons. We believe that Pakistan is taking appropriate protective measures, and Islamabad assures the US that its weapons are secure.

ANSWER E: We would be very concerned should Islamic extremists take control of Pakistan, since many extremists suggested during Operation Iraqi Freedom that Pakistan should provide nuclear devices to Iraq. We are confident that President Musharraf wouldn't provide nuclear weapons, fissile material, or technical assistance to al-Qa'ida. We are concerned, however, about the threat of an individual providing nuclear-related technology, since it is difficult for any government to prevent the unauthorized transfer of information. Islamabad already has arrested and interrogated scientists suspected of passing sensitive nuclear technology to al-Qa'ida.

ANSWER F: Islamabad would be under intense domestic pressure and likely would respond in kind with its own nuclear test.

ANSWER G: The war in Iraq did not appreciably affect the stability of the Pakistani government.

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Security of the Russian Nuclear Stockpile

QUESTION 10: Last year, the CIA informed the Committee that "Russian safeguards for its WMD arsenal are uneven despite some improvements made with U.S. assistance. We have no credible evidence that a Russian nuclear warhead has been lost or stolen. We remain concerned about corruption and the negative effect of the post-Soviet decline in military spending on personnel reliability and physical security."

- a) Is this still an accurate description of the security of the Russian nuclear stockpile?
- b) Have you received any information in the last year that indicates that terrorists have tried to acquire Russian nuclear material?

ANSWER A: Yes, we agree that there is a lack of credible evidence about the loss or theft of a Russian nuclear warhead. Russian safeguards are uneven.

ANSWER B: Yes, there were a few reports during the past year of terrorist attempts to acquire Russian nuclear material.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: The Challenges Facing Post-Saddam Iraq

QUESTION 11: Last year, the CIA told the Committee that: “[t]he nature of post-Saddam Iraq would depend on how and when Saddam left the scene, but any new regime in Baghdad would have to overcome significant obstacles to achieve stability. If Saddam and his inner circle are out of the picture and internal opponents of the regime band together, we assess that a centrist Sunni-led government would be pressed to accept an Iraqi state less centralized than Saddam’s. Iraq’s restive sectarian and ethnic groups, however, would probably push for greater autonomy. Decades of authoritarian rule have deprived Iraqis of the opportunity to build democratic traditions and parliamentary experience that could help them master the art of consensus building and compromise.”

With the fall of Saddam’s regime, there will be many challenges to making Iraq a democratic, stable, and economically viable regime—including creation of an effective transitional security force, developing a comprehensive plan for security, eliminating weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and establishing an international transitional administration.

- a) How long will this process take and how much will it cost?
- b) How is the Arab World reacting to an Iraq defeated and occupied by the U.S. and its allies?
- c) To what extent is this outcome increasing the likelihood that the U.S. will be targeted by Islamic terrorists such as al-Qaida?

ANSWER A: We don’t have reliable timelines or cost estimates, as there are too many unknowns and variables which could have an impact on such estimates.

ANSWER B: Many Arab governments are concerned that the U.S. will not stay focused long enough to create a stable, unified Iraq. Also of major concern to Iraq’s Arab neighbors is the possibility of the rise of fundamentalist Islamists or Shia Muslims in the new Iraq. They fear such developments in Iraq will embolden their own Islamists or minority Shia populations to make demands on their governments. Regional governments also fear that the U.S. and indigenous elements will pressure them to reform their political and economic systems.

Iran is pleased with the fall of Saddam’s regime, but is concerned about Iraq’s follow-on government, the U.S. presence, and destroying the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iranian terrorist organization located in and formerly supported by Iraq.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Turkey is supportive of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The Turkish government seeks to renew trade relations with a new Iraqi government as soon as possible and to participate in reconstruction efforts. Turkey supports a stable Iraq that maintains its territorial integrity, aims for the free and fair representation of all Iraqi people through the establishment of democratically elected government, and ensures for the participation of Iraqi Kurdish groups in any new government.

ANSWER C: Due to the unsettled security environment, Islamic extremists are trying to move money, weapons, and personnel into Iraq. Islamic extremists from the Middle East and other parts of the world are attempting to travel to Iraq to participate in anti-coalition attacks.

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: The Future of North Korea

QUESTION 12: In 1996, DIA informed the Committee that “[t]he likelihood that North Korea will continue to exist in its current state 15 years from now is low to moderate. Unless solutions to the North’s economic problems are found, the regime will not be able to survive. It will have to adapt, slide into irrelevance, or collapse/implode. This has led many analysts to believe a process of political self-destruction has begun with potential for system collapse within 3 years.”

- a) While the North Korean regime obviously did not collapse within three years of that statement, what do you think of the long-term viability of the North Korean regime?
- b) What do you believe is the likeliest scenario for the North Korean regime’s demise – adaptation, sliding into irrelevance, or collapse/implode?

ANSWER A: We foresee continued economic decline and international isolation. Determining any precise “breaking point,” however, is no easier today than it was in 1996. The regime shows no signs of losing control; it is more likely that its course will be driven more by external dynamics, e.g. outcome of the nuclear issue, North-South relations, etc., than by events or forces inside the North.

ANSWER B: The regime’s course will more likely be driven by external dynamics – outcome of the nuclear issue, North-South relations, etc. -- than by events/forces inside the North. “Adaptation” is the most likely of the three scenarios posited.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: The Impact of U.S. Military Withdrawal from South Korea

QUESTION 13:

- a) How serious is anti-American sentiment in South Korea at present?
- b) If the U.S. were to withdraw its military forces from South Korea, what would be the impact on the region – and specifically, on North Korea-South Korea relations?

ANSWER A: While the surge of anti-Americanism in late 2002 has abated and even spurned some pro-American demonstrations, an undercurrent of anti-Americanism is present in Korean society and, by most measures, is increasing. "Anti-Americanism" is found in a range of groups and sentiments, from a public demand that the US show sensitivity to an increasing pluralistic Korean body politic, to those who seize upon incidents to forward an agenda for radical transformation of South Korea. Whether anti-Americanism will threaten the alliance depends on the policies and maturity of South Korean leaders.

ANSWER B: A U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea would have profound implications for regional security, whatever the scenario. In the unlikely event the U.S. were to withdraw unilaterally or under extremely adverse circumstances, the full range of relationships among the U.S., ROK, Japan, North Korea, China, and Russia, as well as others, would undergo major re-examination. If a U.S. withdrawal were conducted in close consultation with the ROK and the other key players, the impact – though still significant – would be lessened.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Possible Iraq-Libya WMD Cooperation

QUESTION 14: What information do we have regarding cooperation between Iraq and Libya with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction? Please elaborate.

ANSWER: I cannot respond in this forum and I am forwarding a response separately.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: The Purpose of Saddam's WMD Programs

QUESTION 15: What is the primary purpose of Saddam Hussein's WMD programs, deterrence or some more aggressive purpose (e.g., for use in terrorist attacks)?

ANSWER: Saddam Hussein's regime no longer exists and thus has no role in any remaining WMD programs or related equipment or material.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Possible Saudi Pursuit of WMD

QUESTION 16: Do we have any reason to believe that Saudi Arabia is seeking WMD from Pakistan or other countries? Please elaborate.

ANSWER: Saudi Arabia has ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Saudi Arabian military forces have some biological and chemical warfare defensive equipment, but we do not believe that Saudi Arabia is trying to acquire biological or chemical agents or weapons from foreign sources. Saudi Arabia purchased CSS-2 Intermediate Range missiles from China in the late 1980s.

I am providing additional information separately.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
World Wide Threat Hearing
11 February 2003

QUESTION AREA: Saudi Arabia

QUESTION 17: The Sunday, February 9, 2003 edition of *The New York Times* reported that "Saudi Arabia's leaders have made far-reaching decisions to prepare for an era of military disengagement from the United States, to enact what Saudi officials call the first significant democratic reforms at home, and to reign in the conservative clergy that has shared power in the kingdom." The article also stated that Crown Prince Abdullah will ask President Bush to withdraw all American armed forces from Saudi Arabia as soon as the campaign to disarm Iraq has concluded.

- a) What is your assessment of the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will seek to alter its military relationship with the U.S. and institute democratic reforms?
- b) Please characterize the nature and extent of Saudi cooperation with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement on counterterrorism in general and the investigation into the September 11 attacks in particular.

ANSWER A: Once US operational forces leave the kingdom, the relationship will be centered upon mutual oil interests, security assistance, commercial interests, and the war on terrorism.

Saudi Arabia is progressing politically, but faces significant societal constraints. Debate over reform is widespread. In January 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah told Arab leaders that it was time for "internal reform and enhanced political participation in the Arab World." Other senior Saudi leaders will continue to oppose Crown Prince Abdullah's reform initiative, slowing the pace of change.

ANSWER B: The Saudis have arrested numerous al-Qaida terrorists and are on the front line of the al-Qaida terrorist threat. Following the 12 May bombings in Riyadh, a 60-man FBI team was dispatched to the Kingdom to assist Saudi authorities with the investigation. US Ambassador Robert Jordan hailed the cooperation as "superb." Saudi military officials also maintain close and productive relationships with their US counterparts.