Congressional Record: October 12, 2000 (House)
Page H9852-H9861


 
  CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4392, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2001

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 626, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 626

       Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be 
     in order to consider the conference report to accompany the 
     bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
     2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of 
     the United States Government, the Community Management 
     Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
     Disability System, and for other purposes. All points of 
     order against the conference report and against its 
     consideration are waived. The conference report shall be 
     considered as read.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), pending 
which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration 
of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, this rules provides for the consideration of the 
conference report on H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001. The rule waives all points of order against the 
conference report and against its consideration.
  Further, the rule provides that the conference report shall be 
considered as read. This is the standard approach for conference 
reports, and this is a noncontroversial rule.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support it. In addition, I strongly 
encourage my colleagues to support the conference report itself. While 
we will discuss the substance of the conference report during the 
general debate, this bill is extremely critical in terms of making sure 
our intelligence agencies have the capabilities needed to protect the 
United States and the lives of American citizens at home and abroad.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this rule allows for the consideration of the fiscal 
year 2001 intelligence conference report. This conference agreement is, 
in the main, not controversial. There is, however, concern about title 
VII of the conference agreement, which creates a new Public Interest 
Disclosure Act.
  Mr. Speaker, as Members know, detailed information about the 
provisions contained in authorizations for the intelligence activities 
are for the most part classified. It is my understanding that there is 
little disagreement on the part of the House managers on the provisions 
of the conference agreement contained either in the statement of 
managers or in the classified annex. However, title VII, the new Public 
Interest Declassification Act, sets forth standards governing access to 
and protection of national security information and creates a new set 
of penalties relating to disclosure of classified information.
  Both the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, have expressed their grave reservations about these 
provisions and their implications on first amendment rights. Both the 
gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Conyers) have said that they should not

[[Page H9853]]

become law without full public hearings. However, since the Senate has 
already acted on this conference agreement, a motion to recommit the 
agreement to the conference has been precluded.
  I would hope in the next Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary, in 
cooperation with the Select Committee on Intelligence will thoroughly 
examine these issues and, if necessary, make remedial changes to the 
provisions now found in title VII of the conference agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, in the meantime, I urge Members to support this rule so 
that the House may proceed to the consideration of the conference 
report.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I 
move the previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider is laid on the table.

                              {time}  1545

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 626, I call up 
the conference report on the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Pursuant to House 
Resolution 626, the conference report is considered as having been 
read.
  (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of 
October 11, 2000 at page H9709.)
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to present the conference report on the 
Fiscal Year 2001 Intelligence Authorization bill. I believe that hard 
work and careful deliberation has produced a first-rate bill that funds 
the critically important work of our intelligence community, and we are 
all reminded today just how critical that work is.
  As has been the long-standing custom of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, this conference report is a bipartisan 
product which reflects credit on our committee's members and its very 
highly professional staff, and I want to thank all involved.
  This conference report authorizes funds for fiscal year 2001 
intelligence-related activities, the Community Management Account, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. I 
just wanted to take a moment to highlight several provisions of the 
conference report for the consideration of Members.
  First, this conference report, I am happy to announce, includes 
Senator Moynihan's "Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000.'' 
This legislation is an important first step in regaining control and 
putting some order to the government's declassification process, a 
subject of great interest to many Members. I want to commend Senator 
Moynihan for his tireless work to encourage the appropriate and timely 
declassification of appropriate U.S. Government records.
  Another initiative of note is language addressing the serious problem 
of leaks of classified information by U.S. Government officials. Mr. 
Speaker, leaking classified government information is not a right or a 
privilege of U.S. officials or employees who have access to that 
information. Too often over the past few years, we have significantly 
risked, and sometimes lost, fragile intelligence resources because 
those employed by the government and who have access to classified 
information have chosen to leak that information and, thus, have 
ignored their commitments to national security. Damage has been done.
  The provision in this conference report simply states that, if one is 
a current or former government employee who had access to classified 
material that one has promised to protect, that one must live up to 
those obligations. If one does not, then one is going to be held 
accountable.
  The provision is narrowly crafted to protect the rights that all 
Americans hold dear. It is not, as some will say, an affront to the 
first amendment. In fact, the Justice Department has reviewed the 
provision and finds no constitutional infirmity. They even support the 
provision. The committee has looked carefully at this provision. As 
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, has stated, "the 
administration leaks like a sieve.'' This must stop.
  Mr. Speaker, although I expect some discussion about the provision I 
just mentioned, I do not want Members to lose sight of a key and 
important fact. Today's activities in the Middle East speak volumes, 
sad volumes, I am afraid to say, to the type of world that we now live 
in. The apparent attack on the U.S.S. Cole and the violence in Israel 
and Palestine are terrible reminders of how fragile our national 
security can be.
  The only way to be ready to face the threats to our security, and 
that is the security of all Americans at home and abroad, is by having 
a vibrant first line of defense that provides indications and warning, 
and that is our intelligence community. This conference report directly 
helps to rebuild resources that were cut after the Cold War and ensures 
the protection of our rights and liberties now and in the future. It is 
carefully crafted.
  Before I close, I want to mention one other important point. With the 
conclusion of this Congress, the committee will lose the talents of 
several valued Members who have either served out their terms on the 
committee or who have chosen to seek other opportunities.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), our esteemed vice 
chairman, who also serves this body as the Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Defense of the Committee on appropriations will rotate off the 
committee.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) has been a tireless 
supporter of the committee and of the intelligence community. His 
insights and his opinions have been invaluable to me and to the 
committee. He has also been instrumental in ensuring that his 
subcommittee and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence work 
very closely together, which has benefitted this House in many ways. I 
thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), and all Americans 
thank him for the work he has done.
  In addition, I would like to recognize two other Members who will not 
be with the committee next year: the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
McCollum) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi). They have 
each contributed in an important way to the committee's work, and we on 
the committee shall certainly miss them.
  Also, I would be remiss if I did not mention the excellent work by 
staff on both sides of the aisle, and I say that from my heart. Their 
efforts have allowed for us to be here today with a good bipartisan 
product on a critical subject.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a good and important piece of legislation. I 
urge my colleagues to support its adoption.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this conference report, 
and because of a scheduling problem, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), a very valuable Member of our committee.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. I want to thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Dixon), the 
ranking member, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the 
chairman, for the outstanding work that they have done and also the 
work of the staff which is so invaluable in helping us to come up with 
this work product.
  Mr. Speaker, months ago, during the debate on the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence's reported authorization bill, I 
highlighted several very positive features of the bill and applauded 
the bipartisanship and the excellent cooperation in the work of the 
committee under the leadership of the chairman and the ranking member.
  I am pleased to note that this conference report sustains the 
important initiatives and actions recommended in the House bill. This 
outcome, too, is

[[Page H9854]]

 testament to the sound judgment and hard work of the committee 
leadership and, indeed, of all my colleagues on the committee.
  During our meetings with the Senate, and our discussions with the 
administration, concern arose over a House proposal to require the 
National Reconnaissance Office to contract separately from the Air 
Force for the large rockets that carry our reconnaissance satellites 
into orbit.
  The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence adopted this 
proposal after substantial investigations and hearings following the 
disturbing and costly string of launch failures and after several years 
of unjustified volatility in the NRO's launch budget.
  The Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence, on which I 
serve as ranking member, concluded that there would be greater 
accountability and sounder fiscal management if the NRO were assigned 
clearer responsibility for this aspect of its overall mission.
  At the same time, I appreciate the concerns that this step could 
contribute to deterioration of the partnership between the Air Force 
and the NRO in managing U.S. national security space launch programs.
  In this regard, I would cite the clear guidance in the statement of 
managers that we expect the NRO and the Air Force to continue working 
closely together, including negotiating contracts with industry 
together to ensure favorable prices.
  I would add also that I expect the NRO's contract awards to provide 
appropriate support to DoD's policy of maintaining a competitive space 
launch industrial base. The NRO and the Air Force are of course subject 
to higher management authority, and the NRO director himself an 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. I would expect that DoD 
management could check any harmful centrifugal forces in the NRO-Air 
Force relationship.
  Mr. Speaker, I will conclude by applauding the vigorous steps 
contained in the conference report to overcome serious management and 
resource problems at the National Security Agency and to improve the 
ability of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to exploit and 
distribute imagery collected by satellites and aircraft. These agencies 
and their respective missions remain absolutely critical to diplomacy 
and military preparedness.
  I think it is a great conference report. I think we are moving 
forward. I urge my colleagues and the House to adopt it. I think the 
committee has done a good job, and we have served our colleagues and 
the country well.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me begin by complimenting the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), 
our chairman, for his hard work and his dedication, as reflected in 
this conference report, to meeting the needs of the men and women who 
produce the intelligence on which policy makers and military commanders 
rely.
  As adopted by the House, the intelligence authorization was one-tenth 
of one percent above the President's request. This conference report is 
below the House bill and two-tenths of one percent below the request. 
The primary reason for the reduction is that some of the items 
authorized in the House bill were funded several months ago in a 
supplemental appropriations measure.
  The conference report, as did the supplemental appropriation bill, 
supports the transformation initiative that the Director of the 
National Security Agency, General Michael Hayden, has begun to 
implement. It is critical to the security of the United States that NSA 
be modernized.
  General Hayden has developed a plan, which the committee generally 
supports. The modernization of NSA will not succeed, however, without 
the sustained, visible support of the most senior leaders of the 
Department of Defense and the intelligence community. To date, in terms 
of resource allocation, I have not seen evidence that the rebuilding of 
NSA is a top priority of the executive branch. I hope that this changes 
next year.
  One of the shortcomings in the intelligence community, in my view, is 
that there is too much emphasis on collection and not enough on making 
sure that which is collected can be used. If it were possible to 
collect only important information, this imbalance would be 
inconsequential.
  Our national technical means, however, collect volumes of information 
that must be analyzed to identify what is important, put in a usable 
form, and sent to those who need it.
  Last year, Congress made clear its expectation that the new Future 
Imagery Architecture (FIA) would be an adequate balance between 
collection activities and TPED or tasking, processing, exploitation and 
dissemination activities. Congress was clear in the description of the 
consequences that would flow from an executive branch decision not to 
make TPED investments sufficient to utilize fully the collection 
capabilities of FIA. As the classified annex to this conference report 
makes clear, the resolve of Congress on this issue has not changed.
  The conference agreement amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) and the criminal code in ways that deserve some comment.

                              {time}  1600

  Among other things, the FISA amendments make clear that, in making a 
probable cause determination that a target was an agent of a foreign 
power, the court may consider past activities of the target. I am 
advised that the target's past activities have regularly been part of a 
probable cause determination. In this respect, the amendment represents 
a codification of current practice.
  There have been suggestions that the amendment is needed to ensure 
that information once excluded from the probable cause determination 
merely because it was dated will now be considered. I believe that this 
is an incorrect interpretation of both the current practice and the 
effect of the amendment. Those facts which are relevant to determining 
the probability that a target is currently an agent of a foreign power 
should be considered. Those facts that are irrelevant, regardless of 
whether they are fresh or stale, should not be considered.
  Section 304 makes the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified 
information acquired by a person who has, or had, authorized access to 
the information a felony, subject to 3 years imprisonment, when the 
disclosure is made willingly and knowingly to a person known not to 
have authorized access. I disapprove of the practice by which some 
individuals entrusted with access to classified information leak that 
information to unauthorized recipients, including members of the media. 
I share the frustration of those who open their daily newspapers only 
to see in print some of the most sensitive information in our 
government's possession. I have, however, grave concerns about the 
reach and the scope of section 304.
  There are currently a variety of statutory and administrative 
prohibitions on the authorized disclosure of classified information. 
The fact that more leakers are not punished is not, and I stress is 
not, the result of too few prohibitions, it is the result of the great 
difficulty inherent in identifying the leakers. Section 304 adds 
another prohibition, unwisely in my judgment. It will not make it 
easier to identify the source of a leak.
  Before our conference began, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) 
and I received a letter from the chairman and ranking member of the 
Committee on the Judiciary urging the rejection of this provision. In 
their letter the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) noted that by making all leaks subject to 
criminal penalties the provision "has profound First Amendment 
implications and goes to the very heart of the ability of the public to 
remain informed about matters of critical public interest which often 
relate to governmental misdeeds.''
  In conference, I offered an amendment to narrow the definition of 
classified information under section 304 to make sure that only leaks 
of information of substantial sensitivity would be punished under this 
provision. Other leaks would continue to be punishable under other 
statutes or administrative procedures. Although my amendment was 
approved by the House conferees, the Senate rejected it. I hope that in 
the next Congress the Committee on the Judiciary, in whose jurisdiction 
the issues raised by section 304 properly reside, will carefully 
examine the provision.

[[Page H9855]]

  Last year's intelligence authorization act established a commission 
to examine the judicial review questions raised by the Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. The commission was given one year 
from the date of enactment to review the current judicial, regulatory, 
and administrative authorities under which the United States blocks 
assets of foreign persons, and to provide a detailed constitutional 
examination and evaluation of remedies available to United States 
persons affected by the blocking of assets of foreign persons.
  I had hoped that the commission might have completed its work in less 
than a year because of the great importance I attach to the resolution 
of the due process concerns raised by the drug kingpin legislation. 
Although it now appears the commission will need all of the time 
allocated, I look forward to its report and hope that it is dispositive 
of these concerns.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, I want to advise the House that two of our 
very constructive and important Members have served their eight year 
terms on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lewis), conclude their terms of service this year. I 
want to thank them for their many contributions to the committee's work 
over the past eight years. Their enthusiasm, insight, and perspective 
will be sorely missed.
  I urge the adoption of the conference report.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Delaware (Mr. Castle), the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical 
and Tactical Intelligence.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time, and I rise in strong support of the conference report for the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking 
member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), are to be commended 
for the outstanding leadership they have provided to the intelligence 
community during these difficult times.
  I would also like to recognize the efforts of our distinguished vice 
chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), who will be 
rotating off our committee under our rules. His insights into the 
technical and distinctly military programs within the intelligence 
community have been very helpful for me in understanding our future 
needs. Likewise, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
Committee on Appropriations, his explanations of the resource 
challenges facing the community are invaluable. I thank him for his 
service to our Nation's security.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence, I understand the critical need to invest in and modernize 
our technical intelligence systems. Although the investment in our 
intelligence community's infrastructure had declined over the years, 
and the strains were clearly showing through, we have responded in the 
past 6 years by making some very difficult but sound choices to ensure 
there are adequate future technical resources. This year's conference 
report continues to address some very substantial problems, but this is 
still only a beginning. We understand that providing the country with 
the capabilities it deserves and needs will take years and will require 
continued support from Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, this conference report also provides our senior 
policymakers with sufficient capabilities and tools to advance our 
foreign policy, to enable strong leadership and proactive diplomacy, 
and to improve our military's advantage over its adversaries, if and 
when needed.
  I am also pleased that we have incorporated a provision into this 
year's conference report to address a concern related to the National 
Reconnaissance Office and its launch program. This was the outcome of a 
series of meetings, briefings, and hearings for which I personally 
devoted a great deal of time. This provision has many benefits. One, it 
will improve the NROs and our ability to have insight and perform 
oversight into contracting launch services; two, it will allow us to 
hold the NROs more accountable for their activities; and, three, it 
could lead to significant savings for the government and American 
people.
  I want to address an issue that has been raised regarding this 
important provision, and I want to make something very clear. There is 
nothing in this provision that precludes the Air Force and the NRO from 
continuing to work in a very close partnership. This includes 
continuing cooperation on the wide range of launch service activities 
and facilities that they share, as well as continuing potential block 
purchases for launch vehicles if the NRO believes this is in the best 
interest of the government.
  Now, however, with this provision, the NRO will have insight into and 
better control of launch contracts that have not been there before. We 
expect that this added responsibility will ultimately result in a 
stronger partnership between these two organizations. It will certainly 
provide better budgeting of scarce intelligence resources.
  Mr. Speaker, the conference report for the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 2001 is a responsible, reasonable, and appropriate 
request to fund our Nation's national security needs. The President, 
our policymakers, our military, and the people of the United States 
deserve nothing less. I ask the Members of the House to give it their 
full support.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise as a member of the committee whose 8-year term is 
coming to an end there. At this time I would like to commend our 
distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for his 
leadership, his fairness, and his willingness to listen to another 
point of view on the committee over these years. I thank him.
  And to our ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), 
we are also very proud of his service. As a Californian, I am 
particularly proud of his service as ranking member on the committee, 
and I hope to see him serve as chair in a very short time on this very 
important committee.
  I would also like to commend the staff, I would say on both sides, 
but I really view it as a unified staff of the committee, who have 
served the Members so well and, in doing so, the community that we have 
oversight over.
  Mr. Speaker, I have been impressed with the dedication and hard work 
of the men and women who work in the Nation's intelligence agencies and 
the amazing feats they can accomplish. They often provide our 
policymakers a decisive advantage in accomplishing our Nation's policy 
goals and national defense goals.
  While I have been a member of the committee, I have been especially 
concerned about the issue of proliferation and how well the United 
States tracks and then prevents weapons proliferation, particularly 
weapons of mass destruction. I have often been dismayed how clear our 
evidence on proliferation can be and how slow our diplomatic response 
has been. We need to maintain a robust intelligence effort on 
proliferation, and the issue needs continued attention and oversight in 
the future.
  I have also been deeply concerned over how counterintelligence 
investigations have been handled. I reject the notion that one American 
citizen is more likely to engage in espionage than another because of 
his or her particular ethnic background. We are a proud Nation 
strengthened by our immigration, and the rights of all our citizens 
must be respected.
  Mr. Speaker, secrecy is, of course, one necessary element in the 
conduct of intelligence. Information that is necessary for us to 
counter proliferation, terrorism, and espionage often must be obtained 
secretly; and thus our sensitive sources and methods must be protected. 
Let us stipulate to that. We all want to protect our sources and 
methods. Yet I am concerned that the public interest is too often 
thwarted by too much classification of information and by maintaining 
classification for too long.
  Last year, there were over 8 million classification actions; 10 
percent more than the year before. Clearly, the system is not perfect; 
but even so, we were all troubled by leaks and by the damage they can 
cause. Nevertheless, I am

[[Page H9856]]

strongly opposed to the section of this legislation that would for the 
first time in our history enact an official secrets law.
  We have to remember that those who violate the rules on handling 
classified information should be and are punished administratively. It 
is already a felony to disclose national defense information to foreign 
nations or their agents in order to injure the United States. Other 
felony laws protect specifically defined, especially sensitive 
categories of information. The Intelligence Authorization Act, on the 
other hand, the bill before us today, would make it a felony for 
officers or employees of the government to knowingly disclose 
classified information broadly defined without the government even 
having to prove any damage to national security.
  In our briefing, I was convinced by the presentation that this 
"officers or employees of the government'' includes Members of 
Congress. By the actions taken in this bill, Members of Congress will 
be subject to criminal charges if this category of properly classified 
information is revealed by them. Make no mistake, this provision marks 
the first time that Congress has placed the full force of criminal law 
behind the executive branch's classification system. The current 
Executive Order on classification of information at least has the 
virtue of specifically prohibiting classification of information in 
order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative 
error, or to prevent embarrassment to the government.

                              {time}  1615

  But the next President of the United States could change this 
prohibition and this leaks law would still be on the books. The 
Congress is foolish in my view, and that is a word I have never used 
here on the floor, to give a blank check to the executive branch for 
prosecutions in this important area.
  I understand that the authors of the provision intend for it not to 
be used to target the President, but I see nothing to prevent reporters 
from being hauled in before grand juries and being forced to reveal 
their sources.
  Furthermore, we do not each know how this leaks law would interact 
with criminal laws on conspiracy aiding and abetting solicitation and 
the like.
  The Committee on the Judiciary should examine issues such as these 
and the impact on the first amendment issues before the Congress adopts 
such important legislation. We should remember how difficult it has 
been in our Nation's history to challenge official versions of the 
facts when it comes to national security matters, even for Members of 
Congress.
  We all know that those outside powers are running a greater risk of 
prosecution under this statute than those on the inside. I do not think 
that this provision in the bill is in our national interest, and that 
is why I was not able to sign the conference report on this important 
legislation.
  Again, I commend the distinguished chairman of the committee, the 
distinguished ranking member, and the marvelous staff for their service 
to the committee.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), a senior member of the 
committee.
  (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, the conference report builds on the substantial work 
done in last year's authorization bill to institutionalize the use of 
competitive alternative analytical techniques by the Central 
Intelligence Agency. This action is intended to further guard against 
intelligence surprises and analytic complacency or "group think,'' 
while better preparing policy-making intelligence consumers to deal 
with the complexities of the post-Cold War international security 
environment.
  Furthermore, the conference report provides the means to modernize 
the production mechanisms used by the CIA's Director of Intelligence to 
produce and disseminate its invaluable finished intelligence products 
in a more timely and secure manner. By promoting greater analytical 
interaction and timeliness, the conference report helps to ensure that 
intelligence consumers have the full range of tools necessary to make 
informed policy before the swiftest of events force them into a 
defensive crisis management posture, as too often has occurred in 
recent years.
  I would like to mention that the committee has worked through this 
conference report, as we did in last year's report, to address the 
problem of the chronic shortage of trained expert linguists available 
to the intelligence community to exploit what is being clandestinely 
corrected.
  Moreover, we have taken steps to promote greater interoperability 
between intelligence analysts of different agencies to further create 
synergies that will improve the quality of intelligence reporting.
  Finally, I am pleased to note that this conference report will help 
the intelligence community to standardize and automate self-evaluative 
tools for promoting greater interaction between those who collect 
intelligence and those who determine its meaning and significance. In 
this way, collectors will be able to determine the value of what they 
are acquiring, and in instances where it is not so valuable, they can 
adjust their collection focus accordingly.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, for 
their leadership.
  I urge adoption of this conference report.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a distinguished member of our committee.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from the State of 
California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with the gentleman from 
Florida (Chairman Goss) and again our ranking member for the hard work 
they put in on this bill all year long, not just on the conference 
report.
  I also want to say that they really strive hard to create an 
atmosphere of bipartisanship on that committee, and I salute them for 
their hard work with that, and also for the excellent professionalism 
we have on our staff.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Fiscal Year 2001 Intelligence 
Authorization Act. Although this conference report represents a funding 
level slightly below the President's request, I believe that it 
nevertheless sets about the right level of overall funding for 
intelligence activities next year.
  I am pleased that the conferees have adopted language that urges the 
administration to submit requests to Congress for reallocation of funds 
to important initiatives, including language training and 
counterterrorism efforts.
  During my travels in various Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence hearings, administration officials have expressed concern 
about the state of language capabilities of intelligence community 
personnel. I have found that all too often there are not enough people 
speaking the language native to the country in which they serve and too 
many of those who are not sufficiently proficient in that language.
  I firmly believe that language proficiency is critical to the core 
mission of the intelligence community. Collectors, processors, and 
analyzers must have sufficient linguistic skills to meet the challenges 
posed by global targets.
  I have, therefore, advocated relentlessly for the sufficient funding 
of language related initiatives. I am pleased that our actions will 
allow those men and women on the intelligence front line to have the 
language training and related resources needed to effectively do their 
jobs. We must continue on this mission.
  Finally, the conference report sends a message that defeating 
terrorism is important to this Congress. Earlier this year, I met with 
the deputy director of Central Intelligence and discussed the 
challenges posed by international terrorists. One thing was clear from 
that meeting, as well as from oversight and legislative hearings. The 
United States must have a robust counterterrorism program.
  I am pleased that the conferees have chosen to fully fund the 
President's request for counterterrorism activities. We would welcome 
proposals for the reallocation of funds to efforts in this critical 
area.

[[Page H9857]]

  I again thank the chairman and the ranking member.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass), a man who keeps 
our budget check working carefully for the committee.
  Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report for the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.
  There are many important aspects of this report, but I thought I 
would use my time to address a concern to all of us, especially today, 
the scourge of terrorism.
  The bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania brought the Usama 
Bin Laden organization to the forefront of terrorist threats to U.S. 
interests, although numerous other terrorist groups continue to plague 
us and put American citizens at risk.
  Now, just this morning, we learned of what appears to have been a 
very tragic attack on an American destroyer, the U.S.S. Cole, off Yemen 
that has resulted in the loss of American lives. The committee, 
together with its counterpart in the other body, understands the 
critical need to be able to fight back. The Cole incident yet again, 
Mr. Speaker, reminds us of the importance of good intelligence in 
preventing these kinds of crises and, as in the case of this one, 
bringing the perpetrators to justice.
  The Intelligence Oversight committees are charged, among other 
things, with overseeing the budgets, programs, and activities of the 
various counterterrorism elements of the intelligence committee. And I 
submit, Mr. Speaker, that our ability to fight back and, more 
importantly, to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring at all is 
robust and growing. But these capabilities, especially those involving 
the prevention mission, need constant attention, as the Cole incident 
reminds us.
  The millennium celebrations around the world, which are a time of 
great risk for us all, proved that our counterterrorism professionals 
were ready and able to protect and defend. I am proud to say, Mr. 
Speaker, that the intelligence community has time and time again saved 
lives and secured the interests of Americans and their allies. This 
arduous task consumes a significant amount of limited resources, but I 
would find it hard to believe that any responsible person could deny 
that this is money well spent.
  We on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are dedicated to 
ensuring that the intelligence community has adequate resources and is 
well prepared to phase down the Usama Bin Ladens of this world.
  While we are satisfied that the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence has generally performed well against the terrorist target, 
we have learned through the course of our normal oversight work that 
much more can and needs to be done, especially as terrorists attempt to 
acquire chemical and biological weapons to pursue their shameful war 
against society. This conference report will enhance our ability to 
defend ourselves against terrorists through a variety of means.
  I just want to say that our chairman and ranking minority member have 
done a wonderful job leading this committee in a bipartisan fashion and 
I want to thank them for their efforts. I urge adoption of this 
conference committee report.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), our connection to 
the Committee on Armed Services.
  (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference 
report.
  I would first like to commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman 
Goss) for his stewardship through the process. I would also like to 
recognize the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking 
member, for his contributions to the committee's efforts as well.
  Mr. Speaker, this conference report provides very important 
investments for the intelligence community, including enhancements in 
many areas that are of specific interest to the military. I wish we 
could do more, especially given the ever-increasing requirements that 
are being placed on intelligence to protect our troops who have been 
sent all over the world for every sort of mission.
  One of the most important issues facing the intelligence community is 
the modernization of the National Security Agency. This agency, which 
supplies signal intelligence to all levels of government, from the most 
senior policymaker to the pilot in the cockpit, is in many ways the 
linchpin of our warning capability. But today, this agency is about to 
be overtaken by technology and by potential adversaries who are 
increasingly sophisticated.
  The NSA, in response, is undergoing a unique transition, the success 
of which will affect the overall capabilities of the intelligence 
community for the next several decades. The Director of Central 
Intelligence has made the modernization of NSA his number one priority.
  The good news is that the NSA director, Lieutenant General Mike 
Hayden, is committed to leading his agency to overcome the 
modernization challenge. Those challenges are great. They involve 
overhauling every aspect of the NSA, from technical collection 
capabilities, to acquisition programs and personnel structure.
  General Hayden must be successful. But in order to make the needed 
changes, he needs certain tools. Perhaps the most critical tool is the 
ability to move the right people into key positions in the Agency to 
affect change. Because of the unique and serious situation at NSA, I am 
pleased that this conference report gives the NSA director that ability 
through the NSA Voluntary Separation Act. This provision permits the 
establishment of an early retirement and voluntary separation program 
for all NSA employees, including the most senior levels of management. 
With this authority, it is anticipated that the director will be able 
to accomplish the personnel changes and management changes necessary to 
see the process of NSA modernization through to completion. General 
Hayden has our support in these efforts.
  I urge all my colleagues to support this conference report.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the distinguished ranking member of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member of the committee 
(Mr. Dixon) for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to be here to find out if anybody ever 
got the letter that me and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) sent 
to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) about the fact that 
criminal matters fall under title 18 of the U.S. Code and is within the 
total jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. Did anybody ever 
find out about that letter?
  Well, we were trying to get some jurisdiction for this part of the 
bill that deals with making it a felony for a Government employee to 
disclose any and all information that the Government says is 
classified.
  The history of this provision, I say to members of the committee, is 
that it was dropped quietly into a Senate version and has never had 
hearings in the House or the Senate, no hearings on a provision that 
has the exclusive jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. And 
we did not even get a response from the letter that the chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary sent the gentleman from Florida (Chairman 
Goss).
  And so, why are we doing this?

                              {time}  1630

  There are a number of theories about this. Members may find out by 
examining what would have happened had this been the law for the last 
30 years:
  One, the scope of the government's activities in Vietnam through the 
Pentagon papers would have resulted in prosecutions.
  Two, the CIA's complicity in the overthrow of Salvador Allende in 
Chile.
  Three, the Nixon administration's support of Pakistan in its 1971 war 
with India.
  Four, the revelations about spying at U.S. laboratories.
  Five, China's alleged military involvement with Pakistan and North 
Korea.

[[Page H9858]]

  Six, basic information regarding the size of the CIA's annual budget.
  See, the reason that we are doing it this sneaky way is because it 
will scare the bejesus out of whistle blowers and they will be able to 
be criminally punished by not sending this through the Committee on the 
Judiciary. I am not saying that Judiciary might not have passed this 
out. We do our share of things that I do not agree with, either. But 
this super sneaky way of trying to do it does not reflect any credit on 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  I resent this very much the way you have dismissed the Committee on 
the Judiciary. I think this is a travesty. And, by the way, The New 
York Times, The Washington Times, the Los Angeles Times, the San 
Francisco Chronicle, The Austin American Statesman and other papers 
have all exposed this for what it is. I am shocked that this radical 
departure of the way we legislate would be applauded on the floor, 
tremendous congratulations for a bipartisan effort. Well, everything 
bipartisan is not always right, and here is a perfect example of it.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
  (Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, notwithstanding what the gentleman from 
Michigan just said, I am standing on this side of the well so I can say 
to all the Members of the House, this is one of the most bipartisan 
committees I have ever served on, and I serve on the Committee on 
Agriculture which is a bipartisan committee. This is one of the best, 
thanks to the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon). The staff people work 
together, and we work closely with the people from the CIA and the 
defense intelligence community and all the intelligence community 
because we care about the people who are out there around the world 
putting their lives on the line, in dark corners of the world.
  This is a bipartisan effort. People should be supporting this bill, 
notwithstanding what the gentleman from Michigan said. And I have a 
great deal of respect for him. This is a bipartisan bill. Every Member 
should support it. I know we are going to hear opposition to it.
  I want to dedicate just a couple of minutes to the human side, the 
human program of intelligence. It is often portrayed in books and 
movies. It is the spy versus spy story, the world's second oldest 
profession. I am glad to say that America has some excellent spies, and 
I am proud of what the conference report does to make them more 
productive and effective. And I am sorry, this is not a laughing 
matter, this is an important matter. After what has happened in the 
world today, I hope Members will think twice about supporting this 
bill. This is not a humorous matter. We are talking about people around 
the world who are offering up their lives in public service for all of 
us so that we can have a safe world.
  Anyone who reads the newspapers and watches the television, if 
anybody flips over to CNN right now will see reports on there about 
what happened. Five Americans were killed today and some people believe 
it was a terrorist attack. So this is important legislation. Criminal 
organizations use ever more sophistication to infiltrate our financial 
institutions and expand markets for illegal narcotics. The 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remains a 
top-priority concern of all civilized countries. The cyberthreat 
becomes more and more real and ominous to Americans as our economy and 
our well-being become ever more dependent on computers and 
communication networks.
  What these threats have in common is the human factor. What this 
conference report does for our spies, the anonymous defenders of the 
United States, for one it will provide more funding for their overseas 
operations. And it does so in two ways. It provides continued but 
overdue increases in the budget for human operations; and, number two, 
it ensures that the funds that we allocate for these operations arrive 
in tact to those operating overseas.
  I encourage and advise all Members to vote for this bill today to 
send a strong message to the intelligence community all over the world 
and to public servants who offer up their lives on behalf of all of us 
that we stand behind them and with them on their important work.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend the conferees, especially the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Dixon), for working together to include in this conference report 
the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act 
which I authored along with the gentleman from California (Mr. Horn) 
and Senator DeWine. This provision will extend the original Nazi War 
Crimes Disclosure Act for 3 additional years while also adding 
responsibilities to the Interagency Working Group's work as it pertains 
to war crimes committed by the Japanese Imperial Government during 
World War II.
  In 1998, President Clinton signed into law the original Nazi War 
Crimes Disclosure Act that established a process for the 
declassification of documents maintained by government agencies about 
Nazi war criminals and its allies. To date, the Interagency Working 
Group has reviewed more than 6 million pages of material and has 
released over 1.5 million pages of previously classified documents to 
the public regarding World War II. Already, significant new information 
about World War II war crimes has been revealed in the more than 
400,000 Office of Strategic Services records released this past June by 
the Interagency Working Group at the National Archives. However, even 
with the diligent work the Interagency Working Group has accomplished, 
there is an overwhelming amount of material that still needs to be 
reviewed and declassified.
  This success has also been achieved even though the Congress has not 
appropriated funds for the support of the Interagency Working Group or 
for the activities carried out by the various agencies that hold the 
records. Without the resources to review the materials being released, 
it will be years before we truly understand the significance of what is 
contained in the declassified materials.
  This conference report is a step forward in providing the Interagency 
Working Group the authority and support it needs to complete the 
tremendous tasks before them. I still have some concerns regarding the 
language concerning the cooperation of U.S. Government agencies with 
the Interagency Working Group and the ability of the Interagency 
Working Group to review the more than 18 million pages of Japanese 
Imperial Government information that the U.S. returned to Japan after 
World War II. However, I support this conference report before us and 
hope that the chairman and ranking member will work with me next year 
to clarify this language and intent of this legislation so as to 
further the success of the Interagency Working Group.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to clarify one point concerning title 8 of 
this bill. Is it the gentleman's understanding that this section in no 
way affects the authority of the Interagency Working Group established 
under Public Law 105-246, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, 
with regard to the ability of the Interagency Working Group to retrieve 
documents from U.S. Government agencies?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Yes, it is.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Further, is it the gentleman's 
understanding that the exceptions enumerated in that act are in no way 
affected by the bill before us today?
  Mr. GOSS. That is correct.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a very valued 
member of our committee, given all the events in that part of the 
world.
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman and the 
ranking

[[Page H9859]]

member for their work on this bill. I am the junior member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I have found it to be a 
pleasure to work there because of the workmanlike and bipartisan and 
professional approach to oversight in the intelligence community. We 
have a wonderful staff and a focus on what this country needs in a 
quiet way.
  Intelligence is the eyes and ears of our national security. Events 
like those we have seen today bring that home more closely than we 
usually see in the day-to-day events of intelligence. It is an 
important part of keeping our Nation strong and free. And it is more 
and more difficult because of the diversity of threats that we face as 
a Nation. We have more data from which to derive information and that 
creates a tremendous challenge for our intelligence agencies.
  I wanted to particularly thank the chairman and the ranking member 
for what this bill does for counterintelligence. It strengthens 
counterintelligence in a number of ways, particularly giving more tools 
to the agencies that need them in order to counter threats from other 
intelligence agencies.
  I also want to commend them on their oversight of our 
counterintelligence program in this country. The committee played a 
quiet role in the creation of the NNSA which John Gordon is now the 
capable head of. And this committee, I think, brought some common sense 
and some balance to what we needed to do to protect our Nation's 
secrets while not damaging that which we were trying to protect. I 
appreciate the committee's point of view, its common sense approach, 
its balance and its competence in this area.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr)
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and the 
ranking member and all members of the committee for their service.
  It pains me greatly as a former member of the CIA, as a former United 
States attorney, as a Member of this body, though, to rise today in 
opposition to this bill. It pains me greatly not only on the substance 
of what is contained in this bill, which is by and large very good, 
solid legislation, properly reflecting the tremendous work that our 
intelligence officials in this country and all over the world perform, 
giving them additional tools with which to perform those duties, but it 
also pains me because of the process whereby I feel compelled to come 
before this body and oppose this important piece of legislation.
  This legislation contains a provision that will create, make no 
mistake about it, with not one day of hearings, without one moment of 
public debate, without one witness, an official secrets act. For those 
who do not know what an official secrets act is, it is something that 
we have never had in this country. It has been broached many times, 
particularly in the Cold War era. But our regard for constitutional 
civil liberties, our regard for the first amendment, and our belief 
that before the government can put somebody in jail for following their 
conscience and disclosing information showing government wrongdoing, 
the government must shoulder a heavy burden, has in every case in which 
an effort has been made to enact an official secrets act beaten back 
those efforts.
  Yet today we stand here with such a provision amending title 18, the 
criminal code, that would create an official secrets act. That would 
mean that any individual who discloses information that is classified 
by the executive branch can be thrown in jail for up to 3 years for 
every disclosure.
  Currently, if an individual discloses certain categories of important 
national security information, he can and should be prosecuted. It is 
not as if these people who harm our Nation's security are not going 
unprosecuted. They are.

                              {time}  1645

  This provision, though, would silence whistleblowers in a way that 
has never before come before this body and which has never before been 
enacted. This is about to be done without the Committee on the 
Judiciary even having been given the courtesy to look at this 
legislation, to assess its first amendment problems; without one 
hearing, without one witness, without one moment of debate.
  This is very similar, Mr. Speaker, to what happened 2 years ago on 
this same bill. The government was granted extensive expansion of 
wiretapping authority without one witness, without one debate, without 
one day of hearing. It was slipped into this bill 2 years ago.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill so that it can go back 
to the drawing board and these particular provisions that have no 
business being in this bill without having gone through the Committee 
on the Judiciary can be properly assessed and their full constitutional 
ramifications properly studied.
  One can only pick up the paper almost every day and see examples, 
whether it is Bill Gertz or Gary Aldrich or others, of people who have 
let the public know important information who would be thrown in jail 
under a provision that is about to pass without one day of hearing, 
without one witness, without even the Committee on the Judiciary having 
been given the courtesy to assess it.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a member of the Committee 
on Armed Services.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I serve on the Subcommittee on Defense 
of the Committee on Appropriations, and it is one of the most 
bipartisan committees that I serve on. I appreciate the bipartisanship 
of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) and the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) as well. I think the Members on both sides of the 
aisle will agree that I think we have a long way to go and a lot of 
work to do. I think this is a good bill. I think hard work has been 
done on it, but I think there is also agreement in areas that make up 
intelligence and the agencies, a strong military.
  While we may have the strongest military in the world, our national 
readiness rates are very, very low in many cases. That hurts our 
intelligence capability. Where our military is strung out for nation-
building quite often, according to George Tenet, those assets were 
spread so very thin that it made it almost impossible to track Osama 
bin Laden because we were engaged in those events. Our State 
Department, both under Republicans and Democrats, I think all that 
needs to be done is take a look at what happened to Enrique Camarena in 
the drug wars and the lack of support for our agents under the State 
Department, to Rambouillet, to hitting the Chinese Embassy. I also 
think it is wrong that we had technology that we were developing to 
defeat a Soviet missile. I cannot say what that missile is; but when we 
gained access to that particular missile, we found out our defensive 
system would not work.
  We spent nearly a billion dollars to build that defensive system that 
would not work. And the reengineering of that, we now have a system at 
very low cost that will defeat that Soviet system, and that is why I 
think many of us got so concerned when Loral with Bernie Schwartz gave 
up second and tertiary missile boots to China, they gave up MRVing 
capability which we, Intelligence, knew that the W-88 warhead had 
already been stolen by the Chinese, and then the targeting device. The 
CIA briefed many of us that North Korea was many years away from 
striking the United States with a nuclear weapon. They can now hit the 
United States with a Taepo Dong-2 missile. That should concern all of 
us, and I think we have a long way to go to secure the national 
security and intelligence forces of our country.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson).
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report, and I wanted 
to respond to my good friend, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr), 
and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) as well, on a couple of 
issues.
  First of all, this provision simply says that we are going to take 
some action to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information by government officials. Now, a complaint has been made 
that, well, it should

[[Page H9860]]

have gone through the Committee on the Judiciary. I am a member of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and I guard our jurisdiction very 
carefully; but, in fact, this was attached by the Senate, who held 
hearings on this, who heard witnesses and who debated this, and this is 
a normal process. Whenever they attach a provision, we in the House 
have to consider it. We have to look at this, and from the standpoint 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, I believe that this is carefully 
crafted.
  Now, the argument is made that this is going to silence whistle-
blowers. Well, I do not think that is true at all. First of all, 
whistle-blowers are protected under the current law. Secondly, whistle-
blowers who have a concern about whether information is properly 
classified or there is a concern about the agency that they are working 
for, can come to Congress. That is our job. The oversight committee 
would hold hearings on it, would deal with that issue, would protect 
the whistle-blower. They are protected under law and under the 
interests of Congress, and so I do not think that should be a concern.
  The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr) raised the question that we are 
going to criminalize conduct that historically has not been 
criminalized and, in fact, what we are doing is to say that if an 
employee of the United States, this does not pertain to the news media, 
but if an employee of the United States has possession of classified 
material and then discloses it to someone who is not authorized to 
receive that material, then they can be prosecuted.
  But there is something more in there that was left out of the 
presentation of the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr), and that is they 
must have done it knowingly and willfully, and that is the intent 
portion of the burden of proof that will be on the government. So it 
does not prosecute mistakes, someone who accidentally or inadvertently 
discloses information. They have to intentionally have done that, 
knowingly have done that.
  So I think it is well drafted, and I urge my colleagues to support 
this well-drafted protection of classified information.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished friend, 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I am glad that the bill contains my 
amendment to investigate the effects of espionage on American business 
and industry and jobs. I am also glad at least we got some report 
language on China. It should have been in the bill.
  There is not enough anatomy in either of these bodies. Mr. Speaker, 
we have had independent counsels on Henry Cisneros and Monica Lewinsky. 
Now, look, Monica may be a threat to fidelity. She is not a threat to 
liberty.
  We had a Chinese Red Army general who funneled cash to the Democrat 
National Committee, and we will not even include the Traficant language 
as binding that says what is the extent on the national security. A 
Chinese missile, as we laugh, will not have exemption for one party or 
the other. A Chinese missile will hit all America. God Almighty. Last 
month's 1-month trade deficit was $31 billion. At 1,000 jobs per 
billion, we lost 31,000 high-paying manufacturing jobs. If that were 
just put into highways, we would have created over a million jobs for 2 
years.
  What is wrong with us? Are we afraid of the politics of China? The 
American people are watching. The greatest threat to our national 
security is China, and they bought and spied and posed that great 
threat.
  I am disappointed. The intelligence committee is our number one 
charge to secure America, secure that American peace. We are not doing 
that. I think we are gutless, and I yield back the fact that that 
should not have been in the report language as a wish; that should have 
been a commitment and a mandate by Congress to investigate this Chinese 
business.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, on balance this is a good conference report that has 
been brought together in a bipartisan way. I understand the ranking 
member of the Committee on the Judiciary. I raised in the conference 
his letter. I attempted to modify the language to make it more narrow. 
The fact is that the Senate would not yield on this issue. I disagree 
with that part of the bill because, one, it is the identification of 
leakers before they can ever be penalized. Increasing the penalty, to 
me, does not work. I certainly think that the House Committee on the 
Judiciary should look at this, and I will pledge my support to support 
legislation that in some way may either modify or mitigate the damage, 
if any, that has been done.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to again publicly thank the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dixon) for being an extraordinary ranking member, 
reaching across so many times on complicated and sensitive matters and 
carrying a huge proportion of the load of the committee. I have a plan 
that would like to keep him there as ranking member. I realize that may 
not go entirely across the aisle.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the vice chairman and critical 
link to the Committee on Appropriations.
  (Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate my 
colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I have a magnificent speech that has been prepared 
carefully for this discussion today. I am not going to refer to the 
speech, but rather submit it.
  In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I want to express my deep appreciation 
to my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), with whom 
it has been my privilege to work for many, many years in the State 
legislature as well as here. He has done a fantastic job, in my view, 
providing the kind of balance that we need that makes the work of this 
committee such a nonpartisan piece of work.
  In turn, before coming to the committee, it had not been my privilege 
to know well the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). The gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) is a person of fabulous background, but very unique 
experience in this subject area. He comes to our committee at a most 
important time in our history. The leadership he has provided for us is 
very important to the security interests of this country, at home and 
abroad, but especially of significance to those who care about freedom 
in the world.
  The men and women who make up the personnel base of our intelligence 
community overall are fabulous people. They do wonderful work on our 
behalf. Most of it gets very, very little attention. From time to time, 
we have a problem where someone crosses the line, usually stupidly, 
sometimes overtly, and the work of the agency does come to public view. 
It ofttimes is of great disservice to this country. It is important, 
very important, that we secure those personnel who want to make sure 
that the work of the agencies take place as reflected in the direction 
of the law passed by the Congress.
  I very much wanted to focus upon the comments of my colleague, the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr). Let me say that whistle-blowers are 
protected within this bill and within the law. So long as they come 
forward with matters that are security matters about which they are 
concerned and they disclose them to people who are cleared to receive 
such information, they can carry forward their conscience and their 
responsibility as they would see fit.

                              {time}  1700

  There is no restriction there, and the law is very careful about 
that. I understand that lawyers, about presuming that only lawyers have 
these answers, but the committee has worked very carefully with the 
work done by the Senate, and I am comfortable with that work, as of 
that moment.
  The work of this bill is very, very critical work. Because of some of 
these questions that are being raised, the votes today may be very 
important. I urge the Members of the body to realize how significant 
the work of this committee is and how important it is that they give it 
their full support, as well as their attention.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to testify that this is a very fine piece 
of work

[[Page H9861]]

done by both bodies, carried forward in a most positive way by the 
leadership of both the ranking member and the chairman.
  Mr. Speaker, this is my last year on the committee, and I want to 
express to our Chairman and to Mr. Dixon my sincerest thanks for their 
dedication in ensuring this nation has the intelligence capabilities 
critical to protecting our freedoms. It's not often thought of in these 
terms, but intelligence truly is our first line of defense, and the 
close, personal, working relationship Chairman Goss and Mr. Dixon have, 
has made our jobs all the easier. I want to thank you both, and I 
believe this entire body owes you a great deal of gratitude.
  Mr. Speaker, every year those of us who serve on the Intelligence 
Committee stand before this body to discuss the Intelligence 
Authorization bill. Because of very real national security issues, we 
cannot discuss the sensitive details of the bill. We simply have to ask 
our colleagues to "trust us'' as we vote on the classified aspects of 
our intelligence agencies and activities. Mr. Speaker, let me assure 
you, and, most importantly, the American people, that each member of 
the committee takes that responsibility very seriously. The issues and 
debates we take up in committee about our intelligence programs are 
based solely on national security interests.
  Partisian politics is not a function in the conduct of committee 
business. This has earned the Intelligence Committee the trust that is 
required. Mr. Speaker, while the Members deserve much for their efforts 
to oversee our Nation's intelligence organizations, I would be remiss 
in not making mention of the superb committee staff. The staff deals 
with some of the most difficult issues facing our country. They do 
tough work, in a tough environment, and we ask much of them. I thank 
each member of the Intelligence Committee staff for the support they 
provide, and more importantly, for what they do for America.
  Mr. Speaker, a quick word about our magnificent intelligence 
community. It is a community of professionals who work in the 
background and who don't get much credit, if any, for successfully 
accomplishing the difficult tasks they are asked to carry out. The men 
and women of the intelligence community often bear the full brunt of 
public criticism for the rare, but inevitable intelligence shortfall--
after all "perfect knowledge'' is a noble, but usually unobtainable, 
goal. So it is important that we, who know the details of the good work 
of this community, take every opportunity to thank them for their 
heroism publically.
  We can't, for example, publically acknowledge the Central 
Intelligence Agency for an operation that might stop a planned 
terrorist attack, or the National Security Agency for providing the 
piece of information that might allow military commanders to locate 
critical targets, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency for providing 
the proof that a foreign nation is developing weapons of mass 
destruction, or the FBI for locating and removing a Russian listening 
device in the State Department conference room. These and the other 
intelligence organizations and the analysts who make sense of the 
myriad information stand watch for all Americans day in and day out. I 
thank them for the jobs they do, for the professionals that they are, 
and for the sacrifices they make every single day.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I urge support for this conference report. 
Indeed it provides the intelligence community with the resources it 
needs to carry out its mission, and it ensures that the American 
military forces deployed around the world have the best information 
resources we can provide them.
  That is not to say that I think we have done enough. The world is not 
a safe place. There are truly bad actors in the world and, in fact, we 
may be living in a more dangerous and unstable world today than we 
faced during the cold war: This past week's events in the former 
Yugoslavia are example; the increase in terrorism--as, tragically, we 
saw again this morning in the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of 
inexpensive weapons of mass destruction that puts unbelievable 
destructive power in the hands of small nations and non-nation groups; 
the number of countries with nuclear weapons and the means to deliver 
them is increasing. These threats present tough information challenges 
for our intelligence community; challenges that must be met. We have to 
make sure our intelligence organizations are given the proper resources 
to successful operate in this dangerous world.
  This conference report provides adequate resources that should be 
seen as a down payment on keeping our intelligence community capable 
and viable in this dangerous world. But to protect our national 
security, we must resolve to invest more in our "intelligence first 
line of defense.'' I urge my colleagues to vote with me in support of 
this conference report.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to say I support subtitle B of 
this conference report regarding the Diplomatic Telecommunications 
Service. Along with the ranking democratic member of the International 
Relations Committee I wanted to clarify that section 322(a)(6)(C) does 
not include personnel requirements. It is our understanding that this 
provision does not require State Department personnel detailed or 
assigned to the DTS or DTSPO to be polygraphed.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). All time has 
expired.
  Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the conference 
report.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The question is on 
the conference report.
  The question was taken; the Speaker pro tempore announced that the 
ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will count. An insufficient number 
of Members have risen, a recorded vote is not ordered.
  A recorded vote was refused.
  So, the conference report was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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