Congressional Record: May 22, 2000 (House)
Page H3496-H3509


 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 506 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 4392.

                              {time}  1846


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Thornberry in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Friday, May 19, 
2000, all time for general debate had expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill 
for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule by title, and each 
title shall be considered read.

[[Page H3497]]

  No amendment to that amendment shall be in order except those printed 
in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose 
and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments printed 
in the Record may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be 
printed or his designee and shall be considered read.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time 
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request 
for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed 
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device 
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by 
electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not be 
less than 15 minutes.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence community management account.
Sec. 105. Transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Authorization for travel on any common carrier for certain 
              intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of 
              mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central 
              services program.
Sec. 402. Technical corrections.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Three-year extension of authority to engage in commercial 
              activities as security for intelligence collection 
              activities.
Sec. 502. Contracting authority for the National Reconnaissance Office.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title I. The text of title I is as 
follows:

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4392 of the One Hundred 
     Sixth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2001 the sum of $144,231,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee shall remain available until September 
     30, 2002.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence are authorized 356 full-time personnel 
     as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such elements 
     may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements 
     of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2001 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). 
     Such additional amounts shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2002.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2001, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel 
     for such elements as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United 
     States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the 
     staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from 
     another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $28,000,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, 
     and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under 
     paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so 
     transferred for the activities of the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

     SEC. 105. TRANSFER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Limitation on Delegation of Authority of Departments To 
     Object to Transfers.--Section 104(d)(2) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)'';
       (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and 
     (E) as clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively;
       (3) in clause (v), as so redesignated, by striking ``the 
     Secretary or head'' and inserting ``subject to subparagraph 
     (B), the Secretary or head''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority 
     to object to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be 
     delegated by the Secretary or head of the department 
     involved.
       ``(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the 
     authority to object to such a transfer may be delegated by 
     the Secretary of Defense, but only to the Deputy Secretary of 
     Defense.
       ``(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph 
     (A)(v) shall have no effect unless submitted to the Director 
     of Central Intelligence in writing.''.
       (b) Limitation on Delegation of Duties of Director of 
     Central Intelligence.--Section 104(d)(1) of such Act (50 
     U.S.C. 403-4(d)(1)) is amended--

[[Page H3498]]

       (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(1)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority 
     given the Director under this subsection to the Deputy 
     Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.''.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of 
the bill be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the remainder of the bill is as follows:

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTING.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of 
     Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements 
     of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the 
     national security interests of the United States and 
     consistent with operational and security concerns related to 
     the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally 
     sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that 
     maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as 
     having been made in the United States.

     SEC. 304. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR 
                   CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


  ``travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection 
                               personnel

       ``Sec. 116. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Director of Central Intelligence may 
     authorize travel on any common carrier that, in the 
     discretion of the Director, would by its use maintain or 
     enhance the protection of sources or methods of intelligence 
     collection or maintain or enhance the security of personnel 
     of the intelligence community carrying out intelligence 
     collection activities.
       ``(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--The Director may only 
     delegate the authority granted by this section to the Deputy 
     Director of Central Intelligence, or with respect to 
     employees of the Central Intelligence Agency the Director may 
     delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for 
     Operations.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 115 the following new item:

``Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence 
              collection personnel.''.

     SEC. 305. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO 
                   WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED 
                   CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.

       Section 721(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2366) (Public Law 104-293, 110 
     Stat. 3474) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Not later than 6 months after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter,'' 
     and inserting ``Not later than March 1, 2001, and every March 
     1 thereafter,''; and
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``6 months'' and 
     inserting ``year''.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S 
                   CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

       Section 21(c)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(c)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G); 
     and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(F) Receipts from miscellaneous reimbursements from 
     individuals and receipts from the rental of property and 
     equipment to employees and detailees.''.

     SEC. 402. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

       (a) Reporting Requirement.--Section 17(d)(1) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by adding ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (D);
       (2) by striking subparagraph (E); and
       (3) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (E).
       (b) Terminology With Respect to Government Agencies.--
     Section 17(e)(8) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(8)) is amended by striking 
     ``Federal'' each place it appears and inserting 
     ``Government''.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN 
                   COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR 
                   INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

       Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``December 31, 2000'' and inserting ``December 
     31, 2003''.

     SEC. 502. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FOR THE NATIONAL 
                   RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

       (a) In General.--The National Reconnaissance Office 
     (``NRO'') shall negotiate, write, and manage vehicle 
     acquisition or launch contracts that affect or bind the NRO 
     and to which the United States is a party.
       (b) Effective Date.--This section shall apply to any 
     contract for NRO vehicle acquisition or launch, as described 
     in subsection (a), that is negotiated, written, or executed 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Retroactivity.--This section shall not apply to any 
     contracts, as described in subsection (a), in effect as of 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.


                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Roemer

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Roemer.
       At the end of title III add the following new section (and 
     conform the table of contents accordingly):

     SEC. 306.  ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE PRECEDING 
                   FISCAL YEAR.

       Section 14 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     404i) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Annual Statement of the Total Amount of Intelligence 
     Expenditures for the Preceding Fiscal Year.--Not later than 
     February 1 of each year, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress a report containing an unclassified 
     statement of the aggregate appropriations for the fiscal year 
     immediately preceding the current year for National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program (NFIP), Tactical and Intelligence and 
     Related Activities (TIARA), and Joint Military Intelligence 
     Program (JMIP) activities, including activities carried out 
     under the budget of the Department of Defense to collect, 
     analyze, produce, disseminate, or support the collection of 
     intelligence.''.

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the debate on this 
particular issue.
  First of all, I want to reiterate to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) that I rise in 
strong support and bipartisan support of this bill overall. I do, 
however, bring up one consideration as amendment on this bill, and that 
is we do not want to reveal agency operations, we do not want to reveal 
any individual agency budgets, and we do not want to reveal spending on 
any kind of specific programs.
  Given those parameters, what this amendment argues is for one ray of 
sunshine, one simple disclosure of the aggregate funding of all 
intelligence activities for fiscal year 1999. Not this year's request, 
not this year's budget, but 1999's budget.
  We do that in light of the fact, and I stress to my colleagues, that 
the intelligence community has voluntarily disclosed the 1998 and the 
1997 budgets, so we are simply saying that this one ray of sunlight 
comes down for the taxpayer to have some kind of sense of what the 
overall budget is for our intelligence community.
  Now, this amendment is cosponsored by my good friend the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Moran), it is cosponsored by my friend the gentleman 
from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer), it is cosponsored by my friend the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith), and, I think most importantly, 
it is supported by my ranking member, who I have the deepest respect 
for, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon).
  The organizations that are for this ray of sunshine, for a little bit 
of accountability in disclosure, the organizations that have written us 
letters on this, include the Taxpayers for Common Sense, Citizens 
Against Government Waste, the Council for a Livable World, the Center 
for Defense Information, the Center for International Policy, and the 
list goes on and on.
  But I think one of the most compelling, one of the most compelling 
reasons to do this, Mr. Chairman, is a report that came out in 1996 by 
people

[[Page H3499]]

who go over these individual budget levels throughout the intelligence 
community, line-by-line, program by program, SAP by SAP, special access 
program by special access program, and they have analyzed this. And 
they are such people as the former Defense Secretaries, Mr. Brown and 
Mr. Aspin. They recommended that we disclose not just the current year, 
but the next year's budget. This was in the Aspin-Brown report in 1996. 
So they asked for a few rays of sunshine on this report, when all I am 
simply asking for is one on the 1999 budget funding level.
  I think this is common sense, I think this will help us get a little 
bit more accountability with the intelligence community. I think this 
informs the taxpayer of an overall budget, what might be going on in 
terms of our intelligence operations. And I think one of the most 
really convincing arguments for this, Mr. Chairman, is that we have 
right here the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. And 
in this we have listed, which is a public document, Mr. Chairman, this 
is an unclassified document, they go through here and list Rivet Joint 
Mission Trainer, $15.5 million plus-up; the Manned Reconnaissance 
Systems, $8 million plus-up; the F-18 Shared Airborne Reconnaissance 
Pod, $18 million plus-up; and on down, over page after page after page, 
a public document.
  We are not even asking for that. We already disclose that in this 
report. We are asking for the aggregate level, not broken down by 
agency, for 1999. Not individual reports, not individual line items, 
like we do in the Defense Department budget, like we did last week, 
item by item, of helicopters and ships and personnel and operations and 
maintenance in our Defense budget. We are not calling for any of that 
in this budget; simply for an aggregate level.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that there are books out there that 
talk in explicit and sensitive detail about some of our very sensitive 
operations.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Roemer was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, there are books out there that you can pick 
up on the best seller list. I am not confirming, I am not denying what 
they say and what accuracy they have in a book written by Tom Clancy, 
or a book written called Blind Man's Bluff on submarines. But certainly 
some of these books that are written by former CIA people or are 
written by journalists and reporters, that talk in intimate detail 
about some of these programs, I do not support the release of that kind 
of information. But we are simply saying, Mr. Chairman, one ray of 
sunshine for disclosure, for public accountability and for information 
for the taxpayer, so that they have one grain of information to look at 
as they assess what our priorities should be with the intelligence 
budget as it relates to the overall budget.
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  Mr. Chairman, I regret really having to oppose this amendment offered 
by my three very good friends and colleagues, but I do not believe it 
makes sense to force, and the word is ``force,'' the executive branch 
to declassify the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence 
activities each year. If there is one item of information a country 
should not disclose to its adversaries, it is the amount of effort 
being made each year to discover those adversaries' plans and 
intentions, their secrets and vulnerabilities.
  Much of the business of intelligence is expensive, especially when it 
comes to our government's amazing technical activities. Yet those 
capabilities can sometimes be defeated by comparatively simple 
countermeasures. If our adversaries can track the ups and downs of our 
intelligence budget over time, they may be able to figure out when new 
capabilities are coming on line and develop techniques to make the 
system less capable. We should keep our intelligence budget secret so 
we do not provide information to our adversaries about what we are 
working on and when.
  Furthermore, I do not believe disclosure of the aggregate 
appropriations amount will improve the debates on intelligence in this 
body. Every Member of the House of Representatives may have access to 
this information, and considerably more, by taking advantage of the 
opportunity to read the classified schedule incorporated in the 
intelligence authorization bill each year. Disclosure of the 
appropriations total will not provide more information about 
intelligence activities to Members of the House and Senate than is now 
available.
  Since disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget will not 
provide more information to Members of Congress but could assist those 
who seek advantages over the United States of America, I urge the 
defeat of this amendment.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, the sponsors of this amendment are not being 
subversive, and I do not think we are being naive. I think we are being 
responsible to the taxpayers, to the extent that it is responsible.
  Now, I would certainly agree with my good friend who just spoke that 
we ought not disclose any kind of information that would jeopardize our 
ability to protect American citizens. But this does not do that.
  When my good friend, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), said he 
was offering the amendment and would I like to be a cosponsor, I said, 
``Of course. Why not?'' That is still my reaction. Of course, we will 
not disclose the cumulative amount. Why not? It is not an astronomical 
amount; it is a very reasonable portion of the Federal budget. In fact, 
when you compare it to anyone that might be considered a potential 
threat, it is a very minimal amount to protect this country.
  But we have a responsibility to the taxpayers. It is their money; it 
is not ours. It is one thing not to give the taxpayers a receipt or an 
accounting of how we might spend the money; it is quite another to ask 
for a blank check. Just sign the bottom line, we will fill in the 
amount.
  I do not think that is the way we do things, that we ought to do 
things in a democracy. We ought to have as much transparency as 
possible. We ought to do everything that we can to restore trust in 
government. This is not a totalitarian society. I could see it if we 
were operating under a fascist or certainly a communist system. You 
would never imagine disclosing these kinds of amounts. But we have 
nothing to hide. We have very responsible members of the Committee on 
Appropriations on both sides of the aisle, and certainly the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Dixon) is an extraordinarily responsible leader on our side, and 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) as well.

                              {time}  1900

  Now, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) is supporting, but so 
is Warren Rudman, a former Senator, certainly not a subversive, 
certainly not someone that does anything in a radical kind of manner. 
General Harold Brown; we have the former CIA director Turner; we have 
any number of people that looked at this and decided this is not an 
irresponsible thing to do. In fact, this is a responsible thing to do 
in light of the requirement that we have to be responsive to the 
American taxpayer.
  So I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this amendment ought to be 
included, and it probably ought to be included as a matter of course in 
each successive year. It is nice that the CIA or our intelligence 
agencies chose to disclose the amount in 1997 and 1998, and probably 
will be disclosed this year; but I think we ought to say as well that 
the legislative branch recognizes that this is an appropriate thing to 
do in light of the fact that it is not our money, it is the taxpayers' 
money.
  It was a recommendation, as the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) 
said, of the commission that was put together to look at these types of 
national security issues. They came up with a recommendation that the 
amount be disclosed to the public, the overall amount for the 
intelligence budget on a current basis. This is not on a current basis, 
this is the previous fiscal year. I think it is a very moderate piece 
of legislation, it is a reasonable thing to do, and I would hope

[[Page H3500]]

that we would not have much controversy over something like this and 
deal with more difficult, complex matters.
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, there is something that I think we are forgetting in 
this debate and that is that every Member of Congress can go up to the 
Select Committee on Intelligence room and see the entire content of the 
intelligence authorization bill. There is nothing that is kept from us 
as elected representatives, but there are things that are kept in every 
detail from our opponents and our potential enemies.
  That puts the responsibility on a small number of shoulders, and most 
of them are sitting in this room here now, the members of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is our job to review the 
budgets and the sources and the methods and to provide oversight of all 
of the intelligence agencies, and we have to do this job in a way that 
is kind of uncommon for politicians. We have to do it quietly, without 
a lot of public hooha, in a closed room where the press is not there. 
Most of us are used to putting out press releases on everything and 
arguing about things in the media, but we do not have that privilege on 
this committee, and we should not, because this is a matter of national 
security.
  Declassifying the intelligence budget, whether as an overall number, 
or in smaller pieces, only helps our enemies to track trends in our 
spending and figure out what we are doing. My colleague from Indiana 
talks about books that have been published or articles that have been 
written, and none of us on this committee ever confirm or deny or say 
anything about what is right and what is wrong; and he well knows that 
a lot of it is complete wildness. But we do not comment on it, because 
it is our job not to.
  The problem with declassifying the whole number is that one cannot 
talk about the details, so it makes no sense in context with other 
parts of the budget. We cannot explain it, we cannot defend it, we 
cannot talk about the details and what it means and what we are buying; 
but we can refer our colleagues up to the intelligence room to look at 
those details, even though we cannot talk about it publicly. Even the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran) seemed to find it difficult to talk 
about comparisons here on the floor because this is a public forum. We 
would have that difficulty again and again and again if we try to 
justify a declassified total number without being able to talk about 
the specifics that make it up.
  I am also concerned that there are no exceptions in this amendment 
for time of war or national emergencies, and we are directing the 
President and the CIA to declassify numbers that, frankly, they already 
have the authority to do without direction of this Congress; and it 
concerns me when, as elected representatives, we tell the executive 
branch to declassify things and get proscriptive about how exactly that 
should be done. It is my view that that generally should be left up to 
the executive branch of government.
  Sometimes I think that we get a little bit complacent. The Cold War 
is over. We are all focused on things at home, on Social Security and 
taxes and education, and things that our constituents are facing every 
day. But just because the Cold War is over does not mean that there are 
not people out there that would take advantage of the United States and 
whose interests are contrary to our own, and I am ever mindful of what 
Churchill once said. The truth must be protected by a bodyguard of 
lies, and it is sometimes in the interests of the United States of 
America to deceive our enemies about what we are actually doing in 
order to protect our national security.
  My colleague from Indiana talks about one ray of sunshine. I see it a 
little differently. I think it is one piece of a puzzle, a piece of a 
puzzle that our enemies would very much like to have, and which I think 
is the obligation of this body to deny them.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. WILSON. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman, who is a very 
valuable member of the Committee on Intelligence, and I certainly 
respect her opinions on a host of different issues.
  However, as she started out the debate on this issue, she said, we as 
members of the committee have access, the 16 of us, and all 435 
members, have access if they want. This amendment is not about that 
access of Members of Congress. Sometimes we think we are pretty smart; 
we think we know and have a lot of the answers. This is about providing 
one simple piece of information to the people that work hard every day 
to fund the overall budget, and then they get one ray of sunshine to 
know how the intelligence budget fits into the overall budget.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. 
Wilson) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mrs. Wilson was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, that really was not my point. My point was 
that there are times when we as elected representatives have to take on 
and shoulder tremendous responsibility, and that responsibility may 
include access to information that we cannot share with our 
constituents. That is the responsibility we have been given as members 
of this committee, and it is one that I think that we should continue, 
including this one piece of information.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, the point, as my colleague from Indiana was making, was 
what the public has a right to know. The fiscal year 1997 budget was 
revealed to the American public as $26.6 billion. That was not 
something that was probably a shock to our adversaries, who have pretty 
good estimates of what we are doing in this arena. There are experts 
that speculate on this. The Republic's foundations have not been 
shattered. The next year when it was revealed that it was $26.7 
billion, life went on, and if we were to give the American public what 
the figure is for this year and what is recommended in the aggregate 
for the following year, life as we know it will continue.
  I think that we in this body and in the Federal Government generally 
tend to draw a curtain of secrecy over things that are not going to be 
secret from our adversaries; but they are going to keep, and this 
happens time and time again, information that we do not want revealed 
to the American public for whatever reason.
  We are starting to see the history of what has happened with the FBI 
under J. Edgar Hoover under the guise of national security. We have 
seen the things that have been perpetrated by that agency under Mr. 
Hoover's regime.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that it is time for us to take a step back and 
look at this amendment, which gives the American public an opportunity 
to evaluate some of the trending. It is not going to be a great mystery 
to our adversaries who have access to some information from their 
sources. It is speculated upon in the academic community, but it will 
give the American public a little more information.
  I think it is appropriate for us to ask hard questions as a people 
about the resources that are being invested. How, given the tens of 
billions of dollars that were invested in our security apparatus, we 
could not predict the collapse of the former Soviet Union; that we 
somehow could not identify the Chinese embassy, which resulted in a 
tragic bombing, the impact of the repercussions we are still dealing 
with.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to be honest about the public 
realm and stop the charade here. There is an adequate amount of 
information that is available for very sophisticated people to be able 
to allow some tracking of this. I think taking an additional step so 
that the American public has it makes sense. I hope that we will be 
more rational about what we keep secret and what we do not. I am all in 
favor of trying to protect things that are truly important for national 
security, but not to protect people from embarrassment about things 
years after the fact, and not to protect the American public from 
knowing how their tax dollars were spent.
  Rumor has it that in about 1987 we had a peak of about $36 billion 
that were invested in all of these intelligence activities. Yet, today, 
13 years later, with a less sophisticated array of allied forces that 
we are contending

[[Page H3501]]

with, we are still investing huge sums of money that ought to give us 
all an opportunity for a constructive national debate.
  I think the approval of this amendment, with the recommendations of 
the commission that we had of other informed sources who want to pull 
this out into the light of day, as my friend, the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has indicated, would be an important step forward.
  Mr. Chairman, I hope that we as a body will be consistent in terms of 
wanting to make sure that the public has access to all of the positions 
that they have a right to have knowledge of and that does not 
compromise our security. We can start by at least going back and giving 
a third year's subject for what the total disclosure is.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of this amendment.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman's amendment, and I 
thank him for his courage and his leadership in offering it here. He is 
a very serious member of the committee, as has been noted, and all of 
us on the committee take our responsibilities very seriously.
  When a Member of the House receives the honor of serving on the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we assume a greater 
responsibility for our national security in that we have to be trusted 
with a great deal of information. We also take a responsibility to 
protect the sources and methods by which we obtain that information. 
That responsibility is a grave one for us, because lives are at stake.
  We also want our President and the administration to have the best 
possible information in the interest of our national security and to 
make the decisions and judgments that a President must make, regardless 
of what party he belongs to, or what opinions he has. We want him to 
have the best possible information.
  So we need to have, and again, as we are in a new world where it is 
not bipolar, but it is many serpents, as DCI Woolsey described it at 
one time, we need to have intelligence, but we ought to be careful 
enough to move in that direction with fiscal responsibility as well as 
responsibility for intelligence.

                              {time}  1915

  We are a very special country. The confidence that people have in our 
government is our strength. So it is hard to understand why, in this 
body, the House of the people, we would want to deprive the public of 
knowing what proportion of our budget is spent on intelligence.
  I happen to think that we are good enough at that, that the 
intelligence community is good enough at releasing that figure and at 
the same time having our adversaries not have access to what that 
figure is spent on or what any increase in spending would be spent on.
  I am certain that our intelligence community can meet that challenge.
  The accountability that the intelligence community must have is one 
of the main reasons that I am supporting the amendment of the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Roemer). Some have said if we go through releasing 
this aggregate number, it starts us down a road to releasing other 
information. No, no, it does not have to be that way. We can say it is 
the aggregate number and that is that. We can make a decision, Congress 
can act, and that can be what the decision is.
  It does not mean we are starting down the road to anything, except 
better accountability to the American people, again for how this fits 
into our total budget. Our budget is what we spend most of our time 
working on here, whether it is in the authorizing committees to prepare 
the policy or the Committee on the Budget to do the allocations or the 
Committee on Appropriations to do the final appropriating. So it is 
what we spend most of our time on, and this amount of money, whatever 
it is, is a large percentage of that discretionary spending, a very 
large percentage of it.
  So as we have to make decisions about cuts here and there, I think it 
is perfectly appropriate that the public knows how this intelligence 
budget fits into the entire budget.
  It is difficult to believe that the aggregate budget figure for 
fiscal years 1997 and 1998 could be made public by DCI Tenet with no 
impact on national security and the figure for fiscal year 1999 could 
not be because national security would be harmed if it were disclosed.
  It is so sad, it is almost ludicrous, it is almost ludicrous, when 
what we are trying to do is to protect the community so that there is 
respect for the job that they do, but what we are trying to do is 
protect their sources and methods.
  By the way, I want to add here that there is much else that should be 
declassified that is in the realm of classified now, and that is a 
whole other subject and one that hopefully we will go into in a more 
serious way as declassification is taking place, but this one simple 
matter, which says to the American people we are not afraid for them to 
know the aggregate number that we spend on intelligence.
  The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) is doing a service to our 
country and to this Congress by proposing this amendment. Again, I 
commend him for his courage, his leadership and urge our colleagues to 
support his amendment.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, for a reasonably short 
time I have had the privilege of chairing the Committee on 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that deals with national 
security. As some of my colleagues have mentioned, there are some of 
our individual military items that are in what we call the black world. 
They are kept secret.
  They are kept secret for a reason, and that is beyond just their 
technological potential and capability. There are a lot of things about 
those systems we would not want our enemies to know. I realize that 
this amendment has little to do with that, for we are not being asked 
to peel back the onion, even though the gentlewoman just suggested 
there are many things that are classified that she would prefer to be 
unclassified.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Let me continue my statement. I would like 
to continue my statement.
  Ms. PELOSI. I appreciate that, but that is not what I said. I am 
talking about information, and the gentleman knows I am respectful of 
his position.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I understand what the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi) was saying, but I am just making a suggestion 
that there is a parallel here.
  One of the pieces of information that is largely public at this point 
has to do with our submarine force. There are people who would suggest 
that we do not need very many more submarines. There are others who 
suggest we ought to have at least as many as we have, and one of the 
reasons is because they go under the water and nobody really 
necessarily knows where they are.
  In the straits near China, it might be interesting to have leaders 
wonder whether we are there or not.
  Well, I make that point because there is a parallel here. Our 
intelligence effort is considerably smaller than some of us would like 
it to be and revealing that number might suggest to many as to why many 
of us are so concerned. On the other side of that, there is reason and 
value in suggesting that maybe our enemies or potential enemies think 
that we spend a lot more money than we do. I would like them to think 
that, frankly, and there is value in having them think that.
  Now, the point that I am making is that this fabulous democracy that 
we have the privilege of representing here involves the people sending 
us to this great forum, to sit in committees, to sit on this floor, 
argue pro and con, develop the information that leads to logical policy 
conclusions. The public sends us here because they cannot come here to 
do that detail work. They send us here also knowing full well that 
there are items relative to the national interest, that not only are 
they not able to participate day in and day out about but indeed they 
think we should do it with competence and sometimes in confidence.
  The fact is that there is not a ground swell of public outcry out 
there saying we have to have this number. It has

[[Page H3502]]

been debated here on the floor for several years, but the numbers of 
people who are really interested perhaps are reflected by the numbers 
of Members who have gone to our committee room to read these bills.
  Outside of our committee, I believe the number last year where 
someone came in was seven Members actually went in to read the bill, 
and I frankly wonder if they read the whole bill. The first page on 
there shows them what the number is. There are four so far this year.
  So there is this huge ground swell out there suggesting that the 
public has no confidence in us in this very delicate area. I would 
suggest that the public that actually studies this area knows there is 
value in not having our enemies or our potential enemies know how 
little we spend or how much we spend. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I 
strongly oppose this amendment
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. PELOSI. I just want to make sure it is clear that I completely 
agree with everything the gentleman said except for the aggregate 
number.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I am making the point about the aggregate 
number.
  Ms. PELOSI. I understand that. The gentleman said I said there should 
be more things. What I am talking about is the Hinchey amendment, which 
talked about our U.S. involvement in Chile and Guatemala and those 
things.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman.
  Ms. PELOSI. Not the gentleman's budget, the gentleman is right.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California has the time.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, with that I believe I made the 
point that I do not want our enemies to know how much we are not 
spending as well as how much we are spending, and I think that is in 
the national interest, in the security of our country's interest and 
perhaps, well not perhaps but very much in the interest of peace.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, those who are watching have to be extraordinarily 
puzzled by this debate. Now since the year I was born, and as everyone 
can all see I am getting a little long in the tooth, that has been 
quite a few years, 1947, the United States has kept secret the amount 
of money that is spent well and the amount of money that is not spent 
so well on the intelligence services and agencies of the United States.
  This certainly could have been a rationale in 1947, the year I was 
born with the closing of the Iron Curtain, the fear of the Soviet Union 
and their growth across Europe and around the world; threats that we 
perceived, but that is history. The Soviet Union has collapsed. We are 
now confronted with rogue nations and others.
  Our defense budget, and the gentleman waxed eloquent about how few go 
to read it, I do not go to read it. Does anyone know why? It is a Catch 
22. If I go and read it, I cannot talk about it but if I do not read it 
then I can talk about it. I will say we are spending $30 billion, $30 
billion of hard-earned taxpayer dollars on the intelligence services.
  Now we had one agency a few years ago that lost $4 billion in 
bookkeeping. They did not know they had it. Well, they found it again 
after they were audited; and that money has been reallocated, I guess. 
I do not know. I have not gone up to check out the secret report.
  The only reason it is kept secret is to keep it secret from the 
American people, not from our enemies. This amount of money is more 
than the gross domestic product of virtually all of our enemies 
combined. They would be frightened to death if they knew we were 
spending $30 billion to sneak around in their countries or to look at 
them from satellites or however else it is we are monitoring their 
activities. But they do not know that and the gentleman says, well, we 
would not want them to know how little we are spending. Only $30 
billion, only $30 billion? This is extraordinary.
  The gentleman has not even proposed that we would tell them how much 
we are going to spend this year, which is more secret. It might be an 
increase of X percent of X which might be Y. Those who took math can 
follow that. But we do not know. We really do not know, and they would 
not know. They would only know what we spent last year.
  This is an incredibly modest amendment. It will let the taxpayers 
know how much money we spent last year. We are not going to audit how 
they spent it. We are not going to audit if they lost billions again 
like that agency unnamed did a few years ago. We are not going to audit 
to see if it was well spent, if it was spent on satellites or human 
information or other secret technologies to monitor every communication 
around the earth that I am getting a lot of e-mails about in my office. 
No. We would just know how much money we spent last year on this 
aggregate budget.
  I think it would scare the bejesus out of all of our enemies if they 
knew how much we were spending. They would be really scared. They 
cannot come near 1/100th of 1 percent of that for their intelligence 
budget. So let us reveal it.
  Like the gentleman has proposed, we are only going to reveal it for 
last year. I would go further. I would actually reveal it for this 
year. I do not think that would be a problem. In fact, we do have a 
report which came out, which I left over there, but a report in 1996 
where in fact, chaired by the Secretary of Defense and others, the 
commission said that there would be no harm, no threat possible to our 
national security to publish this year's and even projected years' 
numbers. In fact, I believe it would scare our enemies into submission.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I support the Roemer amendment. This is an amendment that I think the 
American people are owed today. Perhaps at one time it would not have 
been appropriate to disclose the aggregate amount of the past year's 
intelligence budget, but I think the time has come to do so.
  The first argument that we hear, it is either expressed or implied, 
is that if the American people knew the aggregate amount spent on 
intelligence they would demand that the amount be cut. The problem with 
this argument is that, even if that were true, that is not a reason to 
classify the amount.
  Executive Order 12958 makes clear that information may only be 
classified to protect national security and not hinder discussion or 
debate.
  The second argument we hear in one form or another is that making the 
aggregate figure public would provide no useful information, because a 
context for spending can only be provided at the program level. Because 
the public would be dissatisfied with this useless information, 
irresistible pressure would be brought to declassify more of the 
intelligence budget. This is called the slippery slope argument, and I 
disagree with it.
  I for one will oppose declassification even at the agency level. 
Moreover, fear of what might happen in the future plainly does not meet 
the classification standard in the executive order.
  The third argument is that America's enemies, by comparing year-to-
year aggregate intelligence budgets, and this is the argument we have 
heard mostly tonight, could figure out what specific new programs were 
being funded and the deficiencies these programs were meant to remedy.

                              {time}  1930

  It is difficult to believe that an adversary, no matter how strong 
its analytical skills, could use the top line number to determine 
program specifics. Several nations disclose their intelligence budgets, 
and I doubt if our analysts use solely those figures as a basis for a 
judgment on the specific programs in those budgets.
  Additionally, as the report accompanying this year's authorization 
makes clear, a great deal of information is already made public on the 
shortcomings of the intelligence community.
  Some of us will argue that this year's budget is at an appropriate 
level; others will argue that the administration has not provided 
enough money. The administration's budget request is 6.6 percent above 
last year's appropriation level. Others will argue that, in fact, we 
should cut it.
  If we are to make these arguments on the floor, the American public 
should

[[Page H3503]]

know what that inclusive figure is. It is entirely fighting with one's 
hands behind one's back to say that the President has offered up too 
much or too little, or we have provided too much or too little without 
the public knowing and being able to make the judgment on the aggregate 
number.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment will make an important 
contribution to the debate on the resources necessary to support our 
national security, and I would urge the Members of the House to reflect 
on this overnight and give the public the opportunity to know last 
year's aggregate number. I pledge support to resist opening up the 
budget further. But as we argue too much or too little, the public 
should know what that reference is.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are having this debate again. 
We had it in committee. It was voted down in committee 11-5. In an 
abundance of fairness, the Committee on Rules has given us an open rule 
and done all these things, and we are getting to the point.
  I think there are a couple of points that need to be said. First of 
all, accountability is very important, and I believe our committee does 
a fabulous job on accountability. The point that has been made by 
several who have spoken on this, any Member can come upstairs and 
satisfy themselves on any aspect. The American people look to us for 
that accountability. We are pleased to invite our colleagues to come up 
to the committee to make sure we are doing our job properly. So far, it 
seems we are because, as the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) 
pointed out, there is not a huge groundswell on this subject.
  The second point that has been made as well it would be great to have 
some information out there. It might be confidence building. Well, it 
is true that the President of the United States who does have the 
authority to disclose this number, it does lie with the President of 
the United States to reveal it, chose to reveal it through the Director 
of Central Intelligence in 1997 and 1998. I do not believe there has 
been an uptick in confidence in the intelligence community because of 
that.
  But something else did happen that caused us a problem. When they got 
to 1999, they discovered, whoops, we are getting into a trend-line 
situation. And the President said, ``I do not think it is in the 
national security interest to create these trend lines that our enemies 
can follow,'' and he chose not to disclose the number.
  In fact, the DCI was taken to court over the number, over the issue. 
When the DCI got through making his defense, at the appropriate time I 
will put this in the record, he came to the conclusion that the trend-
line fashion could be reasonably expected to damage national security. 
Judge Hogan for the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia 
sustained the DCI's conclusions and dismissed the lawsuit on the 
summary judgment.
  So I have the President of the United States, head of the 
intelligence community, and the courts all agreeing we have got 
something new, and it is different here.
  Now, some point has been made by the Aspin/Brown Commission. I do not 
claim infallibility for the Aspin/Brown Commission. I was on it. I can 
ensure the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), who has 
made the amendment, that we thought a consensus report was very 
important. We had quite a debate in Aspin/Brown. And rather than make a 
big issue over this, we said, let us have a unanimous report, and we 
put it out.
  I would not read too much in it. What I would read into it is that 
other reports done at the same time, the IC-21 report and the CFR 
report, does not exactly come to the same conclusions. I think what we 
found is that, of the many recommendations that came out of Aspin/
Brown, this one did not prove to be particularly useful. In fact, 
because of this trend-line problem, which we did not debate, 
incidentally, it did not turn out to be helpful.
  Another point that has been made tonight is sunshine. We need just 
one ray of sunshine. Here is 48 pages of sunshine with lots of numbers, 
disclosure of the things that will not damage our national security. 
That is important. We make the decisions, if we think it can be 
disclosed, it should be disclosed, and we try and do that. Of course 
the President has the final word on the question of classification. It 
lies with the executive.
  The final point I would make, I think, is this; and, again, I do not 
want this to be contentious, we have had the debate, and there are 
different views, and they are entirely legitimate, and I accept them. 
We work in a nonpartisan way upstairs, and we have come to a conclusion 
that this is not an amendment we wanted on our authorization, but we 
are bringing it to the Members because one of our Members did.
  I honestly believe that the President trusts Americans. We trust 
Americans. Our committee trusts Americans. Trusting Americans is not 
what this is about. I do not trust our enemies. I do not know whether 
they can get anything useful, but I do not want to take the chance if 
the President of the United States feels that we should not. I do not 
want to give to any terrorist, to any drug dealer, to any weapons 
proliferator any information that could be used against us.
  So perhaps it is an abundance of caution on my part. But those who 
have the first line of responsibility on this said, no, let us not 
reveal it. I think they have made the right judgment. I do not think we 
should override that judgment.
  It is for that reason that I think that we should not approve this 
amendment, and I will urge our colleagues to vote against the Roemer 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include the following materials for printing in the 
Record.

       United States District Court for the District of Columbia

       Steven Aftergood, on behalf of the Federation of American 
     Scientists, Plaintiff, v. Central Intelligence Agency, 
     Defendant.
       Civ. No. 98-2107 (TFH)

                     Declaration of George J. Tenet


                              introduction

       I, GEORGE J. TENET, hereby declare:
       1. I am the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). I was 
     appointed DCI on 11 July 1997. As DCI, I serve as head of the 
     United States intelligence community, act as the principal 
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to 
     the national security, and serve as head of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency (CIA).
       2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I am 
     generally familiar with plaintiff's civil action. I make the 
     following statements based upon my personal knowledge, upon 
     information made available to me in my official capacity, and 
     upon the advice and counsel of the CIA's Office of General 
     Counsel.
       3. I understand that plaintiff has submitted Freedom of 
     Information Act (FOIA) requests for ``a copy of documents 
     that indicate the amount of the total budget request for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal 
     year 1999'' and ``a copy of documents that indicate the total 
     budget appropriation for intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities for fiscal year 1999, updated to reflect 
     the recent additional appropr[Congressional Record
     supplemental' funding for intelligence.'' I also understand 
     that plaintiff alleges that the CIA has improperly withheld 
     such documents. I shall refer to the requested information as 
     the ``budget request'' and ``the total appropriation,'' 
     respectively.
       4. As head of the intelligence community, my 
     responsibilities include developing and presenting to the 
     President an annual budget request for the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program (NFIP), and participating in the 
     development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget 
     requests for the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) 
     and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The 
     budgets for the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA jointly comprise the 
     budget of the United States for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities.
       5. The CIA has withheld the budget request and the total 
     appropriation on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(1) because 
     they are currently and properly classified under Executive 
     Order 12958, and on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(3) 
     because they are exempted from disclosure by the National 
     Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Act of 1949. The purpose of this declaration, and the 
     accompanying classified declaration, is to describe my 
     bases for determining that disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security and 
     would tend to reveal intelligence methods.
       6. I previously executed declarations in this case that 
     were filed with the CIA's motion for summary judgment on 11 
     December 1998. Those two declarations described my bases for 
     withholding the budget request only. Since the CIA filed its 
     motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has filed an amended 
     complaint seeking release of the total appropriation also. 
     For the Court's convenience, the justifications contained in 
     my earlier declarations are repeated and supplemented in this 
     declaration and the accompanying classified declaration and 
     describe my bases for withholding both the budget request and 
     the total appropriation for fiscal year 1999.

[[Page H3504]]

                             Prior Releases

       7. In October 1997, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate 
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for fiscal year 1997 was $26.6 billion. At the 
     time of this disclosure, I issued a public statement that 
     included the following two points:
       First, disclosure of future aggregate figures will be 
     considered only after determining whether such disclosure 
     could cause harm to the national security by showing trends 
     over time.
       Second, we will continue to protect from disclosure any and 
     all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence 
     budget: whether the information concerns particular 
     intelligence programs. In other words, the Administration 
     intends to draw the line at the top-line, aggregate figure. 
     Beyond this figure, there will be no other disclosures of 
     currently classified budget information because such 
     disclosures could harm national security.
       8. In March 1998, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate 
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for fiscal year 1998 was $26.7 billion. I did so 
     only after evaluating whether the 1998 appropriation, when 
     compared with the 1997 appropriation, could cause damage to 
     the national security by showing trends over time, or 
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. Because the 
     1998 appropriation represented approximately a $0.1 billion 
     increase--or less than a 0.4 percent change--over the 1997 
     appropriation, and because published reports did not contain 
     information that if coupled with the appropriation, would be 
     likely to allow the correlation of specific spending figures 
     with particular intelligence programs, I concluded that 
     release of the 1998 appropriation could not reasonably be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security, and so I 
     released the 1998 appropriation.
       9. Since the enactment of the intelligence appropriation 
     for fiscal year 1998, the budget process has produced: 1) the 
     fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriations; 2) the 
     Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 (a 
     subject of this litigation); 3) the fiscal year 1999 regular 
     appropriation (a subject of this litigation); and 4) the 
     fiscal year 1999 emergency supplemental appropriation (a 
     subject of this litigation). Information about each of these 
     figures--some of it accurate, some not--has been reported in 
     the media. In evaluating whether to release the 
     Administration's budget request or total appropriation for 
     fiscal year 1999, I cannot review these possible releases in 
     isolation. Instead, I have to consider whether release of the 
     requested information could add to the mosaic of other public 
     and clandestine information acquired by our adversaries about 
     the intelligence budget in a way that could reasonably be 
     expected to damage the national security. If release of the 
     requested information adds a piece to the intelligence jigsaw 
     puzzle--even if it does not complete the picture--such that 
     the picture is more identifiable, then damage to the national 
     security could reasonably be expected. After conducting such 
     a review, I have determined that release of the 
     Administration's intelligence budget request or total 
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security, or 
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. In the 
     paragraphs that follow, I will provide a description of 
     some of the information that I reviewed and how I reached 
     this conclusion. I am unable to describe all of the 
     information I reviewed without disclosing classified 
     information. Additional information in support of my 
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       10. At the creation of the modern national security 
     establishment in 1947, national policymakers had to address a 
     paradox of intelligence appropriations: the more they 
     publicly disclosed about the amount of appropriations, the 
     less they could publicly debate about the object of such 
     appropriations without causing damage to the national 
     security. They struck the balance in favor of withholding the 
     amount of appropriations. For over fifty years, the Congress 
     has acted in executive session when approving intelligence 
     appropriations to prevent the identification of trends in 
     intelligence spending and any correlations between specific 
     spending figures with particular intelligence programs. Now 
     is an especially critical and turbulent period for the 
     intelligence budget, and the continued secrecy of the fiscal 
     year 1999 budget request and total appropriation is necessary 
     for the protection of vulnerable intelligence capabilities.

              Classified Information FOIA Exemption (b)(1)

       11. The authority to classify information is derived from a 
     succession of Executive orders, the most recent of which is 
     Executive Order 12958, ``Classified National Security 
     Information.'' Section 1.1(c) of the Order defines 
     ``classified information'' as ``information that has been 
     determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to 
     require protection against unauthorized disclosure.'' The CIA 
     has withheld the budget request and the total appropriation 
     as classified information under the criteria established in 
     Executive Order 12958.


                        classification authority

       12. Information may be originally classified under the 
     Order only if it: (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or is 
     under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls 
     within one or more of the categories of information set forth 
     in section 1.5 of the Order; and (3) is classified by an 
     original classification authority who determines that its 
     unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to 
     result in damage to the national security that the original 
     classification authority can identify or describe. The 
     classification of the budget request and the total 
     appropriation meet these requirements.
       13. The Administration's budget request and the total 
     appropriation are information clearly owned, produced by, and 
     under the control of the United States Government. 
     Additionally, the budget request and the total appropriation 
     fall within the category of information listed at section 
     1.5(c) of the Order: ``intelligence activities (including 
     special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or 
     cryptology.''
       14. Finally, I have made the determination required under 
     the Order to classify the budget request and the total 
     appropriation. By Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, 
     ``National Security Information'', 3 C.F.R. 513 (1996), 
     reprinted in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 435 note (Supp. I 1995), and 
     pursuant to section 1.4(a)(2) of Executive Order 12958, the 
     President designated me as an official authorized to exercise 
     original TOP SECRET classification authority. I have 
     determined that the unauthorized disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security. 
     Consequently, I have classified the budget request and the 
     total appropriation at the CONFIDENTIAL level. In the 
     paragraphs below, I will identify and describe the 
     foreseeable damage to national security that reasonably 
     could be expected to result from disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation.


                      damage to national security

       15. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     the national security in several ways. First, disclosure of 
     the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide 
     foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of 
     its intelligence capabilities and weakness. The difference 
     between the appropriation for one year and the 
     Administration's budget request for the next provides a 
     measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment 
     of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease 
     reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are 
     more than adequate to meet the national security needs of the 
     United States. A requested budget increase reflects a 
     decision that existing intelligence programs are insufficient 
     to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no 
     change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs 
     are just adequate to meet our needs.
       16. Similar insights can be gained by analyzing the 
     difference between the total appropriation by Congress for 
     one year and the total appropriation for the next year. The 
     difference between the appropriation for one year and the 
     appropriation for the next year provides a measure of the 
     Congress' assessment of the nation's intelligence programs. 
     Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged 
     appropriation reflect a congressional determination that 
     existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more 
     than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the 
     national security needs of the United States, but an actual 
     figure indicates the degree of change.
       17. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation would provide foreign governments with the 
     United States' own overall assessment of its intelligence 
     weaknesses and priorities and assist them in redirecting 
     their own resources to frustrate the United States' 
     intelligence collection efforts, with the resulting damage to 
     our national security. Because I have determined it to be in 
     our national security interest to deny foreign governments 
     information that would assist them in assessing the strength 
     of United States intelligence capabilities, I have determined 
     that disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     the national security. I am unable to elaborate further on 
     the bases for my determination without disclosing classified 
     information. Additional information in support of my 
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       18. Second, disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to assist foreign 
     governments in correlating specific spending figures with 
     particular intelligence programs. Foreign governments are 
     keenly interested in the United States' intelligence 
     collection priorities. Nowhere are those priorities better 
     reflected than in the level of spending on particular 
     intelligence activities. That is why foreign intelligence 
     services, to varying degrees, devote resources to learning 
     the amount and objects of intelligence spending by other 
     foreign governments. The CIA's own intelligence analysts 
     conduct just such analyses of intelligence spending by 
     foreign governments.
       19. However, no intelligence service, U.S. or foreign, ever 
     has complete information. They are always revising their 
     intelligence estimates based on new information. Moreover, 
     the United States does not have complete information about 
     how much foreign intelligence services know about U.S. 
     intelligence programs and funding. Foreign governments 
     collect information about U.S. intelligence activities 
     from their human intelligence sources; that is, ``spies.'' 
     While the United States will never know exactly how

[[Page H3505]]

     much our adversaries know about U.S. intelligence 
     activities, we do know that all foreign intelligence 
     services know at least as much about U.S. intelligence 
     programs and funding as has been disclosed by the Congress 
     or reported by the media. Therefore, congressional 
     statements and media reporting of the fiscal year 1999 
     budget cycle provide the minimum knowledge that can be 
     attributed to all foreign governments, and serve as a 
     baseline for predictive judgments of the possible damage 
     to national security that could reasonably be expected to 
     result from release of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation.
       20. Budget figures provide useful benchmarks that, when 
     combined with other public and clandestinely-acquired 
     information, assist experienced intelligence analysts in 
     reaching accurate estimates of the nature and extent of all 
     sorts of foreign intelligence activities, including covert 
     operations, scientific and technical research and 
     development, and analytic capabilities. I expect foreign 
     intelligence services to do no less if armed with the same 
     information. While other sources may publish information 
     about the amounts and objects of intelligence spending that 
     damages the national security, I cannot add to that damage by 
     officially releasing information, such as the budget request 
     or the total appropriation, that would tend to confirm or 
     deny these public accounts. Such intelligence would permit 
     foreign governments to learn about United States' 
     intelligence collection priorities and redirect their own 
     resources to frustrate the United States' intelligence 
     collection efforts, with the resulting damage to our national 
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security. I am 
     unable to elaborate further on the basis for my determination 
     without disclosing classified information. Additional 
     information in support of my determination is included in my 
     classified declaration.
       21. In addition, release of both the budget request and the 
     total appropriation would permit one to calculate the exact 
     difference between the Administration's request and Congress' 
     appropriation. It is during the congressional debate over the 
     Administration's budget request that many disclosures of 
     specific intelligence programs are reported in the media. 
     Release of the budget request and total appropriation 
     together would assist our adversaries in correlating the 
     added or subtracted intelligence programs with the exact 
     amount of spending devoted to them.
       22. And third, disclosure of the budget request or the 
     total appropriation reasonably could be expected to free 
     foreign governments' limited collection and analysis 
     resources for other efforts targeted against the United 
     States. No government has unlimited intelligence resources. 
     Resources devoted to targeting the nature and extent of the 
     United States' intelligence spending are resources that 
     cannot be devoted to other efforts targeted against the 
     United States. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation would free those foreign resources for other 
     intelligence collection activities directed against the 
     United States, with the resulting damage to our national 
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security.
       23. In summary, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to provide foreign intelligence services with a 
     valuable benchmark for identifying and frustrating United 
     States' intelligence programs. For all of the above reasons, 
     singularly and collectively, I have determined that 
     disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation 
     for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be expected to cause 
     damage to the national security. Therefore, I have determined 
     that the budget request and the total appropriation are 
     currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

              Intelligence Methods--FOIA Exemption (b)(3)

       24. Section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, 
     as amended, provides that the DCI, as head of the 
     intelligence community, ``shall protect intelligence sources 
     and methods from unauthorized disclosure.'' Disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation would jeopardize 
     intelligence methods because disclosure would tend to reveal 
     how and for what purposes intelligence appropriations are 
     secretly transferred to and expended by intelligence 
     agencies.
       25. There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA. 
     The appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the 
     intelligence community are hidden in the various annual 
     appropriations acts. The specific locations of the 
     intelligence appropriations in those acts are not publicly 
     identified, both to protect the classified nature of the 
     intelligence programs themselves and to protect the 
     classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and 
     between intelligence agencies.
       26. Because there are a finite number of places where 
     intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a 
     skilled budget analyst could construct a hypothetical 
     intelligence budget by aggregating suspected intelligence 
     line items from the publicly-disclosed appropriations. 
     Release of the budget request or the total appropriation 
     would provide a benchmark to test and refine such a 
     hypothesis. Repeated disclosures of either the budget request 
     or total appropriation could provide more data with which to 
     test and refine a hypothesis. Confirmation of the 
     hypothetical budget could disclose the actual locations in 
     the appropriations acts where the intelligence funds are 
     hidden, which is the intelligence method used to transfer 
     funds to and between intelligence agencies.
       27. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949 
     constitute the legal authorization for the secret transfer 
     and spending of intelligence funds. Together, these two 
     sections implement Congress' intent that intelligence 
     appropriations and expenditures, respectively, be shielded 
     from public view. Simply stated, the means of providing money 
     to the CIA is itself an intelligence method. Disclosure of 
     the budget request or the total appropriation could assist in 
     finding the locations of secret intelligence appropriations, 
     and thus defeat these congressionally-approved secret funding 
     mechanism. Therefore I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation would tend to 
     reveal intelligence methods that are protected from 
     disclosure. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for 
     my determination without disclosing classified information. 
     Additional information in support of my determination is 
     included in my classified declaration.

                               Conclusion

       28. In fulfillment of my statutory responsibility as head 
     of the United States intelligence community, as the principal 
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to 
     the national security, and as head of the CIA, to protect 
     classified information and intelligence methods from 
     unauthorized disclosure, I have determined for the reasons 
     set forth above and in my classified declaration that the 
     Administration's intelligence budget request and the total 
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 must be withheld because 
     their disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage 
     to the national security and would tend to reveal 
     intelligence methods.
       I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the 
     foregoing is true and correct.
       Executed this 6th day of April, 1999.
                                                  George J. Tenet,
                                 Director of Central Intelligence.

                           Memorandum Opinion

       Pending before the Court is Defendant Central Intelligence 
     Agency (``CIA'')'s Motion for Summary Judgment. After careful 
     consideration of Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum 
     in Opposition, Defendant's reply, the arguments presented at 
     the November 1 hearing, and upon a second review of both 
     classified affidavits as well as the unclassified affidavit 
     filed by Defendant in this case, the Court will grant 
     Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.


                               background

       Plaintiff Steven Aftergood, on behalf of the Federation of 
     American Scientists, seeks disclosure under the Freedom of 
     Information Act (``FOIA''), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552, of the 
     Administration's total budget request for fiscal year 1999 
     for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities. 
     Defendant, the United States Central Intelligence Agency 
     (``CIA''), denied plaintiff's request on the basis that the 
     information is exempt from FOIA's disclosure requirements 
     because it is properly classified under Executive Order 12958 
     in the interest of national defense or foreign policy 
     (Exemption 1) and because release of this figure would tend 
     to reveal intelligence sources and methods that are 
     specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (Exemption 
     3). On December 11, 1998, the Defendant moved for summary 
     judgment on the basis of three declarations from George J. 
     Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence (``DCI''), one 
     unclassified filed as an exhibit to Defendant's Motion for 
     Summary Judgment, and two classified which were filed under 
     seal and ex parte for the Court's in camera review. These 
     declarations explain why DCI Tenet believes the release of 
     the figure requested by Plaintiff could reasonably be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security and would 
     tend to reveal intelligence methods and sources.


                               discussion

     I. FOIA Exemption 1
       Exemption 1 of FOIA exempts from mandatory disclosure 
     records that are: (A) specifically authorized under criteria 
     established by Executive Order to be kept secret in the 
     interest of national defense or foreign policy, and (B) are 
     in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order. 
     5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(1). The Executive Order currently in 
     effect is Executive Order (``E.O.'') 12958, ``Classified 
     National Security Information.''
       Courts have prescribed a two-part test, part substantive 
     and part procedural, to be applied in determining whether 
     material has been properly withheld under Exemption 1. 
     Substantively, the agency must show that the records at issue 
     logically fall within the exemption, i.e., that an Executive 
     Order authorizes that the particular information sought be 
     kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign 
     policy. Procedurally, the agency must show that it followed 
     the proper procedures in classifying the information. 
     Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970-72 (D.C. Cir. 
     1982). If the agency meets both tests, it is then entitled to 
     summary judgment. See, e.g., Abbotts v. NRC, 766 f.2d 604, 
     606 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 
     (D.C. Cir. 1984).
       a. The Procedural Requirements of Exemption 1
       Based on the unclassified Declaration of DCI Tenet, the CIA 
     has demonstrated that it

[[Page H3506]]

     has followed the proper procedures in classifying the total 
     budget request for intelligence activities. Proper 
     classification must be made by an original classification 
     authority who determines that the information is owned by, 
     produced by or for, or is under the control of the United 
     States Government; that it falls within one or more 
     categories of information set forth in section 1.5 of the 
     Executive Order; and that the information's unauthorized 
     disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage 
     to the national security that the original classification 
     authority can identify or describe. See E.O. 12958, 
     Sec. 1.2(a); see also 32 C.F.R. Sec. 2001.10(b) (Information 
     Security Oversight Office directive explaining that agency 
     classifier must be able to identify and describe damage to 
     national security potentially caused by unauthorized 
     disclosure).
       DCI Tenet is an official authorized to exercise original 
     TOP SECRET classification authority. Tenet Declaration para. 
     13; see Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, ``National 
     Security Information,'' 3 C.F.R. Sec. 513 (1996); E.O. 12958 
     Sec. 1.4(a)(2). Further DCI Tenet has determined that the 
     amount of the budget request for all intelligence activities 
     is owned by the United States Government, see Tenet 
     Declaration, para. 12; that it falls within the category of 
     information listed at section 1.5(c) of the Executive Order, 
     described as ``intelligence activities (including special 
     activities), intelligence sources or methods, or 
     cryptology,'' see Id.; and that its disclosure reasonably 
     could be expected to cause damage to the national security, 
     see Id. at para.para. 13 et seq.
       Plaintiff contends that DCI's determination is at odds with 
     that of the President of the United States and that this 
     conflict renders DCI determination invalid. However, although 
     the President clearly has the authority to do so, the 
     President has never released or ordered the release of, 
     the Administration's budget request or the total 
     appropriated amount for intelligence activities for fiscal 
     year 1999. Therefore, the statement of a Presidential 
     spokesman, made three years earlier, that, as a general 
     matter, the President believed ``that disclosure of the 
     annual amount appropriated for intelligence purposes will 
     not, in itself, harm intelligence activities,'' is neither 
     on point nor in any way legally binding. Plaintiff has 
     offered this Court no evidence that the President has ever 
     addressed the impact of disclosure of the Administration's 
     budget request or the total amount appropriated for 
     intelligence activities for fiscal year 1999. The fact 
     that the President encouraged release of similar 
     information in earlier years is not determinative here. 
     Unless or until the President explicitly orders the 
     release of this information or withdraws his authorization 
     of DCI Tenet to make these classified determinations, and 
     absent a finding by this Court that DCI Tenet was somehow 
     acting in bad faith in refusing to release this 
     information, the Court finds that TCI Tenet is authorized 
     to make this highly fact-dependent classification 
     determination at issue in this case, and that he has 
     properly done so here.
       b. The Substantive Requirements of Exemption I
       To demonstrate that the budget request for intelligence 
     falls within Exemption 1, the CIA must also explain why the 
     information at issue properly falls within one or more of the 
     categories of classifiable information, in this case 
     ``intelligence sources or methods,'' see E.O. 12958 
     Sec. 1.5(c), and why its unauthorized disclosure could 
     reasonably be expected to result in damage to the national 
     security.
       When determining whether the records at issue are properly 
     within the scope of the exemption; this Court must 
     ``determine the matter de novo.'' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B). 
     In Exemption 1 cases, Congress has indicated and courts have 
     consistently recognized, that an agency's determination as to 
     potential adverse effects resulting from public disclosure of 
     a classified record should be accorded substantial weight. 
     See, e.g., Bowers v. Department of Justice, 930 F.2d 350, 357 
     (4th Cir. 1991) (``What fact or bit of information may 
     compromise national security is best left to the intelligence 
     experts.''); Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 
     109 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the agency's determination should be 
     accorded ``utmost deference''); Washington Post v. DOD, 766 
     F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1991) (judicial review of agency 
     classification decision should be ``quite deferential''). The 
     agency's determination merits this deference because 
     ``[e]xecutive departments responsible for national defense 
     and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what 
     adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of public 
     disclosure of a particular classified record.'' Salisbury, 
     690 F.2d at 970 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d 
     Sess. 12 (1974)). Thus, summary judgment for the government 
     in an Exemption 1 FOIA action should be granted on the basis 
     of agency affidavits if they simply contain ``reasonable 
     specificity'' and if they are not called into question by 
     contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency 
     bad faith. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 
     1980).
       DCI Tenet's Declarations meet this deferential standard. 
     Essentially, DCI Tenet explains that disclosure of the budget 
     request reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     national security in several ways: (1) disclosure 
     ``reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments 
     with the United States' own assessment of its intelligence 
     capabilities and weaknesses,'' Tenet Declaration para. 14; 
     (2) disclosure ``reasonably could be expected to assist 
     foreign governments in correlating specific spending figures 
     with particular intelligence programs,'' Tenet Declaration 
     para. 16; and (3) official disclosure could be expected to 
     free foreign governments' limited collection and analysis 
     resources for other efforts targeted against the United 
     States, Tenet Declaration para. 18.
       Obviously, DCI Tenet cannot be certain that damage to our 
     national security would result from release of the total 
     budget request for 1999, but the law does not require 
     certainty or a showing of harm before allowing an agency to 
     withhold classified information. Courts have recognized that 
     an agency's articulation of the threatened harm must always 
     be speculative to some extent, and that to require an actual 
     showing of harm would be judicial ``overstepping.'' See 
     Halperin, 629 F.2d at 149. In the area of intelligence 
     sources and methods, the D.C. Circuit has ruled that 
     substantial deference is due to an agency's determination 
     regarding threats to national security interests because this 
     is ``necessarily a region for forecasts in which the CIA's 
     informed judgment as to potential future harm should be 
     respected.'' Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 
     1982). Further, the Court noted that ``the CIA has the right 
     to assume that foreign intelligence agencies are zealous 
     ferret.'' Id.
       In this case, plaintiff has offered no contrary record 
     evidence undermining the validity of DCI Tenet's highly fact-
     dependent determination. First, the Brown Commission's 1996 
     recommendations in favor of disclosure are not binding on 
     this Court. The Brown Commission was a congressionally-
     charted commission made up of private citizens who lacked 
     classification authority and who made non-binding 
     recommendations to Congress and the President on intelligence 
     matters. Neither Congress nor the President ever enacted the 
     Brown Commission's recommendation on public disclosure of the 
     intelligence budget. Nor did the Brown Commission ever 
     consider the precise issue of classification presented here: 
     whether, in 1999, and under the circumstances described in 
     DCI Tenet's unclassified and classified declarations, it 
     would recommend disclosure of the budget figures for that 
     particular year.
       Second, the fact that DCI Tenet disclosed the total 
     intelligence budget in prior years is not necessarily adverse 
     record evidence. On the contrary, this Court finds that it 
     indicates DCI Tenet's careful, case-by-case analysis of the 
     impact of each disclosure and his willingness to accommodate 
     budget requests whenever possible. When he made these prior 
     disclosures, DCI Tenet emphasized that he would continue to 
     make that case-by-case determination in future year. Tenet 
     Declaration para. 7. Here, DCI Tenet has explained, in both 
     his classified and unclassified declarations, the rationale 
     underlying his predictive judgment that release of the 
     figures for fiscal year 1999 could reasonably be expected to 
     cause damage to national security. Therefore, the Court must 
     defer to DCI Tenet's decision that release of a third 
     consecutive year, amidst the information already publicly-
     available, provides too much trend information and too great 
     a basis for comparison and analysis for our adversaries.
     II. FOIA Exemption 3
       The CIA is also entitled to summary judgment on the basis 
     that the budget request is exempt from disclosure under FOIA 
     Exemption 3. Exemption 3 excludes from mandatory disclosure 
     information that is ``specifically exempted from disclosure 
     by statute . . . provided that such statute requires that the 
     matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to 
     leave no discretion on the issue, or establishes particular 
     criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of 
     matters to be withheld.'' 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(3)(A) & (B).
       In examining an Exemption 3 claim, a court must determine, 
     first, whether the claimed statute is a statute of exemption 
     under FOIA, and, second, whether the withheld material 
     satisfied the criteria of the exemption statute. CIA v. Sims, 
     471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 
     761 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In this case, the CIA has withheld 
     information from plaintiff because DCI Tenet has determined 
     that the budget request falls within Section 103(c)(6) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 403-3(c)(6) (formerly section 403(d)(3)), which requires 
     the DCI to ``protect intelligence sources and methods from 
     unauthorized disclosure.'' It is well settled that section 
     403-3(c)(6) falls within Exemption 3. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167. 
     Thus, the Court need only consider whether the 
     Administration's budget request falls within that statute. 
     Id.
       There is no doubt that the scope of the statute is broad; 
     as the Supreme Court has commented, ``[p]lainly the broad 
     sweep of this statutory language comports with the nature of 
     the [CIA's] unique responsibilities.'' Sims, 471 U.S. at 169. 
     The legislative history of Sec. 403-3(c)(6) also makes clear 
     that Congress intended to give the [DCI] broad authority to 
     protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence 
     process.'' Id. at 170. To establish that the budget request 
     is exempt under FOIA, therefore, the CIA need only 
     demonstrate that the information ``relates'' to intelligence 
     sources and methods. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 762. Like the 
     DCI's determination under Exemption 1, the DCI's 
     determination under Exemption 3 is entitled to ``substantial 
     weight and due consideration.'' Id.
       One nexus between the Administration's budget request and 
     ``disclosure of intelligence sources and methods'' is found 
     in the

[[Page H3507]]

     special appropriations process used for intelligence 
     activities. Disclosure of the budget request would tend to 
     reveal ``how and for what purposes intelligence 
     appropriations are secretly transferred to and expended by 
     intelligence agencies.'' Tenet Declaration para. 20.
       There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA. 
     Appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the 
     intelligence community are hidden in the various 
     appropriation acts. Id. para. 21. The locations are not 
     publicly identified, both to protect the classified nature of 
     the intelligence programs that are funded and to protect the 
     classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and 
     between intelligence agencies. Id. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of 
     the CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 403f, 403j, provide 
     the legal authorizations for the secret transfer and spending 
     of intelligence funds. Id. para. 23. DCI Tenet has asserted 
     that since there are a finite number of places where 
     intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a 
     budget analyst could construct a hypothetical intelligence 
     budget by aggregating suspected intelligence line items from 
     the publicly-disclosed appropriations and that repeated 
     disclosures of either the budget request or the budget 
     appropriation would provide more data with which to test and 
     refine the hypothesis. Id. Plaintiff denies the viability of 
     this argument but provides no conclusive evidence of its 
     implausibility.
       Several courts have held that information tending to reveal 
     the secret transfer and spending of intelligence funds is 
     exempt from disclosure under FOIA as an ``intelligence 
     method.'' See e.g., Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 
     724, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Therefore, because DCI Tenet has 
     determined that release of the total budget request would 
     tend to reveal secret budgeting mechanisms constituting 
     ``intelligence methods,'' it is also exempt from disclosure 
     under FOIA Exemption 3.


                               conclusion

       The Declarations of DCI Tenet logically establish that 
     release of the Administration's budget request for fiscal 
     year 1999 could reasonably be expected to result in harm to 
     the national security and to reveal intelligence ``sources 
     and methods.'' On the basis of these declarations and the 
     entire record in this case as well as the discussion above, 
     this Court will grant the CIA's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
     An order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
       November 12, 1999.
                                                  Thomas F. Hogan,
                                     United States District Judge.

                                 Order

       In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, it 
     is hereby
       ORDERED that Defendant Central Intelligence Agency's Motion 
     for Summary Judgment is granted. It is further hereby
       ORDERED that this case is dismissed with prejudice.
       November 12, 1999.
                                                  Thomas F. Hogan,
                                     United States District Judge.

  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, 
I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 506, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) 
will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.


                Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Traficant:
       At the end of title III, insert the following new section 
     (and conform the table of contents accordingly):

     SEC. 306. UPDATE OF REPORT ON EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE ON 
                   UNITED STATES TRADE SECRETS.

       By not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     submit to Congress a report that updates, and revises as 
     necessary, the report prepared by the Director pursuant to 
     section 310 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2000 (Public Law 106-120, 113 Stat. 1613) (relating to a 
     description of the effects of espionage against the United 
     States, conducted by or on behalf of other nations, on United 
     States trade secrets, patents, and technology development).

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment calls for an update from 
our intelligence community on the effects of foreign espionage on 
United States trade secrets, on, in fact, our patents, our technology 
development, our industrial complex, our military industrial complex, 
and the basic elements that fuel our economy and is our national 
security.
  It is straightforward. It makes sense. I urge its approval.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Traficant) for yielding. I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio for 
his interest and his work with the committee and his support for our 
men and women of our intelligence community. I appreciate his efforts 
on behalf of the economy of the United States of America, which he is 
very outspoken on and very forthright.
  This amendment is eminently reasonable, and I would accept the 
amendment on behalf of the committee. I appreciate the consideration of 
the gentleman from Ohio of the best interest of the intelligence 
community and his willingness to cooperate with the committee on that 
amendment.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I am proud to yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, the minority has no problem with the 
amendment, and I will be glad to accept it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending 
that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 506, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) 
will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.


                Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Traficant:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
       Sec. --. The Director shall report to the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence within 60 days whether the 
     policies and goals of the People's Republic of China 
     constitute a threat to our national security.

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, this is a straightforward amendment. I 
just listened to the last debate. I have a tendency to agree with the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss). The numbers to me are not 
important. I look at what I consider to be results.
  I believe if America would have investigated allegations in the 
Chinese meddling into our political system and to buying and spying on 
our military secrets and technology, if we would have spent as much 
money on that as we spent on investigating Microsoft, I think our 
Nation would be safer.
  But I have a question here today to the Congress. I wonder if the 
Central Intelligence Agency or if our intelligence community has 
basically said to Congress, ``be careful about China.'' I do not know. 
We are going to take up a big vote here later this week, and I believe 
we are going to go ahead and ratify and approve a massive trade 
agreement with China.
  I do not know how much we are spending. But, quite frankly, what do 
they advise us? What has our intelligence community taken the time to 
educate us about where we are going when I read that China just 
purchased 24 cruise missiles from Russia, and the Pentagon spokesman, 
on conditions of anonymity said, any American Naval vessel without the 
protection of a carrier fleet is ``dead meat.'' This is the first 
shipment of the cruise missiles. Now, look, a second shipment they said 
is expected in several months.
  For the first time in history, China, which is showing an aggressive 
posture to Taiwan, for the first time in history, our administration is 
not willing to, in fact, help Taiwan. Now we are embarking on a massive 
trade agreement. I think the trade agreement bothers me on the surface 
with an $80 billion surplus now surpassing Japan, and Japan has never 
opened their markets, and every President from Nixon to Clinton 
threatening to open the markets. So, evidently, they have not abided by 
any agreement we have ever signed.
  I am concerned about the national security implications with China. 
The

[[Page H3508]]

Traficant amendment says tell us what are the goals and policies of the 
People's Republic of China, a communist nation, and if in fact they 
constitute a threat to our national security.
  Now, if I am off base with that, then God save the Republic, because 
we should all have been briefed in our office by the CIA telling us 
what is going on over there. Otherwise, we make this suggestion, give 
$1 billion to CNN, $1 billion. Save a lot of money. Help our people 
with the balance. Because they told us about the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the Berlin Wall, the invasion of Kuwait. We did not hear it from 
CIA. We heard it on CNN. So I think we should know that.
  The Traficant amendment says tell us and go put it down on paper. The 
intelligence community cannot have it both ways and say, Aw shucks, 
look what happened. Tell us if it is a good deal or a bad deal and if 
we have got a problem. They have got to put it on paper, and history 
can reflect it.
  With that, I urge an aye vote that would require our intelligence 
community to advise us if there is this powerful threat.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Traficant) for yielding to me again. I appreciate his efforts to 
raise the consciousness of the House to the risk we face from the 
People's Republic of China. He has obviously done it very well.
  I certainly believe the DCI can operate within the 60-day timeframe 
that we have talked about. In fact, I think he can do it more speedily 
than that, given the other matters going on of interest to this body. I 
would be prepared to accept the amendment and thank the gentleman again 
for his contribution.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to accept the amendment, and I rise to support 
the amendment. I think the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) has an 
excellent amendment. But I also think it is fair to point out that the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Transportation of the Committee on Appropriations, has been encouraging 
Members of this House to get two briefings from the Central 
Intelligence Agency.

                              {time}  1945

  In fact, I received those briefings with staff on Friday. So I cannot 
say that the Central Intelligence Agency does not have information 
available. Perhaps this will better organize it and have a date certain 
for it to come, but any Member can request those two briefings and I 
think it is only fair to point that out.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DIXON. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and I would 
simply ask, does the Central Intelligence Agency, under the milieu of 
events occurring around the world, do they support our efforts in 
moving forward with the trade agreement? And does the Central 
Intelligence Agency believe that the behavior of China poses a 
significant threat?
  I think just having people coming in and talking to us, I want them 
to put it down on paper, and I think that is what Congress should 
require. We may be, without a doubt, dealing with the most serious 
threat in our Nation's history, and our children and their children, 
God forbid, may some day realize that. I hope that does not occur.
  So with that, I appreciate the time the gentleman has afforded me and 
appreciate the gentleman's statement.
  Mr. DIXON. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, the Central Intelligence 
Agency made it clear from the very beginning of the briefing that they 
had obtained certain information and analyzed it; it was up to the 
Member of Congress receiving that briefing to make a judgment on it.
  So I do not think that we will find the Central Intelligence Agency 
making a judgment. In this particular case, as it relates to China and 
whether they have permanent normal trade relations, that is up to each 
Member of Congress based in part on what the analysis is. But as far as 
whether they are a threat or a nonthreat, the CIA made it very clear 
that they were not taking a position in this debate and that they were 
presenting what they felt was sound information and that we should, in 
fact, make our own judgment.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, 
the amendment says the CIA shall let us know whether or not the 
policies and goals of the People's Republic of China constitutes a 
threat to our national security. That is all in writing.
  Mr. DIXON. I realize the amendment says that, but the threat is in 
the eye of the beholder. And one agency may think it is a threat and 
another agency may think that it is a nonthreat.
  But in the final analysis, we have to take intelligence information, 
that every Member of this House has been encouraged over and over by 
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf) to receive, and make a judgment 
call Wednesday or some time in the future.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote, and pending 
that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 506, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) 
will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong bipartisan support of the 
fiscal year 2001 intelligence authorization.
  I believe this bill sets about the right level of overall funding for 
intelligence activities next year. The President requested 6.6 percent 
more in funding for national programs over last year's appropriated 
level. While some have complained that the administration failed to 
request sufficient funding for intelligence activities, the testimony 
we heard during our budget hearings did not convince me we needed to go 
beyond the relatively robust topline increase in the request.
  Nevertheless, there was room for concern about some aspects of the 
request and the allocation of those resources. I have been very 
critical of one classified program of great cost and exceedingly 
doubtful impact. I have also been extremely concerned that the 
heightened pace of U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts arising out 
of the threat identified over the Millennium could not be sustained 
through the end of this fiscal year and into FY 2001. Finally, through 
oversight and legislative hearings, the compiled evidence significantly 
increased my concerns about the state of language capabilities of 
intelligence community personnel. I have found that not only are there 
too few people speaking the language in country, but too often the ones 
who do are not sufficiently proficient. I addressed these three 
concerns with an amendment to transfer some of the funding from the 
highly questionable classified program to areas of greater need 
involving terrorism and language proficiency. This was a bipartisan 
effort and I thank Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Dixon for their 
help.
  Mr. Chairman, later in the debate I will offer an amendment to 
require an annual unclassified statement of the aggregate amount 
appropriate for the previous fiscal year. It is my understanding that 
one of the reasons offered for why the intelligence budget total should 
remain classified is that its disclosure may provide foreign 
governments with the U.S. Government's own assessment of its 
intelligence capabilities and weaknesses. This is not persuasive. The 
fact of the matter is that in our great democratic country, there is 
considerable unclassified information openly published containing 
official assessments of intelligence capabilities and shortcomings. The 
intelligence community has, in fact, published the 1997 and 1998 
aggregate level of spending. There are legitimate concerns about 
protecting through counter intelligence measures and enhanced security 
our sensitive information. An accurate report of the aggregate number 
appropriated for intelligence each year would cause no harm to national 
security and would clearly be a welcome addition to the public's 
understanding of the roles and mission of the intelligence community. 
It could also provide some measure of accountability from the agencies. 
I urge my colleagues to support my amendment later this week.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
McInnis) having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the

[[Page H3509]]

State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under 
consideration the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and 
for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________