IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
FINAL REPORT of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SENATE Rept. 105-167 - 105th Congress 2d Session - March 10, 1998
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| INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS FINAL REPORT of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS SENATE Rept. 105-167 - 105th Congress 2d Session - March 10, 1998 |
PART 9 RESPONSE TO MAJORITY REPORT [EXCERPTS] introduction The Senate Resolution establishing the Special Investigation into the 1996 elections stated that the Committee on Governmental Affairs was to examine allegations of impropriety and illegality by both political parties. Despite the language of the Resolution, the investigation was conducted in a highly partisan fashion: The hearings focused almost entirely on allegations relating to Democrats, while largely ignoring allegations relating to Republicans. It is thus not surprising that the Majority Report on the investigation is a highly partisan document. The partisan bias is manifested in many ways, including questionable interpretations of the evidence, the use of double standards when discussing similar conduct by Democrats and Republicans, and even outright misstatements of the facts and the law. This part of the Minority Report provides an introduction to the Minority's critique of the Majority's Report. In pointing out the rather egregious errors, omissions, misstatements, and unsupported allegations in the Majority Report, we do not mean to suggest that we are defending the system used by both the Democratic and Republican parties to raise campaign funds in 1996. It is one thing to defend against a false allegation that a fundraising practice is illegal. It is another to say that the practice should continue to be legal. That distinction is clear in the Minority Report. Much of the evidence presented to the Committee was open to widely varying interpretations. When the evidence is unclear, it is unfair for the Committee to pretend otherwise by hurling accusations either directly or by innuendo that may result in unfairly damaging the reputations of innocent people. This Committee had an unfortunate history in the early 1950's in this regard, and it would be shameful to repeat it. Unfortunately, the Majority has repeatedly chosen to interpret facts in such a way that Democrats are portrayed in the most unfavorable light while Republicans are given the benefit of the doubt. A case in point is the contrast between the Majority's treatment of Harold Ickes, former Deputy Chief of Staff in the Clinton White House, and its treatment of Haley Barbour, the former chairman of the Republican National Committee. The Majority refuses to accept Ickes's denial of accusations made against him by Warren Meddoff despite the lack of any supporting evidence for these accusations and despite numerous facts which undermine Meddoff's credibility. By contrast, the Majority accepts Barbour's testimony about the National Policy Forum's loan transaction even though it conflicts with testimony from several credible sources and a great deal of documentary evidence. This double standard in the treatment of witnesses is also evident in the Majority's chapter on the White House coffees. That chapter contains a lengthy discussion of the allegation by Karl Jackson that a solicitation was made at a coffee he attended. Jackson had been a White House aide during the Bush Administration and later went into business with former Vice President Dan Quayle (the latter fact is omitted from the Majority Report). Jackson's GOP ties have utterly no bearing on his credibility, in the Majority's view, and yet the Democratic ties of witnesses who contradict him are given overwhelming importance. Moreover, the Majority includes a completely baseless insinuation that the Democratic witnesses misled the Committee, by stating that they ``claim'' not to have recalled the alleged solicitation. The Majority Report also applies a double standard to the two political parties when the parties have engaged in similar conduct. While Democratic examples are highlighted, comparable Republican examples are downplayed or simply ignored. Thus, for example, the Majority criticizes the Democratic National Committee's coordination with the Clinton White House, ignoring similar coordination by the Republican National Committee with the Dole for President campaign and former Republican Presidential campaigns. Similarly, in the discussion of the use of access to elected officials as a fundraising tool, the Majority strongly criticizes the White House coffees organized by the Democratic National Committee (``DNC'), while ignoring egregious practices on the Republican side, such as charging specific prices for access to Republican officials. Partisan bias is evident throughout the Majority's chapter on Ted Sioeng, which either minimizes--or simply omits-- Sioeng's Republican connections. For example, the Sioeng chapter mentions $100,000 in contributions to California State Treasurer Matt Fong but fails to mention that Fong is a Republican. The chapter also notes that political contributions afforded Sioeng access to President Clinton and Vice President Gore, but fails to mention that Newt Gingrich, the Republican Speaker of the House, was the guest of honor at a Sioeng- organized luncheon the day after a Sioeng family company gave $50,000 to a Republican think tank. Nor does the chapter mention that the donation was solicited by a top adviser to Speaker Gingrich and that the think tank was, according to the Internal Revenue Service, essentially an arm of the Republican National Committee. The Majority Report not only contains dubious interpretations of the facts, it often misstates the facts. The Majority also misstates the facts by supplying partial evidence. For example, in the Majority's Charlie Trie chapter, the Majority states that Xiping Wang testified that the DNC did not reimburse her for her contribution, implying that the contribution was not returned by the DNC. Actually, the DNC did return the contribution--to the United States Treasury, as was appropriate for a contribution that had been made by a conduit who was not legally entitled to the money. Similarly, in the Majority Report's chapter on DNC/White House coordination, there are citations to the testimony of former DNC Chairman Donald Fowler to support conclusions regarding the knowledge and activities of DNC officials Marvin Rosen and Richard Sullivan without any reference to Rosen's and Sullivan's own testimony on these subjects. The misleading character of the Majority's factual assertions is also illustrated by internal contradictions within the Majority Report itself. Evidence used to support one claim is often used to support a contradictory assertion in another chapter--sometimes even in the same chapter. Similar inconsistencies are apparent in the Majority's treatment of witnesses who are deemed credible when they support the Majority's position but are deemed not credible when they dispute the Majority's conclusions. Thus, throughout the Majority'schapter on John Huang at the DNC, the testimony of Richard Sullivan is cited and relied upon as an honest recitation of the practices and beliefs of all DNC employees during the 1996 election cycle. Yet, in the Majority's chapter on the Teamsters, the Majority discredits Sullivan's testimony. Similar inconsistencies are apparent in the Majority's treatment of Donald Fowler, whose testimony is credited and relied upon with respect to his disagreements with Ickes, but deemed dishonest in the Majority's Tamraz chapter. The mishandling of evidence is one of the most disturbing aspects of the Majority Report. Again and again, evidence that undermines or contradicts the Majority's theories and allegations is downplayed, mischaracterized, or more often ignored, while disproved allegations are perpetuated. For example, a great deal of evidence gathered by the Committee undermines the theory that John Huang engaged in espionage when he was employed at the Commerce Department. This exculpatory evidence is largely absent from the Majority Report. As noted in Chapter 4 of the Minority Report, Huang failed on many occasions to exploit his post to obtain classified information. Moreover, he offered to testify to the Committee under a grant of immunity that would not have shielded him from prosecution for espionage-related offenses; his offer was not mentioned in the Majority Report. In the Minority's view, the most neutral interpretation of the facts is that Huang was probably not engaged in espionage. The Majority Report also repeats the baseless suggestion that the President was involved in a criminal conspiracy with a consultant to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in spite of the fact that Chairman Thompson admitted at a hearing that the Committee now had evidence that disproved such an allegation. Similarly, the Majority's chapter on Johnny Chung includes his allegation (made in unsworn statements to journalists) that a $50,000 contribution he made to the DNC had been solicited by Margaret Williams, then Chief of Staff to First Lady Hillary Clinton. The Majority Report fails to mention that Williams denied this allegation, under oath, when she was deposed by this Committee, and when she testified before a House committee. And the Majority ignores a host of other witnesses whose testimony before that committee supported Williams's testimony. By publishing the allegation and not the denial, the Majority creates the false impression that the allegation is not only unchallenged, but unquestionably true. Because of the Majority's questionable use of evidence, sourcing is an extremely important issue. Every assertion that might be in dispute should be attributed to a source, such as testimony to the Committee or a document produced in response to a Committee subpoena. In a number of cases, dubious assertions in the Majority Report are not footnoted. In some other cases, the footnotes show that questionable sources were used, such as staff interviews at which the Minority staff was not present. The most important task of the Special Investigation was to probe allegations of improper or illegal activity, and, thus, a clear understanding of the campaign finance laws is fundamental. It is thus surprising to find that the Majority Report contains many allegations of illegality based on misstatements of the law. A few examples will suffice:The Majority's chapter on Clinton White House coordination with the DNC alleges that this coordination was illegal and yet fails to cite a single statute, court decision, or regulation to support its position in this chapter. As demonstrated in the Minority Report, coordination of an issue advocacy advertising campaign between a party and its candidates does not appear to violate provisions of the existing campaign finance laws. Allegations in the Sioeng chapter are based on a misstatement of the law governing foreign contributions. Contributing ``foreign money'' is not illegal so long as the donor is legally entitled to give and is not acting as a conduit for someone else. In Sioeng's case, the issue was not whether he used funds from foreign bank accounts, but whether he directed or participated in contribution decisions (which would have been illegal given his status as a foreign national). On the basis of its misstatement of the law, the Majority analyzes the $100,000 in Sioeng-related money contributed to Matt Fong and concludes that most of these funds were donated legally, because only $16,000 could be traced to foreign sources. In fact, Fong's deposition testimony to this Committee--which is not mentioned in the Majority Report-- strongly indicates that Sioeng was the donor. If Sioeng was the donor, the entire $100,000 was contributed illegally, regardless of whether domestic or foreign funds were used. A major shortcoming of the Majority Report is its failure to acknowledge the fact that some of the most scandalous conduct in federal elections is perfectly legal. The campaign finance laws are so riddled with loopholes that legal restrictions are largely meaningless. Because of the soft-money and issue-advocacy loopholes, large corporations and wealthy individuals are free to spend vast sums of money on behalf of specific candidates. In both the hearings and in the Majority Report, the Majority has given short shrift to these systemic problems. One of the most disturbing aspects of the Majority Report is that it suggests, on the basis of inconclusive evidence, that certain named individuals were spies or foreign agents. These serious charges are supported solely by weak circumstantial evidence and speculation--as acknowledged by the Majority's use of phrases like ``may'' and ``if true.'' Allegations of espionage are grave charges and should not be made without specific credible evidence. Such serious allegations can inflict irreparable damage to the reputations of innocent people, and to do so without having sufficient evidence is irresponsible. The remainder of this Response consists of detailed comments on the Majority Report. It is organized both thematically and on a chapter-by-chapter basis. RESPONSE TO ISSUES INVESTIGATED BY THE COMMITTEE foreign influence The Majority Report addresses the issues of foreign influence and foreign money in the 1996 election by focusing almost exclusively on the alleged role of the Chinese government. The report includes a declassified chapter describing efforts by the Chinese government to influence the U.S. government. The Majority Report also includes a chapter on Indonesian-born businessman Ted Sioeng, four chapters on John Huang, and one on Maria Hsia. Taken together, these chapters are designed to suggest that the so-called China Plan involved efforts to influence the 1996 presidential election and that by using Sioeng, Huang, and Hsia as intermediaries, the Chinese government succeeded in infiltrating the Democratic Party's fundraising operations. The Majority's analysis of foreign influence is deeply flawed. It weaves together conspiracy theories by taking unrelated facts and occurrences and giving them the most sinister possible interpretation. The Majority also uses facts in a highly selective manner. For example, classified information that contradicts the Majority's theories is simply disregarded. Moreover, the Majority fails to acknowledge foreign money that flowed to Republicans. As discussed in Minority Chapter 3, the Republican National Committee received hundreds of thousands of dollars from a Hong Kong businessman who provided backing for a loan to an RNC affiliate. The Minority also found strong indications that businessman Michael Kojima, who gave a half-million dollars to the RNC, acted as a conduit for Japanese businessmen (see Minority Chapter 6). The Majority Report makes no mention at all of Representative Jay Kim, a California Republican, who pleaded guilty to violating the campaign finance laws because he had accepted illegal foreign contributions (see Minority Chapter 8). independent groups The 1996 campaign saw a surge in activity by organizations which are not registered with the Federal Election Commission as political committees. These groups were typically nonprofit organizations, registered with the Internal Revenue Service as tax-exempt, social-welfare organizations. These supposedly ``nonpartisan'' groups spent tens of millions of dollars on behalf of candidates and political parties. Many of them ran political attack ads--under the guise of ``issue advocacy''-- during the closing weeks of the campaign, and some of the ads appear to have determined the outcome of close races. Despite the importance of this phenomenon, the Majority failed to conduct a serious investigation of these groups. In its Report, the Majority asserts that it was impossible to form ``meaningful conclusions'' about nonprofit groups because of obstruction by several organizations that were served with Committee subpoenas. While the Majority cited the AFL-CIO as the prime example of obstruction, several conservative groups also failed to comply with Committeesubpoenas, including the Christian Coalition, Americans for Tax Reform, the National Policy Forum, and two tax-exempt organizations controlled by Triad Management Services. The Majority's assertion that it could form no meaningful conclusions about such groups is questionable on several grounds. First, such an obstacle did not stop the Majority from forming conclusions about other investigatory targets who failed to cooperate, including Democratic fundraisers John Huang and Charlie Trie. Second, as far as the nonprofit groups are concerned, the Committee obtained a great deal of information about conservative groups in spite of those groups' lack of cooperation--sufficient information to conclude that several such groups engaged in improper and likely illegal activity during the 1996 cycle. See Minority Chapter 3 on the National Policy Forum and Minority Chapters 10 through 13 and Chapter 15 on other nonprofit groups. The activity by these and other organizations in the 1996 election cycle sounded only a warning note of what is to come. As several experts testified in the Committee's hearings on proposals for campaign finance reform, the use of nonprofit and other independent organizations to air ``issue advertising'' that is simply disguised advertising on behalf of candidates will only continue to grow. Given an opportunity for a watershed examination of the direction that the election system is heading, the Majority chose not to address any of the substantial wrongdoing by these groups and actively prevented the Minority from presenting hearings on the evidence it had developed. contribution laundering/third-party transfers The federal election laws require that contributors donate their own funds. Thus, it is illegal for a donor to channel funds through a conduit, for an individual to act as a conduit, and for a donor to be reimbursed by a third party after having made a donation. The laws help to ensure that the public knows who is really paying for elections and also discourage contributions from individuals who are not legally entitled to donate, such as foreign nationals who do not have permanent resident status. The Majority Report addresses several cases in which there were allegations that political contributions were made in the names of third parties during the 1996 election cycle. These included contributions made in the names of Yogesh Gandhi, Hsi Lai Temple monastics, and Yue F. Chu and Xiping Wang. Although these Democratic examples are discussed at length, the Majority Report ignores several Republican examples, including some cases where laundering schemes have been acknowledged by the donors or proven in court. Several Republican examples involving Simon Fireman (a national Vice Chair of the Dole campaign), officers and employees of Empire Landfill, and DeLuca Liquor and Wine are mentioned in Chapter 22 of the Minority Report. The Majority Report also fails to discuss third-party contributions as a systemic problem that could perhaps be addressed through legislative reform, regulatory reform, or improved vetting of contributions by political parties and candidates. fundraising and political activities of the national parties and administrations Although the national political parties play a central role in the federal election process, the Majority Report does not contain a detailed, balanced discussion of the two parties. Instead, it is largely a diatribe against the Democratic National Committee. Using evidence in a highly dubious manner, it examines coordination of election activities among the White House, the Democratic National Committee (``DNC''), and the Clinton Campaign (Chapter 2), the DNC's system to check the legality and appropriateness of contributions, fundraising in the White House, fundraising phone calls made from the White House, the vetting of individuals with access to the President, DNC donor Johnny Chung, and DNC donor Roger Tamraz. A fundamental problem with many of these chapters is that they characterize certain activities as illegal without citing any legal authorities for this position. In fact, many of the practices--notably coordination between the White House and the DNC--appear to be acceptable under the current campaign finance laws. Moreover, the Majority Report states and implies that many activities were unique to the Democrats. As shown in the Minority Report, the Republican National Committee similarly coordinated with the Dole for President campaign. See Minority Chapter 33. The Minority Report also discusses how Republicans have used access to public officials as a fundraising tool and have used federal property for fundraising purposes (see Minority Chapter 28). Regarding the vetting issue, the Minority Report notes that in the 1992 and 1994 election cycles the Republican National Committee took the position that it had no legal duty to review contributions (see Minority Chapter 25). The Minority Report also presents evidence that a number of controversial individuals met with Republican Presidents at the White House and at other events (see Minority Chapters 6 and 31). Finally, the Minority Report contains detailed discussions of the Republican Party's close coordination with--and financial support to--several supposedly ``independent'' and ``nonpartisan'' nonprofit groups (see Minority Chapters 10 and 11). allegations of quid pro quo A major goal of our campaign finance laws is to curb corruption and the appearance of corruption, as the Supreme Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo. When political campaigns are financed with private money, there is always a risk of quid pro quos. Examples of alleged quid pro quos to Democratic contributors are discussed in Majority chapters regarding the DNC and Indian Gaming, the Hudson Casino, and the Cheyenne- Arapaho contributions. It is seldom easy to prove a quid pro quo, and inquiries into alleged quid pro quos tend to rely heavily on circumstantial evidence. Nonetheless, the extent to which the Majority Report reaches its conclusions by marrying innuendo to coincidence is startling. In its chapter detailing the DNC's efforts to raise money from the Indian gaming community, the Majority candidly acknowledges that, except for two instances-- the Hudson casino matter and the Cheyenne Arapaho matter--it was unable to investigate whether ``there was any connection between the financial support to the Democratic party and the Interior decisions. . . .'' Nevertheless, the Majority goes on to imply that numerous contributions received from Indian tribes involved in gaming were all given in expectation of specific government actions and that these expectations were fulfilled. The factual bases for these conspiratorial suspicions, by the Majority's own admission, amount to nothing more than ``troubling coincidences.'' Indeed, this chapter is so insubstantial that it resembles nothing so much as an outline created at the beginning of an investigation rather than a final product purchased at a cost of well over $3 million in taxpayer money. One chapter of the Majority Report deals with Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt's supposed involvement in the decision to deny an application to take land into trust for a gambling casino in Hudson, Wisconsin--a community which strongly opposed such a use. That community opposition--a crucial factor in Interior's decision--is scarcely mentioned in the Majority report, along with the fact that the tribes who sought to locate the casino in Hudson lived on reservations located 80 to 190 miles away. Even more disturbing is the Majority's insistence on interpreting evidence and documents in ways that are uniformly contradicted by the sworn testimony of the career Interior employees and officials involved. The Majority not only fails to resolve these contradictions, it does not even mention the great weight of testimony that contradicts the Majority's interpretation of events. Finally, in its chapter on political contributions made by the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, the Majority reaches the condescending conclusion that these tribes' expressions of political support, including contributions, for the Democratic Party were the result of their naivete and political gullibility at the hands of manipulative Democratic fundraisers. In spinning this tale, the Majority Report studiously ignores the ample evidence that these tribes were sophisticated, politically aware, and made a hard-headed calculation that the Democratic Party would likely assist them in prevailing over Republican politicians who, in siding with powerful oil and gas interests, consistently obstructed the tribes' efforts to regain lands that they considered to be rightfully theirs. The Minority Report's chapters on the Hudson Casino and the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes demonstrate that the evidence does not support the quid pro quo allegations contained in the Majority Report (see Minority Chapters 35 and 37). The Minority Report also discusses the Republican Party's ties to one of its biggest sources of funds: the tobacco industry (see Minority Chapter 36). process The Majority Report covers the origins and procedures of the Committee's investigation into the 1996 election by focusing almost exclusively on document production by the White House and the Democratic National Committee, which are the subjects of two separate chapters. A third chapter of the Majority Report discusses the compliance of nonprofit groups that were subpoenaed by the Committee. Although the Majority castigates all entities that did not comply with subpoenas, the most pointed criticism is directed at the AFL-CIO. There is no particular overarching theme that ties these chapters together, except for a general refrain that Democratic individuals, entities, organizations, and sympathizers tried to thwart the Committee's investigation. While the Majority discusses the history and debate over Senate Resolution 39, which clearly stipulated that the Special Investigation was to be conducted on a bipartisan basis, the Majority spends the bulk of its chapter on procedural issues lamenting the deadlines imposed unanimously by the full Senate as the reason the Committee was not able to pursue enforcement of its subpoenas. Moreover, while the Majority's chapter on compliance by nonprofit groups does mention some of the Republican entities that failed to comply with subpoenas, it fails to discuss the Republican National Committee, the Dole campaign, the National Policy Forum, Americans for Tax Reform, and Triad, all of which were among the first entities subpoenaed by the Committee and all of which failed to comply fully with subpoenas. Several individuals associated with conservative groups failed to appear for depositions; others appeared but refused to answer any substantive questions. The Majority does not even mention that the Republican National Committee--alone among the dozens of entities subpoenaed-- unilaterally redacted as much as one third of all the documents it produced. The massive obstruction of the Committee's investigation should never have been tolerated; indeed, the damage done to this body's investigative authority as a result of that failure may be the longest standing legacy of this investigation. Obstruction of the Committee began, however, not with the AFL- CIO, as the Majority has often asserted, but in July when the National Policy Forum willfully refused to obey an order issued by the Chairman to produce documents pursuant to subpoena. No effort was made to hold the National Policy Forum in contempt of the Senate, and on September 3, eight groups, including the Christian Coalition and the National Right to Life Committee, notified the Committee that they would not produce documents. On September 8, Triad Management and its affiliated organizations notified the Committee that its employees, officers, and directors who were under personal subpoenas to appear and answer questions would refuse to do so. While Ranking Minority Member Glenn repeatedly expressed a willingness to support a finding of contempt against all entities not in compliance with Committee subpoenas, no motion for contempt was ever brought before the Committee by the Chairman. A detailed response to each Majority chapter follows. Majority Report Chapter 2: Procedural Background and Overview The Majority Report lays out a procedural chronology and an overview of the investigation. The Majority also presents its view of the conduct of the investigation and the impact the Majority believes the deadline had on the investigation as a whole. Finally, the Majority summarizes the issues addressed in testimony the Committee received in public hearings and issues addressed in its Report. While addressing the procedural history of the Committee's investigation, the Majority seizes yet another opportunity to highlight its version of ``Democratic obstruction'' including harsh criticism of the White House and DNC for what the Majority calls ``poor'' productions. In addition, the Majority claims the Committee's deadline for ending the investigation-- unanimously agreed upon by the full Senate--precluded procedural enforcement proceedings regarding Committee subpoenas. The Majority Report states that one of the main purposes of the investigation was to let the public ``know what went on during the 1996 campaign,'' when, in fact, the Majority only investigated what happened in Democratic fundraising circles during that time. The Majority neglects to mention that the Minority requested only six of the 32 days of public hearing time to present evidence of Republican fundraising transgressions and was granted only three. Had the Minority been allowed the additional three days it repeatedly requested, the American people would have received a fuller picture of ``what went on during the 1996 campaign.'' While the Majority Report complains numerous times about the deadline imposed on the investigation, it fails to mention statements by Democrats that consideration of reauthorization of the budget of the Committee would be appropriate if the investigation had not been completed by the end date, December 31, 1996. Every Member of the Committee-- Republican and Democrat--voted for S. Res. 39, the Resolution authorizing the investigation, which included the deadline.1 Committee Democrats also stated publicly that they would have voted for enforcement of all of our subpoenas and orders, including those against Democrats, if enforcement was sought regarding all Committee subpoenas.2 However, such motions were never brought to a Committee vote. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Congressional Record vote No. 29, pp. S2124-2125. The vote was 99-0. \2\ Senator Glenn, 10/8/97, hrg., pp. 73-74. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority Report claims that the decision not to enforce the Committee's subpoenas was at least partially based on a dearth of resources. While the Minority respects the Majority's wish not to waste taxpayer monies, nearly $1 million of the original $4.35 million authorized by the Senate remained at the end of the investigation. The Majority Report claims that ``Committee staff . . . conducted over 200 witness interviews'' yet fails to mention that at least 20 of these interviews were conducted unilaterally by the Majority. Some of these unilateral interviews were with witnesses who later testified at Committee hearings and some witness affidavits were received that were never shared with the Minority.3 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ See Appendix of Unilateral Interviews Conducted by the Majority. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response to Majority Chapter 4: ``The Thirst for Money'' In this chapter, the Majority places blame for all problematic contributions received by the DNC on an insatiable ``thirst for money'' emanating from the White House. The ability to raise funds, however, is clearly an essential factor in any election campaign. During the 1996 elections, a Democratic President was running for re-election confronted by a Republican Party that had outraised and outspent the Democratic Party in all recent election cycles. Consequently, the Majority's conclusion that the Democratic Party felt pressure to raise funds for the 1996 election is a statement of the obvious. In reaching its conclusion, the Majority alleges violations of law without providing supporting facts or legal citations, ignores the costs of federal elections, and ignores the fact that the Republican Party again out-raised and out- spent the Democratic Party in 1996. The Majority asserts that the DNC and the Clinton campaign violated campaign laws in their coordinated effort to raise money, but provides no facts or legal citations to support such a conclusion. The premise of this chapter--that the need to raise advertising money caused the ``panoply of DNC fundraising irregularities''--rests on a single incorrect statement. The Majority claims that ``[d]ue to the DNC's need to feed the advertising beast [that was planned following the November 1994 Democratic losses in Congressional elections], it dismantled its process for vetting contributions.'' In fact, the DNC's system for checking contributions was changed in May of 1994, five months before the November 1994 elections and over a year before the idea for a large scale DNC advertising campaign was first conceived. The Majority focuses entirely on fundraising by the Democratic Party, and fails to mention that the Republican Party also broke all previous records in 1996, raising almost $100 million more than Democrats. The Majority ignores the fact that in the 1996 election cycle, the RNC out-raised (and out- spent) the DNC by nearly $100 million, with the RNC raising $306 million and the DNC raising $212 million.4 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Federal Election Commission press release FEC Reports Major Increase in party fundraising, 3/17/97, available at www.fec.gov. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority ignores the across-the-board explosion of money raised in the 1996 election. The Majority also ignores the fact that in 1996, the national parties together raised and spent almost 900 million dollars, a 43 percent increase over the 1992 presidential election cycle.5 The Majority's characterization of the Democratic Party as having a ``thirst for money,'' fails to take into account that in the 20 years since the campaign finance laws took effect, total hard money raised by both parties has jumped from $110 million to $658 million.6 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Federal Election Commission press release FEC Reports Major Increase in Party Fundraising, 3/17/97, available at www.fec.gov. \6\ Federal Election Commission press release FEC Reports Major Increase in Party Fundraising, 3/17/97, available at www.fec.gov. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ................. ................. ................. Response to Majority Report Chapter 9: ``White House Vetting of Individuals With Access to the President'' In this chapter the Majority addresses the alleged failure of the White House to appropriately screen visitors invited to attend events at the White House with the President and Vice President from 1993 to 1997. Although the Majority makes a number of valid observations, its inclination to engage in unfounded speculation and to ignore evidence of similar procedures in Republican administrations undercuts its credibility on this issue. Without presenting any evidence, the Majority Report speculates that the problems with the White House vetting procedures from 1993 to 1997 might have been a ``conscious design for fundraising purposes.'' There is no evidence to support this speculative assertion, and the Majority does not cite any such evidence. The Majority ignores evidence obtained by the Committee establishing that the procedures for screening political functions at the White House have been in effect for several administrations. A career White House employee testified that during her 18-year tenure at the White House, the procedures for screening political guests were the same.27 The National Security Advisor similarly testified that NSC procedures for providing information as part of the screening process have been in place since the 1970s.28 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ Judith Spangler deposition, 5/9/97, pp. 39-40. \28\ Samuel R. Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg., p. 6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority ignores that the system in place for years has also resulted in a variety of individuals with controversial backgrounds meeting with Republican Presidents. Although the Committee's investigation of Republican vetting was limited due to the Committee's focus on the Democratic Party, it did uncover several examples where individuals with controversial backgrounds were provided access to President Bush. See Minority Report Chapter 28. The Majority omits the fact that both the White House and the DNC have implemented policies to formalize and improve their procedures for assessing potential guests at most DNC events.29 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Exhibit 1073: New DNC Compliance Procedures and Fundraising Manual; Exhibit 1072: Memorandum from Erskine Bowles to All Executive Office of the President Staff, 1/21/97; Exhibit 1071: Memorandum from Samuel R. Berger to all National Security Council staff, 6/13/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response to Majority Report Chapter 10: ``Johnny Chung and the White House Subway'' In this chapter, the Majority alleges that Chung's status as a DNC donor afforded him extraordinary access to the White House, including ``access to the President and the First Lady'' and to ``the First Lady's office.'' The chapter devotes considerable space to a $50,000 contribution to the DNC which Chung gave to Margaret Williams, then-Chief of Staff to the First Lady. The Majority alleges that the $50,000 contribution was solicited by Williams and that Chung was provided with access to the White House as an explicit quid pro quo for this contribution. The Majority Report refers repeatedly to Chung's access to ``the White House,'' misleadingly implying that he had frequent access to the executive mansion. The Majority Report fails to distinguish between the White House itself--the executive mansion--and the ``White House Complex,'' a term that includes the White House and some nearby buildings, including the Old Executive Office Building (``OEOB''). The vast majority of Chung's visits were to the OEOB; 30 he frequently dropped in on Margaret Williams or her assistant, Evan Ryan.31 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ For example, Secret Service ``WAVE'' records, which record visits by individuals who do not hold White House passes, show that Chung visited the White House complex 30 times in 1995 and that most of those visits were to Williams's office in the OEOB. \31\ Margaret Williams's and Evan Ryan's offices were located in Room 100 of the Old Executive Office Building. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority Report incorrectly implies that Chung had frequent access to President and Mrs. Clinton. The evidence before the Committee shows that Chung only met the Clintons on a handful of occasions, usually at Democratic fundraising events where he was one of a large number of attendees. The references to his visits to ``the First Lady's office'' are misleading because he actually visited the office of Margaret Williams, the First Lady's Chief of Staff, in the Old Executive Office Building.32 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ Evan Ryan deposition, 8/7/97, pp. 11-12: The suite of offices in the OEOB where Williams and Ryan worked does not contain an office for the First Lady. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority alleges that Margaret Williams solicited a $50,000 contribution from Chung. The Majority's discussion of the $50,000 contribution is based largely on unsworn allegations to journalists by Johnny Chung and it ignores a great deal of contradictory evidence in the form of testimony to the Committee by Margaret Williams and Evan Ryan. The Majority also ignores Williams's testimony on the same subject to the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee (even though evidence presented to that Committee has been used elsewhere in the Majority Report). For example, the Majority Report ignores Williams's denial that she solicited the $50,000 contribution from Chung and her testimony that she initially rebuffed him when he tried to hand her the check.33 Ultimately, according to her testimony, she decided to treat the check the same way she had treated unsolicited checks that had arrived in the mail: She simply forwarded it to the DNC.34 By ignoring these and other important parts of Williams's testimony, the Majority has created a distorted impression of what the Committee learned about Johnny Chung. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ Margaret Williams deposition, 5/29/97, p. 184. \34\ Margaret Williams deposition, 5/29/97, pp. 184-86. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority alleges that Williams provided Chung with access to the White House as an explicit quid pro quo for a $50,000 contribution. Regarding the alleged quid pro quo for the $50,000 contribution, the Majority relies again, on unsworn statements to journalists by Johnny Chung and ignores contradictory evidence, including testimony to this Committee by Margaret Williams and Evan Ryan. According to their testimony, neither of them suggested to Chung that his requests would be expedited if he contributed to the DNC. By ignoring this evidence, the Majority has elevated press accounts over actual evidence received by the Committee. Response to Majority Report Chapter 11: ``The Contribution of Yogesh Gandhi'' In this chapter, the Majority concludes that Yogesh Gandhi was able to use a $325,000 contribution to gain access to the President for Gandhi's own purposes. It concludes that the contribution both originated from foreign funds and was laundered through Gandhi. The Majority suggests that DNC officials had concerns about the contribution at the time it was received and concludes that DNC General Counsel Joseph Sandler and the DNC willfully postponed returning the contribution until after the election. The Minority agrees that this contribution should have been handled more carefully, but disagrees with the Majority's presentation of the facts. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Majority asserts that the presentation of the Gandhi award to Clinton was arranged well in advance of the DNC event. The evidence obtained by the Committee indicates that the presentation of the award to Clinton was not arranged in advance, but was handled at the event.35 Gandhi told Committee staff that he did not mention the award to anyone until the event, and that he did not meet John Huang until the event.36 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ Joseph Sandler deposition, 5/15/97, pp. 105-14. Joseph Sandler, 9/10/97 Hrg., p. 100. \36\ Staff Interview of Yogesh Gandhi, 3/26/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority incorrectly claims that evidence indicates that the DNC purposefully delayed return of the Gandhi contribution until after the election. Sandler testified that the date of the 1996 election was not a factor in the decision to return the Gandhi contribution.37 He returned the contribution approximately two weeks after press allegations first surfaced raising questions about Gandhi's solvency.38 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ Joseph Sandler deposition, 5/15/97, p. 116. \38\ Joseph Sandler deposition, 5/15/97, pp. 116-18. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority unfairly insists that there was concern over the Gandhi contribution inside the DNC at the time it was received. The Committee developed no evidence suggesting anyone at the DNC was initially concerned about the Gandhi contribution. DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan actually testified that ``John [Huang] showed me the $325,000 contribution from Gandhi, from Yogesh Gandhi, and I believe he stated he was holding on to it until he could vet it with Joe.'' Although Sullivan testified that Huang later told him he had spoken to Sandler about the contribution, Sandler testified that Huang did not bring the contribution to him for review and that he would have remembered if Huang had done so.39 Sullivan similarly testified that Huang represented that at least one other contribution had been reviewed, while Sandler testified Huang never brought it to him.40 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, pp. 37-39; Joseph Sandler, 9/10/97 Hrg., p. 13. \40\ Joseph Sandler, 9/10/97 Hrg., p. 13. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response to Majority Report Chapter 12: ``Ted Sioeng'' In this chapter, the Majority examines political contributions by Ted Sioeng, his family, and related business interests in the United States. Sioeng is a wealthy Indonesian- born businessman with extensive business interests in China. The recipients of his contributions included the DNC, the RNC's National Policy Forum, and Matt Fong, a Republican currently serving as California State Treasurer. Although the Majority acknowledges that it cannot establish any connection between these Sioeng-related contributions and the Chinese government, the Majority's principal conclusion is that approximately half of the $400,000 contributed by Sioeng-related interests to the DNC consisted of ``foreign money.'' The Majority's analysis is misleading and incomplete as to the central question of whether any of these contributions violated federal campaign laws. Existing law does not prohibit using ``foreign money'' to fund federal political contributions by individuals so long as those contributions are, in fact, made by persons legally eligible to contribute (i.e., U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents) with their own funds.41 Much of the Majority's analysis of the bank records underlying the contributions at issue completely ignores this critical issue. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ See Minority Report Chapters 1 and 20. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority report ignores Jessica Elnitiarta's contribution to the National Policy Forum (``NPF'). The Minority Report raises troubling questions about the actual source of the funds donated to the NPF, a de facto subsidiary of the Republican National Committee. The day before Sioeng's daughter, Jessica Elnitiarta, donated $50,000 to the NPF, the Panda Industries account which funded the contribution had a balance of only $1,300.42 That same day, Ted Sioeng wrote a check for $50,000 from his personal account into the account of Panda Industries.43 These transfers raise the fair inference that Sioeng both directed and was the real source of the NPF donation. In examining this same transaction, the Majority overlooks the evidence that Sioeng, a nonresident alien, probably directed the NPF contribution and, instead, merely concludes that, based on the evidence available to the Committee, it is impossible to determine whether Sioeng's reimbursement of his daughter's contribution came from foreign monies. This does not, however, remove the principal concern raised by this contribution: that Sioeng may have directed the contribution of $50,000 to the NPF. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ Memorandum from Steven E. Hendershot, FBI detailee, to Minority Counsel, re: ``Jessica Elnitiarta Record Review,'' 8/22/97. \43\ Memorandum from Steven E. Hendershot, FBI detailee, to Minority Counsel, re: ``Jessica Elnitiarta Record Review,'' 8/22/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority also ignores that Elnitiarta's contribution to the NPF was solicited by Steve Kinney, an aide to Speaker Gingrich, and was collected by Kinney the day before Sioeng sat next to Speaker Gingrich at a Beverly Hills event in 1996.44 These facts raise the strong inference that Sioeng's seating next to the Speaker was a reward for his daughter's contribution to NPF, but are ignored by the Majority. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\ Memorandum from Steven E. Hendershot, FBI agent, to Senate Investigating Team re: China Press newspaper article of 7/22/95'', 7/ 23/97; Memorandum from Steven E. Hendershot, FBI detailee, to Minority Counsel, re: ``Jessica Elnitiarta Record Review,'' 8/22/97; Staff interview with Jessica Elnitiarta, 6/19/97; Los Angeles Times, 7/4/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority ignores the crucial legal questions regarding Sioeng-related contributions because it focuses solely on identifying possible ``foreign money'' sources of those political contributions. As noted above, a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident, such as Sioeng's daughter and his associates, can make contributions funded entirely by ``foreign money'' so long as the money belongs to the donor and the donor of record is actually the person making the contribution decision, not simply acting as a conduit for others.45 The issue of whether part of the monies contributed to Fong comes from overseas is not nearly as significant as the fact that Fong actively solicited a $100,000 contribution from Sioeng, a person ineligible to donate, personally received a check for $30,000 from him, and failed to ascertain whether Sioeng was eligible to contribute. Fong then unpersuasively testified that he thought that Sioeng was making a contribution on behalf of one of his sons--which would still be illegal as a contribution in the name of another.46 Indeed, the Majority Report contains no reference whatsoever to the deposition testimony which Fong provided to the Committee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ See Minority Report Chapters 1 and 20. \46\ Minority Report Chapter 7: Ted Sioeng. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Without sufficient evidence, the Majority characterizes a $50,000 contribution to the DNC from Kent La, a business associate of Sioeng's, as Sioeng-related. The Majority suggests that Sioeng may have directed this contribution; it bases this on La's characterization of Jessica Elnitiarta (in a telephone interview) as his ``supervisor.'' 47 This is an extremely slender reed upon which to ascribe La's contribution to Ted Sioeng. The Majority failed to mention another Committee interview in which La's wife described the contribution at issue: ``La advised that after she and her husband learned from Jessica [Elnitiarta] that Ted Sioeng had made a big donation to the President, La's husband decided to do the same. La advised that another reason they gave money to President Clinton was because the President supported trade increases with China and granted favorite nation status to China. La advised that no one forced or coerced them into donating the money.'' 48 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ The factual support for the Majority's contention that La described Elnitiarta as his ``supervisor'' is exceedingly unclear. The Majority's characterization of La's statements is not supported by the only report of a telephone interview with La that is known to the Minority. On May 13, 1997 FBI detailee Steven E. Hendershot contacted Kent La and, because La's English was ``not very good,'' conducted an interview in Chinese. Memorandum from Steven E. Hendershot to Senate Investigative Team re: Contact with Kent La, 5/14/97. During that interview, La offered no characterization of his business relationship with Elnitiarta. Id. There are no records of any additional FBI interviews of La and it is unlikely, given La's lack of English fluency, that members of the Majority staff could have conducted such an interview. \48\ Memorandum from FBI detailee Vo Duong Tran to Senate Investigative Team re: Interview of Nancy La, 5/25/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority also notes that it sought to depose La, but was unable to get the Minority's approval for the issuance of the subpoena. The resulting unstated inference--that the Minority's failure to approve the proposed subpoena was motivated by a desire to obstruct the Committee's investigation--is unfair and inaccurate. What the Majority Report failed to explain was that a subpoena to La had already been issued with the Minority's approval, but that the Majority came to discover it had issued an invalid subpoena which mistakenly named La's cousin, Vinh B. La.49 When the Majority proposed to re-issue corrected subpoenas for both Kent La and Vinh B. La, the Minority sought equivalent technical corrections of subpoenas that had been issued to RNC officials. When the Majority made it clear that it was unwilling to extend the Minority the courtesy of reciprocal technical corrections on subpoenas already issued, the Minority declined to approve the requested subpoenas for Kent La and Vinh B. La.50 The Majority had the authority to vote to issue the requested subpoenas over the Minority's objections, but did not do so.51 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ Letter from Laura S. Shores, counsel to Kent La, to Majority Counsel, re: Kent La, 11/6/97. \50\ The text of Senator Glenn's 11/19/97 letter to Chairman Thompson on this matter is as follows: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pursuant to the Rules of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I am writing to object to the Majority's proposed issuance of two subpoenas--a corrected subpoena for Vinh B. La and a new subpoena for Kent La. I do so reluctantly because I have no interest in impeding the legitimate course of the investigation. I am compelled to object, however, because precisely the same requests by the minority for subpoenas to correct alleged technical defects have been ignored and effectively denied. For example, The Committee issued deposition subpoenas for Curt Anderson and Jill Hanson that asked for depositions on dates that had already passed by the time that service was effected. The Minority has twice unsuccessfully sought to have these technical defects corrected by new subpoenas. On another occasion, we detailed for the Majority how Martin Weinstein, counsel for several RNC officials, misled the Committee about his representation of Tim Barnes and caused the Committee to serve a deposition subpoena on Mr. Weinstein rather than his actual counsel, Mr. Burchfield. Our request that a corrected subpoena be served on Mr. Barnes was ignored. The Minority has asked your staff to correct these subpoenas at the same time that your requested subpoenas are issued, but have received no response. Under these circumstances, I am compelled to object to the issuance of the Majority's proposed subpoenas to Vinh B. La and Kent La. \51\ Memorandum from Majority Counsel Michael Bopp to Chief Minority Counsel Alan Baron re: Notice of Deposition Subpoenas, 11/14/ 97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's unwillingness to explore Sioeng's dealings with Republican candidates contrasts starkly with its willingness to use bank records to tie Sioeng to Chinese government officials. In one notable instance, the Majority appears to have overreached considerably in suggesting that a $10,000 check made out to the ``O.C. Chinese Friendship Ass.'' in 1995 ``may have been intended for an organization called the Overseas Friendship Association'' which the Majority Report describes as an instrument of the Chinese Communist Party. From the Minority's perspective, a more reasonable interpretation (at least one that takes into account the ``C'' following the ``O'') is that Sioeng donated this $10,000 to a slightly more benign organization: the Orange County (``O.C.'') Chinese Friendship Association. Response to Majority Report Chapter 13: ``Huang's Years at Lippo'' In this chapter, the Majority suggests that the Lippo Group's shifting focus from Indonesia to the emerging markets of the People's Republic of China over the last five years indicates that the Lippo Group has a suspicious relationship with the Chinese Government. The Majority also claims that John Huang engaged in a pattern of illegal political contributions on behalf of the Lippo Group. The Majority provides scant evidence for its conclusions, however, and ignores much evidence to the contrary. Based on scant evidence, the Majority asserts that Lippo Group joint venture partner China Resources is a corporate agent of espionage for the government of China. The only evidence developed by the Committee indicates that the Lippo Group has a business relationship with China Resources, a major conglomerate owned by the Chinese government that acts as a licensed intermediary for outside businesses doing business in China.52 The Majority fails to mention, for example, that according to a 1992 estimate, China Resources has 29 wholly owned subsidiaries and ``hundreds'' of joint ventures, including ventures with U.S. corporations.53 While there have been allegations that China Resources engages in intelligence gathering on behalf of the Chinese Government, no evidence has been developed that suggests that the Lippo Group has ever acted as agent of China Resources or provided any intelligence information to the Chinese Government.54 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg. pp. 67-68. \53\ Xinhua wire service, 11/10/92. On 2/7/96, the Harris Corporation, an NYSE-listed company, issued a press release announcing that it had been awarded a $2.7 million contract to supply radio terminals to a Northwest Electric Power Group, an electric company in the PRC. The press release states that China Resources National Corporation, a branch of China Resources Group, represented Northwest Electric Power. The press release described China Resources National Corporation as ``an import/export company that acts as a licensed intermediary for outside companies doing business in China.'' A 6/26/85 press release of the Universal Satellite Corp., a public company based in New York, announced a contract to sell high-resolution television projectors to Strong Progress Ltd., a subsidiary of China Resources Group of Hong Kong. \54\ According to the Los Angeles Times, the Riady family issued a statement in February of 1998 explaining the nature of their commercial relationship with China Resources and asserting that they have not ``gathered classified information or [performed] other intelligence operations'' in the course of their dealings with international partners. Los Angeles Times, 2/23/98. In addition, the classified information provided to the Committee supports the conclusion only that the Riadys' relationship with the Chinese Government involved normal business dealings within China. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that an audiotape of a DNC event attended by the Vice President indicates that Huang may have arranged a White House meeting between Vice President Gore and the vice chairman of China Resources, Shen Jueren. The Majorityalleges that Huang may have arranged three ``meetings'' between Shen Jueren and the Vice President--a ``meeting'' in the White House on Friday, September 24, 1993; a ``meeting'' at a California law firm in the afternoon of Monday, September 27, 1993; and a ``meeting'' at a DNC event in California later that same Monday. There is scant evidence, however, to support these alleged ``meetings.'' The meeting on Friday was a short visit with the Vice President's Chief of Staff, not the Vice President; 55 and the meeting on Monday in the afternoon was with approximately 25 Asian Americans and Shen Jueren was not listed as an attendee.56 Finally, the meeting on Friday evening was in fact a DNC ``Reception/Dinner'' attended by approximately 50 individuals, including Shen Jueren. The Vice President was not seated at the same table as Shen at this event.57 Despite the documentary evidence, the Majority relies on an alleged exchange captured on audiotape at the law firm event to argue that on the previous Friday, a White House meeting may have occurred. This audiotape is largely inaudible but appears to reflect that at the law firm event, an individual stated that ``Kevin said he met you last Friday and I also come.'' 58 The tape does not seem to refer to Shen, nor, more importantly, was Shen listed as in attendance at that afternoon event.59 The Majority's reliance on this tape to allege a meeting, despite all evidence to the contrary, is unpersuasive. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ White House Communications Agency audio tape, 9/27/93, Letter to Jack Quinn, 10/7/93, EOP 49490. \56\ List of attendees at 9/27/93 afternoon event, EOP 965-969. \57\ Briefing papers and attendees for DNC ``Reception/Dinner,'' 9/ 27/93, 6:00 p.m., EOP 962-964. \58\ White House Communications Agency audio tape, 9/27/93. \59\ List of attendees at 9/27/93 afternoon event, EOP 965-969; In addition, even if the reference of ``Kevin'' is to Shen Jueren, the individual could very well have been speaking to the Vice President's Chief of Staff, Jack Quinn, who accompanied the Vice President to the law firm event and who had briefly met Shen Jueren the Friday before that event. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority implies that John Huang improperly transmitted information to members of the Lippo Group and to the Chinese government, despite insufficient evidence. The Committee developed no evidence that Huang ever mishandled or passed classified or other sensitive information. Moreover, evidence gathered by the Committee indicates that Huang's contacts with Lippo employees were for administrative or personal reasons.60 For example, James Per Lee, the current president of Lippo Bank in California testified in his deposition that he had investigated the approximately 200 calls exchanged between Huang and Los Angeles-based Lippo employees and concluded that these calls were routine and brief. Per Lee testified that the calls were exchanges primarily between Huang and the bank's executive secretary in order to relay messages of calls received, and that calls to other employees concerned such matters as important bank clients, an appearance by Huang in a Chinese New Year's parade, and administrative matters dealing with the domestic subsidiaries.61 After Per Lee's deposition, the Majority abruptly canceled his scheduled appearance before the Committee 62 and fails in its Report to recognize the Lee's deposition testimony. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ Among one summary of Huang's ``Lippo contacts'' were calls placed from Huang's Glendale home to the home of Lippo bank employee Ken Yuen, although Mr. Yuen testified in deposition that his wife was friends with Jane Huang. Ken Yuen deposition, 4/30/97, p. 23. No attempt was made to determine if Huang was in Glendale or Washington at the time such ``contacts'' occurred. \61\ James Per Lee deposition, 5/2/97, pp. 93-102. \62\ Harold Arthur, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 140-141. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority incorrectly asserts that three 1993 contributions from Lippo subsidiaries in the United States to the DNC were reimbursed with foreign funds. There is no evidence to support the Majority claim that three contributions to the DNC in September 1993 from three Lippo-owned California corporations were reimbursed with funds from abroad. Documents suggest that the contributions consisted of income generated in the U.S. For example, the Committee discovered a reimbursement request for a 1992 contribution from Hip Hing Holdings, but did not discover similar requests for the 1993 contributions, despite reviewing all such reimbursement requests for the relevant time period.63 In addition, contrary to the Majority's assertions, administrator Juliana Utomo did not testify that these contributions were reimbursed from Indonesia.64 And finally, unlike the domestic income generated for the 1992 contribution, the domestic income generated for each of the three companies that contributed in 1993 was more than sufficient to make the contributions from those funds.65 The Majority's assertion that the 1993 contributions were reimbursed by funds from Indonesia has no evidentiary support. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ Lippo Group holding companies requests for reimbursement of expenses from August to December 1993, HHH 0236-37. \64\ Juliana Utomo, 7/15/97 Hrg., pp. 12-15. \65\ Exhibit 105. During the July 15 hearing, Senator Thompson referred to an Advisory Opinion issued by the Federal Election Commission, the summary of which states that ``in order for a contribution to be legal, a domestic subsidiary must make contributions out of net profits.'' Advisory Opinion 1992-16. While the Opinion holds it is proper for the particular domestic subsidiary seeking the Opinion to make contributions from its net profits, it does advise whether contributions from the net income of a domestic subsidiary operating at a loss are permissible. See legal analysis in Chapter 1, supra. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that the Lippo Bank of California is controlled by the Lippo Group from abroad. In public testimony before the Committee, former bank President Harold Arthur testified the bank is owned and controlled by James Riady and managed by the Bank's Board. Arthur testified, ``To the extent that any company controlled by a Riady family member is included within the portfolio of companies and investments under the common name of The Lippo Group, it could be argued that it is part of the Lippo Group. However, . . . the Bank is neither a subsidiary, nor a division of, nor controlled by, any company, group, partnership trust or other person or entity within the Lippo Group or otherwise.'' 66 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ Harold Arthur, Opening Statement, 7/15/97 Hrg., p. 10. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response to Majority Report Chapter 14: ``Huang at Commerce'' In this chapter, the Majority attempts to suggest that John Huang, while employed at the Department of Commerce, was a spy for the Riadys's Lippo Group, and, by extension, the Chinese government. After first implying that Huang was purposefully and carefully restricted from policy matters relating to China, the Majority then suggests that Huang improperly accessed and misused classified materials. The Majority also makes a point of noting that the Committee's work was complicated by Huang's refusal to cooperate. The Majority fails to note, however, that Huang had offered to testify before the Committee without any restrictions as to allegations that he had engaged in espionage.67 The rest of the Majority's conclusions are similarly based on ignoring or mischaracterizing evidence before the Committee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \67\ Opening Statement of Senator Glenn, 7/8/97 Hrg., pp. 30-34. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's assertion that it could not adequately investigate Huang's role at Commerce because Huang refused to cooperate with the Committee is partially correct. The Majority ignores the fact that the Committee took dozens of depositions, received thousands of documents and held public hearings on Huang's role while at Commerce. The Majority asserts that Huang was excluded from policy-making at the Department of Commerce because he ``was not capable of doing the work.'' In fact, Huang was not explicitly excluded from any policy area or from receiving any policy-related information. Huang was hired by his immediate supervisor Charles Meissner to fulfill a primarily administrative position with the concurrence of Undersecretary of International Trade, Jeffrey Garten.68 While Huang played a limited policy role at Commerce, this was primarily due to the administrative nature of his position and inter-department tension. Responsibility for high-profile areas was vested primarily at the Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretary level, two levels above Huang.69 No directive of any sort was ever issued by any of Huang's superiors that Huang was to be restricted from access to any policy area, including China, or that he be ``walled off.'' 70 Huang was also never restricted, implicitly or explicitly, from receiving information regarding any particular country. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., pp. 120-21. \69\ Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 122. \70\ Jeffrey Garten, 7/16/97 Hrg., p. 122, 137. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that the Department of Commerce security clearance procedures were inadequate and that ``warning signs'' pertaining to Huang were ignored. In fact, procedures used for Huang's clearance were identical to every other political appointee and no issues were uncovered in this investigation to suggest that Huang should have been denied a security clearance. Several issues relating to issuance of the clearances follow: The Majority asserts that the Clinton Administration initiated the policy of granting all Department of Commerce Officials an interim clearance. In fact, the policy of granting all political employees interim clearances was determined by career Department of Commerce Officials and not by political appointees or other Administration officials.71 Although interim clearances had been issued in previous administrations, Steven Garmon, a career employee was then the Director of the Department of Commerce Security Office, instituted a policy of automatically granting interim clearances to all appointees in reaction to criticism which had been leveled at the Security Office in previous administrations over the delays political appointees had faced in obtaining their clearances and their consequent inability to attend certain meetings or receive certain information.72 The policy was changed by Secretary William Daley in February 1997. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ Steven Garmon deposition, 5/23/97, pp. 25-27; Paul Buskirk deposition, 6/3/97, pp. 31-35. \72\ Steven Garmon deposition, 5/23/97, pp. 33-34. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that a background check prior to issuance of Huang's interim security clearances showed that he had been ``arrested or detained,'' and contends the finding was not followed up. In fact, Huang was never arrested or detained, and the NCIC record was reviewed by the agent handling the Huang clearance and by his superior, Security Office Deputy Director, Paul Buskirk.73 Buskirk determined that the Immigration and Naturalization Service entry was within days of Huang's marriage in 1972, and was likely a fingerprint check as a part of the initiation of Huang's application for citizenship.74 Buskirk's determination is supported by INS records produced to the Committee that indicate Huang was fingerprinted prior to being granted permanent resident status and was never arrested or detained. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \73\ Joseph Burns deposition, 5/23/97, pp. 55-56. \74\ Paul Buskirk deposition, 6/3/97, pp. 53-54. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that the lack of an overseas background check of Huang has left unresolved questions about Huang's contacts with the Chinese government. An overseas investigation was not conducted because the Office of Personnel Management determined that it was not necessary based on the fact that Huang had emigrated from Taiwan in 1969 and had been living in the U.S. since that time. Moreover, no derogatory information was discovered in the domestic background investigation.75 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \75\ Letter to Rep. Larry Combest from James King, Director of OPM, 10/30/96. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that an OPM investigator made a notation on Huang's file that signified he was a ``potential security problem,'' and that this notation was ignored by the Department of Commerce Security Office. In fact, the ``E'' notation on a security file refers to unresolved issues such as a medical problem, not to indicate a potential security risk. No evidence was found in OPM's background check on Huang that related to loyalty, terrorism, dishonesty in the application or examination process, felony offenses, liquor law violations, employment information, or even disturbing the peace.76 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ Federal Investigative Programs Manual, Office of Personnel Management, 1991. The Majority could not have regarded this as a serious issue as the Minority was never notified of the interview of the OPM staff person, and no witness was questioned about the ``E'' notation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority implies that Huang may have improperly accessed classified information while at the Department of Commerce or received classified information beyond his 18-month tenure at Commerce. In fact, there is no evidence that Huang ever improperly accessed classified information or accessed any classified information outside of his 18 months of employment at the Department of Commerce. None of the intelligence officials questioned by the Committee indicated that there was any evidence of mishandling of classified information on the part of John Huang.77 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \77\ 7/16/97 Hrg., pp. 222-227. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that Huang had access to unprecedented amounts of classified information. In fact, Huang repeatedly declined access to additional classified information and received less classified material than either his predecessor or other individuals at his level. Huang turned down the suggestion of Meissner and Security Officer Bob Gallagher that he get an SCI clearance, a level above top secret.78 Huang also never developed his cable profile to receive anything other that cables at the secret level addressed directly to him.79 Huang's predecessor Rick Johnston received more frequent briefings and more extensive information than John Huang.80 Testimony established that Huang's role, while primarily administrative, required him to be able to make informed decisions on a variety of policy issues about which he received classified information.81 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \78\ Robert Gallagher deposition, 5/30/97, p. 13. \79\ Staff Interview with Lewis Williams, 6/12/97. \80\ Staff interview of Richard Johnston, Jr., 6/12/97. \81\ David Rothkopf deposition, 6/2/97, p. 30. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that Huang's use of the Washington D.C. office of Stephens, Inc. is ``cloaked in mystery,'' and implies that Huang's visits to Stephens were used to pass secret information to outsiders. Although the details of Huang's visits to the Stephen's office are not fully known to the Committee, the Majority neglected to request the appearance at public hearings of those individuals with knowledge of these details. For example, the Majority did not call as a witness Vernon Weaver, the head of the Washington office of Stephens, Inc., although Weaver had explained to the Committee in an interview the uses of the Stephens office. Weaver explained that Huang had used the office before he began employment at Commerce, that other people used the office, and that Weaver in turn used an office in the Lippo Bank when he was in California.82 Rather than call Weaver as a witness, the Majority instead called Paula Greene, a secretary at the Stephens office, although she was not able to provide similar information.83 The Majority is correct that the purpose of Huang's visits is unclear, but it is unfair to cast this ambiguity in the most sinister light possible. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \82\ Staff Interview of Vernon Weaver. \83\ Paula Greene, 7/17/97 Hrg. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority asserts that Huang arranged a meeting between Weaver and California State Treasurer Matt Fong which resulted in Stephens receiving business from the State of California. The Majority appears to rely exclusively on Huang's agenda in making this assertion. Neither Fong nor Weaver were ever questioned about this meeting or the business relationship between Stephens and the state although Fong was deposed and Weaver was interviewed by Committee staff. response to majority report chapter 15: ``john huang moves from commerce to the dnc'' In this chapter, the Majority goes to great lengths to imply that there was something sinister in the hiring of John Huang by the Democratic National Committee (``DNC''). The Majority repeatedly asserts that Huang was hired based upon the President's intervention on his behalf. The Majority's conclusions are not supported by accurate descriptions of the testimony and omit critical facts. There is no evidence that Huang's hiring was suspicious, that it was part of an effort to raise foreign money, or that the President's involvement in the process was either significant or inappropriate. The Majority falsely implies that there was something inappropriate about the President being involved with Huang's move to the DNC to raise money in the Asian American community. The Majority's discussion of the President's ``involvement'' in Huang's hiring is misleading and a distortion of the facts. As noted below, the President did not play a ``central role'' in Huang's hiring, but even if he had, as the leader of his party, it is perfectly appropriate for the President to take an interest in DNC personnel matters, particularly when the DNC was reaching out to a new community, Asian-Americans. Nor does the fact that Huang was hired to raise money in the Asian-American community mean that there was a plan to funnel foreign money into federal elections. With the November 1995 initiation of the Asian Pacific American Leadership Council, the DNC was formally reaching out to a new community; 84 previously, the DNC had established fundraising and outreach programs in other minority communities such as in the Hispanic, African-American, and Jewish communities, and it also had fundraising and outreach to women's groups.85 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \84\ Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, pp. 190-191; Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, pp. 12-13. \85\ Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, p. 9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's claim that the President ``played a central role'' in Huang's hiring is supported by misleading, and inaccurately characterized testimony. The Majority cites to press accounts and unsworn interviews to describe a conversation between DNC Finance Chairman Marvin Rosen and the President relating to Huang, despite the fact that the Committee deposed Rosen and therefore sworn testimony was available. The Majority fails to mention that Rosen stated in his deposition that his conversation with the President regarding Huang was ``very brief, seconds of time.'' 86 The Majority's conclusion that ``the President himself intervened'' with the DNC to hire Huang is supported only by this brief conversation that occurred when the President happened to see Rosen in the receiving line at a fundraiser. In addition, DNC National Chairman Don Fowler testified that he personally made the decision to hire Huang, without consulting anyone from the White House and without knowledge of the President speaking to Rosen.87 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \86\ Marvin S. Rosen deposition, 5/19/97, pp. 139-140. \87\ Donald L. Fowler deposition, 5/19/97, p. 171. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority Report falsely implies that Huang received no training. Despite a discussion about Huang's hiring and conversations about his training (and additional discussion of this subject in other chapters), the Majority fails to mention the uncontested fact that Huang was trained. The Majority extensively investigated this issue, asking numerous witnesses about Huang's training and developed a significant record that clearly establishes that Huang was trained. Huang was placed at a group training session by fellow Finance staffer and office mate Sam Newman; 88 a copy of the DNC's legal guidelines for fundraising was found in his files; 89 DNC General Counsel Joseph Sandler testified that after reviewing checks with Huang after a fundraising event, Sandler determined that Huang was familiar with the laws and guidelines by which he was to raise money; 90 and Sullivan testified that Sandler communicated this to him.91 Despite this uncontested record developed by the Majority, there is absolutely no mention of these facts in the Majority Report, which instead focuses on discussions before Huang was hired regarding the type of training that Huang should receive. These omissions leave the reader with the false impression that Huang was not trained. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \88\ Samuel Newman deposition, 7/17/97, pp. 142-143. \89\ Joseph E. Sandler, 9/10/97 Hrg., p. 13. \90\ Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 8/21/97, p. 17. Sandler also testified that he communicated this level of comfort to either DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan or DNC Treasurer Scott Pastrick. \91\ Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, p. 23. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- response to majority report chapter 16: ``john huang's illegal fundraising at the dnc'' In this chapter, the Majority discusses Huang's fundraising while at the DNC. The Majority states that there were concerns regarding Huang's fundraising before he even undertook his first event and concludes that Huang's involvement in and/or organization of several events should have been a ``warning sign'' for the DNC. In so doing, however, the Majority draws conclusions that are not supported by the evidence. The Majority Report falsely claims that there is ``contradictory testimony on whether Sandler trained Huang.'' The testimony is absolutely consistent that Huang was trained (see Response to Majority Chapter 15). In this chapter the Majority tries to exploit a minor contradiction regarding the ``type'' of training Huang received--the training given to all DNC fundraisers or a special training just for Huang. Even this contradiction has been reconciled in testimony before the Committee: former DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan's understanding that Huang received private training 92 most likely resulted from the session in which Sandler reviewed checks with Huang after his first event.93 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \92\ Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/5/97, pp. 23-24. \93\ Joseph E. Sandler deposition, 8/21/97, p. 15. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority Report illogically asserts that contributions solicited by Huang and returned by him in March of 1996 were a ``warning sign.'' Far from being evidence that Huang was acting improperly, Huang's returns of contributions suggest that he knew the rules and was following them by initiating the return of funds he believed to be problematic. The Majority Report fails to mention the lack of any corroboration of Rawein Soberano's statements regarding Huang and the DNC. The alleged lunch between Soberano and Huang is not noted on Soberano's calendar, and Soberano says there was no credit card, reservation, or other documentary evidence of his lunch.\94\ Moreover, the Minority discovered that the Majority made undisclosed failed attempts to corroborate Soberano's story. When the Minority called the Organization of Chinese Americans to determine whether Huang was registered for its June 1996 conference in San Francisco (at which Soberano claimed that he saw Huang), we learned that Huang was not on the registration list, and that the Majority had (undisclosed to the Minority) called and received the same information. Indeed, the sole corroboration the Majority claims to have for Soberano's story is an interview with Jerry Parker (from whom Soberano rented office space). It should be noted that the Majority neither notified nor invited the Minority to this interview. The Majority also failed to provide the Minority with either a transcript or a memorandum from this interview. According to the Majority, Parker ``confirmed'' in this interview that Soberano told him he had lunch with Huang. If the Majority had, in fact, obtained corroboration of Soberano's allegations, it is unclear why the Majority did not provide this information to the Minority or mention the information during the public hearing on this subject. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \94\ Rawlein Soberano, 9/16/97 Hrg., pp. 211-212; Rawlein Soberano deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 29-31, 39. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- response to majority report chapter 17: ``The Hsi Lai Temple Fundraiser and Maria Hsia'' In this chapter, the Majority discusses the DNC-sponsored event at the Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple in Hacienda Heights, California. The Majority spends nearly half of the chapter discussing the activities of Democratic activist Maria Hsia and her associates, including DNC fundraiser John Huang. The Majority details the contributions made by monastics since 1993 who were reimbursed by the Temple. Finally, the Majority discusses the DNC event held at the Hsi Lai Temple on April 29, 1996, focusing on what the Majority believes the Vice President knew and when he knew it. The Majority's analysis is riddled with inaccuracies and baseless conclusions. In the most serious of these conclusions, the Majority inaccurately claims that this event was a fundraiser, that the Vice President knew this in advance of the event, and that he proceeded to participate in this event despite this information. By mischaracterizing testimony and using documents in a misleading fashion, the Majority incorrectly asserts that the Vice President and his staff were aware as early as January 1996 that the Hsi Lai event was to be a fundraiser. The Majority cites to several memoranda from White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes to prove that the Vice President was personally and specifically informed of amounts of money the Temple event was intended to raise. All of these memoranda are spreadsheets with dozens of other events and goals listed; none specifically discusses or names the Hsi Lai Temple event. Contrary to the Majority's assertion, the Vice President's Deputy Chief of Staff, David Strauss, testified in his deposition that the Vice President did not look at these spreadsheets. There were events on those spreadsheets which never, in fact, occurred but which stayed on the list.\95\ In making these allegations, the Majority ignores the testimony of all witnesses with first-hand knowledge about the scheduling practices of the Vice President's office and about the events that surrounded the scheduling of the Temple event, including Strauss,\96\ Kimberly Tilley \97\ and Ladan Manteghi.\98\ In fact, the Majority refused to call Manteghi as a public witness despite a letter of request from every Minority Member of the Committee. For a full discussion of these events, see Minority Chapters 4 and 21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \95\ David Strauss deposition, 8/14/97, p. 236. \96\ David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., pp. 31, 39. And see pp. 41-44 where Strauss testifies: Q: Prior to the time that the newspaper articles appeared in the fall of 1996, did you have any reason to believe that anybody on the Vice President's staff had heard that there was any fundraising engaged in by Ms. Hsia, by virtue of a call from Mr. Huang? A: I have no knowledge that anyone did know. Q: Did you ever know anything about contributions having been collected or monies having been collected prior to the April 29th event at the Hsi Lai Temple? There has been testimony that a certain amount of money was generated in advance of the event. A: I had no knowledge of that. Q: Do you have any reason to believe that the Vice President knew anything relative to this event, either prior to the event or that after the event any monies had been collected? A: I have no reason to believe that he knew anything about this. \97\ Kimberly Tilley deposition, 623/97, p. 124. \98\ Ladan Manteghi deposition, 8/26/97, pp. 53-57, 67. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's basis for concluding that the Temple event was a fundraiser ignores significant evidence that establishes that it was not. The DNC routinely organizes both fundraisers and community outreach events since it is important to motivate both financial and political supporters during a campaign.\99\ At the Temple event, there was no entrance fee; tickets were not collected or sold at the door; the speakers did not solicit donations; and many of those who attended did not contribute to the DNC at all.\100\ In addition, attendees at the event confirm that it did not appear to be a fundraiser. Charlie Woo, told Committee investigators that there was ``no mention of money at the event.'' \101\ Mona Pasquil, DNC Western States political director and former director of Asian- Pacific affairs, testified that she saw no signs of fundraising, such as a table at the door, name tags, checks being exchanged, or solicitations for money.\102\ DNC Chairman Fowler described it as an ``outreach event'' similar to those he attended at churches in the 1960s; not everyone who attended also contributed, and there were none of the typical trappings of a fundraiser.\103\ Fowler also testified, ``[T]here were three people who made presentations there--myself, the temple master, and the Vice President. None of the three of us made any reference to raising money, contributing money, giving money before or after.'' \104\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \99\ See Chapter 25 of the Minority Report for further discussion of the distinction between fundraisers and community outreach events. \100\ Donald L. Fowler, 9/9/97 Hrg., pp. 26-29. \101\ Staff interview of Charlie Woo, 5/30/97. \102\ Mona Pasquil deposition, 7/30/97, pp. 59-62. \103\ Donald L. Fowler, 9/9/97 Hrg., pp. 26-29, 71-72. \104\ Donald L. Fowler, 9/9/97 Hrg., pp. 29. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Persons associated with the Temple who helped organize the event also indicated that they did not consider the event to be a fundraiser.\105\ Man-Ho, assistant to the Temple abbess, testified at the hearing that Temple personnel did not focus on fundraising during planning before the event.\106\ In her deposition, she said that the guests ``were not required to pay a buck for [the] luncheon. . . .'' \107\ She also told the Committee that she did not see anything at the event that would indicate that it was a fundraiser.\108\ The head of the Temple, Venerable Master Hsing Yun, provided a statement to the Committee with consistent information.\109\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \105\ Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg., p. 83; Man-Ho Shih deposition, 8/6/ 97, pp. 136-146. \106\ Buddhist nuns, 9497 Hrg., p. 143. \107\ Man-Ho Shih deposition, 8/6/97, pp. 134-37. \108\ Man-Ho Shihm 9/4/97 Hrg., pp. 137-139. \109\ Statement of the Venerable Master Hsing Yun presented during his interview with Committee investigators, 6/17/97, p. 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ignoring this evidence, the Majority concludes that the event was a fundraiser based on unfounded inferences: According to the Majority's Report, Immigration and Naturalization Service official Daniel Hesse heard references to money raised, but what the Majority writes that he heard-- ``they had raised X amount of dollars''--does not amount to a solicitation. A solicitation is generally believed to be a request for contributions whereas this is merely a statement of what the DNC had raised; far from a request for funds. Furthermore, this interview was conducted unilaterally by the Majority, and, though the Majority cites the interview as having occurred in August of 1997, before the Committee's hearings on the Temple event, this information was not introduced at the Committee's public hearing which might have presented a fuller picture of the event. The Majority's reliance on Sherry Shaw's assertion that she heard a solicitation from a luncheon speaker is also not credible; not one of the approximately 100 others in the audience claims to have heard this. Moreover, Shaw's assertion does not comport with Hesse's statements to the Majority or the recollections of Charlie Woo (another attendee) or Boston Globe reporter John Aloyisius Farrell. According to the Majority, in addition to Shaw's statement to Committee FBI agents on May 14, 1997, Shaw submitted a sworn statement to the Committee in August 1997 which contained this information. Again, this was the month before Committee hearings on the Temple event, and once again, the Majority did not divulge this material which it believed to have been relevant to the investigation. The Majority inaccurately states that the solicitation of contributions by Hsia assistant Matt Gorman and the nuns proves the Temple event was a fundraiser. While Huang and Hsia used the event to encourage contributions to the DNC the day after the event occurred, there is no evidence that the DNC was aware of these activities nor do the activities establish that the Temple event was a fundraiser. The Majority incorrectly asserts that the Vice President's March 15, 1996, meeting with Master Hsing Yun was set up for the sole purpose of the Master inviting the Vice President to the Hsi Lai Temple for a DNC event. Temple administrator Man Ho testified that the Master was not particularly interested in going to Washington for a possible meeting with the Vice President.\110\ Although the meeting took place, it lasted only 10 minutes.\111\ Briefing memos prepared for the Vice President for the meeting do not mention a DNC event at the Temple in April of 1996; the Master simply invited the Vice President to visit the Temple.\112\ Moreover, there is no evidence that a DNC event was ever discussed, and the Majority's assertion to the contrary is nothing more than speculation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \110\ Man-Ho Shih deposition, 8/6/97, p. 96. \111\ Statement of the Venerable Master Hsing Yun presented during his interview with Committee investigators, 6/17/97. \112\ David Strauss, 9/5/97 Hrg., p. 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority incorrectly states that there never really was a second event planned at a restaurant in Southern California for April 29, 1996. While there is little testamentary evidence that such an event was planned, this does not prove that Huang and Hsia never contemplated such an event. At least two documents produced by Hsia's consulting firm, Hsia & Associates, show that such an event was contemplated by Hsia at one time.\113\ And Charlie Woo, an attendee at the April 29, 1996 event, told Committee FBI detailees that Huang originally invited him to attend an event at a restaurant in Southern California and later called to tell him that the location had been changed to the Hsi Lai Temple.\114\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \113\ Exhibit 772: 3/23/96 letter from Maria Hsia to the Vice President, SEN 01719; Invitation to DNC Asian Pacific American Leadership Council event at Harbour Village Restaurant in Monterey Park, California; the name of the restaurant is crossed out and Hsi Lai Temple is written in, SEN 00111. \114\ Staff interview of Charlie Woo, 5/30/97; see also Richard Sullivan deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 21-22. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority concludes that the nuns' alteration and destruction of documents constituted ``deliberate destruction of evidence'' and was done to protect the Vice President and Maria Hsia. After the Temple events were publicized, two nuns involved in Temple bookkeeping and administration altered and destroyed some documents.\115\ There is, however, absolutely no evidence that their actions were undertaken with the knowledge or consent of anyone at the White House or the DNC. Nonetheless, the evidence does indicate that at least some Temple officials were conscious of possible wrongdoing. Yi Chu, the Temple bookkeeper, testified that she knew the Temple could not contribute directly, in its own name, which is why she had to go through the process of finding individuals to write checks.\116\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \115\ Man-Ho Shih, 9/4/97 Hrg., pp. 34-35; Yi Chu, 9/4/97 Hrg., pp. 60-61. \116\Yi Chu deposition, 8/7/97, p. 31. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority falsely implies that beginning in the 1980s, Maria Hsia had inappropriate access to then-Senator Gore based on her fundraising activities. What the Majority does not mention is that fundraising and political outreach organizations are not only an appropriate and legitimate means of stimulating public interest in the democratic process, they are also commonplace. The Majority's insinuation that when organizations and leaders within the Asian-American community participate in these activities, something untoward or sinister must be involved is disturbing. In the 1980s, Hsia helped form the Pacific Leadership Council and was an active and open fundraiser in the Asian-American community. There is nothing sinister about the Vice President reaching out to and raising money in this community. Hsia was one of hundreds of people who raised money for the Democrats throughout this country. The Majority repeats its allegations that Maria Hsia is an ``agent,'' without stating that the classified information that forms the basis for this allegation--certain activities she undertook while an immigration consultant in the early 1990s--has no connection whatsoever to Hsia's fundraising for the Democratic party.\117\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \117\ See Minority Chapter 2. See also Affidavit of Maria Hsia, 2/ 98. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In this chapter, the Majority also takes the opportunity to mischaracterize the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee's (``DSCC's'') tally program. The Majority falsely states that the tally program serves as a means by which contributors can ``earmark'' large ``soft money'' contributions to particular senate candidates in circumvention of the FECA's hard money limits. The Majority also incorrectly suggests that the tally program was ``ultimately found to be illegal'' and terminated. The Majority is wrong on all scores. First, the Majority is incorrect in its characterization of the tally program as a program that permits ``earmarking.'' In fact, the Federal Election Commission rejected this precise claim when it was made by the National Republican Senatorial Committee in 1996.\118\ When it dismissed that complaint, the FEC's general counsel stated that ``there is no evidence that the DSCC accepted earmarked tallied contributions or pass [sic] earmarked contributions on to the Democratic Senate candidates in the form of coordinated party expenditures.''\119\ In fact, an earlier agreement between the DSCC and FEC was premised on the fact that the DSCC did not earmark tallied contributions-- although some contributors' participants in the program may have been confused. As the FEC stated in its April 14, 1997, letter to the DSCC dismissing the NRSC's complaint about the tally program ``[u]nderlying the need for the remedial requirements in the August 1995, conciliation agreement was the belief that participants in the tally program did not understand how the tally program differed from earmarking.'' The FEC dismissed allegations that the 1996 tally program amounted to earmarking or violated the law. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \118\ See Complaint filed 9/27/96 in MUR Nos. 4490 and 4502. \119\ MUR Nos. 4490 and 4502 at 12 (General Counsel's Report.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response to Majority Report Chapter 18: ``The China Connection: Summary of Committee's Findings Relating to Efforts of the People's Republic of China to Influence U.S. Policies and Elections.'' In this chapter, the Majority explains that the Committee's investigation of campaign finance activities included both a public examination of foreign interests connected to the U.S. political process during the 1996 federal election cycle, and an examination of classified information regarding possible Chinese Government involvement in the U.S. political process. The Majority states that the public and classified information together warrant a number of conclusions. The Majority identifies six individuals with ``extensive ties'' to the Chinese Government who ``produced or facilitated foreign campaign contributions'' from ``the Greater China area'' and states that ``discussions took place and actions were taken that suggest . . . that a variety of PRC entities were acting to influence U.S. elections.'' The Majority concludes: The Committee has learned in sobering detail of a wide range of covert PRC efforts in the U.S. and overseas designed to influence elections in this country. Many of these activities may or may not have been part of a single, coordinated effort. Regardless, a coordinated approach may have evolved over time. Other efforts, though undertaken by PRC government entities, have been characterized as rogue activities. Such fine distinctions fall beyond the scope of this report. Unfortunately, the Majority chapter addressing these important issues does not lay out the information received by the Committee and then draw clear conclusions based on that evidence. For example, the chapter does not identify sources for most of its conclusions or state whether the information for those conclusions came from the Committee's public investigation or from the Committee's review of classified information. In fact, the vast majority of the statements made in the Majority chapter are derived from public information that has been available to the Committee and the public for some time. Another example of this obfuscation is the Majority's identification of six individuals who it states have ``extensive'' ties to China or the Chinese Government followed by its assertion that these ties are demonstrated by political contributions or other activities that in fact have stronger connections to Indonesia, Taiwan, Cambodia or Hong Kong. Having found that there is very little evidence connecting the individuals it has targeted to China, the Majority curiously refers to these Asian countries and the then-British controlled property as the ``Greater China'' area. Along the way, the Majority chapter also makes a number of inaccurate or exaggerated statements to support its case. The Majority chapter contains errors in fact and characterization even when they are based on public information. Such false and exaggerated statements based on public information raise significant questions about the accuracy of the Majority's conclusions based on classified (``non-public'') information, which is not available for independent public assessment.\120\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \120\ The conclusions based on classified information, as stated in the Majority and Minority Reports, were not approved by any Executive Branch agency. Letter from George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency to Senator John Glenn, 2/18/98; Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Fred Thompson, 2/18/98; Letter from Robert M. Bryant, Deputy Director, FBI to Senator John Glenn, 2/25/98. See also Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice to Chairman Fred Thompson, 7/11/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Most important is the fact that, after the Committee's year-long investigation into the ``China Plan,'' the Majority chapter does not provide clear or useful information to the public. For ananalysis of the classified information received by the Committee during its investigation, see Chapter 2 of this Minority Report. The Minority responds to some of the statements set forth in the Majority chapter: Most of the Majority's conclusions are based on media allegations and public information that has been available to the Committee and the public for months. Throughout the Majority's chapter on the China Plan, there are bold assertions about connections to Chinese Government officials and other fundraising activities without clarifying upon what information those assertions are based. As a result, the Majority makes no clear statements about what conclusions can be derived from public information presented to the Committee and what conclusions are drawn from classified (or ``non-public'') information. This approach implies that the Committee received more non-public information than it actually did to support the Majority's conclusions. The Majority's quotations of newspaper articles do not appropriately or accurately describe information made available directly to the Committee. Reliance in a Senate Committee report on the media's second hand characterizations of non-public information is unwarranted, particularly here where the Committee had the direct information available for its review.121 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \121\ For example, the Majority chapter cites a February 13, 1997 Washington Post article that stated that Executive Branch agencies had discovered information that the Chinese Government ``sought to direct contributions from foreign sources to the Democratic National Committee before the 1996 presidential campaign.'' Several months later, however, the Committee received direct testimony from the Executive Branch agencies themselves that, based on the information available at the time, there was no indication that the China Plan was directed at influencing the presidential race or that it had affected that race with campaign contributions. Closed Committee Hearing, 7/28/97, pp. 41- 44, 54. The Majority chapter also cites a March 9, 1997 Washington Post article in order to describe a 1996 FBI briefing to members of Congress regarding the China Plan. Several months after that article appeared, however, the Committee received direct information and testimony from the Executive Branch agencies about this and similar briefings. Closed Committee Hearing, 7/29/97, p. 19-12, 84. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's chapter on the China Plan fails to make any clear conclusions, demonstrated by the fact that the chapter contains 25 statements that include phrases such as ``may or may not,'' ``possibly,'' ``believed to be,'' ``indicated,'' and ``suggest.'' The Majority chapter also makes a number of contradictory assertions and also ignores, without explanation, crucial facts regarding the foreign connections uncovered in the Committee's investigation. Some examples are: The Majority does not explain how contributions from Indonesia, Taiwan, Cambodia or Hong Kong demonstrate that the Chinese Government ``may or may not'' have funneled money into political campaigns. The contributions and activities listed by the Majority in its chapter derive from a variety of independent Asian countries. The Majority's use of the term ``Greater China'' or the ``Greater China Area'' is an unjustifiable attempt to bend the facts to make all connections to every Asian country look like a connection to China. The Majority does not explain why it has focused exclusively on certain individuals' ``ties to China'' without recognizing that the individuals targeted in its chapter have equal, if not stronger, ties to Taiwan and Indonesia. It is clear from the Majority chapter itself that most of the individuals it lists as having ``extensive ties'' to China or the Chinese Government in fact have strong ties to Taiwan, Indonesia or Hong Kong, entities not under the control of the Chinese Government during the 1996 election cycle. For example, John Huang was raised in Taiwan before moving to the United States in 1969 and becoming an American citizen; Maria Hsia was born in Taiwan and is an American who continues to have strong family and institutional ties to that country; and the Riadys are Indonesians with business interests around the world. The Majority chapter provides no explanation or analysis of why it ignored ties to other Asian countries in order to focus exclusively on China or why it assumes all ties to any Asian country demonstrates a tie to China. The Majority also provides no explanation for why it ignored non-public information about other countries and their political activities in the United States. See Minority Chapter 2, Information Not Pursued by the Committee. The Majority ignores the contradiction in its assertion that connections to Taiwan demonstrate connections to China. The Majority states in its Report that Taiwan is considered by China to be ``a rogue province'' but nonetheless assumes that certain individuals'' connections to Taiwan may also demonstrate connections to China or to the China Plan. The Majority chapter explains that a China Plan was developed after Taiwanese President Lee's visit to the United States in the spring of 1995, but does not explain why a number of the activities it highlights occurred before that time period. The Majority states that after Taiwanese President Lee's visit to the U.S. in 1995, the Chinese Government ``[s]ecretly'' developed a plan that went beyond increasing lobbying efforts to include ``influencing U.S. policies and elections through, among other means, financing election campaigns.'' The Majority then highlights, among other things, a 1989 trip to Taiwan organized by Maria Hsia, 1993 political contributions from Lippo Group subsidiaries, and 1993 ``meetings'' involving Shen Jureun. Whether these activities are connected to the Chinese Government is one question. Another question is why these activities are highlighted when the Committee was informed in closed- door proceedings that prior to 1995 and the formulation of the so-called China Plan, the Chinese Government's efforts to promote its interests in the United States were focused almost exclusively on using traditional diplomatic means.122 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \122\ Closed Committee Hearing, 7/28/97, p. 5-6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority chapter also makes assertions based on public information that are unsupported by either publicly available or classified information. This raises serious questions about the accuracy of the Majority's assertions that it claims are based on classified information not available to the public. A few examples of the Majority's misstatement and exaggerations based on public information are: The Majority inaccurately claims that in September 1993, contributions to the DNC by three Lippo Group subsidiaries located in California were `` paid with foreign money'' from Jakarta, Indonesia. The Majority then uses this unproven conclusion to tie the supposed foreign contributions to ``meetings'' between the Vice President, and John Huang and Shen Jueren. According to the Majority, Shen is the head of a commercial enterprise ``identified as a PRC intelligence gathering operation.'' There are several inaccuracies in these Majority assertions. First, while it is true that the Committee received evidence that in August of 1992, one subsidiary of the Lippo Group made a $50,000 contribution to the DNC and, according to a reimbursement requests obtained by the Committee, the subsidiary was likely reimbursed for this contribution from Indonesia, no such evidence was received regarding the 1993 contributions. The Committee reviewed the same reimbursement forms for the three subsidiaries that contributed to the DNC in 1993 and found no document requesting reimbursement for those checks.123 In addition, the Majority's general citation to the testimony of a LippoBank employee does not establish that the 1993 contribution was reimbursed.124 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \123\ Lippo Group holding companies requests for reimbursements of expenses from August to December 1993, (HHH 0236-37). \124\ See Juliana Utomo, 7/15/97, Hrg. pp. 14, 53. (Utomo did not testify that the 1993 contributions were reimbursed and, in fact, she did not even take over the relevant responsibility when working for these subsidiaries until 1994.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Second, the Majority apparently makes this new allegation about the 1993 contributions so it can falsely assert that foreign funds were connected to two ``meetings'' attended by Huang and Vice President Gore in that same month of 1993. Even here, the Majority has it wrong. The Majority states that ``the day after Huang wrote'' the checks, he ``escorted Shen Jueren to a White House meeting with Gore's chief of staff, Jack Quinn, and may have met with Gore as well.'' 125 Public documents received by the Committee, however, establish that Huang and Shen Jueren did not have a meeting with Vice President Gore on that day.126 Regarding the second alleged ``meeting,'' the Majority is referring to a ``DNC Reception/Dinner'' in Santa Monica attended by the Vice President and approximately 50 other people. The Vice President was not seated at the same table as Shen.127 The Majority assertions that Shen had a meeting in the White House with Vice President Gore is not supported and its description of a DNC reception and dinner as an additional ``meeting'' between Shen and Vice President Gore is a mischaracterization of the facts. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \125\ The Majority chapter, as provided to the media in February 1988 and as provided to the Minority in ``final'' form on March 2, 1998, stated that ``Huang escorted Shen Jueren to a White House meeting with Gore and his chief of staff, Jack Quinn.'' On March 3, 1998, the Majority changed the language to assert that Huang ``may'' have met with Vice President Gore on that day. This change was welcome, but as described below, the Majority has continued to make this less definitive assertion despite the fact that the evidence does not suggest that a meeting with Vice President Gore occurred on that date. \126\ The first ``meeting'' was in reality a ``stop by'' meeting with Jack Quinn, a staff member in the Office of the Vice President. Letter from Huang to Quinn, 10/07/93 (EOP 049490). In fact, despite the Majority's assertions in its report about the possibility of a ``meeting'' with Vice President Gore, the Majority never requested the schedules for the Vice President or Quinn on that day, or requested any other information from the Vice President's office or Quinn about this alleged meeting. As a result, the schedules were not received by the Committee because they were not requested, nor are they responsive to other Committee requests. In order to assess the Majority's new allegation in its Report, the Minority requested documents and information regarding the activities of that day. In addition to the fact that Huang's letter to Quinn makes clear that Huang and Shen did not meet with the Vice President on September 24, 1997, documents also establish that no ``meeting'' took place. Schedule of Vice President Gore for 9/24/93; Schedule of Jack Quinn for 9/24/93. Instead, it appears that Huang, Shen and Shen's assistant dropped by for a visit with Quinn. Letter from Huang to Quinn, 10/17/93 (EOP 049490). \127\ Briefing papers for Vice President Gore, DNC Reception, 3/27/ 93( EOP 000959J-64J) (approximately 50 attendees and Shen Jureaun is not listed as one of the few people seated at the Vice President's table.). Earlier that day, Vice President Gore met with over 20 Asian American leaders at a Los Angeles law firm for approximately 40 minutes. In its chapter on Huang's activities while at the Lippo Bank, the Majority asserts that an audio tape proves that Shen was present at that event as well. However, the attendance list for that afternoon event does not include Shen and the audio tape also does not refer to Jueren. Briefing papers for Vice President Gore, Meeting with Asian American Leaders, 4:35-5:15, 9/27/93 (EOP 000965-69); Audio tape, 9/27/ 93, White House Communications Agency (Produced to the Committee 10/ 97). See Minority Response to Majority Chapter 13. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Third, the Majority's description of ``China Resources Holding,'' a company then ``head[ed]'' by Shen Jueren who retired in 1995, as one ``identified as a PRC intelligence-gathering operation'' is apparently designed to imply there was contact between a Chinese Government intelligence official and the Vice President. In addition to falsely stating that the 1993 contributions came ``from foreign funds'' that had some connection to ``meetings,'' the Majority's description of China Resources Holding is also an exaggeration. According to public information, China Resources Holding is apparently the current name of the entity once called, and often still referred to as, China Resources.128 The company has been located in Hong Kong for 50 years and engages in trading and investment involving ``retailing, property development, hotels and infrastructure,'' with an estimated asset value of 6.5 to 8 billion dollars, 76 percent of which is in Hong Kong, 17 percent in Mainland China and 7 percent overseas.129 The organization is also known to be a Chinese Governmen-owned trading and import/export intermediary that does business within China as well as with foreign companies, including American companies.130 The Minority does not set forth any conclusions about this organization because the Committee did not conduct a meaningful investigation on the topic. However, the Majority's characterization of the organization as a ``PRC intelligence-gathering operation,'' something the Majority also alleged during the Committee's public hearings in July 1997,131 appears to be an exaggeration of the facts in order to support its unwarranted conclusion. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \128\ See www.chinaresources.co in the internet. The site provides information about the group and states that China Resources Holding is the current name of the entity once called, and often still referred to as, China Resources. \129\ Financial Times (London), 8/21/93; Time, 5/5/97; Washington Post, 7/18/97; www.chinaresources.co. \130\ Time, 5/5/97; Reuters Wire, 3/31/96, 6/26/85, 2/7/96; Xinhua Wire, 11/10/92; Washington Post, 7/18/97. \131\ Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97 Hrg. pp. 67-73; Senator Bennett, 7/ 15/97, Hrg. pp. 67-73. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's statement that ``Ted Sioeng was one of the DNC's largest contributors during the 1996 federal election cycle'' is not supported by the evidence. The Majority states that ``Sioeng, his family and his business enterprises contributed $400,000 to the DNC in 1995 and 1996.'' Public records show, however, that the $400,000 apparently attributed to Sioeng by the Majority includes $250,000 given to the DNC by Sioeng's adult daughter, a U.S. permanent resident and businesswoman, or from companies that she legally controls, and $150,000 from two individuals who are not employed by Sioeng and who are also eligible to contribute to the DNC.132 Although Sioeng is associated with these individuals and attended several DNC events with his family, there certainly is not sufficient evidence to state that Sioeng, who is not attributed with giving any money to the DNC, was one of the ``largest contributors'' to the DNC in the last election cycle.133 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \132\ Staff interview with Jessica Elnitiarta, Sioeng's daughter, 6/19/97; Memorandum of Steven Hendershot, FBI Agent detailed to the Committee, ``Re: Jessica Elnitiarta Record Review,'' 8/22/97; Letter From Thomas McLish, counsel for Elnitiarta, 6/18/97; FEC Records; Other contributions came from Subandi Tanuwidjaja and Kent La, both of whom are associated with Sioeng and Elnitiarta, but neither of whom are employees of Sioeng's. FEC Records; Staff interview with Jessica Elnitiarta, 6/19/97; FBI Special Investigator interview with Kent La, 5/13/97 (La is an independent distributor who does business with Sioeng). This interview was conducted in Chinese by an FBI agent detailed to the Committee who transcribed the contents of the interview in a report to the Committee dated 5/14/97. There is nothing in the interview report that states that La works for Sioeng or that La contributed to the DNC based on requests from Sioeng. \133\ The Majority also states that Sioeng and his family and business interests ``spent over $550,000 on political campaigns and organizations in 1995 and 1996.'' This figure is derived from the $400,000 contributed to the DNC by his daughter, her companies and associates; $100,000 contributed to Matt Fong, a Republican California official, apparently by Sioeng's companies in Hong King and $50,000 contributed by his daughter's company to the National Policy Forum, an arm of the RNC. See Chapter 7 of this Minority Report. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's conclusion that the Chinese Government consulate in Los Angeles gave a hotel owned by Sioeng $3,000 ``for the purpose of making or reimbursing'' Sioeng for a political contribution to a California state candidate is not based on a sufficient investigation. The Majority states that ``the Committee has concluded'' that the Chinese Government provided $3,000 to a hotel in California in order to reimburse Sioeng for a $5,000 political contribution to a Republican California state candidate. The Majority apparently reached this conclusion based only on review of two bank transfers.134 The Majority did not request information from the hotel about the reason for this $3,000 payment and it appears that the payment may have been made to the hotel to cover expenses of a Chinese Government television crew that stayed there in 1996.135 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \134\ See footnotes 13 and 14 of the Majority chapter. \135\ Los Angeles Times, 2/23/97 (stating that attorneys for the hotel supplied billing records to verify that the hotel charges were to cover the expenses of a Chinese government television crew in early 1996). The Committee did not request such information and therefore the Minority is unable to reach a conclusion about the purpose of the payment to the hotel. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's statement that Charlie Trie's contributions solicited for the Presidential Legal Trust Fund were ``ultimately'' reimbursed with money from Taiwan and Cambodia is an exaggeration. Putting aside the propriety of Trie's unsuccessful attempt to provide the private trust fund with nearly $500,000 in contributions,136 the evidence before the Committee supports the conclusion that of the nearly $500,000 of attempted contributions, only $70,000 came from abroad: $40,000 from Taiwan and $30,000 from Cambodia.137 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \136\ In Majority Chapter 20, which discusses Charlie Trie's attempted contributions to the Presidential Legal Expense Trust, the Majority claims that the amount of Tries' attempted contributions was not ``nearly $500,000,'' but instead ``$789,000.'' The Majority's figure in this chapter is the accurate one. \137\ Zhi Hua Dong deposition, 6/17/97, pp. 98-105. Interviews reports and other analyses on this topic written by FBI agents on detail to the Committee do not suggest that additional funds came from abroad. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority chapter's pattern of misstating and mischaracterizing public information received by the Committee is continued in the Majority's treatment of classified information received by the Committee. When the Executive Branch agencies reviewed the portions of the Majority and Minority report regarding the China Plan, they expressly noted that their review was limited to deleting direct factual errors or classified information. The agencies informed the Committee that they did not take any position regarding conclusory statements made by either the Majority or the Minority based on classified information.138 And indeed, the Minority here responds to some of the most egregious allegations made by the Majority against American citizens and other individuals based on ill founded conclusions of classified and other information. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \138\ The conclusions based on classified information, as stated in the Majority and Minority Reports, were not approved by any Executive Branch agency. Letter from George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency to Senator John Glenn, 2/18/98; Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Fred Thompson, 2/18/98; Letter from Robert M. Bryant, Deputy Director, FBI to Senator John Glenn, 2/25/98. See also Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice to Chairman Fred Thompson, 7/11/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's two statements about John Huang do not show that he had ``extensive ties'' to the Chinese Government. The Majority states that Huang is one of six individuals identified by the Majority who had ``extensive ties'' to the Chinese Government and then describes two activities to support its assertion: (1) that in 1993 Huang made a political contribution reimbursed by funds from Indonesia and escorted Shen Jueren to ``two meetings'' and that (2) the Committee obtained a ``single piece of unverified information . . . that indicates that Huang himself may possibly have had a direct financial relationship with the PRC government.'' The first activity is based on public information and the factual inaccuracies of the Majority's assertions regarding these contributions and ``meetings'' are discussed above. The second activity highlighted by the Majority is based on non-public information. Indeed, the facts are derived from an unsubstantiated hearsay speculation gathered well after Haung's campaign finance activities were extensively publicized in the press. The Majority's statements about Maria Hsia also do not demonstrate ``extensive ties'' to the Chinese Government. The Majority states that Hsia also had ``extensive ties'' to the Chinese Government and then lists several activities to support its assertion: (1) a long standing relationship with the Hsi Lai Temple in California, (2) contributions ``laundered'' through the Temple, (3) a trip to Taiwan organized by Hsia in 1989, (4) fundraising for the Democratic Party generally, (5) attendance at the Santa Monica ``meeting'' attended by Shen Jueren in 1993, (6) activities considered to constitute being an agent for the Chinese Government and (7) information that Hsia worked with Sioeng and Huang to identify donors for the Democratic Party. The first four activities, which are based solely on public information, demonstrate that Hsia has a long-standing relationship with Taiwan as well as with a Temple in California that is both wealthy and ardently pro-Taiwan. The fifth activity, also based on public information, is Hsia's attendance at a 1993 ``meeting'' with Shen Jureun. This meeting, however, was in fact a ``DNC Reception/Dinner'' in California attended by approximately 50 individuals. Regarding the sixth activity mentioned by the Majority, it should be noted that the Committee received no information suggesting that Hsia's fundraising activities were connected to the Chinese Government. Indeed, the information characterized by the Majority from the classified information regarded some of Hsia's duties while an immigration consultant in California in the early to mid 1990s. In an affidavit submitted to the Committee, Hsia explains those duties, raising doubt regarding any improper ties to China. The allegations made by the Majority against an American citizen without a thorough analysis of the facts is troubling. The final activity of Hsia described by the Majority, number seven above, is again based on the same non-public information in which Huang is referred, which contained a hearsay speculation gathered well after allegations of fundraising improprieties against these individuals were publicized in the media. The Majority's assertions that the Committee uncovered connections between the Riadys and a Chinese intelligence entity does not imply that the Riadys were involved in foreign spy or similar intelligence activities. The Majority's conclusions about the Riady's business interests and their connections to Chinese intelligence sources is based primarily on public information presented to the Committee during its open proceedings.139 The non-public information received by the Committee supports the conclusion that the Riady's business dealings may have involved a relationship with a Chinese intelligence entity, but does not support the implication that the Riadys were involved in foreign spy or other similar intelligence activity. The Minority agrees that the Riadys have ties to China but is unable to assess whether those ties are ``extensive'' or whether they are appropriate ties based primarily on business dealings within China. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \139\ Thomas Hampson, 7/15/97, Hrg. pp. 67-73. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority Report's assertions regarding Charlie Trie are based solely on public information received by the Committee. The Majority does not make any conclusion about Trie based on non-public information and the Minority agrees with this decision. For information about Trie, see Chapter 5 of the Minority Report. conclusion In describing the basic elements of the China Plan, the Majority provides information that the plan, for the most part, contemplated legitimate activities that have been undertaken by most other countries for years. However, in order to expand on the plan and its significance in the 1996 election cycle, the Majority makes a series of speculative assertions and conclusions. The Majority strings together a number of activities connected to several Asian countries, labels those countries the ``Greater China Area,'' and implies or assumes that they ``may or may not'' be related to the China Plan or the Chinese Government. This is a necessary predicate for the Majority to establish because the activities the Majority lists in support of its theory have limited connections to China. Huang's contribution though a Lippo Group subsidiary in 1993 is connected to Indonesia; Trie's attempted contributions to the President's Legal Expense Trust was partially reimbursed by funds connected to Taiwan and Cambodia; Hsia's association with the Hsi Lai Temple is connected to Taiwan; and the Riadys are connected to Indonesia and have global business interests. The incidents mentioned by the Majority in its China Connection chapter that actually show any possible connection to China are (1) alleged ``meetings'' with Shen Jueren in 1993; (2) Hsia's immigration work on behalf of Chinese nationals, (3) the Riady's business dealings with China Resources; (4) an event attended by Wang Jun 140 and (4) Sioeng's contacts and business interests in China. While these connections are important, they are greatly exaggerated by the Majority chapter. The Minority does not downplay the seriousness of the allegations of foreign connections that were exposed by the Committee's public hearings or closed proceedings. In fact, as stated in Chapter 2 of the Minority Report, the allegations and information raised legitimate questions about contributions from a number of countries making their way into the 1996 federal elections. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \140\ The Majority repeats its characterization of Wang Jun as a ``Chinese arms'' dealer, despite the fact that the Committee was informed that Wang Jun is primarily associated with the Chinese investment company CITIC, which has a board of international advisors that includes prominent Americans. Staff interview with Robert Suettinger, Director, Asian Affairs, National Security Council, 6/3/97. The Minority does not make any conclusions about Wang Jun, but believes that this repeated characterization of Wang Jun by the Majority is, at best, simplistic. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority's treatment of the important issue of foreign influence in the 1996 election cycle and its highly questionable and damaging conclusions based on the information presented to the Committee were unfortunately driven by a conclusion looking for supporting information that was not available. Ultimately, the information presented to the Committee demonstrated a number of foreign contributions making their way into both political parties from businessmen and companies in a variety of Asian countries. The information submitted to the Committee to date, however, does not demonstrate that these troubling instances were connected to a grand scheme by the Chinese Government to influence our electoral process. Response to Majority Report Chapter 19: ``Charlie Trie and Ng Lap Seng's Laundered Contributions to the DNC'' In this chapter, the Majority analyzes Charlie Trie's contributions to the DNC and possible involvement in contribution conduit schemes, and concludes that Trie used foreign funds supplied by Macao businessman Ng Lap Seng to pay for both his own contributions and to reimburse others for making contributions to the DNC. The Majority also implies that the DNC failed to return a conduit contribution by Xiping Wang. The Minority generally agrees with the Majority's conclusions in this chapter, but notes that several facts have been omitted. For example, the Committee did not receive evidence that most of the money Trie raised for the DNC involved conduit funds. In addition, the Majority fails to mention that the DNC returned the Xiping Wang contribution to the U.S. Treasury. The Majority concludes that Trie used foreign funds supplied by Macao businessman Ng Lap Seng to pay for both his own contributions and to reimburse others for making contributions to the DNC. The Minority agrees with the Majority's conclusion, but disagrees that ``most'' of the money Trie raised for the DNC involved conduit funds; for example, there is no evidence that Trie reimbursed the $325,000 contribution by Yogesh Gandhi which comprises more than half of the funds attributed to Trie by the DNC. The Majority suggests that the DNC has not returned Xiping Wang's contribution. The Majority references Xiping Wang's testimony indicating that she was not reimbursed by the DNC for her contribution. However, the Majority fails to note that the DNC did in fact return the contribution--it sent the money to the United States Treasury after failing in an attempt to locate Wang and it informed her attorney of that fact.141 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \141\ Letter from DNC retained counsel, Judah Best, Debevoise & Plimpton, to R. Michael Haynes, Esq., attorney for Xiping Wang, 2/20/ 98. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response to Majority Report Chapter 20 : ``Charlie Trie's Contributions to the Presidential Legal Expense Trust'' In this chapter, the Majority analyzes Charlie Trie's fundraising efforts on behalf of the Presidential Legal Expense Trust (``PLET'' or ``Trust''). The Majority concludes that the donations were ``highly questionable,'' may have been ``coerced,'' and that the Trust acted improperly in how it investigated the donations, returned them, altered the Trust's accounting procedures, and delayed revealing the matter to the news media. The Majority further suggests that Trie's PLET fundraising efforts may have been linked to, among other things, his appointment to a Presidential Commission and to his obtaining an invitation for Wang Jun to a White House coffee. The Majority's analysis of Trie's fundraising efforts for PLET is deeply flawed. The Majority chapter apparently double counts a number of the checks that Trie presented to the Trust; notes the bipartisan, impressive credentials of the trustees, but then ascribes partisan motives to their actions and; speculates on linkages between the PLET donations and Trie's Commission appointment, Wang Jun's coffee invitation. The Majority incorrectly states that Trie presented PLET with donations totaling $789,000. This figure apparently double counts a number of the checks. In Trie's first meeting with the Trust, the Trust declined to accept checks totaling $70,000, whose deficiencies Trie promised to correct. Bank records establish that the Trust actually deposited $380,000.142 In Trie's second meeting, the Trust declined to accept checks which Trie said totaled $179,000. In a third meeting, the Trust declined to accept checks which Trie said totaled $150,000. The $380,000 bank deposit and the $150,000 figure Trie used in the final meeting result in a total of $530,000, almost a third less than the inflated figure used in the Majority chapter. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \142\ See Michael Cardozo, 7/30/97 Hrg., p. 7. See also Minority Chapter 5 on Trie. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority acknowledges the bipartisan, impressive credentials of the Trustees, but then attributes partisan motives to the trustees. The Majority suggests that the trustees sought White House permission for the Trust's actions, while failing to acknowledge testimony by the Trust's executive director that the Trust never took direction from the White House. The Majority also suggests that the trustees hid the Trie-related donations to protect the President until after the election, while failing to acknowledge that the trustees' accounting decisions were made on a unanimous, bipartisan basis for substantive reasons. In short, the Majority unfairly impugns the motives of the respected, bipartisan trustees and fails to acknowledge that the Trust acted prudently and with restraint in declining to accept apparently eligible contributions. The Majority's analysis of a link between Trie's Commission appointment and the PLET donations fails to acknowledge the documentary evidence that Trie's appointment was finalized before he ever met with the Trust.143 The facts do not establish any link between the PLET donations and Trie's Commission appointment, the Wang Jun invitation, or Trie letter. The Majority fails to cite any facts linking the PLET donations to the DNC's decision to invite Wang Jun to a White House coffee as Trie's guest. There is no evidence before the Committee that the DNC personnel involved in the coffee invitation. DNC officials David Mercer, Richard Sullivan, and Marvin Rosen were aware of the PLET donations. In addition, the White House personnel involved in responding to Trie's letter to the President have stated that they handled the letter routinely, using standard language they had developed to respond to a host of letters on the same subject.144 The Majority chapter also fails to acknowledge testimony by FBI detailee Jerry Campane that Trie's letter was apparently prompted by one of his employees, had no connection to China, and no impact on U.S. policy.145 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \143\ See Minority Chapter 5, including analysis of a 12/15/95 White House personnel office memorandum stating that ``President Clinton has approved'' Trie for the Commission appointment, and 2/5/96 White House legal counsel memorandum reporting successful completion of a background check and stating that the Commission appointment of Trie and another individual ``may proceed.'' Trie first contacted the Trust on 3/20/96. \144\ See Minority Chapter 5; staff interview of Robert Suettinger, director, Asian affairs, National Security Council, 6/3/97. \145\ See Minority Chapter 5; Jerry Campane, 7/29/97 Hrg., pp. 58, 77-78, 95; staff interview of Robert Suettinger, director, Asian affairs, National Security Council, 6/3/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority labels the donations made by members of the Buddhist Ching Hai sect as ``highly questionable'' and, in part, ``coerced,'' even though the majority of PLET donations met the Trust's requirements. The Majority fails to acknowledge the evidence that most of the donors appeared to be U.S. citizens who contributed voluntarily to help the President.146 The recent indictment of Trie does not reference any questionable conduct in connection with the PLET donations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \146\ See Minority Chapter 5; see also Michael Cardozo, 7/30/97 Hrg., p. 80.; Sally Schwartz deposition, 5/6/97, p. 144; 5/9/96 memorandum from Sally Schwartz to Michael Cardozo, Document 0078. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Response to Majority Report Chapter 21: ``The Saga of Roger Tamraz'' In this chapter, the Majority describes Tamraz's attempts to gain access to U. S. Government officials and concludes that in the spring of 1996, senior U.S. Government officials looked for ``any reason'' to support Tamraz's pipeline project based on his political contributions to the Democratic Party. The Majority's conclusion that Tamraz was successful at gaining access to U.S. Government officials is correct. Before Tamraz made political contributions to the Democratic Party, he met with several Government officials. After he made contributions, he attended several DNC events where senior Government officials were in attendance. The Majority's chapter, while containing several statements and conclusions with whichthe Minority agrees, also contains omissions of significant evidence, assumptions not based on evidence, and conclusions contrary to the evidence. The Majority Report erroneously states that the DNC ``pressure[d] NSC officials to change their position on the merits of Tamraz's Caspian Sea Pipeline.'' The Majority claims for the first time in its Report that the DNC did more than invite Tamraz to DNC events in the spring of 1996. The Majority now claims that the DNC and the White House actually pressured ``NSC officials'' to change U.S. Government policy regarding Tamraz's pipeline project. This assertion is contradicted by the facts. The Majority provides absolutely no citations for its conclusion that seven months after U.S. policy was implemented,147 senior Government officials were looking for ``any reason'' to support Tamraz's pipeline proposal. In fact, the evidence contradicts these assertions. Tamraz testified that he mentioned his pipeline in March and April 1996 during a brief ``introduction to the President'' and ``for about 30 seconds'' to White House official Thomas (``Mack'') McLarty, both at DNC events.148 He testified that he described his pipeline proposal during those brief encounters as one that would supposedly bring peace to the region and jobs to Americans. In response, McLarty asked his Energy Department contact, Kyle Simpson, to provide him with information about the pipeline project.149 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \147\ U.S. policy was implemented in October of 1995 and Tamraz played no role in that policy. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg. pp. 5-6, 19- 20, 28, 52, 72. \148\ Mack McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 5-9; Memorandum for Jonathan Marks to Ann Ngo, 10/25/95; E-mail from Ira Sockowitz to Jonathan Marks, 10/27/95; Melissa Moss Deposition, 6/11/97, pp. 190- 193. \149\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 56; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 26. Simpson testified that requests for information about American companies and their projects are not uncommon. He explained that the U.S. Government sees value in U.S. companies participating in foreign projects although it is ``not terribly particular'' about which U.S. company it is if more than one is vying for a project. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p.54. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, despite the assertions that this request was based on Tamraz's political contributions, both McLarty and Simpson testified unequivocally that they were not aware of Tamraz's political contributions at the time of this request nor did they mention political contributions to anyone.150 Tamraz himself testified that he had never mentioned political contributions to anyone in the White House ``ever.'' 151 The Majority ignores the fact that even Jack Carter, another Energy Department official, testified that Simpson's request for information about the pipeline was not, in any way, an attempt to tie alleged information about political contributions to U.S. Government support for, or meeting with, Tamraz.152 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \150\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 30. 56-57; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg. pp. 50-51; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 43, 46-48. \151\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg. p. 73. \152\ Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 44-45. The Majority relies on Carter's testimony to assert that political contributions motivate this request for information. However, the Majority at the same time asserts that Carter's recollection of other issues are not accurate. The Majority also attempts to bolster its decision to rely on Carter's testimony by stating that Carter's ``handwritten notes of his encounter with Simpson corroborate that they discussed Tamraz and suggest also that Simpson made clear President Clinton's interest in the matter.'' The statement is correct only as far as it goes. The notes say ``do background on Tamraz'' and ``consider distance'' and ``memo to Pres.'' The notes do not contain any figures or any mention of political contributions whatsoever. Exhibit 1199, p. JC-007 (Notes of Jack Carter, 4/3/96). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Apparently recognizing that its conclusion is unsupported by the evidence, the Majority makes several questionable assertions in its attempt to support its assertion that U.S. officials were ``looking for any reason'' to change U.S. policy in the spring of 1996. The Majority unsuccessfully attempts to cast doubt on the testimony of other witnesses whose testimony was consistent. The Majority suggests that Simpson's testimony about his exchange with Carter may have been influenced by a call from McLarty and is less credible because he attended a fundraiser in his home town of Houston. Simpson's deposition and hearing testimony, however, demonstrate that these suggestions are false.153 The Majority's allegations regarding a DNC-generated list of Tamraz's contributions also ignores the testimony of four witnesses. McLarty, Simpson and Carter all testified that they have never seen this list 154 and Tamraz himself testified that he never showed the list to anybody. Tamraz also testified that ``nobody at the White House has ever talked to me about contributions, ever.'' 155 Finally, the Majority's speculation that Carter was acting at the behest of someone else fails to address the inaccuracies of the speculation, the contrary testimony by all other witnesses, and the documentary evidence that demonstrate what actually occurred. See Minority Chapter 30. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \153\ Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 83 (Simpson called McLarty in March of 1997 in response to an answer Simpson gave to a reporter that confused a 1995 meeting between Tamraz and Jack Carter and McLarty's later request for information on the pipeline); Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97, Hrg. pp. 135-38 (Simpson was given a complimentary seat at the fundraiser during his tenure at the Energy Department and did not raise money for the DNC while he was at the Department.) \154\ Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 30; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 50; Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 32. \155\ Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97, Hrg. p. 73. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority Report's discussion of Tamraz's attempt to meet with the Vice President is incorrect. The Majority recounts that at ``some point in August or early September 1995'' the Vice President ``expressed interest in Tamraz's pipeline and `requested that Harut Sassounian set up a meeting about the proposal.' . . . and that ``[a]s a result, Tamraz was invited to a breakfast with the Vice President scheduled for October 5, 1995.'' The Majority also states that Tamraz was disinvited from the coffee due to Sheila Heslin's efforts, but was ``not unhappy'' because he attended a private fundraiser on October 2, 1995 and sat at the head table with a number of individuals, including Vice President Gore. There are several factual misstatements in this version of events. Although relatively minor points, the Majority's treatment of this issue is the looseness with which the Majority handles the facts. The Vice President's staff did receive a request that the Vice President meet with Sassounian and his associate, Roger Tamraz.156 Contrary to the Majority Report, however, the response to this request was not to invite Tamraz ``to a breakfast with the Vice President scheduled for October 5, 1995.'' Rather, the evidence establishes that the Vice President's staff responded by sending a memorandum to the Vice President on September 13, 1995, suggesting that he not agree to such a meeting.157 And in fact, after that memorandum was sent, the Vice President's staff notified Sassounian and Tamraz that no meeting would be scheduled. No meeting was ever scheduled, nor did one occur.158 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \156\ Exhibit 1127: Memorandum to the Vice President from Leon Fuerth, 9/13/95, EOP 45766-67. The Vice President received this request after meeting with Sassounian on August 8, 1995, not in ``early September,'' as the Majority asserts. Exhibit 1126; Exhibit 1127; EOP 045766 and EOP 56535, 5639-40. \157\ Exhibit 1127: Memorandum to the Vice President from Leon Fuerth, 9/13/95, EOP 45766-67. \158\ EOP 25006-006; 250-4; Exhibit 1135. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tamraz's attendance at a October 2 private fundraising dinner was scheduled by the DNC and, upon discovering this, the Vice President's staff, not Heslin, caused Tamraz to be ``disinvited'' from the October 5, 1995 coffee. The DNC organized the fundraiser on October 2 and decided whom to invite.159 On October 3, 1995, having learned that the DNC had invited Tamraz to an event the night before, the Vice President's staff faxed to the DNC a copy of Vice Presidential National Security Advisor Leon Fuerth's September 13, 1995 memorandum advising the Vice President not to meet with Tamraz, apparently to make clear to the DNC that it should not invite Tamraz to future events with the Vice President.160 It was this fax that resulted in the DNC withdrawing Tamraz's invitation to the October 5, 1995 coffee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \159\ Exhibit 1136. \160\ Exhibit 1137 and Exhibit 1138. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ultimately, the assertion that the Vice President or the DNC responded to a request for an official meeting by inviting Tamraz to the October 5 coffee is inaccurate. The Majority Report's description of the two phone calls between Bob of the CIA and DNC National Chairman Donald Fowler is incomplete. The Majority Report states that Fowler called Bob of the CIA twice, once on October 19, 1995 and again on December 13, 1996. The Majority states that ``Fowler was closely engaged in efforts to contact Bob at the CIA'' and that Fowler was not truthful in his testimony before the Committee when he denied having any memory of calling the CIA. The Majority analysis of these phone calls is incomplete. First, the Majority's factual statement is correct as far as it goes, but evidence omitted--most notable relevant references to Bob of the CIA's deposition--casts serious doubt on the Majority's conclusion. Regarding the October phone call, the Majority ignores the testimony of Bob, who stated that he called Fowler first on October 18, 1995 and left his name, and possibly his phone numbers, with a receptionist who answered the phone. Fowler returned the call the next day.161 There is no explanation in the Majority Report why they call Bob's name and phone number ``classified'' in the context of these calls. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \161\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Second, the Majority also ignores the fact that Bob testified that during both phone calls with Fowler his affiliation with the CIA was never mentioned. Bob testified that during the October phone call he was working undercover, that he never mentioned his CIA affiliation and was ``not sure that Fowler [knew] who he [was] talking to.''162 Bob testified that during the December phone call he still could ``not say for certain how [Fowler] knew who he was talking to because CIA was never mentioned.''163 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \162\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 6. \163\ Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, although the Majority criticizes Bob for lobbying the NSC's Sheila Heslin on issues regarding Tamraz, the Majority ignores the evidence that establishes that Bob's lobbying began in June 1995, long before Bob had his first contact with Fowler in October of 1995. In fact, according to Heslin, Bob's lobbying from June through October 1995 focused on getting Tamraz's proposal accepted by the U.S. Government and, accordingly, stopped after October of 1995, probably because Bob was aware that U.S. policy regarding the Caspian Sea pipeline had already been determined and Tamraz had already been excluded.164 Fowler's contacts began after U.S. policy was already established and were focused on gaining information on Tamraz to permit him to attend DNC events. The Majority's conclusion that ``Fowler was closely engaged in efforts to contact Bob at the CIA'' is called into serious doubt when all the evidence about their two phone conversations is examined. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \164\ Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97, Hrg. p. 20; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority Report incorrectly asserts that Tamraz was not able to obtain access to Republicans. The Majority agrees that in the 1980s, Tamraz ``gave enough money to become a Republican Eagle.'' However, the Majority states that ``Tamraz received no response to his overtures from the Reagan Administration; he could not even gain access to the Reagan White House.'' Although Tamraz testified that he did not visit the Reagan White House, the evidence before the Committee shows that in 1985, the chairman of the Republican National Committee, Frank Fahrenkopf, apparently endorsed Tamraz for a position in the Reagan Administration by sending a letter to Robert Tuttle, Reagan's White House Personnel Director. The letter of endorsement was clearly based on Tamraz's political contributions to the Republican Party.165 Tuttle responded to the letter by requesting that the RNC forward Tamraz's resume to the White House. Tamraz also testified that he received two letters from President Reagan thanking him for his contributions to the Republican Party 166 and that during the 1980s, he had access to high level CIA political appointees.167 As late as 1997, Tamraz was offered meetings with Republican Senators in exchange for contributions to the Republican Party.168 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \165\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 36; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/ 97 Hrg. p. 18; Senator Levin, 9/18/97 Hrg. pp. 64-44; Exhibit 1064M. \166\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 40. \167\ Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 11-14, 123-24; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg. pp. 3-4. \168\ Roger Tamraz, Hrg. pp. 67, 169-170; Exhibits 1065 & 1066. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ................. ................. .................