SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF
1994
Wednesday, October 23, 1997
Room 2237 Rayburn Building, 10:00
AM
Dempsey
Testimony
Testimony of James X. Dempsey
Senior Staff Counsel
Center for Democracy and Technology
before the
House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime
CALEA Implementation
October 23, 1997
I. Introduction and Summary
The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) is pleased to have this
opportunity to testify about implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA).
Our testimony will make the following points:
CALEA is critically important to maintaining a balance among the interests of law
enforcement, privacy and innovation as the nation's communications infrastructures
continue to evolve and expand their importance in everyday life.
-Implementation of the legislation has gotten seriously off-track, largely because the FBI
has departed from the reasonableness that marked the drafting of the law and instead
has tried to use it to expand government surveillance capabilities.
Congress has to intervene to make clear to the FBI that it cannot dictate the design of
the nation's phone system and cannot insist upon industry acquiescence to
capabilities that go beyond the status quo. Congress must intervene to return
CALEA to a narrow focus on preserving but not expanding law enforcement
access.
Essential elements of the CALEA
compromise
CALEA was intended "to balance three key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly
focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized
intercepts: (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally
revealing technologies: and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new
communications services and technologies." Judiciary Comm. Rep. 103-827, p. 13.
The essential features of the balance that Congress struck in CALEA were:
(1) Telephone companies would be required to ensure that their systems
continue to enable government agencies to intercept communications and associated
call-identifying data, notwithstanding developments in technology.
(2) Law enforcement's ability to wiretap would be preserved but not
expanded.
(3) Law enforcement would not be able to dictate system design; rather
industry would develop the technical specifications for implementation, with an appeal
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) if the standards process
failed.
(4) Privacy protections would be strengthened, especially to give added
protection to the increasingly rich category of transactional or signaling data, and
carriers would be required to protect the privacy of communications not authorized to be
intercepted.
(5) Carriers would be reimbursed for expenses in retrofitting existing
equipment and adding additional capacity for law enforcement.
(6) Mechanisms of accountability and oversight would ensure that the
implementation process is open to review by Congress and ultimately by the public.
CALEA is now in jeopardy.
CALEA was adopted in October 1994. Three years later, implementation
of the statute is in a state of uncertainty approaching paralysis and its carefully-crafted
balance is in jeopardy:
To date, the FBI still has not issued a final capacity notice advising
communications carriers how many simultaneous law enforcement surveillances they
must be able to accommodate. The FBI's two efforts so far have proposed surveillance
capacities far in excess of historical patterns. Capacity, though, was supposed to be
the easy part of implementation. Congress thought it would take one year; it is now
almost three.
In terms of the harder issue, defining technical standards to give service
providers and their manufacturers a safe harbor for complying with CALEA's capability
requirements, the FBI has tried to dictate the adoption of enhanced surveillance
capabilities and has blocked adoption of an industry standard that did not include all the
FBI's detailed proposals.
It appears that the FBI is trying to avoid reimbursement of carriers for the
full cost of implementation, shifting costs to carriers, thereby avoiding responsibility for
prioritizing law enforcement's needs and defeating the principle of accountability.
CDT and other public interest organizations have joined the cellular industry in
urging the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to take over implementation of
CALEA. CDT has argued to the FCC that the proposed industry standard already goes
too far in expanding law enforcement capabilities and fails to protect the privacy of
communications not authorized to be intercepted.
Meanwhile, the October 25, 1998 implementation deadline for CALEA is rapidly
approaching and the FBI is threatening to seek sanctions against any company that
fails to meet its interpretation of the law.
How did CALEA get so off track?
Since CALEA was enacted, the FBI has tried to enforce the statute that it
wanted, rather than the balanced and narrowly-focused statute that Congress enacted.
Early versions of digital telephony legislation would have given the Department of
Justice design control over the nation's telecommunications system. Congress rejected
that approach. It instead enacted broad functional criteria and deferred to the industry
standards process to develop solutions, with an appeal to the FCC if that process
failed. FBI Director Louis Freeh testified in 1994 that this Committee's work was "a vast
improvement" over the earlier version. Freeh testified that the revised bill was a
"remarkable compromise," that it achieved "a delicate, critical balance." He
emphasized that the legislation "reflects reasonableness in every provision."
Since Congress finished its work, the FBI has rejected reasonableness. It
has sought to dominate the industry standards process and has sought to assume for
itself the type of design control over the nation's telecommunications system that
Congress expressly denied it. The FBI has tried to use the statute to exploit the
potential of the new digital technology to enhance rather than merely preserve its
surveillance capability.
-- What can Congress do now?
CDT is a privacy and civil liberties organization focused on promoting democratic
values in the new digital media. Much of the current staff at CDT were involved in the
development of CALEA. I myself was assistant counsel to the Subcommittee that
originated CALEA in the House, and I spent considerable time on this legislation.
Having helped put this statute together, we cannot support it the way it is being
implemented.
CDT does not question here the objective of preserving a narrowly-focused
ability for the government to carry out electronic surveillance in the face of ongoing
technological changes. Nor do we question here that wiretapping is a useful law
enforcement tool, although we suspect it is not as critical as the current leadership of
the FBI claims. Finally, we do not ask the Committee today to block the government
from taking advantage of market-driven changes in technology that enhance
surveillance. (One of the ironies of the CALEA debate is that digital technology in
many ways enhances law enforcement's abilities.)
Instead, we urge the Committee to return the CALEA implementation process to
the spirit of reasonableness that characterized the drafting and enactment of CALEA.
We urge the Committee to ensure that CALEA is not interpreted as a mandate to
industry to affirmatively design a surveillance infrastructure, but merely as a
requirement, in the words of FBI Director Freeh, to "preserv[e] that tool as it has existed
since 1968." Hearings, p. 113. And because developments in technology are in some
ways making surveillance easier, we urge the Committee to strengthen, not weaken the
wiretap laws, to protect the privacy of innocent citizens.
CALEA is heading for the proverbial trainwreck. In October 1998, the legislation
takes effect. Standards for implementation have not been adopted. Even if adopted
tomorrow, they could not be incorporated into equipment until sometime in 1999 at the
earliest. The FCC, however, is clearly reluctant to become involved in the matter. This
means that, in October 1998, if not sooner, the statute could be thrown into the courts,
with serious risks for law enforcement, industry and privacy.
It is clear now that it is time for Congress to intervene to reassert the balance
that it intended in 1994. It can do so without reopening the entire statute. The goals of
Congress should be to make it clear that the FBI cannot dominate the implementation
process and that the FBI's proposals for enhanced surveillance capability are beyond
the mandate of CALEA.
Congress can achieve these goals by directing the FBI to begin promptly to reimburse
carriers to implement the proposed industry standard minus location tracking and
the packet switching option and minus the other additional items still sought by the
FBI.
Alternatively, Congress can amend the language of CALEA section 107(b) to require
the FCC to institute a rulemaking on standards.
In light of the delays caused by the FBI, it seems necessary for Congress to extend the
October 25, 1998 implementation deadline and the reimbursement cutoff date of
January 1, 1995.
Congress should make it clear that location information is not a CALEA mandate, but
because location tracking information will probably become increasingly available
and increasingly specific within wireless systems, whatever is done in terms of
CALEA implementation, Congress should amend Title III to enact a probable cause
standard for access to location information.
II. CALEA Overview -- What Did Congress Intend?
For much of the history of telephony, the government's ability to wiretap was an
unintended by-product of the design of the telephone system, and that capability
remained largely static. More recently, the technology has been changing rapidly. In
this time of rapid development, the industry could ignore law enforcement concerns,
and design its systems only to meet market demands most efficiently, in which case
some changes would enhance government surveillance capability and others would
hinder it. At the other extreme, industry, if mandated, could build a comprehensive
surveillance network. There is a middle course: society could try to achieve a balance,
preserving a narrowly focused surveillance capability while protecting privacy and not
impeding the development of new services to meet customer demands.
In CALEA, Congress chose this third path of balance. The law was intended to
ensure that developments in technology did not have the unintended effect of eroding
government surveillance capabilities. It is clear that Congress did not intend to mandate
that the technology be developed in ways that would maximize its surveillance
potential. The Judiciary Committee report states that CALEA was intended "to
preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out
properly authorized intercepts" (emphasis added). FBI Director Louis Freeh testified
repeatedly and consistently that the legislation was intended to preserve, not expand
the capability as it had existed since 1968. This Committee's report stressed that
CALEA's requirements were to be narrowly construed.
In determining how far the FBI approach to CALEA implementation has departed
from Congress' intent, it is useful to look at the actual problems that were presented to
Congress. Between 1992 and 1994, the FBI conducted a series of surveys of federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies and found 183 technology-based problems
out of the tens of thousands of surveillances conducted. (The problems covered both
Title III content interceptions and the interception of call-identifying information through
pen registers and trap and trace devices.)
Of the problems identified by the FBI, the most common was lack of adequate
capacity in cellular systems to accommodate multiple surveillances at the same time.
This accounted for 30% of all problems law enforcement could identify. The second
most common problem was the inability of certain cellular systems to provide law
enforcement with call-identifying information on a real-time or contemporaneous basis.
(The cellular system collected dialing information, but there was a delay before the
information could be accessed.) The third most common set of problems related to
special dialing features. Basically, when a person uses speed dialing, voice dialing or
automatic redial or call-back, the pen register on the customer line only picks up the
coded command, not the full number that it represents. The fourth most common
problem was call forwarding. Law enforcement could not capture incoming calls to the
target's line that were forwarded at the central office using a service provided by the
telephone company. Like the other problems, call forwarding was not a uniquely
"digital" problem; it had existed in the analog world. There were other miscellaneous
problems. See Judiciary Comm. Rep., p. 15.
From this survey, it was clear to Congress that there were problems meriting
legislation. And, of course, Congress was concerned to ensure that the future evolution
of technology did not create new problems. But it was a fundamental assumption of
Congress in 1994 that most equipment in place at the time was able to meet law
enforcement surveillance requirements. After all, of the tens of thousands of wiretaps,
pen registers and traps and traces conducted in the 1992-94 timeframe, there had been
only 183 documented problems. This type of record cannot serve as the basis for a
comprehensive redesign of the nation's' telecommunications system.
Conclusive evidence that Congress' assumption was correct is found in the fact
that since 1994, even though CALEA implementation has been stalled, even though
industry has continued to install equipment not designed with law enforcement's
requirements in mind, electronic surveillance continues to be carried out. In the years
since CALEA was enacted, the numbers of wiretaps, pen registers and trap and trace
devices have remained at all-time highs, while the number of persons intercepted and
the number of conversations monitored have gone up. There is no need for a
comprehensive redesign of the telecommunications networks. Most equipment and
services in place today are "CALEA compliant."
III. Privacy Problems Raised by CALEA
Implementation
Despite the discrete nature of the problems identified by the FBI and presented
to Congress in 1994, and despite evidence that the nation's telecommunications
system continues to support law enforcement wiretaps, the FBI has pushed for a
comprehensive redesign of communications infrastructures. The FBI dominated the
industry standards setting process. Under pressure from the FBI, industry yielded, and
put forth a proposed standard that expands surveillance capabilities and fails to protect
the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted.
Two provisions of the industry proposed standard are of major
concern:
A. Location Tracking
The FBI wants to require wireless carriers to provide law enforcement agencies
with location information at the beginning and end of any cellular and PCS
communication, thereby turning the nation's wireless phones -- now used by millions of
ordinary citizens -- into real-time tracking devices. It was the express intent of
Congress, supported by the Director of the FBI on the record in public testimony, that
CALEA not include any location or tracking requirement.
At the first joint House and Senate hearing leading to enactment of CALEA, FBI
Director Freeh expressly testified that CALEA would not require carriers to make
location information uniformly available. Director Freeh testified that "call setup
information" (later changed to "call-identifying information") as a CALEA requirement
was not intended to include location information. Freeh was very clear in disavowing
any intent to cover such information:
"[Call setup information] does not include any information which
might disclose the general location of a mobile facility or service,
beyond that associated with the area code or exchange of the
facility or service. There is no intent whatsoever, with reference to
this term, to acquire anything that could properly be called tracking'
information." Hearings, p. 6.
Wireless phone tracking was a very potent source of opposition to CALEA. The
FBI was eager to put it off the table. Nothing in the subsequent negotiations over
CALEA brought it back in. When FBI Director Freeh returned to Congress to praise the
revised CALEA bill, he never mentioned tracking. Ever since the law was signed, the
FBI has worked mightily to claim that tracking is a CALEA mandate, and industry, while
never agreeing that it was a mandate, put it in the standard.
B. Packet Switched Content Delivery
Telecommunications companies are beginning to incorporate in their systems
"packet switching" protocols similar to those used on the Internet. In a packet switching
system, communications are broken up into individual packets, each of which contains
addressing information that gets the packets to their intended destination, where they
are reassembled.
This development has potentially profound implications for government
surveillance. It has always been assumed that there is a distinction between call
content, which is entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection requiring a judicial
warrant based on probable cause, and signaling information, which is protected under a
much lower relevance standard. In CALEA, Congress required companies to use
technology that kept these two separate. But in the CALEA process, industry and the
FBI assumed -- apparently with little study -- that it is not feasible to provide signaling
information separate from the communications content in a packet switching
environment. Therefore, the FBI and industry have proposed a standard that allows
companies to deliver the entire packet data stream -- including call communications --
when law enforcement is entitled to receive only dialing or signaling information under a
pen register order. The proposed standard relies on law enforcement to sort out the
addressing information from the content, keeping the former but ignoring the
latter.
This approach, were it followed, could well represent a total obliteration of the
distinction between call content and signaling information that was a core assumption of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. It also violates section
103(a)(4)(A) of CALEA, which requires carriers to ensure that their systems "protect[]
the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying data not authorized to
be intercepted."
Before casting aside a basic distinction of the wiretap laws, there should be a
careful technical examination of whether call-identifying information can reasonably be
separated from the full data packet. The implementation of CALEA could go forward
without a packet-switching standard. A technical inquiry, by the FCC or another entity,
undertaken at the direction of Congress, could examine the privacy and security
aspects of packet switching and determine whether, and if so how, call content can be
withheld from the government when the government is not authorized to receive it.
Otherwise, Congress should act to make it clear that the government can access
packet data information only in response to a Title III order, not in response to a pen
register order
C. Additional Surveillance Enhancements Sought by the
FBI
In the foregoing respects, the standard proposed by industry under FBI pressure
already exceeds the outer limits of what Congress intended to mandate through
CALEA. The FBI, however, has made it clear that it is not satisfied with the standard.
The FBI has urged expansion of the standard to require functionality that goes even
further beyond anything Congress contemplated. The FBI's "punch-list" of
enhancements includes:
_ Multi-party monitoring - The FBI wants phone companies to design their
systems so the government can monitor all parties to a multi-party call even after the
subject of the intercept order is no longer participating in the call. The purpose of
CALEA was to follow the target, but the FBI wants to continue monitoring those left
behind after the subject of the court order is no longer on the call. Not only is this not
mandated by CALEA, but providing it would violate section 103(a)(4)(A) of CALEA and
the particularity requirement of Title III and the Fourth Amendment, since law
enforcement is not authorized to intercept the calls of people not named in the order,
when they are not using the facilities named in the order.
_ Expanded definition of call-identifying information - Much of the
controversy under CALEA relates to the distinction between interception of call content
and the interception of call-identifying information. Call-identifying information is
collected with pen registers or trap and trace devices, authorized without probable
cause and without the discretionary review accorded to full call content interceptions.
The FBI is seeking an expanded definition of "call-identifying information" in order to
increase the amount of information that it obtains under the minimal standard applicable
to pen registers.
But CALEA rejected this approach. Because Congress was concerned with a
blurring of the distinction between call-identifying data and call content, it included in
CALEA an amendment to the pen register statute to require law enforcement when
executing a pen register to use equipment "that restricts the recording or decoding of
electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling information utilized in call
processing." CALEA section 207(b), codified at 18 U.S.C. 3121(c). Other
signaling or sounds that do not relate to dialed numbers are neither encompassed by
the pen register law nor required by CALEA. Contrary to this intent, the FBI wants to
use pen registers to collect digits that the subject dials after cut-through. These digits
do not identify a call in any sense but rather are content-related. The FBI is also
seeking on-line notifications of customer changes in service, messages indicating when
a party puts a call on hold, and messages indicating when the subject has a voice mail.
D. Capacity
One of the major issues that prompted Congress to adopt CALEA was concern
that telephone switches would not have the capacity to conduct multiple simultaneous
intercepts. This had already been a problem in cellular systems, especially in New York
City, where a number of law enforcement agencies operate and were competing for a
limited number of surveillance ports on cellular switches.
Since law enforcement surveillance activity obviously varies from region to
region, CALEA requires the FBI to issue notice of its capacity requirements for each
geographic area, so that carriers know how much capacity to install. In October, 1995,
the FBI issued its first proposed capacity notice. It seemed to require companies in
major cities to install a surveillance capacity that would allow simultaneous monitoring
of up to 1% of customer lines in service. This proposal was roundly criticized as
excessive and the FBI withdrew it.
In January, 1997, the FBI issued a second notice, using a new methodology
based on past activity. However, this second notice was also deficient in three ways:
(1) The FBI exaggerated law enforcement's past experience. The Bureau
collected data, consisting of combined federal, state and local law enforcement
surveillance activity for each county or service area nationwide, between 1993 and
1995. From this data, the FBI determined the 24-hour peak of surveillance activity for
each switch, over the course of the 26 month survey period. From switch to switch,
these peaks did not occur on the same day, but the FBI added them together to obtain
a hypothetical county-wide "peak," which the notice requires companies to meet as if
the surveillances occurred all on the same day.
(2) The second notice and some of the FBI's informal comments about it have
seemed to imply that each and every carrier serving a particular area would have to
install capacity sufficient to meet the total surveillance needs for that region, even if the
carrier only served a portion of the customers in the area. Even broader interpretations
of the notice, which the FBI has informally disavowed, would require carriers to install
in each switch a capacity sufficient to meet the requirements projected for an entire
county or multi-county service area. Under either of these interpretations, the
requirements of the second notice would require industry to install capacity unrelated to
historical surveillance activity, costing taxpayers many millions of dollars in unnecessary
reimbursement.
(3) The second notice draws no distinction between the capacity required to
intercept call content and the capacity required to access dialed number information,
even though CALEA requires a distinction between interceptions of call content and
interceptions of call-identifying information through pen registers or trap and trace
devices. The FBI indicates that 90% of all surveillances involve access only to dialed
number information, not call content. The distinction is important for privacy because
the capacity to intercept call content is more intrusive (and may be more expensive)
than the capacity to intercept call-identifying information. Congress wanted companies
to use technology that limited the amount of information provided to law enforcement
under pen register and trap and trace authority. The second notice ignores that
intent.
Given the lack of any official written interpretation of the notice that is subject to
public review, we have concluded that the problems created by the conflicting
interpretations of the second notice are so profound that the FBI should issue another
notice for further public comment, making it clear what capacity levels were
intended.
IV. Strong Privacy Protections Are Essential to the Integrity of
CALEA
CALEA was based on the dual premise that the laws authorizing electronic
surveillance have strict legal requirements to protect privacy and that those standards
are strictly enforced by the courts. In the absence of such strict legal requirements -- if
they are weakened legislatively or if they are not enforced by the courts -- then the
premise of CALEA falters and the legislation becomes far more threatening, requiring
as it does the ubiquitous preservation of easy technical access.
Unfortunately, since CALEA was enacted, the Justice Department has sought
numerous weakening amendments to the wiretap laws. Congress so far has rejected
most, but it included two weakening changes in the 1996 terrorism bill. There, the
Justice Department won Congressional repeal of one of the privacy enhancements
adopted in CALEA with the intent of balancing privacy concerns with law enforcement
needs (the now-repealed provision extended the privacy protections of the wiretap laws
to wireless data transfers). In addition, this Committee inserted a provision carving
electronic funds transfer information out of the definition of electronic communication. In
the Senate, there was a proposal to carve out wiretapping in prisons. Further, the
Justice Department continues to pursue other amendments that would loosen the
privacy standards of the wiretap laws, notably the standards for roving taps.
Some clarifications in the wiretap laws may be warranted. But it undermines the
foundations of CALEA if those changes weaken the existing privacy protections, or if
those protections are not working as intended to limit investigative agency discretion.
Unless Title III, ECPA, and the pen register statute constitute meaningful privacy
legislation, the foundation of CALEA will be eroded.
If this Committee supports CALEA, it should support strong privacy provisions in
the wiretap laws. Continuing technological developments are already shifting the
balance in law enforcement's favor. Wireless telephone systems are developing the
capability to provide more refined location information on wireless phone users.
Nonconsensual government monitoring of location through a wireless phone implicates
privacy interests. Since wireless telephones are regularly carried into places where a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, Congress should clarify the law by
requiring a warrant based on a showing of probable cause for nonconsensual
governmental access to real-time wireless telephone location information.
Advanced signaling systems have also blurred the distinction between call-identifying information and call content. CALEA was intended to ensure that pen
registers and trap and trace devices only collect signaling information utilized in call
processing. It appears that that is not happening. Instead, it appears that more and
more information is being handled on the signaling channel, subject only to the low pen
register standard. If that is the direction of the technology, then Congress should
amend the standards for governmental access to signaling data to require a judge to
make an affirmative finding, based on a showing by the government, at least that the
information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.
V. Conclusions
There is a significant difference between what law enforcement thinks would be
a useful capability versus what is essential to allow law enforcement to carry out
surveillance as it has since 1968. There is a significant difference between authorizing
law enforcement to take advantage of whatever capabilities are available as a result of
market-driven developments versus using the power of the government to require
industry nationwide to build a telecommunications system that optimizes the
surveillance potential of the technology. In CALEA, Congress did not say that the FBI
could require phone companies to design their systems to provide to law enforcement
all the capabilities that could be technically produced. Rather, Congress said that the
companies had to preserve a minimal capability.
Therefore, Congress should intervene to get the CALEA process back on track.
It can do so directly, by authorizing the FBI to begin reimbursing carriers to implement
the industry standard, minus tracking and packet switching, or Congress can require the
FCC to exercise its rulemaking function and decide the petitions now before it. But it
has to be made clear that the law does not allow the FBI to use the reimbursement
process or the industry standards process to write its own demands into the network
design. Congress will have to extend the deadlines, so that the FBI cannot use the
pressure of October 1998 to force industry to capitulate. And Congress must make it
clear that the government is responsible for reimbursing industry to retrofit existing
equipment, including equipment installed after January 1, 1995. This will force the FBI
to prioritize its requests and will keep the funding issue in the public light, rather than
shifting the costs to the companies, where they hidden in the phone bills of consumers.
Regardless of the outcome of the CALEA implementation debate, it is clear that
technology is moving in directions that increase government powers. Congress should
ensure that those powers are carefully controlled. For this reason we urge the
Committee, regardless of the outcome of the CALEA implementation debate, to
establish a probable cause standard for access to location tracking information and a
more meaningful standard for access to other signaling information.
CDT is an independent, non-profit public interest policy organization. The
Center's mission is to develop and implement public policies to protect and advance
individual liberty and democratic values in new digital communications media. The
Center achieves its goals through policy development, public education, and coalition
building. CDT coordinates the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group (DPSWG), a
forum of more than 50 computer, communications, and public interest organizations
and associations working on communications privacy issues. Members of the Working
Group played a critical role in ensuring that CALEA included privacy protections and
public accountability mechanisms and was narrowly tailored so as not to impede the
deployment of new technology.
House Rule XI, clause 2(g)(4) disclosures: Neither James X. Dempsey nor the
Center for Democracy and Technology have received any federal grant, contract or
subcontract in the current or preceding two fiscal years, nor do they represent any
entity that has received any federal grant, contract or subcontract in the current or
preceding two fiscal years.
James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel
Center for Democracy and Technology
+1 202.637.9800 (v)
+1 202.637.0968 (f)
jdempsey@cdt.org
http://www.cdt.org/
1997 Congressional Hearings