104th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 2d Session                                                     104-551
_______________________________________________________________________


 ESTABLISHING A SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 

                     RELATIONS TO INVESTIGATE 
 
THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA

                                _______


 May 2, 1996.--Referred to the House calendar and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Solomon, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                       [To accompany H. Res. 416]

    The Committee on Rules, to whom was referred the resolution 
(H. Res. 416) establishing a select subcommittee of the 
Committee on International Relations to investigate the United 
States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon without 
amendment and recommend that the resolution be agreed to.

                       purpose of the resolution

    The purpose of H. Res. 416 is to establish a select 
subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations to 
investigate the U.S. role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia 
and Bosnia.

                       summary of the resolution

    H. Res. 416 establishes a select subcommittee of the 
Committee on International Relations to investigate the U.S. 
role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. The 
resolution outlines the composition of the subcommittee and the 
appointment of its members. It sets forth the scope for the 
select subcommittee's investigation. It deems the select 
subcommittee a subcommittee of a standing committee of the 
House.
    The resolution further authorizes the chairman of the 
select subcommittee, for purposes of its investigation, to 
authorize the taking of affidavits and depositions pursuant to 
notice or subpoena by a member of the select subcommittee or of 
the staff of the Committee on International Relations 
designated by the chairman of the select subcommittee. It 
provides direction to the select subcommittee on the 
transmission of its report, and sunsets the subcommittee 6 
months after the date of enactment of this resolution.

                        committee consideration

    H. Res. 416 was introduced by Rep. Ben Gilman, Chairman of 
the Committee on International Relations, on April 29, 1996 and 
referred to the Committee on Rules.
    On Wednesday, May 1, 1996, the Committee on Rules held a 
hearing on H. Res. 416 and received testimony from the Hon. 
Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations; the Hon. Lee Hamilton, Ranking Minority Member of 
the Committee on International Relations; the Hon. Steny Hoyer; 
and the Hon. David Skaggs.
    On Thursday, May 2, the Committee met to markup H. Res. 
416. The Committee favorably reported H. Res. 416 by a record 
vote of 7-4. During the markup, no amendments to H. Res. 416 
were agreed to.

 background on the u.s. role in iranian arms transfers to croatia and 
                                 bosnia

    After Yugoslavia disintegrated and descended into factional 
warfare in June 1991, one of the responses of the international 
community was to impose a United Nations arms embargo on the 
area comprising the entire former nation of Yugoslavia in 
September of 1991. U.N. Security council resolution 713, which 
imposed the embargo, passed with the support of the U.S. 
government under the Bush administration.
    But as the outgunned Bosnian military suffered repeated 
defeats and Bosnian civilian casualties mounted, many people, 
including presidential candidate Bill Clinton, came to see the 
embargo as unfair to the Bosnians, as it locked in an imbalance 
of arms. Upon taking office in January 1993, the Clinton 
administration initially attempted to persuade our allies to 
multilaterally lift the embargo. After failing to do so, the 
administration ultimately elected to continue the policy and to 
both support and enforce the embargo with U.S. naval forces.
    In the face of increasing congressional, media and public 
opposition to the embargo, the Clinton administration 
repeatedly voiced its opposition to unilaterally lifting the 
embargo right up until its phased termination was approved in 
November 1995 in accordance with the Dayton peace accords. The 
administration's rationale was that a unilateral lifting of the 
embargo would antagonize our allies, endanger U.S. forces in 
Yugoslavia, necessitate a U.S. military deployment to the 
Balkans to facilitate a U.N. withdrawal and possibly weaken 
other international sanctions against nations such as Iraq, 
Libya and Serbia.
    During this period, the U.S. Congress voted twice to 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. On both 
occasions, the administration strenuously opposed the measures. 
The administration did, however, agree in November 1994 to 
legislation that terminated U.S. enforcement of the embargo 
against third parties, though it did not terminate the U.S. 
arms embargo or directly or indirectly provide arms to Bosnia.
    In April 1996, however, a press report suggested that the 
Clinton administration had secretly given its consent to covert 
arms shipments by Iran to Croatia and Bosnia. An April 5 Los 
Angeles Times article by James Risen and Doyle McManus claims 
that the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, and then-
U.S. Contact Group representative, Charles Redman, responded to 
an inquiry from Croatian President Tudjman about whether the 
U.S. would object to the transshipment of arms through Croatia 
from Iran to the government of Bosnia by saying that the U.S. 
had ``no position.''
    According to the story, the two U.S. diplomats were acting 
on instructions from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and President Clinton 
himself. The policy was known only to a small group of State 
Department officials, with Congress, the CIA and even several 
regional U.S. embassies kept out of the loop. When then-CIA 
Director James Woolsey became aware of the Iranian shipments, 
he contacted Mr. Lake and conferred with then-White House 
counsel Abner Mikva. The matter was then referred to the 
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), which began an 
investigation in November 1994. In May 1995, the Clinton-
appointed IOB concluded that no US laws had been broken, 
despite the administration's failure to issue a presidential 
finding and to notify Congress. In testimony before the House 
International Relations Committee on April 23, 1996, the basic 
assertions of the article were confirmed by Undersecretary of 
State Peter Tarnoff.
    A subsequent April 17 story in the Los Angeles Times by the 
same reporters claims that Redman, soon after the inquiry from 
Tudjman,requested that the Croatian government ``expedite'' a 
convoy destined for Bosnia which was suspected to contain arms. 
Undersecretary Tarnoff claimed in his testimony before the 
House International Relations Committee on April 23 that Redman 
believed the convoy to be strictly humanitarian and had no 
knowledge of it containing arms.
    In the meantime, Iran has skillfully exploited the opening 
that the arms pipeline provided, parlaying it into an extensive 
presence in Bosnia. Iran's connections to the hundreds of 
``mujahideen'' fighters in Bosnia are not completely known, but 
IFOR commanders and other diplomats suspect that the Iranians 
can utilize some mujahideen as surrogates to attack U.S. 
interests in Bosnia. In fact, two holders of Iranian diplomatic 
passports were captured in the raid on the Bosnian-operated 
terrorist training center in February. The Iranians have the 
largest embassy in Sarajevo and they have just opened a large 
``cultural center'' there as well. The Iranians are reportedly 
training large numbers of Bosnian Muslim troops in Iran, thus 
exploiting the tardiness of the U.S.-led equip and train 
program. The Iranian presence is also cited by the Serb and 
Croatian officials as a threat which necessitates the 
maintenance of strong Serbian and Croatian military 
capabilities, as well as a cause of friction between the 
Bosnian Muslims and other groups in Bosnia. To date, the 
Bosnians have only partially responded to U.S. demands that 
they reduce the Iranian presence on their soil.
    The Clinton administration's actions in relation to this 
matter are disturbing and raise several questions. Was the 
administration telling the American people, Congress, our 
allies and even most of the executive branch one thing while it 
was doing another? Did any of the administration's actions 
violate U.S. law? Was the U.S. government's role in these arms 
transfers simply passive or was it, as the April 17 Los Angeles 
Times article asserts, more ``hands on? Which government 
officials knew about these arms transfers, and when? How 
extensive was the effort to keep Congress uninformed of the 
Iranian operations? Why did the Clinton administration allow 
Iran to extend its influence into Europe after the 
administration had announced a policy of isolating Iran? Why 
would the Clinton administration allow Iran, a State Department 
``terrorist nation,'' to unilaterally violate the arms embargo 
after repeatedly ignoring U.S. congressional pleas and 
directives for the U.S. to do so? Did the administration's 
actions increase the risk to U.S. Armed Forces deployed in 
Bosnia or decrease the likelihood of a timely withdrawal of 
U.S. Armed Forces from Bosnia.

                        need for the resolution

    It is the view of the Committee on Rules that H. Res. 416 
is necessary for several reasons. First, it will ensure that 
the Committee on International Relations has the resources to 
ascertain the answers to questions raised in response to the 
Clinton administration's actions with respect to covert arms 
shipments by Iran to Croatia and Bosnia. As Chairman Gilman 
stated in testimony before the Rules Committee: ``The full 
International Relations Committee has before it a full 
legislative and oversight agenda. We expend virtually 99 
percent of our funds in that. The full committee quite simply 
does not have the resources to undertake that kind of extensive 
review of looking into all of the documents that the executive 
branch may have and all of the events that occurred.''
    Second, although the Rules of the House grant investigative 
and subpoena powers to standing committees and subcommittees, 
H. Res. 416 is needed to allow the International Relations 
Committee to thoroughly investigate this matter utilizing a 
select subcommittee.
    Specifically, the resolution is required to effectively 
exempt the International Relations Committee from the five 
subcommittee limit on a temporary basis and solely for the 
purpose of establishing this select subcommittee. Clause 6(d) 
of rule X limits House committees to establishing no more than 
five subcommittees, except Appropriations, which is limited to 
13; Government Reform and Oversight, limited to 7; and 
Transportation and Infrastructure, limited to 6. H. Res. 416 
states that ``this select subcommittee shall be deemed to be a 
subcommittee of a standing committee for all purposes of law 
and for all purposes of the Rules of the House'' except for 
clause 6(d) of rule X.
    Service on the select subcommittee established by H. Res. 
416 is consistent with House rules. Clause 6(b)(2)(A) of rule X 
limits Members to service on two full committees and four 
subcommittees of the House. This rule continues in clause 
6(b)(2)(B) to state that for purposes of the committee and 
subcommittee assignment limit, ``the term `subcommittee' 
includes any panel, task force, special subcommittee, or any 
subunit of a standing committee that is established for any 
cumulative period longer than six months in any Congress.'' 
Since H. Res. 416 specifically states that the select 
subcommittee shall cease to exist 6 months after the date on 
which the resolution is agreed to, service on the select 
subcommittee is entirely appropriate under House rules, 
including under the Member assignment limits.
    Third, a resolution of this nature is necessary to limit 
the scope and time frame for the select subcommittee's 
investigation. The select subcommittee's scope and focus of its 
investigation is clearly set forth in subsection (c) in 
paragraphs (1) through (7) of the resolution. Subsection (f) of 
the resolution states that the select subcommittee shall 
transmit a report to the Committee on International Relations, 
including a detailed statement of findings and recommendations, 
not later than 6 months after the date on which this resolution 
is agreed to. Subsection (g) of the resolution states that the 
select subcommittee shall cease to exist 6 months after the 
date on which the resolution is agreed to.
    Furthermore, H. Res. 416 is necessary to authorize the 
taking of depositions, pursuant to notice or subpoena, by a 
Member or staff designated by the chairman. The House has, on 
occasion, granted special authority to standing or select 
committees to allow a single Member or designated staff to take 
sworn depositions as part of a broader resolution authorizing 
specified investigations. Such investigative authorization 
resolutions have been necessary either because they created new 
select committees to carry-out the investigations, or because 
they granted existing standing committees with special 
jurisdiction and/or procedures not available to them under the 
standing rules of the House. Some examples of investigation 
authorization resolutions that have included special deposition 
authority are the following:
          President Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (93rd 
        Congress, 1974, H. Res. 803)--This resolution gave the 
        Judiciary Committee full authorization to conduct an 
        impeachment inquiry into allegations against President 
        Nixon. Among other things it permitted the committee to 
        require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance and 
        testimony of any person, including the taking of 
        depositions by counsel to the committee.
          Assassinations Investigation (95th Congress, 1977, H. 
        Res. 222)--This resolution created the Select Committee 
        on Assassinations, and provided it with various 
        procedural authorities, including the authority to take 
        testimony under oath anywhere in the United States or 
        abroad and authorized designated staff of the select 
        committee to obtain statements from any witness who is 
        placed under oath by an authority who is authorized to 
        administer oaths in accordance with the applicable laws 
        of the U.S.
          Koreagate (95th Congress, 1977, H. Res. 252 & H. Res. 
        752)--The first resolution broadened the authority of 
        the House Standards Committee to investigate whether 
        family members or associates of House Members, officers 
        or employees had accepted anything of value from the 
        Government of Korea or representatives thereof. The 
        resolution also gave joint subpoena authority to the 
        chairman and ranking minority member of the committee 
        but permitted appeal to the committee if one objected. 
        It also gave special counsel the right to intervene in 
        any judicial proceeding relating to the inquiry. The 
        second resolution authorized committee employees to 
        take depositions, but required that an objection by a 
        witness to answer a question could only be ruled on by 
        a member of the committee.
          Abscam (97th Congress, 1981, H. Res. 67)--The 
        resolution gave certain special authorities to the 
        Standards Committee, though the investigation was 
        confined to Members, officers and employees. Included 
        in the Resolution was a provision permitting any single 
        member of the committee to take depositions.
          Iran-Contra (100th Congress, 1987, H. Res. 12)--The 
        resolution authorized the creation of a select 
        committee to investigate the covert arms transactions 
        with Iran and any diversion of funds from the sales. 
        Among other things, the resolution gave the chairman, 
        in consultation with the ranking minority member, the 
        authority to authorize any member or designated staff 
        to take depositions or affidavits pursuant to notice or 
        subpoena, which were to be deemed to have been taken in 
        executive session, but available for use by members of 
        the select committee in open session.
          Judge Hastings Impeachment Proceedings (100th 
        Congress, 1987 H. Res. 320)--This resolution authorized 
        counsel to the Judiciary Committee or its Subcommittee 
        on Criminal Justice to take affidavits and depositions 
        pursuant to notice or subpoena.
          Judge Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (100th Congress, 
        1988, H. Res. 562)--This resolution authorized 
        Judiciary Committee counsel to take depositions and 
        affidavits pursuant to notice and subpoena.
          October Surprise (102nd Congress, 1991, H. Res. 
        258)--This resolution established a special task force 
        to investigate certain allegations regarding the 
        holding of American hostages by Iran in 1980. Among 
        other things the resolution authorized the chairman, in 
        consultation with the ranking minority member, to 
        authorize subpoenas and to authorize the taking of 
        affidavits and depositions by any member or by 
        designated staff, which were to be deemed to have been 
        taken in Washington, D.C., in executive session.
          White House Travel Office (104th Congress, 1996, H. 
        Res. 369)--This resolution authorized the chairman of 
        the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, for 
        purposes of its investigation and study of the White 
        House Travel Office Matter, upon consultation with the 
        ranking minority member of the committee, to authorize 
        the taking of affidavits and depositions by a member or 
        designated staff, or require the furnishing of 
        information by interrogatory, which were to be deemed 
        to have been taken in Washington, D.C., in executive 
        session.

                       analysis of the resolution

    H. Res. 416 establishes a select subcommittee of the 
Committee on International Relations to investigate the U.S. 
role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. The 
resolution authorizes the select subcommittee to sit and act 
during this Congress in the United States and overseas, whether 
the House is in session or has adjourned. This language is 
similar to that which applies to standing committees under 
clause 2(m)(1)(A) of rule XI of the Rules of the House. The 
resolution also authorizes the select subcommittee to sit and 
act outside the United States.
    Unless otherwise provided in this resolution, the rules of 
the Committee on International Relations are applicable to the 
select subcommittee. The select subcommittee may adopt 
additional written rules to govern its procedures provided they 
are not inconsistent with the resolution, the rules of the 
Committee on International Relations, or the rules of the 
House.
    The resolution states that the select subcommittee shall be 
composed of 8 members of the Committee on International 
Relations, 5 of whom shall be members of the majority party and 
3 of whom shall be members of the minority party. The majority 
members shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations and the minority members shall be 
appointed by the chairman upon recommendation of the ranking 
minority party member of that committee. Unless formally 
appointed to serve on the select subcommittee, the Chairman and 
Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on International 
Relations may attend the meetings and participate in the 
activities of the select subcommittee, except for voting and 
being counted for a quorum. This is consistent with Rules 15 of 
the Rules of the Committee on International Relations.
    The resolution sets forth the scope of the select 
subcommittee's investigation. The select subcommittee is 
authorized to investigate the policy of the U.S. government 
with respect to the transfer of arms from Iran to countries or 
entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia during any period that an international arms embargo 
was in effect; the nature and extent of those arms transfers; 
any actions by the U.S. Government to facilitate or impede such 
arms transfers; any communications to the Congress or the 
American people with respect to matters described above and 
with respect to the arms embargo or efforts to terminate or 
modify the U.S. participation in that embargo; any implication 
of the matters described above for the safety of the United 
States Armed Forces deployed in and around Bosnia, for 
relations between the U.S. and its allies, and for relations 
between the U.S. and Iran; any actions to review, analyze, 
investigate or keep from being revealed the above described 
matters; all deliberations, discussions, or communications 
within the U.S. government relating to the matters described 
above and all communications between the U.S. government and 
other governments, organizations, or individuals relating to 
these matters.
    The resolution deems the select subcommittee a subcommittee 
of a standing committee of the House for all purposes of law 
and for all purposes of the Rules of the House, including 
clause 2(m) of rule XI but excluding clause 6(d) of rule X. 
Clause 2(m) of rule XI provides any committee or subcommittee, 
in the course of carrying out its functions and duties within 
its jurisdction, the authority to sit and act whether the House 
is in session, or has recessed or adjourned. Furthermore, this 
rule provides the authority to issue subpoenas for attendance 
of certain witnesses or documents. A subpoena may be authorized 
by the subcommittee only when authorized by a majority of the 
Members voting, a majority being present. The House rule 
further provides that the authority to issue subpoenas may be 
delegated to the chairman by the committee. Clause 6(d) of rule 
X limits the number of subcommittees a committee of the House 
shall have to no more than five, except the Committees on 
Appropriations, Government Reform and Oversight, and 
Transportation and Infrastructure.
    The resolution authorizes the select subcommittee to sit 
while the House is reading a measure for amendment under the 
five-minute rule.
    The resolution further authorizes the chairman of the 
select subcommittee, for purposes of its investigation, and 
upon consultation with the ranking minority member, to 
authorize the taking of affidavits and depositions pursuant to 
notice or subpoena by a member of the select subcommittee or of 
the staff of the Committee on International Relations 
designated by the chairman of the select subcommittee, or 
require the furnishing of information by interrogatory, under 
oath administered by a person otherwise authorized by law to 
administer oaths. The resolution states that the select 
subcommittee shall provide access to information and 
proceedings under procedures adopted by the select subcommittee 
consistent with those found in clause 7(c) of rule XLVIII 
(procedures of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence). 
The resolution further provides access to information and 
proceedings of the select subcommittee by the Speaker, the 
majority leader, the minority leader, and their appropriately 
cleared and designated staff. Such access is similar to that 
provided to the Speaker and the minority leader with respect to 
the Permanent Select Committee on Ingelligence. H. Res. 416 
only authorizes the taking of affidavits and depositions by a 
member of the select subcommittee or of the staff of the 
International Relations Committee designated by the chairman.
    The resolution directs the select subcommittee to transmit 
a report to the Committee on International Relations not later 
than 6 months after the date on which this resolution is agreed 
to. The select subcommittee shall cease to exist 6 months after 
the date on which this resolution is agreed to.
    The resolution does not authorize additional funds for the 
select subcommittee to carry out its investigation. Such 
funding must be provided for by a separate House resolution.

             MATTERS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE

Committee vote

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House rule XI the results 
of each rollcall vote on an amendment or motion to report, 
together with the names of those voting for and against, are 
printed below:

                    Rules Committee RollCall No. 306

    Date: May 2, 1996.
    Measure: H. Res. 416, Establishing a select subcommittee of 
the Committee on International Relations to investigate the 
United States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and 
Bosnia.
    Motion By: Mr. Moakley.
    Summary of Motion: Substitute amendment directing the 
International Relations Committee to undertake investigation 
using existing committee resources.
    Results: Rejected, 4-7.
    Vote By Members: Dreier--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; 
Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay;, Greene--Nay; Moakley--Yea; 
Beilenson--Yea; Frost--Yea; Hall--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

                    rules committee rollcall no. 307

    Date: May 2, 1996.
    Measure: H. Res. 416, Establishing a select subcommittee of 
the Committee on International Relations to investigate the 
United States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and 
Bosnia.
    Motion By: Mr. Hall.
    Summary of Motion: En bloc amendments to require 
``concurrence'' instead of ``consultation'' with ranking 
minority member for authorizing the taking of staff depositions 
and add requirement to consult with minority on staffing 
decisions.
    Results: Rejected 4-7.
    Vote By Members: Dreier--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay; 
Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Greene--Nay; Moakley--Yea; 
Beilenson--Yea; Frost--Yea; Hall--Yea; Solomon--Nay.

                    rules committee rollcall no. 308

    Date: May 2, 1996.
    Measure: H. Res. 416, Establishing a select subcommittee of 
the Committee on International Relations to investigate the 
United States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and 
Bosnia.
    Motion By: Mr. Dreier.
    Summary of Motion: Report the resolution favorably to the 
House with the recommendation that it be adopted.
    Results: Adopted 7-4.
    Vote By Members: Dreier--Yea; Linder--Yea; Pryce--Yea; 
Diaz-Balart--Yea; McInnis--Yea; Greene--Yea; Moakley--Nay; 
Beilenson--Nay; Frost--Nay; Hall--Nay; Solomon--Yea.

Congressional Budget Office estimates

    Clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI requires each Committee to 
include a cost estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office, pursuant to section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, if the cost estimate is 
timely submitted. No cost estimate was received from the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office.

Oversight findings

    Clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI requires each committee report 
to contain oversight findings and recommendations required 
pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X. The Committee has no 
oversight findings.

Oversight findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government 
        Reform and Oversight

    Clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI requires each committee report 
to contain a summary of the oversight findings and 
recommendations made by the Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee pursuant to clause 4(c)(2) of rule X, whenever such 
findings have been timely submitted. The Committee on Rules has 
received no such findings or recommendations from the Committee 
on Government Reform and Oversight.

Views of committee members

    Clause 2(l)(5) of rule XI requires each committee to afford 
a three day opportunity for members of the committee to file 
additional, minority, or dissenting views and to include the 
views in its report. Although neither requirement applies to 
the Committee, the Committee always makes the maximum effort to 
provide its members with such an opportunity. The following 
views were submitted:
                             MINORITY VIEWS

    This unprecedented legislative procedure proposed in H. 
Res. 416 was created for one purpose and one purpose only. It 
is a political fishing expedition designed to embarrass the 
administration by creating a perceived problem where one does 
not exist. It is an expensive political ploy designed to 
manufacture campaign fodder in an election year. It is a 
perfect example of politics at its worse.
    The incident cited as the reason for this unnecessary and 
expensive special select subcommittee simply does not warrant 
the implementation of this highly unusual process. No laws were 
broken; there were no reporting requirements on the part of the 
Administration; no government officials participated in any 
prohibited activity; and no charges of wrongdoing have resulted 
from this particular incident. The resolution, however, seeks 
to focus attention on a situation that can be manipulated to 
cause the public to believe illegal or questionable activities 
took place. And, to add insult to injury, this resolution seeks 
to use additional Federal funds to the tune of $1 million for 
this purely political endeavor.
    This measure clearly seems to be in response to a call by 
the Republican leadership in the House calling upon their 
Committee Chairmen to dig deep for any dirt on the 
Administration. This contention is not simply a paranoid charge 
on the part of the minority, but rather the result of an April 
23, 1996 memorandum requesting such information. The following 
is a copy of that memo:

To: All House Full and Subcommittee Chairmen.
From: Bob Walker and Jim Nussle.
Subject: Request for information--Urgent.
Date: April 23, 1996.

    On behalf of the House leadership, we have been asked to 
cull all committees for information that you already have on 
three subjects listed below. We are compiling information for 
packaging and presentation to the Leadership for determining 
the agenda. You are a tremendous source for this project. The 
subjects are:
          Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the Clinton Administration
          Influence of Washington Labor Union Bosses/Corruption
          Examples of Dishonesty or ethical lapses in the 
        Clinton Administration
    Please have your staff review pertinent GAO reports, 
Inspector General reports or committee investigative materials 
or newspaper articles for departments and agencies within your 
jurisdiction that expose anecdotes that amplify these areas.
    Send your material to Ginni Thomas at H-226, U.S. Capitol 
or fax it to 6-1116. We need this information as soon as 
possible--no later than close of business on Friday, April 26.

               Bypassing the existing committee structure

    The existing committee structure and the standing rules of 
the House already empower committees to undertake this type of 
investigation without the need to create a new, freestanding 
investigative structure. Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X, 
committees have authority to conduct oversight hearings on 
those subjects within their jurisdiction. It is one of their 
functions as defined in the House Rules. We understand that 
three individual House committees are currently considering 
looking into this one incident. Furthermore, the Committee on 
Government Reform has an oversight subcommittee, the 
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and 
Criminal Justice, specifically for the purpose of investigating 
activities and policies analogous to those spelled out in H. 
Res. 416.
    The majority could have chosen any of these avenues to 
pursue their concerns with regard to the situation at hand and 
done so without any additional cost to the taxpayer. Instead 
they chose to take this costly and unconventional, not to 
mention highly public, route seemingly for the sole purpose of 
highlighting a nonevent and turning it into a new ``scandal'' 
to damage the President in an election year. It certainly can 
be no coincidence that this resolution, if enacted within the 
next few weeks, will end on or about election day.
    The Republicans were adamant when they implemented their 
new rule changes at the beginning of the 104th Congress. They 
were going to cut committees, subcommittees, staff, and 
expenses by nearly one-third. They eliminated subcommittees, 
limiting them in all but a few cases to five per committee. 
They cut staff and they cut committee budgets. And, in order to 
allow members to develop expertise in specific areas, they 
limited to four the number of subcommittees on which an 
individual member may serve. They proclaimed an end to 
government waste in the legislative branch. Yet they abandoned 
their promises of a streamlined, efficient, and economical 
committee system by proposing this additional subcommittee and 
an increase in the subcommittee assignment limit simply so they 
may exploit a groundless, politically driven agenda. We offered 
an amendment to treat the select subcommittee as a regular 
subcommittee for the purposes of the requirement that Members 
sit on no more than 4 subcommittees simultaneously. It was 
defeated.
    This new select subcommittee carries a heavy price tag. 
House Resolution 417, which would authorize the funding for H. 
Res. 416 and is moving on a parallel committee track, provides 
the rather substantial sum of nearly $1 million for this six-
month-in-duration subcommittee. By contrast, the entire 1995 
committee budget for the International Affairs Committee and 
its subcommittees was $5.074 million. To spend this much 
additional money to look into an event that contained no 
evidence of wrongdoing is incredibly wasteful and 
irresponsible.
    Furthermore, this special subcommittee will not do the 
investigation exclusively. The other committees looking into 
this incident will use their own funds as well and will likely 
duplicate the efforts of the select subcommittee. Therefore, we 
will spend an enormous amount of taxpayer money from as many as 
four different committees on an investigation that goes not to 
any violation of law, not to any facts in dispute, but only to 
the question of the President's judgement. We offered a 
substitute resolution that would have directed the 
International Relations Committee to work within the existing 
committee structure and with existing committee funds to pursue 
this matter. Our substitute was voted down.

Danger to the peace process and to U.S. Troops in the former Yugoslavia

    Even more disturbing than the wastefulness of this 
situation, however, is the willingness to allow this partisan 
political event to spill over into the tinderbox that was once 
Yugoslavia. Has the majority, even for a moment, stopped to 
consider how their actions will be read by the Bosnians, or 
Serbs, or Croats, or the multitude of other forces arrayed in 
that dangerous place? With U.S. troops on the ground in that 
volatile, war-torn nation, have they thought what effect this 
will have on the fragile peace the fractured former Yugoslavia 
enjoys for now? Have they considered the potential danger that 
this highly political probe might have on our soldiers in 
Bosnia? We would hope that these important considerations would 
cause the majority to reconsider going down this unwise path.

                            Minority Rights

    There is very little in H. Res. 416 that outlines the 
minority role in this special select subcommittee. Other than 
the committee membership ratio, there are no specific minority 
rights written into resolution. There is nothing in the 
resolution to specify if the minority will be given staff 
representation or control over any portion of the committee 
funding. In subsection (7)(e)(1) of the resolution it states 
that ``The Chairman * * * may, upon consultation with the 
ranking minority party member'' authorize the taking of 
affidavits and depositions by staff or committee members. We 
are concerned that the use of the term ``consultation'' does 
not ensure that the minority will be given any authority to 
question or veto any decision made by the Chair. We offered an 
amendment in the Rules Committee markup which would have 
required the ``concurrence'' of the Ranking Minority Member 
with the Chair to authorize the taking of affidavits or 
depositions. We also offered an amendment stating that no 
staffing decisions can be made without consultation with the 
Ranking Minority member. Unfortunately both of our amendments 
were defeated.

   lack of clarification regarding citation of witnesses for contempt

    We continue to be troubled by the lack of clarity in the 
Rules Committee report with regard to the issuance of a 
contempt citation against witnesses who refuse to comply with 
the subpoena for staff depositions. We hope that this grant of 
authority is not intended to change any of the longstanding 
practices of the House in this area. A similar situation 
occurred in March of this year when the Rules Committee 
considered and reported H. Res. 369. Our concern was then and 
continues to be now that absent clarifying language, there is a 
danger that there could be a challenge to the longstanding 
practice in the House which holds that there are no grounds for 
a contempt citation if a witness refuses to appear before or to 
answer questions in a staff deposition provided that the 
witness responds fully at a duly called hearing of the 
committee with a quorum of members present. We offered the 
following clarifying amendment to be included in the Rules 
Committee report accompanying H. Res. 416:

        The procedure used in this resolution which authorizes 
        the deposition of witnesses by staff is meant to 
        augment not replace the current information gathering 
        function of a committee hearing. Nothing in this 
        resolution is intended to change the longstanding 
        precedent that there are no grounds for a contempt 
        citation if a witness refuses to appear before or to 
        answer questions in a staff deposition provided that 
        the witness responds fully at a duly called hearing of 
        the committee with a quorum of members present.

    Regretfully, as was the case in H. Res. 369, this amendment 
was defeated.

                               conclusion

    If the majority feels this incident must be examined, then 
they should do so through the existing mechanisms and committee 
structures of the House. It should be deliberated in a manner 
that is responsible and done out of genuine concern over the 
existing policies with regard to embargoes and third country 
actions. It should not be ``investigated'' as a political 
agenda to be used for election year gains. The cost, both in 
dollars and in public trust, is far too great to do otherwise. 
Equally important is the need to consider how any action would 
impact the peace process and the safety of our U.S. troops in 
Bosnia and Croatia. We urge the majority to abandon the unwise 
course laid out in H. Res. 416 and reconsider their approach by 
utilizing the committee system that is already in place. To do 
otherwise can only raise concerns over the real motive for such 
actions.

                                   Joe Moakley.
                                   Anthony C. Beilenson.
                                   Martin Frost.
                                   Tony P. Hall.

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