Mr. MITCHELL (Mr. Ford). Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 675, S. 2991, the intelligence authorization bill, and that there be up to 30 minutes for debate following passage of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2991) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for intelligence activities of the United States Government and Central Intelligence Retirement and Disability System, to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to provide a framework for the improved management and execution of United States intelligence activities, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services, with amendments; as follows:
(The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface brackets and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in italic.)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title: This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993'.
(b) Table of Contents: The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Staff.
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 301. Postemployment assistance for certain DIA employees.
Sec. 302. Inclusion of Senior Executive Service positions in civilian intelligence personnel system.
Sec. 303. Awarding of degrees by Defense Intelligence College.
Sec. 304. National Security Education Act amendments.
Sec. 305. Pay and allowances for employees of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 401. Temporary FBI authority to accept bequests or devises.
Sec. 501. Authority of Inspector General to receive complaints and information from any person.
Sec. 601. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 602. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 603. Sense of Congress regarding disclosure of annual intelligence budget.
Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Definitions.
Sec. 711. Participation of the Director of Central Intelligence in the National Security Council.
Sec. 721. Appointment of the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 722. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 731. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Sec. 732. Resource management for intelligence programs.
Sec. 741. Inclusion of tactical military intelligence activities within jurisdiction of Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Sec. 751. Effective date.
Sec. 741. Effective date.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1993 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specification of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings: The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1993, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared by the Committee of Conference to accompany (S. 2991) of the One Hundred Second Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations: The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments: The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized for fiscal year 1993 under section 102 of this Act whenever he determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees: The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of the House of Representatives whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT STAFF.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1993 the sum of $10,500,000.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels: The Community Management Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 68 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1993. Such personnel may be permanent employees of personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. Any such personnel detailed to the Community Management Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that such personnel may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(c) Administration of Community Management Staff: The activities and personnel of the Community Management Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence shall be subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as are the activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1993 the sum of $168,900,000.
TITLE III--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 301. POSTEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN DIA EMPLOYEES.
(a) Assistance Authorized: Section 1604(e) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(4)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may assist employees who have occupied sensitive positions in the Defense Intelligence Agency and who are found to be ineligible for continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information and employment with the Defense Intelligence Agency, or whose employment with the Defense Intelligence Agency has been terminated--
`(i) in finding and qualifying for subsequent employment;
`(ii) in receiving treatment of medical or psychological disabilities; and
`(iii) in receiving necessary financial support during periods of unemployment.
`(B) Assistance may be provided under subparagraph (A) only if the Secretary determines that such assistance is essential to maintain the judgment and emotional stability of such employee and to avoid circumstances that might lead to the unlawful disclosure of classified information to which such employee had access. Assistance provided under subparagraph (A) for an employee may not be provided any longer than five years after the termination of the employment of the employee.
`(C) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives an annual report describing the expenditures, if any, made pursuant to this paragraph during the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.'.
(b) First Annual Report: The first report under paragraph (4) of section 1604(e) of title 10, United States Code, shall be submitted not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 302. INCLUSION OF SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE POSITIONS IN CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM.
(a) Inclusion of Senior Executive Service Positions: Section 1590 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) by inserting `, including positions in the Senior Executive Service,' after `positions'; and
(B) by inserting after `such departments' the following: `, except that the total number of positions in the Senior Executive Service established pursuant to this section may not exceed one-half of one percent of the total number of all civilian intelligence positions established pursuant to this section;';
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: `The Secretary shall also fix rates of pay for positions in the Senior Executive Service established pursuant to this section that are not in excess of the maximum rate or less than the minimum rate of basic pay established pursuant to section 5382 of title 5.'; and
(3) by inserting at the end of the section the following new subsections:
`(f) With regard to any position in the Senior Executive Service which may be established pursuant to this section, the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to implement this section which are consistent with the requirements set forth in sections 3131, 3132(a)(2), 3393a, 3396(c), 3592, 3595(a), 5384, and 6304, subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 7543 (except that any hearing or appeal to which a member of the Senior Executive Service is entitled shall be held or decided pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary), and subchapter II of chapter 43 of title 5. The Secretary of Defense shall also prescribe, to the extent practicable, regulations to implement such other provisions of title 5 as apply to members of the Senior Executive Service or to individuals applying for positions in the Senior Executive Service.
`(g) The President, based on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, may award a rank referred to in section 4507 of title 5 to members of the Senior Executive Service whose positions may be established pursuant to this section. The awarding of such a rank shall be made in a manner consistent with the provisions of that section.'.
(b) Conforming Amendment: Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after `National Security Agency' the following: `, Department of Defense intelligence activities the civilian employees of which are subject to section 1590 of title 10,'.
SEC. 303. AWARDING OF DEGREES BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE.
(a) Amendment to Title 10: Section 2161 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`2161. Defense Intelligence College: conferral of degrees on graduates
`(a) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Commandant of the Defense Intelligence College may, upon recommendation by the faculty of such college, confer a bachelor's or master's degree appropriate to the profession of intelligence upon graduates of the college who have fulfilled the requirements for that degree.
`(b) A degree may not be conferred under this section unless the curriculum leading to that degree is accredited by a professional authority determined appropriate by the Secretary of Defense.'. unless entering students have fulfilled general education requirements suitable for a bachelor's degree before being accepted into the program and unless the curriculum leading to the degree is approved by the Secretary of Education and is accredited by a professional authority determined appropriate by the Secretary of Defense.'.
(b) Table of Sections: The item relating to that section in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of such title is amended to read as follows:
`2161. Defense Intelligence College: conferral of degrees on graduates.'.
SEC. 304. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION ACT AMENDMENTS.
(a) Administration of Program: The National Security Education Act of 1991 (title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992) (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 802(a)(1)(A), by inserting `or equivalent term,' after `at least one academic semester';
(2) in section 802(a)(1)(B)(i), by striking `in the United States' and inserting in lieu thereof `as part of a graduate degree program of a United States institution of higher education';
(3) in section 802(a)(4), by inserting at the end of the subsection the following new sentence: `In addition, the Secretary may enter into personal service contracts for periods up to one year for program administration, except that not more than 10 such contracts may be in effect at any one time.';
(4) by amending section 802(e) to read as follows:
`(e) Administration of Program: The Secretary shall establish an independent center for international studies to administer the program.'; and
(5) in section 803(b), by--
(A) redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8);
(B) inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph:
`(7) The Chairperson of the National Endowment for the Humanities.'; and
(C) in paragraph (8) (as so redesignated)--
(i) by striking `Four individuals' and inserting in lieu thereof `Six individuals'; and
(ii) by inserting before the period at the end the following: `and who may not be officers or employees of the Federal Government'.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations to the National Security Education Trust Fund: There is authorized to be appropriated to the National Security Education Trust Fund, established pursuant to section 804 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1904), for fiscal year 1993, the sum of $35,000,000.
SEC. 305. PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of Defense (or his designee) is authorized to establish such positions, and to appoint thereto, without regard to the civil service laws, such officers and employees, in the National Security Agency, as may be necessary to carry out the functions of such agency. The rates of basic pay for such positions shall be fixed by the Secretary of Defense (or his designee for this purpose) in relation to the rates of basic pay provided for in subpart D of part III of title 5, United States Code, for positions subject to such title which have corresponding levels of duties and responsibilities. Except as otherwise provided by law, no officer or employee of the National Security Agency shall be paid basic pay at a rate in excess of the maximum rate payable under section 5376 of such title and not more than 70 such officers and employees shall be paid within the range of rates authorized in section 5376 of such title.
`(b) The Secretary of Defense (or his designee) may provide officers and employees of the National Security Agency other compensation, benefits, incentives, and allowances which are consistent with, and do not exceed the levels authorized for, such compensation, benefits, incentives, or allowances by title 5, United States Code.'.
TITLE IV--FEDERAL BUREAU OFINVESTIGATION ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
SEC. 401. TEMPORARY FBI AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT BEQUESTS OR DEVISES.
(a) Acceptance of Bequests: During fiscal year 1993, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may accept, on behalf of the Bureau, any bequest or devise made by a citizen of the United States, if such bequest or devise is used only--
(1) to fund and administer, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Director, a scholarship program for the benefit of the immediate families of Federal law enforcement officers slain or permanently disabled in the line of duty; and
(2) to pay all necessary expenses in connection with the acceptance of such bequest or devise.
(b) Authority To Use Funds: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, proceeds from the sale of property accepted as a bequest or devise by the Director pursuant to subsection (a) shall be maintained in an interest bearing account and shall remain available for disbursement for purposes of this section until such funds are expended.
(2) The authority of paragraph (1) may be exercised only to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts.
(c) Regulations Required: Not later than 90 days after accepting any bequest or devise pursuant to this section, the Director shall prescribe regulations to implement the provisions of this section in a fair, equitable manner, and shall make copies of such regulations available to all Federal law enforcement agencies. Copies of such regulations shall also be provided the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
TITLE V--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 501. AUTHORITY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL TO RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AND INFORMATION FROM ANY PERSON.
Section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
(1) by striking `an employee of the Agency' and inserting in lieu thereof `any person'; and
(2) by inserting `from an employee of the Agency' after `received'.
TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 601. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the purposes of this Act such additional amounts for fiscal year 1993 as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, and other employee benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 602. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations in this Act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 603. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.
It is the sense of Congress that, beginning in 1993, and in each year thereafter, the aggregate amount requested and authorized for, and spent on, intelligence and intelligence-related activities should be disclosed to the public in an appropriate manner.
TITLE VII--INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1992
Subtitle A--In General
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the `Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992'.
SEC. 702. DEFINITIONS.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 2 the following new section:
`SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
`As used in this Act--
`(1) the term `commissioned officer of the Armed Forces' does not include a commissioned warrant officer;
`(2) the term `counterintelligence' means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign powers, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities;
`(3) the term `Intelligence Community' includes--
`(A) the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, which shall include the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council (as provided for in section 105(b)(3)), and such other offices as the Director may designate;
`(B) the Central Intelligence Agency;
`(C) the National Security Agency;
`(D) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
`(E) the central imagery authority within the Department of Defense;
`(F) the Office of Reconnaissance Support (as provided for in section 105(b)(3)) within the Department of Defense;
`(G) other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
`(H) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy;
`(I) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and
`(J) such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the Intelligence Community;
`(4) the term `intelligence' includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence;
`(5) the term `foreign intelligence' means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign powers, foreign organizations, or foreign persons;
`(6) the term `foreign power' means--
`(A) a foreign government or any component thereof;
`(B) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
`(C) any group engaged in international terrorist activities or international narcotics activities abroad; or
`(D) a foreign-based political organization not substantially composed of United States citizens or persons admitted into the United States for permanent residence;
`(7) the terms `national intelligence' and `intelligence related to the national security'--
`(A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and
`(B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title; and
`(8) the term `National Foreign Intelligence Program' refers to all programs, projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community, as well as any other programs of the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President, and does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces.'.
Subtitle B--The National Security Council
SEC. 711. PARTICIPATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
`(h) The Director of Central Intelligence (or, in his absence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) may, in performance of his duties under this Act and subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.'.
Subtitle C--The Director of Central Intelligence
SEC. 721. APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General: Section 102(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting `(1)' immediately after `(a)';
(2) in the first sentence--
(A) by striking `under the National Security Council'; and
(B) by striking `with a Director' and all that follows through `disability'; and
(3) by striking the second sentence and subsections (b) through (f) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
`(2) There shall be a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate--
`(A) who shall serve as head of the United States Intelligence Community;
`(B) who shall act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security; and
`(C) who shall serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
`(3) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his responsibilities under this Act, there shall be a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his or her absence or disability.
`(4)(A) The Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence may be appointed from among the commissioned officers of the Armed Forces, or from civilian life, but at no time shall both positions be simultaneously occupied by commissioned officers of the Armed Forces, whether in an active or retired status.
`(B) It is the sense of the Congress that under ordinary circumstances, it is desirable that either the Director or the Deputy Director be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces or that either such appointee otherwise have, by training or experience, an appreciation of military intelligence activities and requirements.
`(5)(A) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces appointed pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3), while serving in such position--
`(i) shall not be subject to supervision or control by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the Department of Defense;
`(ii) shall not exercise, by reason of his or her status as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense except as authorized by this title except as otherwise authorized by law; and
`(iii) shall not be counted against the numbers and percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of such officer authorized for the military department of which such officer is a member.
`(B) Except as provided in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (A), the appointment of a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) shall in no way affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, position, rank, or grade.
`(C) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces appointed pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3), while serving in such position, shall continue to receive military pay and allowances (including retired or retainer pay) payable to a commissioned officer of the officer's grade and length of service for which the appropriate military department shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director of Central Intelligence.'.
(b) Amendment to Title 5, United States Code: Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new undesignated paragraph:
`Director of Central Intelligence.'.
SEC. 722. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General: The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 103 as section 107, and section 104 as section 108; and
(2) by striking section 102a and inserting in lieu thereof the following new sections:
`SEC. 103. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
`(a) Provision of Intelligence: Under the direction of the National Security Council, the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for providing timely, objective national intelligence, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the Intelligence Community--
`(1) to the President;
`(2)(A) to the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch; and
`(B) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and
`(3) where appropriate, to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof.
`(b) Establishment of National Intelligence Council: (1)(A) There is established within the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence the National Intelligence Council (hereafter in this section referred to as the `Council'), composed of senior analysts within the Intelligence Community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of Central Intelligence. The Council shall be headed by a Chairman with two deputy chairmen, at least one of whom shall be from the private sector.
`(B) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the Council to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which are deemed unnecessary by the Director for this purpose.
`(2) The Council shall--
`(A) produce national intelligence estimates for the Government, including, whenever the Council deems appropriate, alternative views held by elements of the Intelligence Community; and
`(B) otherwise assist the Director in carrying out the responsibilities described in subsection (a).
`(3) Within their respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the Director, the members of the Council shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers of the Intelligence Community for purposes of representing the views of the Intelligence Community within the Government.
`(4) The Director shall make available to the Council such staff as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this subsection, and shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the Council and its staff satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence.
`(5) The heads of elements within the Intelligence Community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be required by the Director.
`(c) As Head of the Intelligence Community: In his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community, the Director shall--
`(1) develop and present to the President and the Congress an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program of the United States;
`(2) establish the requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community;
`(3) promote and evaluate the utility of national intelligence to consumers within the Government;
`(4) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the Intelligence Community;
`(5) protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; and
`(6) perform such other functions as the President or the National Security Council may direct.
`(d) As Head of the Central Intelligence Agency: In his capacity as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director shall--
`(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers, or internal security functions;
`(2) provide overall direction for the collection of national intelligence through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other agencies of the Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and that the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection are minimized;
`(3) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence;
`(4) perform such additional services as are of common concern to the elements of the Intelligence Community, which services the Director of Central Intelligence determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; and
`(5) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the National Security Council may direct, including the conduct of covert actions as may be authorized pursuant to title V of this Act.
`SEC. 104. AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
`(a) Access to Intelligence: Subject to the direction of the National Security Council, the Director of Central Intelligence shall have access to all intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any department, agency, or other entity of the United States.
`(b) Approval of Budgets: The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide guidance to elements of the Intelligence Community for the preparation of their annual budgets and shall approve such budgets before their incorporation in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
`(c) Role of DCI in Reprogramming: No funds made available under the National Foreign Intelligence Program may be reprogrammed by any element of the Intelligence Community without the prior approval of the Director of Central Intelligence except in accordance with procedures issued by the Director.
`(d) Transfer of Funds or Personnel Within the National Foreign Intelligence Program: (1) In addition to any other authorities available under law for such purposes, the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program to another such program and, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Director and the heads of affected departments and agencies, may transfer personnel authorized for an element of the Intelligence Community to another such element for periods up to a year, only if--
`(A) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
`(B) the need for funds or personnel for such activity is based on unforeseen requirements;
`(C) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency;
`(D) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds or personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
`(E) the Secretary or head of the department which contains the affected element or elements of the Intelligence Community does not object to such transfer.
`(2) Funds transferred under this section shall remain available for the same purposes, and for the same period, as the appropriations account to which transferred.
`(3) Any transfer of funds under this section shall be carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer notified to the appropriate congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the proposed transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In addition, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall be promptly notified of any transfer of funds made pursuant to this subsection where such transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the date of enactment of this section.
`(4) The Director shall promptly submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and, in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection. The Director shall include in any such report an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
`(e) Coordination With Foreign Governments: Under the direction of the National Security Council and in a manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate the relationships between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means.
`(f) Use of Personnel: The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in coordination with the heads of departments and agencies with elements in the Intelligence Community, institute policies and programs within the Intelligence Community--
`(1) to provide for the rotation of personnel between the elements of the Intelligence Community, where appropriate, and to make such rotated service a factor to be considered for promotion to senior positions; and
`(2) to consolidate, wherever possible, personnel, administrative, and security programs to reduce the overall costs of these activities within the Intelligence Community.
`(g) Termination of Employment of CIA Employees: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the Office of Personnel Management.'.
(b) Amendments to the Table of Contents: The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking out the items relating to sections 102a and 103 and inserting in lieu thereof the following new items:
`Sec. 103. Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.
`Sec. 104. Authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence.
`Sec. 107. National Security Resources Board.
`Sec. 108. Annual National Security Strategy Report.'.
Subtitle D--The Intelligence Activities of the Department of Defense
SEC. 731. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING TO THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) In General: The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104 (as added by this title) the following:
`SEC. 105. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING TO THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
`(a) In General: The Secretary of Defense shall--
`(1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commands, and, wherever such elements are performing governmentwide functions, the needs of other departments and agencies;
`(2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director of Central Intelligence by elements of the Department of Defense within the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
`(3) ensure that the tactical intelligence activities of the Department of Defense complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
`(4) ensure that the elements of the Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces; and
`(5) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication among the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense. . ; and
`(6) ensure that intelligence activities of the Department of Defense are conducted jointly where appropriate.
`(b) Responsibility for the Performance of Specific Functions: Consistent with sections 103 and 104 of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure--
`(1) through the National Security Agency (except as otherwise directed by the President or the National Security Council), the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the conduct of signals intelligence activities and shall ensure that the product is disseminated in a timely manner to authorized recipients;
`(2) through a central imagery authority, with appropriate representation from the Intelligence Community, the continued operation of an effective unified organization within the Department of Defense for carrying out tasking of imagery collection, for the coordination of imagery processing and exploitation activities, and for ensuring the dissemination of imagery in a timely manner to authorized recipients;
`(3) through the establishment of an Office of Reconnaissance Support, the continued operation of an effective unified organization for the research and development, procurement, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to satisfy the requirements of all elements of the Intelligence Community;
`(4) through the Defense Intelligence Agency, the continued operation of an effective unified system within the Department of Defense for the production of timely, objective military and military-related intelligence, based upon all sources available to the Intelligence Community, and shall ensure the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence to authorized recipients;
`(5) through the Defense Intelligence Agency, effective management of defense attaches Department of Defense human intelligence activities, including defense attaches, and of such other intelligence programs as may be assigned to the Agency by the Secretary; and
`(6) that the military departments maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence to meet--
`(A) the requirements of the Director of Central Intelligence;
`(B) the requirements of the Secretary of Defense of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
`(C) the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands and of joint operations; and
`(D) the specialized requirements of the departments for intelligence necessary to support tactical commanders, military planners, the research and development process, the acquisition of military equipment, and training and doctrine.
`SEC. 106. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO DEFENSE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
`(a) Consultations With Regard to Certain Appointments: (1) The Secretary of Defense shall undertake appropriate consultations with the Director of Central Intelligence before the appointment of any individual as head of the National Security Agency, the Office of Reconnaissance Support (as provided for in section 105(b)(3)), or the Defense Intelligence Agency.
`(2) `(b) Appointment of Head of Central Imagery Authority: The Secretary shall appoint, upon the recommendation of the Director, the head of the central imagery authority within the Department of Defense.
`(b) Exception to General or Flag Officer Ceilings: In the event the Secretary of Defense appoints a general or flag officer as head of the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, the central imagery authority within the Department of Defense, or the Office of Reconnaissance Support (as provided for in section 105(b)(3)), such appointment shall, for the period of such appointment, be excluded from calculation of the numbers and percentages specified in sections 525 and 526 of title 10, United States Code, pertaining to the officers authorized for the armed force of which he or she is a member.'.
(b) Amendments to the Table of Contents: The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting the following new items:
`Sec. 105. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
`Sec. 106. Administrative provisions pertaining to defense elements within the Intelligence Community.'.
SEC. 732. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.
(a) Budget Submissions Regarding Tactical Intelligence Matters: As part of the budget presentation materials submitted to the Congress for fiscal year 1994 and for each fiscal year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall identify to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives those intelligence activities of the Department of Defense currently listed as the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) which--
(1) produce foreign intelligence in peacetime;
(2) interface or interoperate directly with national intelligence systems; or
(3) meet the intelligence requirements of all Department of Defense elements rather than the requirements of a single element.
(b) Tactical Intelligence Program: Beginning with fiscal year 1995, and each fiscal year thereafter, the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense which were identified by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to subsection (a), or which may be subsequently identified by the Secretary as meeting the criteria of subsection (a), shall be funded as elements of a Tactical Intelligence Program within the budget of the Department of Defense, and shall be administered as a separate program by the Secretary of Defense.
Subtitle E--Congressional Oversight
SEC. 741. INCLUSION OF TACTICAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN JURISDICTION OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE SENATE.
(a) Amendment to Senate Resolution 400 (94th Congress): Section 14(a) of Senate Resolution 400 of the Ninety-fourth Congress is amended by striking the last sentence.
(b) Effective Date: This section shall take effect on October 1, 1993.
Subtitle F E--Effective Date
SEC. 751. 741. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This title shall take effect on the date of its enactment.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, the Senate takes up today the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993. This is the sixth such authorization bill that I have had the privilege of bringing before the Senate during my tenure as chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, which, as the record will show, is now longer than that of any previous chairman.
During this period, I have been extremely fortunate to serve with two distinguished and capable vice chairmen: First, with Senator Cohen, who served in this position for 4 years, and, then, with Senator Murkowski for the past 2 years. With their help and cooperation, the committee has been able to operate effectively in a bipartisan manner. Indeed, most of our decisions have been taken by unanimous vote or with only limited dissents. Rarely have votes broken down along party lines, and we have tried to take the views of all our Members into account regardless of the issue.
At the same time, we have been very mindful of our institutional role. The activities within the purview of this committee are crucial to the Nation's security. Yet they also pose potential risks for our country, and how it is perceived at home and abroad. Intelligence activities necessarily must be carried out in secret, and Congress must respect this secrecy if the oversight system is to work. At the same time the committee serves as virtually the only check outside the executive branch on the conduct of intelligence activities. We perform this surrogate role, not only for the Senate, but for the American people as well. Thus, it is crucial that we maintain our independence and authority as an institution, and that we be accountable for our stewardship to both the Senate and the public, to the extent we are able to do so.
In this regard, the lengthy set of public hearings that we held last year on the Gates nomination stand out in my mind as perhaps the most open discussion of intelligence activities which has ever taken place in our history. These hearings did much, I believe, to educate the American people with respect to the contributions made by intelligence, and to demonstrate the importance of effective congressional oversight.
When I became chairman of the Intelligence Committee 6 years ago, the efficacy of the entire oversight process was being called into question. We were in the throes of the Iran-Contra affair, the most serious breach of the oversight process to have occurred since the intelligence committees were created in the mid-1970's, and, indeed, it appeared the existing oversight arrangements had significant flaws.
Senator Cohen and I made it the first priority of our committee to shore up the oversight framework. I am pleased to report to my colleagues, Mr. President, that these efforts ultimately produced significant, concrete results.
With respect to the committee's own internal procedures, we created a small audit unit on our staff to give us the capability of auditing expenditures and funding arrangements in covert action programs and other types of intelligence activities, and we instituted quarterly reviews by the committee of all covert action programs on the books.
In the fiscal year 1990 Intelligence Authorization Act, we created an independent, statutory Inspector General for the CIA, and required that he make semiannual reports of his activities to the Congress. The first incumbent of this office was confirmed by the Senate in November, 1990, and is having, in our view, a very constructive impact on the work of the Agency.
Perhaps most significant of all the reforms was the revision of the oversight statute itself which was accomplished by the fiscal year 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act. This law set new rules for the approval of covert actions and reporting them to the Congress, and, in doing so, addressed many of the problems in evidence in the Iran-contra affair. Thus, the President must now approve covert actions in written findings which cannot be retroactive. If third parties are to be used to carry out covert actions, this must be noted in the finding. All entities of the Government which might be used for these purposes also must be identified. Further, the law makes clear that covert actions cannot be used to violate laws of the United States, or to influence domestic political opinion. Significant changes in previously approved findings must now be reported to the oversight committees as a matter of law.
Finally, we were able to obtain a commitment from the President that if he were to withhold prior notice of a covert action from the oversight committees, he would interpret the statutory requirement of `timely notice' as meaning notice `within a few days.' While the President did reserve the possibility that he might assert constitutional authority to withhold notice for longer periods, he no longer asserted that the statute itself gave him unfettered discretion when to notify the Congress.
Mr. President, these changes took us almost 4 years to enact. One of our authorization bills was vetoed because of it. But to my mind, they were worth the effort. We are leaving behind a far stronger oversight structure. While I think it is true that in the end successful oversight ultimately depends upon good faith and mutual trust between
the branches, I think that good faith and trust are fostered by having a strong institutional framework in which these relationships are played out.
In addition to strengthening the oversight process, the committee has played a key role in terms of allocating resources for intelligence activities. When I became chairman 6 years ago, the reality of the cold war was still very much with us. The committee was concerned with keeping close tabs on the Soviet military threat, and about countering Soviet influence around the world. We were worried about our ability to verify arms control treaties, and what to do about Soviet spies. The role of intelligence was crucial to these concerns, and the committee supported the funding necessary to provide a strong capability to collect and analyze information.
Given the dramatic developments of the last 3 years, however, the military and political threat posed by the former Soviet Union has vastly diminished. Clearly, the intelligence community does not need to do many of the things it did in the past to monitor activities in this area of the world, or to counter Soviet influence. Cost savings are clearly possible.
While the committee made modest reductions in the intelligence authorization in each of the last 2 years, in this year's bill, we are recommending a more substantial reduction in the President's budget request. We believe such a cut can be achieved while still preserving a strong, flexible capability to cope with this rapidly-changing, increasingly complex world. Our policymakers still need intelligence to guide their decisions. They cannot rely solely upon the media or upon the representations made by other governments. Above all, we must preserve an intelligence capability sufficient to support U.S. military forces, wherever they may be deployed around the world. The Persian Gulf war was a sobering reminder that, notwithstanding our desire to reap the peace dividend, American lives may well depend on preserving our intelligence edge into the future.
Now, I want to turn to the subject of reorganizing the intelligence community, and explain how the bill before us deals with that area.
My colleagues will recall that earlier in this session, I introduced a bill, S. 2198, which called for a comprehensive, far-reaching restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community. A similar bill was introduced in the House by Congressman McCurdy, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
The bill called for a Director of National Intelligence,
separate from the CIA, with three Deputy Directors, one for the intelligence community, one for estimates and analysis, and one to run the CIA, which would have been made largely an operational agency. The new Director of National Intelligence would have been given new responsibilities and new authorities to run the intelligence community, which itself would have been considerably restructured by this proposal.
When the bill was introduced, I said that it was intended as a launching pad for discussion. It was also hoped that the bill would cause the administration to be somewhat bolder than it might otherwise have been in addressing the organizational shortcomings perceived by the committee.
In both respects, the bill succeeded in accomplishing its objectives. The committee held a series of five hearings on the bill between February and April, receiving excellent testimony on the future of U.S. intelligence from experts such as James Schlesinger, Frank Carlucci, and others. At the final hearing, the committee heard from the Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, who summarized the actions which he had taken, or proposed to take, to address the concerns addressed by the legislation. He spoke of his efforts to revitalize intelligence analysis and make it more relevant to policymakers; of his plans to rejuvenate the community role of the DCI; of his plans to reorganize the office which procures overhead reconnaissance systems; and, finally, in a subsequent letter, of his plans to create a new office to coordinate the exploitation and dissemination of imagery intelligence.
The members of our committee reacted positively to these initiatives, which we regarded as substantial and responsive to our concerns.
At the same time, the hearings clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of existing law in terms of providing the legal underpinning for U.S. intelligence activities. Existing law essentially boils down to two sections of the National Security Act of 1947 which have not been amended in the 45 years of their existence. Not only are they woefully out of date, they are woefully out of sync in terms of reflecting the composition of the intelligence community and the nature of the relationships between its component parts. Thus, the committee came to conclude that legislating the fundamental roles, missions, and relationships of the intelligence community was, indeed, desirable, both to reflect and preserve the changes made by the administration, and to signal the continuing commitment of the Congress to the preservation of an effective intelligence capability. We also recognize the need to build sufficient flexibility into the law to permit the President and the DCI to adjust the
structural arrangements as future needs may require.
These legislative provisions are contained in title VII of the bill before us. They have been worked out in consultation with the administration, and, while I cannot say the administration is satisfied with every word, I believe we have reached agreement on all but a few minor issues. There will be further opportunities, of course, to address these in conference.
If enacted, title VII would, for the first time, define the U.S. intelligence community in law. It would set forth the roles of the Director of Central Intelligence, and provide specific responsibilities and authorities to his office for the first time in law. And it would similarly define the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense for national intelligence programs, again for the first time in law.
Mr. President, this is significant legislation. While I would not describe it as radical surgery, I would describe it radical improvement in the law governing intelligence activities. For the first time, Congress would be telling the intelligence community what we expect it to do--not sub rosa, not in closed session, but openly, in law, where all can see. The time is ripe, in my view, for this legislation, and I commend it to my colleagues.
Before turning the floor over to the distinguished vice chairman, let me quickly highlight the other provisions of this year's authorization bill.
Title I contains the annual authorization of appropriations for the elements of the U.S. intelligence community. Because these figures are classified, title I incorporates into the law the classified schedule of authorizations which accompanies the bill. This classified schedule and the accompanying classified report has been available to all Members of the Senate in our committee spaces since July 20.
Title II contains the annual authorization for the CIA retirement and disability system.
Title III contains a number of provisions relating to intelligence elements of the Department of Defense. Section 301 authorizes the DIA Director to provide limited assistance to certain former employees in order to prevent security problems from developing. Section 302 clarifies that senior executive services positions within the military departments are to be included in the civilian intelligence personnel system already established by law. Section 303 provides that the Defense Intelligence College may award bachelors' degrees in intelligence fields contingent upon the school receiving
appropriate accreditation for this course of study. Section 304 contains minor amendments to the National Security Education Act, passed by Congress in last year's authorization bill, and authorizes an additional $35 million to be applied to the trust fund established under that legislation. Section 305 authorizes the Director of the National Security Agency to pay benefits and allowances to employees which are comparable to, but do not exceed, those payable to other Federal employees.
Title IV provides temporary authority for the FBI to accept a bequest of funds from a private citizen, and use such funds to establish a scholarship program for immediate families of Federal law enforcement officers slain or permanently disabled in the line of duty.
Title V makes clear that the CIA inspector general may receive and investigate complaints from persons or sources outside CIA.
Title VI contains general provisions, including a sense-of-the-Congress provision that beginning in 1993 and in each year thereafter, the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence activities should be disclosed to the public in an appropriate manner. This is the same budget disclosure provision that was in last year's bill, and represents a reiteration of the committee's position on this issue.
Title VII, as I have already explained, contains the provisions on intelligence reorganization.
This, then, Mr. President, is a summary of the legislative provisions in this year's bill. They have the support of all members of our committee, and I would urge my colleagues to vote for its passage.
Before I yield, though, let me pay tribute to the contributions made by our Members, and, in particular, our vice chairman, the distinguished Senator from Alaska, Frank Murkowski. Our committee prides itself on the bipartisan spirit in which we work. But clearly bipartisanship is impossible without a vice chairman who takes a cooperative interest in the work of the committee, and Senator Murkowski has clearly played such a role. I appreciate his advice and counsel, and his willingness to work with me toward what I believe have been our common goals: the improved performance of our intelligence agencies, and the strengthening of the oversight process.
He and I will turn over the reins of the committee to others at the end of this year, and other members of the committee will reach the end of their terms, or will otherwise be leaving the Senate. On the Democratic side, Senators Hollings, Bradley, and Cranston will be departing;
and on the Republican side, Senator Rudman will be leaving. I want to thank each of them publicly for their interest and involvement in the work of the committee. Service on this committee does not often translate into political points. The public is largely unaware of the role that individual Senators play. Each has had his own areas of interest; and has left his own mark on the work of the committee. Together they have been a formidable force, shaping policy, process, and the allocation of resources. Their contributions will be long remembered; and their impact, longlasting. I thank them as well as those Senators who will remain: Senators DeConcini, Metzenbaum, Glenn, Kerrey, Warner, D'Amato, Danforth, Gorton, and Chafee, for making my tenure as chairman so satisfying. It has been a distinct honor and privilege to have served as leader of this distinguished group.
We also could not have done it without our talented staff. I know of no committee which has such a dedicated, knowledgeable group of experts to support them. Since this is my last year with this auspicious group, I want to take a moment to acknowledge their contributions, particularly those of our senior staff. George Tenet, our staff director, has provided strong direction and leadership in a very demanding and very sensitive position. A person of enormous energy and a no-nonsense style, George has guided the committee through the treacherous shoals of the intelligence business for the last 4 years displaying excellent judgment and unflagging persistence. John Moseman, minority staff director for the last 2 years, has combined a judicious temperament with unmatched dedication and diligence. Always cooperative and helpful, John was largely responsible for keeping us on an even keel, ensuring that the interests of all our members were accommodated. Britt Snider, our general counsel, has been with the committee for 6 years, during which time he has served as the lawyer for both sides of the aisle. A professional with experience in both the legislative and executive branches, Britt was the principle author of the most significant legislation enacted over the last 6 years, to include the CIA inspector general law, the 1991 revision of the intelligence oversight statute, and this year's amendments to the National Security Act of 1947. Regina Genton, the budget director, has also been with the committee for 6 years, serving as budget director during the past year, succeeding Keith Hall, who took his considerable talents to the Department of Defense. Gina has demonstrated an unusual ability to assimilate and marshal vast amounts of information, presenting the committee with recommendations that are clear and convincing. She is an extremely talented and capable person. Heading our audit staff for the last 2 years has been Pat Hanback, a woman who is a professional accountant with previous experience at CIA, a rare combination. Thanks to Pat and her staff, the committee has considerably improved its capability to monitor and evaluate
financial transactions by intelligence agencies, a key element of oversight. Serving as special assistant for covert actions programs has been Chris Straub, a very able and insightful member of our team. Doubling as the staff designee for Senator Hollings, Chris has played the key role in this critical area of our oversight responsibilities. The chief clerk of the committee, Kathleen McGhee, has served in this position during my entire tenure as chairman. As head of our administrative staff, she has skillfully and consistently managed the affairs of our committee, and both members and staff owe her a debt of gratitude.
Time does not permit me to go on in detail. Suffice it to say, the contributions of the remainder of our very capable core staff: Cullum Clark, Claudia Daley, Pete Dorn, John Elliff, Dave Garman, David Halperin, Judy Hodgson, Sarah Holmes, Karen Lydon, Jim Martin, Zach Messitte, Marvin Ott, Andre Pearson, Joan Piermarini, Terry Ryan, Mary Sturtevant, Tawanda Sullivan, Tracey Summers, Blythe Thomas, Jim Van Cook, Fred Ward, Jim Wolfe, and Sheryl Wood are acknowledged and appreciated, as are the contributions made by the staff designees of our members: Naomi Baum for Senator Cranston; Tim Carlsgaard for Senator DeConcini; John Despres for Senator Bradley; Art Grant for Senator Rudman; Bill Griffies for Senator Gorton; Mike Hathaway for Senator D'Amato; Ed Levine for Senator Metzenbaum; Chris Mellon for Senator Chafee; Don Mitchell for Senator Glenn; Jennifer Sims for Senator Danforth; and Gary Sojka for Senator Warner. It has been a team effort and a quality effort. I salute all of you.
I now yield the floor to the distinguished vice chairman of the committee, Senator Murkowski.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I join Senator Boren in urging our colleagues to support the fiscal year 1993 intelligence authorization bill. This year, our committee carefully evaluated the President's budget request in light of the dramatic changes that have taken place in the world, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued instability in the Middle East, recently negotiated arms agreements, and other significant matters affecting our national security.
We have made a program-by-program review to insure that we maintain highly capable intelligence expertise to deal with a most complex world. In doing so, I believe we have complimented the serious efforts undertaken by the Director of Central Intelligence, Bob Gates, who has implemented a restructuring of key components of the intelligence community to respond to this new world order.
I will not detail here the particular features of our bill. Senator Boren has provided a careful, unclassified outline of our approach. Suffice it to say, I believe our committee made difficult choices and established firm priorities in reducing spending on intelligence by over $1 billion. This savings, I am pleased to note, was applied by the Armed Services Committee to reduce the national deficit, and was not spent on other defense programs. I commend the leadership of Senators Nunn and Warner in working with our committee to achieve this result.
Mr. President, another feature of this legislation that deserves the attention of our colleagues is title VII, which reorganizes portions of the intelligence community. The reorganization provisions are the culmination of several years' of effort by our professional staff and our committee to codify the modern intelligence community structure and authorities. These provisions do not establish a radical readjustment or realignment of the varied components of the intelligence community. Rather, title VII codifies reality. This is long over due, particularly in light of the fact that no similar codification has taken place since late 1940.
Mr. President, I join with Senator Boren in commending the fine staff that has served us so ably during our tenure on the committee. My colleagues should understand that one of the most important functions of our Intelligence Committee is to oversee the vast number of classified programs that we authorize. This ranges from highly sensitive covert action initiatives, to the performance of agencies and directorates. We rely very heavily on the expertise of our staff to assist us in this important function, and all members of our committee are grateful for the hard work and dedication of this professional staff.
Mr. BYRD. A very special opportunity has arisen for the Senate as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the setting loose of a group of newly emerging sovereign democracies out of the ashes of the old Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.
East Europe and the former States of the Soviet Union is now known as a zone of emerging democratic States, and with that development comes the difficulties of making democracies work, of maintaining openness while preserving order, of establishing security organizations and intelligence organizations which are controlled by the civilian leadership of those nations. Problems that are common knowledge to us in the Senate in controlling the operations of secret bureaucracies are new to the fledgling parliaments of these new States.
I believe that it would be highly appropriate, during the upcoming 103d Congress, which will convene in January 1993, for the Senate, through the Appropriations and Intelligence Committees, which conduct the work of overseeing our own intelligence agencies and security bureaucracies, to take up the task of providing information, advice, and energy to the parliaments, the legislatures of those newly emerging democracies on how to effectively monitor and control the policies and operations of the intelligence and security organizations that will undoubtedly develop and grow in those societies. It was not long ago that the security organizations in those nations and former Republics controlled the lives of the people, and now we are hoping that the tables will permanently be turned. I would hope that specific Senators on our two committees would assume this as an area of special work and attention, since the benefits would be very substantial not only for those new governments, but more importantly for the peoples of those new nations who are now tasting freedom after decades of deprivation.
Mr. President, we have already had in place for 2 years a modest program funded by our two committees to establish liaison relationships with the nations of Eastern Europe, and in a couple of cases, both in Czechoslovakia and Romania, we have provided modest assistance in the form of transmitting materials explaining our laws and procedures in the complicated task of overseeing and controlling our intelligence organizations. The parliamentary oversight committees which do exist and have been in touch with us are eager, more than eager, to learn from us, and it would be a great mistake for us not to give them all the help and assistance that we can.
It would be my hope that interested Senators would devote substantial attention to this job, and would take the time to visit with their legislative counterparts in those nations, and I am certain that the staffs of our two committees, some of whom have already been involved in this effort, stand ready and willing to provide the necessary support to make this a successful venture.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, S. 2991 was reported on July 24 as an original bill. It was subsequently referred to the Committee on Armed Services for a period of 30 days for matters within the jurisdiction of that committee. The committee reported out this bill on September 16, 1992, Senate report 102-407, with several amendments, most of which were made to title VII, the part of the bill which deals with the restructuring of the intelligence community. These amendments are acceptable to the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. President, while the committee agrees to adopt the amendments made by the Armed Services Committee, I do wish to comment on two provisions of our original bill which were stricken.
When the Intelligence Committee was established in 1976, the Senate gave it jurisdiction over the CIA and so-called national intelligence programs, but it excluded from the committee's jurisdiction military tactical intelligence, leaving those programs in the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee.
As the work of the Intelligence Committee has evolved and matured, we have found it impossible to evaluate the budget for the CIA and national intelligence programs without assessing what sorts of intelligence capabilities are being funded as tactical intelligence programs. Since Armed Services remains the authorizing committee for these programs, however, the Intelligence Committee has ordinarily made recommendations regarding the annual authorization for tactical intelligence activities to the Armed Services Committee, and has played no role in conferencing the issues related to these activities.
Our counterpart committee in the House of Representatives, on the other hand, does have jurisdiction over tactical intelligence, and authorizes the annual appropriations for tactical intelligence and related activities.
In the bill reported by the Intelligence Committee, we had proposed eliminating the limitation in our charter, which excluded tactical intelligence activities from our jurisdiction. We did so in the belief that by giving our committee responsibility for tactical intelligence would lead to more thorough oversight of this area by our committee, and make our jurisdiction comparable to that of our counterpart committee in the House.
It would still have left our authorization for tactical intelligence to be considered on sequential referral by the Committee on Armed Services.
In any case, the Committee on Armed Services did not favor making this change, feeling that separating tactical intelligence activities, in a budgetary sense, from the operating forces they support was not advisable.
We respect their decision, and will not challenge it today. I do, however, continue to believe that this is an area which requires more thorough oversight both from the Department of Defense and from the Congress. The Select Committee on Intelligence will continue to review these activities, with or without formal jurisdiction over them.
The second matter is I wanted to comment upon briefly involves the Armed Services Committee's striking the provisions of the bill reported by our committee exempting the positions of NSA and DIA Directors from the statutory ceilings on flag-rank officers.
Under existing practice, the military departments have been reluctant to use their general or flag officer allocations to fill these defense agency positions. The result has been very little competition for these crucial jobs, and, occasionally, seeing them filled by officers with little or no intelligence backgrounds. The provision in our bill had been intended to free up these positions from the service quotas to foster competition among the services, and to give career intelligence officers in the services positions to aspire to.
While I believe the Armed Services Committee appreciates the problems with the existing system, it has opted for a different approach in its own bill by transferring certain flag-rank billets from the allocations of the military services to be used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These allocations could be used by the Chairman to
fill defense agency positions like those at NSA and DIA.
On the basis of this action, our committee will not press for its provision. I hope, however, that the chairman will make use of these additional allocations to fill the NSA and DIA Director positions. If he does not do so, and the existing problems continue to plague the system, it would be my hope that the Intelligence Committee will reconsider this provision.
Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the amendments reported by the Armed Services Committee be considered and adopted en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
The Armed Services Committee amendments were agreed to en bloc.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendments were agreed to.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I now send to the desk a committee amendment making certain changes in the bill and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Boren] proposes an amendment numbered 3157.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(1) On page 13, line 24: after subsection 304(a)(5) insert the following new subsection:
`(6) in section 804(c), by striking obligation and inserting in lieu thereof expenditure.'
(2) On page 19, line 12: delete `Office of Reconnaissance Support (as provided for in section 105(b)(3))' and insert in lieu thereof `National Reconnaissance Office'.
(3) On page 25, line 16, by inserting after subsection 102(a)(5)(C) the following new subsection:
`(6) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, for administrative purposes, be within the Central Intelligence Agency.'
(4) On page 32, line 10, changing `to' to `from'.
(5) On page 35, line 19, delete `the Office of'.
(6) On page 37, line 14: delete `establishment of an Office of Reconnaissance Support' and insert in lieu thereof `the National Reconnaissance Office'.
(7) On page 37, line 17: delete `procurement' and insert in lieu thereof `acquisition'.
(8) On page 39, line 3, by inserting at the end of section 105 the following: `Provided, the Secretary of Defense, in carrying out the functions described in this section, shall be authorized to utilize such elements of the Department of Defense as may be appropriate for the execution of such functions in addition to, or in lieu of, the elements identified in this section.'
(9) On page 39, line 18, by inserting at the end of subsection 106(b) the following new subsection:
`(c) Authority To Withhold Certain Information Regarding the National Reconnaissance Office.--Nothing in this Act or any provision of law shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Reconnaissance Office, of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names titles, salaries, or number of persons employed by, or assigned or detailed to, such office.'
Mr. BOREN. The first part of the committee amendment, Mr. President, I take particular pleasure in offering. Its principal purpose is to conform the relevant portions of the bill to the action announced by the administration on September 18, 1992, to declassify the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], the office within the Department of Defense with responsibility for building and operating U.S. satellite systems, whose existence, for the last 30 years, has never been officially acknowledged by the Government.
Perhaps such secrecy was justified when the NRO was created, but with the passage of time and particularly with the end of the cold war, the justification for continued secrecy has drastically diminished. Indeed, the Select Committee on Intelligence has come to conclude that continued secrecy was not simply an anachronism in today's environment, but that it was having decidedly adverse effects on the external relationships of this organization.
I am personally very gratified by this decision, and, indeed, believe the efforts of the Intelligence Committee to bring the existence of the NRO out into the open contributed significantly to the decision. I introduced legislation earlier this year to reorganize the intelligence community. (S. 2198) which called for the establishment of a publicly acknowledged office with responsibilities similar to those of the NRO in hopes that this would motivate the Administration to consider seriously the continued classification of the National Reconnaissance Office. This proposal was carried over in the authorization bill reported by the committee.
We are, therefore, delighted that the administration has taken this action. The existence of NRO, its principal functions and organizational arrangements, and its senior officials have now been publicly acknowledged. It is a significant step toward openness, and I congratulate the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the NRO itself, Martin Faga, for having taken it. It was the right thing to do.
Official acknowledgment of NRO's existence does not mean, however, that its activities will themselves be declassified. Indeed, virtually all of NRO's operations and activities must necessarily remain classified. In a letter sent to the congressional leadership last Friday, the administration requested a number of changes to existing law to allow NRO to maintain appropriate security for its operations even as its existence was being disclosed.
The amendment I am offering today, in fact, includes one
of the provisions requested by the administration which is similar to provisions in existing law applicable to the National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency. This amendment would give the NRO discretion to withhold further information from the public concerning its organization and functions, or the names, titles, salaries, and number of persons employed by, or assigned to, such Office.
While most of NRO's activities are classified and information concerning them can be withheld from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, the information covered by the amendment may not be classified, and, thus, could be subject to disclosure under existing law. In my view, this is information which should be protected from disclosure. Such information means little to the public, and yet its release could disclose significant information about the nature of NRO's classified activities.
With respect to the other provisions requested by the administration, there simply has not been enough time to consider and coordinate these proposals with the pertinent committees of jurisdiction. We recognize that a need for further legislative relief may exist, however, and are prepared to work with the administration to develop such legislation as may be warranted.
A second change made by the committee amendment makes clear that the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, while constituting a separate element of the intelligence community, remains, for administrative purposes, within the Central Intelligence Agency.
Accordingly, the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and the entities contained therein, for example, the National Intelligence Council, remain governed by and subject to the provisions of this act, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and other applicable law, orders, directives and regulations to the extent they apply to the Central Intelligence Agency.
While the committee intends that the entities within the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence which support the Director in the execution of his responsibilities for the intelligence community, set forth in section 103(c) of the bill, as well as the National Intelligence Council, established pursuant to section 103(b), remain independent of the CIA in terms of the performance of their respective substantive functions, it is nonetheless the intent of the committee that these entities be considered administratively a part of CIA for purposes of receiving logistical and other administrative support, and that the personnel and activities of these entities be subject to the same laws and regulations as the personnel and activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, to include those laws and regulations which provide special authority to CIA for the conduct of intelligence activities.
This is, indeed, consistent with what had heretofore been existing law and practice.
At the same time, the committee reiterates that in making the Office of the DCI part of CIA for administrative purposes, it is not its intent that those elements of the Office of the DCI which support the DCI in the execution of his role as head of the intelligence community, or, like the National Intelligence Council, perform functions for the DCI which transcend those of the CIA itself, should be subject to the management, supervision, or control by CIA officials with respect to the execution of their substantive responsibilities, apart from responding to the direction of the DCI or DDCI themselves. In short, in providing that the Office of the DCI be considered, for administrative purposes, as part of the CIA, the committee does not intend to impair the ability of the DCI to act as an impartial head of the intelligence community.
The third substantive change proposed by the committee amendment is to clarify the section of the bill pertaining to the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense.
Since the bill was reported, the Department of Defense has expressed concern that the bill as written might be interpreted to preclude the Secretary from using appropriate elements of the Department for the conduct of intelligence activities without its coming back to Congress and obtaining a change in the law. This was never contemplated by the bill, but in order to make this crystal clear, the committee amendment adds a new proviso to the bill stating that notwithstanding the requirement in the bill that the Secretary utilize certain DOD components to carry out certain activities, he is not precluded from using such other components as may be required to carry out the functions identified.
The Department would nonetheless be required to consult the Congress if funding had not been previously authorized and appropriated to permit the component concerned to undertake the function in question. Thus, a decision by the Secretary to utilize, for example, an element of the Department of Defense other than the National Security Agency to form a unified signals intelligence organization would necessitate the authorization and appropriation of funds by the Congress to be used for this purpose.
Lastly, Mr. President, the committee amendment would make three technical corrections. Two of the three would correct errors in the text of the bill. The third is an amendment to section 804(c) of the National Security Education Act, enacted last year, to clarify that money placed in the trust fund established by the act may continue to draw interest until it is expended rather than until it is obligated as is currently provided.
This, then, Mr. President, is what the committee amendment would accomplish.
Mr. President, this committee amendment has been thoroughly discussed in our committee, and I ask for its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 3157) was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair and wish the Chair good morning, and my colleague, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
First, let me say to my friend from Oklahoma I am initiating a departure and breaking a rule on our bipartisan basis by offering this amendment without the chairman's knowledge.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski], for himself, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Warner, Mr. Bradley, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Danforth, Mr. Cranston, Mr. Rudman, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Kerrey, and Mr. Cohen, proposes an amendment numbered 3158:
On page 18, after line 2, add the following new section:
SEC. 604. REDESIGNATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION ACT OF 1991.
Section 801(a) of Public Law 102-183 is amended to read as follows:
`(a) Short Title: This title may be cited as the `David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991'.'.
On page 3, in the table of contents, after the item relating to section 603, insert the following new item:
`Sec. 604. Redesignation of National Security Education Act of 1991.'.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair and I congratulate my colleague, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. President, my amendment is offered on behalf of members of the committee: Senator Warner, Senator Hollings, Senator Bradley, Senator D'Amato, Senator Cranston, Senator Danforth, Senator DeConcini, Senator Rudman, Senator Metzenbaum, Senator Gortin, Senator Chafee, Senator Kerrey, and Senator Cohen.
Mr. President, this will undoubtedly be the last time Senator Boren manages the intelligence authorization bill in his capacity as chairman of our committee. I think it is fitting that we reflect on his tenure over the last 6 years as chairman of that committee, which I am informed is the longest period of time that anyone has served as chairman of that committee.
As chairman of our committee, Senator Boren has been able to apply his fundamental belief that partisanship should stop at the water's edge. He has practiced what he has preached, and as vice chairman of that committee I can attest to that.
Mr. President, it has not always been an easy chore. Senator Boren has presided over the Intelligence Committee over a relatively contentious period of history which has included some very serious Senate debate over our foreign policy, difficult negotiations with the executive branch over legislation arising from the Iran-Contra episode, and the hard-fought confirmation of Robert Gates to be Director of the Central Intelligence. These two last matters were more or less public activities, a departure from the committee's norm.
During the Gates confirmation proceedings, which lasted over 5 months, the American public saw Senator Boren preside over a highly charged series of hearings that provided perhaps more information than ever before about the inner workings of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was a pleasure to have worked closely with him to ensure that the hearings were thorough and fair to all parties. He certainly maintained that policy.
But as my colleagues well know, most of the work of our committee is done in closed sessions. We learn about and debate some of the most sensitive of our Nation's intelligence programs. Perhaps because we operate in closed sessions, our committee members often speak their minds as directly and forcefully as possible in that cloistered environment.
However, Senator Boren has the responsibility, and I might say the thrill, if I can use that word, of presiding over these very energetic closed sessions. He consistently seeks a committee consensus and his leadership has not resulted in one party-line vote on any significant issue within the committee that this Senator from Alaska can recall.
There are many things that have occupied the attention of Senator Boren and our committee. He and then Vice Chairman Bill Cohen instituted an audit function for our staff that has resulted in important cost savings for particular intelligence programs. He has been a strong advocate for increased funding for human intelligence. He has been careful to promote and protect the important oversight functions of our committee by working in close harmony with the Director of the Central Intelligence, the National Security Adviser and, indeed, with the President on a variety of different issues including those related to covert action.
But, Mr. President, there is one program in particular that I believe has given David Boren the most satisfaction during his 6 years as chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Last year, our committee authorized the establishment of the National Security Education Act. It was a new program within the Department of Defense that has, as one of its central purposes, the goal of increasing educational opportunities for college students and universities in national security studies.
Senator Boren identified a critical national education need and established a program to meet the challenges of an increasingly competitive world. He wants to be sure we have trained professionals who can assist policymakers to respond appropriately to the complexities of foreign affairs. This educational program, funded as it is through the intelligence budget, was not easily accomplished. But it is a measure of David Boren's tenacity and grit that he worked months to build a case, argued effectively for his cause, formed a coalition of support and negotiated a successful resolution.
He used all of his skills as a legislator, but I believe the critical element that made this effort a success was that David Boren had his heart and his spirit fully engaged in the project as well as that of his staff.
He truly believes that the well-educated minds of our young people will be more important to our future than any technology we can devise to deal with world challenges and national security.
It is also clear that education has been important to Senator Boren's life, particularly the education he received from his best and most important teacher, his father, Congressman Lyle Boren, who passed away a short time ago.
So, Mr. President, as I thought about paying tribute to my colleague for his good works and his bipartisan leadership, I decided it would be appropriate to ask my colleagues to include David Boren's name in the title of the National Security Education Act.
Finally, Mr. President, I am sure my colleague intends to respond, but let me first say that when grants and scholarships are given to increase our expertise in national security affairs, the recipients ought to know who the father of their particular program is. I suggest that they all be required to write him a letter at least once a year after they get their scholarship! But that may be presumptuous. More than that, the recipients ought to understand that bipartisan that can, indeed, be practiced in this body and that one man, David Boren, has used his position of leadership to try to influence the future in a most positive and meaningful way.
Mr. President, adding David Boren's name to the National Security Education Act is a small but sincere measure of our admiration for the decency of Senator Boren and for the strong leadership he has provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It has been a pleasure for me as vice chairman to have served with David Boren on the committee and certainly a pleasure today to recognize the contribution that he has made.
I urge my colleagues, as we address the final responsibility associated with our joint work on the Intelligence Committee, to support my amendment.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to add my support to the Murkowski amendment, naming the National Security Education Act of 1991 in honor of our departing chairman, Senator David L. Boren.
Senator Boren has achieved so much in his 6-year leadership of the Intelligence Committee that I hesitate to say that the Boren Education Act is his crowning accomplishment. As in so many things, Senator Boren saw a need, foresaw the impact of a lack of young Americans studying foreign languages and cultures, sought the counsel of the best minds on how to fix the problem, crafted a solution that included a sound financial base for future generations of scholars, and convinced his colleagues and the administration to do it. The Nation will be the richer for his effort, first in the quality of our future intelligence officers but also in the broader, more international scope of our future businessmen and women.
I am the most recent appointee to the Intelligence Committee but it is clear to me that our committee has exceptional leadership. Thanks to both the chairman and our distinguished vice chairman, Senator Frank Murkowski, partisanship stops when you pass through the doors into our committee room. We have balanced, nonpartisan leadership that seeks and achieves broad consensus. There is also a sense of responsibility which the committee, and particularly the chairman and vice chairman, bear on behalf of the entire Senate. Further, it is clear to me that the relations of mutual respect and candor between the Intelligence Committee and the intelligence agencies didn't just happen; they are the fruit of 6 years of David Boren's chairmanship. It has been a historic and extremely positive chairmanship.
It has been an honor to serve on the Intelligence Committee during the Boren era, if only briefly. It is period that has set the standard for congressional oversight of sensitive Government activities and proved that our two branches of Government can work together positively and creatively.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I am delighted to join Senator Murkowski and others in offering an amendment to name the National Security Education Trust Fund after Senator Boren, the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
Let me begin by saying that the National Security Education Act was entirely the brainchild of the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma. It was not only his idea but I think he deserves credit for almost single-handedly selling the concept to some skeptical colleagues of ours on other committees in this body and in the House of Representatives. The National Security Education Trust Fund is a product of his labors and his ingenuity and it is only fitting that it bear his name.
Let me say in addition, however, that this is only one of many farsighted initiatives our distinguished chairman has successfully implemented during his tenure as chairman of the Intelligence Committee. He was instrumental, together with our distinguished colleague Bill Cohen, the former vice chairman of the committee, in passing legislation to improve congressional oversight of the intelligence community. He formed an audit team within the staff of the Intelligence Committee which has proven to be of great value in investigating intelligence community programs. He succeeded in strengthening the inspector general of the CIA, a policy I had reservations about, but which seems to be working well today. He undertook a thorough review of the intelligence community's structure and organization, and some important changes have recently emerged from that effort. I would also say, Mr. President, that whether it was during a closed door hearing on a covert action policy, or during the televised hearings on the Gates' nomination, our distinguished chairman always acted in the finest bipartisan tradition of the Senate.
Mr. President, Senator Boren was a member of the Intelligence Committee for the last 8 years, and its chairman for the last 6 years. It has been a period in which the United States has benefited from greatly increased capabilities within the intelligence community. At the same time, largely through Senator Boren's efforts, this is a period during which the intelligence community has become more accountable for the funding it receives.
During a colloquy on the floor yesterday, our former vice chairman pointed out that there is little public reward or recognition for the long hours that are required to master the intricacies of the intelligence budget. I am delighted that we are able today to provide Senator Boren a measure of public recognition for his efforts as chairman of the Intelligence Committee. He has served the country with great distinction in a very sensitive and important position and I congratulate him on his achievements over the last 8 years.
Mr. RUDMAN. Mr. President, I want to express my full support for the amendment that has been offered by the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. When I retire from the Senate in the near future, I will remember with great respect the tireless efforts of the chairman--and the vice chairman who has offered this amendment--to increase the Senate's ability to properly oversee the intelligence community's activities while at the same time improving the capabilities of the intelligence community to meet the national security needs of the United States. This amendment provides the recognition that Senator David L. Boren so richly deserves.
Unfortunately, for reasons of classification it will be a long time before the public will know all of the details of Senator Boren's many contributions to our Nation's intelligence capabilities. But it is possible to speak publicly about some of Chairman Boren's many accomplishments as head of the Intelligence Committee. Among those were his endeavors to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence which not only has fostered the Intelligence Committee's bipartisan spirit, but also has cemented an excellent understanding between the committee and the intelligence community. This trust and confidence has been built upon the premises that secrets must be kept secret and that the intelligence community will be held completely accountable for its actions. This trust and confidence has contributed significantly to the United States' intelligence capabilities.
During his chairmanship, Senator Boren improved the committee's and community's controls over classified activities. Clear penalties for unauthorized release of classified information were set and implemented. Trust and confidence were enhanced by improving the committee's oversight of the intelligence community's most sensitive and secret activities. For example, he directed the creation of a special Intelligence Committee audit staff that has looked in detail at several highly classified activities which heretofore had received only passing attention. The auditors have made many important recommendations which will improve future operations and accountability. To further increase accountability, the committee, under Senator Boren's leadership, also conducted frequent hearings to review the Nation's covert activities. These critical reviews have ensured that a full range of ideas has been brought to bear on some very difficult problems. All of these efforts have helped to establish a clear sense of trust and confidence between the committee and the intelligence community.
These often sensitive and always important improvements in the details of the committee's and community's daily activities occupied some of the chairman's time, but his breadth of vision really represents the most important contributions that he has made. This is evident in the Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992. There has not been any comprehensive legislation affecting the organization of the intelligence community since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Through his personal
leadership, Senator Boren worked hard to bring the legal status of the community into line with the realities of today. Extensive staff work, important committee hearings, and useful negotiations with the executive branch created the basis for a sound legislative proposal. Today, we will make this proposal the law of the land, and the intelligence community's organization will finally have a firm basis in statute.
Chairman Boren's breadth of vision has also been demonstrated in his clear understanding of the national security needs of the United States and the intelligence community's ability to support those needs. Early in his tenure as chairman, Senator Boren realized that in the rapidly evolving international environment, human source intelligence was going to play an increasingly significant role. His personal drive and tenacious pursuit of improving the United States' HUMINT capabilities resulted in the series of initiatives that have been called the `HUMINT in the 90's.' For reasons of classification, I cannot identify here the successes which can be traced to those initiatives. It is sufficient to say in this forum, however, that the payoff has been high, and that the chairman's foresight has been rewarded by the personal knowledge that he did the right thing at the right time and the Nation is better off for it.
Mr. President, this brings me to the amendment that has been offered by the committee's vice chairman. Senator Boren's vision of the future has extended well past the nineties. Realizing that the world of tomorrow will require the next generation of intelligence officers to have a broad understanding of a more complicated world, he personally embarked upon an effort to improve their educational background now. This effort, of course, is expressed in the National Security Education Act.
The act will offer educational opportunities to future generations of national security experts in the fields of language and foreign area studies. As we look around the world today we can clearly see that some areas of foreign studies previously believed to be significant have declined in importance and the relative importance of others have leaped to the forefront. As a result, particular language skills are in short supply and regional expertise in some cases goes wanting. The National Security Education Act will help solve these problems and the next generation will be better prepared to face the world that it will find around them.
It is appropriate that we are going to recognize the efforts of Senator Boren to improve the Nation's intelligence capabilities by naming an act after him that so firmly bears his imprint and sense of vision. I applaud the vice chairman for his introduction of this amendment and am glad that future generations will refer to the David L. Boren National Security Education Act.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I rise in strong support of Senator Murkoski's amendment to properly identify the National Security Education Program for all time by giving it the name of its founder, Senator David L. Boren. Our distinguished chairman identified the need for this program, he designed it, he shepherded the program through the legislative shoals, he convinced the administration of the need, and he will watch over it in years to come. The students who will benefit from the Boren program will improve the quality of U.S. human intelligence, but they will also increase our competitive advantage in the global economic competition. They will help America to become the export superpower that President Bush talks about, a goal which we all support. Our farsighted chairman first saw the need and he deserves the credit.
Our consideration of the intelligence authorization bill is a fitting moment to salute our chairman, because this is the sixth and last authorization bill produced under this leadership. David Boren has served 8 years on the Intelligence Committee, 6 years as chairman, and I take nothing away from his distinguished predecessors when I say that he has been our best chairman yet.
Senator Boren started out in the most difficult circumstances possible, when the Iran-Contra hand grenade was tossed into his lap. The committee was deeply split along party lines, staff were scrapping with each other, and the Intelligence Committee and its counterpart in the House were in the stressful position of being the only people in the country in possession of actionable information about Iran-Contra. I did not agree with everything the committee did during that period, but I have to credit Senator Boren with taking charge firmly, calming the waters, eliminating the partisan strains, and moving forward with a sound course of action.
Senator Boren set a tone, in those first weeks, that has become the hallmark of the chairmanship. He listens, he lets everybody have his say, he masters highly complex material, and he leads the committee to broad bipartisan consensus. It is no accident that our votes in the Intelligence Committee are usually 13 to 2 or 14 to 1, if not unanimous. Our chairman is convincing and he puts together positions that we can all support. His diligence has also brought new levels of cooperation and mutual respect between the Intelligence Committee and the intelligence agencies. The agencies know that in Senator Boren they are getting fair, nonpartisan oversight from a conscientious expert.
Our chairman's accomplishments would not have been possible without the contributions of the two vice-chairmen who served alongside him, Senator Bill Cohen for the first 4 years and Senator Frank Murkowski for the last 2. They supplied the partnership and the constructive balance that kept the Intelligence Committee out of the partisan wars. It has been my honor to serve with each of them. But I think they would agree that the greatest honor belongs to our departing chairman. He has been, for longer than any other chairman, the steward for the Senate and for the Nation of all our Nation's intelligence activities. I doubt if those activities will ever be under the stewardship of a more effective leader, a more skillful legislative craftsman, or a more brilliant mind.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. I congratulate my colleague from Oklahoma.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I know that we have practiced a high level of security in our committee, and we have learned, over a period of time, to keep the secrets and to bear that responsibility. But I must say that my good friend, the vice chairman of the committee, the Senator from Alaska, has really pulled one on me on this. He has managed to keep it secret within the committee from the chairman of the committee.
It is almost impossible for me to respond adequately both to the terms of this amendment and to the generous comments which the vice chairman has just made. Very few people, while they are still alive, have the privilege of hearing such kind things said about them.
I want to express my deep gratitude to the vice chairman. It has been a real privilege working with him for the past 2 years. I suppose if there is any one thing, as I look back over the last years that I have had the privilege of serving as chairman--a period of time that is now drawing to a close because I believe, wisely, we have rules in our body that require the rotation of membership of this committee over a period of time so that more Members of the full Senate will have the responsibility of sitting on this committee dealing with the very sensitive issues of national security that confront our country and having a better understanding of them so that we can assure, also, that there will be the greatest possible effective oversight over the most sensitive activities of the intelligence community and they will be fully accountable to the American people so that the committee really will be a force for oversight and will not enter into a relationship that causes it to lose its objectivity and its distance from the intelligence community over which it has this responsibility--as I look back over this period of time, the vice chairman has certainly highlighted those things which have given me the greatest satisfaction, beginning with the fact that with the hundreds of votes which we have taken in closed session on some of the most contentious issues that have confronted this country in the past 6 years, those involving covert actions, which have been widely discussed now, some of them now that they are completed, in the press, some that have yet to be discussed publicly, but nonetheless were very contentious and private discussion--that, as the Senator from Alaska said, we have never had a party-line vote in the Intelligence Committee and we have rarely even come close to a party-line vote.
I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times in which we have even had a serious division that was as much as a 2-to-1 majority within the Intelligence Committee. That is remarkable given the fact that the membership is eight members from one party, seven from the other, and that we have had a broad spectrum of representation from all parts of the political spectrum in this body on that committee.
So it has been a rare privilege for me to have the opportunity to work with such a fine group of people in the Senate, those who have been members of this committee over the past 8 years that I have been privileged to be on it, particularly during the past 6 years that I have been
privileged to serve as chairman.
This kind of spirit of working together in the national interest is not something that one person can accomplish or even that two people can accomplish. The chair and the vice chair, no matter how much they wish to work together, can only do so if the other members of the committee have the dedication of doing the same thing. I hope that, if there is any lesson that we can pass on to our colleagues in the full Senate from our working together over these past 8 years, it is that bipartisanship is possible even on the most contentious and difficult and sensitive of issues.
As we look ahead toward preparing the country for our next century toward meeting those challenges, those that we will focus upon after the Presidential election, whichever candidate happens to win that election, we are only going to solve the problems of this country, we are only going to build the educational system we need, we are only going to revise the tax system in a way that will help us compete in the world marketplace, we are only going to deal with divisions that exist in our country in existence of an underclass in our country, and bring us all into the mainstream, if we work together on a bipartisan basis.
I hope that, if we contributed anything, we have contributed substantially to that kind of bipartisanship. There has never been a time during the service of Senator Murkowski, as vice chairman of the committee, that he has ever approached me on the basis of partisan considerations as opposed to what is in the best interest of the country.
I can make the same statement about Senator Cohen, who served as vice chairman of the committee for 4 years prior to Senator Murkowski's becoming the vice chairman, who has worked with us.
Never once did they raise partisan considerations instead of what needed to be done for the good of the country. To be able to have an opportunity to serve with vice chairmen like that has been a rare privilege indeed.
Senator Murkowski has outlined those things of which we are most proud that have been accomplished over the last few years that have really improved the oversight process. We now have an independent statutory inspector general for the first time in the intelligence community. We have our own audit, as Senator Murkowski said, which gives us the ability, for the first time, to have an independent source of information about how funds in the intelligence budget are being spent, about whether or not programs are being carried out in accordance, not only of the law but in the spirit of the law and the values of the American people.
We have a new law on the books which will tighten the definition of covert activities and what must be reported by the President to the Congress when covert activities are undertaken, a law which puts into place many of the lessons learned from the tragic Iran-contra affair to ensure that kind of affair will not happen again.
Most recently, included in this authorization bill are sweeping changes to reorganize the intelligence community so that we can get more for our dollars invested, in the years ahead, coordinating, for example, the provision of imagery systems in the future, at lower costs, by bringing them together, coordinating them in one place; whether the intelligence budget spends many resources, making more interdisciplinary the analysis of intelligence; and providing for more use of open sources and coordinating our human source collection.
These are the most sweeping changes in the Intelligence Committee since it was created and the CIA was created back in the late 1940's.
So to have an opportunity to serve on this committee during this period of tumultuous change in the world and our adjustment to it, and to be able to serve with those who are determined we would make a difference for the country instead of following the partisan agenda, has been a real privilege for me.
Let me say on a personal note to my good friend from Alaska, what he has done this morning and what he has surprised me with this morning is something that could not please me more, because I cannot think of any piece of legislation with which I have been involved since I have been in the Senate that gives me more satisfaction to have him suggest that my name should be associated with it, than the National Security Education Act; because if we are going to be leaders in the new world in which we are going to be increasingly working more closely with other countries, we are not only going to have good intelligence and the opportunity to act in a diplomatic sphere, but also in a commercial sphere as well.
We are going to have to make sure that the next generation is international in its thinking; that it understands the world's cultures; that it speaks the world's languages; that it has the ability to fully understand and analyze what is going on in the world around us so that we can continue to play that role for the sake of our national security and for the sake of our national economic interests.
So I want to thank the Senator from Alaska, not only for all that he has meant and his work has meant to the work of the Intelligence Committee, and to the service of our country, but I want to express my deep gratitude to him for this gesture, for this amendment, and to also thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee, and others who have joined with the Senator from Alaska in presenting this amendment on the floor this morning.
Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kerrey). The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I think as we wind up our tribute, it is one that should recognize the contribution of the professional staff, as well as the Senators that join me in encouraging adoption of this amendment, naming Senator Boren to the Special Education Act in his name. I would like to thank George Tenet and Britt Snider, who are here; John Moseman and David Garman; and there are others that worked on this.
I think the comment made by my good friend from Oklahoma that this has been a well-kept secret is evidence of the fact that our professional staffs worked so harmoniously, but bottom line, so professionally together that made possible the record of accomplishment that has occurred under Senator Boren's tenure. I have been pleased to assist in that capacity.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I wonder if the floor managers would yield me a couple of minutes, if I might.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. CHAFEE. I have a comment in connection with the amendment. Mr. President, first of all, I am delighted to join with Senator Murkowski and others in offering this amendment naming the National Security Education Trust Fund after Senator Boren. Truly, this was Senator Boren's child, no question about it. He single-handedly sold the concept to some of us who were a bit skeptical about it. And I think the way it is set up is excellent. We will see the fruit of this in the years to come.
At the same time, of course, it is a tribute to Senator Boren's leadership. Think of it, he has been on the committee for 8 years and has been chairman for 6. I do not think anybody has been chairman for as long as he has been chairman of that committee.
So this is a very justifiable designation, as Senator Boren leaves the committee. I also would like to comment that Senator Murkowski is leaving the committee. This is really their final act. I would like to pay tribute to the job Senator Murkowski has done. Both of them have given splendid, bipartisan leadership.
Mr. President, it is a topsy-turvy world. Think of how things change. The Russians invite us, members of our organization, to go to Moscow to advise them how to have adequate supervision of their intelligence units. How is that for a change? Indeed, I along with others visited the KGB offices and met the head of the KGB who joked that if you went through a certain door there and went in a deep tunnel, you came up in Langley. We did not try it.
So, Mr. President, there are very, very difficult new times, as evidenced by the budget we just passed here a couple of days ago, which has a $1 billion cut from the current level--not a $1 billion cut from the requested amount, but from the current amount.
So I join in the tribute to Senator Boren for the leadership he has given, and also I want to salute Senator Murkowski for what he has done.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
I advise my friend that I certainly appreciate his remarks. I was startled the other day to meet the former head of the KGB in the elevator in the Hart Building while going up to my office on the sixth floor. I was surprised when he introduced himself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 3158) was agreed to.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BOREN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, very briefly, and we will move on, I thank my colleagues for the comments and express my appreciation to the vice chairman not only for his comments today, but for the service he has rendered during our time of working together on the committee.
In addition to what Senator Murkowski just mentioned, let me say that the spirit of bipartisanship has been exceptional, and it has been a pleasure to work with John Moseman, the staff director for Senator Murkowski, and he already mentioned the others, including our own staff director, George Tenet and Britt Snider. I also want to mention Regina Genton, who worked so hard on the financial side, the budget side of this particular bill, and David Halperin, who has worked on several sections of the bill, including the National Security Education Act, and Dick D'Amato, who served as our liaison, particularly with the Appropriations Committee, who has been a very great help to us. And we are deeply grateful to him.
Mr. President, if there are no further amendments, I ask for the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time.