2. After Dobrynin finished his summary of oral statement, the Secretary asked how long the Soviet Government would envisage duration of proposed ESC. Ambassador replied conference need not be long at all if agreement can be reached on draft documents beforehand through bilateral discussions. Obviously if conference were to discuss substance of controversial issues it could last very long time. It would be Soviet hope, however, that agreement could be reached on draft documents prepared at Prague conference before ESC convenes. The USSR assumed, Dobrynin said, that NATO countries might have two or three other issues which they would like to raise at ESC; these could also be discussed through diplomatic channels ahead of time.

3. Draft documents handed Secretary noted in para (3) above are identical with texts transmitted in London’s 9176. (Text being repeated to addressees who did not received London Embtel.)

4. For USNATO—at November 20 Polads discussion of Eastern European follow-up to Prague declaration, you may inform Allies of Dobrynin call on Secretary. You may also make oral summary of principal points which Dobrynin made.

Rogers

103. Memorandum for the 303 Committee


SUBJECT

United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union

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1 Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR. Secret; Eyes Only.
1. Summary

In accordance with NSC 5502/1,\(^2\) as revalidated on 10 November 1960, CIA sponsors a covert action program which supports media\(^3\) and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union.

[4 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

This paper recommends that the 303 Committee approve the continuation of the covert action program directed primarily at the Soviet intelligentsia and reaffirm the approval it has given in the past to the program generally and the individual projects specifically.

The total cost of this program is $766,000. The program as a whole was discussed with and endorsed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Dubs on 21 October and 6 November 1969. The individual projects had been approved by the 303 Committee in 1967 and 1968.

2. Proposal

While these projects differ in their approach to the Soviet target, they share common objectives which provide the justification for continued support of their activities. The primary objective is to stimulate and sustain pressures for liberalization and change from within the Soviet Union. The neuralgic points of this disaffection—desire for personal and intellectual freedom, desire for improvement in the quality of life, and the persistence of nationalism in Eastern Europe and among the nationality groups in the Soviet Union—are the main issues exploited by these projects. A secondary objective is to enlighten important third-country elites, especially political leaders and the public-opinion shaping professions, about the repressive nature of the Soviet system and its imperialistic and self-aggrandizing foreign policy.


\(^3\) The activities directed at the Soviet Union by Radio Liberty Committee and Free Europe, Inc., were approved by higher authority on 22 February 1969 and are, therefore, not treated in this paper. The Radio Liberty Committee, successor organization to the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, is composed of three major divisions: Radio Liberty which broadcasts via short wave to the Soviet Union 24 hours a day in 18 languages; a book publication and distribution program designed to provide Soviet citizens with books not normally accessible to the Soviet public; and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which produces research papers and publications targeted at the developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. [4½ lines of source text not declassified] [Footnote in the source text.]
Anticipating the persistence of these trends in the intellectual climate of the Soviet Union in the 1970’s, there is long-range merit in continuing to encourage and support the publication and distribution of dissident literature and socio-political commentary on the broad current issues and the conditions of life in the Soviet Union, even though the regime will continue to repress dissidence. Operations aimed at influencing third-country elites are based on the assumption that U.S.-Soviet competition for prestige and influence in strategic areas will continue for an indefinite period of time. It would, therefore, seem prudent to maintain a capability of influencing third-country intellectuals and elite groups through the words and voices of distinguished Soviet nationals who are disaffected.

The intellectual dissidence movement has demonstrated a vitality of its own. It is reasonable to assume that these dissidents will continue to seek outlets for literature and socio-political commentary that has thus far been suppressed. Each time the regime has silenced a group of dissidents a new group has emerged to produce a new generation of protest literature.

An American professor reported that the dissidence is widespread among the Soviet intelligentsia and they “yearn for exposure to Western literature and cultural influence.” Graphic evidence of the existence of this dissidence was provided in October 1969 by Dr. Pyotr L. Kapitsa, the “dean” of Soviet physicists, when he publicly endorsed in Washington the thesis of Dr. Andre D. Sakharov, a distinguished Soviet physicist credited with a major role in the development of the hydrogen bomb, that the United States and the Soviet Union can avoid a clash only through the convergence of their systems of government. The Sakharov thesis is set forth in a lengthy essay which has been circulating underground in the Soviet Union and which has been a staple of the CIA distribution program. Recent press dispatches from Moscow indicate that the convergence ideas expounded by Dr. Sakharov are being widely circulated among the intelligentsia, including military personnel, in the form of underground mimeograph publications.

3. Effectiveness

4. Alternatives

A. The United States could follow a policy of encouraging more vigorous émigré activities by more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré objectives, the extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving assistance from
the United States Government, and adoption of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas such as the Ukraine. Substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might result in stimulating dissension inside the USSR, inducing defections and improving the collection of intelligence; identification with the independence of national minority groups could strengthen ethnic nationalist resistance to Russian domination. On the other hand, a more vigorous emigration probably would strengthen the forces of conformity and repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadership attitudes which the program is trying to promote.

B. It could also be argued that it would be in the national interest to divorce the United States Government entirely from the emigration and its activities. In this event the efforts of Soviet conservatives to justify repression of dissent on the basis of American “subversion” would lose some of their credibility. This argument, however, is negated by the fact that suspicions of U.S. intentions are so deeply ingrained that any change in U.S. policy toward the emigration would have minimal impact on the conservatives. Moreover, a source of support for those in the Soviet Union who are sustained by a sense of contact with the emigration would be removed and the Soviet authorities would be able more easily to foist their own version of events on the people and be under less pressure to make reforms.

5. Risks and Contingency Planning

All of the above projects have been subjected, at one time or another, to attacks by Soviet regime media, including allegations of CIA sponsorship. Each project has weathered the attacks without any apparent loss of effectiveness. It would be prudent to anticipate that the attacks will continue sporadically but without any effect on the operations.

6. Coordination

A. CIA’s covert action program set forth herein was discussed with and endorsed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Emory C. Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Adolph Dubs on 21 October and 6 November, 1969. The individual projects4 had been coordinated previously within the U.S. Government as follows:

4 Additional documentation on these projects is in the National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files.
7. Costs

The allocations for the covert action program are as follows:

[6 lines of source text not declassified]

Total $766,000

These funds for the program are available in the FY 1970 CIA budget.

8. Recommendation

It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the continuation of CIA’s covert action program directed against the Soviet Union and reaffirm the approval it has given in the past to the individual projects, as described herein. The 303 Committee is also requested to approve the funding level for these projects as set forth in paragraph 7 above.

104. Editorial Note

On December 9, 1969, in a public address before the 1969 Galaxy Conference on Adult Education in Washington, D.C., Secretary of State William Rogers outlined a proposal for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The position set forth in the Secretary’s speech, which became known as the Rogers Plan, incorporated most of the language contained in the United States proposal handed to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco on October 28, 1969 (see Document 98). Rogers enunciated the main elements of his plan as follows:

“Peace between the Parties

—The Resolution of the Security Council makes clear that the goal is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the state of belligerency which has characterized relations for over 20 years. We believe the conditions and obligations of peace must be defined in specific terms. For example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and in the Straits of Tiran should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties to each other must be made specific.

“But peace, of course, involves much more than this. It is also a matter of the attitudes and intentions of the parties. Are they ready to coexist with one another? Can a live-and-let-live attitude replace suspicion, mistrust and hate? A peace agreement between the parties must be based on clear and stated intentions and a willingness to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and conditions which are characteristic of the Middle East today.
assume that you will want to call this to the attention of the Secretary of State.3

3 Haig’s initials and the following handwritten comments appear at the end of the memorandum: “Absolutely. Hal [Sonnenfeldt]—Rogers called HAK, agreed completely with your psn [position] and on his own volunteered this psn—HAK ran by Pres—and confirmed in writing. Copy attached.” At 12:22 p.m., Rogers and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about this issue. According to a transcript of their conversation, “R said Tommy [Llewellyn] Thompson recommended that we advise Dobrynin about the proposed talks with the Chinese. R said he doesn’t think we should, but we wanted to give the P[resident] the chance to think about it. K said how did he know? K said I guess he got it in the traffic. R said he got it in the traffic and it’s going to be in the papers. R said he thinks we should be nice in view of the SALT, but R doesn’t agree. K said he agrees with R and K thinks the P will need a lot of selling to accept Tommy Thompson’s view. K said he would mention it to him. K said he will say that R disagreed, but wanted to be meticulous and let K know.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

106. Memorandum for the 303 Committee1


SUBJECT
U.S. Policy on Support for Covert Action Involving Emigrés Directed at the Soviet Union

Summary:
The Department of State was instructed by NSDM 252 of September 17, 1969, to review and up-date NSC 5502/13 dated January 31, 1955 on the subject of “U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities.” That document, which was reviewed and approved again by the NSC Planning Board on November 1, 1960, has provided the authorization for CIA covert action programs directed at the Soviet Union involving émigrés from Soviet-dominated areas. In view of the essentially covert nature of these CIA programs, it has been determined

1 Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR. Secret; Eyes Only.
2 NSDM 25 directed the “Disposal of Outdated NSC Policy Papers.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, NSDM Files, NSDM 25)
3 See footnote 2, Document 103.
that decisions not only on programs but also on policy should be the responsibility of the 303 Committee.

The principal policy recommendations in this paper are:

— that the present policy of selective support of émigré-related activities be continued;
— that the United States avoid policies, such as those favored by some émigrés, supporting separate nationhood for racial or language groupings within the Soviet Union; and
— that covert support activities be kept under periodic review, keeping in mind the option of withdrawing support in return for identifiable political advantages.

The CIA has distributed a related memorandum on “United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union” dated December 9, 1969 which serves both as background for examination of this revised policy document and to support a request for funding for FY 1970. The CIA request does not include funds for the Radio Liberty Committee (current budget is $13,131,000) because those programs were approved by Higher Authority on February 22, 1969. The programs for which CIA is requesting continued support involve the expenditure of $766,000 in FY 1970. These programs have the approval of appropriate officers in the Department of State: Bureau of European Affairs (Deputy Assistant Secretary Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Dubs) and the Planning and Coordination Staff (Mr. R. Davies).

Trends in US-Émigré Relations

Anti-Soviet émigrés were regarded as an important potential asset in the early post World War II years, at a time when fear of eventual if not imminent war with the USSR was very real in the West. Émigré organizations and individual Soviet refugees were in demand to help staff proliferating anti-Soviet activities and serve generally as a reserve for a possible war emergency.

After the 1950’s, the United States became more selective in its support for émigré activities. It had become clear that the émigrés were hopelessly split between groups with opposing aims, philosophies and ethnic composition and that it was difficult for any government working closely with them not to be dragged into the morass of émigré politics. In the mid-1950’s, efforts were, in fact, abandoned to try to unite the anti-Soviet émigrés behind a common program. The declining interest in émigrés was also related to the realization that they were aging and had grown increasingly out of touch with developments in the

[4 Document 103.
5 [3 lines of source text not declassified] [Footnote in the source text.]
USSR. The relations between the United States Government and the émigré community also became more distant as the United States and the Soviet Union moved toward a more normal relationship.

In the early 1960’s, the more responsible émigré leaders came to realize that there was no hope of returning to their homeland in the wake of a Soviet-American war or after the overthrow of the Soviet regime. They therefore shifted the emphasis of their activities toward stimulating and publicizing the growing intellectual ferment and expressions of dissidence within the Soviet Union.

United States officials had come to understand that assistance to the émigrés for the eventuality of war with or revolution within the USSR was unrealistic. The skills of the émigrés would be available in the event of war, regardless of whether or not the United States was subsidizing émigré organizations. The sort of mass unrest and revolutionary changes predicted by some émigrés were unlikely to occur within the USSR under conditions short of war. To the extent that significant changes in Soviet policy or leadership might take place, they were likely to result from the actions of a relatively narrow circle of leaders responding to changing attitudes and imperatives within Soviet soviety.

It was recognized, at the same time, that the émigrés could play an important role in overcoming the resistance to change in Soviet society by stimulating dissatisfaction with existing policy among the Soviet people, especially under the less repressive conditions which followed Stalin’s death. As broadcasters, editors and scholars working for Radio Liberty and other émigré information activities, the émigrés were able to address themselves more candidly than U.S. officials could to developments within the USSR; and there was evidence that the émigrés reached an important audience in the USSR precisely because they spoke with special intimacy and concern about developments in Mother Russia. In short, the United States Government concluded that anti-Soviet émigrés had a special contribution to make to United States information programs, both overt and covert, which collectively aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Soviet people and their leaders in directions which would make the Soviet Government a more constructive and responsible member of the world community.

It was also recognized that the émigrés had a certain role to play per se. For some Soviet intellectuals and liberals, they served as in the 19th century as the “conscience-in-exile” and repository of the best cultural traditions of the Russian people and in extremis as a haven of refuge. The émigré organizations accordingly provided—and continue to provide—encouragement to intellectuals in their struggle for personal freedom against the Soviet regime.

Emigré groups have continued to seek official American recognition and support for their particular organizations and aims. In their response, American officials have been authorized to express traditional
American sympathy for all peoples struggling to preserve their cultural traditions and religious beliefs and to protect the human rights of their people. At the same time, it has long been United States Government policy to remain neutral between the Russian proponents of a unitary Russia and émigrés from national minority areas favoring separatist policies.

**Nature of Present Activities**

The United States Government is presently involved with the émigré community in a number of activities which are summarized below. Details regarding these activities are set forth in the CIA memorandum.

a. **Radio Liberty Committee (RLC):** (successor organization to the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism), RLC is composed of three major divisions: (1) a radio station (Radio Liberty) which broadcasts via shortwave to the Soviet Union 24 hours a day in 18 languages; (2) a book publication and book distribution program designed to provide Soviet citizens with books not normally accessible to the Soviet public, and; (3) the Institute for the Study of the USSR which produces research papers and publications targeted at the developing countries in Africa, Middle East, and the Far East. In all instances RLC émigré employees are picked for talent and ability without regard to private émigré political beliefs or affiliations.

[3 paragraphs (28 lines of source text) not declassified]

**United States Policy Options**

**A. High Profile Support**

The United States could reverse field and follow a more vigorous pro-émigré policy, which might take the form, for example, of (i) more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré activities and objectives, (ii) extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving U.S. Government assistance; (iii) adoption for the first time of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas like the Ukraine.

**Pro**

—Blatant support of anti-Soviet émigré activities would suggest the determination of the Administration to follow a tough policy toward the USSR, exploiting any vulnerability, in the event that the USSR does not become more cooperative on major issues in dispute.

—Any substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might have some feedback in terms of defections, in acquisition of information, and in stimulating dissension inside the USSR;

—United States identification with the independence of national minority areas would strike a responsive chord in an area like the Ukraine and could strengthen nationalist resistance to Russian domination.
Con

—The Soviet leaders, who are chronically suspicious of US policies, could conclude that the United States Government had embarked on a frankly subversive and hostile course of action and that it is disinterested in negotiations on outstanding issues.

—The Soviet leaders will not be induced to be more cooperative by the threat of increased American aid to the émigrés since they believe that the émigrés are feeble and that the Soviet government can control internal dissent.

—Inside the USSR, hard-line supporters of strict conformity and suppression of dissent would have their hands strengthened.

—Repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadership attitudes which United States policy has sought to promote.

—Support for the national independence of minority areas would alienate and unify Russian opinion everywhere so that the United States would lose with one hand what it might hope to gain with the other.

—The USSR would be encouraged to increase its own anti-American activities around the world, including support for radical and subversive movements within the United States.

—The problems of finding émigré organizations which are potentially effective and useful to the United States Government have increased with time many émigrés are now even more out-of-touch with Soviet reality, older and less active than in the early post-war years.

B. Withdrawal of All Support

The question of support for specific émigré activities is periodically reviewed. For example, a decision was taken in February 1969 to continue to finance the Radio Liberty Committee.

It can be argued that it would be in the national interest to divorce the United States Government entirely from the emigration and its activities.

Pro

—There would be a financial saving.

—A decision to withdraw American financial support from all émigré/activities?

—The existence of émigré voices speaking from abroad would continue to provide moral support and information to those Soviets who have the courage to voice their convictions openly in the USSR.

—Continuation of U.S. Government support for émigré activities on their present limited scale is not incompatible with negotiations with the Soviet Union on matters of mutual concern.
—Withdrawal of U.S. Government subsidies would eliminate, not merely the information activities which reach directly into the USSR, but also useful auxiliary activities which provide anti-communist information to target audiences in non-communist areas.

Con

—By continuing the present level of activities, the United States would not realize the advantages cited under the earlier options.

Recommended Courses of Action

On balance, the low profile policy which has evolved toward the emigration appears both realistic and well suited to United States objectives. Accordingly, it is recommended:

a. That the United States continue to work with émigrés and their organizations for the primary purpose of encouraging an evolution in attitudes within the USSR.

b. That the present general level of involvement with anti-Soviet émigrés be regarded as compatible with our limited adversary relationship with the USSR.

c. That the effectiveness of the activities presently being subsidized be reviewed periodically.

d. That the possibility of withdrawing support from émigré-related organizations, including the Radio Liberty Committee, be kept under review, on the understanding that any withdrawal should be based on concrete political advantage.

e. That any proposals to organize the émigrés for the possible eventualuality of war with, or revolution in, the USSR be opposed as unrealistic and likely to damage US-Soviet relations.

f. That the United States support the aspirations of minority peoples in the USSR for preservation of their national culture, religious identity and human rights, but that it avoid identification with any émigré policy favoring separate nationhood for racial or language groupings within the Soviet Union.

g. That the United States policy of non-recognition of incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR be maintained, subject to possible review, but that Baltic refugee organizations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] be discouraged from active propaganda or other efforts to detach the Baltic States.

h. That émigré activities should continue to be monitored as appropriate even where no US subsidy is involved, since the émigrés occasionally obtain useful information on the USSR through their own channels, and are a potential source of embarrassment to the United States in its relations with the USSR.
114. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 23 December 1969

PRESENT
Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Johnson, and General Cushman
Mr. Packard was out of the city
Mr. John Hart was present for Item 1
Mr. William Nelson was present for Items 2 and 3
Mr. [name not declassified] was present for Item 4
Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. [name not declassified] were present for Item 5
Mr. Archibald Roosevelt was present for Item 6
Mr. Thomas Karamessines and Mr. [name not declassified] were present for all items

[Omitted here is discussion of items 1–4, which are unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

5. United States Government Support of Covert Action Directed at the Soviet Union

a. The State Department memorandum for the 303 Committee dated 12 December 1969, entitled “U.S. Policy on Support for Covert Action Involving Emigrés Directed at the Soviet Union,” was approved as a basic policy statement superceding NSC 5502/1, dated 31 January 1955, entitled “U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities.”

b. It was agreed that this policy statement will not be issued as a National Security Directive Memorandum (NSDM) but will serve as the U.S. policy authorization for the kinds of emigré activities described in the CIA paper dated 9 December 1969, titled as in the above paragraph heading.

c. [2 names not declassified] briefed the Committee and responded to numerous questions on the following activities which comprise the CIA covert action program supporting media and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union:

[4 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

1 Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Files, 303 Committee Meeting Minutes, 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Mitchell, Packard, Johnson, and Helms.
2 Document 106.
3 Document 103.
d. The Committee approved the continuation of the CIA covert action program including the above individual projects at the funding level contained in the CIA FY 1970 budget.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Frank M. Chapin

115. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Evolution of Positions in US–USSR Talks

On December 30, I gave you a wrapup of US and Soviet positions as stated in the US formulations of October 28 and the Soviet response of December 23.² Attached is a detailed study of the evolution of the US and Soviet positions through five negotiating phases since March 18. Since that study is comprehensive, following is an analytical summary of the changes on each major issue:

Negotiating Procedure

*The US* has insisted throughout—either in text or in gloss—on direct negotiations at some stage. In September–October, the US added the concept of Rhodes-type talks to the discussions and text.

*The USSR* in early phases urged us not to complicate the process by emphasizing direct contacts. In September, Gromyko told Rogers he would agree to Rhodes-type talks (though he appears to have understood that direct talks were involved only at signing) if the US were

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote the following comments on the memorandum: “Excellent paper. Now let’s get same for European Security.” A large bold handwritten “P” appears in the upper right hand corner of the memorandum. Kissinger drew an arrow to the “P” and wrote, “What does this mean?”

² Saunders’s memorandum of December 30 has not been found. The U.S. formulations of October 28 on the Middle East are in Document 98; the Soviet response of December 23 is Document 109.
As I noted in my previous letter,\(^5\) the principal cause of the present hostilities in Laos is the presence there of over 65,000 North Vietnamese troops. The restoration of peace in Laos cannot, therefore, be accomplished solely through consultations among the political forces there as you suggest. Such internal talks can serve a useful purpose, as they did in 1961 and 1962, as an adjunct to international actions dealing with the basic cause of the Lao problem, North Vietnamese aggression in Laos and use of Lao territory for interference in the internal affairs of other countries. I need hardly remind you that the United States air activities in Laos are in response to these antecedent North Vietnamese actions.

I assure you that the United States Government will spare no effort to bring peace to Laos through full implementation of the 1962 Agreements. I welcome your assurances that the Soviet Government will continue to make efforts aimed at the cessation of military actions in Laos and the creation of conditions for the re-establishment of peace and neutrality. For there can be little doubt that failure to bring peace to Laos will have repercussions beyond the confines of that region of the world and adversely affect our relations. I confirm my Administration’s desire to base our relations on the principle of negotiation rather than confrontation and I therefore call upon you to reconsider your position concerning consultations under Article IV of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos. I again urge that your government join with mine and the governments of the other signatories in fulfilling the responsibilities we assumed in 1962.

Sincerely,

RN\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Document 139.

\(^6\) Printed from a copy that indicates Nixon signed the original.

147. Memorandum for the Record\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Talk with President Nixon

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\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Helms Chronological File, Job 80–B01285A, Box 11, Folder 9, Secret. Drafted by Helms.
452  Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XII

1. The President called Henry Kissinger and me into the Oval Office after the NSC meeting today for what turned out to be a 25-minute discussion of a variety of subjects, including SALT, Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, and black operations.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cuba and Laos.]

4. With respect to black operations, the President enjoined me to hit the Soviets, and hit them hard, any place we can in the world. He said to “just go ahead,” to keep Henry Kissinger informed, and to be as imaginative as we could. He was as emphatic on this as I have ever heard him on anything. He indicated that he had had a change of mind and thought that Radio Free Europe should be continued. I took this moment to hit hard on the point that I felt strongly the United States should give up nothing which constituted a pressure on the Soviet Union or an irritation to them without exacting a specific price in return. The President agreed with this and pointed out that we had had nothing from the Russians—in the recent past “except assistance on the shape of the table at the Paris talks.” I indicated that we were coming up with a paper on covert actions aimed at the Soviet Union.

RH
Director

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union


44154. 1. Following is the oral statement made by the Secretary in response to Dobrynin’s oral statement of March 11. Secretary and Dobrynin met on March 25 with Sisco and Vorontsov also present. Vorontsov took careful notes on the following. No paper was given. Separate cable being sent which reports additional comments.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 653, Country Files, Middle East, Sisco Middle East Talks. Secret; Nodis; Noforn. Drafted and approved by Sisco on March 25, and cleared by Hawley (S/S). Also sent to USUN. This telegram was attached to an April 8 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger which is printed as Document 151.

2 See Document 141.

3 Not further identified.
route to a settlement than Resolution 242 and the Jarring Mission. Once agreement has been reached and carried out between Israel and the UAR, and between Israel and Jordan, there should be no difficulties in the way of Syria’s taking the necessary steps which would make possible consideration of a settlement also between Israel and Syria.

“With respect to the question of press leaks, we assure the Soviet Government that we share its desire to avoid such leaks. Both of us must recognize, however, that in view of the deep interest in Middle Eastern developments, press contact cannot be completely avoided. As for the leak of the exchange of letters between Chairman Kosygin and President Nixon, we reconfirm our previous assurance to the Soviet Government that it is not our policy to publish such confidential correspondence with other heads of government, that we did not do so in this case, and that we regret these letters were made available to the press by others to whom they were entrusted.

“Finally, the Soviet Government is correct in assuming that the United States is guided by a desire to strengthen international security and to develop the relations between our two nations. We are pleased that the Soviet Government feels, as we do, that it would serve neither of our interests for the Middle East to become an area of confrontation between us.”

149. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Exploitation of Tensions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Attached is an excellent CIA paper describing covert action programs being undertaken to exploit tensions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kissinger and Haig on April 6. Haig sent it to Kissinger on April 6 under a covering memorandum that reads: “Attached is a memorandum for the President forwarding the excellent CIA paper on Tensions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. I have informed Director Helms that you believe this is a first-rate paper and appreciate his forwarding it to you.” The memorandum is an unsigned copy.
Eastern Europe and identifying activities which may be emphasized in the future. In assessing Soviet vulnerabilities the report notes that:

—Although the internal dissident is not likely to significantly influence Soviet society in the short term, existing trends toward more active dissidence could be affected by external developments. The discrediting of the regime by a serious economic crisis or another Czech-type crisis might promote radical changes in the internal political climate.

—Suppression of the growing intellectual dissent by Soviet authorities has disillusioned many foreign Communists and Soviet sympathizers.

—Among the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union dissent is vocal and widespread.

—There is also increasing criticism of the Soviet economy.

—In Eastern Europe where the tensions are greater and the Western orientation much stronger the Soviets will have to rely on force to maintain hegemony.

There are numerous indications of the effectiveness of the program CIA conducts to capitalize on Soviet vulnerabilities:

—Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to an Eastern European audience of over 30 million that swells dramatically during crises, is frequently denounced by Communist leaders. Czech Party Secretary Husak, for example, has blamed RFE for his party’s inability to win over the Czech population.

—Radio Liberty which broadcasts to the Soviet Union has had a significant role in increasing manifestations of dissent and opposition among the Soviet intelligentsia. Defectors have often commented on the significant impact of the broadcast of documents written by protesters.

—The $150 million spent annually by the Russians for jamming operations which are only marginally successful is indicative of the value of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty which cost less than $35 million to operate.

—Publication of smuggled manuscripts and magazines geared to the Eastern European audience and distribution of books not available in Communist countries have also made an impact.

Emphasis on the following activities is being considered in planning for future operations:

—greater exploitation of dissent through modernized radio transmitting facilities, wider dissemination of criticism by the intellectuals, and stimulation of nationality aspirations among Soviet minorities;

—attacks on Soviet activities outside the bloc and intensified exploitation of anti-Communist themes abroad;
—developing leaders capable of providing a democratic alternative to Soviet-supported front organizations;
—selective use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to increase distrust of Russians in developing countries and exploiting Soviet sensitivity to local hostility and exposure of their activities;
—preparations for covert programs to offset the threat of Communist election victories in the Free World. Past examples of successful operations include Guyana in 1963 and Chile in 1964.

Tab A

Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

TENSIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

Introduction

At no time in the history of the Soviet Union to date have political forces outside the Communist Party leadership played a significant role in influencing events. The Party apparatus, the KGB and the deeply vested interests of the Soviet State hierarchy are experienced in coping with dissidence of all types, and have an impressive record of asserting their will at any cost to the rest of society. The KGB in particular has an almost perfect record of successful penetration, manipulation and suppression of opposition elements. In addition there is an historic tradition of public apathy, largely unchanged even today among the workers and peasants of Russia, and dissident elements find little encouragement at the grass roots. The authorities have often exploited the antipathy of the working class toward the intelligentsia in suppressing incipient demonstrations.

Thus the experience of Russian history strongly argues against the proposition that the internal dissident will significantly influence Soviet society in the short term. The conditions, nevertheless, which abet existing trends toward more active and articulate dissidence could be

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2 Secret; Nodis. Helms sent this paper to Kissinger under a March 30 covering memorandum that reads: “Pursuant to the interest expressed by the President [see Document 147] in a review of our covert action activities with respect to the Soviet Union and, more particularly, what we might additionally do, we have prepared the attached paper.” (Ibid., Box 433, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Black Operations)
affected by external developments. A discrediting of the regime by, say, another Czechoslovak crisis or a serious economic crisis, might well promote radical changes in the internal political climate. The paragraphs that follow should be considered in this light.

**Intellectual Dissent**

To describe the nature and scope of dissidence in the Soviet Union today poses the risk of over-emphasis. The Soviet regime is by no means on the brink of collapse. On the other hand, something new has indeed emerged in Soviet society since Stalin’s death. The growing demand for freedom of expression has been widely reported in the Western press, and its suppression by Soviet authorities has in turn contributed to disillusionment among foreign Communists and Soviet sympathizers.

The top rank of dissenters in the Soviet Union includes leading scientists, some of whom share the views of Andrey Sakharov, an eminent scientist. In 1968, Sakharov in a long pamphlet advocated radical changes in human society the world over. Speaking of his own country, he called for tolerance of political opposition, elimination of censorship, and frank discussion of Stalin’s use of terror. Later in 1968, other prominent scientists including Peter Kapitsa, the Soviet Union’s leading theoretical physicist, told Western colleagues that they agreed with Sakharov. The Sakharov pamphlet has never been published in the Soviet Union, but through Western radio broadcasts and publications Sakharov’s words have been carried back to his countrymen.

After the scientists, next in prestige come the writers, whose tradition of social concern goes back to Turgenev, Tolstoy and even earlier. Their involvement in politics and protest has almost always been reluctant. Alexander Solzhenitsyn tried for years to remain aloof, but his determination to write what he believed and his refusal to conform to the requirements of the Party put him squarely against the censors and the Soviet Writers’ Union. Last fall the Writers’ Union expelled Solzhenitsyn for his recalcitrance. Learning that he had been expelled without an opportunity to defend his position, Solzhenitsyn wrote a letter to the leaders of the Union that epitomizes the attitude of the creative intelligentsia toward the Party hacks who control the institutions of Soviet society. “The face of your clock has been rubbed out: Your clock is far behind the times. Open your heavy curtains. You do not even know that outside it is already day . . . .” In this time of crisis in our dangerously sick society you are not able to suggest anything constructive, anything good, only your own hatred and your spying on others and your determination to coerce and never to let go.”

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3 All ellipses are in the source text.
Beyond the circle of leading scientists and writers there are the active dissidents themselves. Most of them are younger members of the intelligentsia, but their ranks also include workers, teachers, and other professionals. A leading physicist in this group runs the only “underground press” known to exist in the Soviet Union. In May 1969 fifteen of the most active dissidents organized a Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, and petitioned the United Nations to protest against violations of human rights in the USSR. They were joined by some fifty other persons who publicly announced their support of the Committee. When the first petition received no answer, they sent a second. Now, ten months afterward, ten of the fifteen of the organizers of the Committee have been imprisoned or placed in mental hospitals, a favorite device of the regime for handling awkward cases.

In April 1968 the group began a bi-monthly *Chronicle of Current Events*, reporting in detail on arrests, threats and other coercive acts the Soviet regime uses to suppress opposition, plus the latest news concerning underground literature and petitions. Ten issues of the *Chronicle* were subsequently circulated in hundreds of typewritten copies inside the USSR. A few copies of each reached the West, where they have been republished and broadcast back into the Soviet Union.

The writing and circulation of protest documents of many varieties, typed in carbon copies or handwritten, continues in the face of regime repression. In early 1968 the trial of Ginsburg and Galanskov inspired hundreds of Soviet citizens to risk censure, job loss or imprisonment by appealing to the authorities on behalf of the defendants. The petitioners and protestors have since supported other causes, and have proposed their own political programs as alternatives to the Communist Party’s dictatorship. As one leader of the dissident movement, Lydia Chukovskaya, wrote: “The conspiracy of silence is at an end.”

In reaction to the increasing repression of creative freedom in the USSR, outstanding representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia have forsaken their homeland for life in the West. In addition to Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana, they include three distinguished writers, a prominent philosopher and editor, a young nuclear physicist, two outstanding musicians, a magazine editor, two leading experts on cybernetics, a movie director, a film critic and three students from Moscow University’s Institute of Eastern Languages.

The picture of the Soviet Union that these defectors paint is one of increasing cynicism and alienation on the part of the intelligentsia, and apathy and bitterness in the working class. The philosopher mentioned above had this to say on the subject: “People are still afraid to trust one another entirely. I shared my real views only with three other men. Yet one knows how everybody feels—disillusioned, contemptuous of the bosses and frustrated by the Party careerists who know noth-
ing but how to win and keep power. Now these careerists sense their
isolation from the rest of the population. They no longer believe in any-
things. There are no idealists like my father left among them. They only
know that to keep their power they must stick together, like cattle sur-
rrounded by wolves.”

Minority Repression

Among many of the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union, dis-
sent is vocal and widespread. It is also vigorously repressed. In the
Ukraine, the arrests of hundreds of Ukrainian dissidents in 1965 and 1966,
and subsequent repressions, have been vigorously protested by lead-
ing Ukrainian scientists, artists, and writers, including Oleg Antonov, one
of the Soviet Union’s leading aircraft designers.

The contempt of the Baltic people for Soviet rule remains as strong
as ever. It is no longer expressed in hopeless armed resistance, as it was
twenty years ago. Instead, these small nations manifest a vigorous de-
termination to preserve their national cultures. Even the local Com-
munist Party apparatus has sought to assert a degree of autonomy. In
Estonia many works of Western literature that have never been pub-
lished in Russian are printed in the native language. Two of the major
underground documents recently proposing alternatives to the Com-
munist dictatorship originated in Estonia.

Economic Unrest

Since the December 1969 Central Committee Plenum, the Soviet
press has given increasing attention to the lethargy of the economy. The
best informed defectors and even Soviet economists depict the econ-
omy as suffering from overcentralization, rigid control, and a system
of falsification and misrepresentation that prevents anyone from know-
ning what the true conditions are. A recent letter to Brezhnev circulated
through underground channels in Moscow described the problems of
the economy in the following terms: “It is obvious to everyone that in
our system nobody is involved in real work. They only throw dust in
the eyes of the bosses. Phony events, such as jubilees and special days,
have become for us more important than the real events of economic
and social life. . . . Other states in which the economy is not ruled from
the heavens, but from earth . . . are outdistancing us more and more . . .
Freedom to discuss problems openly, only such freedom, can put dis-
eased Russia on the road to recovery.”

Eastern Europe

In addition to its domestic problems, the Soviet Union has had
chronic difficulty in managing its satellites in Eastern Europe. In East-
ern Europe the tensions in society are much greater than in the Soviet
Union, the Western orientation much stronger, and the possibility
exists that at some future time one or more of these countries may successfully make the transition that Czechoslovakia essayed in 1968. It seems inevitable that, as long as the Soviet Union maintains its current system, it will be impossible for the peoples of Eastern Europe to live in real harmony with the Soviet Union and that, to maintain hegemony in the area, the Soviets will have to continue to rely upon force.

Dissident elements in the USSR and Eastern Europe display remarkable sympathy and understanding for their fellows throughout the whole Soviet dominated region. Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Daniel and others were exiled from Moscow for trying to stage a peaceful demonstration against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Others protested the biased reporting in the Soviet press and Soviet threats before the troops moved in. Intellectuals in all Eastern European countries have actively collaborated with the Soviet dissidents, and have expressed their sympathy for those arrested and imprisoned.

With its easier access to the West, Eastern Europe acts as a conduit for books, letters, manuscripts and ideas. The flow back and forth across the Soviet borders is relatively easy and constant. The fact that Eastern European standards of tolerance and freedom of expression, although restrictive, are well above the levels permitted in the Soviet Union makes the region’s ability to influence the Soviet Union a consideration of major importance to the United States.

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Covert Action Programs Targeted at Eastern Europe and the USSR

Current CIA operations targeted at Eastern Europe and the USSR are designed to foster the tensions and cleavages outlined above. Their aim is not to promote armed rebellion, but rather to encourage the movement for greater personal freedom within the Soviet Union and to weaken the ties between the nations of Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia.

Radio Broadcasts

Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty Committee, Inc., were organized in 1949 and 1951 respectively by the CIA. The major activity of each operation is radio broadcasting. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty programming centers are located in Munich, Germany. Their staffs, composed largely of Soviet and Eastern Europe expatriates with Americans in key policy positions, represent a unique concentration of expertise and professional talent.

Radio Free Europe (RFE)

RFE currently broadcasts 19 hours daily into Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 12 hours to Romania, and 8 hours to Bulgaria. It also conducts an extensive and respected research program on Eastern
Europe. The radio has achieved a high degree of Eastern European listener acceptance as a station which identifies with their needs, thoughts and aspirations. It is estimated that over 30 million people listen to RFE broadcasts. This percentage rises dramatically during periods of international crisis. RFE is denounced almost daily by Communist media, and on occasion by key figures of the Eastern European governments. Czechoslovak Party Secretary Husak has publicly placed a large share of the blame on RFE for his Party’s inability to win over the Czechoslovak population.

The station is a political force with which the Eastern European regimes must reckon. The reason for this lies partly in RFE’s pattern of cross-reporting—i.e., reporting in detail to all the Eastern European countries on domestic developments in the individual countries. This is in effect the principal way the peoples of the area learn of significant developments in their own and neighboring countries. It can be demonstrated that RFE’s repeated exposure of domestic policies and methods has forced modification of censorship and similar restrictions in several of the Eastern European countries.

RFE’s role in the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis is a striking example of the radio’s effectiveness. Prior to the ousting of Party First Secretary Novotny in January 1968, RFE was the chief source of factual information and research analysis on domestic affairs for much of the Czechoslovak population. After the Soviet invasion and the loss of their new-found freedom, the Czechoslovak people again became dependent on the round-the-clock reporting of RFE. Audience research indicates that RFE’s listenership rose to 70 percent of the population. The station received thousands of letters extolling its programs, while the Communist news media unleashed an unprecedented series of attacks on RFE. The Soviet journal Red Star described the radio as the “most strategic weapon in the global psychological war being carried on by the United States against the world socialist system.”

Radio Liberty (RL)

Radio Liberty broadcasts round-the-clock in the Russian language, 14 hours a day in Ukrainian, and at varying lengths in 15 other national languages. In contrast to RFE, RL is targeted against the more restrictive Soviet system. Effectiveness is more difficult to measure. However, letters from listeners, defector reports and legal travelers indicate that there is a sizeable audience. It is generally agreed that RL merits a significant share of the credit for the increasing manifestations of dissent and opposition among the Soviet intelligentsia. In this respect the Sinyavskiy–Daniel trial of 1966 was a landmark. RL played a unique role in conveying the facts, the significance, and Western reactions to the trial to the Soviet people. RL has also broadcast back into the Soviet Union detailed information on every important letter, protest
document, and piece of underground literature which has reached the West through underground channels. Recent Soviet defectors, among them the author Anatole Kuznetsov, have specifically cited RL’s vital function in providing such information and thereby expanding the scope and depth of dissident attitudes.

Communist Attacks on the Radios

Soviet and Eastern European attempts to discredit RFE and RL are intensive and coordinated. The Communist regimes are particularly discomfited by the two radios’ detailed news coverage and highly effective cross-reporting of internal developments, and by their exploitation of intellectual ferment, nationalist tendencies and general dissent within the Soviet Union.

A measure of the Soviet concern over Western broadcasts is the extent of the Soviet jamming effort. At this time, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria also extensively jam RFE broadcasts. According to a VOA study, the Soviets use 2,000–2,500 jammers at an estimated annual cost of $150,000,000. As indicated above, however, the jamming is marginally effective inasmuch as the target audiences hear the radios on one or more frequencies. The cost of the Soviet jamming effort can be put into perspective by comparing it with the annual operating costs of FE, Inc., and RLC, Inc., $21,723,000 and $12,770,000 respectively. The radios represent a 20-year investment of over $400,000,000.

Non-Radio Programs of Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty Committee, Inc.

In addition to the radios, FE, Inc., and RLC, Inc., sponsor book distribution programs. FE, Inc., also administers a program of support for exiles who fled Eastern Europe during the early post-war period. RLC, Inc., sponsors the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, Germany.

FE, Inc., and RLC, Inc., have distributed a total of two and one-half million books and periodicals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the late 1950’s. The titles comprise works which are not available in those countries because their content is considered ideologically objectionable.

The book programs are, for the most part, demonstrably effective in reaching directly significant segments of the professional and technical elite, and through them their colleagues in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with material that can inferentially be said to influence attitudes and reinforce predispositions toward intellectual and cultural freedom, and dissatisfaction with its absence.

The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is a research organization supported by Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. It is also heavily engaged in a publications program designed to counter Soviet prop-
agenda in underdeveloped nations. In 1969 over 135,000 copies of its publications were distributed to the Arab countries of the Middle East. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also publishes the prestigious “Prominent Personalities in the USSR” and sponsors symposia which bring together the foremost Western experts on the USSR to consider new approaches to dealing with the Communists. A recent budget reduction levied on Radio Liberty Committee, Inc., has led to a decision to terminate the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], although efforts are being made to find ways to carry on certain of its activities independently.

[6½ pages of source text not declassified]

Election Operations

There have been numerous instances when, facing the threat of a Communist Party or popular front election victory in the Free World, we have met the threat and turned it successfully. Guyana in 1963 and Chile in 1964 are good examples of what can be accomplished under difficult circumstances. Similar situations may soon face us in various parts of the world, and we are prepared for action with carefully planned covert election programs when U.S. policy calls for them.

150. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 7, 1970, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Kissinger

The conversation took place at Dobrynin’s initiative prior to his departure for the Soviet Union for consultations.

Vietnam

After an exchange of pleasantries, Dobrynin turned the conversation to Vietnam. He said that he wanted to understand our position: were we committed to maintaining an anti-Communist Government in Saigon or were we willing to settle for true neutrality?

1Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 36, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Chronological, 3/69–6/70. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held at Dobrynin’s residence. Sent to Nixon by Kissinger under an April 13 covering memorandum that summarized the conversation.