


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NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi has poured cold water on any notion that there is an easy way for the US to obtain the release of American prisoners.

Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's chief delegate in Paris, told Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post that the Communists might be willing to separate their military and political demands, and thus not insist on the removal of the present Saigon government as part of the price for American prisoners. But he made clear that simply setting a date for the withdrawal of US forces would not bring about their release. Thuy indicated that prisoners would not be set free until the US was committed not just to the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, but to pulling out all American military personnel from Indochina--including advisers and other noncombatants--and ceasing all American military operations against the Communists; he implied strongly that military aid to the South Vietnamese Government would have to end too.

Hanoi is well aware that if these actions were carried out before a settlement of the war, the present anti-Communist government in Saigon could not survive very long. Hanoi also knows that the US is not likely to agree to these extreme demands, and therefore Communist spokesmen often try to blur them in order to encourage critics of US policy who argue that setting a troop withdrawal date is a way to get back American prisoners.

But the Thuy interview indicates that Hanoi still holds to the view that American involvement in Vietnam can end only by the US throwing in the towel, or by bringing about political changes in Saigon through negotiations. Moreover, it suggests that Hanoi is not likely to alter soon its basic position on prisoners even for propaganda effect. Thuy made clear once again that the Communists insist the prisoner question is a postwar issue that can only be settled after the US agrees--either by negotiation or by ending support for the present Saigon government--to resolve the main issue of political power in South Vietnam to Hanoi's satisfaction. [REDACTED]

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
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Phnom Penh Area



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CAMBODIA: Government forces northeast of Phnom Penh are regrouping following the setback dealt them by the Communists two days ago.

Most of the Khmer Krom troops that were heavily attacked by the enemy on Tuesday between Vihear Suor and Kampong Chamlang were able to fight their way back to their staging base at Vihear Suor. A military spokesman has told the press in Phnom Penh that, once these forces are reassembled, they will make another attempt to drive through to hard-pressed government positions at Kampong Chamlang and Kampong Ampil, whose battered defenders apparently are badly in need of medical assistance.

It is unlikely that the government will be able to resume the offensive, however, until fresh reinforcements and supplies are dispatched to Vihear Suor. The commander of the Khmer Krom units on the northeastern battlefield told the US defense attaché on 9 June, for example, that he is unable to retake the initiative now because his troops are low on ammunition and in need of replacements. He stated that his units suffered 26 killed and 126 wounded in the fighting on 8 June, a total substantially lower than initial reports indicated. Over-all losses of his troops in the current campaign total 50 killed and 246 wounded. Despite these casualties, the commander said his men's morale was still high because they killed at least 85 of the enemy in the encounter of 8 June.

The attaché also reports that a low-level Vietnamese Communist prisoner captured by the Khmer Krom has told his interrogators that he was assigned to a regiment of the Communist 9th Division, which he claimed has an over-all strength of 3,000. He also claimed that his unit had moved out of the Chup plantation area in order to capture Kampong Chamlang and Kampong Ampil. Although the prisoner did not disclose why the Communists wanted to take these positions, he alleged that his unit would eventually attack Phnom Penh. [REDACTED]

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FRANCE-BERLIN: Paris continues to edge toward a more independent line in the Berlin negotiations.

In the first explicit statement to this effect, the two French diplomats involved in the Berlin talks recently said that the three Western allies should no longer follow the custom of agreeing on a common position prior to negotiating sessions with the Soviets. They argued that the Berlin talks have now entered a new phase, and that each Western ambassador should be free to negotiate directly with Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov. In addition, one of the diplomats stated that rather than meeting at specific intervals the ambassadors should move toward continuous sessions.

Whether these statements represent new French policy or are a trial balloon, they are in keeping with the recent thrust of French European policy. This appears to be aimed at regaining the initiative for Paris in the dialogue with Moscow by taking positions out in front of the Western allies on a variety of issues. The most recent example was the attempt by France at the Lisbon NATO ministerial meeting last week to modify the allied position that a successful outcome of the Berlin talks should be a precondition for multilateral preparations for a Conference on European Security.


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
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
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Belgrade has publicly charged Moscow with encouraging anti-Yugoslav emigre activity in the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslav decision to publicize the "resolute protest" lodged with the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade is the first acknowledged move against Soviet anti-Yugoslav activity in recent years. In the past, Belgrade has hinted at alleged Soviet complicity with Yugoslav emigres, but shied away from taking open countermeasures. This time, however, Yugoslav press reports from Moscow of a series of lectures there by emigres attacking Belgrade's policies and Tito personally apparently prompted stronger action.

Yugoslavia's get-tough attitude also appears linked to the fact that its negotiations with the USSR on a reciprocal information exchange agreement are stalled. Belgrade is particularly angered over the amount of money and time the Soviets spend distributing propaganda in Yugoslavia. Similar Yugoslav efforts in the Soviet Union are closely restricted. Belgrade argues that its side of the story is being suppressed in the USSR. [REDACTED]

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

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


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
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: The EC Commission has informed US Ambassador Schaetzel that the communities are prepared to take steps to ease several specific trade problems which have been a source of irritation to US-EC relations for several years. The proposed measures would give US citrus improved access to the EC market during certain times of the year, reduce EC and US competitive subsidization of some exports to third country markets, and commit the EC to consult in the event its tobacco policy increases community production to the detriment of US exports. The Commission offer--long-delayed by conflicting interest among the member states and the division of authority within the community over trade policy--is intended to be a token of good faith that will lead to negotiations on more general trade problems once the talks with Britain are successfully completed.


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