

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 1995

HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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We must achieve a more robust, more dynamic and more modern C3I infrastructure.

We must modernize our C3I capabilities to prepare for regional conflicts which will require highly mobile, light and lethal forces.

We must ensure that our C3I capabilities are more flexible and satisfy the needs of diverse users, as current and future operations will likely be worldwide, joint and involve coalition partners.

We must retain highly effective command and control systems that maintain a credible nuclear deterrent capability.

We must integrate military satellite communications, commercial satellite communications, and terrestrial communications into an integrated and interoperable infrastructure for the warfighting forces; and

We must implement an end-to-end information transfer capability which is protected, interoperable and cost-effective.

We can no longer give lip service or blow smoke. The time for action is long overdue. Rest assured that the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and I are totally committed to making real progress on this watch and institutionalizing the way for business to be done long into the future.

The fiscal year 1995 budget request is structured to meet these challenges. For fiscal year 1995, we are requesting \$14.9 billion for C3 programs. This request may be divided into three major C3 mission areas: Defense-wide C3, Theater and Tactical C3, and Space and Nuclear C3.

Defense-wide C3 systems provide the long haul and common user communications, base-level information infrastructure, information security and national level communications needed for a seamless, secure, reliable and cost-effective global telecommunications infrastructure.

This global infrastructure supports the ready availability and transfer of information to meet military contingencies throughout the world and across the spectrum of potential military conflicts.

These systems are critical to DOD's readiness. Our growing dependence on automated systems, coupled with their vulnerabilities and increasingly complex and sophisticated threats, requires that a comprehensive Information Systems Security readiness program be established within the Department and we are working toward this end.

For the broad range of services provided by defense-wide C3 systems, we are requesting \$4.8 billion in fiscal year 1995.

Theater and tactical C3 systems provide military commanders with the facilities and communications equipment necessary for managing conventional forces. The main objective of theater and tactical C3 systems is to ensure secure, survivable, interoperable C3 systems for joint and combined operations.

Given the emphasis on strengthening our ability to rapidly respond to regional conflicts, effective theater and tactical C3 capabilities are extremely critical. This is especially true as the size of the force structure decreases.

In support of this objective, we are continuing to acquire new theater and tactical C3 systems. For example, we are pursuing improvements to our combat identification capabilities. We are also continuing to improve the Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS) in the areas of radar range and reliability, identification, communications and navigation.

Similar improvements are being realized in our theater and tactical communications programs. Procurement and fielding of Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios is continuing with monthly production approaching 1700 radios, and full rate production by a second source has been approved.

In addition, pre-planned product improvements and system enhancements are being made to Mobile Subscriber Equipment and TRI-TAC equipment. For these and other theater and tactical C3 programs, we are requesting \$5.2 billion in fiscal year 1995.

Space and nuclear C3 systems provide important capabilities in support of both strategic and conventional command and control. The nuclear C3 systems developed and maintained over the past 40 years have been a key ingredient in sustaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrence.

Consistent with a post-Cold War era, we are continuing to restructure, consolidate and downsize nuclear C3 assets. At the same time, we are moving forward with the satellite communication (SATCOM) systems needed to not only maintain command and control of our nuclear forces, but to also provide secure and interoperable communications for conventional warfare and to rapidly respond to regional crises.

Our forces must be capable of responding with speed and flexibility anywhere in the world. Space C3 systems provide an unparalleled capability to support this rapid, global response requirement.

As we pursue the force reductions and restructuring needed to respond to a new defense strategy, space systems will become even more important to C3 in the future.

A total of \$4.9 billion is requested in fiscal year 1995 for our space and nuclear C3 systems.

The budget request for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, or TIARA, for fiscal year 1995 totals \$10.4 billion. In line with a definition provided by Congress more than 15 years ago, the tactical intelligence programs supported by this request includes all sensor systems, processing and exploitation equipment and activities aimed at responding to the combat commander's needs for timely, accurate information on the battlefield.

While the tactical and national budgets are managed through two separate processes and compete for resources in a different manner, we do recognize the need to ensure that they are properly coordinated and integrated.

Over the last year, Secretary Perry and the Director of Central Intelligence have implemented a new joint management approach for national and tactical intelligence activities. This new approach includes a joint review process which examines intelligence "across the board," the issuance of both general and specific joint planning guidance, and a corporate approach to addressing priorities.

As an example, for years the development of certain tactical airborne reconnaissance capabilities remained fragmented, uncoordinated and inadequately funded. In order to correct this problem, we established the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program. It consolidates the acquisition of all relevant airborne capabilities

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PORTION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Question. The DOD portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program includes DIA and the military intelligence components, the National Security Agency and its military components, the National Reconnaissance Agency, the Central Imagery Office, Foreign Counter-Intelligence activities, and other classified Navy programs. You are requesting a total of \$16.3 billion for these activities in fiscal year 1995. However, the Director of Central Intelligence has already testified that DOD requires only \$13.2 billion for fiscal year 1995 for these functions. Why are your numbers \$3.1 billion higher for exactly the same activities?

Question. Since the Director of Central Intelligence is in charge of these programs and he believes he needs only \$13.2 billion, if you have requested \$16.3 billion, does that mean that the Committee can delete \$3.2 from your request?

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department was unable to provide responses in time to be printed in this hearing volume.]

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. FORCES DEPLOYED WITH THE U.N.

Question. The U.S. currently has over 300 troops deployed as a part of the U.N. presence in Macedonia. During a recent visit by the Committee staff, it was found that our troops had no capability to receive intelligence information. The only information that they were receiving was provided by a very dedicated CIA agent who was not only doing his regular job, but was working overtime to provide our forces with occasional tactical intelligence concerning the order of battle of the Yugoslav forces deployed across the border which was only a few miles away. The U.S. has excellent human and technical intelligence information concerning the deployment of Yugoslav troops. Why has DOD not fashioned some method to provide intelligence support to these deployed U.S. forces?

Question. In recent years, DOD and the CIA have developed a good working relationship to better support U.S. troops deployed abroad. CIA personnel in Macedonia were very receptive to being assigned a senior enlisted military person under non-official-cover to provide the U.S. battalion commander with direct tactical intelligence support. Do you believe that such an arrangement might be feasible? Would you please look into this situation and provide a response to the Committee as to how DOD can provide better intelligence support to U.S. troops in Macedonia?

Question. The environment in Macedonia is much friendlier than could be expected if we ever deploy U.S. troops into Bosnia to support a U.N. enforced cease-fire. Do you have plans to get current tactical intelligence to U.S. troops in Bosnia if we should deploy them?

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department was unable to provide responses in time to be printed in this hearing volume.]

GUARD AND RESERVE C3I PROGRAMS

Question. In fiscal year 1993 the Committee created a C3I planning office in the Air Guard. The purpose of the office is to provide

centralized planning as modern C3I missions transition into all of the Guard and Reserve forces. What has been accomplished to date in identifying C3I missions for the Guard and Reserve?

Answer. Since the office was established in January 1993, the Air National Guard (ANG) C3I Planning Office has worked through the normal Air Force system for identification and transfer of missions from the active to reserve components. As a result, the active Air Force has transferred the Senior Scout mission to the Utah ANG.

In addition, the ANG has established a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Air Force Space Command Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Office. This MOU allows for ANG participation in capability demonstrations of new warfighting technologies. This landmark agreement has resulted in ANG participation in several major exercises highlighting space support to the warfighter. The planning office is working with the Space Warfare Center in Colorado Springs to identify future space missions for Reserve Component participation.

The ANG has established 10 traditional guard positions, 5 each in Florida and Colorado, to work with Air Force Space Command in identifying potential missions for the ANG.

The Long Range Planning Office will continue to work closely with the active Air Force to identify other missions for transfer to the Reserve Component.

Question. Has the C3I planning office been useful as an Executive Agent or should it be disestablished and the billet authorizations be cancelled?

Answer. The C3I Planning Office has been effective within the Air Force. The ANG has benefited from the visibility and relationships established by the planning office. Although no missions have transferred to the Reserve Component since the establishment of the office, the groundwork has been laid and we are optimistic.

The C3I Planning Office has not been as effective when dealing with the other service components reserve forces. We are exploring options to improve this. Regardless of where the executive agent responsibility resides the billets should be preserved.

Question. For the record, please provide a detailed listing of C3I funds requested in fiscal year 1995 by Guard and Reserve component and appropriation, and compare that with the corresponding fiscal year 1994 levels.

Answer.

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year—	
	1994	1995
Army:		
O&M Army Reservedo	Do.
O&M Armydo	Do.
Military personnel, Armydo	Do.
Reserve personnel, Armydo	Do.
Guard personnel, Armydo	Do.
SOCOM:		
Reserve personnel, Armydo	Do.
Reserve personnel, Navydo	Do.
Guard, personnel, Armydo	Do.