(U) White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement

17 October 2006

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Prepared by

FBI Counterterrorism Division
(U/LES) White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement

(U) Scope Note

(U/LES) This intelligence assessment provides an overview of white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement and derives its information from FBI investigations and open sources available as of August 2006. This assessment addresses the terrorism (TERR) topic of the NIPF and responds to Intelligence Requirement FBI DT-I.A.3.
(U) Key Judgments

- (U//LES) Although white supremacist groups have historically engaged in strategic efforts to infiltrate and recruit from law enforcement communities, current reporting on attempts reflects self-initiated efforts by individuals, particularly among those already within law enforcement ranks, to volunteer their professional resources to white supremacist causes with which they sympathize.

- (U//LES) The primary threat from infiltration or recruitment arises from the areas of intelligence collection and exploitation, which can lead to investigative breaches and can jeopardize the safety of law enforcement sources and personnel.

- (U//LES) White supremacist presence among law enforcement personnel is a concern due to the access they may possess to restricted areas vulnerable to sabotage and to elected officials or protected persons, whom they could see as potential targets for violence. In addition, white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement can result in other abuses of authority and passive tolerance of racism within communities served.

- (U//LES) The intelligence acquired through the successful infiltration of law enforcement by one white supremacist group can benefit other groups due to the multiple allegiances white supremacists typically hold.
Introduction: Consequences of Compromised Intelligence

This assessment examines white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement from perspectives of both strategic infiltration by organized groups and self-initiated infiltration by law enforcement personnel sympathetic to white supremacist causes. The primary threat from infiltration or recruitment arises from the areas of intelligence collection and exploitation, which can lead to investigative breaches and can jeopardize the safety of law enforcement sources or personnel.1

- A white supremacist leader is known to have acquired a sensitive FBI Intelligence Bulletin on the white supremacist movement that had been posted on Law Enforcement Online and had inadvertently become publicly accessible through a law enforcement Web site. In addition to identifying the FBI personnel who prepared the bulletin, the document identified the FBI’s targeting interests within the white supremacist movement.2

White supremacist presence among law enforcement personnel is also of concern due to the access they may possess to restricted areas vulnerable to sabotage and to elected officials or protected persons, whom they could see as potential targets for violence. Though least verified by reporting, this last scenario gains prominence given the training and access to firearms provided to law enforcement personnel in their line of duty. In addition, white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement can result in other abuses of authority and passive tolerance of racism within communities served.

Organized Intent to Infiltrate Law Enforcement

There is little corroborated reporting on current strategic attempts by white supremacist groups to infiltrate law enforcement communities. Cases that have been reported tend to reflect self-initiated efforts by white supremacist sympathizers, particularly among those already within law enforcement, to use their professional skills for the benefit of white supremacist causes.

The apparent sporadic reporting on white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement could be an indication of successful infiltration that has gone undetected, unreported incidents, or—despite apparent intentions to the contrary—a lack of systematic effort on the part of white supremacist groups to recruit from law enforcement communities. Although this last possibility appears more credible as a result of the current factionalism and crises of leadership among several national white supremacist groups, the possibility that infiltration has gone undetected is of great concern.

Strategic Infiltration and Recruitment Campaigns

White supremacist leaders and groups have historically shown an interest in infiltrating law enforcement communities or recruiting law enforcement personnel.
Most information about systematic attempts by white supremacist groups to infiltrate law enforcement involves efforts by the National Alliance (NA) during the era of its founder, William Pierce, and in the years immediately following his death in 2002. White supremacist infiltration of the federal government, including the FBI, plays a prominent role in Pierce’s novels, *The Turner Diaries* (1978) and *Hunter* (1989), both widely read works that are sometimes interpreted as practical guidance within white supremacist circles.

(U//LES) In March 2001, Pierce began focusing the NA’s recruitment efforts toward individuals associated with academic institutions, members of the military, and law enforcement officers. At that time, the NA had a military unit and hoped to form a law enforcement unit comprised of current and former federal, state, and local law enforcement and corrections officers.

(U//LES) By developing a law enforcement unit, Pierce intended to attract “higher quality” members, who possessed intelligence access and weapons training, and who had minimal criminal or extremist histories in law enforcement records. As part of this recruitment campaign, the NA mailed audio tapes and flyers to law enforcement officers. Reporting in 2004 indicated that several state units of the NA had discussed production and distribution of DVDs designed in part to recruit law enforcement personnel.

(U//LES) Whether in response to these recruitment efforts or by personal initiative, active and retired law enforcement personnel are known to have joined the NA and in some cases have held regional leadership roles in the organization. Any success the NA may have in infiltrating or recruiting law enforcement would likely benefit other white supremacist groups with whom the NA shares intelligence. Shared intelligence is a particular likelihood given the multiple group affiliations typically held by white supremacists.

(U) William Pierce

(U) Tradecraft

(U//LES) Since coming to law enforcement attention in late 2004, the term “ghost skins” has gained currency among white supremacists to describe those who avoid overt displays of their beliefs to blend into society and covertly advance white supremacist causes. One Internet posting described this effort as a form of role-playing, in which “to create the character, you must get inside the mind of the person you are trying to duplicate.” Such role-playing has application to ad-hoc and organized law enforcement infiltration. At least one white supremacist group has reportedly encouraged ghost skins to seek positions in law enforcement for the capability of alerting skinhead crews of pending investigative action against them.

(U//LES) Leaders in the white supremacist movement have advocated confronting suspected infiltrators and to instruct them to provide their FBI handlers with low level information that will minimally impact the group’s activities. Another as yet undocumented infiltration strategy, is for members to "walk in" to law enforcement agencies and offer information to determine an agency’s interest in the organization.

In 2001, Creativity Movement (CM) leader Matthew Hale stated that, although the CM had few law enforcement officers as members, the group shared intelligence information with the NA.\textsuperscript{8}

In addition to its historical interest, white supremacist leadership has also engaged in recent rhetoric that encourages followers to infiltrate law enforcement communities.

(U) In a speech made at Aryanfest 2004 in Phoenix, Arizona, a white supremacist leader reportedly encouraged his audience members to refocus their energies from street violence to infiltration of the military, local governments, school boards, and law enforcement.\textsuperscript{9}

(U) White Supremacist Sympathizers

(U//LES) The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) is notable among white supremacist groups for historically having found support in many communities, which often translated into ties to local law enforcement. Although the First Amendment’s freedom of association provision protects an individual’s right to join white supremacist groups for purposes of lawful activity, the government can limit the employment opportunities of group members who hold sensitive public sector jobs, including jobs within law enforcement, when their memberships would interfere with their duties.\textsuperscript{10} Recent examples of law enforcement personnel whose activities in support of white supremacist beliefs have come under scrutiny include:

(U) In July 2006, a former police officer with possible ties to the KKK was charged with civil rights violations involving alleged death threats made against black schoolchildren and a black city council member.\textsuperscript{11}

(U) On 26 June 2006, Shayne Allyn Ziska, a state correctional officer at the California Institution for Men in Chino, was sentenced to seventeen and a half years in federal prison. Ziska was convicted on federal racketeering charges for helping the Nazi Low Riders white supremacist prison gang distribute drugs and assault other inmates, and reportedly providing white supremacist indoctrination to an inmate. Ziska advised he considered himself a government infiltrator consistent with National Socialism’s strategy for revolution.\textsuperscript{12}
(U) Outlook

(U//LES) Having personnel within law enforcement agencies has historically been and will continue to be a desired asset for white supremacist groups seeking to anticipate law enforcement interest in and actions against them. The potential for strategic attempts by white supremacist groups to infiltrate law enforcement will likely increase should the movement as a whole resolve some of its factionalism. This could occur either by existing groups resolving their leadership disputes and stabilizing their membership bases or by the emergence of new leaders or groups that could bring cohesion to the movement.

(U//LES) Factors that might generate sympathies among existing law enforcement personnel and cause them to volunteer their support to white supremacist causes could include hostility toward developments in US domestic policies (such as the current immigration debate) and foreign policies (such as perceived US favoritism toward Israel) that conflict with white supremacist ideologies.
(U) Intelligence Gaps

(U//LES) Are white supremacist groups engaging in systematic efforts to infiltrate law enforcement communities?

(U//LES) To what extent have white supremacists already infiltrated law enforcement?

(U//LES) To what extent are law enforcement communities operating in environments sympathetic to white supremacist beliefs that could potentially hinder investigations into criminal white supremacist activities?

(U//LES) What methods are white supremacist organizations using to recruit law enforcement personnel?

(U//LES) To what extent has infiltration into law enforcement adversely affected investigations into white supremacist activities?

This product was prepared by the Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit, Counterterrorism Analysis Section at FBI Headquarters. Questions may be addressed to the DTAU Unit Chief at 202-324-0256.
Endnotes

1 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
2 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
3 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
4 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
5 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
6 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
7 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
8 (U//LES) FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
10 (U) Brian Levin, “Addressing Hate Groups” (UNCLASSIFIED).
12 (U) AP article, “Ex-California Prison Guard Sentenced for Aiding White Supremacist Gang,” 26 June 2006 (UNCLASSIFIED); FBI case information (UNCLASSIFIED).
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