March 5, 2010

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This is in response to your electronic Freedom of Information Act request dated November 4, 2008, seeking a copy of “…08-INTEL-15, ‘Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11’, September 23, 2008.” We received your request the same day.

The enclosed document is responsive to your request and appropriate for release without excision. Inasmuch as this constitutes a full grant of your request, I am closing your file in this office. There are no assessable fees associated with this response in this instance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dave Henshall
Senior Advisor, Information and Privacy

Enclosures:
As stated
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission (U)
Additional Copies

To request copies of this report, contact Mr. Gary Campbell at (703) 604-8835 (DSN 664-8835).

Suggestions for Future Evaluations

To suggest ideas for or to request future evaluations of Defense intelligence issues, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence at (703) 604-8800 (DSN 664-8800) or fax (703) 604-0045. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 703)
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Acronyms

DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DOS  Asymmetric Threat Division
JFIC  Joint Forces Intelligence Center
JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support
JTC-I  Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence
MC  Management Control
ODNI  Office of Director of National Intelligence
OIG  Office of the Inspector General
DIG(D) Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
USJFCOM United Stated Joint Forces Command

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Send written complaints to: Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1900
Phone: 800.424.9098 e-mail: hotline@dodig.mil www.dodig.mil/hotline
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE


(U) We conducted an extensive review of documentation and conducted 14 interviews. Available evidence and testimony showed that the former employee had no basis for his allegation and that the Joint Forces Intelligence Command provided a timely and accurate reply in response to the 9/11 Commission.

(U) On February 11, 2008, we issued a letter announcing a review, and then conducted interviews and document reviews at all levels of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command. Reference documents are on file at the DoD Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence.

(U) We believe that the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our review objective.

(U) We performed this review in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.”

(U) Questions should be directed to Mr. Gary Campbell at (703) 604 8835 (DSN 664 8835). At management’s request, we will provide a formal briefing on the results. See Appendix D for the report distribution.

Patricia A. Brannin
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified enclosures

-SECRET//NOFORN-
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D2008-INTEL-15

September 22, 2008

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission (U)

Executive Summary

(U) Who Should Read This Report and Why? The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, responsible for overseeing DoD intelligence activities; the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, responsible for the organization accused of misleading Congress; the Commander, Joint Forces Intelligence Command, accused of misleading Congress; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency responsible for compiling the report for Congress.

(U) HOTLINE Allegation

(U) A Joint Forces Intelligence Command former employee alleged in May 2006 to the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General that the Joint Forces Intelligence Command had not disclosed all original material in response to the 9/11 Commission. In November 2007, the former employee contacted the Office of the Director of National Intelligence regarding the status of his allegation. The Director of National Intelligence forwarded the allegation to HOTLINE, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, where the allegation was tasked to the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence. On February 11, 2008 the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence announced a review.

(U) Background

(U) The Joint Forces Intelligence Command was established in 1999 and was subordinate to the United States Joint Forces Command. The mission of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command was to “provide general and direct intelligence support to United States Joint Forces Command, United States Joint Forces Command staff directorates, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, Service component commands and subordinate joint forces commands tasked with executing United States Joint Forces Command geographic or functional missions.” In 1999, the Joint Forces Intelligence Command created the Asymmetric Threat Division to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Asymmetric Threat Division provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the Intelligence Director for the United States Joint Forces Command. The Asymmetric Threat Division also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance.

(U) Public Law 107-306 created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) on November 27, 2002. Public Law 107-306 mandated that the Commission investigate “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”

(U) On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission issued its public report. The 9/11 Commission report does not mention the Joint Forces Intelligence Command. The 9/11 Commission report discussed the establishment of the United States Joint Forces Command. The report also stated that the United States Joint Forces Command was responsible for military response to domestic emergencies, both natural and man-made.

(U) Results

(U) We did not substantiate the allegation. We found no evidence that the Joint Forces Intelligence Command misled Congress by withholding operational information in response to the 9/11 Commission. The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission. The answers provided to the United States Joint Forces Command were accurate and substantiated by our extensive review of available documentation and our 14 personnel interviews at all levels of Joint Forces Intelligence Command. We concluded that the Joint Forces Intelligence Command provided a timely and accurate reply in response to the 9/11 Commission. The United States Joint Forces Command forwarded the response to the Defense Intelligence Agency's Congressional Affairs Office.
Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Background

Objective

Review of Internal Controls

Results

Appendixes

A. Scope and Methodology
   Prior Coverage
B. Scanned JFIC Response
C. Scanned USJFCOM Response
D. Report Distribution
(U) Background

(U) In May 2006, a Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC)\(^1\) former employee\(^2\) (IRON MAN) alleged to the Department of Defense, Inspector General HOTLINE that the JFIC had not disclosed all documentation relating to the 9/11 Commission\(^3\). In November 2007, IRON MAN contacted the Office of Inspector General, Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) regarding the status of his allegation. The ODNI forwarded IRON MAN's query to the DoD Inspector General HOTLINE where his allegation was tasked to the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence (DIG (I)).

(U) Guidance


Sec 601 “ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION,” “established in the legislative branch the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.”

Sec 602 “PURPOSES,” “examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”

Sec 605 “POWERS OF COMMISSION,” “the commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics.”

(U) DoD Directive 5400.4, “Provision of Information to Congress,” January 30, 1978, states that all DoD components will “make maximum information available promptly to, and cooperate fully with, Members of Congress and congressional committees and their staffs.”

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\(^1\) (U) The Joint Forces Intelligence Center, JFIC, has been reorganized and is currently identified as the Joint Transformation Command – Intelligence.

\(^2\) (U) We assigned the former employee the nickname IRON MAN to protect his identity as the HOTLINE reporter. However, during the course of the investigation, one of the senior interviewees informed us that the IRON MAN had told her in a phone conversation that he had registered the complaint.

\(^3\) (U) The 9/11 Commission was established by Public 107-306 to “examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”
Objective

The objective was to determine whether the JFIC misled Congress by willfully withholding operational information in response to the 9/11 Commission.

See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Directive 5010.38, “Management Control (MC) Program,” and DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Management Control (MC) Program Procedures,” require DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy of the controls.

Scope of the Review of the Managers’ Internal Control Program. This report is provided in response to an allegation made to the DoDIG HOTLINE. The scope of the report is limited to fact finding surrounding that particular case. Accordingly, a review of the managers’ internal control program was not performed and was outside the scope of this review.
(U) JFIC Response to Congress

(U) The JFIC provided a timely and accurate reply to United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in response to the 9/11 Commission. The USJFCOM forwarded the JFIC response to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Congressional Affairs Office. We found no evidence that the JFIC willfully attempted to withhold information in its response to the 9/11 Commission. The JFIC provided information that was accurate and was substantiated by an extensive review of available documentation and of 14 personnel interviews at all levels of the JFIC. As a result, we concluded that the allegation was invalid, and that the JFIC acted responsibly in its response to the 9/11 Commission.

(U) History

(U) The United States Joint Forces Command

(U) The United States Atlantic Command transitioned into the USJFCOM when the Unified Command Plan was approved in 1999. The naming change reflected the expansion of USJFCOM’s mission areas. The Unified Command Plan assigned to the USJFCOM the mission “to accelerate opportunities for forces to gain joint warfighting training and experience, leverage lessons learned in real and training scenarios, and recommend changes to joint doctrine that improve the warfighting capability of the armed forces.” The Unified Command Plan further identified the Northern Atlantic as the geographic area of responsibility for the USJFCOM.

(U) The Joint Forces Intelligence Center

(U) As the USJFCOM transitioned, the Atlantic Intelligence Command transformed into the JFIC. The JFIC remained subordinate to the USJFCOM. The mission of the JFIC was to "provide general and direct intelligence support to the USJFCOM, the USJFCOM staff directorates, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, Service component commands and subordinate joint forces commands tasked with executing the USJFCOM geographic or functional missions." The JFIC did not have the mission to track Usama Bin Ladin or predict imminent US targets.

(U) JFIC’s Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5)

(U) In 1999, the JFIC created the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5) to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Director of Operations recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise. The DO5 provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff. The DO5 also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. The DO5 supported the JTF-CS exercises by establishing fictional terrorist threats.
organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups. In the summer of 2001, the DO5 was realigned under the Intelligence Watch Center.

(U) JFIC’s transition to JTC-I

(U) In 2005, the JFIC transformed into the Joint Transformation Command Intelligence (JTC-I), and its mission was to optimize “intelligence capabilities to support the USJFCOM as the lead agent for defense transformation.”

(U) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

(U) Public Law 107-306 created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) on November 27, 2002. Public Law 107-306 mandated that the Commission investigate “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”

(U) USJFCOM responds to the 9/11 Commission

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) requested USJFCOM to provide information regarding the September 11, 2001 attacks in support of the 9/11 Commission on March 11, 2002.

(U) The USJFCOM tasked its subordinate organizations, to include the JFIC, to provide information in response to the DIA inquiry. The USJFCOM sent the tasker to the JFIC on March 13, 2002. The tasker was marked urgent and was due on March 22, 2002. The tasker consisted of 13 questions derived from the original DIA tasker. (See Appendix B for the original questions and answers.)

(U) The JFIC processed the DIA tasker via a command implemented tasker tracker system called Remedy. The tasker was assigned to a JFIC senior naval officer who acted as the action officer. The JFIC action officer collected information from various departments within the JFIC. After the action officer compiled the JFIC’s response, the answered questions were forwarded to the USJFCOM. The USJFCOM Intelligence Director reviewed the JFIC’s input prior to release to the DIA. (See Appendix C for original questions and answers to 13 questions that USJFCOM forwarded to the DIA Congressional Affairs Office on March 25, 2002.)

(U) On March 25, 2002, the USJFCOM provided the DIA Congressional Affairs Office with a coordinated response. The USJFCOM explained to the DIA Congressional Affairs Office that it had “forwarded the task to our associated intelligence organizations and have received two affirmative replies: One from the Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC), and one from the Joint Force Headquarters, Homeland Security Command (HLS).”
The 9/11 Commission Report

On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission issued its public report. The 9/11 Commission report did not mention the JFIC. The 9/11 Commission report discussed the establishment of the USJFCOM. The report also stated that the USJFCOM was responsible for military response to domestic emergencies, both natural and man-made.


HOTLINE Allegation

In May 2006, IRON MAN reported to the DoD Office of the Inspector General HOTLINE that the JFIC had not disclosed all documentation relating to the 9/11 Commission. The allegation stated that the “Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC), when instructed in or before May 2002 to provide all original material it might have relevant to al-Qa’ida and the 9/11 attacks for a Congressional Inquiry, intentionally misinformed the Department of Defense that it had no purview in such matters and no such material.” The allegation further stated that the JFIC, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5), had reported that the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the most likely domestic targets.

Analysis of the Allegation

The allegation stated that the JFIC had not provided files in response to the 9/11 Commission. IRON MAN alleged that the JFIC had not provided the 9/11 Commission with the original material created by DO5 relevant to al-Qa’ida. During his interview, IRON MAN stated that he had never seen the 9/11 Commission questions or JFIC’s response, but that Congress should have asked for files concerning the tracking of Usama Bin Ladin.

The 9/11 Commission questions had not requested the direct submission of any files or requested information regarding the tracking of Usama Bin Ladin. The 9/11 Commission questions were very specific, and asked for information which involved the “imminent attack” or “hijackers involved.” Evidence indicated that the JFIC did not have knowledge regarding imminent domestic targets prior to 9/11 or specific 9/11 hijacker operations.

IRON MAN alleged that DO5 had completed “Numerous original reports.” Interviews with former JFIC personnel along with historical DO5 briefings indicated that DO5 had not completed original intelligence reporting. DO5 monitored and compiled intelligence reporting to keep the USJFCOM leadership aware.

We interviewed the previous USJFCOM Director of Intelligence, the JFIC Commanding Officer, the JFIC Deputy Commander, the JFIC Director of Intelligence Operations (DI), JFIC action officers and personnel from the Asymmetric Threat Division.
(U) IRON MAN alleged that the JFIC would have denied the existence of DO5 and its analysis. The JFIC correctly identified the DO5 in its response to question 8 (See Appendix B), and stated that DO5's emphasis was on force protection for the USJFCOM components.

(U) IRON MAN alleged that the JFIC had "intentionally misinformed the Department of Defense." The Senior Intelligence Officer for the USJFCOM reviewed the JFIC's input and stated that he had sat through their morning briefs, and didn't think it was odd they would not have had any of the information requested.

(U) The JFIC's Commanding Officer established a command atmosphere which highlighted intelligence oversight and mission focus. The DO5 Operations Officer stated that the JFIC was very cautious over the support that was provided to the JTF-CS based on intelligence oversight guidelines. The Deputy Director of Intelligence stated that the JFIC Commanding Officer would repeatedly ask for written certification to justify any tasking for any department or division. He further stated that DO5 had no theater specific mission. The subsequent Deputy Director of Intelligence stated that the JFIC Commanding Officer directed him to stop tracking Usama Bin Ladin. The Commanding Officer stated that the tracking of Usama Bin Ladin did not fall within JFIC's mission. The Commanding Officer also stated that a couple of folks doing analysis of Afghanistan terrorist training camps was perceived as excess capability when it is not your AOR [Area of Operations] and that the issues where not in JFIC's swim lane.

(U) Conclusion

(U) We did not substantiate the allegation. We found no evidence that the Joint Forces Intelligence Command misled Congress by withholding operational information in response to the 9/11 Commission. The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission. The answers provided to the United States Joint Forces Command were accurate and substantiated by our extensive review of available documentation and our 14 personnel interviews at all levels of Joint Forces Intelligence Command. We concluded that the Joint Forces Intelligence Command provided a timely and accurate reply in response to the 9/11 Commission. The United States Joint Forces Command forwarded the response to the Defense Intelligence Agency's Congressional Affairs Office which was responsible for further dissemination.
Appendix A. (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted a review in response to an allegation made to the DoD HOTLINE. We evaluated National, Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) documentation to determine whether the JFIC misled Congress by willfully withholding operational information in response to the 9/11 Commission. We completed field work on September 3, 2008.

(U) To achieve our objectives, we conducted 14 interviews to include the previous USJFCOM Director of Intelligence, the JFIC Commanding Officer, the JFIC Deputy Commander, the JFIC Director of Intelligence Operations (DI), JFIC Action officers and personnel from the Asymmetric Threat Division. We interviewed current and former personnel involved in, or with knowledge of, this case from the following organizations:

- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
- The Joint Transformation Command for Intelligence (JTC-I)

(U) We also interviewed the complainant to obtain any additional information or documentation.

(U) We performed this review in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.”

(U) We also examined documents from the organizations above, which are on file at DoD IG. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our review objective.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform this review.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage was conducted on the Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission.

7
Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:

1. Did your agency have any information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorists planned an imminent attack on a target or targets in the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

ANSWER: No, there had been in-depth discussions about potential terrorist attacks since Dec 00. There was also ambiguous reporting received last summer (2001), but it was believed that the attacks were planned for Israel and Saudi Arabia.

2. Did your agency have information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

ANSWER: No, but prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFIC nor JFCOM tracked terrorist activity in the United States. The United States was not part of JFCOM’s AOR. The United States area belonged to CJCS and force protection responsibility for DoD facilities, and personnel was a service responsibility. JFIC maintained global situational awareness for areas such as CONUS outside of the US/JFCOM AOR, and briefed pertinent information available within DoD intelligence channels at the morning J2 brief, but we did not track it. This information generally consisted of CIA and NSA reports, sometimes supplemented by other NCIS, APOSI, or AOC reports and threat assessments. Generally, all national level agency reporting that we had visibility on stopped once the suspected terrorists reached U.S. borders. We assume that this information entered law enforcement channels and was investigated (Terrorism in the United States is the responsibility of the Department of Justice and the FBI).

A JFIC analyst recalls a message from CIA talking about Hizballah members coming to the United States via Mexico. Reportedly the terrorists were going to move through Texas and head to Minnesota. We never saw any follow-up reporting on this issue.

3. Did your agency have any information on the hijackers involved in the attacks before Sept 11? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

ANSWER: NO

4. Please set aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry any information your agency has obtained since Sept 11, 2001 about the hijackers (e.g., their backgrounds, their prior involvement in terrorist activities, their attendance into the U.S., their activities while in the U.S.).

ANSWER: JFIC has no original sources or unique reporting about the Sept 11th hijackers. All information received by the command originated from other agencies, and we included it in our products. The best summary/background report we have seen, specifically with respect to the Sept 11th hijackings, was a video teleconference. Director of Military Intelligence Crisis MIB (Dec 2001/Jan 2002) when the FBI presented a most impressive summary of potential indications for the attacks. We did not receive electronic copies or hard copies of this briefing.

a. Does any of this information, in the view of your agency, suggest actions that should have been taken either by your agency or other agencies with the hijackers and for their accomplices prior to Sept 11 but were not? If so, please describe them.

ANSWER: NO

b. Does any of this information, in the view of your agency, indicate systemic problems or deficiencies that should be remedied to increase the likelihood that the U.S. Government would in the future learn of terrorist cells operating within the United States? If so, please describe them.

ANSWER: There needs to be common databases amongst government organizations that allow them to view each other’s data and work on things together. There probably needs to
be a Homeland Security JAIF set up to allow all key personnel from respective agencies/commands to participate and review the same information. At some level, law enforcement information must be fused with intelligence.

5. Did your agency perform a "post-mortem" or "lessons learned" evaluation as a result of the Sept 11 attacks? If so, please provide copy.

ANSWER: No. The command did however react to the event with established crisis procedures and subsequently evolved to establish a larger effort dedicated to POL/MIL/FP, both in CONUS and OCONUS.

Prior to Sept 11, JFIC had a 24-hour watch floor. The watch’s main focus was the Russian Northern Fleet and the JFCOM AOR. The watch was also responsible for providing worldwide situational awareness, however this was the job of one senior enlisted member who was titled the POL/MIL/Force Protection Watch Officer. It was this individual’s job to monitor worldwide events and terrorist issues. After Sept 11, JFIC did not really perform a “post-mortem.” Instead, we improvised, adapted, and overcame. 15 minutes after the first plane hit the World Trade Center, JFIC started to set up a Crisis Action Support Cell (CASC). The CASC consisted of a Team Leader, Information Manager, Senior Analyst, INTSUM Producer, and a Briefer. This entity tracked events as they occurred and provided support to the JFCOM Crisis Action Team (CAT). The JFCOM J2 gave JFIC five areas to focus on with respect to the attacks: they included CONUS Threats, OCONUS Threats, International Reaction to the terrorist attacks and the U.S. war on terrorism, tracking the situation in Afghanistan, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. JFIC also started to stand-up a POL/MIL/FP Analysis Branch. The purpose of this branch was to conduct analysis on the above issues and provide analytical depth to the situational awareness functions being performed by the watch. The foundation of this analytical branch was 14 active duty personnel and 1 government civilian pulled from throughout JFIC. The branch was augmented with 14 JFIC reservists, recalled to active duty, and 4 contractors, and paperwork was initiated to hire 21 GG-11 Temporary Hires.

Currently the POL/MIL/FP Analysis branch consists of 4 Sections (CONUS Threat, OCONUS Threat, Terrorist Group Analysis, and CBRN). This branch now tries to track and report on terrorism issues worldwide, with a focus on potential threats to CONUS. One of the challenges that JFIC faced is the fact that JFCOM’s AOR currently consists of the Atlantic Ocean, Russian Northern Fleet areas and, for practical purposes, now CONUS. JFCOM’s AOR is the rest of the world (Joint Force Provider). As a result of this, the POL/MIL/FP Analysis Branch is a “jack of all trades, master of none”. As far as we know, JFIC is one of the few DoD entities attempting to track potential terrorist activities within CONUS.

6. Has your agency prepared any finished intelligence reports (e.g. analyses, summaries) since Sept 11, 2001 concerning the hijackers involved in the attacks, e.g., their backgrounds, the circumstances of their admission into the United States, their activities while in the United States? If so, please identify these reports by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

ANSWER: NO

7. Please provide a list of the offices within your agency that are principally responsible for counter-terrorism activities on a day-to-day basis and identify the heads and deputy heads of these offices and their dates of service from 1995 to present. (Note: we are not asking for everyone in the supervisory chain of such officials). If the individuals occupying these positions are current employees of your agency, please indicate this.

ANSWER:
1995-1996 CD/CJ/CT Division, Division Head SA Warren Brownly (NCIS)
1997-1998 CJ/CT Branch, Branch Head SA Mike Gilpin (NCIS)
1998-1999 CICT/FP Branch, Branch Head CW3 Rich Shisler (USA)
Nov 1999-Summer 2001: Asymmetric Threat Division, Division Head MAJ Oliver Wright
Ill (USA) still at JFIC, Deputy Mr. John Rodriguez (NCIS) now at DIA
Summer 2001-Sept 11, 2001: Current Intelligence Division, Division Head LCDR Bill Carr
(USN) still at JFIC, Deputy Capt Andrew Weis (USMC) still at JFIC until Jun 2001, PCS Camp
Lejune, NC.
Sept 11, 2001-Present: PolMI/FP Analysis Branch, Current Intelligence Division: Capt
Andrew Weis (USMC) still at JFIC until Jun 2001, PCS Camp Lejune NC. Previous Current
Intelligence division Officer (to Jan 2002): LCDR Bill Carr. Current Intelligence division officer:
CDR Carlisle Wilson.

8. What does your agency consider its "marching orders" both past (since 1985) and present, in
terms of its responsibilities in the counter-terrorism area, j.e. what documents establish your
requirements and priorities? Please identify these by title and set them aside for review by the
staff of the joint inquiry.

ANSWER: JFIC's counter-terrorism focus has changed over the years.
1995-1999 the CD/CICT Division/Branch focused on military operations that USACOM forces
were conducting in Haiti.
Fall 1999-Sept 11, 2001: Focused on Asymmetric Threats OCONUS to include terrorism and
CBRN issues. Emphasis was on force protection for JFCOM Components and support to JTF-
CS. (JOINT FORCE PROVIDER). JFCOM and JTF-CS PIRs set the requirements.
Sep 11, 2001-Present: Focused on terrorism worldwide to include CONUS. (JOINT FORCE
PROVIDER/HLS Mission) JFCOM PIRs, HLS PIRs, and the US/JFCOM Homeland Security
Campaign Plan set the requirements.

9. Please provide the overall funding levels for, and personnel dedicated to, the counter-terrorism
activities of your agency for FY02. Please provide any augmentations to these levels that have
occurred since Sept 11, and the levels of such funding and personnel requested for FY03.

ANSWER: DP WILL PROVIDE

10. Apart from enhanced funding and personnel levels, has your agency made any significant
organizational or operational changes since the Sept 11 in order to position itself better to warn
of or prevent terrorist attacks against the United States in the future? If so, please describe
them.

ANSWER: JFIC stood-up a separate branch within the Current Intelligence Division to support
the JFCOM J2 and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security. It is called the
PolMI/FP Analysis Branch. It currently consists of 14 Active Duty, 14 Reservists, 1 Permanent
Gov Civilian, 4 Temporary Civilians, and 4 Contractors. This branch is broken into 4 sections,
they include: CONUS Threat Section, OCONUS Threat Section, Terrorist Group Analysis
Section, and CBRN Analysis Section. This branch has established databases to track terrorist
activities and suspicious events in CONUS, in order to conduct fusion and analysis. The 24-hour
Watch has been augmented with an additional 3 personnel to support.

11. Are there specific things that are not being done by your agency in the counter-terrorism area
for lack of funding and/or skilled personnel, which your agency believes would be important to its
ability to warn of terrorist attacks against the United States? If so, what are they?

ANSWER: Prior to Sept 11, JFIC did not have a robust counter-terrorism mission. We did do
some analysis but since it did not directly support JFCOM's AOR, the analysts were directed to
stop. As a result of this, and normal military rotation, we did not have a large counter-terrorism
analysis base to build on. After Sept 11, JFIC developed a counter-terrorism analysis capability
by reassigning existing personnel. There are no active duty billets designated for counter-terrorism analysis and the people that we have doing the work will rotate within the next couple of years. Also the reservists that were activated to conduct counter-terrorism analysis will be retained for two years. The reservists brought skill sets and knowledge (from previous active duty experience or their civilian jobs) that will only be temporary. JFIC has started hiring 21 temporary civilians to conduct counter-terrorism analysis. Some of these individuals have prior counter-terrorism analysis experience, but most of them do not. This presents a training challenge trying to build experience. By the time the new temp hires are proficient on counter-terrorism analysis, their one-year temp hire will be over. If their billets are not made permanent or funded for a second year they will be dismissed, leaving USJFCOM with minimal capability to support a PoH/MilFP, HLS mission. Since the draft UCP transfers HLS missions to a newly created United CinC, USJFCOM is not anticipating this mission, and thus JFIC is not expecting to provide similar intelligence support.

There is still a need for an intelligence and law enforcement fused picture and an established, operable national threat warning system to quickly pass threat data from intelligence entities to agencies that can take action such as INS, FBI, U.S. Customs Service etc. Additionally more direction and guidance is required that establishes “lanes in the road” for Homeland Security.

12. Insofar as your agency is concerned, what proportion of the information you obtain about known or suspected terrorists operating in the United States or against U.S. interests abroad comes from your own unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency’s liaison with foreign counterparts? On the average (taking at least a month’s sample), how many such reports would your agency receive in a given day? What do you do with the information that you receive from your unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency’s liaison with foreign counterparts?

ANSWER: JFIC does not conduct any unilateral collection in CONUS, nor does it conduct liaison with foreign counterparts.

JFIC’s process is to fuse all of the information that we have visibility on into one all-source threat picture. We receive all of our reporting from other agencies, JFCOM components, or services.

On average DI/13 sections review 2275 messages daily. When JFIC receives a report we decide if the information should be briefed to the senior leadership (J2 Brief), if it should be incorporated into the Daily INTEL Summary, if it should be entered into relevant data-bases, if we should try to do further analysis (connect the dots, possibly produce a special analytic product), or if we need to follow-up with the reporting agency – based on Priority Information Requirements, as mentioned above.

13. Are there laws, regulations, or policies in effect that restrict or hamper your ability to collect or disseminate information about terrorists operating in the United States or against U.S. interests abroad? If so, what are they, and does your agency believe they should be changed?

ANSWER: JFIC does not currently collect intelligence pertaining to terrorist operations in CONUS or OCONUS. JFIC does receive collected information, in the form of intelligence, which has been disseminated through intelligence channels. The difficulty is in the paucity of law enforcement information disseminated (very little information on CONUS is published by the national intelligence agencies concerning day-to-day suspicious activity in the United States), and the lack of a true intelligence/Law Enforcement fusion center or process.

Currently JFIC can review information that is available in DoD intelligence channels. Most of the information received is through Service Counterintelligence reporting. The information available in DoD intelligence channels probably only represents 1/10 of all reporting on suspicious activities in the United States. This is a result of intelligence oversight regulations put on the DoD intelligence community, and the fact that other government agencies are responsible for
investigating this suspicious activity. Passing the information to DoD could compromise the investigation.

There are several possible solutions to these problems, but the bottom line is that all information needs to be made available to one entity in order to analyze it and create actionable information.

One of the other challenges that we face is the fact that often there are no follow-up reports to "close the loop" on events being reported. Intelligence could tip law enforcement about potential suspicious activity, terrorist travel, or financial activity. Law enforcement agencies take this information for action but never report the results back to the intelligence community. If the results were shared then the intelligence community would be able to sharpen its indications and warning system for future suspicious activity.

The following are potential solutions to the above stated problem.
1). Change the intelligence oversight regulations to allow DoD intelligence assets to receive and analyze more information on suspicious activities in the United States.
2). DoD directs the J3s of its various commands to be responsible for the fusion of information available in intelligence and law enforcement channels.
3). A national fusion center is stood-up that incorporates DoD and other federal agencies that receives and analyze all information that could potentially pertain to a threat to CONUS to include tactical, operational, and strategic level information.
Appendix C. (U) Scanned USJFCOM Response:

No Classification in Message Body

From: Robinson, John A - MAJ - USAF
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2002 2:20 PM
To: Wikesus@dcs.mil.gov
Cc: Cheddar, Mark E - GG15 - CV
Subjects: US Joint Forces Command's Reply to Congressional 9/11 Inquiry Tasking
Importance: High

Classification: SECRET NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

Mr. Freed: the message and attachments below are our reply to VADM Wilson's 11 Mar 02 tasking memo. They have all been reviewed and approved for release by CAPT Dany Fengyu USN, USJFCOM2

Maj. Robinson

US Joint Forces Command J2
25 Mar 02
To: Mr. Peter S. Freed, DIA Congressional Affairs

Subject: Congressional Inquiry into 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attack (U)

(U) In response to VADM Wilson's 11 Mar 02 memo, same subject, JFCOMJ2 has named JFCOMJ23 as OIR and appointed Maj. John Robinson USAF (DSN 635-6005, JWICS email la06972@jfcicom.ic.gov) as POC for this task.

(U) We have forwarded the task to our associated intelligence organizations and have received two affirmative replies: one from Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC), and one from Joint Force Headquarters, Homeland Security Command (HLS). Other organizations have either returned negative replies or will participate in the inquiry via their parent organizations rather than through JFCOM.

(U) JFIC did not have INCOUS foreign threat or terrorist information prior to 11 Sep 01, so its answers to Mr. Snider's questions are mostly negative. The answers are attached to this email, they have been reviewed by CAPT Janice Douglas USN, JFC Commander.

(U) HLS did not exist as an organization prior to 11 Sep 01, so its answers to Mr. Snider's questions are mostly negative. It has provided a list of threat briefings which contain information regarding terrorism. The list and answers are attached, they have been reviewed by CAPT Broderick USN, HLS Director of Intelligence.

(U) JFCOMJ2 is ready to cooperate further with your investigation as needed. Please contact me if you require further assistance.

Very Respectfully,

(Maj. John A. Robinson, USAF
US Joint Forces Command J2
(703) 835-6005/DSN 835-6005
E-mail: la06972@jfcicom.ic.gov

No Classification in Message Body
SECRET//NOFORN

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

Subject: Activation of Provisional Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security


2. Mission: As directed by Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Commander, JFHQ-HLS (CJFHQ-HLS) plans, coordinates, and executes homeland security operations to include the implementation of an HLS CINC.

3. Authority: CJFHQ-HLS commands the provisional JFHQ-HLS, including the HLS CINC Implementation Planning Team. CJFHQ-HLS also exercises full operational control over Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), and other forces as assigned.


5. Structure: Pending final decisions on the Unified Command Plan, CJFHQ-HLS will organize the JFHQ-HLS staff utilizing the available personnel assigned to the former Homeland Security Directorate. CJFHQ-HLS will coordinate with the Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, to develop a draft Joint Manning Document and tables for equipment and facilities to complete the activation process. Final recommendations will be subject to the approval of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

6. Reassurance to U.S. Joint Forces Command Staff: The Chief of Staff will work closely with the CJFHQ-HLS to ensure the right identification of reassurance and CJFHQ-HLS effort to ensure increased mission capability for the JFHQ. U.S. Joint Forces Command staff will support JFHQ-HLS, with specific attention to meeting...

Attachment 1, CINC USJFCOM Memorandum, page 1.
mission-critical needs in personnel, budget, facilities, equipment, and training, especially during the early period of activation.

7. Coordination: This memorandum serves to initiate appropriate planning, coordination, and resourcing within the USJFCOM staff and JPRQ-HLS.

W. P. KERMACK
General, U.S. Army

Distribution: (USJFCOMINST 5605.1A)
List I and II
Copy to:
List III A. 99

Attachment 1, CINC USJFCOM Memorandum, page 2.

1. Did your agency have any information prior to September 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist planned an imminent attack on a target or targets in the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No, JFHQ HLS did not exist as an organization prior to September 11, 2001.

2. Did your agency have information prior to September 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No, JFHQ HLS did not exist as an organization prior to September 11, 2001.

3. Did your agency have any information on the hijackers involved in the attacks before September 11, 2001? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No, JFHQ HLS did not exist as an organization prior to September 11, 2001.

4. Please set aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry any information your agency has obtained since September 11, 2001 about the hijackers (e.g., their backgrounds, their prior involvement in terrorist activities, their admittance into the U.S., their activities while in the U.S.).

JFHQ HLS J2 has had access to classified information and reporting produced by the national intelligence community, to include CIA, DIA, NIMA, and NSA, and the various commands and agencies. This information was widely available on the collateral and Top Secret Special Compartmented Information (SCI) networks.
a. Does any of this information, in the view of your agency, suggest actions that should have been taken either by your agency or other agencies vis-a-vis the hijackers and/or their accomplices prior to September 11, 2001 but were not? If so, please describe them.

No. JFHQ HLS did not exist as an organization prior to September 11, 2001.

5. Did your agency perform a "post-mortem" or "lessons learned" evaluation as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks? If so, please provide a copy.

No. JFHQ HLS did not exist as an organization prior to September 11, 2001.

6. Has your agency prepared any finished intelligence reports (e.g. analyses, summaries) since September 11, 2001 concerning the hijackers involved in the attacks, e.g. their background, the circumstances of their admission into the United States, their activities while in the United States? If so, please identify these reports by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No.

8. What does your agency consider its "marching orders," both past (since 1985) and present, in terms of its responsibilities in the counter-terrorism arena, i.e. what documents establish your requirements and priorities? Please identify these by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

- Memorandum from CINC USJFCOM, Activation of Provisional Joint Force Headquarters - Homeland Security, 24 Jan 02 (see attachment 1)
- Message - CJCS DTG 161000Z OCT 2001 (see attachment 2)

10. Apart from enhanced funding and personnel levels, has your agency made any significant organizational or operational changes since the September 11, 2001 attacks in order to position itself better to warn of or
prevent, terrorist attack against the United States in the future? If so, please describe them.

Yes. USJFCOM created a Homeland Security Directorate on 1 Oct 01 that transformed on 1 Feb 02 into a separate command known as the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS). The current USJFCOM HLS mission statements are as follows:

**USJFCOM Mission**

U.S. Joint Forces Command conducts sustained maritime and land operations within the designated Joint Operations Area (JOA), and supports CINCYORAD in aerospace defense operations, to deter, prevent, and, if necessary, defeat aggression aimed at U.S. territory, its population, and designated critical infrastructure; provides Military Assistance to Civil Authorities within the JOA in support of National Homeland Security efforts; and provides combat ready joint forces in support of Combatant CINCS—all of which allow the Nation to maintain freedom of action to defeat the threat of terrorism worldwide (effective 22 Oct 2001)

This mission statement is the foundation for all intelligence production, exploitation, and dissemination of JFHQ HLS products and analysis. The corresponding Priority Intelligence Requirements that have driven JFHQ HLS J2 actions are as follows:


(SECRET/REL CAN) PIR-03, Vulnerabilities in the JOA - What Tier I critical infrastructure and IO capabilities are most vulnerable to
attack or provides a high value target to terrorist organizations? (CCIRs 3.A.1, 3.A.9, 3.B.1, 3.B.5, 3.C.3)

(SECRET/REL CAN) PIR-44, IO capabilities and threat - what are the IO capabilities of the five TOs posing the most serious threat in the JOA? (CCIRs 3.C.11, 3.C.13, 3.C.14, 3.C.15)


12. Insofar as your agency is concerned, what proportion of the information you obtain about known or suspected terrorist operations in the United States or against U.S. interests abroad comes from your own unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency's liaison with foreign counterparts? On the average (taking at least a month's sample), how many such reports would your agency receive in a given day? What do you do with the information that you receive in a given day? What do you do with the information that you receive from your unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency's liaison with foreign counterparts?

All intelligence and information reporting JFHQ HLS J2 processes comes from other DoD and law enforcement agencies. We receive hundreds of inputs every day. JFHQ HLS J2 produced daily briefings for the HLS CG and disseminated this information to a variety of customers to include national intelligence community (DIA, CIA, NSA) entities and various commands through the CONUS (USSPACECOM / NORAD, USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USFORECOM, USCENTCOM). The products were a compilation of current intelligence available on collateral and SCI networks and law enforcement information. JFHQ HLS J2 produced this daily product starting in October 2001 and continued through February 2002 (see attachment 1)
Compilation of JFHQ HLS J2 Daily Threat Briefings

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Appended below are the Joint Forces Intelligence Command's responses to the Congressional Inquiry questions tasked by VADM Wilson. JFIC POC is CDR Mike Villereal, JFIC ADI, DSN 886-7166. JFCOM J2 POC is Maj. John Robinson. JFCOM J2, DSN 836-6006.

1. Did your agency have any information prior to September 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist planned an imminent attack on a target or targets in the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No.

2. Did your agency have information prior to September 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No. Prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFCOM nor JFIC tracked foreign threat or other terrorist activity in the United States prior to 16 Oct, CONUS was not within JFCOM/JFIC's AOR. In response to CINCUS/JFCOM's Joint Force Provider mission, JFIC maintained global situational awareness for areas outside of the US/JFCOM AOR and briefed pertinent information available from other DoD intelligence channels for the JFCOM J2, but did not track any information or retain it.

3. Did your agency have any information on the hijackers involved in the attacks before September 11, 2001? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No.

4. Please set aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry any information your agency has obtained since September 11, 2001 about the hijackers (e.g. their backgrounds, their prior involvement in terrorist activities, their admittance into the U.S., their activities while in the U.S.).

JFIC has no original sources or unique reporting about the Sept 11th hijackers. All information received by the command originated with other agencies.
a. Does any of this information, in the view of your agency, suggest actions that should have been taken either by your agency or other agencies vis-à-vis the hijackers and/or their accomplices prior to September 11, 2001 but were not? If so, please describe them.

No.

b. Did your agency perform a "post-mortem" or "lessons learned" evaluation as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks? If so, please provide a copy.

No. However, CINCUS/JFCOM was tasked with responsibility for Homeland Security (HLS) on 16 Oct 01. JFIC had already established a crisis action support cell (CASC). The effort subsequently evolved to a larger footprint dedicated to a POL/MIL/PP situational awareness recap of other agency reporting of potential terrorist activity both CONUS and OCONUS. Focus areas were based on CINCUS/JFCOM CCIR and JFCOM J3 PIRs: Threats to CONUS; OCONUS threats; Terrorist Group Analysis; CBRN analysis (for support to Consequence Management).

c. Has your agency prepared any finished intelligence reports (e.g., analyses, summaries) since September 11, 2001 concerning the hijackers involved in the attacks, e.g., their background, the circumstances of their admission into the United States, their activities while in the United States? If so, please identify these reports by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

No.

d. What does your agency consider its "marching orders," both past (since 1985) and present, in terms of its responsibilities in the counter-terrorism arena, i.e., what documents establish your requirements and priorities? Please identify these by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

JFIC's counter-terrorism focus has changed over the years:

a. 1995-1999: Focus on military operations conducted by USACOM forces Haiti.
b. Fall 1999-Sep 11, 2001: Focus on Asymmetric Threats OCONUS to include terrorism and CBRN issues. As Joint Force Provider, emphasis was on force protection for JFCOM Components and support to JTF-CS (Joint Task Force-Civil Support). JFCOM J2 and JTF-CS PIRs set the requirements.

c. Sep 11, 2001-Present: Focus on terrorism worldwide to include CONUS. (JOINT FORCE PROVIDER/HLS Mission) JFCOM PIRs, HLS PIRs, and the USJFCOM Homeland Security Campaign Plan set the requirements.

10. Apart from enhanced funding and personnel levels, has your agency made any significant organizational or operational changes since the September 11, 2001 attacks in order to position itself better to warn of or prevent terrorist attack against the United States in the future? If so, please describe them.

Using Defense Emergency Relief Fund (DERF) supplemental funding and some existing manpower temporarily realigned from other mission areas, JFIC established a separate POLAI/IP Analysis branch to support the JFCOM J2 and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Homeland Security. Based on CJJFCOM CCIR and JFCOM J2 PIRs, this branch focuses on: Threats to CONUS; OCONUS threats; Terrorist Group Analysis; CBRN analysis (for support to Consequence Management). The branch established databases to track terrorist activities and suspicious events in CONUS in order to conduct situational awareness fusion and analysis.

12. Insofar as your agency is concerned, what proportion of the information you obtain about known or suspected terrorists operating in the United States or against U.S. interests abroad comes from your own unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency's liaison with foreign counterparts? On the average (taking at least a month's sample), how many such reports would your agency receive in a given day? What do you do with the information that you receive in a given day? What do you do with the information that you receive from your unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency's liaison with foreign counterparts?
JFIC does not conduct any unilateral collection in CONUS, nor does it conduct liaison with foreign counterparts concerning counterterrorism issues.
Appendix D. (U) Report Distribution

Department of Defense Organizations

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
   Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Commander, Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence

Non-Department of Defense Organizations

Director of National Intelligence, Inspector General

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement,
   Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
   Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Team Members


William Rainey
Gary Campbell
LCDR John Markley, USN
Cindy Maule