(U) Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II
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October 10, 2014

(U) Objective

• (U) Assess whether the degradation in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's (DIE) long-term intelligence analysis capability, as highlighted in Phase I of this project, specifically affected the analytic intelligence support required for DoD acquisition and campaign planning program requirements.

(U) Findings

• (U) The DIE needs a prioritization plan to guide all-source analytic resource allocation.
• (U) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) is not adequately emphasized in DIE analytic training programs.
• (U) The DIE is providing adequate analytic support to the DoD acquisition process, but could be improved.

(U) Observations

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director, Joint Staff provided comments to this report. Management either concurred or partially concurred with all the recommendations. Two recommendations still require action plans for implementation.
**Recommendations Table**

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Please provide comments by October 24, 2014
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: (U) Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II
(Report No. DODIG-2015-004)

(U) The Deputy IG, Intelligence and Special Program Assessments (ISPA) is providing this report for your information and use.

(U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. Comments from the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence were partially responsive for recommendation A. Therefore, we request a plan of actions and milestones (POA&M) on recommendation A as indicated in the recommendations table by October 24, 2014.

(U) Comments from the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Vice Director, Joint Staff, were also partially responsive for recommendation B.1, but require a POA&M for joint training policy and standards as indicated in the recommendations table by October 24, 2014.

(U) Comments from the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency were also partially responsive for recommendations B.2a and B.2b, but we request specific details on agency plans for incorporating Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment into analyst training programs as indicated in the recommendations table by October 24, 2014.

(U) Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [email redacted]. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. Classified electronic format comments must be sent via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) or over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

Report No. DODIG-2015-004
(U) Your comments should state whether you agree or disagree with the recommendations. If you agree with a recommendation, clearly state that you "concur" or "concur with comment" and describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendation and include the completion dates of your actions. Send copies of documentation supporting the actions you may have already taken. If you disagree with the recommendations, or any part of them, please clearly state your "non-concur" and give specific reasons why you disagree and propose alternative action if that is appropriate.

(U/FOO) We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to me at [REDACTED], DSN 999-9999, or [REDACTED] at DSN 999-9999.

[Signature]

Anthony J. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Programs Assessments
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(U) Introduction

(U) Background

(U) On August 5, 2013, we published "Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities," which addressed the impact of a 10-plus-year focus on crisis and current intelligence support for DoD activities on the Defense Intelligence Enterprise’s (DIE) long-term intelligence analysis capability. The assessment captured some of the root causes behind the widely-held view in DoD that over the past decade the DIE had lost long-term analysis production as well as analytic capability. We found that the DIE reallocated analytic resources to support the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other contingency type operations. However, we found that any assessment of the enterprise’s capability to perform long-term intelligence analysis was much more complicated than just competition for analytic capacity.

(U) During our interviews for the Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities, multiple organizations highlighted the significantly diminished science and technology DIE expertise and the prioritizing of analytic efforts to support defense acquisition processes. A number of Combatant Commands (CCMDs) also expressed concern that certain Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) policies were out of sync with the current Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP)-mandated Operations Plan (OPLAN)/Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) intelligence production requirement. Because our assessment’s original scope and methodology precluded us from gathering objective data about both of these issues, we included them as Observations I and II, respectively, in the original report and initiated this follow-on assessment specifically dedicated to these issues now called Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II. A detailed discussion of the background to this project is attached as Appendix B.

(U) Objectives

(U) Assess if the degrading of the DIE’s long-term intelligence analysis capability, as highlighted in Phase I of this project, specifically affected analytic intelligence support
required for DoD acquisition and campaign planning program requirements. We assessed how:

A. (U) The DIE supported the DoD acquisition mission area with intelligence analysis and was responsive to DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System", 20 November 2007; and Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01H, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System" 10 January 2012, directives.

B. (U) The DIE addressed the DoD planning mission area with intelligence analysis and was responsive to the joint planning series of directives to include the GEF and JSCP.

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is attached as Appendix A.
Finding A

(U) The Defense Intelligence Enterprise Needs a Prioritization Plan to Guide All-Source Analytic Resource Allocation

Simultaneously, organic CCMD analytic capacity is shrinking due to recent personnel reductions that DoD fiscal guidance required. This requirement-capability mismatch forces each CCMD to reach out to the greater DIE for all-source analytic support. From the CCMD perspective, each request for outside support should be a high priority for the DIE to address. While a collaborative intelligence analysis effort across the DIE would seem a practical response to increased CCMD demand, the DIE lacks a prioritization plan at the departmental level to guide analytic resource allocation. As a result, 

(U) Current DoD Planning Guidance for CCMDs

(U) The DoD Joint Planning series of directives--DOD Series, "Guidance for Employment of Force," August 2012, CJCSI 3110.01B, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan," 10 October 1996, and CJCSM 3130.03, "Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)," 18 October 2012--specify the policies, procedures, and formats to be used in the planning required to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict. The GEF is the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) written policy guidance, issued through the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, for the preparation and review of contingency plans. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issues the JSCP to provide guidance on preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the SECDEF. Our interviews with CCMD J-2, J-3, and J-5 personnel revealed concerns about the intensifying scope and complexity inherent in the current GEF and JSCP planning and the ability of their organic analytic workforce to provide the desired intelligence crucial to addressing these requirements. Specifically, the CCMDs personnel described how the DoD's added emphasis on intelligence, significantly increases the demand for high-quality intelligence analysis--both in quantity and on topics not necessarily correlating with subject-matter experts normally resident at the CCMD JIOC level.

(U) Recent DoD Fiscal Decisions Affecting JIOC Analytic Capability

(U) CCMD JIOC analytic manpower has been decreasing since the mid 2000s. Previous manpower reductions were directed as a result of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence’s “Re-Balance” initiative in the 2008-2009 time-frames, as well as the SECDEF's “Efficiencies” initiative begun in 2010.

(U) How the JIOC/DIE previously supported Joint Operation Planning Processes for Contingency Planning

(U) The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) is initiated when GEF/JSCP planning guidance is provided to the CCMDs. The JIOCs were responsible for developing JIPOE
Finding A

analysis pertaining to potential contingencies and significant characteristics of the operational environment resulting from the planning tasks. At the same time, DIA produced a Dynamic Threat Assessment (DTA) for each top priority plan identified in the GEF and continuously updated each DTA when changes were made to relevant aspects of the operational environment. CCMD intelligence analysts continuously monitored the situation, updated existing JIPOE products, and initiated new intelligence collection or production requirements to the greater DIE to support the traditional contingency plan being developed, i.e., OPLAN or CONPLAN.

(U) How the JIOC/DIE is now supporting Joint Operation Planning Processes for Planning

(U) These additional planning challenges have not changed the doctrinal requirement for the JIOCs to continuously perform JIPOE and DIA to produce DTAs as directed. What has changed is the demand signal from the planning community. Assessment
Finding A

Interviewees in the J-2 and J-5 at the CCMDs stated that the "older model" of identifying intelligence gaps during the planning process, requesting intelligence production from the DIE, and then waiting over a certain time period for products was no longer operative. Addressing the new TCP planning requirements and responding to interaction with intelligence analysts intimately familiar with the theater.

(U) The DIE faces difficult Choices

(U) DIA interviewees stated that every CCMD now submits analytic support requirements, based on their GEF/JSCP tasking to develop as their number one priority, which forces DIA to prioritize analytic production for the CCMD competing requirements without clear DoD guidance on departmental priorities. Multiple DIA senior intelligence managers said that .

Simultaneously, we noted that no senior analytic intelligence manager disputed the need for plans and planning to address , but these same managers also mentioned challenges with .
At the same time, the DIE is also constantly challenged to support the DoD policy community and other national requirements.

(U) Conclusions

(U) We agree with the 9/11 Commission Report, which stated that "...the importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to 'connect the dots.' No one component holds all the relevant information."

(U) Combatant Commanders exercise control over an impressive array of assigned, allocated, and attached intelligence collection and analytic capabilities. Nevertheless, these capabilities alone cannot satisfy all the joint force's campaign planning intelligence requirements. The CCMD J-2 will have to rely on other elements of both the DIE and the IC for support in order to provide the CCMD with the most accurate intelligence possible in support of their planning tasks. As our interviews with both Geographic and Functional CCMD staffs have highlighted, CCMDs are tasked more than ever before with planning for a greater variety of strategic objectives. These staff officers also do not foresee any reduction in the demands for a wide spectrum of intelligence analysis necessary to support these planning challenges.

(U) Our evaluation identified the desire of senior intelligence managers at the CCMDs and within the greater DIE for a framework for allocating limited analytic resources to support the DOD's ever-increasing planning requirements. If every planning task is expected to be a number-one priority, DoD...

(U) Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)), in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD (I)), the Director of the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, develop and issue overarching intelligence prioritization and synchronization guidance for the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise to improve all-source analytic intelligence support to Department of Defense planning tasks.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(U//FOUO) USD (P) concurred with the concept that a clearly stated set of integrated intelligence priorities is critical to effectively managing limited analytic resources. Because the CCMD planning community represents one of many components of the Department's intelligence customer base, they said its priorities must be appropriately integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set of integrated intelligence priorities. Accordingly, they said a product that integrates the intelligence requirements derived from a wide range of sources, including from CCMDs, would be valuable to the development of these integrated priorities.

(U//FOUO) The USD (P) deferred to the USD (I) on matters of intelligence. USD (P) said they will support USD (I)'s efforts to ensure that the priorities of all of the Department's intelligence stakeholders are accounted for as part of the intelligence analysis process.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(U//FOUO) The USD (I) concurred that a clear set of integrated priorities is critical to managing analytic resources. They also concurred that a product integrating the intelligence requirements from the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capability Plan would be a valuable input to the development of these integrated priorities. Accordingly, they fully support the USD (P) efforts. However, they state, that the CCMD planning community represents only one component of the Department's intelligence customer base and their priorities must be integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set of integrated intelligence priorities.

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
(S//NF) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
(U) Vice Director, Joint Staff

(U/FOUO) The Vice Director, Joint Staff concurred with our report and provided inputs from the CCMDs on the recommendation. Eight of nine CCMDs concurred with our findings and recommendations, and one non-concurred. Of the eight who concurred, two provided specific inputs on the recommendation agreeing that there is no prioritization plan at the Department level to guide DIE analytic resource allocation. One recommended clarifying the recommendation to read: "...develop and issue overarching intelligence prioritization and synchronization guidance to improve all-source analytic intelligence support to Joint Planning."

(U/FOUO) The command who non-concurred, said that the serves as an effective prioritization plan for the DIE. They also said that the real issue is that many CCMDs

(U) Our Response

(U/FOUO) Comments from the Joint Staff and the CCMDs are responsive and while the majority of the CCMDs agreed with our finding and recommendation, we acknowledge the differing viewpoints on intelligence prioritization for joint planning requirements. We encourage the CCMDs to engage with OSD to refine the process for determining joint planning requirements and subsequent intelligence analytic production needs.
Comments from the USD (P) and USD (I) were partially responsive. We accept that the CCMDs planning requirements are just one component of the Department's intelligence customer base. But we also agree with the DIA Director, that additional guidance is needed from OSD in order for the DIE to proceed effectively. We believe that a prioritization product jointly prepared by the OSD policy and intelligence offices, in coordination with DIA, that differentiates between the competing CCMDs joint planning tasks, would enhance intelligence production overall efficiency. Therefore, we request that both USD (P) and USD (I) provide a program of actions and milestones on recommendation A as indicated in the recommendations table on page iii by October 24, 2014.
Finding B

(U) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment is Not Adequately Emphasized in Defense Intelligence Enterprise Analytic Training Programs

(U) DIE all-source analyst training programs inadequately emphasize and prioritize JIPOE training—which is primarily a result of the misalignment of formal JIPOE training responsibilities subsequent to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) disestablishment. As a result:

(U) Requirement for JIPOE Training Across the DIE

(U) Joint Publication 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations," January 5, 2012, states that "the primary purpose of JIPOE is to support joint operation planning, execution, and assessment by identifying, analyzing, and assessing the adversary's center of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, decisive points, limitations, intentions, course of actions, and reactions to friendly operations based on a holistic view of the operational environment. Joint Force Commanders and their staffs are responsible for ensuring that all JIPOE products and analyses are fully integrated into the joint force's operational planning, execution, and assessment efforts." This joint doctrine presents the fundamental principles that guide employing U.S. military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective, and promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations.

(U) The CJCS, issues this doctrinal guidance through the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL is a common-language menu of tasks that serve as the foundation for joint
operations planning across the range of military and interagency operations. The UJTL supports DOD in conducting joint force development, readiness reporting, experimentation, joint training and education, and lessons learned, and is the basic language used to develop joint mission essential tasks and agency mission essential task lists. CCMDs are specifically tasked with UJTL Strategic Theater 2.4.1., which is called "Conduct Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment."

(U) The Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP), which DIA manages, establishes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for providing timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to all U.S. government customers. In the DIAP, JIPOE analysis is a specified responsibility of geographic CCMD JIOCS. While CCMD JIOCs have primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, and conducting overall JIPOE production, they must proactively solicit and exploit all possible assistance from other DIE elements, interagency partners, academia, and multinational sources to inform the analysis.

(U) JIPOE Training History and Current Status

(U) Prior to 2012, JIPOE training for analysts assigned to CCMDs, as well as other DIE personnel, was USJFCOM's responsibility. This training, in the form of a mobile training team (MTT), was eliminated with USJFCOM's disestablishment. The balance of funds, primarily contract dollars, was transferred to DIA and its training element, the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) which is DoD's school for all-source intelligence training. DIA's intention was to develop a computer-based training (CBT) course to replace the MTT. The JMITC on-line course catalog, as of April 2014, still lists JIPOE as an additional CBT planned for delivery in FY13.

(U) In addition to the planned CBT, DIA Training and Education personnel told us that an introduction to JIPOE was to be included in the new Professional Analyst Career Education Program (PACE). PACE was introduced in late 2013 to replace DIA's current entry-level analyst training program--known as the Defense Intelligence Strategic Analysis Program I (DISAP I). However, the current PACE 16-week program of instruction allocates only four or five hours of JIPOE discussion interspersed
Finding B

throughout other analytic blocks of instruction and does not present JIPOE as a stand-alone foundation of the CCMD planning construct.

(U) DISAP and Joint Intelligence Training Standards

(U) DISAP governs analytic training and certification standards for DIA all-source intelligence analysts to include those assigned to CCMD JIOCs. DIA interviewees stated that DISAP was primarily developed to carry out Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Intelligence Community Directive 203, "Analytic Standards." However, analytic standards for the conduct of JIPOE are specified by the CJCS through Joint Publication 2-01.3, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment," 16 June 2009. As previously stated, despite being a DIAP task to perform JIPOE, the all-source analytic training program for analysts (DISAP) assigned to the DIE does not formally address JIPOE or other "joint intelligence" standards for analysis to fully satisfy the requirements of the CCMDs efficiently or expeditiously.

(U) Conclusions

(U) According to JSCP 2010, "the dynamic global security environment requires a flexible, adaptive approach to planning for the use of military forces to accomplish U.S. national security objectives. CCDRs must balance and integrate efforts to shape the current environment with preparing to respond to potential contingencies."

(U) The JIPOE process, employed by organic CCMD all-source intelligence analysts and supported by other DIE elements, provides the basic data and assumptions regarding potential U.S. adversaries and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that help the CCDRs and staff execute their assigned planning tasks.

(U) The DoD has a mechanism already in-place to address the seemingly conflicting DNI and joint intelligence analytic training standards. The USD(I) has chartered the DoD Intelligence Training and Education Board (DITEB) to lead, in collaboration with the DoD intelligence and security components, the integration of the training, education, and professional development program of the DIE. One of the specified responsibilities
Finding B

of the DITEB is to coordinate with other components and non-DoD elements on issues of common concern.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation B.1

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop and issue enterprise standards for analytical professional development programs encompassing the educational requirements for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Training for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. This action should be accomplished in coordination with the Director, Joint Staff and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

(U) The USD (I) agreed with the need for appropriate JIPOE training for Defense Intelligence analysts and concurred with the recommendation that JIPOE training requirements be integrated into the standards for analytic professional development programs. However, they noted that while USD (I) oversees the joint intelligence training process, the Joint Staff is responsible for developing joint analytic training standards. As such the Director, Joint Staff, not the USD (I), was the appropriate designee, in coordination with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to implement this recommendation. They also recommended that the phrase “enterprise standards” be replaced with “joint standards”.

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

(U) The Director, DIA partially concurred and agreed that such an initiative is needed. However, in accordance with the Agency’s responsibility for developing DIE-
wide analytic training standards, the Director, DIA is the appropriate designee to implement the recommendation.

(U) Vice Director, Joint Staff

(U/FOUO) The Vice Director, Joint Staff concurred with the report and commented that standards for training of the Joint Force are set by the Joint Staff \(^7\), in collaboration with the Services and stakeholders and implemented by the Director, DIA.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the USD (I), Director, DIA, and the Joint Staff are partially responsive and we accept the suggestion from the Joint Staff to rephrase recommendation B.1. However, we still believe that the Department lacks clarity on who has the ultimate responsibility of ensuring joint analytic intelligence training standards are established and incorporated into Defense Intelligence Training programs. It is beyond the scope of our evaluation to adjudicate any dispute over primary OPR responsibility between the Joint Staff and the Director, DIA as the Functional Manager for Intelligence Analysis within the DIE for analytic training standards. Therefore, we request that the USD (I), Joint Staff, and the Director, DIA develop a POA&M on revised recommendation B.1 as indicated in the recommendations table on page iii by September XX, 2014.

(U) Revised Recommendation B.1

(U) We recommend that the USD (I) develop policy mandating joint intelligence standards, including JIPOE, be incorporated into Defense Intelligence training. Joint intelligence standards should be established by the Joint Staff, incorporated into overall DIE standards in conjunction with the Director, DIA as the Functional Manager for Intelligence Analysis, and training executed as required by the functional organization responsible.

(U) Recommendation B.2.A

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency complete the development and dissemination of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Finding B

Environment Computer Based Training, in CY 2014, and make it readily available to all Defense Intelligence Enterprise all-source analysts.

(U) Recommendation B.2.B

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency develop a POA&M to expand, highlight, integrate, and emphasize the critical role the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment process plays in the Department of Defense Campaign Planning environment during initial all-source intelligence analyst training, either in the Professional Analyst Career Education Program or the Defense Intelligence Strategic Analysis Program.

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

(U) The Director, DIA partially concurred with our recommendations. DIA believes that the entry-level PACE program's current treatment of JIPOE is adequate, particularly given the breadth of topics requiring coverage in PACE and because JIPOE is specifically a CCMD responsibility. However, DIA will explore adding JIPOE to the advanced PACE program currently in development and agrees with the recommendation for a JIPOE specialty course for those needing a more comprehensive treatment of the subject. DIA will also explore a JIPOE computer-based training course for DIE all-source analysts.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director, DIA are partially responsive. We agree that the entry-level PACE program's current treatment of JIPOE satisfies the intent of our recommendation. However, we request more specific details on the plan for incorporating a more comprehensive treatment of JIPOE into the advanced PACE program currently under development and therefore request a program of actions and milestones as indicated in the recommendations table on page iii by October 24, 2014. DIA did also agree to explore a JIPOE computer-based training course but our recommendation B.1 indicated that the JMITC course catalog listed this as a planned 2014 action. We request more information on whether the computer-based training course will be a stand-alone capability or will the content be incorporated into either the entry-level or advanced PACE programs.
Finding C

(U) The Defense Intelligence Enterprise is Providing Adequate Analytical Support to the Defense Acquisition Process, but Could be Improved

(U) We found no evidence that the analytical shortfalls identified in our "Assessment of DOD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities" report have resulted in a significant negative impact on the support that the DIE provides to the defense acquisition process. While our interviews with senior Service Acquisition decision makers' revealed overall intelligence-related shortfalls in the DoD acquisition system, we could not determine a specific linkage to our Phase One findings. Furthermore, most of the individuals in the organizations we interviewed were satisfied with the quality of support they received from the DIE.

(U) The Defense Acquisition System and Intelligence Support

(U) The Defense Acquisition System, as defined by DoDD 5000.01, is "...the management process by which DoD provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users." The specific support requirements for the DIE are found in DoDI 5000.02 "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 8 December 2008" Currently, the scope of intelligence support to acquisition programs is determined by the program's size with the largest--Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1, programs--receiving the most support. For these programs, intelligence analysis is provided at almost every stage of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process.

(U) The JCIDS process is very specific and involves many milestones and stages through which an acquisition program proceeds before it enters production and becomes operational. While a thorough description of the JCIDS process is beyond this report's scope, it is a well-established process that the DIE has historically supported.
Finding C

support typically consists of analyzing intelligence collected on foreign weapon system developments that may threaten the U.S. system’s ability to conduct its mission once operational and then throughout its life cycle.

(U) Intelligence threat analysis is conducted at different stages in a program’s development. The analysis in an early stage takes the form of a Capstone Threat Assessment providing an overview of threats to such areas of potential warfare, as air and land warfare, and information operations. Once a material solution is identified, threat analysis concentrates on a general assessment of the environment in which the system will operate and is embedded in such various requirements documents as the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), the Capabilities Development Document (CDD), and the Capabilities Production Document (CPD). As the weapon system takes shape and is further refined and its capabilities and operational parameters are determined, the threat analysis becomes more specific and tailored to the individual program. For larger programs, this analysis has typically been provided in the form of a System Threat Assessment Report (STAR).

(U) The DIE also supports the defense acquisition system with other intelligence products, such as intelligence mission data (IMD) and engineering, and test phase intelligence analysis. These other types of products overlap—putting them in categories would be oversimplifying matters. Often, raw intelligence data must be analyzed before it can be used in weapon system testing or be provided in the form of IMD. For this report’s purpose, we focused our efforts on the intelligence analysis that the DIE produced, and did not examine the provision of IMD to acquisition programs, as it was beyond this project’s scope. Our objective was to determine if our Phase One findings had a direct, causal relationship to providing intelligence analysis that the defense acquisition community requires.

(U) Continued Analytical Support to the Acquisition System

(U) We interviewed senior leaders in each Service Acquisition office to gain insight into how the DIE was currently providing analytic intelligence support for new systems development. We also interviewed senior representatives from offices responsible for
Finding C

system requirement development, and those associated with program development and sustainment to include the Program Executive Offices. We found no substantive evidence that the DIE provided a systematic reduction in the quantity or quality of analytic support.

(U) Our interviewees were uniformly satisfied with the analytical intelligence products provided for their programs. However, they did identify some aspects of their analytical requirements that were not completely satisfied. For example, one organization stated it had problems getting intelligence collection for specific electronic warfare signals to meet program testing requirements. In this case, the individuals interviewed could not identify why a requirements shortfall existed or if it only involved a case of conflicting intelligence collection priorities. Another organization said the analysis it received on foreign weapons systems

(U) This assessment was to determine if any of these identified shortfalls could be directly attributed to the Phase One findings—a lack of subject-matter expertise, or a misalignment of production priorities in DIAP. Our evaluation determined that these issues are part of the ongoing challenges of addressing competing priorities in the entire national intelligence community, and not a systematic breakdown in analytic support due to the DIE focus on satisfying crisis-intelligence requirements.

(U) Structural Analytical Challenges in the Acquisition Cycle

(U) Our evaluation did reveal one issue that many of the organizations identified as an evolving problem area. During the earliest phases of the acquisition process, a determination is made whether or not to seek a material solution to a potential gap in capability. Once a material solution is selected, it is further refined and eventually becomes a weapon-system program of record. At the initiation of Milestone B in the acquisition process, the weapon system is usually assigned a program office and enters the engineering and manufacturing development phase. By this point in the developmental cycle, major changes to the weapon system are highly unlikely without considerable risk to the acquisition and funding time-table. Many of the organizations
we interviewed identified a basic structural issue with the intelligence analysis provided. Early in the acquisition process, when intelligence information can have the biggest impact in shaping overall system development, Service Intelligence Centers managers told us that analysts have difficulty providing the desired intelligence insights because the weapon system is still in a conceptual phase. They said that significant analytic challenges are associated with comparing actual and/or potential adversarial capabilities against a conceptual program with evolving capabilities.

(U) For example, one DIE organization stated that assessing the capabilities of an [redacted]. As a result, the requirements community is forced to make decisions on developing weapon systems based largely on generic intelligence regarding the potential threat environment. When the refined weapon system has known capabilities and operating parameters, the DIE will then be able to refine the threat analysis to account for actual specifications. Using the previous example, once actual system data is available regarding radar cross section and counter-measures; the DIE provides tailored intelligence analysis comparing foreign threats to actual weapons system capabilities. However, a number of PEOs stated [redacted]

(U) Users of analytical information agreed that the DIE could help matters by providing more specific information earlier in the developmental process when it can better shape requirements. However, to achieve this end, the organization’s developing system requirements will have to work more closely with its DIE counterparts to better identify its critical intelligence needs. As an example of where this is already working, one U.S. Navy Program Office stated that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is producing [redacted]. This now routine
Finding C

interaction ensures that the intelligence analysts better understand the requirements under development, throughout the acquisition cycle. U.S. Navy requirements personnel were able to highlight the significance of intelligence gaps and refinement of intelligence collection that would not have been readily evident to intelligence analysts in the greater DIE. We were unable to visit every Service program office to determine if this intelligence/program office interaction was a common practice. The Service Acquisition Intelligence Directors told us that this high degree of interaction was rare and that, in fact, the levels of interaction greatly varied—usually with increases occurring in conjunction with large program decision milestones or in support of major documentation, such as STAR development.

(U) Increasing Analytical Requirements, Limited Analytical Resources

(U) One other concern several organizations raised involved the level of analytical effort required to support acquisition decision processes. In most cases, the service intelligence elements supporting their acquisition program offices are rather small—sometimes consisting of only intelligence analysts. These small organic elements are usually only a conduit to the greater DIE for general analytical intelligence production. These small groups of analysts are responsible for refining the general intelligence products based on their detailed knowledge of program-specific requirements. Many of our interviewees expressed concern that the workload to support ongoing and future acquisition programs with refined intelligence analysis will only increase. However, these Service intelligence elements also told us that the following factors were highlighted pointing to future requirement growth.

(U) A relatively new requirement being levied against all developmental systems is for Intelligence Mission Data (IMD). DoDD 5250.01, “Management of Intelligence Mission Data,” 22 January 2013, defines IMD as “DoD intelligence used for programming platform mission systems in development, testing, operations, and sustainment including, but not limited to, the functional areas of signatures, electronic warfare integrated reprogramming, order of battle, systems characteristics and performance
and geospatial intelligence." While reviewing the actual IMD process was not an objective of this evaluation, several intelligence organizations stated that the

Senior Service Intelligence Center managers told us that the

analytic community

(U) DoDI 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," 8 December 2008, mandates that a full STAR be written only for ACAT I programs. A shorter System Threat Assessment was required for ACAT II programs. For ACAT III and below, no specific threat assessment was required beyond those inputs to such requirements documents as the Capability Development Document and Capability Production Document. Senior Intelligence Managers said

These managers told us that this requirement would result in a

One Service intelligence organization told us that the number of STARs it supports in a year could jump from

(U) Finally, the development timeline of larger weapons systems has increased and, once operational, these systems have much longer life-cycles, which present a unique challenge to the DIE to estimate potential threats to these weapon systems much farther into the future—in some cases extending out to 30 years.
(U) Conclusions

(U) The DIE appears to have weathered the increased demand for all-source intelligence analysis to support the Global War on Terror, while at the same time, providing an adequate level of intelligence to the defense acquisition community. Our project scope was to determine if any perceived shortfalls were due to a lack of subject-matter expertise or a misalignment of production priorities in the DIE. We found no evidence to support that hypothesis; therefore, our evaluation results do not support any specific recommendations for this finding.

(U) We arrive at this judgment partially due to our view that the DIE is an integral component of the current acquisition community and processes for conducting intelligence analysis for acquisition programs are well understood. Also, the requirements for intelligence collection and analysis supporting new weapon system development usually falls into the category of "traditional" military intelligence analysis to include the deciphering of capabilities of potential adversarial weapons systems. Fortunately, the DIE today has extensive experience and the resident expertise for producing this type of intelligence;

(U) Finally, the Commander, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, said at a recent forum for DoD acquisition leaders that, "...the rate of technology advancement and proliferation is increasing. The importance of intelligence that enables mission capability and ensures our systems can meet the emerging threat has never been greater. The DoD and the Air Force... Addressing this issue starts during concept development and continues throughout the full life-cycle of modern weapons systems. Management of intelligence as a component of acquisition programs is important to ensuring our modern weapon systems are, in fact, intelligent."
(U) Other Observations

(U) Observation A

(S//NF) [Redacted]

(U) Management Comment

(S//NF) [Redacted]

(U) Observation B

(U) Intelligence Planning expertise and capacity have been significantly reduced in the DIE

(U) We were also informed by CCMD and Joint Staff representatives during the assessment that much like [Redacted] in the DIE.
(U) Conclusion

(U) We believe action should be taken to comprehensively address

Our observations track closely with previous Service, Joint Staff Combat Support Agency Review Teams, and General Accounting Office reports that already documented these serious shortfalls. Therefore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should immediately begin working with the Director, DIA, and the Uniformed Services to address these shortfalls. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should establish specific and intelligence planning training requirements for both uniformed and civilian intelligence analysts; incorporate these standards in the DIE professional education programs; and, establish career development policies to promote sustainment of these DIE core competencies.
(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) The evaluation was conducted from February 2013 to November 2013, in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation that the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency issued. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives.

(U) To achieve our objectives for the review of Intelligence Analysis support to Acquisition, we:

- (U) Reviewed DoD policy and directives, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions, and Defense Intelligence Enterprise procedures regarding intelligence analysis required to support the Defense Acquisition System

- (U) Interviewed U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force Service Acquisition Authority Principals and staff to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force Service Acquisition Management Commands responsible for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force Service Program Executive Office Principals and staff to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force Command future service requirements representatives to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force Command intelligence representatives to obtain their perspectives
(U) Interviewed U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force Service Intelligence Centers to obtain their perspectives

(U) To achieve our objectives for the review of Intelligence Analysis support to Campaign Planning, we:

- (U) Reviewed DoD, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) policy and doctrine regarding intelligence preparation of the operational environment, National Unified Intelligence Strategies, Defense Intelligence Strategies, intelligence community-wide lessons-learned papers, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans, and Defense Planning Guidance

- (U) Interviewed USSTRATCOM, USPACOM, and USTRANSCOM General Officers, Senior Executive Service, and Directors from the Operations, Plans, and Intelligence Directorates for their views on the current state of intelligence analysis in support of their GEF/JSCP tasked planning requirements

- (U) Interviewed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD (P)) representatives from Strategy, Plans, and Forces to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD (I)) representatives from Warfighter Support and Intelligence Strategy, Programs, and Resources to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed ODNI National Intelligence Managers to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed CJCS J-2, J-3, J-5, and J-8 Directors and Staff Officers to obtain their perspectives

- (U) Interviewed Service Intelligence Personnel to obtain their perspectives
• (U) Interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency representatives from the Directorate of Analysis; Defense Intelligence Office; Joint Warfighter Support; Collection Management; Office of Training, Education, and Development; and multiple Regional Intelligence Centers to obtain their perspectives.

(U) Limitations

(U) We did not evaluate the actual intelligence analysis that the DIE produced for ongoing acquisition programs or operational CCMD planning efforts. Our efforts were focused on identifying whether the key findings from Phase I of this project also affected the intelligence community’s ability to provide intelligence analysis to these two key DoD mission activities.
(U) Appendix B

(U) Background

(U) This assessment was originally initiated in response to requests/recommendations from multiple CCMD staffs and was intended to complement the then-draft 2012 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence "Review of Defense Intelligence Analysis." Representatives from OUSD (I) Defense Analysis and this office met early in 2012 to deconflict focus areas in order to minimize duplication of effort.

(U) During our initial project’s field work, multiple leaders in the DIE expressed concern about the expertise that the DIE possesses and the prioritizing of analytic efforts to support defense acquisition processes.

(U) Our interviews with CCMDs, Service Intelligence Centers, and selected DIA offices revealed that the DIE has expertise. Our interviewees offered subjective and anecdotal reasons for these shortfalls. In addition to concerns expressed about analytic capability to support current and future acquisition efforts, these same interviewees also felt that

(U) Multiple CCMDs also expressed concerns that certain DIAP analytic time-frame reporting requirements were inconsistent with the Joint Strategic Capability Plans and Guidance for Employment of Force-mandated OPLAN/CONPLAN intelligence production requirements.

(U) Our assessment interviews revealed general concerns from CCMD J-2, J-3, and J-5 personnel about the current DIAP management guidance for the Geographic CCMD (GCC) JIOCs. Specifically, these representatives detailed how to satisfy current JSCP and GEF
requirements. During our interviews, we were unable to solicit specific instances where the DIAP guidance affected a command's OPLAN/CONPLAN development. Therefore, we made no judgment at that time on the validity of these concerns.

(U) Conclusion

(U) Because our assessment's original scope and methodology precluded us from gathering objective data about shortfalls in specific acquisition intelligence analytic programs, we felt it appropriate to capture their concerns as Observation I in the final report.

(U) We were also unable to gather objective data about specific CCMD OPLAN/CONPLAN intelligence analytic requirements and potential shortfalls. But we captured these concerns as Observation II in the final report.

(U) This assessment was therefore initiated to specifically address these two issues and is hereby referred to as Phase II of this project.
August 19, 2014

SUBJECT: Response to DoD IG Draft Report Assessing the Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II

This memorandum responds to the request for comments on DoD IG Project No. DOD-2012-000100-0186.01, “Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II.” OSD Policy was requested to comment on “Finding A,” recommending an overarching policy to prioritize competing intelligence requirements. We concur with the concept that a clearly stated set of integrated intelligence priorities is critical to effectively managing limited analytic resources. Because the Combatant Command planning community represents one of many components of the Department’s intelligence customer base, its priorities must be appropriately integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set of integrated intelligence priorities. Accordingly, we believe a product that integrates the intelligence requirements derived from a wide range of sources, including from Combatant Commands, would be valuable to the development of these integrated priorities.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy defers to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) on matters of intelligence. OUSDP will continue to support OUSDI’s efforts to ensure that the priorities of all of the Department’s intelligence stakeholders are accounted for as part of the intelligence analysis process.

Attachment:
As stated
MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS)

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Draft Report, "Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities, Phase II" (Project No. D2012-000000-0186.91)

(U//FOUO) Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the subject report. Our comments below are keyed to those recommendations calling for action by OUSD(I):

- **Recommendation A (Intelligence prioritization guidance):** We concur that a clear set of integrated intelligence priorities is critical to managing analytic resources. We also concur that a product integrating the intelligence requirements from the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capability Plan would be a valuable input to the development of these integrated priorities. Accordingly, we will fully support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s efforts. However, it is important to realize that the Combatant Command planning community represents only one component of the Department’s intelligence customer base and their priorities must be integrated with those of other Department customers in arriving at our overall set of integrated intelligence priorities.

- **Recommendation B.1. (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JPOE) training standards):** We agree with the need for appropriate JPOE training for Defense Intelligence analysts and concur with the recommendation that JPOE training requirements be integrated into the standards for analytic professional development programs. However, while the USD(I) oversees the joint intelligence training process, the Joint Staff is responsible for developing joint analytic training standards. As such, the Director, Joint Staff, not the USD(I), is the appropriate designee, in coordination with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to implement this recommendation. We also recommend the phrase “enterprise standards” in line two of the recommendation be changed to “joint standards”.

We would also like to comment on Observation A regarding "-

..."
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

(U) Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on these recommendations.
My point of contact is (redacted).

[Signature]
HM Higgins
Director for Defense Intelligence
(Intelligence & Security)
To: Ms. Margaret R. Posa
Acting Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Evaluations
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Subject: Defense Intelligence Agency Response to the Department of Defense Inspector General Report, "Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities, Phase II"


1. As requested in the Reference, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides the following comments regarding report recommendations A, B.1, and B.2.

2. Recommendation A. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), DIA, the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and the Joint Staff, develop a policy to prioritize competing intelligence requirements resulting from Guidance for Employment of Force and Joint Strategic Capability Plan planning tasks.

3. Recommendation B.1. USD(I) develop and issue Enterprise standards for professional development and analytic professional development programs encompassing educational requirements for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

training. This action should be accomplished in coordination with the Director, Joint Staff, and the Director, DIA.

a. DIA partially concurs with this recommendation. DIA agrees that such an initiative is needed. However, in accordance with the Agency's responsibility for developing DIE-wide analytic training standards, the Director, DIA, is the appropriate designee to implement this recommendation.

4. Recommendation 8.2. DIA complete development and dissemination of JJPOE computer-based training in calendar year 2014 and make it readily available to all DIE all-source analysts. DIA develop a plan of action and milestones to expand, highlight, integrate, and emphasize the role JJPOE has in the DoD campaign planning environment during the initial all-source analyst training, either in the Professional Analyst Career Education (PACE) program or the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program.

a. DIA partially concurs with this recommendation. DIA believes that the entry-level PACE program’s current treatment of JJPOE is adequate, particularly given the breadth of topics requiring coverage in PACE and because JJPOE is specifically a CCMD responsibility. However, DIA will explore adding JJPOE to the advanced PACE program currently in development and agrees with the recommendation for a JJPOE specialty course for those needing a more comprehensive treatment of the subject. DIA will also explore a JJPOE computer-based training course for DIE all-source analysts.

5. The DIA point of contact for this matter is [Signature] Director for Analysis.

David R. Shedd
Acting Director
MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Draft DODIG "Assessment Of Department Of Defense Long Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Phase II," July 7, 2014

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject report. Based on a review within the Joint Staff and at the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Joint Staff concurs with the report and offers one comment.

3. I have enclosed the responses from the CCMDs for your consideration. My point of contact for this topic is Rear Admiral Paul Becker, USN; Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; 703-693-1424.

FREDERICK S. RUDESHEIM
Major General, USA
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Attachment:
CCMD Responses
# (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAT</td>
<td>Acquisition Category</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Computer Based Training</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Capabilities Development Document</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Centers of Gravity</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Capabilities Production Document</td>
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<td>DIAP</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Analysis Program</td>
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<td>Defense Intelligence Enterprise</td>
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<td>Defense Intelligence Strategic Analysis Program</td>
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<td>Dynamic Threat Assessment</td>
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<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>Initial Capabilities Document</td>
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<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>Intelligence Mission Data</td>
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<td>JCIDS</td>
<td>Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<td>JIOC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Operations Center</td>
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<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment</td>
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<td>JMITC</td>
<td>Joint Military Intelligence Training Center</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operational Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Capability Plan</td>
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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Program</td>
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<td>Operations Plan</td>
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<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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U.S. Department of Defense

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