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## *Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture*

### Insights, Issues and Implications

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# **Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture – Insights, Issues, and Implications**

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# **Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture**

## **Some Implications**

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## ***Background and Roadmap to this Report***

Over the past year, Science Applications International Corporation has explored “foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture.” This project was undertaken for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). This briefing book sets out the results of our research.

More specifically, the report is organized into three sections. After highlighting the most critical findings of the project, Section I discusses some possible implications for future U.S. policy of this exploration of foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Section II comprises a more comprehensive Executive Briefing of the study’s results, including both discussion of a series of cross-cutting themes and a set of one-page summaries for specific key countries. Section III provides more detailed results respectively for countries of the P-5, Europe (including NATO), Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and Canada and Latin America. The Appendix sets out a description of U.S. policy and posture based on open source documents.

### ***Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture – A Snapshot of the Results***

To tap foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture, the study team relied on a mix of written and recorded sources as well as discussions with 75-100 persons individually and in larger groups.<sup>1</sup> The views were examined of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, allies and friends as well as potential adversaries, developed and developing countries, “old” and “new” NATO members, and countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Both the availability of research materials and overall resource limitations influenced the breadth and depth of the analysis. For some countries, there was a great deal of information available; for other countries, considerably less so. Some individual sources clearly were more authoritative than others. Foreign commentary on U.S. nuclear policy and posture also ebbs and flows with critical events – and also must be viewed within the broader geopolitical context.

A number of key themes and patterns, emphases and concerns, nonetheless, clearly stand out across the specific country assessments and from the overall analysis. In particular, these key themes include:

#### **Foreign Perspectives on ...**

- The Nuclear Posture Review – and U.S. nuclear policy *writ large*
- Role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy
- The threshold of nuclear use and nuclear modernization
- The importance of extended nuclear deterrence
- NATO’s nuclear role
- The requirements of credible deterrence
- The role of missile defenses in the New Triad
- Plus interactions of advanced conventional weapons and missile defenses
- Implications for regional and global stability, including for the policies of other nuclear weapons states and not least, for nuclear non-proliferation

<sup>1</sup> Other members of the study team included Mr. Gregory Giles, Mr. Jeffrey Larsen, and Mr. Thomas Skypek. In addition, staff members of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute provided research inputs on specific countries’ attitudes.

- *Other countries view U.S. nuclear policy through the lens of an overall perception of U.S. foreign and defense policies*, widely viewed as entailing U.S. unilateralism as well as a U.S. pursuit of absolute security and military primacy;
- There is a widespread perception that the United States is placing *heightened emphasis on nuclear weapons* as part of overall U.S. defense posture, shifting from a posture of nuclear deterrence to one of nuclear war-fighting if not nuclear preemption, while intentionally or unintentionally lowering the threshold of nuclear weapons use;
- *U.S. allies and friends increasingly welcome cooperation on missile defenses* with the United States and largely acknowledge that their earlier fears of the dire destabilizing consequences of U.S. pursuit of missile defenses have proved unfounded;
- *Russia and China are closely watching the scope, pace, and locations of missile defense deployments*, though their earlier concerns about U.S. defenses have been somewhat abated by the technical and operational constraints that are seen to have slowed and shaped U.S. deployments;
- The United States is widely perceived to be seeking to *escape from deterrence relationships* with new adversary nuclear powers such as North Korea and Iran, whether by more effective proliferation prevention, possible military preemption, or effective defenses;
- *Russia and China also are uncertain about whether a perceived U.S. attempt to escape from deterrence relationships applies to them* – and not only to the so-called “rogues;”
- Ongoing Russian and Chinese decisions about their strategic modernization will be *influenced by their perceptions of U.S. strategic intent, plans, and commitments*;
- *U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is seen as essential to security by Japan, Turkey, the new NATO members, and Australia* – but in both Japan and Turkey, questions have begun to surface about the credibility of that U.S. nuclear guarantee;
- *Within the Japanese defense community*, there is a clear interest in U.S.-Japan discussions of the types of conflict scenarios that could bring the American nuclear guarantee into play as one means to *demonstrate and buttress the credibility of extended deterrence*;
- *For other U.S. non-nuclear allies, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is seen as less critical* in today’s post-Cold War world;

- With occasional exceptions, *U.S. allies and friends oppose U.S. development of new, tailored, low-yield nuclear weapons* as unnecessary, potentially dangerous, politically divisive, and adversely impacting non-proliferation;
- Among Russian and Chinese experts and officials as well as among some U.S. allies, there is *uneasiness about the unintended risks of deploying ballistic missiles with conventional warheads* as part of the future U.S. strategic posture;
- There are *widespread concerns* among U.S. allies and friends (not simply among the traditional disarmament activists) *about possible adverse non-proliferation impacts* of a U.S. nuclear policy and posture perceived to be giving nuclear weapons a heightened security role;
- As seen by close U.S. allies and friends, the United States needs to *be smarter* in dealing with other countries' perspectives on nuclear issues and *to listen more* to other countries' views;
- Again from close U.S. allies, their final message for U.S. officials is that a *greater U.S. readiness to engage on nuclear disarmament issues would pay off in increased support from other third parties in pursuing U.S. non-proliferation objectives.*

### ***Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture – Some Implications***

Different individuals will draw their own implications from this report's exploration of foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Partly to stimulate thinking and debate about such implications, the following sets out one such evaluation of "what does it all mean?" All readers will not necessarily agree with each and every judgment set out, which reflect the views of the author not necessarily all of the project team or the project's sponsors.

*Periodically Define and Explain U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture.* The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, including especially its articulation of a New Triad of offensive operations, defenses, and responsive infrastructure, was an important shift of U.S. nuclear policy and posture. For the NPR's authors, part of the purpose of the NPR and the New Triad was to foster a wider analytic and public debate on the "big nuclear questions" – the future role of nuclear weapons, the limits of deterrence, the interaction of defenses and deterrence, the trade-offs of advanced conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, and the requirements of credible nuclear deterrence in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. This public debate never occurred. Instead, after the early 2002 public briefing of elements of the NPR, high-level official articulation of U.S. nuclear policy virtually ceased. In that regard, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review makes but one passing reference to nuclear weapons in stating that the future U.S. force will include: "... maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent, which remains a keystone of U.S. national power."

The absence of periodic high-level official explanation of U.S. nuclear policy and posture has proved costly. First, without such presentations, publics and officials at home and abroad have had to draw their own conclusions about U.S. nuclear policy and posture, frequently based on partial or even potentially misleading information. Second, failure to build on the NPR’s effort to foster a wider debate on the “big nuclear questions” has meant that no consensus on today’s role of nuclear weapons has been fostered among U.S. and allied publics and governments. But this lack of a consensus makes it more difficult to address some of the key security issues ahead. Third, this lack of authoritative official explanation has contributed to uncertainties in other key countries about U.S. strategic intentions and plans, not least in both Russia and China.

*Don’t Let Misperceptions or False Assertions Go Unanswered.* The project revealed several important and widespread misperceptions about U.S. nuclear policy and posture. The allegations that the United States is seeking to lower the nuclear threshold and that U.S. policy no longer regards nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort stand out in this regard. Similarly, the perception that the United States is preparing for nuclear preemption conflates the 2001 NPR and the announcement of a U.S. doctrine of preemption that followed shortly thereafter.

Too often, however, U.S. officials have let such claims go unanswered when they are made in public forums, whether multilateral negotiating bodies, international meetings, or expert conferences. Sometimes, there has been bureaucratic resistance to using senior officials to explain U.S. policies and posture. By failing to respond publicly and strongly to these types of misperceptions, however, the United States has allowed others to define the public picture of U.S. nuclear policy. Thus, closely related to the preceding, one clear lesson for the future is to be prepared to respond to such misperceptions and allegations to set the record straight.

*Use Multiple Forums and Venues to Set Out the U.S. Record.* The widespread foreign perception that U.S. nuclear policy and posture adversely affects global non-proliferation efforts partly reflects disagreements between U.S. and foreign officials on the impact of the nuclear policies and postures of the existing nuclear weapon states on the proliferation decisions of other countries. But it also reflects a lack of understanding of the many actions that have been taken by the United States over the past decade to roll back the Cold War U.S. nuclear posture – in terms of reductions of deployed nuclear weapons, eliminations of nuclear weapons, changes in alert levels, phasing out of infrastructure, and other steps. This lack of understanding exists despite the fact that every five years within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, U.S. officials have presented information papers on U.S. actions to implement the disarmament obligations of NPT Article VI.

Looking ahead, the responsibility for setting out the U.S. record should not be viewed solely as a five-yearly “NPT diplomacy matter.” Instead, there should be a broader and continuing senior-level, public diplomacy effort to describe and explain that record as well as overall U.S. nuclear posture. Bilateral exchanges with key countries,

multiple multilateral forums (from NATO to regional forums), periodic official statements, and the NPT process all could be used. In turn, in making such presentations, it would be easier to influence foreign perspectives by presenting as much detailed information as possible.

*Recognize Disagreements – and Respond Appropriately.* Nonetheless, in some areas, the United States and some of its allies and friends simply disagree about issues of nuclear policy and posture. It is not a question of their misperceiving U.S. policy or of U.S. officials doing a better job at explaining U.S. policies and actions. For example, with isolated exceptions, as already noted, U.S. allies do not believe that the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence requires the development and deployment of a new generation of tailored, very low-yield nuclear weapons. Similarly, they do not share U.S. skepticism about the non-proliferation payoffs of engaging in the nuclear disarmament process. They also are more prepared to believe that more formal nuclear agreements between the United States and Russia – or at least a more regularized process of managing the rollback of the two countries’ Cold War nuclear postures – still has a role to play. Differences persist, as well, on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Confronting not misperception but disagreement, the right U.S. response likely varies. Sometimes, the best response may be to agree to disagree (e.g., regarding the linkage between deterrence and specifics of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities). At other times, it may be possible to narrow the gap between U.S. and other countries’ positions at an acceptable price (e.g., in terms of more rhetorical acceptance of nuclear disarmament as an ultimate very long-term goal if not also engagement in certain aspects of the nuclear negotiations process). In all cases, there may be benefits to be gained from being perceived at least to listen to the views of allies and friends in this area.

*Seek to Lessen Uncertainties about U.S. Intentions, Plans, and Programs.* Both Russian and Chinese officials remain uncertain about longer-term U.S. strategic policy and posture. This is reflected in Russian concerns about U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy and Chinese concerns about the impact of U.S. advanced conventional weapons and defenses on their limited nuclear deterrent. Such uncertainties, as Russian and Chinese officials both argue, could lead to actions and reactions that would serve neither U.S., Russian, or Chinese interests.

For Russia, the resumption of a serious U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue would provide an initial step to lessen such uncertainty. It could be accompanied by agreement on mutual restraints, including possibly a post-2009 transparency regime to replace START I. Doing so would be consistent with pursuit of the oft-articulated goal of a non-adversarial strategic relationship between the two former Cold War adversaries.

For China, its uncertainty partly reflects uncertainty in American thinking about U.S. goals for the longer-term U.S.-Chinese strategic relationship. Even so, the decision taken by Presidents Bush and Hu in April, 2006 to initiate a strategic dialogue may offer a means to address not only Chinese uncertainty about U.S. intentions, plans, and programs but U.S. uncertainty about those of China. Notwithstanding past Chinese

resistance to the concept of greater transparency, their interest in lessening their own uncertainties about U.S. intentions and programs could provide an incentive. As appropriate, this dialogue could go on to explore actions that either or both countries might take to enhance mutual predictability and to foster a non-adversarial longer-term strategic relationship. At the same time, it would be important to steer clear of more traditional Cold War adversarial arms control, which could reinforce mutual suspicions.

*Step up to Today's Extended Deterrence Challenges.* Given the importance of a credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for the future security of Japan and Turkey, a key part of managing extended deterrence in the future will be to put in place means to help demonstrate that credibility. For Japan, options range from additional affirmation of the U.S. nuclear guarantee through the type of discussion of nuclear scenarios being informally suggested by some Japanese defense officials to institutionalization of exchanges on nuclear deterrence matters. For Turkey, thinking is needed about how to leverage the full spectrum of potential deterrence assets – those of the United States, NATO, the United Kingdom, and France – to convey the right assurance message. Success is essential to contain the risk that either country could seek its own nuclear deterrent out of fear of newly-nuclear neighbors. Indeed, conveying this deterrence message could well contribute to rolling back the nuclear programs of both North Korea and Iran by signaling that “they shall not gain.”

Similarly, in light of the perceived importance of a U.S.-NATO nuclear tie in the thinking of “new” NATO members, how best to provide that tie in a changed environment also needs to be addressed. What if any nuclear role might be played by such “new” NATO members will be a key issue. Equally important, any such steps would need to be balanced against Russian concerns and the need to work toward a non-adversarial U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.

At the same time, the relative decline in the perceived importance of extended nuclear deterrence in the thinking of many “old” NATO countries – combined with the upcoming need to replace dual-capable aircraft in those countries – calls into question pursuit of a “don’t rock the boat posture” on extended deterrence in Europe. It is none too soon to address this issue of NATO’s future nuclear role, first within the U.S. government and then within the Alliance. Absent a new consensus on extended deterrence, the NATO members could well find themselves on a glide path toward the end of a NATO nuclear mission.

*Don't Overstretch on Defenses.* Statements by various experts and officials strongly suggest that one reason for the new-found support for missile defenses among U.S. allies – as well as the lessened concern in Russia and China – is a perception of U.S. defenses as limited. In part, those limits have resulted from technical and operational difficulties; in part, those limits also reflect the spiral development nature of the U.S. program. But the ultimate scope and objectives of the U.S. missile defense program remains an open question to some degree. Given the foreign perspectives examined here, it should be assumed that at some point an expanding commitment to missile defenses

would once again meet renewed opposition from U.S. allies and stepped up responses from Russia and China.

*Address Concerns about Conventional Ballistic Missiles.* In differing degrees, other countries are uneasy about U.S. consideration of putting conventional warheads on longer-range ballistic missiles. These countries' concerns need to be addressed in two ways. On the one hand, the potential benefits of such a capability should be argued, not least in terms of filling a gap in U.S. options to strike fleeting, very high value terrorist or WMD targets. On the other hand, U.S. officials should continue to make clear to all concerned U.S. readiness to put in place assurance measures with Russia and China that would reduce to an absolute minimum any risk of unintended consequences from the launch of conventional ballistic missile.

*Rethink the U.S. Approach to the Nuclear Disarmament Debate.* This is the most controversial potential implication of this exploration of foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture. To paraphrase a retired senior official of a close U.S. ally: "If you want other countries to work your issues, then you need to help them work their issues." One such issue for other countries has been affirmation of and incremental pursuit of the ultimate goal articulated in Article VI of the NPT of a world without nuclear weapons. For those other countries, there is no expectation that such a world would be reached anytime soon; but there is an expectation that the United States would support that goal and play a leadership role in moving incrementally toward it.

As already stated, U.S. officials can do a better job in setting out the U.S. record in rolling back the Cold War nuclear posture. Misperceptions and false charges can be answered and not left sitting on the table. In addition, three other closely-related steps should be explored consistent with the foreign advice set out above.

First, unlike its predecessors in the nuclear age, the Bush Administration has not been prepared to affirm that the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons is a U.S. goal. Whether at the presidential level or some other senior level, such a reaffirmation of a long-standing U.S. position would be one way to help those U.S. allies and friends with strong domestic disarmament constituencies to work their issues.

Second, U.S. officials should join the debate on nuclear disarmament by setting out the many different political, technical, and military conditions that would have to be met even to contemplate a radical transformation of today's nuclear postures. By doing so, the United States would help to shift the terms of the nuclear disarmament debate in a more realistic direction. Equally important, the very fact of taking seriously other countries' views and responding to them would again help those others to work their issues.

Third, there is a need to define a realistic middle ground for shaping the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relationships between the adversarial arms control approach of the Cold War years and the nuclear laissez-faire of the past half decade. The former approach no longer fits with the strategic challenges of today; the latter approach has not

prevented the emergence of potentially damaging nuclear anxieties among all three parties. Defining such a middle ground would be valuable in and of itself to help reduce potentially destabilizing strategic uncertainties. But it also would be welcomed by those other countries whose support the United States needs to confront today's proliferation challenges, including the support of Russia and China as well as U.S. allies. Not least, such a process of strategic engagement with Russia and China likely would make it easier to win support at home for other U.S. strategic policy and posture objectives.

*A Wake-up Call.* There are both challenges and opportunities reflected in the foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Perhaps above all, the results sketched above and set out in increasingly greater detail in the following two sections of this report are a wake-up call. It is increasingly important to turn U.S. attention once again to creative engagement on strategic issues with U.S. allies and friends, with Russia and China, and with the wider set of nations whose support also is needed to confront successfully the security dangers of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

# **Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture – Key Findings and Themes**

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**Executive Briefing**

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# Outline

- o **Background**
- o **Key cross-cutting themes**
- o **Some Implications for U.S. Policies**
- 
- o **Backup – Some key country summaries**
  - Russia
  - China
  - UK
  - Germany
  - Other “Old” NATO
  - New “NATO”
  - Japan
  - Iran

# Background

## **Focus on Foreign Perspectives in Following Areas**

- o **The Nuclear Posture Review – and U.S. nuclear policy *writ large***
- o **Role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy**
- o **The threshold of nuclear use and nuclear modernization**
- o **The importance of extended nuclear deterrence**
  - NATO's nuclear role
- o **The requirements of credible deterrence**
- o **The role of missile defenses in the New Triad**
  - Plus interactions of advanced conventional weapons and missile defenses
- o **Implications for regional and global stability**
  - Policies of other nuclear weapons states
  - Non-proliferation

## Methodology

- **Survey of written materials, recorded speeches**
  - Sought to be as comprehensive as possible – as long as linked to perceptions of U.S. nuclear policy or posture
    - » Nearly 50 countries, varied material available
- **Complemented with selected interviews with 75-100 persons, individually and in groups**
  - Officials and experts, military and civilians
  - Guided by a set of questions to explore
  - In-country and leveraging opportunities
  - Interviews extended far beyond the “nuclear disarmament supporters”
- **Product – short overview essay, executive briefing, plus comprehensive country-by-country briefing book**

## Caveats

- o **Presenting a snapshot of foreign perceptions:**
  - Shaped by 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, 2005 Joint Publication 3-12 on Nuclear Operations, other salient events
  - Some things left out, some things included – whether intentionally or not
- o **Overall, authoritative sources – but some more so, sometimes**
  - Plus more information for some countries
- o **On occasion, obvious disconnects, some ulterior motives behind their message being sent**

*Broad themes and patterns, emphases and concerns clearly emerge – from credible overall set of sources*

## **Key Findings and Themes**

## Key Findings and Themes (1): Context

- o Foreign commentary on U.S. nuclear policy ebbs and flows – and is often triggered by immediate context
  - Initial flurry after Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) unclassified briefing and subsequent leak – 2002
  - Revived with Joint Pub 3-12 on Nuclear Operations -- 2005
  - For Russia, speculation in journal Foreign Affairs about U.S. nuclear primary -- 2006
- o Statements should be viewed in a broader geopolitical context -- views of U.S. foreign and defense policies
  - Alleged U.S. unilateralism, pursuit of absolute military superiority and global primacy

## **Key Findings and Themes (2): Different Types**

- o Four broad types of foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture
  - Misperceptions
  - Disagreements
  - Uncertainties
  - Agreements

**All with implications for U.S. strategic engagement with allies, friends, and others**

## **Key Findings and Themes (3): Perceived Heightened Nuclear Emphasis**

- Widespread perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. nuclear policy
  - Increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons
  - Shift from nuclear weapons for deterrence and as weapons of last resort to nuclear weapons for war-fighting roles and first-use
    - » Including against NNWS
  - Lowering nuclear threshold – intentionally or unintentionally
  - Blurring difference between nuclear and conventional weapons – use whatever “fits best”

**Overall, still watching and waiting on where  
Reliable Replacement Warhead fits**

## **Key Findings and Themes (4): Defenses**

- o **Missile defenses increasingly welcomed by U.S. allies and friends**
  - Recognition that worst fears not realized surrounding U.S. ABM Treaty withdrawal
  - Plus changing threat perceptions – not least in Asia
  - Plus more modest technical progress recognized
- o **Missile defenses still a concern to Russia and China**
  - Though somewhat abated by limited technical and operational progress, so far limited deployments
  - Both countries watching scope and pace of future developments

## **Key Findings and Themes (5): Escaping Deterrence Relationships**

- **Perceived U.S. desire to escape from deterrence relationships with new nuclear powers**
  - Via mix of capabilities of New Triad – especially advanced conventional strike and defenses
  - Via preemption and prevention
- **Uncertainty in China and Russia – does this attempt to escape from deterrence apply to us?**
  - Or, how far can – does – perceived U.S. pursuit of absolute security and nuclear primacy extend?

## Key Findings and Themes (6): U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence

- o Importance of U.S. extended deterrence perceived to vary for U.S. allies and friends
  - For NATO members “to the East”, Turkey, Japan, Australia matters a great deal; for Western European NATO, much less so; for South Korea , increasingly important
- o Credibility of extended deterrence not seen closely linked to nuclear modernization
  - Overall, “no sale” among allies and friends on new types of tailored nuclear weapons
    - » But occasional exceptions – including “musings” in Japan
    - » But belief that despite Congressional opposition, U.S. will find a way to pursue “new” low-yield nuclear weapons
- Willingness to run risks, habits and structures of defense cooperation (including missile defense and shared roles and missions) more important than specifics of nuclear arsenal

## Key Findings and Themes (7): Stability Implications

- Widespread concerns expressed about stability implications of U.S. nuclear policy and posture
  - Stability implications of defenses less than predicted – but both Russia and China closely watching
  - Unintended risks of conventional ballistic missile option
  - Other old and new nuclear powers learn “wrong lessons”
    - need, uses, and usability of nuclear weapons
  - Undermining non-proliferation efforts and the NPT
    - » Nuclear modernization claimed at odds with Article VI
    - » Signals sent, lessons taught about utility and usability of nuclear weapons – to NNWS, to new nuclear states
    - » Alleged practical payoffs of engaging on nuclear disarmament issues often cited but without specifics

## Key Findings and Themes (8): Wild Cards

- o China's nuclear modernization said linked to advances of U.S. missile defenses and advanced conventional capabilities
  - Facing perceived U.S. nuclear warfighting doctrine
  - Tempered by belief in “manageability” of Taiwan
- o Russia's nuclear and related strategic investments
  - Restoring capabilities without unnerving onlookers
- o Perceived European desire not to rock the NATO nuclear boat
  - Becoming less sustainable given aging DCA?
- o Differences between U.S. and ally/friend over nuclear threats or use
  - US-ROK (v. response to CBW), US-Taiwan (in cross-Strait crisis)

## **Key Findings and Themes (9): Some Advice from Close U.S. Friends**

*Be  
Smarter*

*and*

*Listen  
More*

*Plus*

**“If you want other countries to help work your issues [non-proliferation], then you need to help them work their issues [public-political support for a nuclear disarmament process and actions]”**

## **Some Implications for U.S. Policies**

## **Do a Better Job at Articulating U.S. Nuclear Policy**

- o **Important periodically to define and articulate U.S. nuclear policy and posture**
  - And not to let misperceptions or false assertions go unanswered – at home, abroad
- o **If U.S. does not articulate clearly its own nuclear policy**
  - Foreign publics and governments will have to draw their own conclusions – not always correctly
  - Others will define the public picture of U.S. policy – including others with their own agendas
  - Others will dominate the debate on the “big nuclear questions” abroad – and make it harder to create a consensus at home
- o **Should use multiple forums – not simply the NPT context**

## Recognize Disagreements Exist – and Respond Appropriately

- **Making our case sometimes can clear up misperceptions and gain greater acceptance of U.S. nuclear policy and posture**
  - Example: misperception of heightened nuclear emphasis
  - Example: allegations of lack of Article VI disarmament actions
- **Nonetheless, disagreements on nuclear policy with allies, friends, others do exist**
  - It is *not* simply a need for better public diplomacy, for playing the disarmament game “smarter”
- **We should seek to narrow those gaps**
  - But it sometimes may be better to agree to disagree
    - » But still listen

## Seek to Reduce Uncertainties

- Should seek to reduce other countries' uncertainties about U.S. intentions, plans, and programs
  - Not doing so could have unintended spillovers for U.S.-Russian non-adversarial relationship – and same with China
  - Not doing so could adversely affect other U.S. strategic objectives, e.g., development of CTM, RRW
- Partly requires *choices on our part*, e.g., our vision of future U.S.-Russian, U.S.-China strategic relationships
  - Plus strategic engagement (see below)

## Step up to Today's Extended Nuclear Deterrence Challenges

- **Strengthened U.S.-Japan nuclear security relationship**
  - U.S. nuclear guarantee still Japan's preferred option
  - But signs of internal discussion of credibility – and how best to enhance
    - » Interest in U.S.-Japan dialogue on nuclear scenarios
  - Plus how to convince China this relationship serves its interests, too?
- **Reaffirming extended nuclear deterrence with Turkey**
  - Extended nuclear deterrence provides preferred option
    - » But unwillingness of NATO pre-Iraq war to reaffirm Article V and move PAC-3 to Turkey deeply offended
  - Need to think through how to leverage full set of available deterrent capabilities – U.S., NATO, UK, France

## Pursue Sustained Strategic Dialogues with Russia and China – to Reduce Uncertainty

- o Leveraging restored U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue
  - Context: Nuclear “hidden hand” has not led to the “withering away of nuclear anxieties”
  - Objectives:
    - » Narrowly defined: What to do with START I post 2009
    - » Broadly defined: How to reduce and stabilize longer-term nuclear balance – and build non-adversarial relationship
- o Nurturing an U.S.-China strategic dialogue
  - Context: Unresolved strategic futures on both sides
  - Objectives:
    - » Narrowly defined: exploring differences, clarifying plans
    - » Broadly defined: cooperative security management to avoid increasing strategic competition

**One bottom line: foreign perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy underline the importance of creative strategic engagement – with allies, friends, and other critical countries**

## **Some Key Country Summaries**

## Russian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Context: U.S. pursuit of absolute supremacy, global primacy, and ulterior motives toward Russia
  - But global nuclear war improbable; terrorism greatest threat
- U.S. seeks to escape mutual deterrence – but will fail
- Concern about defenses (numbers, scope, type), seen directed at Russia – but partly discounted by technical-operational skepticism
- U.S. reducing nuclear threshold and blurring line between nuclear and conventional weapons
  - Expanded U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons – no longer only means of deterrence
- New low-yield weapons seen as threat to Russia – as well as advanced conventional weapons
  - Despite Russian pursuit of new types of nuclear weapons
  - Congress' opposition will not stop U.S. program
- U.S. New Triad and nuclear posture undermines stability
  - Expressed concern about disarming strike despite statements that large-scale threat to Russia improbable

## Chinese Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Context: Perceived U.S. pursuit of absolute security
- Concerned about impact of offenses and defenses on China's nuclear deterrent – but more muted now
  - Likely reflects assessment of state of U.S. missile defenses – program scope, technical status, not in space
- Criticism of U.S. lowering nuclear threshold with widely perceived first use doctrine
  - Occasional voices noting constraints on Presidential decision to use nuclear weapons
- Chinese posture will adapt as necessary to U.S. nuclear policies – and maintain its nuclear deterrent
  - Stick for now with no first use policy
  - “Pace not race” – minimum capability, no rush to retaliate
- Uneasiness about adverse stability impacts of U.S. policy – other nuclear powers, NPT

## United Kingdom Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o Broader context shapes attitudes to U.S. nuclear policy
  - Distrust of Bush Administration post-Iraq
- o Defenses no longer feared as destabilizing
- o Extended deterrence still important – with link to 2<sup>nd</sup> UK decision-center
  - UK support for DCA in Europe – but skepticism in many EU countries
- o U.S. nuclear policy entails possible first use and nuclear warfighting v. deterrence only
  - Lowering the nuclear threshold – via lower yield, whether intentional or not
- o Costs and controversies outweigh limited deterrence payoffs of new nuclear weapons
  - Credibility most tied to perceived willingness to run risks
- o U.S. needs to work other countries' issues, not only its own
  - Plus be smarter on disarmament, listen more to other countries

## French Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o **NPR and U.S. nuclear posture viewed in a broader context**
  - Perceived U.S. arrogance and unilateralism; Iraq; preemption doctrine
- o **Convergence and divergence of U.S. and French strategic thinking**
  - Greater French appreciation of missile defenses
  - But perceived less U.S. emphasis on deterrence, especially of “rogues”
  - Neutral stance on NATO nuclear deployments
- o **NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy:**
  - Blur line between conventional and strategic forces
  - No longer views nuclear weapons solely as a deterrent – but as war-fighting means, preemption means
  - Nuclear weapons being made more usable, nuclear threshold being lowered
  - Future of NATO nuclear weapons is a U.S. issue
- o **U.S. sends signal only nuclear weapons can guarantee security – bad for non-proliferation**

## German Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- **Some New Triad elements a plus, others not**
  - Defenses, yes; large numbers, store v. dismantle, responsive infrastructure, and new nuclear weapons, no
- **U.S. widening contingencies for nuclear use**
  - And seeking to lower nuclear threshold, make nuclear weapons more usable
- **Talking the talk of extended deterrence -- no fervor**
  - Ready to re-think U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
    - » But some voices still see need for those weapons
  - Overall, skeptical and cautious on U.S. nuclear modernization
- **New Triad, U.S. desire for new nuclear weapons will undermine non-proliferation**
  - Going against NPT Article VI

## Other Western European NATO Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o Context: perceived U.S. unilateralism
- o Extended deterrence less relevant for most “old” NATO
  - But still “talk the talk”
  - Turkey is a critical exception
- o Opposition to missile defenses has abated
- o U.S. seen widening roles for nuclear weapons – possible warfighting use against NNWS
- o Divergent perspectives among “old NATO” countries on need for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
  - Some voices still see political importance; other more skeptical
  - Overall – don’t rock the boat
    - » But will that become less possible due to aircraft decisions?

## **Eastern European NATO” Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes**

- o Strong support of extended deterrence and U.S. nuclear guarantee
- o U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe essential
  - Strengthen political solidarity with Alliance
    - Under-gird extended deterrence
    - Czech and Polish interest in a “nuclear mission”
- o Nuclear modernization is a U.S. decision

## Japanese Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Differing views on role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy – reduced, increased, little changed
- Advanced conventional option increases risk of preemption
- Extended deterrence and U.S. nuclear umbrella essential
  - Ensuring credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantee emerging issue
    - » Strengthening many types of defense cooperation most important
    - » Dialogue on nuclear scenarios could add to confidence in guarantee
    - » Most “no”, a few “perhaps” on whether tailored nuclear weapons needed to enhance of DPRK
- On balance, opposition to new types of nuclear weapons
  - But also officials oppose a U.S. no-first-use policy
- Mixed views on is U.S. making nuclear weapons more usable
  - Tailored weapons seen lowering threshold
- Missile defenses essential – and also buttress deterrence
- Support for nuclear-free world a long-term goal
  - With focus on what is achievable now, balanced against nuclear deterrence goal

## Indian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o **NPR's context is U.S. unilateralism**
- o **NPR reflects shift from deterrence to preemption – nuclear preemption**
  - Including against NNWS
- o **U.S. pursuing new types of “mini-nukes” and lowering threshold of nuclear use**
- o **U.S. still seeking new types of nuclear weapons, e.g., bunker busters**
- o **NPR will encourage proliferation**
  - Via implicit claim of U.S. right to use nuclear weapons against any state
  - Via don't challenge the U.S. without nuclear weapons
  - Via lessening case for Indian nuclear restraint – force size and doctrine

## Pakistani Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- **NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy shifting ground**
  - Away from traditional non-proliferation agenda
  - Pre-emption and war-fighting replacing classic deterrence
  - Use of nuclear weapons against NNWS
  - Lowering threshold for nuclear use – dangerously low
- **Perceived destabilizing impacts include**
  - More pressures on Pakistan to strengthen own deterrent
  - Weakened international institutions
  - Pressures on other countries to acquire nuclear weapons
    - to deter U.S. nuclear use
  - Embolden others to preempt

## Iranian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o Iran will not be intimidated by U.S. nuclear posture
- o U.S. developing new nuclear doctrine and seeking new types of nuclear weapons
- o U.S. placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons
  - Expanded scope for use
  - Lowered nuclear threshold
  - Nuclear preemption
- o Opposition to missile defenses in outer space

## South African Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o NPR reflects fundamental change in nuclear policy
  - Increased role for nuclear weapons
  - Conventional use of nuclear weapons
  - Deterrence giving way to preemptive use of nuclear weapons
  - Threatened nuclear use against NNWS
- o U.S. nuclear policy seeking new rationales for nuclear weapons and exploring new types of weapons
  - Could lead to nuclear testing
- o Development of new types of nuclear weapons, new rationales for nuclear use, threats of use against NNWS, signal of nuclear weapons as security enhancer will undermine NPT
  - Contrary to Article VI

# **Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture – Country Results**

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## Outline

- o **Country-by-country results**

- P-5
  - Europe
    - » Germany
    - » Other “old” NATO
    - » “New” NATO
    - » Others
  - Asia
  - Middle East and Africa
  - Western Hemisphere
- o **Sources Consulted or Cited**

## **P-5 Nuclear Weapon States**

## Russian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Context: U.S. pursuit of absolute supremacy, global primacy, and ulterior motives toward Russia
  - But global nuclear war improbable; terrorism greatest threat
- U.S. seeks to escape mutual deterrence – but will fail
- Concern about defenses (numbers, scope, type), seen directed at Russia – but partly discounted by technical-operational skepticism
- U.S. reducing nuclear threshold and blurring line between nuclear and conventional weapons
  - Expanded U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons – no longer only means of deterrence
- New low-yield weapons seen as threat to Russia – as well as advanced conventional weapons
  - Despite Russian pursuit of new types of nuclear weapons
  - Congress' opposition will not stop U.S. program
- U.S. New Triad and nuclear posture undermines stability
  - Expressed concern about disarming strike despite statements that large-scale threat to Russia improbable

## Russia (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: U.S. Goals

- o U.S. pursuit of “absolute security” and “global primacy”
  - The U.S. “has always seen and sees the U.S.S.R. and post-Soviet Russia as a geopolitical rival. . . It's about time Russian politicians realized this and stopped having illusions that Washington wishes Moscow well and prosperity.”
    - » Col-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, Former Head of the Defense Ministry’s Department for International Cooperation, AP, (3/10/02)
  - “. . . from the very initiation of the development of nuclear weapons, the United States has continuously adhered to the doctrine for the preservation of military strategic supremacy.”
    - » Col-Gen. Vartolomey Korobushin, Speech (4/21/05)
  - “The aspiration of the United States to insure its absolute supremacy in the military sphere . . . ”
    - » Chief of RF Armed Forces General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy (7/26/06)

## Russia (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Today's Risk

- o The threat to Russia today – not large-scale war
  - “ . . . a large-scale threat for Russia is improbable, while the likelihood of local conflicts, by contrast is extremely great”
    - » Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin (12/26/01)
  - “ . . . international terrorism represents the greatest threat we face today.”
    - » First Deputy Defense Minister Belousov (5/05)
  - “ . . . In particular, in the foreseeable future not only is a world war becoming improbable, but the danger of large-scale aggression against Russia also is diminishing. . . .”
    - » Gen. Makhmut Gareyev (President of Academy of Military Sciences) (12/14/05)
  - “ . . . the General Staff believes Russia is being encircled and the United States will attack”
    - » Mark Schneider, Briefing (2006)

## Russia (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: U.S. Motives

- o What's the ulterior motive behind U.S. policy leaks and other writings?
  - “Russian military officials...are concerned not so much about the contents of the report as the timing of the leak [NPR]. They believe that 'we are being provoked just as Russia has virtually started reducing its nuclear arsenal unilaterally on a scale that is without precedent.’
    - » Yuri Golotyuk in reformist Vremya Novostei (3/12/02)
  - “[The purpose of the Lieber-Press Foreign Affairs article on American nuclear primary is] to convince the world that it is useless to resist U.S. political and military strategy.”
  - U.S. pursuing “nuclear blackmail”
    - » Col-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, Moscow Daily

## Russia (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: New Triad

- o Importance of New Triad recognized
  - “One of the most important planned changes [found in the NPR] is a lowering of the status of the strategic triad [offensive capabilities] from being the central element of deterrence to being one of the /legs of the new strategic forces structure.”
    - » Aleksandr Savelyev in Yaderny Kontrol (3/19/02)

## Russia (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Role of Nuclear Weapons

- o New Triad reduces U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons
  - “Apparently, the new concept formulates a long-term objective – to reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons . . .”
    - » Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Revising Nuclear Deterrence (10/05)

## Russia (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: U.S. Seeks to Undermine Deterrence

- o New U.S. capabilities seek to undermine mutual deterrence
  - “[U.S. strategy] intends to use to a varying extent ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ strikes of ‘overwhelming force’ as the primary tool of preventive military operations against potential enemies.”
  - “[U.S. policy] returns the world to the times of the U.S. nuclear monopoly of the 1940s”.
  - “[Recent trends] put us on guard . . . .”
    - » Chief of the RF Armed Forces General Staff Yury Baluyevskiy (7/26/06)
    - “. . . the United States is also preparing a very unpleasant surprise for the Russian leadership. It consists of depreciating Russia’s efforts to provide a retaliatory strike. . . . discrediting the nuclear deterrence principle . . . .”
      - » Sergey Sokolov (7/12/06)
  - o “. . . General Staff believes Russia is being encircled and the US will attack”
- Schneider, op. cit.

## Russia (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Concerns about Defenses

- o U.S. pursuit of defenses a concern . . .
  - “The deployment of the U.S. missile defense must cause concern in our country. . . .”
  - “. . . removed the thesis that [it] . . . will have limited capabilities and is designed only for defense from a limited number of attacking missiles”
    - » Chief of Staff Baluyevskiy op. cit.
  - “. . . there are currently no grounds for concern. But Russia will have to improve the ground-based component of its nuclear forces . . . Over the next 10-15 years. Unless it does this, many systems will become outdated, nuclear parity will be upset, and the United States will have a definite advantage.”
    - » Alexei Arbatov, Web Commentary (3/22/06)

## Russia (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Technical-Operational Skepticism

- Concerns about U.S. defenses discounted by technical-operational skepticism
  - “[But also] substantial lag in development . . . caused by numerous technological and engineering problems”
    - » Chief of Staff Baluyevskiy op. cit.
  - “Extremely doubtful” that missile defenses will upset the U.S.-Russian balance
    - » Col-Gen. Victor Yessin, Vlasti.net (3/23/06)
  - “. . . in the foreseeable future the American missile defense system all the same isn’t capable of intercepting anything.”
    - » Nikolay Sokov, “Geopolitics” (7/12/06)

## Russia (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Has U.S. Achieved “Primacy”?

- o Argument unfounded that U.S. has already achieved nuclear primacy – capability for a disarming first strike
  - “ . . . there is no cause for concern about the prospect of upsetting the nuclear parity. . . . ”
  - » Reserve Maj-Gen. Pavel Zolotarev, “A Nuclear Tempest in a Teapot” (3/31/06)
  - “until at least 2015 Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential is unlikely to decrease appreciably . . . . ”
  - » Mai-Gen. (ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, Interfax (3/22/06)
  - “ . . . we are confident that in the future Russia will be able to provide a worthy response to any attempts to undermine its security.”
  - » Chief of Staff Baluyevskiy, op. cit.

## Russia (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use

- o Nuclear weapons no longer only means of deterrence
  - According to the NPR, nuclear weapons have become “weapons of operational use, and, in my opinion, this is very dangerous.”
    - » Russian President Vladimir Putin (4/4/02)
  - Based on the contents of the story [NPR leak], one has the impression that a transformation of the approaches to using nuclear weapons is taking place in the United States. In particular, it is now recognized that they could be employed in regional conflicts, including against non-nuclear countries which have relinquished the nuclear choice. This transfers nuclear weapons from a means of deterrence to the operational military arsenal of the USA, which lowers the threshold of their application.”
    - » Alexander Yakovenko, Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4/13/02)

## Russia (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Reducing Nuclear Threshold

- o U.S. reducing nuclear threshold
  - “On the whole . . . the decisions of conducting research on low-yield penetrating charges . . . give grounds to suspect U.S. policy of reducing the threshold for use of nuclear weapons.”
    - » Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Revising Nuclear Deterrence (10/05)
  - “. . . The United States is seriously preparing for lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons . . .”
    - » Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy (10/03) quoted in Mark Schneider, “Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Russian Federation”, Briefing
  - “. . . lowering the threshold for use of atomic weapons is in itself dangerous. Such plans [as evidenced in Joint Publication 3-12] do not limit, but in fact promote efforts by others to develop (nuclear weapons).”
    - » Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov (9/14/05)

## Russia (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Blurring Conventional-Nuclear

- o U.S. blurring line between conventional and nuclear weapons
  - “ . . . the new strategy boldly wipes out the borderline between the use of nuclear weapons and that of conventional weapons against potential adversaries.”
  - » Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Revising Nuclear Deterrence (10/05)
  - “ . . . the administration’s desire to equalize the difference between the use of low-yield nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in carrying out combat operations in theatres of war.”
  - » Igor Borcharov, “Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons are being Created” (10/14/05)

## Russia (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use: New Weapons and Deterrence

- Occasional acknowledgment of U.S. argument that new low-yield nuclear weapons enhance deterrence
  - “ . . . Bush’s four initiatives relating to nuclear weapons [including low-yield weapons] supported as enhancing deterrence”
    - » Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, op. cit.
- But also met with suspicion – despite evidence that Russians themselves pursuing comparable weapons
  - . . . the development of a new type of nuclear warhead will also be seen by the Russian strategic community as designed to threaten Russia itself.”
    - » Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, op. cit.

## Russia (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Types of Nuclear Weapons

- o U.S. seen developing new types of nuclear weapons

- “I must, however, say frankly that these statements [NPR] do worry us...we hear statements and proposals for developing low-yield nuclear charges and their possible use in regional conflicts. This, to a very low bar, to a dangerous line, lowers the threshold of possible nuclear weapons use.”

» Russian President Vladimir Putin (4/4/02)

- “... the United States is conducting research on the development of comparatively low-yield nuclear weapons ... penetrating nuclear warheads . . .”

» Maj-Gen. (ret), Vladimir Belous (7/26/06)

- “... American concept of developing ‘clean’ nuclear mini-charges that penetrate deep underground . . .”

» Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, op. cit.

## Russia (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation: Continuing Regardless

- o Despite Congressional “no”, believe U.S. program will continue
  - “... no guarantee that the Pentagon will not force the Congress into reversing . . .”
    - » Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, op. cit.
  - “Although the creation of new types of weapons is prohibited, actually it’s a matter of ‘redesigning’ existing types. Therefore many tasks initially set for the ACI [Advanced Concepts Initiative] evidently will be accomplished one way or another.”
    - » Nikolay Sokov, op. cit.
- o Russia pursuing own program
  - “New types of nuclear weapons are already emerging in Russia”
    - » Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, quoted in Schneider, op. cit.

## Russia (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation: Conventional Strategic Systems

- Conventional strategic systems potentially destabilizing

- “ . . . U.S. military-political leadership [decided] on the development and deployment of a new super-system . . . first of all, of offensive, non-nuclear strategic system and second, a single global integrated reconnaissance information system . . . .”
  - “ . . . could substantially disrupt military-strategic stability . . . [with risk of] a disarming strike against the opposing side’s strategic nuclear forces using precision-guided munitions with conventional warheads . . . .”
  - “ . . . need to conduct a dialogue on the limitation of strategic non-nuclear weapons.”
- » Col-Gen. Varfolomey Korobushin, “The Metamorphoses of Strategic Deterrence” (4/21/05)

## Russia (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Strategic Balance

- o U.S. policies – and Russian neglect – combine to undermine strategic balance and threaten arms racing
  - “ . . . substantial concern over the forecast of diminishing strategic stability of the Russian-American strategic balance”
    - » Alexei Arbatov, “Isn’t it Time to Do Away with Obscurantism” (5/17/06)
    - “ . . . We see the primary danger in the fact that the deployment of a full-scale U.S. missile defense could cause a new spiral of the arms race and divert colossal resources from the resolution of a multitude of other problems. . . . ”
      - » Chief of Staff Baluyevskiy, op. cit. (7/26/06)

## Russia (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Uncertainties

- o Expressions of uncertainty about U.S. intentions and plans – and calls for dialogue
  - “We need more predictability in U.S.-Russian nuclear relations so that you understand who we are and we understand who you are”
    - » Former Senior Russian Ambassador (5/06)
    - “. . . [need to shift from] declarative transparency to actual mutually advantageous cooperation and a search for ways to resolve potentially conflict situations.”
      - » Chief of Staff Baluyevskiy op. cit.
  - Need for a U.S.-Russia global partnership to reduce and stabilize the nuclear balance – and transform it into a cooperative mode.
    - » Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, op. cit.

## Russia (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: On Russia

- o **NPR Used to Justify Revised Russian Military Planning**
  - “Replying to new challenges in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, Russia is revising its own Military Building Plan to 2005, and Armament Program to 2010.”
    - » Yelena Aleksandrova in official parliamentary Parlamentskaya Gazeta (3/14/02)
  - Russian disarmament is adversely affected by: NATO expansion to the Russian border, U.S. BMD, the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and “new nuclear initiatives, which appeared in the January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review”
  - U.S. BMD will force Russia’s neighbor, China, to develop new nuclear weapons
    - » Alla Yaroshinskaya (4/9/02)
- U.S. programs will be used by Russian military to justify – to themselves and others – comparable actions by Russia.
- U.S. programs will shape Russian assessments of comparable activities, giving them a “stamp of approval”
  - » Expert (5/06)

## Russia (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Impact U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal

- o **ABM Withdrawal enabled Russia to Discard START II**
  - “U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty enabled Russia to discard the unpopular START II treaty, and restore its own freedom of action in fashioning its own nuclear forces.”
  - “...systems that were slated for elimination under START II are to be retained, including MIRVed SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jassinski, et. al, The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: International Perspectives and Implications, CNS/MIIS, date unavailable

## Chinese Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o Context: Perceived U.S. pursuit of absolute security
- o Concerned about impact of offenses and defenses on China's nuclear deterrent – but more muted now
  - Likely reflects assessment of state of U.S. missile defenses – program scope, technical status, not in space
- o Criticism of U.S. lowering nuclear threshold with widely perceived first use doctrine
  - Occasional voices noting constraints on Presidential decision to use nuclear weapons
- o Chinese posture will adapt as necessary to U.S. nuclear policies – and maintain its nuclear deterrent
  - Stick for now with no first use policy
    - “Pace not race” – minimum capability, no rush to retaliate
- o Uneasiness about adverse stability impacts of U.S. policy – other nuclear powers, NPT

## China (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: U.S. Goals

- o **NPR an excuse for arms buildup; U.S. seeking 'absolute military superiority'**
  - “The [NPR] indicates that U.S. nuclear strategy is oriented towards maintaining absolute military superiority around the world...The proclaimed transition from a ‘threats-based’ to a ‘capabilities-based’ strategy is nothing more than a pretext for further arms buildup...
    - » Official China Daily (3/13/02)
  - “Key Chinese concern: that NPR is ‘pointed at them’ and is being aggressively implemented
    - » Brad Roberts et al, Summary of U.S.-China Conference in Beijing, (7/06)

## **China (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Stability Concerns**

- o **NPR impact on stability**

- “... Chinese analysts from different types of institutions share a common view of the NPR as signaling developments in the US posture that will have a directly negative effect on stability as China understands it in the bilateral strategic relationship but also more generally on China’s security environment because of NPR-induced reactions by Russia and by states of proliferation concern.”
  - » Brad Roberts, China’s Perception of the U.S. Nuclear Threat: A Post-NPR Survey, Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2004
- “There is some evidence to suggest that Chinese fears of the destabilizing consequences for the Sino-US strategic relationship of US BMD have subsided in recent years. . . .”
  - » Brad Roberts, op. cit.

## **China (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: No First Use Doctrine**

- **NPR threatens China's NFU policy**
  - “The NPR’s emphasis on enhancing the offensive leg of the new triad by using both nuclear weapons and conventional precision-guided munitions raises serious challenges to China’s current nuclear weapon policy of ‘no-first-use.’”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: International Perspectives and Implications”, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (3/02)
- **Stick with NFU Policy**
  - “Much internal debate in recent years about eliminating or conditionalizing NFU, but policy will not change”
    - » Brad Roberts et al, U.S-China Conference Summary, (7/06)

## China (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Dissuasion

- o Dissuasion does not figure prominently in Chinese responses to NPR
  - “ . . . the logic of dissuasion . . . is not broadly appreciated.”
  - “There is very little evidence that Chinese analysts have thought about ‘responsiveness’ as a dominant characteristic of the emerging US strategic posture.”
    - » Brad Roberts, op. cit.

## China (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Pre-NPR

- o U.S. missile defense calculus driven by China – despite what U.S. Officials may say
  - “The U.S. has stated clearly that China has not been figured in its NMD calculations. However, China views the situation differently and remains strongly suspicious of the U.S. intentions in terms of NMD development...From China's perspective, the U.S. national missile defense would cause even worse strategic relations between Beijing and Washington.”
    - » Shen Dingli, Professor and Director of Fudan University's Centre for American Studies (2/20/01)
- o U.S. missile defense decreases Chinese security
  - “China is opposed to NMD, because it would compromise China's security.”
  - “We just hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved . . .”
    - » Former Chinese Ambassador Sha Zukang (3/14/01)

## China (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Pre-NPR (cont.)

- o NMD may embolden U.S. in crisis
  - “The deployment of an NMD system would provide the American public with an illusion that the several surviving retaliatory Chinese ICBMs would be intercepted by the NMD system – since it is both designed and said to be able to defeat attacks by small numbers of missiles. If the Americans tended to believe that a first nuclear strike plus a NMD system would be able to disarm the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability, the U.S. could become incautious in risking nuclear exchanges with China in a crisis.”
    - » Li Bin, of the Arms Control Program, Institute of International Studies in Beijing (4/01)

## **China (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Pre-NPR Chinese Response**

- o Ambassador Sha Zukang: **Missile defense will lead to more advanced offensive missile capabilities**
  - “If a country, in addition to its offensive power, seeks to develop advanced TMD or even NMD, in a attempt to attain absolute security and unilateral strategic advantage for itself, other countries will be forced to develop more advanced offensive missiles.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)

## **China (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Concerns on Defenses after DPR**

- o **The New Triad Combination of Offenses and Defenses Could Threaten Mutual Vulnerability and Undermine China's Deterrent**
  - “The New Triad would provide the United States with not only offensive strike capability but also missile defense capability against China. This would reduce China’s nuclear retaliatory capability to impotence and thus neutralize China’s limited nuclear deterrent forces.”
    - » Dr. Tian Jingmei, associate professor at the Arms Control Research Division of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) in Beijing (3/03)
  - “...the issues remain the same for China: the credibility and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)

## China (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Concerns on Defenses (cont.)

- o Persistence of Chinese concerns about threat to deterrent from offense-defense combination:
  - “U.S. may tailor the New Triad to negate China’s deterrent, increasing possibility of nuclear coercion in a crisis”
    - » Brad Roberts et al, U.S.-China Conference Summary, (7/06)
  - “U.S. enthusiasm for missile defense appears somewhat slowed”
    - » Senior Military (Ret.) (3/06)
  - “For now, China o.k. with missile defenses since U.S. is only making limited progress; greater concern if U.S. develops space-based defenses”
    - » Expert (3/06)

## China (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Threat to Deterrent (cont.)

- o Cautious response to impact of New Triad on China's deterrent and stability
  - “China still concerned about advanced conventional weaponry and missile defenses – but China is taking cautious, quiet actions to ensure its deterrent.”
    - » Expert (3/06)
  - “Chinese scientists advised leaders to ‘wait and see’ in response to US missile defense capabilities”
    - » Brad Roberts et al, U.S.-China Conference, (7/06)
  - Government pursuing “pace not race” approach
    - » Brad Roberts, comment to authors (8/06)

## China (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Blurring Nuclear-Conventional

- o U.S. blurring distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons
  - “ . . . the distinctions between conventional and nuclear weapons have been blurred.”
    - » Li Bin, April, 2002, quoted in Roberts, op. cit.
  - “The new strategy...blurs the distinction between nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence. This is very risky. On the one hand, this blurring could lead the United States to employ nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it is not easy for opponents to identify exactly when and under what conditions the United States would use nuclear deterrence or conventional deterrence in a crisis.”
    - » Tian Jingmei, March 2003

## China (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use

- o **NPR's targeting policy a 'serious concern'**
  - “Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials demanded that the United States provide explanations about its targeting policy. At the same time, Chinese governments statements accused the United States of “nuclear blackmail” and vowed not to bow under any foreign threats.”
  - “For Beijing, the revelation of the targeting list raises a serious issue about U.S. trustworthiness: China and the United States signed a de-targeting agreement in 1997.”
  - “...what worries China the most is nuclear use ‘in the event of surprising military developments,’ including a war between China and Taiwan.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)

## China (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use (cont.)

- U.S. Prepared to use nuclear weapons first in conflict, e.g., In a Taiwan contingency
  - "China is 'deeply shocked' at the U.S. Defense Department's report that includes China in a list of seven countries that would be subjected to a U.S. nuclear attack under an emergency," according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi.
    - » Official China Daily (3/12/02)
  - "If the suggestions in the [NPR] are accepted by the U.S. administration, it means that the U.S. thinks that strategic ambiguity is not threatening enough and it must make clear the possibility of launching nuclear attacks to check any fighting in the Taiwan Strait."
    - » Independent Chinese-language Hong Kong Economic Journal (3/14/02)

## China (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use (cont.)

- o U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons
  - “China’s belief that US has a ‘First Use’ policy . . .”
    - » Brad Roberts et al, U.S.-China Conference, (7/06)
- o But some other voices
  - “. . . difficulty concluding U.S. president would use nuclear weapons – too many other alternatives and options available . . .”
    - » Expert (3/06)
  - “Use of nuclear weapons is conceivable by a U.S. president but only as a result of miscalculation or misperception in a situation in which the United States thought itself under nuclear attack”
    - » Senior Military (Ret.) (3/06)

## **China (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Lowered Nuclear Threshold**

- o **NPR lowers nuclear threshold**
  - “All Chinese analysts who have written on this topic have argued that [lowering the nuclear threshold] will be the ultimate, if perhaps unintended, effect of US NPR implementation.”
    - » Roberts, op. cit.
  - “...the Bush administration is making every effort to reduce the ‘threshold’ for the use of nuclear weapons.”
    - » Zhou Jianguo, March, 2002, quoted in Roberts, p. 16
- o **Again, some other voices**
  - “U.S. would like new nuclear weapons but is not lowering the nuclear threshold given difficulties concluding U.S. president would use nuclear weapons. . .”
    - » Expert (3/06)
  - “U.S. wants new nuclear weapons not for deterrence but to use these weapons”
    - » Expert (3/06)

## China (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Deterring U.S. Nuclear Use

- o China's deterrent will deter U.S. nuclear first use
  - “China’s deterrent will work for us where we need it to work – to counter US efforts to use nuclear weapons to coerce and control escalation.”
    - » Quoted in Roberts, op. cit., p. 18
  - “China’s [nuclear] modernization is aimed at creating and sustaining an ‘effective and sufficient’ retaliatory strike capability”
    - » Brad Roberts et al, U.S.-China Conference, (7/06)
  - “Want the capability to be able to get a single nuclear missile through the missile defense – or at least for the United States to worry about that possibility”
    - » Expert (3/06)

## **China (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons**

- o **Bush Administration pursuit of new nuclear weapons**
  - “Concerned about U.S. interest in new nuclear weapons – even acknowledging Congress’ decision not to fund RNEP, tailored weapons”
    - » Senior Military (Ret.) (3/06)
  - “Bush Administration would like new nuclear weapons for some WMD contingencies – but Congress is not prepared to support”
    - » Expert (3/06)

## **China (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation: Space**

- o **U.S. weaponization of space A dangerous choice**
    - “If the trend is not reversed, countries will be compelled to take measures to protect the security of their space assets and relevant ground facilities in the near future. The peaceful use of outer space will also be more costly, vulnerable satellites and manned spaceships will have to orbit a weaponized space, also full of weapon debris. Efforts for peaceful uses of outer space will be retarded and fruitful achievements endangered.”
- » Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, First Committee of the 57<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly  
(10/15/02)

## **China (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: China's Response**

- o China's commitment to maintaining nuclear deterrent
  - Nuclear development, in which it aims to acquire a deterrent capability that does not rely on uncertainty to be effective. In this stage, no matter how well the USA measures the total number of Chinese nuclear weapons, at least a few Chinese ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) would survive a US pre-emptive strike and could be used to retaliate. This improvement in China's deterrent capability is designed to avoid any uncertainty in external perceptions of its ability to retaliate to a pre-emptive strike."

» Dr. Li Bin of the Arms Control Program, Institute of International Studies in Beijing (3/7/01)

## **China (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: China's Response**

- o Evidence mixed on how China will respond to NPR – either “reactive or anticipatory”
  - “China will not participate in an arms race with the United States. Firstly, it is unnecessary for China, because China only want to maintain a minimum capability of retaliatory counterattack.”
    - » Xia Liping, Director Center for International Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Affairs, quoted by Roberts
  - “After the U.S. adjustment of its nuclear strategy, other big countries with nuclear forces will make responding adjustments.”
    - » Tian Jingmei, quoted in Roberts
  - “China must strive to gain time to increase its offensive and defensive nuclear capabilities and its ability to survive. . . . China must strive to strengthen the reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence . . . .”
    - » Gu Guoliang, August, 2002, quoted in Roberts

## **China (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Spillovers for Others**

- o **U.S. first use posture likely to shape Russian and French nuclear postures**
  - “The global nuclear posture will certainly be rendered into a state of more uncertainties if Russia, France, and other nuclear powers vie to follow the example of the U.S. and pursue a strategy of striking first with nuclear weapons.”
    - » Wu Sha, International Strategic Studies, (6/04)
  - “The Bush administration has expanded the range of use of nuclear weapons from nuclear weapon state to non-nuclear weapon states and has shifted the main role of nuclear weapons from deterrence to war-fighting. This breaks a decades-long taboo against the use of nuclear weapons except as a last resort, and it lowers the threshold for using nuclear weapons.”
    - » Tian Jingmei, op. cit.

## **China (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Impact on NPT**

- o New U.S. posture undermines NPT
  - “Most of the countries that are clearly listed as possible targets of a nuclear attack are non-nuclear countries that are signatories to the NPT. . . . By expanding the scope of the use of nuclear weapons, it is sapping the validity of the NPT.”
    - » Mei Zhou, quoted in Brad Roberts, op. cit.
- o NPR impedes non-proliferation cooperation
  - “Such a policy or tendency is neither helpful to the international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, nor conducive to the cooperation between countries in addressing issues in the disarmament and nonproliferation field. It undermines mutual trust between countries in the strategic security field . . . .”
    - » Liu Jieyi, Director General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, MFA – Interview in Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2004

## French Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o **NPR and U.S. nuclear posture viewed in a broader context**
  - Perceived U.S. arrogance and unilateralism; Iraq; preemption doctrine
- o **Convergence and divergence of U.S. and French strategic thinking**
  - Greater French appreciation of missile defenses
  - But perceived less U.S. emphasis on deterrence, especially of “rogues”
  - Neutral stance on NATO nuclear deployments
- o **NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy:**
  - Blur line between conventional and strategic forces
  - No longer views nuclear weapons solely as a deterrent – but as war-fighting means, preemption means
  - Nuclear weapons being made more usable, nuclear threshold being lowered
  - Future of NATO nuclear weapons is a U.S. issue
- o **U.S. sends signal only nuclear weapons can guarantee security – bad for non-proliferation**

## **France (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Shift of Planning Focus**

- o **NPR ends “Russia-centrism” in U.S. Nuclear Planning**
  - » Bruno Tertrais (3/14/02) – Former MOD Official, Think Tank Expert
- o **But NPR publicly highlighted issues unnecessarily**
  - Example: Mini-nukes – nothing new in related R&D efforts, why tell the public?
- » Senior Member of Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## France (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Downplayed in France

- o **NPR coupled nuclear weapons with additional capabilities, including conventional strike and missile defenses**
  - But very few people pay attention to this, or made the connection between the new linkages
  - Those who did recognize it see enhanced C2 capabilities as the key element of change in U.S. doctrine – sensitive in France given weakness in C2
  - Nobody spoke much about NPR to avoid public attention
    - » Senior Analyst at Parisian Think Tank (3/06)
  - “Public opinion not interested except when nuclear is in the headlines; except for France, an extraordinarily sensitive issue”
    - » Expert (6/06)

## France (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Broader Context

- o Bush Administration widely seen as arrogant and untrustworthy
- o Overall, Europeans perceive NPR very low on their list of concerns with the Bush administration
  - More important to Europeans: military operations (e.g. Iraq), doctrine & strategy (especially preemption), and only then nuclear weapons and the RNEP
    - » Senior Member of Parisian Think Tank (3/06)
- o Nuclear questions linked to something bigger
  - “ABM linked to U.S. unilateralism; RNEP linked to preemption”
    - » Expert (6/06)

## **France (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Attention Focused Elsewhere**

- o Other issues currently capturing attention of security experts, not future of NATO nuclear weapons
  - Iran, Missile Defense
- o Almost no public knowledge in France of U.S. nuclear policy
  - But those who do know recognize a convergence in strategic thinking between the two countries
  - Though differences on deterrence
    - » Plus U.S. also can and must do things on the global scene that other states cannot (e.g. assurance, dissuasion)
    - » Senior Member of Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## France (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Deterrence Deemphasized

- o U.S. strategy placing less emphasis on deterrence
  - Emphasis on preventing the rise of a peer competitor, which has major implications across all arenas
  - Unwise – what if cannot prevent the rise of an economic power, for instance?
  - If we mean we're preventing the rise of a confrontational military superpower, we should clearly say so
  - The image is of an emphasis on preemption and preventive war while ignoring the role of deterrence
    - >> Senior Member of Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## **France (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Deterrence of Rogues**

- o **Unlike United States, France looks toward deterrence of rogues**
  - Iran not a present threat but will have nuclear IRBM capability (in 5-10 years)
  - West needs to educate Iran about deterrence concepts so our deterrent force will work, including how to define red lines, vital interests, etc.
    - » Senior Analyst at Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## France (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Pre-NPR Perspective

- o **Defenses are unnecessary and/or destabilizing**
  - “What Washington is telling the world through NMD is that the United States, which already commands 35% of the world’s military expenditures, considers itself secure only if it now gets a missile shield in addition to the world’s most powerful conventional and nuclear forces.”
    - » French expert and former MOD official François Heisbourg, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2000
- o **Missile Defense = Arms Race**
  - “[Missile Defense] cannot fail to re-launch the arms race in the world.”
    - » President Jacques Chirac in New York Times (2/4/01)

## France (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Changed French View of Defenses

- o President Chirac's (1/06) speech a breakthrough
  - Strategic defenses very expensive, require a tradeoff with other military capabilities
  - France has so far preferred to put its money in traditional offensive nuclear deterrent forces but France is a stakeholder in any future European TMD effort
    - » Senior Analyst at Parisian Think Tank (3/06)
- o France takes missile defense relatively seriously
  - Chirac's speech discussed protecting deployed forces
  - France is investing in early warning satellites
    - » Senior Member of Parisian Security Think Tank (3/06)

## France (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Public Attitudes on Defenses

- o Almost no European public recognition of the role of strategic defenses in the New Triad
  - Those who do know about it aren't concerned; it's just the U.S. wasting money on a program that won't work, but not really causing anybody any harm
  - But public release of a possible 3<sup>rd</sup> NMD site in Central Europe could raise level of the debate
  - Also if a state one day threatened Europe's capitals
  - Iran a concern only because it could lead to regional conflict, not because of a threat to Western Europe
  - Main reason for lack of European interest: lack of Russian concern or response to American efforts
  - The thinking is, if missiles defense doesn't bother the Russians, "We can't be more royalist than the king"
    - » Senior Member of Parisian Security Think Tank (3/06)

## **France (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: No Debate on Defenses (cont.)**

- o Missile defense another potentially divisive issue that has not come up in any government discussions
  - Multiple issues that should be addressed—impact on deterrence; cost; technical issues; potential means of responding to proliferation – but none have been, or will be
    - » Western European Union Staff Members in Paris (3/06)

## France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Readiness to Use

- o Blurring the line between conventional and strategic forces – and making nuclear weapons more usable
  - "The Pentagon's study [Nuclear Posture Review] suggests a total change in America's nuclear doctrine. . . It normalizes the idea of using a weapon initially intended as a deterrent. . . erasing the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons."
    - Le Monde Editorial (3/13/02)
      - » Also see Roussel in below on "battlefield weapons"
- o The general perception across Europe is that the U.S. has plans to use nuclear weapons in a military sense
  - » Western European Union Staff Members in Paris (3/06)

### France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Readiness to Use (cont.)

- o The only aspect of the NPR that sparked some debate within Europe was the issue of mini-nukes
  - But there were no official government reactions, either because it was too sensitive, or the public is too anti-nuclear, or the governments simply felt that U.S. policy was none of their business
  - Europe opposes development of mini-nukes because it could erode traditional deterrence, lowering the threshold of use
    - » Expert (1/06)
  - “Deterrence is existential. One nuclear weapon on target would suffice. U.S. policy is seeking new nuclear weapons not for deterrence but for a strategy of preemption.”
    - » Expert (6/06)

## **France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: U.S. Moving in France's Direction?**

- o France views ***all*** nuclear weapons as **strategic**
  - U.S. defense thinking is moving in that direction
  - Rationale: any nuclear use after 60 years would have strategic implications
  - From an operational perspective, such thinking provides more flexibility in use planning
    - » Senior Member of Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NATO Deployments

- o Some basic French policy considerations
  - Neutral stance on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe: it is “not our business”
  - Value in having other states thinking about and discussing nuclear weapons, so as to maintain a nuclear culture in Europe
  - Keep open possibility of a trans-European nuclear mission -- if U.S. weapons withdrawn
  - But should U.S. withdraw its nuclear weapons to buttress the norm of no-forward deployment of nuclear weapons on any other state’s territory?
    - » Senior Member of Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## **France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NATO Deployments (cont.)**

- o **Don't rock the boat is preferred posture**
  - NATO should stick with what it has; no real cost to the current situation of US weapons in Europe
  - When it is necessary to do maintenance or updates to stockpile, do so quietly
  - **Spotlighting anything nuclear in Europe will just create problems**
    - » Senior Member of Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## **France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Weapons in Europe**

- o France remains committed to creating a framework for a European nuclear deterrent
  - Britain sees no reason to change current reliance on NATO; Germany doesn't want to talk about it; Italy only wants to talk informally without committing to anything; Spain is willing to talk about the nuclear framework within NATO but not outside the Alliance
  - So the European Security & Defense Initiative is in limbo
  - Expect no new French initiatives until after the 2007 presidential election
  - Nor will we see any initiatives within NATO; no one wants to rock the boat
    - » Senior Analyst at Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Weapons in Europe

- o Western European Union (WEU) has tried to instigate a debate among its members on the subject of nuclear policy and the possibility of a European nuclear deterrent
  - But they cannot get European governments to even discuss the issue
  - Same issue Chirac's (1/06) speech tried to re-open
  - Chirac's speech introduced a new element in that debate: using nuclear forces to deter state sponsors of terrorism
- o WEU Assembly attempts to think of nuclear forces in terms of nonproliferation and tries to deemphasize the potential role of such weapons
- o While the Brussels Treaty still exists, the Council of Europe does not discuss defense issues
  - So no country will raise the issue of a European nuclear force
    - » Western European Staff Members in Paris (3/06)

## **France (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Weapons in Europe**

- **NATO only retains nuclear weapons because the U.S. wants them to; they have no real purpose**
  - There is no threat to Europe today, so no mission for nuclear weapons, no desire to keep them stationed on European soil
  - Europe not seeking new threats to justify those weapons
  - All DCA countries would prefer to be non-nuclear, so they are content to let the mission wither away (such as by not buying replacement aircraft with nuclear capabilities)
  - There is significant public antipathy toward nuclear weapons
- The most anti-nuclear countries in Europe: Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Ireland
  - » Western European Staff Members in Paris (3/06)

## France (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons Needed

- o America's insistence on modernizing in order to be able to cope with any threat, including small states, was correct
  - France's nuclear forces now want quick reaction capability, too
  - The NPR helped spur this new thinking by the French nuclear community that began after the 1991 Gulf War
  - Confirmed French belief in the trends shown there: need to react quickly and deal with a WMD-armed adversary
    - » Senior Analyst at Parisian Think Tank (3/06)

## **France (5): Stability Impacts of US Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- o **NPR sends message only nuclear weapons can guarantee security**
  - “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the massive increase in the U.S. defense budget, and the U.S. National Security Strategy, tend to reinforce the belief that only nuclear weapons can guarantee your security in a militarily unipolar world.”
    - » Bruno Tertrais (3/3/03) – CEPSS/IISS European Security Forum

## United Kingdom Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Broader context shapes attitudes to U.S. nuclear policy
  - Distrust of Bush Administration post-Iraq
  - But also lack of clarity about U.S. nuclear posture
- Defenses no longer feared as destabilizing
- Extended deterrence still important – with link to 2<sup>nd</sup> UK decision-center
  - UK support for DCA in Europe – but skepticism in many EU countries
- U.S. nuclear policy entails possible first use and nuclear warfighting v. deterrence only
  - Lowering the nuclear threshold – via lower yield, whether intentional or not
- Costs and controversies outweigh limited deterrence payoffs of new nuclear weapons
  - Credibility most tied to perceived willingness to run risks
- U.S. needs to work other countries' issues, not only its own

## **UK (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Major Change of Approach**

- o **New Triad established**

- “The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of January 2002 clarified the extent of the new nuclear ambitions. Setting out the direction of US forces for the next 5-10 years, the NPR outlined a major change of approach, establishing a New Triad of offensive strike systems – both nuclear and non-nuclear, active and passive defences, and a revitalized defence infrastructure.”
  - » Kate Hudson, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (4/4/04)
- “U.S. Administration has not made clear even to [informed observers] what is going on [with its nuclear policy]”
- “[Also need to recognize] anti-nuclear priesthood here”
  - » Retired Senior Defense Official (6/06)

## UK (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Context

- o U.S. perceived disdainful toward international law
  - "America's record . . . fits into a wider picture of disdain for international law and institutions. In recent years it has rejected the Comprehensive Test-Ban-treaty, withdrawn from the anti-ballistic missile treaty, pushed research on new nuclear weapons – and hinted at using them against non-nuclear countries."
    - » Guardian (5/4/05)
- o Nuclear policy put into broader context by others
  - "Inclination post-Iraq to think ill of the United States"
  - "Distrust of Bush Administration"
    - » Retired Senior Defense Official (6/06)

## UK (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Pre-NPR Attitudes toward Defenses

- o U.S. and U.K. share concerns over missile threat and WMD
  - “The ABM treaty is bilateral between the United States and Russia. Therefore its future is [an issue] for those two countries... What is important is the maintenance of strategic stability rather than...the particular framework to achieve it... We share United States concerns about the threats stemming from missiles and weapons of mass destruction. We agree there is now a need for a comprehensive strategy, including defensive systems, to counter such threats.”

» U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair (12/14/01)

## **UK (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Pre-NPR Attitudes toward Defenses**

- 70% of Britons believe U.S. BMD will drive arms race
  - “The development of the US missile defence system will encourage other countries to build more advanced nuclear weapons.”
    - » Market and Opinion Research International survey of a representative sample of 2,110 5-9 July 2001. Margin of Error (+/- 3%)

## UK (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Role of Missile Defenses

- o **Changing views of defenses in UK and allies**
  - “In late 1990s, senior policymakers viewed missile defenses as destabilizing. This is no longer so. Allies now believe defenses can make sense.”
  - “Limited defenses useful when combined with deterrence. . . reduce asymmetry by missile defenses.”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)
  - Do not see close linkage between BMD and nuclear weapons or deterrence; why did missile defenses end up in New Triad
    - » U.K. Diplomat (1/06)

## UK (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Extended Deterrence

- o Importance of U.S. extended deterrent
  - “UK believes its minimum deterrent only is effective in the context of the wider nuclear umbrella. . . . UK still needs and wants to be a 2<sup>nd</sup> nuclear decision center. . . . Two separate but closely allied deterents make deterrence more effective.”
  - “For new NATO allies, extended deterrence is highly important. But for Germany, Italy, and Benelux the underlying momentum is away from nuclear deterrence. For them, extended deterrence is losing its grip. . . .”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)

## **UK (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Readiness to Use Nuclear Weapons**

- o **NPR authorizes use of nuclear weapons vs. NNWS NPT parties – disturbing policy change**
  - “Such a redefinition of U.S. policy would amount to a disturbing departure from the longstanding U.S. position: that it would not use a nuclear device against a non-nuclear state that has signed the [NPT].”
    - » Financial Times Editorial (3/11/02)
  - “This completely changes the terms of debate about nuclear deterrence. America has said that it can now act unilaterally and that it could use nuclear weapons against nations who do not have nuclear capability. Britain will have to think very carefully now about its support for systems such as the national missile defence system.”
    - » Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs Spokesman (3/10/02)

## **UK (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Readiness to Use (cont.)**

- o U.S. plans for nuclear warfighting
  - “U.S. still thinks of first use and fight wars. UK only retaliatory.”
    - » Defense Official (6/06)
    - “The Pentagon has just removed from its website a document (Joint Publication 3-12) outlining a new doctrine for joint nuclear operations for the US chiefs of staff. For the first time it sets out specific guidance for US commanders reflecting the Bush administration’s doctrine of pre-emptive strikes. It envisages the use of nuclear weapons to preempt a possible attack by a country, terrorist or criminal group with “weapons of mass destruction.”
    - » Richard Norton-Taylor, security affairs editor, The Guardian (11/5/05)

## UK (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Lowering the Nuclear Threshold

- o U.S. perceived lowering the nuclear threshold
  - “Big perception of global strike as lowering the nuclear threshold – not seen as filling the conventional gap.”
  - “New Triad seen about lowering the nuclear threshold”
  - “Sustained unease [in Europe] about U.S. lowering the nuclear threshold by seeking bunker busters, weapons with exotic effects. This is a political reality that need to think about.”
  - “Problematic for United States to go down that route. Cannot see any ally signing up for anything that lowers the nuclear threshold.”
  - “Perception is that lower yield is more usable. Believe that is correct. . . . If lower, would be more usable.”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)

## **UK (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Warfighting**

- o Nuclear weapons scenario different for UK
  - Thus, no need for weapons with warfighting capability
    - » UK Diplomat (1/06)
  - UK focuses on scenario in which there is use of nuclear weapons against a deployed force with significant losses
    - issue is “would UK respond with nuclear weapons at all?” For UK unlike US, issue is not warfighting
      - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)

## **UK (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: U.S. Nuclear Deployments in Europe**

- o UK supports U.S. DCA deployed in Europe
  - Because it gives the U.K. a degree of independence, but also allows them to have nuclear weapons because of the political binds to the Alliance
- o Mixed feelings on U.S. NSNW in Europe
  - Some allies would breathe a huge sigh of relief if US NSNW were withdrawn from Europe – Eastern European states would be sorry to see them go
    - » U.K. Diplomat (1/06)
- o Reasons for continued utility of nuclear weapons in NATO:
  - Russian threat, other states with nuclear weapons, hedge
  - Strong message of solidarity nuclear mission sends
    - » Senior U.K. Military Officer (3/06)

## UK (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: U.S. Nuclear Deployments in Europe (cont.)

- o Withdrawal of nuclear weapons
  - “What if U.S. took nuclear weapons out of Europe? Weapons not matter as long as politicians act in smart way.”
    - » Retired Senior Defense Official
  - “[European countries that today have NATO nuclear weapons] are skeptical that nuclear weapons are needed on their soil for the credibility of extended deterrence. . . . How to shift dollars to other things they really need.”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)

## UK 4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons

- o Views on nuclear modernization
  - Most changes to U.S. nuclear policy seem reasonable from the operational point of view
    - » U.K. Diplomat (1/06)
  - “What is United States doing on modernization and why is not well-explained. If replacing weapons that wear out to make safer and more reliable, one thing. If new concepts to make more usable, expect grumbling.”
  - “Mini-nukes are not so important for deterrence that [their pursuit] is worth all the fuss.”
  - “... Will be seen as widening the use of nuclear weapons. The presentation will go wrong on RNEP so not worth the candle.”
    - » Retired Senior Defense Official (6/06)

## **UK (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons**

- o **New nuclear weapons will have devastating consequences**
  - “In restarting new nuclear weapons development, and creating usable nuclear weapons to destroy underground bunkers, Washington would be ignoring the complex regime of arms control agreements that govern global non-proliferation efforts.”
    - » BASIC Research Report, July 2002
- o **U.S. ‘disingenuous’ on ‘mini-nukes’**
  - “Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of State [sic], claims that the Bush administration just wants to study these weapons, ‘not to develop, not to deploy, not to use’ them. This is howlingly disingenuous: tens of millions of dollars aren’t being spent simply to see the pretty pictures these plans might make on a page.”
    - » Johann Hari, The Independent Editorial (5/23/03)

## UK (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons (cont.)

- o Bush ‘twists arms’ on RNEP, RRW

- “Congress rejected funding for it [the RNEP] in November, but Bush twisted enough arms this year to get it restarted...It gets worse. Last year Congress allocated funding for something called the “reliable replacement warhead.” The government’s story is that the existing warheads might be deteriorating...It’s a pretty feeble excuse for building a new generation of nukes, but it worked.”
  - » George Monbiot, The Guardian (8/2/05)
- “People think that U.S. is doing bunker busters”
  - » Foreign Affairs Official (6/06/

## UK (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: Usability and Deterrence

- o Usability of nuclear weapons linked to deterrence
  - “Well-known that nuclear weapons need to be usable to deter but what does that mean?”
  - “There is adequate deterrence without RNEP – as long as can do damage.”
    - » Retired Senior Defense Official (6/06)
  - “Credibility in eyes of future opponents has far more to do with perception of our willingness to run risks than with the bang. They think they are more ready to run risks”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)

## **UK (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Perceptions of U.S. Policy**

- o Must make the U.S. case better and smarter
  - “U.S. widely perceived not to give a damn about Article VI of the NPT”
  - “No understanding of the extent to which the United States actually has reduced”
  - “U.S. Administration perceived not taking seriously its own responsibilities. U.S. has major need to communicate [better]”
    - » Senior UK Defense Official (6/06)
  - The United States should attempt more positive public diplomacy to show its progress toward compliance with NPT Article VI disarmament goals
    - » Senior U.K. Diplomat (1/06)

## UK (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Working Non-Proliferation

- o U.S. needs to work with others more
  - “U.S. efforts to convince others to accept sanctions on Iran made tougher by fact U.S. not doing enough on nuclear disarmament. . . U.S. needs to give more on issues of concern to their [European governments] publics. . . On Iran, Europe will pay the price for sanctions.”
  - “[Perception is] you don’t want to work our problem so why should we work your problem?”
    - » Retired Senior Defense Official (6/06)
  - “To push NPT and get what U.S. wants on non-proliferation, U.S. needs to give some on disarmament. It’s a balancing act. . . Ministers [in UK] come under pressure from public, Parliament.”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (6/06)

## **UK (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Working Non-Proliferation**

- “Moderates like Canada and Australia ask why should we cooperate with United States”
- “Be smarter on posture”
- “U.S. public diplomacy approach focuses too much on pushing out the U.S. message rather than listening to others.”
  - » Foreign Affairs Official (6/06)
- “Perceptions of U.S. nuclear posture impact a range of countries on how hard to push non-proliferation, e.g., on Iran. . . . Does impact on ability to get a wider coalition to ratchet up pressure, political backing for sanctions.”
  - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)

## **UK (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- o Impact on proliferation incentives
  - “U.S. nuclear posture does not increase proliferation incentives. . . . pursue because want the stuff to deter U.S. and UK from intervening”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (Defense Responsibilities) (6/06)

## **UK (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Testing**

- **U.S. should ratify the CTBT—this has created a fracture between the two states**
  - Failure to ratify, coupled with the RNEP debate, has had an unsettling effect on London.
    - » U.K. Diplomat (1/06)



**Europe**

## German Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- **Some New Triad elements a plus, others not**
  - Defenses, yes; large numbers, store v. dismantle, responsive infrastructure, and new nuclear weapons, no
- **U.S. widening contingencies for nuclear use**
  - And seeking to lower nuclear threshold, make nuclear weapons more usable
- **Talking the talk of extended deterrence -- no fervor**
  - Ready to re-think U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
    - » But some voices still see need for those weapons
  - Overall, skeptical and cautious on U.S. nuclear modernization
- **New Triad, U.S. desire for new nuclear weapons will undermine non-proliferation**
  - Going against NPT Article VI

## Germany (1): General Perceptions of NPR & New Triad: Overall Assessment

- o Differing views on New Triad
  - Welcomed initially as step to reduce role of nuclear weapons – with New Triad
    - » Expert (12/05)
    - “Such a strategy could endanger the disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”
      - » German Deputy Foreign Minister, Ludger Volmer (3/13/02)
  - Deployment, storage and responsive infrastructure are not in line with NPT's objectives
  - Changes to Triad make sense, especially incorporating strategic defenses to New Triad
  - US arsenal still vastly oversized for new security environment, appears aggressive
    - » German Defense and Diplomatic Officials in Berlin (1/06)

## **Germany (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Role of Extended Deterrence**

- o Deterrence is necessary but different in today's world
  - Cannot eliminate or dismiss deterrence – but role different and only against some of today's threats
    - » German Diplomat (12/14/05)
  - Nuclear weapons will obviously play some role in that future of 21<sup>st</sup> century deterrence
    - » German Diplomat in Berlin (1/06)

## **Germany (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Defenses Today**

- o **Broad acceptance of missile defenses**
  - Changes to Triad make sense, especially incorporating strategic defenses to New Triad
    - » German Defense and Diplomatic Officials in Berlin (1/06)

## **Germany (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons**

- **U.S. widening contingencies for use of nuclear weapons to include:**
  - New uses of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states seen to include preemption of use of chemical and biological weapons, war termination, demonstrating U.S. resolve, countering conventional weapons
  - U.S. moving to replace conventional with nuclear responses in many contingencies, while eroding the taboo against nuclear use
  - Draft Joint Publication 3-12 cited as evidence
    - » Expert (12/05)

## Germany (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons (cont.)

- o U.S. threatening NNWS with nuclear weapons
  - “If America and the other nuclear powers preach abstinence to the world, then they are not allowed to boast about new weapons such as mini-nukes and nuclear strategies.”
    - » Stefan Ulrich in center-left Sueddeutsche Zeitung of Munich (5/3/02)
    - But if not only 'rogue states' such as Iraq appear on the list but also Russia and China, then we wonder whether the planners in Washington are able to think beyond the walls of the Pentagon.”
      - » Josef Joffe in center-left Die Zeit (3/14/02)

## Germany (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Lowering Nuclear Threshold

- o U.S. seeking to lower nuclear threshold
  - Difficult to understand U.S. decisions which appear to make nuclear weapons more usable
  - “Old fashioned” nuclear response options no longer appropriate
    - » German Defense Official in Berlin (1/06)
  - Disarmament groups worry that the U.S. is making nuclear weapons more usable
    - » German Diplomats in Berlin (1/06)
  - U.S. nuclear policy moving in wrong direction, appears aggressive
    - » German Think Tank Analyst in Berlin (1/06)

## **Germany (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Deployments in Europe**

- o **Withdrawals no longer a taboo subject?**
  - U.S. should remove all its remaining nuclear weapons from Europe
    - Would provide numerous advantages, while old counterarguments against removal are no longer valid
      - » Senior Analyst at Berlin Think Tank (3/06)
    - NATO Alliance should debate the future of nuclear weapons in Europe
      - » German Foreign Minister, 2005 NPT RevCon
    - NATO cannot continue to follow a strategy of “don’t rock the boat” regarding nuclear issues
      - » Call by German Chancellor Merkel for a new NATO Strategic Concept by 2009
    - Old rationale for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe was rational, logical, cohesive -- that's no longer true today
      - » Senior Analyst at Berlin Think Tank (3/06)

## Germany (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons

- o Cautious official views on nuclear modernization
  - The New Triad illustrates US desire to develop new nuclear weapons and may result in increased proliferation
    - » German Defense Official in Berlin (1/06)
  - NATO needs credible, capable modernized weapons— even if only used for political role
    - » German Defense Official in Berlin (1/06)
  - Some concern that US modernization efforts could lead to an arms race but recognize the importance of possessing a credible deterrent
    - » German Diplomat in Berlin (1/06)

## Germany (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation Impact

- o U.S. Nuclear Posture Undermines Non-Proliferation
  - “ . . . what of nonproliferation policy if have-nots are threatened with nuclear weapons?”
    - » Josef Joffe in center-left Die Zeit (3/14/02)
  - The New Triad illustrates US desire to develop new nuclear weapons and may result in increased proliferation
    - » German Defense Official (1/06)
  - Why should other countries renounce nuclear weapons if U.S. placing new emphasis on them; U.S. policies encourage proliferation
    - » Expert (12/05)

## **Germany (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Article VI Issues**

- o Elements of NPR are going in the wrong direction for Article VI
  - Deployment, storage and responsive infrastructure are not in line with NPT's objectives
    - » German Defense Official in Berlin (1/06)
  - US arsenal still vastly oversized for new security environment, appears aggressive
    - » German Defense and Diplomatic Officials in Berlin (1/06)
  - Reducing Russia's NSNW stockpile consistent with Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)
    - » German Defense Official in Berlin (1/06)
  - Both the disarmament and non-proliferation pillars
    - » German Defense Official in Berlin (1/06)

## Other “Old NATO” Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o Context: perceived U.S. unilateralism
- o Extended deterrence less relevant for most “old” NATO
  - But still “talk the talk”
  - Turkey is a critical exception
- o Opposition to missile defenses has abated
- o U.S. seen widening roles for nuclear weapons – possible warfighting use against NNWS
- o Divergent perspectives among “old NATO” countries on need for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
  - Some voices still see political importance; other more skeptical
  - Overall – don’t rock the boat
    - » But will that become less possible due to aircraft decisions?

## Other “Old” NATO (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Unilateralism

- o U.S. unilateralism evidenced through nuclear policy
  - “The nuclear warning is one more sign of the U.S.’ regressive foreign policy and its mistaken zeal for keeping to in itself.”
    - » Spain, Conservative ABC (3/10/02)

## Other “Old” NATO (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Diverging Approaches

- o The United States appears to be moving in a different direction regarding nuclear policy than its European allies
  - It is more focused on military approaches to the international system
  - U.S. appears to be diverging from its European allies
  - U.S. discussion over nuclear use options has negative consequences overseas. It appears to be rocking the unnecessarily.
    - » Dutch Defense Official (1/06)

## Other “Old” NATO (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Pre-NPR View

- o U.S. BMD ‘bad’ for Europe
  - “The new Pandora’s box opened by Bush [plans for missile defense]...is for Europe a bad initiative. For decades, European leaders have told their fellow citizens that the ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of global security. The 1972 treaty might have been superseded by other events, but it would be much better to adapt it to current reality than axing [it]...If Bush goes forward it would be best to do so in close cooperation with his allies and in good faith consultations with those who are not his allies. Simply imposing this matter of planetary significance would not be the best way to initiate an imperial presidency.”
    - » Spain, center-left El País (5/3/01)

## Other “Old” NATO (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Extended Deterrence

- o For most countries, decreasing relevance
  - NATO feels no current threat of state attack; so while the alliance may want to keep some nuclear weapons around for traditional deterrence purposes, it does not want an open debate – “don’t make waves”
    - » Belgian Military Officer (3/06)
- o But on the flanks, threats persist
  - Extended deterrence absolutely essential for Turkish security and to support Turkey’s decision to renounce nuclear weapons
    - » Senior Diplomat in Europe (6/06)
  - Credibility of extended deterrence undermined by NATO member’ unwillingness to invoke Article V and to move missile defenses to Turkey prior to 2003 Iraq war
    - » Expert (10/06)

## Other “Old” NATO (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons

- o Widening roles for use of nuclear weapons
  - “...Europeans are uneasy that the new NPR reverses a 20-year policy of consigning nuclear weapons to the category of a ‘weapon of last resort,’ given its enunciation of a new strategic doctrine that moves away from containment and mutual nuclear deterrence to a kind of ‘unilateral assured destruction’ in many areas of the world.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jastinski, et. al, “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: International Perspectives and Implications”, CNS/MIIS (3/02)
  - U.S. moving to use nuclear weapons not only for deterrence but also for warfighting
    - » Norwegian MFA Official (12/05)

## Other “Old” NATO (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons (cont.)

- o Widening roles for use of nuclear weapons
  - The NPR “...brings a drastic change in U.S. policy for the use of nuclear weapons; until now it was that nuclear weapons would be used only in case of a nuclear attack or in outstanding cases during a war.”
    - » Editorial in Greek anti-American Eleftherotypia (3/11/02)
    - “... we realize that certain countries are listed in the category of ‘those nuclear weapons might be used against,’ and they are China, Russia, N. Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria.”
      - » Semih Idiz in Turkish tabloid Star (3/12/02)

## Other “Old” NATO (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons (cont.)

- o Widening roles for use of nuclear weapons
  - “...the document [the NPR] does away with the 50-year-old moral and practical taboo on the “first use” of nuclear weapons, and provides for the preventative use of atomic warheads against military objectives and nations that the order even lists by name: Russia, China, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.”
    - » Rome’s La Repubblica (3/10/03)
  - NATO does not want to open the discussion on possible alternative roles for its nuclear forces, such as countering WMD proliferation, due to fear the members will decide to drop their nuclear responsibilities completely
    - » Belgian Military Officer (3/06)

## **Other “Old” NATO (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NATO Nuclear Deployments**

- o **Don’t rock the boat and keep the weapons deployed**
  - Any suggestion of removing US NSNW from Europe would be poorly received by all allies because it would send the wrong signal and look like a U.S. decision to disengage from European security
    - » Spanish Diplomat (1/06)
  - Greek public opposes all things nuclear; Greek government prefers to keep U.S. NSNW in Europe
    - » Greek Diplomat (1/06)
  - Only real concern would be if U.S. decided to “go it alone”
    - » Turkish Diplomat (1/06)
  - Removal of U.S. nuclear weapons would undermine Turkish security
    - » Turkish Diplomat (6/06)

## Other “Old” NATO (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NATO Nuclear Deployments (cont.)

- U.S. NSNW in Europe do provide stability through burden-sharing and creating a forum for greater consultation with Allies; Turkey wants the United States to keep them in Europe
  - » Turkish Diplomat (1/06)
- Transatlantic relations more important to Belgium than any specific policy or weapons system; so they will not question America's moves, will allow the key nuclear nations in the Alliance to determine the future of nuclear weapons, and then follow their lead
  - » Belgian Diplomat (1/06)
- The Italian public is overwhelmingly anti-nuclear, with little interest in or knowledge of U.S. nuclear policy
  - » Italian Diplomat (1/06)

## Other “Old” NATO (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NATO Nuclear Deployments (cont.)

- Belgium's support for continued deployment of U.S. weapons in Europe has decreased though it recognizes that the Alliance needs to retain some limited capabilities
  - » Belgian Diplomat (1/06)
- Belgium disagrees with German suggestions that the Alliance should discuss the future of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe; there is a continued role and need for NSNW. They also like the importance those weapons give to the Belgian Air Force
  - » Belgian Diplomat, Spring 2005
- Developing new DCA makes little military sense; instead, the alliance should rely more on strategic systems, including sea-based systems
  - » Dutch Diplomat (1/06)
- No change foreseen in Italy's current nuclear role or commitments anticipated
  - » Italian Military Officer (1/06)

## Other “Old” NATO (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NATO Nuclear Deployments (cont.)

- General impression at NATO Nuclear Symposium: modernization will never happen, so the real options are to get rid of them, or leave them as they are
- But as a German pointed out: “If you’re going to let a sleeping dog lie, you had better be sure he’s going to stay asleep”
  - » U.S. Expert (1/06)

## Other “Old” NATO (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Weapons

- o Concern about new nuclear weapons
  - European critics fear that the call for developing a new generation of low-yield, earth penetrating ‘tactical’ devices blurs the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons and might inexorably cause substantial collateral casualties among innocent indigenous populations.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)
- o Isolated voices supporting?
  - NATO needs nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes, so the development of new nuclear weapons is understandable
    - » Greek Diplomat (1/06)

## Other “Old” NATO (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Reductions

- o Reductions a plus
  - U.S. policy changes have led to generally positive reactions, especially the strategic reductions as part of the Moscow Treaty
    - » Belgian Military Officer (1/06)
  - They [Europeans] also worry that the U.S. government does not foresee any actual ‘irreversible’ reductions in its strategic nuclear arsenal, since ‘downloaded’ warheads are to be retained as a ‘hedge’ in case of a needed ‘responsive force.’
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jassinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)

## **“New NATO” Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes**

- **Strong support of extended deterrence and U.S. nuclear guarantee**
- **U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe essential**
  - Strengthen political solidarity with Alliance
  - Under-gird extended deterrence
  - Czech and Polish interest in a “nuclear mission”
- **Nuclear modernization is a U.S. decision**

## **“New NATO” (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Context**

- Changes to U.S. Policy are an internal U.S. Decision
  - Latvia appreciates being kept updated by US representatives on those changes, but they recognize that they have no input to the process
    - » Latvian Diplomat (1/06)
- Estonians familiar with nuclear weapons, had 27 Russian nuclear facilities in their country during the Cold War

## **“New NATO” (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Extended Deterrence**

- o Importance of extended deterrence and nuclear deployments
  - All new member states in NATO are rightly concerned over their security; they want assurance, and most see nuclear assurance by the Alliance (and the U.S.) as the best way to do that
  - Czechs and Poles most adamant about fully integrating themselves into all aspects of NATO
    - Hence their interest in hosting nuclear weapons, or having a nuclear mission
      - » Senior Analyst in Parisian Think Tank (3/06)
  - o (See discussion below of NATO nuclear deployments)

## **“New NATO”: (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Usability**

- o New warheads likely to increase usability
  - Latvia would oppose new warhead designs if they make the possibility of nuclear use more likely
  - But don't expect to see a formal state position on this issue; they don't presume to intervene in US decisions
    - » Latvian Diplomat (1/06)

## **“New NATO”: (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Deployments**

- o Nuclear deployments in Europe necessary for security
  - Latvia likes having U.S. weapons stationed on European soil; sees a continuing need for their deployment, recognizes their value in assuring allies of American commitment, and would be unhappy if NSNW were withdrawn
  - Other Baltic member states likely feel the same way
    - » Latvian Diplomat (1/06)
  - U.S. nuclear weapons are crucial for under girding extended deterrence guarantee; want to see continued presence of US DCA role and NSNW in Europe
  - Unofficially, Poland would be willing to accept a DCA role in the future if any current DCA state wants to drop that mission
    - » Polish Defense Officials (1/06)

## **“New NATO”: (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Deployments**

- The continued deployment of NSNW in Europe remains necessary to show political solidarity with the Alliance
  - » Latvian and Polish Diplomats (1/06)
- NATO nuclear weapons provide additional security to the alliance; the Alliance and nuclear forces cannot operate without one another
  - » Estonian Diplomat (3/06)

## **Other European Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes**

- **Concern about pursuit of new types of nuclear weapons as well as widening circumstances for use**
  - Plus blurring boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons
- **Emphasis on nuclear weapons will make it harder to oppose proliferation**

## **Other European Countries (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy**

- o **NPR shifts emphasis to conventional capabilities**
  - "The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)...contains a few new and somewhat surprising aspects...The basic philosophy of the review seems to be that the United States is shifting (but not too drastically), its point of emphasis from strategic nuclear weapons to conventional capability. The United States is maintaining as much maneuver room as possible and committing itself through treaties to as little as possible.
    - » Finland's Helsingin Sanomat (1/14/02)

## **Other Europeans (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: New Focus**

- o Shift of focus welcomed
  - Europeans are relieved that the new U.S. nuclear doctrine somehow is contemplating a nuclear force cut by two-thirds (despite lack of warhead dismantlement) and seems overall to be shifting its attention away from Russia and more toward the threat arising from rogue states – thus moving beyond the Cold War chapter in NATO's history.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: International Perspectives and Implications”, CNS/MIIS, (3/02)

## Other Europeans (2): U.S. Thinking on Defense and Deterrence

- o U.S. Missile Defense May Lead to New Arms Race
  - "Sweden has pointed out repeatedly that a unilateral decision to go ahead with missile defense plans may potentially lead to a new arms race and have adverse effects for disarmament and non-proliferation. Sweden has welcomed the consultations between the Bush administration and other countries, and had hoped that a constructive solution would be found to the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, the consultations with Russia and China have been particularly important. I call upon the USA to continue consultations so as to achieve a joint solution instead, a solution that makes a positive contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation."

» Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh (12/01)

## Other Europeans (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons

- o Widening roles for use of nuclear weapons
  - "The Bush administration aims not only at developing new types of nuclear weapons, but also at expanding the list of situations in which nuclear weapons could be used. The Bush administration seems to have found a new role for nuclear weapons, which will be used against any country in the 'evil axis,' or countries which cause trouble."
    - » Romania, Business-oriented Ziarul Financiar (3/12/02)
  - "[T]he importance and urgency to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was stressed, and it was once again confirmed that nuclear disarmament was the ultimate goal of the treaty. Nowadays, the US wants to hear nothing about this--on the contrary, it is busy working on 'mini-nukes.'"
    - » Foreign affairs editor Gudrun Harrer in Austria's independent Der Standard (5/2/05)

## Other Europeans (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons (cont.)

- o Targeting Non-Nuclear States
  - “Targeting non-nuclear states with nuclear arms undermines U.S. ‘negative security assurances,’ threatening the foundation of multilateral arms control.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)
  - “We remain concerned that in the post Cold War security environment, security policies and defense doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons...In addition we are deeply concerned about emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as a part of new security strategies.”
    - » Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of which Sweden is a member, NPT Preparatory Committee (4/02)

## Other European Countries (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation

- o Europeans Troubled by Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons
  - “European critics fear that the call for developing a new generation of low-yield, earth penetrating ‘tactical’ devices blurs the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons and might inexorably cause substantial collateral casualties among innocent indigenous populations.”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)

## **Other Europeans (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- o **U.S. Nuclear Policy Eroding Non-Proliferation Efforts  
and NPT**
  - “The U.S. has . . . started development of new nuclear weapons. This policy makes it difficult for the U.S. to credibly argue that other states should do without what the U.S. has. This argumentation easily becomes hollow . . . that is the perpetual question regarding arms control. Why should certain states be allowed. . . when others cannot? As long as the answer is absent, there is a risk that the dangerous (weapons) spiral will continue.”
    - » Foreign Editor Per Ahlin, Sweden's independent Dagens Nyheter (5/3/02)

## Other European Countries: Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Reductions

- o Reductions not ‘irreversible’
  - “They [Europeans] also worry that the U.S. government does not foresee any actual ‘irreversible’ reductions in its strategic nuclear arsenal, since ‘downloaded’ warheads are to be retained as a ‘hedge’ in case of a needed ‘responsive force.’”
    - » Jean du Preez, Michael Jasinski, et. al, op. cit. (3/02)

Asia

## Japanese Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Differing views on role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy – reduced, increased, little changed
- Advanced conventional option increases risk of preemption
- Extended deterrence and U.S. nuclear umbrella essential
  - Ensuring credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantee emerging issue
    - » Strengthening many types of defense cooperation most important
    - » Dialogue on nuclear scenarios could add to confidence in guarantee
    - » Most “no”, a few “perhaps” on whether tailored nuclear weapons needed to enhance of DPRK
- On balance, opposition to new types of nuclear weapons
  - But also officials oppose a U.S. no-first-use policy
- Mixed views on is U.S. making nuclear weapons more usable
  - Tailored weapons seen lowering threshold
- Missile defenses essential – and also buttress deterrence
- Support for nuclear-free world a long-term goal
  - With focus on what is achievable now, balanced against nuclear deterrence goal

## Japan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Impact of 9-11

- o 9/11 attacks led U.S. to alter its nuclear posture
  - “The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in particular, have drastically changed the U.S.’s perception of potential threats. As a result, a number of fundamental changes have been taking place in the U.S. Firstly, the U.S. is reviewing the structure of its own military forces and strategy that relies on nuclear deterrence (mainly in the form of strategic nuclear weapons) has been relatively diminished, and the United States transformed its strategy by attaching more importance to the role of non-nuclear defense systems.”
- » The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policy, 2002*  
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy.pdf>  
20/150 (See also, Japan Defense Agency, *Defense White Paper, 2002*)

## Japan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Unilateralism

- o U.S. Unilateralism

- “Nonproliferation is a major pillar of U.S. security policy. But this does not mean that the U.S. alone can bolster its nuclear strategy. America, now developing new types of nuclear weapons to fight terrorism, would win more confidence internationally if it listened humbly to voices calling for a nuclear-free world.”
  - » Japan Times (5/3/05)
- “Frustration with U.S. unilateralism creates support for idea of Japan defending ourselves . . . with independent nuclear weapons.”
  - » Expert (3/06)

## Japan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Advanced Conventional

- o Preemption more possible
  - “Development of advanced conventional weapons will lower the threshold of preemption.”
  - “If North Korea planned to attack an ally of the United States or was blackmailing an ally with missiles – and the United States knew where the missiles were – the threshold might be lower of preemption if the U.S. could do it with conventional weapons.”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)

## Japan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Infrastructure Component

- o Concept of New Triad was difficult to understand
  - “New Triad is very difficult to understand. [In particular], why is defense industry part of it? Did not understand at first. Had to study the concept.”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

- o **NPR's Reduces Dependence on Nuclear Weapons a**
  - “ . . . the new Nuclear Posture Review seems to advocate a decreasing role for nuclear forces in the U.S. deterrent strategy. . . the review establishes a ‘New Triad’ to replace the preexisting U.S. nuclear triad . . . ”
  - “Reducing the dependence on nuclear force is a sensible option for the United States . . . [b]ecause the United States has the strongest comparative advantage in its conventional forces. . . .”
    - » Yukiya Amano, former Deputy Director General for Arms Control and Science, MFA in The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2002

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

- o Greater role for nuclear weapons after 9-11?
  - The Bush administration's attitude toward proliferation is as aggressive as the Clinton administration's. However, it became easier to justify the coercive nonproliferation policy and a greater role for U.S. nuclear weapons because the Bush administration connects the nonproliferation issue and the terrorism issue.
    - » Yohji Tozaki, "Kaku Fukakusan Taisei heno Inpurike-shon (The Implications of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System)"
  - "The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy is about the same. But the share of nuclear weapons as part of U.S. defense posture may be a little decreased."
    - » Defense Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Reliance on Nuclear Weapons (cont.)

- o Perception of greater emphasis on nuclear weapons
  - “United States perceived to be putting more emphasis on nuclear weapons, especially seeking small nuclear arms. At one level, New Triad generally reduces role of nuclear weapons. At tactical level, more emphasis placed on nuclear weapons.”
    - » Academic Expert (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: U.S. Security Relationship

- o U.S. security ties essential to Japan's security
  - “The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan’s security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.”
    - » Japan’s National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005 (12/10/04)
  - Japanese stance consists of two elements: 1) Desire for peace and mission as the only country in the world to have suffered the devastation caused by the use of atomic bombs; and 2) In order to ensure peace and security in Japan, it is imperative to stabilize as much as possible the military situation of the surrounding area.
    - » The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy*, April 2004

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: U.S. Security Relationship (cont.)

- o Security debate in Japan has changed
  - “Japanese people more understand the necessity to cooperate with the United States in the area of security.”
  - “More and more people interested in security in Japan”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)
  - “Taboo against talking about nuclear weapons went out in the 1990s. . . . But for the next 20 years, Japan will not acquire nuclear weapons unless there is a radical change in its security environment.”
    - » Expert (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Extended Nuclear Deterrence

- o Essential for Japan's security – and non-nuclear status
  - “U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan’s defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region”
    - » U.S.-Japan Joint Document, 2005
  - “Credibility of U.S. nuclear capability and deterrence is very essential to Japan . . . even if Japan’s ultimate goal is a nuclear-free world”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)
  - “As a matter of logic, given the capabilities and threats around Japan, Japan needs to rely on extended nuclear deterrence. This is widely accepted.”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Extended Nuclear Deterrence (cont.)

- “Compared to the Cold War, the matter of nuclear deterrence is more important, more consensus over security now”
  - » Defense Official (3/06)
- “Given security environment, reliance on American nuclear umbrella essential – and reason why Japan does not need to have nuclear weapons”
  - » Defense Official (3/06)
- “If U.S. nuclear deterrence will not work, a Japanese nuclear deterrent will not work either”
  - » Academic expert (3/06)
- “Japan relies on the U.S. nuclear capability. Why is there all of this concern about Japan seeking nuclear weapons?”
  - » Homeland Security Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Deterrence of Whom?

- o Deterrence of whom – North Korea, yes; China, perhaps
  - “Japan depends on deterrence considering its security environment – North Korea, China, Russia all with nuclear forces”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)
  - “North Korea for sure threatens Japan; China might not since the postwar consequences for China would be huge.
    - . . . Not need hard core military deterrent for China even in case of war.”
  - » Defense Official (3/06)
  - “Government and ordinary people view China as a threat”
    - » Expert (3/06)
  - “There is a division of opinion on whether missile defense should be also directed at China. China has too many missiles.”
    - » Academic expert (3/06)

## **Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Deterrence of Whom?**

- “The China issue is what really concerns Japan.”
  - » Homeland Security Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defense: Deterrence and Disarmament

- o Importance and legitimacy of nuclear deterrence
  - “Japan has been pursuing the goal of creating a safe world without nuclear weapons . . . . Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence still continues to play an important role in maintaining security in the contemporary world. Japan is located in a region where tension is high, and it would be highly imprudent for Japan to depend solely on the good will of other countries to ensure its security.”
  - “. . . these two approaches to national security [calling on the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals and being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella] are not in contradiction...”
- » Yukiya Amano, op. cit., Spring 2002

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defense: Deterrence and Disarmament (cont.)

- “Security of Japan from attack is the priority for the short term, which requires nuclear deterrence. But want to maintain nuclear disarmament as a long-term goal. How to bridge these two goals is very difficult . . . Especially post-9-11.”
- Disarmament is an important part of security. . . . Even within the Foreign Ministry, there are two schools: now the security concern dominates disarmament.”
  - » Retired Ambassador (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Credibility of Guarantee

- o Issue of credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantee being discussed – but low key
  - “How to assure the public, others that U.S. nuclear deterrent is credible?
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)
  - “Some persons but not many do ask: where is the visible credibility of the American deterrent?
    - » Defense Official (3/06)
  - “What about decoupling – some persons say that the United States would not counterattack because of the threat to the United States?
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)
  - “In the marginal cases, the small attacks, demonstration attacks against Japan, will the United States use nuclear weapons to retaliate?
    - » Defense Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Credibility of Guarantee (cont.)

- “There is a perception of increasing discomfort in the United States about becoming entangled in Japan’s problems. Some Japanese becoming afraid of will the United States be there for Japan. Can see that debate, with some groups playing up to that perception.”
  - » Academic Expert (3/06)
- “Personally, I have no concern about the U.S. commitment particularly given the very intense dialogue on common objectives, roles, and missions in recent years”
  - » Defense Official (3/06)
- “In Japan, the public does not ask about the credibility of the deterrent. . . . Credibility is discussed among officers and foreign affairs officials.”
  - » Academic expert (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Enhancing Credibility

- o Steps to ensure or strengthen credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantee identified
  - “Military cooperation with United States in the area around Japan, military exercises, coordinated defense planning, Transformation of defense relationship are one source of credibility. [These activities] can be expanded.”
  - “Enhanced missile defense capability – and missile defense cooperation – also are a source of credibility.”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)
  - “Overall cooperation, realignment of U.S. forces, joint planning is real way to maintain and enhance credibility. Plus discuss the marginal scenarios. [See below]”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Enhancing Credibility (cont.)

- “Provide credibility by making Japan more integrated into American operations. . . U.S. with higher stake in Japan as an indispensable partner.”
  - » Expert (3/06)
- “Credibility from the U.S. commitment and the process of strengthening the Alliance. . . What the United States says.”
  - » Homeland Security Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Discussions of Nuclear Scenarios

- o Discussion of nuclear planning scenarios could also strengthen Japanese confidence in nuclear guarantee
  - “Why should there not be some discussion of nuclear scenarios, of the situations in which the nuclear guarantee could be involved? There is general discussion of scenarios but not those involving U.S. nuclear guarantee.”
  - “Study the marginal cases, the blackmail case. . . . Very sensitive issue in Japan. If do discuss, need to do so quietly.”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Nuclear Weapons and Credibility

- o Characteristics of nuclear arsenal can impact credibility of deterrence – in the view of some
  - “Better, more capable nuclear arsenal will strengthen deterrence – a personal not an official view”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)
  - “Given the collateral damage of nuclear weapons, there would be some hesitation to use.”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)
  - “Very skeptical about the idea of mini-nukes, small nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons cannot be other than mass destruction [weapons]. . . To deter North Korea, political will, a firm commitment to protect Japan is needed – not new nuclear weapons. If need nuclear weapons for deterrence, strategic ones useful.”
    - » Retired Ambassador (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Nuclear Weapons and Credibility (cont.)

- “China and North Korea will be deterred by “old” nuclear weapons like those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Have not bought the argument about the need for new nuclear weapons, not think that the United States will be self-deterred by large civilian casualties.”
- “... may add to deterrent but many people in Japan concerned about impact on China’s modernization.”
  - » Homeland Security Official (3/06)
- “Same type of nuclear weapon sufficient for credibility of deterrence; don’t need new type or enhanced type. Image of United States as a big nuclear superpower [counts].”
- “[Before ratifying CTBT] Japan did ask if the United States could maintain the credibility of the nuclear deterrent without testing. Japan’s officials were worried about this. Confirmed could be done by the Clinton Administration.”
  - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Support for Missile Defenses

- o Missile defenses essential
  - “The GOJ shares the recognition with the US that the proliferation of ballistic missiles is causing serious threat to our security...the GOJ expresses the understanding that the US is considering the missile defense program while making various diplomatic efforts to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles...and welcomes the United States' renewed announcement of conducting close consultation on this issue with allies, and such other interested states as Russia and China.”
    - » Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (undated)
    - » Comparable statement by Yukiya Amano, op. cit.
  - “. . . Since BMD is purely a defensive measure and thus well suited for [Japan's] defense policy.”
    - » *2001 Defense of Japan*, quoted in Amano, op. cit.

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Support for Missile Defenses

- o **Missile defenses buttress deterrence**
  - “Missile defenses make it much harder for North Korea to calculate what level of threat would be just enough to scare Japan into not supporting defense of South Korea and not too much threat to provoke Japan and the United States”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)
  - “Missile defenses are considered the most effective means to deter North Korea.”
    - » Expert (3/06)

## Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: ABM Withdrawal

- o ABM Treaty withdrawal a U.S.-Russia issue – but should be handled to minimize instability
  - “ . . . Japan views the ABM Treaty as essentially a matter between the United States and Russia . . . ”
  - “Thanks to the intensified talks [between the United States and Russia], the negative impact [of U.S. withdrawal] seems to have been held to a minimum.”
  - “Finally, the United States does not seem to be moving toward an open-ended deployment of BMD . . . .”
    - > Yukiya Amano, op. cit., Spring 2002

## **Japan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: ABM Withdrawal**

- o Japan welcomes U.S. Consultations with Russia and China on BMD
  - “the Government of Japan welcomes the renewed announcement by the United States to conduct close consultations on this issue [missile defense] with allies and other interested states, such as Russia and China. So, Japan considers it very important that the United States carries out such consultations. The US side should, at least, explain about the programs to Russia and China in particular.”
    - » Norio Hattori, Press Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(5/8/01)

## Japan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use

- o **U.S. expanding possible uses of nuclear weapons**
  - America, now developing new types of nuclear weapons to fight terrorism . . .
    - » Japan Times (5/3/05)
  - “The media and politicians believe that President Bush is addicted to nuclear weapons, but Japanese officials understand better.”
    - » Homeland Security Official (3/06)
- o **U.S. prepared to use nuclear weapons preemptively**
  - “Allowing pre-emptive nuclear strikes against possible biological and chemical attacks would effectively contradict a ‘negative security assurance’ policy declared 10 years ago by the Clinton administration during an international conference to review the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.”
    - » Japan Times (5/2/05)

## Japan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use (cont.)

- o U.S. seeking usable nuclear weapons

- “The United States plans to produce usable nuclear weapons and is even contemplating using them in preemptive strikes. What a horrible idea! The destructive force of a nuclear weapon, however low yield it might be, is tremendous. People exposed to its radiation would continue to suffer the effects, even if they should survive the bomb itself. It seems outrageous to even consider using such a cruel weapon.”
  - » *The Asashi Shimbun*, “Japan Has Good Reason to Seek Nuclear Abolition,” (8/6/02)
- “The probability that nuclear weapons will be used and the danger of nuclear war are increasing.”
  - » Tadatoshi Akiba, a mayor of Hiroshima city, Kyodo New Service, “Japan: Hiroshima Mayor Delivers Peace Declaration,” (8/6/02)

## Japan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Risk of Nuclear Use Increasing

- o Lowering the Nuclear Threshold?
  - “If United States develops small nuclear weapons, this will reduce the nuclear threshold. Intentions may be good but it will lead to the opposite result, more dangers and more arms racing.”
  - “If U.S. uses small nuclear weapons to preempt, this will invite North Korea to use nuclear weapons against Japan.”
    - » Retired Ambassador (3/06)
  - “New kinds of weapons will increase usability”
    - » Academic expert (3/06)
  - “Unless North Korea uses force, difficult to imagine U.S. use of nuclear weapons”
    - » Homeland Security Official (3/06)
  - “Don’t think United States want to use nuclear weapons”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## **Japan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Risk of Nuclear Use Increasing**

- o **Media and Anti-Nuclear Organizations Claim Use More Likely**
  - “The probability that nuclear weapons will be used and the danger of nuclear war are increasing.”
  - “The United States government has no right to force Pax Americana on the rest of us, or unilaterally to determine the fate of the world.”
    - » Tadatoshi Akiba, a mayor of Hiroshima city, Kyodo New Service, “Japan: Hiroshima Mayor Delivers Peace Declaration,” (8/6/02)

## **Japan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: No First Use of Nuclear Weapons**

- Japan Opposing a U.S. No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Doctrine
  - “In 2005, a private committee considered the concept of no first use of nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister rejected this concept.”
    - » Academic Expert (3/06)
  - “No first use would erode the credibility of the nuclear extended deterrent.”
    - » Academic expert (3/06)

## Japan (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons

- o **U.S. Seeks New Nuclear Weapons**
  - The U.S. "recommended [in the NPR] the development of mini-nuclear weapons and the resumption of nuclear explosions for test purposes, and openly proposed the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances."
    - » Nagasaki Mayor Iccho Itoh (8/09/03)
  - "RNEP created image of U.S. developing new warheads, may use"
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)
- o **Dangers of New Nuclear Weapons**
  - "The 'mini-nukes' that the U.S. is trying to develop possess terrible power, despite their smaller size. The radiation destruction they would cause is no different from that of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki."
    - » Nagasaki Mayor Iccho Itoh (8/10/04)
  - "[U.S.] Congress' refusal to fund was a good decision"
    - » Retired Ambassador (3/06)

## Japan (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons

- o Impact of Developing ‘Small Nuclear Weapons’
  - The U.S. should reconsider developing small nuclear weapons.
    - These nuclear weapons will give terrorists incentives to use nuclear weapons prior to the U.S. strike; where the U.S. will use these nuclear weapons; and if the U.S. will lose the moral ground on measures to eliminate terrorists.
      - » Nobumasa Akiyama, a staff member of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, in *Gaiko Forum*, (9/05)
    - Mini-nukes are undesirable [see above]
      - » Homeland Security Official (3/06)
    - “Not happy to see U.S. strengthening new types, new warheads”
      - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## Japan (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Nuclear Weapons

- o Impact of New Nuclear Weapons on Security of the East Asian Region?
  - Japan should analyze if the U.S. flexible deterrence strategy improves stability over the uncertain future. For example, we should examine if the small nuclear weapons can be effective and desirable for Japanese security for the North Korea issue.
    - » Katsuhisa Furukawa, Aratana Yokushi Gainen no Kouchiku ni Mukete (Developing New Deterrence Concept), *Gaiko Forum*, (9/05)

## Japan (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: A Different View?

- o Some Voices Speculate Unofficially on Utility New Nuclear Weapons
  - “New nuclear weapons – RNEP and small weapons – could be useful to decapitate North Korean leadership, to preempt imminent nuclear missile attacks.”
  - “Posing threat to North Korean leadership may be better deterrent than simply threat of mass killing which North Koreans might think United States would not use.”
    - » Defense Official (3/06)
  - “Better, more capable nuclear arsenal will strengthen deterrence – a personal not an official view”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Disarmament

- o No U.S. Interest in Nuclear Disarmament
  - “United States is not interested in disarmament but only in non-proliferation. . . . U.S. should put equal emphasis on disarmament and non-proliferation.”
    - » Retired Ambassador (3/06)
  - “United States gives image of only being interested in non-proliferation.”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Reductions

- o NPR approach to reductions unacceptable
  - “...there are some points in the NPR that cannot be accepted. First, although the NPR mentions “reduction of nuclear warheads,” all it is saying is that these warheads will be removed from operational deployment...Secondly, the NPR, in preparation for the future, calls for shortening the process of resuming nuclear tests, reconfirming “opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”
- » “Editorial in Tokyo’s Mainichi Shimbun (1/12/02)

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Reductions

- o Reserve Nuclear Warheads Questioned

- “There is considerable merit to these arguments, particularly those concerning ‘the hedge’ and non-strategic nuclear warheads. It would be far better if warheads now intended to be preserved for the responsive force were dismantled . . .”
- “That said, it must be recognized that what may be desirable is not always achievable in a limited amount of time.”
  - » Yukiya Amano, op. cit., Spring 2002
- “Japan would like the United States to explain its [record] more smartly to the outside world.”
  - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Testing

- o Importance of CTBT
  - It is regrettable that the Bush administration opposes to ratify the CTBT. The Japanese government thinks that the CTBT is a great device to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without the CTBT, the security environment could result in worsening Japanese security, such as a nuclear experiment by North Korea.
    - » Yukiya Amano, Nihon ga Dekirukoto 6-tsu no Teian (Six proposals which Japan can do), *Gaiko Forum*, September 2003
  - “Japan recognizes that the treaty [CTBT] has certain limitations, but believes that on balance the CTBT will enhance Japanese security and international stability.”
    - » Yukiya Amano, op. cit., Spring 2002

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Testing

- o Impact of CTBT Should be Assessed Realistically:

- “Some officials in the Japanese government expect that the CTBT can delay Chinese modernization of its nuclear weapons. But, Japan should analyze whether this expectation is possible and what the Japanese deterrence strategy toward China should be if the CTBT doesn’t delay the Chinese modernization. Japan should have logical connection between its disarmament policy and its deterrence strategy.”
  - » Katsuhisa Furukawa, Aratana Yokushi Gainen no Kouchiku ni Mukete (Developing New Deterrence Concept), *Gaiko Forum*, (9/05)

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of US Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Testing

- o Lack of Progress on CTBT ‘Regrettable’

- “Japan welcomes the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty between Russia and the United States, which should serve as an important step for further nuclear disarmament. Japan hopes for full implementation of the Treaty by both States. It is nonetheless regrettable that no progress has been made with regard to the entry into force of the CTBT or the commencement of FMCT negotiations, despite relevant agreements that have been formulated to this end.”

- » Statement by Ambassador Yoshiki Mine, Conference on Disarmament (4/26/04)

## **Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Defenses**

- o **Stability Impact of Missile Defenses**

- Missile defense could encourage nuclear disarmament and contribute to nuclear non-proliferation because the system reduces the effectiveness of missiles with nuclear warheads.
  - » Yukiya Amano, Nihon ga Dekirukoto 6-tsū no Teian (Six proposals which Japan can do), *Gaiko Forum*, September 2003

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Risk of Proliferation

- o Developing New Nuclear Weapons Will Lead to Proliferation

- “If the U.S. were to develop new types of nuclear warheads, it might be tempted to end its moratorium on nuclear testing. A resumption of testing would undermine the rules and moral constraints which have inhibited other countries from conducting their own tests, and could set off a stampede to develop weapons of mass destruction among the non-nuclear nations and potential nuclear powers.”

» *The Mainichi Shimbun*, “U.S. Must Not Lower Nuclear Threshold,” March 22, 2002

## **Japan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Risk of Proliferation**

- o **NPR Promotes Proliferation**

- The NPR encourages non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons. All countries should make active efforts to solve the nuclear issue of North Korea and Iran without taking military measures. If the Bush administration continues their aggressive nonproliferation policy, some countries may think nuclear weapons are necessary for their defense.
  - » Greenpeace Japan

## Japan (5): Stability Impacts of US Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Risk of Proliferation

- U.S. Reliance on Nuclear Weapons Encourages Proliferation
  - "It's clear that as long as the world's most powerful country continues to rely on nuclear weapons, other countries can't pursue nuclear non-proliferation."
    - » Nagasaki Mayor Iccho Itoh (8/10/04)

## South Korean Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Concern that NPR signals greater U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons in certain contingencies
  - Emphasis on “any available options” in response to chemical or biological weapons use
- Acknowledges Congress blocking development of new types of nuclear weapons by Bush Administration
- Formal statements stress continued importance of extended deterrence and U.S.-ROK Alliance
- U.S. paying a price in NPT context for unwillingness to engage on nuclear disarmament matters
  - Should accept irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency

## **South Korea (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy**

- o Dangerous Shift in U.S. Strategic Policy
  - “The world is reeling from a Pentagon report...because the report signals a dangerous shift in U.S. strategic ideology in the wake of September 11.
    - Independent Joong-Ang Ilbo (3/12/02)
  - “Korean government was not concerned by the 2002 NPR with the exception of its reference to the use of ‘any available options’”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## **South Korea (2): US Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Deterrence**

- Nuclear deterrence less important now
  - “Nuclear umbrella less important than in the Cold War but still recognize utility for now – different in long term”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## **South Korea (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Use**

- o Concern about U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons
  - “NPR keeps open possibility of using nuclear weapons with emphasis on ‘any available options’ and in light of 7 contingencies for use of nuclear weapons”
  - “Greater U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons in certain non-Soviet contingencies”
  - “If U.S. wanted to use nuclear weapons against bio or chem [sites] there would be tensions with ROK – an area of concern but not otherwise”
  - “ROK goal is to avoid any war on the Peninsula”
  - “U.S. not seeking to make nuclear weapons more usable . . . but under some contingencies could be used”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## South Korea (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation

- o U.S. Seeking New Nuclear Weapons
  - “Bush Administration seeking to develop mini-nukes, RNEP but Congress is blocking”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)
  - “The U.S. has the most nuclear weapons but is avoiding making reductions, and is trying to develop a new nuclear ‘bunker buster’ bomb. Also, the U.S. is determining its nuclear experiment budget while rejecting the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is supported by most nations.”
    - » Nationalist, left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun (5/30/05)

## **South Korea (5): Stability Impacts of US Nuclear Doctrine and Posture**

- o **ROK-U.S. Comment on Defense Posture, Alliance**
  - “Both sides concurred that the ROK-U.S. Alliance remains vital to the interests of the two nations and that a solid combined defense posture should be maintained in order to secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both sides praised the fact that the ROK-U.S. combined force capability remains at peak readiness.”
    - » The 37th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué (10/21/05)

## **South Korea (5): Stability Impacts of US Nuclear Doctrine and Posture**

- o U.S. pays price in NPT context for nuclear policies
  - “Know U.S. cannot disarm now – but U.S. can do more”
  - “U.S. pays price in NPT context due to gap between NAM and NWS”
  - “Go along with NAM view that U.S. could do more to reduce nuclear weapons and role of nuclear weapons”
  - “NWS not carrying out their obligations”
  - “Welcome triad of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency”
    - » Foreign Affairs Official (3/06)

## Taiwanese Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- Deterrence still central to U.S. nuclear strategy even after NPR
- NPR seen to signal readiness to use nuclear weapons in a cross-Strait crisis – by outsiders, by officials
- Apparent differences among Taiwanese on whether that signal a plus or a minus
  - Could adversely impact Chinese relations with Taiwan
    - Would buttress deterrence
- Public opinion polls indicate public opposes use of nuclear weapons

## Taiwan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy

- o **NPR: A major shift in U.S. thinking**
  - “[O]ver the last half century, the U.S. nuclear policy was mainly meant to deter. The ultimate goal of the U.S. nuclear policy was deterrence, rather than the actual use of nuclear weapons.”
  - “However, if the *Los Angeles Times* report, ‘The Bush Administration Has Ordered the Pentagon to Devise Contingency Plans for the Use of Nuclear Weapons,’ was true, it would signal a major change in U.S. nuclear policy following the 11 September attacks.”
    - » Lin Chung-pin, advisor to the National Security Council [NSC], cited in Taipei *Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao* [*China Times*] in Chinese, 11 March 2002, FBIS-CPP2002031100091

## Taiwan (2): US Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Deterrence

- o Deterrence Still Central to U.S. Strategy

- “[Deterrence is a major guidance in the U.S. nuclear policy, and no significant strategic change has happened ... otherwise such a shift ... would stir up a debate, not only in the international community, but also between the U.S. Congress and the administration.]”
  - » Lin Chung-pin, advisor to the National Security Council [NSC], cited in Taipei *Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao* [*China Times*] in Chinese, 11 March 2002, FBIS-CPP2002031100091

## Taiwan (3): US Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Extended Deterrence

- o U.S. resolute in its willingness to defend Taiwan
  - “The unequivocal statements in the Nuclear Posture Review that the U.S. may use tactical nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait are meant to warn China unequivocally that the U.S. is deadly serious and that it will not shrink from using maximum power in a cross-strait war. China should harbor no illusions about U.S.’s willingness to stand up to it, as it did in the Korean War.”
    - » Chiu Chwei-liang, a visiting professor at Tamkang University, in *Taipei Times* in English, 19 April 2002, FBIS-CPP20020419000124.

## Taiwan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons

- o Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming reiterates “five no’s” policy
  - Taiwan continues to maintain its “five No’s” policy: no developing, producing, obtaining, storing or using nuclear weapons. A Taiwan Strait free of nuclear arms is Taipei’s objective.
    - » Tang Yao-ming, Minister of National Defense, reportedly during an interpellation in the legislature, cited in Taipei Times in English, 19 April 2002, FBIS-CPP20020419000124.
  - “Taiwan has been seeking to make the Taiwan Strait become a ‘nuclear weapons-free’ zone. Our stance is that all the Asia-Pacific countries should try their best to avoid nuclear disasters from happening.”
  - “China will surely harbor greater mistrust and a sense of insecurity toward the US. The result will be greater antagonism and tension between the two nations. Taiwan will be affected as a result.”
    - » Ministry of National Defense Statement

### Taiwan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons (cont.)

- o Taiwan opposes Washington's possible use of tactical nuclear weapons
  - “Unfortunately, his [Taiwanese Defense Minister Tang’s “Five No’s”] statements mean that Taiwan opposes Washington’s use of limited tactical nuclear weapons to protect Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.”
  - “It is said that this is not the thinking of President Chen Shui-bian and his government and that the National Security Council was surprised by Tang’s statements. The council reportedly has criticized him indirectly.”
    - » Chiu Chwei-liang, a visiting professor at Tamkang University, in *Taipei Times* in English, 19 April 2002, FBIS-CPP20020419000124.

## Taiwan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Use of Nuclear Weapons

- o Majority of Taiwanese oppose use of nuclear weapons in Cross-Strait Conflict
  - 56 percent of Taiwanese oppose the use of nuclear weapons in a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan; 22 percent support the idea and 21 percent are unsure.
    - » Survey of 1,083 respondents by the Public Opinion Research Foundation following the NPR leak in US media, *Taipei Times* in English, 25 March 2002, FBIS-CPP20020325000169
  - “Although we welcome U.S. support of Taiwan, we’d really hate to see the U.S. use such an extreme measure to protect us.”
  - “Although the DPP government has described itself as an anti-nuclear party, it has failed to comment on the issue since the report [on NPR] was made public. I think the president owes the nation an explanation on the government’s stance.”
    - » Tim Ting (Ting T’ing-yu), chairman of Gallup in Taiwan, commenting on the survey result, *ibid.*

## Taiwan (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation

- Per above, would not support develop of tailored nuclear weapons for warfighting

## Taiwan (5): Stability Impacts of US Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Concerns

- o U.S. nuclear stance detrimental to cross-strait relations
  - “The development will be detrimental to cross-Strait relations since it will only give greater leverage to hawkish members of the Chinese government.”
  - “Taiwan wants to maintain stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait through confidence-building measures. It does not want to see any use of nuclear weapons in the region. Taiwan is a sovereign country. It has its own self-defense policy, which will not change because of US government policies.”
  - “If the security of the Taiwan Strait is to be entangled with the US government’s nuclear-arms policy, the triangular relations between Taiwan, China and the US will become even more complicated and the stability and balance of power in the Strait will be greatly changed.”

» Statements by the Ministry of National Defense, cited in *Taipei Times* in English, 1 April 2002. FBIS-CPP20020401000132

## Australian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o Mixed views on NPR – reflecting policy perspectives
  - Rejection of CTBT singled out by some, lack of progress on NPT Article VI by others
- o U.S. extended deterrent important for Australia's security
- o For some, U.S. seen as no longer viewing nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort
  - Pursuit of new types of nuclear weapons reflects that shift
- o U.S. refusal to agree to nuclear elimination as long-term goal undermines NPT

## Australia (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Two Views

- o **NPR reverses decades of U.S. nuclear thinking**
  - NPR reflects lack of U.S. commitment to abolish its nuclear weapons under Article VI of NPT
    - » Former Australian FM Gareth Evans (November 2002)
- o **'Generally supportive' but not without reservation**
  - “Generally supportive” of U.S. nuclear policy but one particular area of dissatisfaction is the U.S. failure to ratify the CTBT.
    - » Australian Diplomat, discussion (1/25/06)

## Australia (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Extended Deterrence

- o Support for U.S. Deterrence Posture
  - The United States “...provides a robust security guarantee” for Australia, including extended nuclear deterrence
    - » Former Australian Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Dibb (August 2005)
    - “Deterrence only works against a rational state, not against terrorist groups and suicide bombers. The axis of evil speech, derided by liberal commentators, will emerge as a key-defining document of the new era...”
      - » Foreign editor Greg Sheridan in national conservative Australian (3/14/02)

## Australia (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons

- o Nuclear weapons no longer viewed as weapons of last resort
- o "A secret Pentagon report which reveals plans for a 'first-strike' nuclear arsenal reverses decades of American military thinking which effectively defined nuclear warheads as weapons of last resort
  - » Sydney Morning Herald Editorial (3/12/02)

## Australia (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Weapons

- o U.S. seen planning first-strike nuclear arsenal
  - With development of new nuclear weapons
    - >> Sydney Morning Herald (3/12/02) above
    - >> Former FM Gareth Evans

## Australia (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NPT

- o NPR Undermines NPT
  - “NPR . . . along with the total unwillingness to subscribe to any kind of ultimate elimination objective (coming on top of the Senate’s rejection of CTBT ratification in 1999), has made the NPT more fragile than it has ever been.”
    - » Former Australian FM Gareth Evans (Summer/Fall 2003)

## Indian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o **NPR's context is U.S. unilateralism**
- o **NPR reflects shift from deterrence to preemption – nuclear preemption**
  - Including against NNWS
- o **U.S. pursuing new types of “mini-nukes” and lowering threshold of nuclear use**
- o **U.S. still seeking new types of nuclear weapons, e.g., bunker busters**
- o **NPR will encourage proliferation**
  - Via implicit claim of U.S. right to use nuclear weapons against any state
  - Via don't challenge the U.S. without nuclear weapons
  - Via lessening case for Indian nuclear restraint – force size and doctrine

## India (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Unilateralism

- o **NPR Epitomizes New U.S. Unilateralism**
  - “...the emerging U.S. nuclear posture is evidence of the administration dismantling all restraints to pursue a nuclear policy that stems from its strident unilateralism.”
    - » R. Ramachandran, “The New American Posture,” *The Hindu*, January 2003

## India (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Revising Deterrence

- o **NPR Emphasizes Pre-emption, Not Retaliation**
  - “The Pentagon is poised to turn America’s nuclear security doctrine upside down...George W. Bush has said that the idea is to enhance America’s power of deterrence. He has, in effect, redefined deterrence....He wants the offensive power to pre-empt America’s potential enemies from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.”

» P.S. Suryanarayana, “America’s Nuclear Hit-List,” The Hindu, April 30, 2002

## India (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons

- o NPR justifies doctrine of nuclear preemption, even against non-nuclear weapons states
  - “At the doctrinal level, the arrangements for a pre-emptive attack are in place with the Nuclear Posture Review...and [the U.S. is] warning that it could use even nuclear weapons against a ‘rogue’ state which has a programme to acquire weapons of mass destruction.”
    - » Praful Bidwai, “Nuclear Poker Over Iran,” *Frontline*, January 28, 2006
- “India cannot embrace a morally controversial idea which is implicit in the Pentagon’s reported thinking that favours nuclear strikes against those without the proven means to retaliate in a like manner.”
  - » P.S. Suryanarayana, The Hindu, (4/30/02)

### **India (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Lowered Threshold**

- o **NPR displaces discussion of nuclear disarmament and blurs the line between nuclear and conventional arms**
  - “Allies and strategists are asking the question: would a U.S. president consider making a nuclear strike against a non-nuclear state? The answer seems to be: yes...President Bush has warned that the U.S. will do anything to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining chemical or biological weapons. One course of action Pentagon envisages in the ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ is a strike with a low-yield nuclear weapon designed to dig deep into the earth and wipe out underground sites storing or manufacturing such weapons. This weapon would be a ‘mini nuke’ and would supposedly produce a low fallout.”
- » Baichand Patel, former Senior Political Affairs Officer of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, “A Farewell to Arms Control?” Hindustan Times, April 2, 2002

## India (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Lowered Threshold

- o Assertion that U.S. has relaxed posture over use of tactical nuclear weapons

- “The arsenal of ‘strategic’ nuclear weapons is still under much stricter rules, but command over ‘tactical’ weapons has been relaxed and dispersed in accordance with a new classification which claims that these ‘mini-nukes’ are ‘safe for the surrounding population.’ That re-classification is frightening enough. Moreover, this dispersal of authority among regional commanders itself makes it all the more likely that, in the heat of battle and faced with particularly difficult targets, the man in the field would opt for the nuclear weapon and, since he is the man in the know, the war-loving President would grant the permission.”

» Ajaz Ahmed, “The Imperial Nuclear Order,” *Chennai Frontline* in English, National news magazine. Sister publication of the respected Chennai-based national daily *The Hindu*, May 6, 2006

## India (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation: Expanding Capability

- o New nuclear technologies (e.g., RNEP) highlight value of improved nuclear capabilities
    - “The U.S. insists on keeping its nuclear weapons arsenal, indeed on expanding it. It has embarked on a plan to extend its nuclear capability both upwards, through ‘Star Wars,’ and downwards, through bunker-buster nuclear weapons. There could be no example that is more negative than Washington’s own addiction to nuclear weapons.
- » Praful Bidwai, “Nuclear Poker Over Iran,” Frontline, January 28, 2006

## India (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation: New Weapons

- o U.S. conventional test paves way to nuclear bunker buster
  - “The Pentagon is preparing to test a 700-ton bomb that is designed to destroy underground military targets. The test, code-named Divine Strike, is set to take place on June 2 in the western U.S. state of Nevada about 145 kilometers northwest of Las Vegas and will be the biggest controlled conventional explosion in military history...Once the computer modeling of the blast dynamics is validated, the U.S. will have its nuclear bunker buster, tested and ready for delivery. The U.S. emphasis on realistic testing of its nuclear weapons has important lessons for Indian politicians and strategists some of whom quixotically believe that India already possesses a credible nuclear deterrent.”
- » Vijainder K. Thakur, “Divine Strike – A Nuclear Weapon Test with Conventional Explosives,” Thakur’s blog, Thakur spent 20 years in the Indian Air Force, March 31, 2006.

## **India (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- **NPR will force other states to acquire nuclear weapons if they want to challenge the U.S.**
  - “The basic implication of the NPR—that the U.S. reserves the right to target any nation with nuclear weapons whenever it chooses to do so—is itself likely to increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. If a country believes it’s falling out of favor with Washington, what is the first thing it is likely to do? A quote attributed to Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes provides some insight: ‘Before one challenges the United States, one must first acquire nuclear weapons.’”
- » Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes, as quoted by Robert McNamara and Thomas Graham, Jr., “A Pretty Poor Posture for a Superpower,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 13, 2002

## India (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation

- o NPR contributes to the maintenance of an imperial nuclear order, led by the U.S.
  - “Not only does the U.S. openly plan for nuclear attack on any number of non-nuclear countries, it is also the chief proliferator of nuclear weapons in the world. Its extensive nuclear cooperation with Israel is well-known but it has also supplied nuclear weapons to some non-nuclear members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)...There is hardly any significant NATO country which does not have nuclear weapons on its soil and the possible use of them is now part of NATO’s strike plans.”
  - Nuclear Threshold Lowering in Europe
    - » Aijaz Ahmed, “The Imperial Nuclear Order,” Chennai Frontline in English, National news magazine, May 6, 2006.

## **India (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Less Nuclear Restraint**

- o **NPR undercuts U.S. arguments for Indian nuclear restraint**
  - “When analysts and commentators ask U.S. interlocutors what would happen if India or Pakistan or some other country were to invoke the principles of unilateralism and pre-emption, they are told that these concepts only apply when the U.S. is invoking them and not to other countries and other situations. They go on to add that in respect of other disputes, other avenues of solving the conflict are available.”

» M.R. Srinivasan, “Bush’s Nuclear Doctrine,” The Hindu,  
October 31, 2002

## **India (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Less Nuclear Restraint**

- o U.S policy undercuts credibility
  - “Recent steps taken by the NWS, the United States in particular, have undercut the credibility of calls for Indian and Pakistan to refrain from developing and deploying nuclear weapons...the administration’s plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), research and development of new nuclear weapons, and the resumption of nuclear testing, all advanced recently in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.”
    - » Admiral L. Ramdas, Former Chief of the Indian Navy, 2002  
NPT PrepCOM

## **India (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Erode NFU**

- o **Erode India's NFU doctrine**
  - “The first [Indian] National Security Advisory Board two years ago had supported the government’s stand that India would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. But the latest report wanted this policy overturned, pointing out that India is the only nuclear weapon state that has committed itself to a ‘no-first-use’ policy . . . It discussed the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which had listed nuclear and even non-nuclear countries that can be targeted with small nuclear weapons. The Board warned that India should worry about the possible chaotic situation if Pakistan or China were to follow the U.S. policy of targeting non-nuclear states.”
    - » “Abandon ‘no first use’ policy, security board tells gov’t,” Rediff.com; January 9, 2003.

## **India (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Degrade Security**

- o NPR targeting of non-nuclear weapons states degrades the security environment
- o Threatens to erode the global nuclear testing moratorium and Indian “no first use” policy
- o Development of RNEP will have significant consequences
  - “...the development of deadly new nuclear weapons by the U.S. should be a matter of great concern to India for their eventual deployment will degrade the security environment in the world and Asia. The same is true of the U.S. missile defence programme, which India, regrettably, will continue to remain engaged with.”
- » Siddharth Varadarajan in “The truth behind the Indo-US nuclear deal,” The Hindu; July 29, 2005

## Pakistani Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- **NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy shifting ground**
  - Away from traditional non-proliferation agenda
  - Pre-emption and war-fighting replacing classic deterrence
  - Use of nuclear weapons against NNWS
  - Lowering threshold for nuclear use – dangerously low
- **Perceived destabilizing impacts include**
  - More pressures on Pakistan to strengthen own deterrent
  - Weakened international institutions
  - Pressures on other countries to acquire nuclear weapons
    - to deter U.S. nuclear use
  - Embolden others to preempt

## Pakistan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Major Shift from Past Policies

- o **NPR reflects an abandonment of previous U.S. Security policies**

- “The Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002 enunciates an aggressive combination of unilateral military action in support of U.S. interests, and the abandonment of long-pursued disarmament and non-proliferation policies. The administration has made major changes in the U.S. nuclear policy.”
  - » Ghazala Yasmin, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (undated)

## Pakistan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Unilateralism and Favoritism

- o Unilateral approach of the NPR
  - “[Describing the U.S. NPR and decision to pull out of the ABM Treaty], Pakistan’s [then] Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said these negative trends could become much worse if the policies designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons were abandoned in favour of arbitrary and uni-dimensional approaches to security .....The spelling out of [U.S.] nuclear designs as contained in its so-called Nuclear Posture Review is a manifestation of this sinister quest.”
    - » The Frontier Post, “US nuclear duplicity” (3/31/02)
- o NPR simply U.S. favoritism
  - NPR is part of the anti-Pakistan/pro-India policies of U.S.
    - » The Frontier Post (Peshawar) (3/31/02)

## Pakistan (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Politicization

- o Political agenda of U.S. dominates non-proliferation
  - “As the U.S. moves closer to its war with Iraq, it is becoming clear that the post-1945 nuclear non-proliferation regime along with the efforts to control other weapons of mass destruction are all becoming increasingly irrelevant as they become ensnared in the political agenda of the U.S. . For instance, by casting into doubt the ratification by certain states of treaties relating to WMD, the treaties themselves are being undermined in terms of credibility. . . .”
    - » Shireen Marzari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “The U.S. and the end of WMD regimes,” The News, Islamabad, February 26, 2003.

## Pakistan (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Preemption and Prevention

- o New war-fighting strategies displacing more classic deterrence

- “Pre-emption seems to have superseded the previous [Cold War] strategy because the current adversaries of the U.S. are extremely different in their form and unpredictable in their approach. The difference between the two strategies is a shift from defensive prevention to aggressive pre-emption . . . Pre-emption pertains to military action when actual WMD use by an adversary is imminent, but in the U.S. interpretation, the mere suspicion can be considered as a reason to attack. Such a shift in modern strategy is liable to bring about changes in the application and relevance of the previous strategies with a concern that some of the previous strategies might recede into oblivion.”

» Ahmed Ijaz Malik, An Evaluation of Pre-emption in Iraq, IPRI PAPER 8 (Islamabad Policy Research Institute), October 2004

## Pakistan: (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Destabilizing Defenses

- o U.S. missile defense efforts threatening to stability
  - “The start of this new U.S. effort to legitimize nuclear weapons and undermine the AC&D [Arms Control & Disarmament] structures began with the Missile Defence (MD) programme, with its National Theatre Missile Defence components. As explained in earlier columns, MD will destroy the deterrence premised on mutual vulnerabilities of the opposing sides. It will also undermine not just the bilateral ABM Treaty but also the multilateral Outer Space Treaty, the regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]...”

» Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, The News, Islamabad, March 27, 2002

## Pakistan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Targeting Non-Nuclear States

- o U.S. targeting policy most threatening
  - “...more threatening is the newly revealed U.S. Nuclear Posture Review in which the U.S. contemplates the use of nuclear weapons against at least five non-nuclear states, parties to the NPT, and of course, the list could expand. After all, once the threshold is crossed, it becomes very difficult to define the parameters of restraint.”
    - » Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, The News, Islamabad, March 27, 2002
  - “The Bush team’s approach does not violate the letter of the treaty, but it asks the Pentagon to make necessary preparations to do so. It is an announcement in advance that the U.S. government will violate the treaty whenever it deems it desirable.”
    - » Ashfaq Bokhari, “Which is a rogue state?” Karachi Dawn, March 29, 2002

## Pakistan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Lowering the Nuclear Threshold

- o **NPR rationalizes nuclear warfighting**
  - “To make matters worse, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy Paper—both of 2002 – deliberately seek to rationalize nuclear war fighting...”
    - » Shireen Marzari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “The U.S. and the end of WMD regimes,” The News, Islamabad, February 26, 2003
  - “Combining mini-nukes and pre-emption means that the administration’s threshold for nuclear pre-emption is at best, ambiguous, and at worst, dangerously low.”
    - » Ghazala Yasmin, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (undated)

## Pakistan (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Warfighting (cont.)

- “[Regarding the 2001 NPR], some of us pointed out at the time that the US was now attempting to remove the “special-ness” of these weapons, which, since the end of the Second World War had assigned weapons as being more viable politically and within the context of deterrence.....We have seen yet another addition to the Bush Doctrine of preemptive/preventive war and this time in an even more fatal form—that of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operation (DJNO) put out March 15, 2005....[It is]...a blueprint for the use of nuclear weapons and their impact....Clearly the intent is not only of a preemptive but also of a preventive use of nuclear weapons.”

» Shireen Mazari, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, “U.S. Claims Nuclear First Strike,” The News, Islamabad, September 14, 2005.

## Pakistan (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Weapons

- o **NPR stresses need for nuclear bunker-busters**
  - “The administration claims that because the RNEP would penetrate the earth before detonation, it would be a ‘clean’ nuclear weapon. In reality, the explosion would have deadly results. These are very powerful weapons and their blast effect would not be contained underground.”
- » Ghazala Yasmin, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad  
(undated)

## Pakistan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Less Nuclear Restraint

- o Need for Pakistan to strengthen own arsenal and deterrence

- “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review suggests a need to safeguard our nuclear assets from U.S. intrusiveness, especially given the U.S.-India strategic cooperation. One major positive fallout of the Review is that nuclear weapons have become kosher once again – hence the pressure should not be there for Pakistan to undermine its nuclear capability.”
  - » Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, The News, Islamabad, “Making nuclear weapons kosher again,” March 27, 2002.
- “All in all, with an aggressive U.S. nuclear doctrine and hostile U.S. policy analysts, we are lucky to have our nuclear deterrence. Now we must ensure its continuing viability.”
  - » Shireen Mazari, The News, Islamabad, September 14, 2005

## Pakistan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Institutional

- o NPR will undermine international institutions dedicated to regulating nuclear development
  - “Obviously, WMD regimes are going to become enmeshed into the political agendas of major powers like the US . . . What this will lead to. . . is a destruction of the credibility of a purely technical international organisation -- the IAEA. Once these institutions have lost their credibility, the US will have far greater freedom of maneuver to implement its national global agendas.”
- » Shireen Mazari, “U.S. Claims Nuclear First Strike,” The News, Islamabad, September 14, 2005.

## Pakistan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation

- o **NPR encourages new arms race**
  - “The development of so-called ‘usable’ nuclear weapons could trigger a new nuclear arms race.”
    - » Abdul Sattar, Former Pakistani Foreign Minister, as quoted by Jean Du Preez in “The Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” March 8, 2002
  - “Why should every country of the world not develop nuclear weapons now that America may nuke anyone at any time?”
    - » Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor of Physics at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, as quoted by Norman Solomon in “Nuclear Weapons and Media Fog,” June 8, 2002

## Pakistan (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Foster Emulation

- o New nuclear doctrine may embolden Israel and India
  - “The Bush Doctrine, that includes elements derived from the NPR, claiming the right to use nuclear weapons against a number of potential adversaries and...establishing the right to pre-emption, has encouraged the hawkish regimes in Israel and India to follow suit.”
    - » Dawn (12/14/02)

## Other Asian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy

### - Key Themes

- o NPR seen as reflecting U.S. unilateralism
- o Concern about U.S. seeking new rationales for nuclear weapons
  - Retention and modernization
  - Expanding circumstances for U.S. nuclear use
- o Bush Administration seeking new nuclear weapons but Congress blocking
- o Little change from Cold War nuclear postures
  - Calls for irreversibility and verifiability of reductions

## **Other Asian Countries (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: U.S. Arrogance**

- o **NPR Illustrates U.S. ‘arrogance’**
  - “...the NPR demonstrates arrogance under the veil of fear and anxiety...NPR constructed on threats from ‘invisible enemies’,
    - » Manh Kim in Vietnamese Lao Dong (3/17/02)

## **Other Asian Countries (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses**

- o **Concern over ABM withdrawal**
  - “We note with concern the recent development pertaining to the START process and the ABM Treaty.”
    - » Association of South East Asian Nations, UN First Committee General Debate (10/9/02)

## **Other Asian Countries (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Rationales**

- o New nuclear rationales
  - “There is growing concern at the slow pace of progress in achieving the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The situation has been further compounded by the updating of strategic doctrines which set out new rationales for the permanent retention of these weapons, a new generation of such weapons, and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. My delegation has also noted with regret the unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, plans for national missile defence, and the prospects of an arms race in outer space.”  
» Indonesian Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti (10/4/02)

## **Other Asian Countries (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: New Nuclear Uses**

- o **Expanded circumstances for nuclear use**
  - “Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against.”
    - » Ambassador Makmur Widdodo of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties, 2002 NPT PrepCom (5/02)
  - “United States not moving away from nuclear weapons”
    - » Malaysian Diplomat (3/06)

## **Other Asian Countries (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation**

- o **Bush Administration seeking modernized nuclear weapons**
  - “Administration seeking new nuclear weapons but Congress will not allow the United States to do so”
    - » Malaysian Diplomat (3/06)
  - “There are worrying signs. . . that evolving security policies entail new designs and generations of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons to be used against mobile and deeply buried targets, and as a counter to conventional warfare.”
    - » Tim Caughley, Permanent Representative and Ambassador for Disarmament of New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of which Egypt is a member, 2003 NPT PrepCom.

## **Other Asia Countries (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture**

- o Concern over Impact of NPR on arms control
  - “Nuclear weapons must be left in the 20th century. We cannot allow them to become the weapon of choice for the 21st century...I urge the government of the United States to reject any pressure to walk away from their commitment to nuclear disarmament...If the recommendations in this leaked report [NPR] were taken up by the Bush administration, it would throw the disarmament agenda internationally into disarray.”
    - » Matt Robson, New Zealand Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control (3/02)

## **Other Asia Countries (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture (cont.)**

- “We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures.”
  - » Ambassador Makmur Widodo of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties, 2002 NPT PrepCom (5/02)
- “Reductions are not irreversible or verifiable”
- “U.S. nuclear posture has not changed since the end of the Cold War”
  - » Malaysian Diplomat (3/06)

## **Middle East and Africa**

## Egyptian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- **NPR breaks with past U.S. commitments**
  - Traditional non-proliferation mechanisms
  - Targeting non-nuclear countries
  - Emphasizing “good” and “bad” proliferators
- **NPR affirms possession of nuclear weapons and expands role for nuclear weapons**
- **U.S. lowering nuclear threshold, while seeking to develop new types of nuclear weapons**
  - At odds with commitment to nuclear disarmament
- **Adverse stability impacts of NPR**
  - Arms racing
  - Resumed nuclear testing
  - Undermines NPT
  - Sets example for NNWS to follow NWS lead
  - Nuclear modernization by other NWS

## Egypt (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: U.S. Unilateralism

- o **NPR representative of U.S. unilateralism**
  - “The report is redolent of the kind of unilateralism that has made the Bush administration notorious.”
    - » Iason Athanasiadis, “Nuking the Axis?” Al-Ahram, 3/14-3/20/02

## Egypt (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Major Shift of Policy

- o **NPR breaks with past commitments**
  - “The policy “flies in the face of traditional U.S. and international non-proliferation policies and arms control treaties”
    - » Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, “A New Balance of Terror,” Al-Ahram, 3/28-4/3/0
  - The NPR breaches international law by identifying countries such as Syria, Libya, Iran and North Korea as possible targets, thereby reneging on its earlier promises of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that have signed the NPT
  - Goes against President Bush’s pledge to slash nuclear weapon stockpiles
    - » Jason Athanasiadis, “Nuking the Axis?” Al-Ahram, 3/14-3/20/02

## Egypt (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Prevention

- o U.S. emphasizes “good” and “bad” proliferators
  - The U.S. limits nuclear weapons to a few ‘trustworthy state structures,’ while forbidding them for the ‘rest of the world community,’ justifying it with the need to keep the weapons from terrorists. As the proliferation of nuclear technology is inevitable, U.S. reasoning is moot
    - » Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, “A Balance of Terror,” Al-Ahram, 3/28-3/02
- o Concern about defenses
  - “There is concern that the notification of withdrawal by one of the State parties to the treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), the additional element of uncertainty it brings and its impact on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to and facilitating nuclear disarmament, will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
    - » Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, 2002 NPT PrepCom (4/9/02)

## **Egypt (2): U.S. Nuclear Posture and Doctrine: Role of Nuclear Weapons**

- o Nuclear weapons remain major security strategy
  - “We remain concerned that in the post Cold War security environment, security policies and defense doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons...In addition we are deeply concerned about emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as a part of new security strategies”
    - » Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, 2002 NPT PrepCom (4/9/02)

## Egypt (2): U.S. Nuclear Posture and Doctrine: Targeting NNWS

- o Arab countries targeted with nuclear weapons
  - “It is rather astonishing that among those targeted countries there are three Arab countries and one Islamic country and all are peaceful countries and do not produce nuclear weapons. So on what basis did the U.S. put them on the list of the targeted countries to be attacked by nuclear weapons. The clear answer is that in America’s point of view these countries could be a source of threat in the future to Israel.”
    - » Former Amb Ahmad El Molla, Al Ahram (3/14/02)

## Egypt (3): U.S. Nuclear Posture and Doctrine: Lowering the Nuclear Threshold

- o The U.S. is setting a dangerous precedent
  - The U.S. is lowering the threshold for nuclear use by stressing the need to develop alternative types of weapons limited in scale and fallout, the RNEP being one such example
    - » Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "A New Balance of Terror," Al-Ahram, 3/28-4/3/02
  - The stress on the development of alternative types of weapons alludes to the possible resumption of testing
    - » Iason Athanasiadis, "Nuking the Axis?" Al-Ahram, 3/14-3/20/02

## Egypt (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: Breaks U.S. Pledges

- o New nuclear weapons breaks U.S. commitments
  - “The New Agenda countries believe that such developments would be inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.”
    - » Ambassador Mary Whelan of the Republic of Ireland, “Statement to the Conference on Disarmament on Behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden,” Geneva, Switzerland, 6/27/02
  - In particular, we will address the troubling development that some nuclear-weapon states are researching or even planning to develop new or significantly modify existing nuclear weapons. These actions have the potential to create the conditions for a new nuclear arms race and would be contrary to the Treaty.”
    - » Marian Hobbs, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of which Egypt is a member, 2005 NPT Review Conference.

## **Egypt (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Arms Racing**

- o Risk stimulating nuclear arms racing
  - “ . . . researching or even planning to develop new or significantly modify existing nuclear weapons . . . have the potential to create the conditions for a new nuclear arms race and would be contrary to the Treaty”
    - » Marian Hobbs, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of which Egypt is a member, 2005 NPT Review Conference.

## Egypt (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Nuclear Testing

- o NPR may lead to resumed nuclear testing
  - The indication that the U.S. might resume testing for new weapons designs reneges on its declared voluntary moratorium on testing.
    - » Iason Athanasiadis, "Nuking the Axis?" Al-Ahram, 3/14-3/20/02

## Egypt (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NPT Spillovers

- o **NPR undermines NPT**
  - “The role given to nuclear weapons in security doctrines and policies has yet to diminish. Instead of eliminating nuclear weapons, some nuclear powers have plans to modernize or develop new kinds or new uses of nuclear weapons or new rationales for them. Some even entertain the notion that nuclear weapons may be used pre-emptively against non-nuclear weapon states, or see them as a possible defense against conventional weapons. This would go against Article VI of the NPT and the agreements made in 1995 and 2000. It is critical that any such plans be laid aside immediately.”
    - » Statement by Ambassador Anders Liden of Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of which Egypt is a member, General Debate UNGA 1st Committee 2004

## **Egypt (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Encourage Proliferation**

- o Other countries will follow NWS lead
  - “If the nuclear weapon states continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer there is a real danger that other states will start pondering whether nuclear weapons would not be a security enhancer also for them.”
    - » Statement by Ambassador Anders Liden of Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of which Egypt is a member, UNGA 1<sup>st</sup> Committee 2004.

## **Iranian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes**

- o **Iran will not be intimidated by U.S. nuclear posture**
- o **U.S. developing new nuclear doctrine and seeking new types of nuclear weapons**
- o **U.S. placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons**
  - Expanded scope for use
  - Lowered nuclear threshold
  - Nuclear preemption
- o **Opposition to missile defenses in outer space**

## **Iran (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Aimed at Iran**

- o If the U.S. seeks to intimidate Iran – it will fail
  - "America thinks that if a military threat looms large over the head of these even countries, they will give up their logical demands."
    - » Hashemi Rafsanjani, Former Iranian President, AP (3/10/02)
  - "The Islamic Republic believes that the era of using force to push forward international relations is long past, and those who resort to the logic of force follow exactly the same logic as terrorists, although they are in the position of power."
    - » Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Iranian Government spokesman, China Daily (3/13/02)

## Iran (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses

- o **Missile defenses will create arms race in outer space**
    - “Development of national missile defense systems would instigate new arms race in outer space and should be avoided.”
- » Kamal Kharrizi, Minister of Foreign Affairs (5/3/05)

## **Iran (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons**

- o **Expanded role for nuclear weapons**
  - “The new US doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons not only shifts back towards a new era of nuclear arms race, but also expands the role of nuclear weapons to conventional conflicts and even non-belligerent non-nuclear-weapon States. By devising such a policy, the US would require to test the new nuclear weapon systems which would be in clear violation of its legal obligations stemming from its signatures of the CTBT and its unilateral moratorium to conduct further nuclear tests.“

» Ambassador Hadi Nejad-Hosseiniyan (4/02)

## Iran (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation: New Weapons

- o Development of New Generation of Nuclear Weapons
  - “...the new nuclear posture review submitted by the US Defense Department to the Congress is the most real setback within the nuclear non-proliferation context requiring our careful consideration. This doctrine indicates the emergence of a new doctrine in the United States on the use of nuclear weapons through development of new generation of nuclear weapons and improving the existing ones to be used against nuclear as well as non-nuclear-weapon States.”
    - » Ambassador Hadi Nejad-Hosseiniyan (4/02)
  - “Concerns continue to remain over the research and development of new non-strategic and low-yield nuclear weapons. Commitments need to be renewed to ban developments of new nuclear weapon systems.”
    - » Kamal Kharrizi, Minister of Foreign Affairs (5/05)

## **Iran (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NPT Impacts**

- o Pre-emption undermines non-proliferation
  - “It is a source of grave concern that the emergence of new doctrines, based on pre-emption and enlarging the scope for the use of nuclear weapons, as defined in the Nuclear Posture Review, undermine the very foundations of the non-proliferation regime with grave consequences for the regional as well as international security environment.”
    - » Dr. Javad Zarif, UN First Committee General Debate  
(10/4/02)

## South African Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes

- o NPR reflects fundamental change in nuclear policy
  - Increased role for nuclear weapons
  - Conventional use of nuclear weapons
  - Deterrence giving way to preemptive use of nuclear weapons
  - Threatened nuclear use against NNWS
- o U.S. nuclear policy seeking new rationales for nuclear weapons and exploring new types of weapons
  - Could lead to nuclear testing
- o Development of new types of nuclear weapons, new rationales for nuclear use, threats of use against NNWS, signal of nuclear weapons as security enhancer will undermine NPT
  - Contrary to Article VI

## **South Africa (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Fundamental Change**

- o **NPR entails fundamental change – but does not de-emphasize role of nuclear weapons**
  - “[The NPR] is, however, designed to justify the continuing modernization of nuclear weapons and research aimed at making nuclear weapons more usable.”
  - “. . . the NPR represents a fundamental change in thinking over the use of nuclear weapons.”
  - “While the NPR provides for the ‘conventional use’ of nuclear weapons in the new triad, the wider agenda of the Bush administration indicates an increased role for nuclear weapons in U.S. military planning.”
- » Jean du Preez, former South African diplomat, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2002

## **South Africa: (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Preemption**

- o Deterrence giving way to preemptive strategy
  - “Nuclear weapons have traditionally been considered as weapons of deterrence with very little, if any, practical use in times of conflict. . . [Instead], the new NPR advocates the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. . .”
  - the new NPR advocates the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, not only against the Russia Federation, but also against several other countries.”
    - » Du Preez, op. cit., 2002

## **South Africa (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons**

- o **NPR entails threat or use of nuclear weapons in U.S. Defense posture**
  - “The policies contemplated in the NPR . . . constitute a framework in which the United States can more effectively threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries that don’t have them, while at the same time reduce the chances of nuclear exchanges between nuclear weapon states.”
    - » Du Preez, op. cit., 2002

## **South Africa (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons**

- o Security doctrines envisage the use of nuclear weapons
  - “South Africa like many others remain deeply concerned by the continued retention of the nuclear weapons and security doctrines that envisage the use of nuclear weapons.”
    - » Abdul Samad Minty, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the 2005 Review Conference
- o NWS are devising new rationales for use and exploring the development of new types of devices
  - “There has been no progress on real nuclear disarmament. On the contrary these weapons seems to be regaining their allure. The Nuclear Weapons States cling to their arsenals, are devising new rationales for their use and are reported to be further exploring the development of new types of devices. This...should be opposed with all our endeavors.”
    - » South Africa Statement at the UNGA 1<sup>st</sup> Committee, October 2003

## **South Africa (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Lowering Nuclear Threshold**

- o **NPR blurs line between nuclear and conventional weapons and lowers nuclear threshold**
  - “In the NPR, a clear distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons no longer exists. . . . These new warheads [with yield flexibility and earth penetrating capabilities] could now become the weapon of choice for U.S. forces in future conflicts.”

» Du Preez, op. cit., 2002

## South Africa (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization & Transformation

- o New nuclear weapons
  - “In particular, we will address the troubling development that some nuclear-weapon states are researching or even planning to develop new or significantly modify existing nuclear weapons.”
    - » Marian Hobbs. Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, New Zealand. On behalf of the New Agenda Coalition of which South Africa is a member, 2005 NPT Review Conference
  - Research and development of new bunker-buster weapons could also lead the United States to undertake new nuclear testing.”
    - » Du Preez, op. cit., 2002

## **South Africa (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NPT**

- o **NPR undermines NPT**
  - “The role given to nuclear weapons in security doctrines and policies has yet to diminish. Instead of eliminating nuclear weapons, some nuclear powers have plans to modernize or develop new kinds or new uses of nuclear weapons or new rationales for them. Some even entertain the notion that nuclear weapons may be used preemptively against non-nuclear weapon states, or see them as a possible defense against conventional weapons. This would go against Article VI of the NPT and the agreements made in 1995 and 2000. It is critical that any such plans be laid aside immediately.”
    - » Statement by Ambassador Anders Liden of Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. General Debate UNGA 1st Committee 2004.

## **South Africa (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NPT (cont.)**

- o **NPR undermines NPT**
  - “Overall, the NPR undermines the NPT, given that it signals the United States’ continued lack of commitment to its obligations under Article VI of the treaty . . .”
  - “The NPR also casts additional doubt on the obligations and commitments made by the United States and other nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.”
  - “. . . it also amounts to an ‘unequivocal rejection’ of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 [NPT Review] Conference.”

» Du Preez, op. cit., 2002

## **South Africa (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- o Other countries will emulate view of nuclear weapons as a “security enhancer”,
  - “If the nuclear weapon states continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer there is a real danger that other states will start pondering whether nuclear weapons would not be a security enhancer also for them.”

» Statement by Ambassador Anders Liden of Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, UNGA 1<sup>st</sup> Committee 2004

## **South Africa (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- o **NPR will lead to increased proliferation**
  - “By undermining the NPT, the NPR would in the long run encourage vertical as well as horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons . . .”
  - “U.S. conventional superiority, its retention of a large nuclear arsenal, and the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons, could in turn lead other nuclear weapon states to hold onto their existing weapons stockpiles and/or develop more nuclear weapons for new missions.”
    - » Du Preez, op. cit., 2002

## **South Africa (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NPT**

- o States will leave the NPT
  - “If the policies outlined in the NPR are pursued, however, loyalty to the NPT will wane. The long-run implication may be that some of these states will choose to leave the treaty and rearm themselves, possibly with WMD. . . . States of particular proliferation concern could use the NPR as justification for their own nuclear weapons programs.”
  - “If non-nuclear states are to be convinced of not pursuing nuclear weapons and staying within the NPT, they will need to be convinced that the United States and other nuclear weapon states are taking active steps toward eliminating their nuclear arsenals rather than increasing the chances of these weapons being used.”
    - » Du Preez, op. cit., 2002

## **South Africa (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: NPT (cont.)**

- “There is concern that the notification of withdrawal by one of the state parties to the treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), the additional element of uncertainty it brings and its impact on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to and facilitating nuclear disarmament, will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
  - » Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, 2002 NPT PrepCom (4/9/02)

## Western Hemisphere

## **Canadian Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes**

- o **NPR has both pluses and minuses**
  - Pluses: New Triad, including reductions and responsive infrastructure
  - Minuses: Triggered debate over new types of nuclear weapons, linkage of preemption to nuclear weapons
- o **U.S. perceived lowering nuclear threshold**
  - o Diversion of attention from non-proliferation

## **Canada (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Overall**

- o Overall thrust of NPR was good and positive
- New Triad makes sense, creates more tools for crisis management
- Responsive infrastructure also understandable in order to provide a long term hedge against uncertainty
- But debate over the RNEP and new warheads have caused US to lose much international support
- U.S. is playing catch-up in the media and public relations
- o Concept of preemption has also played badly on the world stage
- Most publics linked it to NPR and nuclear weapons in preemptive roles
  - >> Senior Canadian Defense Official (3/06)

## **Canada (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy: Evolution of U.S. Thinking**

- o A shift in U.S. Strategic Threat Perceptions
  - “Rather than a fundamentally new concept devised by a particularly hawkish administration, the New Triad should be viewed as merely a stage in the evolution of post-Cold War U.S. strategic threat perceptions.”
    - » David S. McDonough, Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, (date unavailable)

## **Canada (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Deterrence**

- o **NPR seeks to retain deterrent credibility**
  - “Retaining this credibility [deterrence] is the animating spirit behind the Pentagon’s new [NPR]...”
    - » Canada’s conservative National Post (3/13/02)

## **Canada (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Public Attitudes**

- o Canada has not said that missile defense was a bad idea, just that it chose not to participate at this time
  - Public opposition was tied to anti-Americanism, the weaponization of outer space, memories of Reagan and star wars, test failures, cost
  - Possibly (by some Canadians) the opportunity to be free riders on a North American shield provided by the US
    - >> Senior Canadian Defense Official (3/06)

## **Canada (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons**

- o U.S. lowering nuclear use threshold – first strike option
  - “... U.S. President George Bush has lowered the nuclear bar. He has served notice that the U.S. can envisage striking first with nuclear weapons, even against an adversary that doesn't have them.”
    - » Liberal Toronto Star (5/5/02)
- o Concept of preemption misperceived
  - Most publics linked it to NPR and nuclear weapons in preemptive roles
    - » Senior Canadian Defense Official (3/06)

## **Canada (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation**

- o **Development of RNEP ‘frightening’**
  - “American development of new theatre and battlefield nuclear weapons (including the ‘robust nuclear earth penetrator’) is frightening many because of the US administration’s apparent willingness to resort to their use.”
    - » Associate Professor Erika Simpson, University of Western Ontario, (2/26/04)

## **Canada (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- Reliance on active defenses may harm non-proliferation efforts
  - “Focusing all of its attention on a technological ‘solution’ may tempt the US to forgo efforts to achieve non-proliferation goals through diplomatic means.”
    - » David Rudd, President and Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (May 2003)
- U.S. doctrine at odds with non-proliferation
  - “The U.S. and other nuclear powers have reneged on the ‘grand bargain’ at the heart of the 1970 treaty, inviting others to do the same.”
    - » Liberal Toronto Star (5/5/02)

## **Canada (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Non-Proliferation**

- “ . . . the United States, which repudiates long-standing arms control treaties and NPT disarmament commitments. . . . ”
- “The perception that the Nuclear Weapon States are not serious about fulfilling their disarmament obligations at the same time that they are calling for the non-Nuclear Weapon States to assume ever more stringent non-proliferation commitments, exacerbates the discriminatory aspects of the Treat and contributes to an erosion of confidence in its integrity and authority.”
  - » Ambassador Paul Meyer, Presentation at “Atlanta Consultation II on the Future of the NPT” (1/05)

## **Latin American Attitudes toward U.S. Nuclear Policy – Key Themes**

- o NPR seeking to re-rationalize nuclear weapons – and their use
- o U.S. developing new types of nuclear weapons
- o U.S. nuclear policy will adversely affect non-proliferation
- o U.S. should ratify CTBT

## **Latin American (1): General Perceptions of NPR, New Triad, and U.S. Nuclear Policy**

- o New rationales for nuclear weapons
  - “Brazil deplores any attempts [NPR] at re-rationaizing nuclear doctrines that may include the possibility of using, testing or finding new roles for nuclear weapons.”
    - » Brazilian Ambassador Celina Assumpcao, UN First Committee General Debate (10/9/02)

## **Latin American (2): U.S. Thinking on Deterrence and Defenses: Reject Deterrence**

- o U.S. nuclear doctrine destabilizing
  - “We reject deterrence and strategic alliances doctrines, as well as the doctrine that proposes new uses for nuclear weapons, since they are based on force or the threat of use of force.”
    - » Colombian Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso, UN First Committee General Debate (10/10/02)

## **Latin American (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: Role of Nuclear Weapons**

- o **Development of new nuclear weapons 'preoccupying' and 'disturbing'**
  - "There are preoccupying signs of the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons and emerging approaches for ongoing justification of a future role of nuclear weapons as part of new strategies of security. These signs deteriorate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation."
    - » Mexican Ambassador Gustavo Albin (5/9/02)
  - "The development of a new generation of nuclear weapons is also a disturbing rumour. It appears to signal a new role for nuclear weapons. New rationales for the possession of nuclear weapons continue to be re-stated or reinforced. The use of nuclear weapons, so it seems, is being re-idealized."
    - » Brazilian Ambassador Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira (4/8/02)

## **Latin American (3): U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture: An Outlying View**

- o U.S. targeting NNWS with nuclear weapons
  - “The U.S. president's decision to extend the possible use of an atomic bomb to non-nuclear powers that export terrorism is a correct first step against countries harboring terrorists...”  
» Carlos Escudé, analyst and academic, in Buenos Aires Económico (3/12/02)

## **Latin American (4): U.S. Nuclear Modernization and Transformation**

- o Ratify CTBT – no nuclear tests
  - “Our country is therefore concerned that nine years after the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), some ten of the 44 countries whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty to enter into force have so far failed to ratify. It is extremely important that nuclear weapons States compromise not to improve their weapons through nuclear tests.”
    - » Statement by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Ambassador Jorge Taiana (5/02/05)

## **Latin American (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture**

- o **U.S. withdrawal from ABM will harm non-proliferation efforts**
  - “There is concern that the notification of withdrawal by one of the State parties to the treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), the additional element of uncertainty it brings and its impact on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to and facilitating nuclear disarmament, will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
    - » Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden), 2002 NPT PrepCom (4/9/02)

## **Latin American Countries (5): Stability Impacts of U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Posture**

- o U.S. nuclear strategy undermines non-proliferation
  - These new strategies [NPR] 'deteriorate' nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
    - » Mexican Ambassador Gustavo Albin (5/9/02) cited above
- o CTBT must enter into force
  - "In the priority area of nuclear disarmament, renewed efforts should be made at the political level to bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty...more needs to be done by the nuclear powers who have clear responsibilities and obligations to fulfill under the NPT and in the implementation of the commitments agreed at the 2000 Review Conference."
    - » Ambassador Stafford Neil of Jamaica, Caribbean Community (10/7/02)

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- **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)**
- **Strategic and Defence Studies Centre – Australia**
- **Strategic and Defence Studies Centre - Australian National University**
- **Tehran International Studies and Research Institute**
- **The Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIIC)**
- **Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies**

# Nuclear Baseline

## Post-Cold War US Nuclear Policy

Dr. Jeffrey Larsen  
SAIC

Prepared for the  
DTRA/ASCO-AF/INSS Strategic Concepts Roundtable  
Colorado Springs

6 September 2006

# US Declaratory Policy

- “We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.”
  - President Bush, NDU, May 2001
- “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”
  - National Strategy to Combat WMD, December 2002
- “Both offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and non-state actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force. Safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role.”
  - National Security Strategy, March 2006

# US Declaratory Policy

- Purposes of nuclear weapons:
  - Deter major powers
  - Dissuade potential adversaries
  - Defeat adversaries if necessary
  - Assure allies
  - Counter rogue states
  - Counter other WMD
  - Capabilities based planning—not *who* we fight, but *how* we will fight
- First use remains an option
  - Circumstances in which US may consider using nuclear weapons (not official doctrine or policy)
    - In response to NBC use
    - In anticipation of NBC use
    - To demonstrate US intent and capability to deny/deter use of WMD

# Extended Deterrence Commitments


- NATO:
  - “To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of aggression, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level.”
    - » Alliance Strategic Concept, 1999, para. 46
  - Washington Treaty 1949
  - Since 1953 this has meant US weapons of all types
  - Today only “several hundred” B-61 bombs stationed in Europe, for delivery by DCA aircraft manned by several allied air forces
- Other states covered by the US nuclear umbrella:
  - Taiwan, Japan, Israel (?) ...

# Key Nuclear Documents

- Key nuclear documents since Cold War:
  - 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
  - 1991 & 1999 NATO Strategic Concepts
  - 1993 Bottom Up Review
  - 1993 Counterproliferation Initiative
  - 1994 & 2001 Nuclear Posture Reviews
  - 2001 & 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews
  - 2002 & 2006 National Security Strategies
  - 2002 DOD Report to Congress
  - 2004 National Military Strategy
  - 2005 National Defense Strategy
  - 2005 Defense Science Board Report on Strategic Strike
  - 2006 NNSA Vision “Complex 2030”
  - 2006 Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure (Overskei Rpt)
  - Regular reports on the Strategic Posture and Strategic Modernization Programs
  - Multiple DOD directives, manuals, and doctrine documents

# 2001 Nuclear Posture Review

- Dec 2001
- Called for New Triad: new mix that emphasizes offenses, defenses, and robust infrastructure (R&D, industry, C2, intel, adaptive planning)
- Reflects America's changed role in a new world
- Incorporate conventional strike options, de-emphasizes nuclear weapons
  - Make nuclear use less likely but more credible
  - Nuclear weapons have expanded role beyond just deterrence




Source: NNSA web site

# Reductions to SORT 2012

- Reflects move from ~12,000 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads in 1990 to 2,000 +/- by 2012
  - No numbers given on chart, but approaching START II levels—3,800 by 2007

- Lower arrow shows improved capabilities that will supplant need for nuclear weapons



Source: NNSA web site

# 2006 QDR

- QDR positions on nuclear weapons:
  - Maintain robust nuclear deterrent as “the keystone of US national power”
  - Develop wider range of non-kinetic and conventional strike capabilities
  - Develop next generation long-range strike systems (“prompt global strike”)
  - Expand DOD counterproliferation capabilities
  - Develop *tailored deterrence* and weapons to match
  - DOD tasked to support DOE in move to smaller and more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure
- Builds on NPPR briefing:
  - When planning nuclear policy and force structure, the US faces threats from “multiple potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges.”

# Changes to US Nuclear Policy

- Changes over the past decade fall in four categories:
  - Operations and Strategy
  - Testing
  - Infrastructure and Acquisition
  - Arms Control

# Operations and Strategy

- Development of a new triad based on 2001 NPR
  - Strategic strike, strategic defenses, enhanced infrastructure
- Movement toward quick-strike strategic delivery systems with conventional warheads
  - Perception of an increased emphasis on preemption
  - NPR emphasized this shift—but the intended message, that conventional weapons can in some cases do the job formerly requiring a nuke, was perceived by some as a lowering of the nuclear threshold
- Recent organizational changes:
  - National Nuclear Security Administration created 2000
  - US Strategic Command assigned global strike mission 2005
  - DTRA assigned as primary combat support agency to STRATCOM in combating WMD mission 2006
  - OPLAN 8044 replaced SIOP

# Stockpile Reductions

- Continued reduction in nuclear arsenal size
  - 85% reduction in operationally deployed strategic warheads from 1990 to 2012
  - 95% reduction in non-strategic nuclear warheads deployed to NATO Europe since 1980s
  - All US nuclear weapons removed from South Korea in 1991
  - President Bush May 2004 announced that US arsenal would be reduced to half its 2001 size by 2012
  - Reductions via: retire some warhead families; B-1 conventional only; convert 4 SSBNs to SGNs; retire MX fleet; de-MIRV Minuteman III; reduce to 450 M III
  - DOE increasing warhead dismantlement at Pantex in FY07 by 50% over previous year

# Current Stockpile

**Current U.S. Nuclear Warhead-Types and Associated Delivery Systems**

Bombs		Description	Delivery System	Laboratories	Mission	Military Service
B61 3/4/10	Tactical Bomb	F-15, F-16, & Tornado	LANL/SNL	Air to Surface	Air Force	
B61 7/11	Strategic Bomb	B-52 & B-2	LANL/SNL	Air to Surface	Air Force	
B83 0/1	Strategic Bomb	B-52 & B-2	LLNL/SNL	Air to Surface	Air Force	
Warheads		Description	Delivery System	Laboratories	Mission	Military Service
W62	ICBM Warhead	Minuteman III (CBM)	LLNL/SNL	Surface to Surface	Air Force	
W76	SLBM Warhead	D5 Missile, Trident Submarines	LANL/SNL	Underwater to Surface	Navy	
W78	ICBM Warhead	Minuteman III (CBM)	LANL/SNL	Surface to Surface	Air Force	
W80-0	TLAM-N	Attack Submarine	LANL/SNL	Underwater to Surface	Navy	
W80-1	ALCM/ACM	B-52	LLNL/SNL	Air to Surface	Air Force	
W87	ICBM Warhead	Minuteman III (CBM) (future delivery system)	LLNL/SNL	Surface to Surface	Air Force	
W88	SLBM Warhead	D5 Missile, Trident Submarines	LANL/SNL	Underwater to Surface	Navy	

Source: NNSA web site

# Testing

- Last US underground nuclear test was 1992
- US announced unilateral testing moratorium and reduced presumed preparation time needed to resume testing to 24-36 months
- NPR called for decrease in time required to resume testing should it be deemed essential
  - Could resume testing at NTS in 18 months
- No plan to ratify the CTBT
  - Signed 1996, Senate failed to ratify 1999
- These aspects upset arms control advocates and led to active public opposition

# Infrastructure and Acquisition

- Continued sustainment of the strategic arsenal—bombers, ICBMs, SSBNs, SLBMs, warheads, and underlying C4ISR capabilities
- Last new nuclear weapon built in 1991
- No longer can US rely on perpetual modernization, testing, and upgrade of the existing arsenal
- Consideration of new purposes for nuclear weapons, and possible new designs to simplify, reduce costs, give arsenal greater deterrent credibility
  - E.g. RNEP (cancelled), RWW (ongoing)
  - Enhancements to certain aspects of the nuclear weapons production infrastructure
- Stockpile transformation initiatives
- Many ongoing programs at weapons laboratories and facilities under the rubric of Defense Environmental Cleanup
- Congressional opposition to administration's preferences for R&D into new weapons and missions



# Nuclear Stockpile Transformation

- Builds on synergy of SSP, RRW, and NPR's responsive infrastructure
- 2030 goal:
  - smaller stockpile
  - fewer weapons types with common attributes
  - smaller but modernized, consolidated, and safer nuclear facilities
  - smaller non-deployed stockpile (today's hedge, or "responsive force")
- Lead: NNSA Office of Transformation
  - established June 2006
  - Director George Allen, formerly at Sandia

Source: NNSA web site

# US Nuclear Programs

- Recent nuclear programs for operations:
  - Stockpile Stewardship Program (1994)
    - Major elements: stockpile surveillance, assessment & certification, and weapon refurbishment
  - Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) (2004)
  - Minuteman III SLEP, SERB, and guidance replacement programs
  - SGN w/conventional SLBM
  - Trident Conversion
  - D-5 SLEP
- Studies underway:
  - Replacement ICBM
  - Conventional ICBM
  - Follow-on strategic bomber

# US Nuclear Programs II

- Recent nuclear programs for infrastructure:
  - Modern Pit Facility (LANL)
    - Interim production resumes 2007
  - National Ignition Facility (inertial confinement fusion program) (LLNL)
  - Tritium production resumption 2003 (SRL)
  - Fusion secondary production resumption (ORNL, 2006)
  - Reduced preparation time at Nevada Test Site
- Ongoing programs:
  - Secure transportation programs
  - Nuclear weapons incident response
  - Safeguards and security
  - Dismantlement activities (Pantex)

# Arms Control

- Diminished view of the role of traditional arms control permeates the Bush administration
  - Potential loss of international support and cooperation as a result
- US is committed to 21 treaties and agreements that restrict or influence US nuclear weapons or policy in some way
  - The only ones that really matter are INF, START I, and SORT
- June 2006 agreement reached at Moscow G-8 summit to resume US-Russian strategic dialogue
  - Bob Joseph and Sergei Kislyak
  - Talks set to begin September 2006
- Many robust programs under nonproliferation and threat reduction
  - E.g. NPT, IAEA, CTBT, CTR, Lab to Lab, Nuclear Cities, PSI, Global Threat Reduction, HEU Purchase, Plutonium Reactors Agreement, NWFZs, Nuclear Suppliers Group

# Key Arms Control Agreements

- Key nuclear arms control treaties:
  - 1987 INF Treaty
    - Verification regime expired 2001, but treaty extended indefinitely
  - 1991 START I (in effect until 2009)
    - US dealing with unintended consequences arising from 400 pages of details in 15 year old treaty
  - 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (NSNW)
  - 1993 START II (never entered into force)
  - 1996 CTBT (not ratified)—and earlier LTBT/TTBTT, PNET
  - 2002 Moscow Treaty
    - Enters into force Dec 2012, but affecting US force level decisions today
  - FMCT (still under negotiation at CD)
  - ABM Treaty (US withdrew 2002)
  - Many NWFZs and export control regimes in effect

# Conclusion

- In the strategic realm of recent changes to US nuclear policy:
  - Taken *individually*, each step appears a logical, evolutionary move to strengthen deterrence and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons
  - Taken *collectively*, however (particularly from a different ideological starting point), the case can be made for an alarming increase in the possible usability of nuclear weapons due to these changes in US nuclear policy
    - Those with this perspective disregard disarmament and NSNW trends that would diminish their argument—and they missed the NPR emphasis on conventional weapons
- Hence the debate
  - Both sides are talking past one another
  - Misunderstandings—domestically and internationally
  - The intended message of the NPR has not been received