Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force
on
Strategic Communication

September 2004

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)


I am pleased to forward the final report of the DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication. This effort was part of the 2004 DSB Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities. The Task Force on Strategic Communication was one of six separate panels for the 2004 Summer Study. The attached final report represents the complete work of this panel.

The Task Force explicitly outlines seven summary recommendations. If implemented, these recommendations will greatly improve the ability of the US to communicate with and thereby influence worldwide audiences. Effective strategic communication can prevent a crisis from developing and help diffuse a crisis after it has developed. To win in a global battle of ideas, a global strategy for communicating those ideas is essential.

I endorse all of the Task Force’s recommendations and encourage you to review the report.

William Schneider, Jr.
DSB Chairman
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD


The DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication has completed its work and a final report is attached. The report emphasizes that the ability of the US to credibly communicate to populations throughout the world is critical for achieving our national objectives. The topic of strategic communication was previously examined by the DSB in October 2001. The recommendations of the current study are in harmony with the previous effort and are even more relevant today.

The Task Force met with representatives from the National Security Council, White House Office of Global Communications, Department of State, Department of Defense, Broadcast Board of Governors and the academic and private sectors. Based on extensive interaction and discussion the Task Force concludes that US strategic communication must be transformed. Strategic communication is vital to US national security and foreign policy. We are engaged in a global struggle of ideas similar in magnitude to what we faced throughout half of the twentieth century. Succeeding in this struggle requires leadership from the President on down. The US has tremendous communication capability in all the various private sector media and academic communities. The Task Force believes these resources can be leveraged while maintaining independent analysis and thought.

The new recommendations emphasize the scope of change required across US Government departments and agencies in order for strategic communication to be effective. These recommendations are delineated in the attached report. The Task Force urges the senior leaders of the US Government to implement the recommendations at the earliest opportunity.

Vincent Vitto
Task Force Chairman
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Executive Summary

The Defense Science Board Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities was formed in early 2004 (the terms of reference are contained in Appendix A) and culminated in the production of a final report and summary briefing in August of 2004. The DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication conducted its deliberations within the overall Summer Study schedule and revisited a topic that was addressed in October 2001.¹ Task Force members and Government advisors are identified in Appendix B. The current Strategic Communication Task Force re-examined the purposes of strategic communication and the salience of recommendations in the earlier study. It then considered the following questions:

(1) What are the consequences of changes in the strategic communication environment?  
(2) What Presidential direction and strategic communication means are required?  
(3) What should be done about public diplomacy and open military information operations?

The Task Force met with representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), White House Office of Global Communications, Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and the private sector (the schedule of meetings, briefings and discussions is contained in Appendix C). Based on extensive interaction with a broad range of sectors in the government, commercial, and academic worlds, as well as a series of highly interactive internal debates, we have reached the following conclusions and recommendations.

This Task Force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are

consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem.

**Understanding the problem.** Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative.

To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against the tactic of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both government and non-government. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states (“getting it right” in Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), we will fail. *Chapter 2 of this report examines the complex nature of this new paradigm and implications for sustained and imaginative action.*

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on “doable tasks,” develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. This approach will build on in-depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of sustained effort. Just as importantly, through evaluation and feedback, it will enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in
strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft. Chapter 3 of this report addresses ways in which strategic communication can be generated and managed with effect.

We need to move beyond outdated concepts, stale structural models, and institutionally-based labels. Public diplomacy, public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) and open military information operations must be coordinated and energized. Chapter 4 of this report recommends changes in the strategic communication functions and structures of the Departments of State and Defense, U.S. embassies and combatant commands.

Leadership from the top. A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required.

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices. Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards. These objectives mean officials must take full advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, understand cultures, and assess influence structures – not occasionally but as an iterative process. Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated.

Swift and sustained Presidential direction is also required to connect strategy to structure. In 1947, America confronted new threats and opportunities as well. The President with bipartisan support in Congress carried out policy and organizational initiatives that shaped U.S. national security for two generations. Today, we face challenges of similar
magnitude, made more formidable by a world where geography, military power, and time to react are no longer sufficient to ensure our security. Strategic communication and other 21st century instruments of statecraft require changes different in kind but similar in scale to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. These changes will occur only with sustained, enthusiastic, and deeply committed Presidential leadership – and the collaborative and bipartisan support of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of Congress.

**Government-private sector partnership.** Finding new ways to harness strategic communication to the flexibility and creative imagination of the private sector will be central to successful strategic communication in the 21st century. The commercial sector has a dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and media surveys, information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring the influence of communications. Academic and research communities offer vast untapped resources for education, training, area and language expertise, planning and consultative services.

Effective sharing between government and society in the conduct of strategic communication is not new. Government grants to private organizations have long been a way to carry out international educational and cultural exchanges, foreign opinion polling, democratization and media training programs, and much of U.S. international broadcasting. Grants extend the reach of government programs and capitalize on the expertise and flexibility of non-government partner organizations.

Recent study groups, including the October 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force, have recommended more extensive collaboration. These observers see value not only in leveraging private sector competencies but in new structures and a *degree of distance* that attracts credible messengers with non-government resumes, creative thinkers and talented communicators uncomfortable working with government agencies, and skilled, language-qualified professionals available for temporary crisis deployment.
Collaboration between government and the many benefits of private sector thinking and skills should be strongly encouraged. The complexity of strategic communication problems calls for balanced coordination of effort. Independent analysis is required in a wide range of fields: cultures and values, international intellectual engagement, communications studies, and applied science. Teamwork among civilian agencies and military services will be necessary to draw effectively on the seminars of universities, professional skills of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and imagination of the media production industry. Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For all their strengths, private organizations represent particular interests. Investments in strategic communication must be grounded in the public interest as determined by appropriate executive branch and Congressional authorities.

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped implementation of U.S. strategic communication for more than half a century. New thinking and new collaborative structures hold promise of a transformed and continuous strategic communication capability that serves America’s interests.

The Task Force has made a set of recommendations listed below which we believe will make a significant difference. The time line and scale of their impact is difficult to quantify but we will not succeed in revitalizing Strategic Communication if we tinker around the edges. Given the enormous challenges we face, we can succeed only if we use all the instruments of national power. We should expect to see some progress within a year but we are dealing with at least a decade to have a significant impact. US public diplomacy efforts in the Cold War, the creation of the Peace Corps and the launch of a new brand or product within the private sector in a highly competitive environment are examples of efforts that have required comparable time scales and the challenges we face today are potentially more complex. We must begin and maintain our intensity and focus until we succeed.
Recommendations

(1) The Task Force recommends that the President issue a directive to: (a) strengthen the U.S. Government’s ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences; (b) coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations; and (c) provide a foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic communication.

(2) The Task Force recommends that the President should establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create legislation and funding for a:

- Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication;
- Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC; and an
- Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations; concur in strategic communication personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide program and project direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication.
The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations represented on its Strategic Communication Committee. The Center should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Rand Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual appropriation approved by Congress as part of the Department of State budget. The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic Communication Committee should provide program and project direction to the Center. The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by an independent nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center’s Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance.

The Center should be guided by three purposes:

- Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decision-makers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source intelligence assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices.

- Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats.
• **Support government strategic communications through services provided on a cost-recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness.**

(4) The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State redefine the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. The Under Secretary should serve as the Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Committee; have adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation; direct the Department’s foreign opinion and media research activities; approve senior public diplomacy assignments; and review the performance ratings of public diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. The Department’s current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy should be tripled from current levels and placed under the control of the Under Secretary. The Department should provide a core funding grant to the Center for Strategic Communication in the amount of an annual appropriation in the Department’s budget.

(5) The Task Force recommends that public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State should be at the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission positions or the Senior Foreign Service should have served at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in the Department or in an interagency assignment relevant to public diplomacy. The Bureau of International Information Programs should be directed by an Assistant Secretary.
(6) The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee. The Under Secretary for Policy should coordinate strategic communication activities with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should extend the role and responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to act as the Department’s focal point for military support of public diplomacy and create a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs to coordinate all activities associated with military support for public diplomacy; and provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation.

(7) The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. STRATCOM’s and U.S. SOCOM’s Information Operations responsibilities to include DoD support for public diplomacy. The Department should triple current resources (personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DoD support to public diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM for expanded support for strategic communication programs.
Chapter 1, Strategic Communication: The Case for a New Vision

Strategic communication is vital to America’s national security and foreign policy. Although recent attention to its value is driven by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, strategic communication describes a variety of instruments used by governments for generations to understand global attitudes and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, advise policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior through communications strategies.

Strategic communication can help to shape context and build relationships that enhance the achievement of political, economic, and military objectives. It can be used to mobilize publics in support of major policy initiatives – and to support objectives before, during, and after a conflict. To be effective, strategic communicators must understand attitudes and cultures, respect the importance of ideas, adopt advanced information technologies, and employ sophisticated communication skills and strategies. To be persuasive, they must be credible.

Policies, diplomacy, military operations, and strategic communication should not be managed separately. Good strategic communication cannot build support for policies viewed unfavorably by large populations. Nor can the most carefully crafted messages, themes, and words persuade when the messenger lacks credibility and underlying message authority.

For some the case for strategic communication is not self-evident. Global media already provide an abundance of information they suggest. “Why can’t CNN, Fox, or MSNBC do it?” But commercial media are selective in ways that serve news and business interests first. And few politicians, corporations, or advocacy groups are content to leave their political campaigns, business objectives, and policy agendas to improvisation or the media. The U.S. Government needs a strategic communication capability that is planned, directed, coordinated, funded, and conducted in ways that support the nation’s interests.
Strategic communication can be understood to embrace four core instruments.

*Public diplomacy* seeks through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting relationships and receptivity to a nation’s culture, values, and policies. It seeks also to influence attitudes and mobilize publics in ways that support policies and interests. Its time horizons are decades and news cycles. Public diplomacy is distinguished from traditional diplomatic interactions between governments. In an age of global media, the Internet revolution, and powerful nonstate actors — an age in which almost everything governments do and say is understood through the mediating filters of news frames, culture, memory, and language — no major strategy, policy, or diplomatic initiative can succeed without public support. Fulbright scholarships, youth exchanges, embassy press briefings, official websites in language versions, and televised interviews with ambassadors and military commanders are examples of public diplomacy.

*Public affairs* is used by the Departments of State and Defense to depict communication activities intended primarily to inform and influence U.S. media and the American people. The White House, the NSC, departments and agencies, and military commands all have public affairs staffs. They focus on domestic media, but their advocacy activities reach allies and adversaries around the world. Distinctions between public affairs and public diplomacy continue to shape doctrine, resource allocations, and organization charts. But public diplomacy and public affairs practitioners employ similar tools and methods; their audiences are global and local. This conceptual distinction is losing validity in the world of global media, global audiences, and porous borders.

*International broadcasting services* are funded by governments to transmit news, information, public affairs programs, and entertainment to global audiences via AM/FM and shortwave radio, satellite television, and web-based systems. Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio/TV Marti, and the Radio Sawa, and Al Hurra Arabic language radio and television services are examples of U.S. international broadcasting.
Information operations (IO) is a term used by the DOD to include Computer Network Operations (Computer Network Attack and Defense), Electronic Warfare, Operational Security, Military Deception, and PSYOP. This report will discuss only open PSYOP, military activities that use selected information and indicators to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of military and national security objectives.

1.1 Introduction

Three weeks after 9/11, a Defense Science Board Task Force sponsored jointly by the DOD and Department of State issued a report on U.S. civilian and military information dissemination capabilities. In a ten month study, written before the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, the Task Force determined that the United States needed a sustained, coordinated capability to understand and influence global publics rooted in Presidential direction and the information age.

The October 2001 Task Force recommended that America’s leaders give higher priority to strategic communication – public diplomacy, public affairs, and open international military information. Engaging the right audiences at the right time can create diplomatic opportunities, reduce tensions leading to war, help contain conflicts, and address nontraditional threats to U.S. security. Some of these “right audiences” are individuals, networks, and groups that can be mobilized to support U.S. goals. Some are publics that resent U.S. power and oppose it asymmetrically through rhetorical and political means. Some are enemies capable of deploying nuclear or biological weapons, computer viruses, hate broadcasts, or terrorist attacks.

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Because the U.S. lacks an effective means to plan and coordinate strategic communication, the October 2001 Task Force called for a Presidential Decision Directive to:

- Strengthen the nation’s ability to shape public understanding and support for foreign and national security policies;
- Coordinate strategic communication activities through a NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC);
- Require regional and functional NSC committees to assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when considering policy options and develop communication strategies for policy implementation; and
- Leverage private sector capabilities and harness information assets to the Internet revolution.

The strategic environment has changed radically since the October 2001 Task Force report. We face a war on terrorism, intensified conflict within Islam, and insurgency in Iraq. Worldwide anger and discontent are directed at America’s tarnished credibility and ways the U.S. pursues its goals. There is consensus that America’s power to persuade is in a state of crisis. Global transparency, driven by new media and low cost technologies, shape the strategic landscape.

This Task Force re-examined the purposes of strategic communication and the salience of recommendations in the earlier study. We then addressed three questions:
(1) What are the consequences of changes in the strategic communication environment?
(2) What Presidential direction and strategic communication means are required?
(3) What should be done about public diplomacy and open military information operations?

1.2 The New Strategic Communication Environment

**Anti-American attitudes.** Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew Research Center, Gallup (CNN/USA Today), and the Department of State (INR) reveal widespread animosity toward the United States and its policies. A year and a half after
going to war in Iraq, Arab/Muslim anger has intensified. Data from Zogby International in July 2004, for example, show that the U.S. is viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (98 percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and Jordan (78 percent). The war has increased mistrust of America in Europe, weakened support for the war on terrorism, and undermined U.S. credibility worldwide. Media commentary is consistent with polling data. In a State Department (INR) survey of editorials and op-eds in 72 countries, 82.5% of commentaries were negative, 17.5% positive.³

Negative attitudes and the conditions that create them are the underlying sources of threats to America’s national security and reduced ability to leverage diplomatic opportunities. Terrorism, thin coalitions, harmful effects on business, restrictions on travel, declines in cross border tourism and education flows, and damaging consequences for other elements of U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive atmosphere of hostility.

Although many observers correlate anti-Americanism with deficiencies in U.S. public diplomacy (its content, tone, and competence), the effectiveness of the means used to influence public opinion is only one metric. Policies, conflicts of interest, cultural differences, memories, time, dependence on mediated information, and other factors shape perceptions and limit the effectiveness of strategic communication.

Perceptions of public diplomacy in crisis. Since the Defense Science Board’s October 2001 Task Force study, more than 15 private sector and Congressional reports have examined public diplomacy: the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and

Muslim World ("Djerejian group"), the Council on Foreign Relations, The Heritage Foundation, The Brookings Institution, The Aspen Institute, the Public Diplomacy Institute, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and several reports each by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the U.S. General Accounting Office, and Congressional committees.4

There is consensus in these reports that U.S. public diplomacy is in crisis.5 Missing are strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient resources, and a culture of measurement and evaluation. America’s image problem, many suggest, is linked to perceptions of the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-indulgent. There is agreement too that public diplomacy could be a powerful asset with stronger Presidential leadership, Congressional support, inter-agency coordination, partnership with the private sector, and resources (people, tools, structures, programs, funding). Solutions lie not in short term, manipulative public relations. Results will depend on fundamental transformation of strategic communication instruments and a sustained long term, approach at the level of ideas, cultures, and values.

The number and depth of these reports indicate widespread concern among influential observers that something must be done about public diplomacy. But so far these concerns have produced no real change. The White House has paid little attention. Congressional actions have been limited to informational hearings and funding for Middle East broadcasting initiatives, Radio Sawa and Al Hurra. State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors responses to Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO) were not at the strategic level.

One limitation of these post-9/11 studies is that most did not look comprehensively at civilian and military strategic communication assets. Several called for strategic

4 These reports are listed in Appendix E

direction by the White House or the NSC. Some examined only State Department public diplomacy programs, others U.S. international broadcasting, others both.

**Terrorism as a national security frame.** The events of September 11, 2001 were a catalyst in creating a new way to think about national security. The Global War on Terrorism replaced the Cold War as a national security meta narrative. Governments, media, and publics use the terrorism frame for cognitive, evaluative, and communication purposes. For political leaders, it is a way to link disparate events; identify priorities, friends, enemies, victims, and blame; and shape simple coherent messages. For journalists and news consumers the terrorism frame conflates and appears to make sense of diverse national security stories – Al Qaeda, Jihadists, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Iran, Chechnya, Indonesia, Kashmir, the Philippines, Kenya, Spain.⁶

Frames simplify and help to communicate complex events. But like the Cold War frame, the terrorism frame marginalizes other significant issues and problems: failing states, non-proliferation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, economic globalization, transnational threats other than terrorism, and global warming. Often the terrorism frame directs attention to tactics not strategy. The focus is more on capturing and killing terrorists than attitudinal, political, and economic forces that are the underlying source of threats and opportunities in national security.

**Volatile Islam.** Islam’s internal and external struggle over values, identity, and change is the dominant political arena in which strategic communication takes place. Analysts differ on causes and consequences. But there is widespread agreement that terrorist networks are symptomatic of a broader transformation within Islam and a continuation of the 20th century conflict between tolerance and totalitarianism. Islam’s crisis must be understood as a contest of ideas and engaged accordingly.⁷

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⁷ The literature on the struggle of ideas in Islam substantial. Particularly useful for strategic communication are Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies,* Rand
Islam’s struggle raises critical considerations for strategic communication:

- The contest of ideas is taking place not just in Arab and other Islamic countries but in the cities and villages of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.
- U.S. policies on Israeli-Palestinian issues and Iraq in 2003-2004 have damaged America’s credibility and power to persuade.
- The hostile atmosphere in which terrorists act is reinforced by religious messages, sophisticated media strategies, and advanced information technologies.
- Regimes based on consent may be intolerant and oppose U.S. policies.
- More sophisticated influence and attitudinal segmentation models are needed.
- Strategists face difficult trade-offs in determining feasible choices and funding priorities in using persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments of power.8

**New Arab Media.** Satellite television, FM radio, international newspapers edited in London and transmitted by satellite for printing in capitals throughout the Arab world, and growing Internet penetration are creating a complex Arab media environment no longer dominated by state-sponsored media. Qatar’s Al Jazeera, launched in 1996, is the best known satellite TV network, but Saudi MBC, Lebanon’s LBC-al Hayat, Abu Dhabi TV, Dubai-based Al Arabiya and other stations are contesting Al Jazeera with lively news and talk shows that spark political argument in homes and cafes throughout the Middle East.9

Greater amounts of real time information and decreasing costs are severely challenging state censors and changing the ways governments interact with their citizens. Arabs in the region and in Arab diasporas throughout the world increasingly see and read the same information with consequences for Arab self-identity. Although Internet use in the

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8 The Task Force addresses many of these issues in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report.

Middle East is the lowest in the world, this digital divide is narrowing, and cyberspace is an arena for both conflict and conflict resolution in the region. These new Arab media are creating the frames within which people understand and misunderstand events and U.S. political goals.

**Global transparency.** Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television networks dominate discussion of the information and media environment. But a host of information technologies — in addition to satellite TV — are creating greater global transparency: cell phones, wireless handhelds, videophones, camcorders, digital cameras, miniaturized fly away units used by TV crews in remote locations, high resolution commercial space imaging, blogs, and email. Many are cheap; costs are declining.\(^{10}\)

These technologies have consequences for all three stakeholders in strategic communication: governments, media, and publics. Policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders face more breaking news from more places in a reactive mode. Journalists rely less on “institutionally based news” (i.e., official sources, press conferences). Publics (i.e., NGOs, image activists, soldiers with digital cameras) can drive perceptions and policies with pictures and stories.

Transparency creates threats and opportunities – and changes in the strategy/tactics dynamic. Tactical events can instantly become strategic problems (digital cameras in Abu Ghraib). On the other hand, transparency can show strategic threats more clearly and enhance the capacity to undercut an opponent’s political will and ability to mislead (embedded media in Iraq).

Transparency is only one element in a global environment characterized also by faster rates of change, shorter reaction times, asymmetry, interconnectivity, decentralization, disintermediation, declining communication costs, content/transport disconnects, multiple channels, more narrowcasting, Internet penetration at rates exceeding earlier

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technologies, greater volumes of information in less time, pervasive feelings of saturation, short news and memory cycles, digital divides, and interactive tensions between fragmenting consequences of conflict and integrative effects of cooperation.

There are critical consequences for strategic communication. New information technologies often separate information from the sender’s identity and the social frames that provide credibility and meaning. Social context on the Internet, for example, is not self-evident. Nor is the identity of those who generate information. Terrorists use websites in ways that mask their agendas. Their web-based narratives usually do not celebrate violence so as to elicit sympathy and resonate with supporters.

Information saturation means attention, not information, becomes a scarce resource. Power flows to credible messengers. Asymmetrical credibility matters. What's around information is critical. Reputations count. Brands are important. Editors, filters, and cue givers are influential. Fifty years ago political struggles were about the ability to control and transmit scarce information. Today, political struggles are about the creation and destruction of credibility.

Strategic communicators need to understand this new information environment, train for it, and deal with it.

1.3 Post-9/11 – Tactical Achievements

Strategic communication was a high priority in the months immediately after 9/11. Public statements by U.S. political leaders made clear that war on terrorists with global reach was not a war against Islam. Messages were tailored to global audiences as well as audiences at home. America’s political leaders, diplomats, and military leaders

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understood that a counter-terrorism strategy could not succeed without effective, coordinated strategic communication.

National security agencies initiated networks and crisis response teams. The White House created a Coalition Information Centers (CICs) network linking Washington, London, and Islamabad. Modeled on techniques used successfully in British and American political campaigns, and by NATO in Kosovo, the CICs deployed language-qualified public affairs experts to respond to breaking news, Taliban and Al Qaeda claims, and regional events. They did so within news cycles — not hours and days later during business hours in western capitals. The CICs sought to dominate global media coverage with positive, coordinated coalition messages on humanitarian aid, building a representative government in Afghanistan, and other themes.

In October 2001, the State Department established an unprecedented 24/7 public diplomacy coordination group in its Operations Center with links to the White House, Defense Department, U.S. embassies, and U.S. combatant commands. The NSC created a Counter Terrorism Information Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. The Defense Department retained skilled political communications consultants and gave high priority to strategic communications planning. White House officials, Cabinet secretaries, and military leaders appeared regularly on Al Jazeera and other global media outlets. Shaping message personally became part of the daily routine of America’s top political and military leaders.13

The promise of these early efforts did not lead to transformation of instruments and institutions. Three positive developments, however, deserve comment.

Tactical communication. The President, the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military

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13 Secretary of State Colin Powell: “The terrorist attacks of September 11 underscored the urgency of implementing an effective public diplomacy campaign. Those who abet terror by spreading distortion and hate and inciting others take full advantage of the global news cycle. We must use the same cycle.” Statement before the House Budget Committee, March 7, 2002.
commanders continue to devote extraordinary amounts of personal time to advocating policies and shaping perceptions at home and abroad. Tactical public affairs coordination has been effective through the White House Office of Global Communication, the successor to the CICs. Daily videoconferences on talking points, the message of the day, and who takes the lead on what issue enhance a process among national security agencies that long pre-dates 9/11.

**U.S. International Broadcasting.** U.S. government broadcasting in the Middle East is changing driven by events in the region, narrowcasting tendencies in mass audience broadcasting, Congressional pressures, policies of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and a BBG marketing strategy that draws on research and emphasizes targeted programming. Radio Sawa broadcasts a mixture of American and Arabic popular music with brief news breaks on the half hour to young Arabs via FM, AM, and satellite. Al Hurra, a 24/7 U.S. funded Arabic language satellite television service launched in 2004, provides entertainment programs and American style news and information intended “to counter the lack of depth and balance in the Middle Eastern media.” Radio Farda broadcasts entertainment, news, and information and maintains a website for audiences in Iran.

Supporters of U.S. international broadcasting cite market share (actual and potential), space in Middle East’s dominant media (satellite television, FM radio), and a U.S. voice in the Arab world that serves American interests. Critics of Radio Sawa question its music format. They assert that U.S. broadcasting needs to do more than just build an audience and point to Sawa’s irrelevance to Arab intellectuals and political reformers. Critics of Al Hurra doubt the value of a U.S. television network in a region skeptical of state-owned media. They contend that much larger appropriations will be required to compete with Al Jazeera and other powerful Arab networks in highly competitive Middle East television markets.

Supporters and critics suggest that missing is a strong investment in Internet-based broadcasting. They agree too that audience research and independent evaluation will
enable firm conclusions on the long term value of these strategic communication initiatives to U.S. interests.

**Embedded Media Policy.** The Defense Department’s policy of embedding journalists in Iraq has won broad support in government and the media. Reporting from embedded media during the spring of 2003 reduced the potential for Iraqi disinformation (e.g., on civilian casualties) that could have undermined political support in the U.S. and in other countries. Media coverage during the march to Baghdad may have influenced the political will of Iraqi military and civilian leaders. From the media’s perspective, journalists gained unusual access (at the tactical level), opportunities to challenge or confirm headquarters briefings, knowledge not otherwise attainable (censored news gets reported eventually), and a better understanding of the military.

### 1.4 Post-9/11 – Strategic Limitations

United States strategic communication lacks sustained Presidential direction, effective interagency coordination, optimal private sector partnerships, and adequate resources. Tactical message coordination does not equate with strategic planning and evaluation. Personal commitment by top leaders has not been matched by needed changes in the organizations they lead or in a dysfunctional interagency process.

In 2002, the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) urged fundamental change in the major instruments of statecraft designed to meet different requirements in a different era — including “a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America.”14 Two years later, the U.S. has made little progress in building and transforming its strategic communication assets.

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**Strategic direction.** There has been no Presidential directive on strategic communication since the Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information (PDD 68) issued April 30, 1999. The NSC terminated PDD 68 early in 2001 with the intent of reviewing its approach to public diplomacy. Pending the outcome of this review, the NSC placed public diplomacy under a PCC on Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations, which exercised minimal direction and coordination.¹⁵

Leaders in cabinet departments did not fill the gap. Short appointments and long vacancies occurred in the State Department’s office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This office was vacant or filled in an acting capacity for two years during the Bush Administration (2000-2004).¹⁶

The DOD created an Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) on October 30, 2001 to serve as the Department’s focal point for a “strategic information campaign in support of the war on terrorism.” The Office “was to develop a full spectrum influence strategy that would result in greater foreign support of U.S. goals and repudiation of terrorists and their methods.” OSI generated opposition from government public affairs officials who feared it would undermine their credibility and from negative press coverage in the U.S. and abroad alleging the Office intended to place lies and disinformation in foreign media organizations. The Secretary of Defense dissolved OSI on February 26, 2002 stating the “office has clearly been so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not function effectively.”¹⁷

**Inter-agency Coordination.** The Bush Administration created two entities intended to coordinate strategic communication. In June 2002, the White House established an

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¹⁵ Shortly after 9/11, the NSC created an Office of Combating Terrorism with a Senior Director for Strategic Communications and Information. The NSC also created a Counter Terrorism Information Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee to focus on military and intelligence agency issues and coordination.

¹⁶ Charlotte Beers served 18 months, Margaret Tutwiler 6 months.

Office of Global Communications (OGC) as a successor to the Coalition Information Centers. According to the White House, the OCG “coordinates strategic communications with global audiences” and “advises on the strategic direction and themes that United States government agencies use to reach foreign audiences.”\textsuperscript{18} Despite sweeping authority calling for the OGC to develop strategies for developing messages, assess methods and strategies, coordinate temporary teams of communicators, and encourage state-of-the art media and technology, the OGC evolved into a second tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination. The OGC does not engage in strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation.

In September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee “at the direction of the President and in consultation with the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense.” This NSC PCC was intended to “coordinate interagency activities, to ensure that all agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the President’s messages across the globe.” Its authority included “interagency support for international broadcasting, foreign information programs, and public diplomacy,” and “development of strategic communications capabilities throughout the government.” The PCC was co-chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the NSC’s Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations.\textsuperscript{19} The PCC met several times with marginal impact. It has not met for more than a year.

The Task Force finds that the White House Office of Global Communications and the NSC’s Strategic Communication PCC have overlapping authorities. Both entities have

\textsuperscript{18} The White House Office of Global Communications was formally established by Executive Order 13283, with an accompanying news release, on January 21, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/ogc/.

\textsuperscript{19} Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordination Committee, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, September 10, 2002. The PCC members included the chair of the Combating Terrorism Information PCC, the Deputy Assistant to the President and Counselor to the National Security Advisor for Communications, the Director of the White House Office of Global Communications, and representatives from relevant agencies at the Assistant Secretary level.
been ineffectual in carrying out intended responsibilities relating to strategic communication planning, coordination, and evaluation.

**Planning and implementation.** In 1999, Presidential Decision Directive 68 authorized a “dedicated staff, under the direction of the Under Secretary [of State] for Public Diplomacy” to serve as a Secretariat for the interagency coordinating group established by the Directive. PDD 68 authorized non-reimbursable details of individuals from the DOD to the Department of State “in the national security interest of the United States and in the predominant interest of the Department of Defense.” Since then a tiny multi-agency strategic communications planning staff has operated in the State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs.

This State Department planning staff continued after the rescission of PDD 68. It has provided support for strategic communications activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the global war on terrorism. It supported meetings held by the Strategic Communications PCC. Recently it has been a catalyst for information sharing through interagency “fusion teams.” Its impact is constrained, however, by its location within a Departmental bureau, lack of tasking and contracting authorities, small staff and budget, inadequate State Department messaging technologies, limited evaluation capabilities, and insufficient attention from State and Defense Department leaders.

**Opinion/media research.** U.S. strategic communication is limited by insufficient and decentralized research capabilities. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) engages in foreign opinion polling and provides daily reports on foreign media editorials and commentary. Its small annual budget has long been stable at approximately $6 million ($3 million for polling, $3 million for analysis). Opinion research is appreciated in the Bureau, but more for its contribution to all-source intelligence products than for strategic communication.

Other government and private organizations also conduct opinion and media studies. The Foreign Broadcast Information Services collects and analyzes foreign print, radio, TV,
web-based, and gray literature publications, including assessments of Al Jazeera and other Arab/Muslim satellite TV broadcasting. The Broadcasting Board of Governors engages in audience and media research through contracts with Intermedia, a private research organization. Foreign opinion and attitude assessments are available also from U.S. embassies, the DOD, U.S. combatant commands, the CIA, non-governmental organizations, and commercial polling organizations.

Each of these activities has merit, but overall U.S. government opinion and media research faces a number of challenges. Research findings are not used sufficiently in policy formulation and policy advocacy. Policymakers, diplomats and military leaders often do not appreciate that “listening” and influence analysis are critical prerequisites to effective communications strategies. Funding is woefully inadequate. Collection often outstrips analysis. Data bases are stovepiped; “the U.S. often doesn’t know what it knows.” Users often do not task for product; providers often are late in delivering product. Media trends research and media framing analysis have low priority relative to polling and strategic communication requirements.

**Technology.** The October 2001 Task Force concluded that “the Government has taken only the first, most tentative steps toward the new ‘Internet-centric’ world of information dissemination.” Since then, State, Defense, and the combatant commands have made modest progress. The State Department’s e-Diplomacy initiatives hold promise as do VOANews.com, RFE/RL’s website, and VOA’s on-line *New Europe Review*.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has no Internet champions, as it does for radio and television. U.S. broadcasters lag well behind the private sector and America’s adversaries in developing interactive, content rich, targeted, multi-lingual web-based broadcasting services. Internet penetration in the Middle East is the lowest in world, but it is growing rapidly. Arab and Muslim Internet users worldwide include change agents, young and old, critical to the region’s future. The U.S. needs trusted, reliable web sites conducive to dialogue on political, intellectual, and cultural levels.
The impact of digital convergence is only beginning to be understood by political and military leaders. U.S. strategic communication has not evolved in ways to coordinate and leverage the potential of Internet-centric information dissemination.

**Resources.** Annual spending for State Department information programs and U.S. international broadcasting is approximately $1.2 billion – one-quarter of 1 percent of the military budget. Political leaders need to determine whether a military budget 400 times greater than a strategic communication budget is adequate to U.S. national security strategy and to a global war on terrorism viewed as a struggle about ideas. Moreover, compartmentalized budget processes in departments and agencies, in the Office of Management and Budget, and in numerous Congressional committees prevent overall funding priorities and tradeoffs at the strategic level.

1.5 Transforming Strategic Communication

This Task Force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem.

**Understanding the problem.** Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national security.20 It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress

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20 Secretary of Defense Donald S. Rumsfeld: “To win the war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas . . . That is why the president is using all elements of national power: military, financial, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence and public diplomacy.” See “Take the Fight to the Terrorists,” *The Washington Post*, October 26, 2003. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice: “We are engaged primarily in a war of ideas, not of armies. It will be won by visionaries who can look past the moment.” “It is absolutely the case that the United States needs to put new energy into its public diplomacy.” See “U.S. Needs New Energy in Public Diplomacy Campaign, Rice Says,” Washington File, Department of State, March 11, 2004; “Dr. Rice Speaks at Michigan State University,” White House News Release, May 7, 2004.
are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative.

To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against the tactic of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both government and non-government. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states (“getting it right” in Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), we will fail. Chapter 2 of this report examines the complex nature of this new paradigm and implications for sustained and imaginative action.

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on “doable tasks,” develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. This approach will build on in-depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of sustained effort. Just as importantly, through evaluation and feedback, it will enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft. Chapter 3 of this report addresses ways in which strategic communication can be generated and managed with effect.

We need to move beyond outdated concepts, stale structural models, and institutionally-based labels. Public diplomacy, public affairs, PSYOP and open military information operations must be coordinated and energized. Chapter 4 of this report recommends changes in the strategic communication functions and structures of the Departments of State and Defense, U.S. embassies and combatant commands.
Leadership from the top. A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required.

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices. Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards. These objectives mean officials must take full advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, understand cultures, and assess influence structures – not occasionally, but as an iterative process. Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated.

Swift and sustained Presidential direction is also required to connect strategy to structure. In 1947, America confronted new threats and opportunities as well. The President with bipartisan support in Congress carried out policy and organizational initiatives that shaped U.S. national security for two generations. Today, we face challenges of similar magnitude, made more formidable by a world where geography, military power, and time to react are no longer sufficient to ensure our security. Strategic communication and other 21st century instruments of statecraft require changes different in kind but similar in scale to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. These changes will occur only with sustained, enthusiastic, and deeply committed Presidential leadership – and the collaborative and bipartisan support of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees of Congress.

Government-private sector partnership. Finding new ways to harness strategic communication to the flexibility and creative imagination of the private sector will be
central to successful strategic communication in the 21st century. The commercial sector has a dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and media surveys, information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring the influence of communications. Academic and research communities offer vast untapped resources for education, training, area and language expertise, planning and consultative services.

Effective sharing between government and society in the conduct of strategic communication is not new. Government grants to private organizations have long been a way to carry out international educational and cultural exchanges, foreign opinion polling, democratization and media training programs, and much of U.S. international broadcasting. Grants extend the reach of government programs and capitalize on the expertise and flexibility of non-government partner organizations.

Recent study groups, including the October 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force, have recommended more extensive collaboration. These observers see value not only in leveraging private sector competencies but in new structures and a degree of distance that attracts credible messengers with non-government resumes, creative thinkers and talented communicators uncomfortable working with government agencies, and skilled, language qualified professionals available for temporary crisis deployment.

Collaboration between government and the considerable benefits of private sector thinking and skills should be strongly encouraged. The complexity of strategic communication problems calls for balanced coordination of effort. Independent analysis is required in a wide range of fields: cultures and values, international intellectual engagement, communications studies, and applied science. Teamwork among civilian agencies and military services will be necessary to draw effectively on the seminars of universities, professional skills of NGOs, and imagination of the media production

industry. Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For all their strengths, private organizations represent particular interests. Investments in strategic communication must be grounded in the public interest as determined by appropriate executive branch and Congressional authorities.

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped the implementation of U.S. strategic communication for more than half a century. New thinking and new collaborative structures hold promise of a transformed and continuous strategic communication capability that serves America’s interests.
Chapter 2 – The New Strategic Environment

2.1 The Cold War Paradigm

In the second half of the 20th century U.S. national security was driven by the Cold War. America and its allies faced a seemingly powerful adversary—the Soviet Union—whose strategic objectives were inimical to our own. During this long struggle we used the various elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military and economic—to advance our interests. There is a conviction held by many that the “War on Terrorism” will have a similar influence in the 21st century. There are indeed similarities between the two struggles, and strategic communication will be as central to this war as it was to our Cold War strategy.

Throughout the Cold War the U.S. used a variety of informational and cultural means to weaken Marxist-Leninist regimes and keep alive the hope of freedom for tens of millions behind the “Iron Curtain.” Over the course of the Cold War era a suite of organizations—especially the Voice of America, the United States Information Agency, and a broad program of cultural and educational exchanges—spearheaded this effort. Several Presidential decision directives staked out the central role to be played by strategic communication. When Ronald Reagan stood in Berlin in June 1987 and demanded, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”, he was speaking to a live television audience of millions behind that wall. East Germans had been watching Western TV for years, but Reagan turned this reality into a powerful metaphor that the wall’s days were numbered.

The Cold War transformed the entire U.S. national security structure, and created what has been called the “national security state.” The National Security Act of 1947, the web of military departments and intelligence agencies that it created, and the overriding doctrines of deterrence and containment, were integral to the Cold War. But above all the Cold War represented a conservative strategy that nurtured a conservative mindset: its strategy spoke of change, but its pervasive charge in contrast was to preserve. Despite

seemingly black-and-white differences in governments and policies, over time we came to resemble our adversary, as our adversary came to resemble us. The U.S.S.R. generally acted like a normal nation state with which we could conduct diplomacy, conclude treaties, and engage in statecraft with a reasonably predictable leadership. By the 1960s the possibility of nuclear war declined as the terrible recognition of its apocalyptic consequences grew. In fact, both sides increasingly sought the assurance of stability to keep even the possibility of nuclear confrontation at arm’s length. But stability encouraged — even demanded — predictability, and thus the bureaucratic activities of both sides became highly routine. The Cold War evolved over time into a ritualized struggle that sought its own comfortable perpetuation. The very idea of “victory” slowly transformed from the idea of defeating Communism to the more perfect realization of “stability.” Thus the Cold War’s end and outcome, with Russia in the 1990s reduced almost to a client state of the U.S., came as a shocking surprise.

Our thorough inability to grasp the final dynamic changes that led to the end of the Cold War should be unsettling to us, but after all, the outcome was also a total victory. So the Cold War template was almost mythically anointed in the decade before 9/11. Thus, with the surprise announcement of a new struggle, the U.S. Government reflexively inclined toward Cold War-style responses to the new threat, without a thought or a care as to whether these were the best responses to a very different strategic situation.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Patriot Act were two such representative organizational and legislative responses. There will surely be many more the longer the struggle goes on — because deeper expectations within the Washington policy and defense cultures still seek out Cold War models. There is an expectation that, like the Cold War, the U.S. will naturally create enduring alliances and coalitions. Moreover, if the Cold War could be described as a struggle against one form of totalitarianism — Marxist-Leninism — so too there is a desire to describe the “War on Terrorism” as a struggle against yet another form of totalitarianism — this time in the form of a radical Islamist vision. Thus the problem is presented as one of how to confront
and eventually defeat another totalitarian evil. And as with the Cold War, many now also declare that it is incumbent on the U.S. to assume leadership in this struggle.

**But this is no Cold War.** We call it a war on terrorism — but Muslims in contrast see a history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents — of which radical fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for restoration also represent, in their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within Islam.

If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the “apostate” regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward — and potentially dangerous — situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all Muslims *and* country-specific.²³

This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S. seeks to “dominate” and “weaken” the Muslim World.²⁴ Not only is every

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American initiative and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intra-Islamic hostilities — but Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.

Therefore, in stark contrast to the Cold War, the United States today is not seeking to contain a threatening state/empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity — an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a “War on Terrorism.”

But if the strategic situation is wholly unlike the Cold War, our response nonetheless has tended to imitate the routines and bureaucratic responses and mindset that so characterized that era. In terms of strategic communication especially, the Cold War emphasized:

• Dissemination of information to “huddled masses yearning to be free.” Today we reflexively compare Muslim “masses” to those oppressed under Soviet rule. This is a strategic mistake. There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. groundswell among Muslim societies — except to be liberated perhaps from what they see as apostate tyrannies that the U.S. so determinedly promotes and defends.

• An enduringly stable propaganda environment. The Cold War was a status quo setting that emphasized routine message-packaging — and whose essential objective was the most efficient enactment of the routine. In contrast the situation in Islam today is highly dynamic, and likely to move decisively in one direction or another. The U.S. urgently needs to think in terms of promoting actual positive change.

• An acceptance of authoritarian regimes as long as they were anti-communist. This could be glossed over in our message of freedom and democracy because it was the main adversary only that truly mattered. Today, however, the perception of intimate U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that of the enemy.
Communicating authority and persuading others has been an essential tool of statecraft since ancient times. Three millennia ago Assyrian kings carved scenes of their power and majesty into stone tableaux meant to impress their authority on peers and subjects alike. In the mid 20th century all of the major powers made extensive use of radio as a means of extending information and influence across borders. Twenty years ago the Reagan Administration had a sophisticated grasp of the power of information — especially television — characterizing information as one of the elements of national power.

Yet the current national security strategy (October 2002) says nothing about the power of information nor does it allude to the necessity of integrating all of the forms of national power and authority. We now have national strategies for securing cyberspace, protecting national infrastructures, military strategy, and others, yet a national strategy for the employment of strategic communication does not exist. This blind spot existed throughout the 1990s, abetted in part by the belief that the end of the Cold War also ended our responsibility to continue strategic communication. This critical strategic mistake was made at the same time a new threat posed by radical Islam was emerging. Strategic communication must be at the center of America’s overall grand strategy in this war. But how should we begin to move in this direction? The U.S. Government does not even have a coherent statement of the problem, and refuses to address the importance of strategic communication in addressing it. Moreover, it has adopted a Cold War style response in terms of activity and organization. So where to begin?

2.2 Strategic Communication Principles

If there were a strategic communication corollary to the U.S. Military’s “intelligence preparation of the battle space” it would be: correctly analyze the combined impacts of audience, impact, message and means. We often speak of “the audience” we wish to influence as if there were only one. The reality is that in the global information environment in which we live and work there are numerous audiences that can be affected differently by the same message. Crafting an influence campaign means precisely identifying the key audience, but also other audiences as well.
What would we like our targeted audiences to see — and what impact do we wish to have? Do we want them to “like” us? Do we want them to question and doubt the information they get from their own governments, like we did with Radio Free Europe during the Cold War? Do we wish them similarly to cease supporting militant jihadists in their midst? Or are these traditional approaches to strategic communications even the right questions? Crafting an impact that we can see, measure, and realize is surely as important as accurately analyzing the audiences we wish to influence. But how to craft a message when our target audience is unwilling even to listen to us?

What message can generate the desired impact on the targeted audience? We must begin by listening to that audience, because if we do not understand what resonates with them we have only a serendipitous chance of succeeding. Much of the current U.S. effort concentrates on delivering “the message” and omits the essential first step of listening to our targeted audiences. We can craft a message that actually gets through only by using language, symbols, and images that resonate with the targeted audience.

Each synthesis of message-impact-audience suggests its own best means of delivery. Whether radio, TV, Internet, or print, we must understand how these factors interrelate before we can gauge the potential influence we might have. TV may be the most ubiquitous information medium in today’s world, but it is the blend of media and how they can mutually reinforce our message that is crucial.

**Information Age Dynamics.** We must also take the measure of new dynamics emerging from the information age. The *speed* with which information becomes available to the global audience, the *convergence* of means by which we can capture many different kinds of information (visual, audio, print, etc) in a single digital format, and the ability to get that information to a global audience all suggest some of the advantages and limitations of this information age. Often the first information to reach an audience (a global audience that is really a galaxy of niche audiences) frames how an event is perceived and discussed — and thus can shape its ultimate impact as well. Always reacting to information is tantamount to losing. For example, NATO strategists were stunned to
discover that Slobodan Milosevic’s most effective weapon in the air campaign against him was not, say, an air defense network, but rather the global television network.\textsuperscript{25} Digital convergence is only beginning to be understood by decision makers. The significance of a common news language of bit and byte simply cannot be overstated. A truly global network is reshaping politics, diplomacy, warfare — all social interaction.\textsuperscript{26} Just one example: the ability of a blogger in a conflict zone to capture a digital image of an atrocity, upload it, paste it on a webpage, and have it available to millions in minutes is a startling development.

Here is just one example of information age implications for old-style info-agency organization. While we focus inward our adversary is focusing outward, truly reaching and motivating those they hope to enlist against us. The U.S. has always operated from the proposition that in the “war of ideas” and the competition of ideologies, one form of governance and society functions best when the bright light of free-flowing information is pulsing — among free and democratic societies — while another — the tyrannical and fascist — functions with difficulty, if at all, under those circumstances. Yet the paradox today is that our enemy is thriving in an environment of free and open information flows. Thus our challenge is to transcend Cold War clichés, to seek out new and creative responses — especially in the realm of strategic communication — and to do so most urgently, because at this moment it is the enemy that has the advantage.

\textbf{2.3 What is the Problem? Who Are We Dealing With?}

The information campaign — or as some still would have it, “the war of ideas,” or the struggle for “hearts and minds” — is important to every war effort. In this war it is an essential objective, because the larger goals of U.S. strategy depend on separating the vast majority of non-violent Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist-Jihadists. But

American efforts have not only failed in this respect: they may also have achieved the opposite of what they intended.

American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in some Arab societies.

- Muslims do not “hate our freedom,” but rather, they hate our policies. The overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.

- Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy. Moreover, saying that “freedom is the future of the Middle East” is seen as patronizing, suggesting that Arabs are like the enslaved peoples of the old Communist World — but Muslims do not feel this way: they feel oppressed, but not enslaved.

- Furthermore, in the eyes of Muslims, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. U.S. actions appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim self-determination.

- Therefore, the dramatic narrative since 9/11 has essentially borne out the entire radical Islamist bill of particulars. American actions and the flow of events have elevated the authority of the Jihadi insurgents and tended to ratify their legitimacy among Muslims. Fighting groups portray themselves as the true defenders of an Ummah (the entire Muslim community) invaded and under attack — to broad public support.

- What was a marginal network is now an Ummah-wide movement of fighting groups. Not only has there been a proliferation of “terrorist” groups: the unifying context of a shared cause creates a sense of affiliation across the many cultural and sectarian boundaries that divide Islam.
Finally, Muslims see Americans as strangely narcissistic — namely, that the war is all about us. As the Muslims see it, everything about the war is — for Americans — really no more than an extension of American domestic politics and its great game. This perception is of course necessarily heightened by election-year atmospherics, but nonetheless sustains their impression that when Americans talk to Muslims they are really just talking to themselves.

Thus the critical problem in American public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim World is not one of “dissemination of information,” or even one of crafting and delivering the “right” message. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of credibility. Simply, there is none — the United States today is without a working channel of communication to the world of Muslims and of Islam. Inevitably therefore, whatever Americans do and say only serves the party that has both the message and the “loud and clear” channel: the enemy.

Arguably the first step toward mitigating and eventually even reversing this situation is to better understand the values and worldview of the target audience itself.

**Target Demographics and Values.** The official take on the target audience has been gloriously simple. If the enemy is a relatively small group of crazies and criminals — “Bad Muslims” — then the rest must be “Good Muslims” and thus the people we want our public diplomacy to reach:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good Muslims</th>
<th>Bad Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>(Including friendly regimes and everybody else)</em></td>
<td><em>(Only terrorists &amp; sponsors)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difficulty of course is that the Muslim World looks nothing like this. Islam is a cacophony of competing and crosscutting groups, sub-cultures, and whole societies. A Muslim may be balancing up to five identities: as a Muslim, as a sectarian Muslim
(Sunni, Sh’ia, Ismaili, etc.), as a national citizen, as an ethnic “citizen” (Arab, Kurd, Turkmen, etc.), and as a tribal or clan member. If we were to grossly simplify this picture, and yet still have a roughly accurate yardstick of Muslim sociology today — especially in terms of the dynamics of the war — it might break down like this:

- Regimes and their retainers: (including the army, bigwigs, cronies, & hangers-on)
- The professional class (also known in some quarters as “technocrats”)
- Establishment & activist Islamist prelates (plus social welfare & education networks)
- Regular and poor Muslims (small entrepreneurs on-down)
- Fighting groups and their networks

These broad segments represent relatively distinct social and political constituencies, with varying weight and influence in national life. The norms of national life can be seen in some ways as a balance between the first three of these segments: a rough triad of regime elites, establishment Ulama (Muslim prelates) and the technocratic class.27

But the war has placed these norms under increasing stress, and conflicts below the surface in Muslim (and especially Arab) national life are emerging into a promise and anticipation of change. Change is the province of the fighting groups and the activist Islamists prelates who are not creatures of their regimes. Change means of course the vision of Islamic Restoration. Thus if we were to look at Muslim societies (again, Arab societies especially) in terms of their receptivity and support for change/restoration, the spectrum might look like this:

| Regimes | Uncommitted | Sympathizers | Islamists | Jihadis |

This “change-spectrum” shows change constituencies in terms of a weighted mix of both numbers and authority. By this last measure, paradoxically, regimes may have the

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highest level of power but the lowest level of authority within their societies. This sort of authority is not what has been referred to as “soft power” in the foreign policy context — rather it is ultimately the foundation of political legitimacy within society. Thus a developing shift in such authority within Muslim society presages eventual changes in political power — and so in today’s ruling regimes.

And of course, the regimes are the most resistant to political and social change, while the Jihadis, the fighting groups, are its most active agents. Notably the regime and status quo segments are quite small. Some elements within Arab regimes are actually quite committed, if subversively, to the change agenda. In Pakistan, regime support for Islamic Restoration is quite high. This sort of continuing sub rosa defection will be in fact a critical indicator of impending regime collapse.

Thus it is possible to show the Jihadis as having a wider degree of sympathetic (Arab majorities), indirect (Islamists), and direct support than most of the regimes. Certainly Arabs, by an overwhelming majority, sympathize with, or are active in the cause of Islamic Restoration. Therefore it is even more interesting to track the relative weight of the non-Jihadi Islamists, also called “moderate” or “New Islamists,” because their professed vision of Islamic Restoration is non-violent, tolerant, and relatively pluralistic. It can be argued that the New Islamists are in fact the true center of gravity in the Muslim World today, in that they have the most authority to make change, and draw the highest levels of sympathy from less-active, but receptive and supportive Arab majorities. In this construct the Jihadis are seen as perhaps necessary to make change begin and thus become eventually inevitable, but the radicals do not appeal to the majority of Muslims in terms of practical political change if and when old regimes finally collapse.

The change spectrum reveals target demographics for U.S. public diplomacy that offer at best a highly constricted opportunity — how constricted it actually is can be shown by

mapping the change-spectrum above onto the marketing construct presented in Chapter 3 which defines the “where to put your marketing effort” spectrum:

- **Hard Support (for U.S. Government):** Regimes and their retainers
- **Soft Support:** Regimes and their retainers, a few technocrats
- **Neutral:** Some of the professional class and some regular & poor
- **Soft Opposition:** The overwhelming majority
- **Hard Opposition:** A substantial minority (more than we want to admit)

This spectrum does not preclude future opportunities for us to reach key segments of these audiences. Neither, however, should we underestimate the magnitude of the problem we face. A June 2004 Zogby poll\(^{29}\) of Arab opinion shows that the audience receptive to the U.S. message is miniscule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>June 2004 Favorable/Unfavorable</th>
<th>April 2002 Favorable/Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>11/88</td>
<td>38/61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>4/94</td>
<td>12/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>15/78</td>
<td>34/61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>20/69</td>
<td>26/70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>14/73</td>
<td>11/87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2/98</td>
<td>15/76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But Americans believe that while the U.S. necessarily shapes foreign policies to support our national interests, those same interests are not necessarily in opposition to the interests of other nations and cultures. To the contrary, Americans are convinced that the U.S. is a benevolent “superpower” that elevates values emphasizing freedom and

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prosperity as at the core of its own national interest. Thus, for Americans, “U.S. values” are in reality “world values” — exemplified by the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the 1975 Helsinki Accords — so deep down we assume that everyone should naturally support our policies.

Yet the world of Islam — by overwhelming majorities at this time — sees things differently. Muslims see American policies as inimical to their values, American rhetoric about freedom and democracy as hypocritical, and American actions as deeply threatening. Again, from the Zogby poll\textsuperscript{30}:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Morocco & Saudia & Jordan & Lebanon & UAE \\
 & Fav/Unfav & Arabia & Fav/Unfav & Fav/Unfav & Fav/Unfav \\
\hline
Science/ & 90/8 & 48/51 & 83/13 & 52/46 & 84/12 \\
Technology & & & & & \\
\hline
Freedom/ & 53/41 & 39/60 & 57/40 & 41/56 & 39/53 \\
Democracy & & & & & \\
\hline
People & 59/29 & 28/64 & 52/39 & 39/58 & 46/35 \\
\hline
Movies/TV & 60/37 & 35/60 & 56/41 & 30/66 & 54/43 \\
\hline
Products & 73/24 & 37/59 & 61/35 & 39/57 & 63/34 \\
\hline
Education & 61/16 & 12/74 & 59/29 & 38/54 & 63/23 \\
\hline
Arabs & & & & & \\
\hline
Palestinians & & & & & \\
\hline
Policy on & 13/82 & 2/96 & 21/75 & 10/84 & 9/84 \\
Terrorism & & & & & \\
\hline
Iraq Policy & 1/98 & 1/97 & 2/78 & 4/93 & 4/91 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
In other words, they do not hate us for our values, but because of our policies.

But this chart suggests an even more worrisome development. A similar series of questions showed even more favorable opinion ratios in favor of U.S. culture and its values — in 2002. Thus it seems that in two years the Jihadi message — that strongly attacks American values — is being accepted by more moderate and non-violent Muslims. This in turn implies that negative opinion of the U.S. has not yet bottomed-out, but is in fact continuing to move dynamically. But the movement is now qualitative rather and quantitative, meaning that regular Muslims are moving from “soft opposition” toward “hard opposition.” In Saudi Arabia, a large majority believes that the U.S. seeks to “weaken” and “dominate” Islam itself — in other words, Americans have become the enemy. It is noteworthy that opinion is hardest over against America in precisely those places ruled by what Muslims call “apostates” and tyrants — the tyrants we support. This should give us pause.

Thus it is incumbent on the U.S. strategic information campaign to first find a way to address this near-unanimity of Muslim opinion hostile to the U.S.. If we want to truly demonstrate the linkage between American power and the universal values we support, and if we want to truly build a bridge between ourselves and the Muslim World, then we must first open a working channel of communication with that world, which as of now does not exist. Furthermore, if regular Muslims are indeed moving to hard “opposition” to the U.S. then we have only so much time to open such a channel before the possibility is closed for the duration of this war.

Therefore it is not enough for us to preach to Muslims, telling them that they need to show us that they believe in our values — such as tolerance and pluralism — and that they must reject the bad values of the violent Islamists. It is patently patronizing, for example, to keep bringing up Islam’s “Golden Age” as though we were scolding Muslims for some sort of civilizational backsliding. This is in fact a counter-productive approach; a non-starter. If we really want to see the Muslim World as a whole and the Arabic-
speaking World in particular, move more toward our understanding of “moderation” and “tolerance,” we must reassure Muslims that this does not mean that they must submit to the American Way. In other words, as we seek out Islamic voices that share essential beliefs with us, we must convey an important message of reassurance to them — before we can expect to usefully talk with them.

This should not be seen as an intractable enterprise. In more moderate Muslim societies like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh, there is markedly more support for the U.S. — albeit still small minorities — so we might look to realize some small initial success there. Furthermore, the wider task of strategic communication reaches beyond the exigencies of this war and the Muslim World. Arguably it is just as essential to renew European attitudes toward America — and this is surely a more straightforward task. Strategic communication is still a global mission.

The next chapter will examine means and methods that we can use towards this end.
Chapter 3 – Leveraging the Private Sector

3.1 Borrowing Private Sector and Political Campaign Best Practices

The U.S. approaches modern warfare with strategies, tactics and weapons that are cutting-edge, designed to be effective against modern foes and constantly upgraded. By contrast, our current strategic communication planning and execution is mired in diplomatic and marketing yesteryear. We have no clearly defined strategic framework, themes or messages. And we try to use the advantages of the incumbent and the tactics of mass marketing. Yet those advantages have diminished greatly in the past several years; and those tactics no longer work even in private sector marketing.

Put simply, winning the global struggle for ideas requires waging a much more effective strategic communication effort here and abroad. There is widespread agreement on this point. To do this, however, we must give up the assumed advantages of the “incumbent” and trade them for the real edge of the “insurgent” in the information age. Building an insurgent global strategic communication culture that borrows the most effective private sector marketing and political campaign techniques will be at the core of rebuilding and reinventing the way the U.S. listens, engages, and communicates with the world.

Consider, for example, the new environment in which the U.S. Government, political leaders and businesses must today communicate:

- Information moves increasingly farther and faster than ever before.
- Most individuals have almost infinite choice of information sources.
- Changes in perceptions and attitudes, according to political and marketing polls, are taking place more and more quickly in more and more places.
- The “change state” is the constant state in politics and business today.

As a result, it’s a very, very difficult time for “incumbents” in politics and business, here in the U.S. and around the world. For example:
"Incumbents" tend today to be bloated, slow, cautious, bureaucratic, change-resistant and more likely to play “defense” than “offense” to maintain power.

"Insurgents” invariably harbor today an attitude of difference, move faster and welcome change as opportunity. There modus operandi: mobile and agile.”

In past decades, business and governmental incumbents—for example, a superpower or a leading global brand—had dominant control of the global dialogue as a result of superior resources and access to communications channels. Through the peak of mass marketing in the latter part of the 20th century, this domination of private sector mass communications resources literally developed the power of Western popular culture and the growth of global brands.

But the same factors that added to the power of the incumbent leaders and brands also provided opportunity for insurgent movements and insurgent companies—for fresh, cutting-edge and sharply differentiated competitors. Today, as a result of the global Information Revolution, private sector mass marketing is losing its relative power. And the incumbent advantage for political and business leaders is being lost with it.

Interestingly, in the private sector, it is not simply that incumbents have lost effectiveness in communicating. Insurgents have gained advantage at the same time—and have developed a new set of communications rules to help push that advantage. That’s why, in the private and campaign management sectors, insurgent political movements and insurgent brands are creating most of the energy and innovation in all parts of the world today.

This is true, for example, in U.S. commercial marketplaces. Numerous insurgent companies and marketers have fought their way to the top of markets to challenge the leader brands by using a new set of communications and marketing rules. Moreover, the same is true in global politics and U.S. foreign policy. Having faced an enemy for more

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than half a century that aligned its forces of mass against the U.S., we now face an enemy of tiny proportions and relatively meager resources, but clearly in control of the political dialogue in the war on terror. Objective observers say that Al Qaeda constantly outflanks the U.S. in the war of information.

The argument of this report, then, is that this dynamic must be changed. In essence, this means the U.S. must adopt the strategies and tactics of the insurgent, not the incumbent: waging a proactive, bold and effective U.S. strategic communication effort.

How best can the U.S. Government begin to drive this kind of culture change: moving from an incumbent to an insurgent strategic and tactical mindset in the way it communicates? And what best practices can the U.S. Government borrow from its private and campaign management sectors? Three overall answers:

(1) As in a successful political campaign, the U.S. must clearly define what success means in terms of its benefits for all of our target audiences. All these constituents must understand what success means for them in personal terms. And a carefully defined set of themes and messages must reinforce targeted audiences’ perceived and personal benefits.

(2) We must communicate what our definition for the future promises on individual terms, not national or pan-national religious terms. We should personalize the benefits of our defined future: For example, personal control, choice and change, personal mobility, meritocracy, individual rights (and, particularly, women’s rights). And we must draw a stark difference between support and opposition along these personal lines.

(3) As with the most effective private sector and political marketing campaigns, we must understand what constituents must be moved to achieve success. And we must understand what it will take to move them. More importantly, though, we must target those constituents who can be moved—practically and strategically picking our target audience. We must adopt the practical principle of “do the doable”; otherwise we waste
our strategic communication resources on impossible goals, demoralize our allies and energize our enemies.

The U.S. Government should target those who support, or are likely to support, our views based on their own culture, traditions and attitudes about such things as personal control, choice and change. Private sector best practices define this as the “hard support” and “soft support” in a marketplace and they are not only the likeliest to move in the U.S. Government’s direction, but they’re also the likeliest to move others. Both their behavior and viral communications form the most powerful and credible medium for attitudinal change. Specifically, for example, we believe the most “movable” targets will be the so-called secularists of the Muslim world: Business people, scientists, non-religious educators, politicians or public administrators, musicians, artists, poets, writers, journalists, actors and their audiences and admirers.

3.2 Implications of Adapting Private Sector and Political Campaign Best Practices

The current state of U.S. public diplomacy itself has become so stigmatized that it literally must re-invent itself. Given the generational national security damage that has accrued, a re-focused and transformed U.S. public diplomacy—we call it “strategic communication”—must be launched. Specifically, success in “strategic communication” necessarily involves institutional culture change and the selective borrowing of private sector best practices.

For example, this new strategic communication function must be more comprehensive, substantive, locally agile and below the radar than public diplomacy today. Moreover, realistic expectations must be set: It will take decades to counter extremist terrorist recruiters and fully restore U.S. global standing and credibility.
Drawing on the insurgent culture change and private sector best practices discussed above, the following steps will be necessary to transform U.S. strategic communication:32

- Acknowledge the state and national security implications of public diplomacy in crisis. The first step to any solution is recognition of a problem. And this recognition needs to occur at the highest, and ultimately widest, levels of the U.S. Government.
- Recognize that the solution lies in transforming this strategic communication function—even launching, as per the private sector, effective “change leadership” from within the U.S. Government. Just as the most successful private sector leaders pull their respective companies through culture change to continually make them more strategic, bold and insurgent, so must we drive culture change efforts throughout the U.S. Government’s new strategic communication function. Recruiting, training and motivating the next bold and cutting-edge generation of strategic communication officials will be critical to long-term success.
- Define a future vision, measurable objectives, a strategic framework and key themes and messages. A transformed U.S. strategic communications function must frame its definition of future success and formulate a core strategy to drive all tactical efforts toward achieving this success. Moreover, strategic communication efforts must reinforce key themes and messages and constantly be measured against defined objectives. As a result, adjustments must be made and those responsible for implementation held accountable.
- Search-out ways to promote a more robust dialogue within Islam. For example, as described below, a far more sophisticated attitudinal segmentation model must be built that targets “soft support” and “undecided”—and focuses on moving them to higher levels of support. For the U.S., where possible, helping forces within Islam drive a wedge between moderates and extremists is a top strategic priority.
- Mobilize greater private sector initiatives that contain a built-in agility, credibility and even deniability that will be missing from government-sponsored initiatives. One thing is clear: Over coming years, the U.S. private sector’s stake in more effective

U.S. strategic communication efforts will increase. More and more, they will be looking for channels to contribute where they can.

### 3.3 Implementation Examples

The argument of this study is that the U.S. Government must take a dramatically more disciplined, methodical and strategic approach to global communication. This, we believe, means selectively borrowing private sector best practices and creating a range of insurgent U.S. strategic communication vehicles, programs and products as detailed below. They are based, for example, on the following approaches:

**Analyze Perceptions:** Utilizing cutting-edge research and political-strategic methodologies to better understand global perceptions toward the U.S., including American values and policies.

**Formulate Key Objectives and Strategies:** One reason the U.S. has had difficulty managing the post-war occupation of Iraq is a near total confusion over objectives and strategies. The definition of post-war success has never been enunciated clearly. Similarly, in terms of U.S. strategic communication, a critical step in planning will be to detail exactly the destination toward which we must head. Put simply, the new strategic communication planning function must define what success looks like. And it must formulate a comprehensive strategic framework to achieve it.

For example, as with the private sector, it is important for the U.S. Government’s new strategic communication function to develop an understanding of the U.S. “brand” positioning and strategy. In this sense, the word “brand” simply means a conceptual system to guide and navigate our constituents to an understanding of the meaning and essence of the U.S., including its values, interests and policies.
More specifically, strategic communication planning should very selectively borrow private sector best practices and begin to maximize the U.S. “brand” positioning in its five key dimensions:

**Presence**: How will we develop awareness of the U.S. “brand” in terms of its constituents and audience?

**Relevance**: How will the U.S. define the role of its “brand” in terms of the needs and wants of key target audiences?

**Differentiation**: How will the U.S. distinguish its “brand”? While the U.S. Government clearly shares respect for human dignity and other values with many nations, there are attributes that set us apart and are especially admirable and inspirational to others.

**Credibility**: How will the U.S. ensure that its “brand” fulfills its promises and delivers on defined expectations?

**Imagery**: What images, icons and symbolic elements will help communicate and enrich this “brand” meaning?

**Determine Targets**: Identifying audience targets that are “winnable” in terms of increased U.S. support will be critical to successful strategic communication. For example, this means borrowing from campaign and private sector methodologies and conducting political-style attitudinal research: identifying, as the highest priority, “soft support” targets. The best private sector marketing and political campaign management use the attitudinal continuum below to organize, maximize and focus communication resources. And this approach should be utilized to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. strategic communication:

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HO = The Hard Opposition: In a political campaign, for example, these individuals will come out and vote against you in any circumstances. Of course, political campaigns do not want to waste a penny chasing their “un-gettable” votes, but they must also be ready to counter their negative effect on other voters. In elections, as in product marketing campaigns, these are the activists who form-up against you.

SO = The Soft Opposition: In a political campaign, these individuals support your opponent, or prefer in marketing a competitive brand, but they might not vote, for example, in bad weather. In an election campaign, you try not to raise issues that will enflame soft opposition to vote. And in product or service marketing, you realize these consumers can be moved … eventually. But you never target to their wants and needs directly; that will take the focus off much more productive targets.

The UNDECIDED: Typically, a political campaign will do virtually anything to move the undecided before Election Day; after all, it needs whatever it takes to get to 50.1%. The 2000 U.S. Presidential election proved this. After hundreds of millions were spend through primaries and the general election, more millions were poured into the legal arguments that would decide the election. Campaigns will buy any vote they can. They’ll run negative advertising. They’ll rent fleets of vans to drive hard supporters to the polls. The votes of the undecided can move at any time and change in a light breeze.

SOS = Soft Support: Constituents who are leaning your way and who, research tells us, are six times less expensive to move to hard support as undecided are to move to soft support. To win, you must engage and activate this segment to vote—or in consumer terms to come back and buy your product again. Identifying, targeting and moving soft support to hard support is the highest priority of any U.S. strategic communications effort.
HAS = Hard Support: Extremely loyal constituents who must not be taken for granted, but who ultimately are critical to success in political campaigns or marketing. This is your loyal support. And you must, in campaign terms, hold these constituents until Election Day and motivate them to help pull the soft support to hard support.

Develop Themes and Messages: Based on the research referenced above—and specifically focusing on moving soft support constituents to hard support. A strategically formulated, focused and consistent set of themes and messages is a prerequisite for the success of a transformed strategic communication effort. These key themes and messages should, for example, communicate:

- **Respect for human dignity and individual rights**
- **Individual education and economic opportunity**
- **Personal freedom, safety and mobility**

Identify Key Products and Programs: Again utilizing research, the new U.S. strategic communication effort must reach audience targets through a customized and even personalized dialogue that is relevant and credible to those targets. This will involve an array of products and programs:

Conduct Audience Polling and Analysis: Including ethnographic, psychographic, demographic, behavioral and tracking research. As with a successful political or marketing campaign, the reality is you simply cannot know too much about your audience and their perceptions. For example, using hypothesis-testing methodologies in qualitative focus groups and quantitative benchmark research is a critical prerequisite for strategic communication success.

Undertake Cultural Analysis: Including cultural factors involving values, religion, entertainment and education. Strategic communication must adopt a wide and incisive analytical view of how its audiences are continually influenced.
**Conduct Media Analysis:** Identifying daily influences on audiences including content analysis, agenda and biases, relevance and credibility, structure and control.

**Communicate to Target Audiences:** Identifying and organizing key targets based on the above attitudinal continuum, demographics and other attributes. For example, this should include lists of influential “opinion leaders” country by country. And this should include a “friends and family” database of soft supporters and hard supporters who “self-select” themselves and are constantly engaged in a personal, relevant and credible dialogue.

**Deploy Strategic Communication Teams:** Not unlike the Peace Corps, we should recruit a wave of former USIA and public diplomacy officials and next generation representatives from various private, non-profit, academic and entertainment sectors to articulate American values. These representatives must be talented, well-trained and strategically mobilized; and, importantly, their actions must communicate more loudly than their words.

**Mobilize Global Spokespeople:** Including religious, ethnic or cultural leaders and representatives from sports, entertainment, culture, literature, music, local communities, education, health care, etc. is vital. These spokespeople can be an invaluable and highly credible source of information for key foreign audiences.

**Underwrite International Products:** There is a world-wide community of expert story tellers who produce message products for television, radio, film and games. Some of their products are exquisitely sensitive to nuances of the culture of the target audience. Such products should be developed – or better – identified so that their broader distribution to the target audience can be underwritten.

**Use Interactive and Mediated Channels:** Pervasive telecommunications technology permits the cost effective engagement of target audiences in sustained two-way interactions using electronic mail, interactive dialogue, virtual communication, interactive video games, and interactive Internet games. Similarly, this technology
supports ad hoc group interactions using blogs and chat rooms. Mediated interactions involve an individual who orchestrated the posting of material on a web site focused on a specific issue. These new forms of engagement should be harnessed for appropriate audiences.

**Utilize Private Sector Media Techniques:** The new U.S. strategic communications effort should utilize the same media as do the private sector marketing and political campaigns. Their deployments tactics should be adapted to government needs. Channels include classic broadcast media such as television, film, newspaper, radio, periodicals and e-magazines. Interactive channels, as described above, permit a sustained conversation. Country by country, target audience by target audience, the most credible channels and the most promising techniques need to be identified and used to deliver appropriate messages.

**Bolster Exchanges:** From 1993 to 2001, overall funding for the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs fell more than 33 percent—and exchanges in societies with significant Muslim populations has declined. This must change. Increased, expanded and targeted exchange programs must be significantly ramped-up under the new strategic communication function.

**Facilitate Events and Meetings:** For example, a series of locally sponsored initiatives to counter Islamic jihadism should be launched within the Muslim world. Examples include economic development conferences, seminars discussing political openness and formation of a pan-Islamic council of respected spiritual and secular leaders to coordinate the Islamic world’s own ideological battle against extremism and terrorism.

**Bolster U.S. Recruitment and Training:** While progress has been made in upgrading recruiting and training, it is only a beginning. Strategic communications must be infused with new blood: A concerted communications effort must be planned and launched to attract a next generation of cutting-edge, risk-friendly, private sector talent. And this
talent must be hired, trained, prepared, groomed, motivated, and promoted to communicate with an insurgent-like efficiency and effectiveness.

**Partner with Private Sector:** U.S. strategic communication efforts must be synergized by the public sector. The bottom line: Government alone cannot today communicate credibly and effectively to foreign populations. It must be assisted by adjunct private sector efforts.

**Use Feedback to Monitor Success:** Critical to the success of a new strategic communication effort will be creating a culture of measurement that helps the U.S. make necessary adjustments and learn from both past and present efforts and initiatives. This feedback loop must continually foster accountability and measure success against selected objectives—looping up to the highest levels of the new strategic communication function.

Specifically, as in the private sector, this monitoring and feedback system must measure progress against the ten strategic communication objectives below. Cutting edge private sector measurement, models and management systems, both qualitative and quantitative, should be applied to calibrate progress against the following:

- WHAT do we want to communicate?
- WHY exactly do we want to communicate this?
- WHAT do we want this to actually do?
- WHO are we trying to reach?
- WHAT do we want them to remember?
- WHAT attitude or behavior do we expect?
- WHEN will this be done?
- HOW much will it cost?
- WHAT exact results do we anticipate?
- HOW will we measure success?
Chapter 4 – Strategic Communication: Direction, Coordination, Support, and Execution

4.1 Linking Purpose to Process

Presidential efforts to plan and coordinate U.S. strategic communication since World War II have employed White House and cabinet department models. Presidents typically have used the NSC or the Department of State. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Neither has been consistently successful.

The NSC’s Presidential imprimatur gives it more clout with line departments and agencies. The NSC “thinks” in interagency terms, and it is more suited to dealing with civilian/military and inter-agency rivalries. On the other hand, the NSC is susceptible to the pressures of election cycles. Its staff has less continuity. The NSC normally is not operational, and it has weak tasking authority. The NSC’s strategic communication senior advisors and policy planning committees come and go. Two Presidential directives, often cited as models to emulate (PDD 68, President Clinton; NSDD 77, President Reagan), contained elegant formal authorities but proved weak in sustained impact.34

Cabinet departments in contrast have more continuity, operating budgets, and contract authority. On balance they are less susceptible to the demands of election cycles. However, cabinet departments properly advance their own interests and tend not to “think” in interagency terms. The State Department delegates interagency strategic communication coordination to an Under Secretary with minimal planning and staff support at the bureau level. Under Secretaries rarely advise Presidents directly and are

34 The bipartisan Presidentially-appointed U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy in its 1989 report concluded: “The elaborate public diplomacy coordinating mechanism established by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 77) in 1982 has not worked well. The Senior Planning Group (SPG), chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and its four subordinate committees have met infrequently and have not played the role expected of them” (p. 27). The Advisory Commission’s conclusion applies equally to PDD 68 on International Public Information signed by President Clinton in 1999 and the Strategic Communication PCC created by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in 2002.
much less suited to dealing with interagency turf battles than the NSC. State occasionally has planned and coordinated strategic communication well on single issues (e.g., during the 1991 Persian Gulf war), but it has failed to do so successfully on a consistent basis when it has had the responsibility.

The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was an independent executive branch agency from 1953 until it was merged with the Department of State in 1999. USIA’s core competencies were information dissemination and managing educational and cultural exchanges overseas. Until the Broadcasting Act of 1994, U.S. international broadcasting services were independent grantees (RFE/RL) and linked organizationally, albeit tenuously, to USIA (Voice of America). USIA was flexible and responsive. USIA’s mission and critical mass gave it a level of strength in the execution of public diplomacy that so far has eluded the Department of State.

USIA seldom developed communications strategies or coordinated interagency activities at the strategic level, however, despite statutory advisory responsibilities. USIA’s Directors by law reported directly to and served as the “principal advisor to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of State.” USIA’s Directors by law reported directly to and served as the “principal advisor to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of State.” Some USIA directors were invited occasionally to attend NSC meetings; some were not. The degree of participation depended almost always on personal relations between a President and a Director. Only rarely did it demonstrate appreciation of the value of understanding public opinion, other cultures, and communication strategies in making and implementing foreign policy.

For sixty years strategic communication planning and coordination has been ephemeral and usually treated with indifference. The United States can no longer afford a repetitious pattern of hollow authorities, ineffectual committees, and stifling turf battles in strategic communication. The White House Office of Global Communications and a NSC PCC now have formal authorities relating to strategic communication coordination.

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35 Section 2, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977. The USIA Director’s legal authority as “statutory advisor” was contained in the Agency’s enabling legislation. USIA’s advisory role was analogous, at least formally, with the advisory authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided in the National Security Act of 1947. For example, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.” 10 U.S.C. 141(b).
Their practical influence is marginal at best, non-existent at worst. Their authorities should be rescinded. Given ample evidence that traditional NSC and cabinet models have not worked, these entities should be replaced with new structures grounded in legislation that address 21st century realities.

America needs a revolution in strategic communication rooted in:

- Presidential direction reinforced and made permanent with bipartisan Congressional funding and support and the backing of cabinet secretaries and agency heads who will build strong cooperative institutional capabilities.
- Direction, planning, and coordination led by a new statutory Deputy National Security Advisor and an interagency Strategic Communication Committee.
- Support from an orchestrated blend of public and private sector components dedicated to addressing critical challenges and providing operational support through an independent non-profit and nonpartisan Center for Global Strategic Communication.

There is no such thing as a “perfect” planning and coordinating structure. The success or failure of new structures ultimately will be determined by the skill and integrity of the people involved. But substance and structure are integrally related. Good organizations can help shape good outcomes.

4.2 Presidential and NSC Direction

A unifying Presidential vision and broad bipartisan Congressional support are the critical starting points in transforming America’s strategic communication. Only Presidential direction and the focused actions of Congressional leaders can create the political will needed to build the long-term strategic communication capabilities America needs. Incremental changes to structures designed generations ago are not the answer. We need a new vision, new structures, and new Congressional authorities. Leadership from the top must drive widespread understanding that 21st century foreign and national security policies will fail unless interlinked with strategic communication.
The Task Force recommends a Presidential directive that will (1) strengthen the U.S. government's ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences; (2) coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations; and (3) provide a foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic communication.

To achieve these goals the President should establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create legislation and funding for a:

- Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication;
- Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC; and an
- Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication (described in Section 4.3 below).

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be equivalent in rank to a deputy head of a cabinet department and report to the National Security Advisor and to the NSC. The NSC Deputy for Strategic Communication would also serve as the President's principal advisor on all matters relating strategic communication. This should be a highly experienced individual with a close relationship to the President, superb political communication skills, the stature to work at the highest levels of government, sensitivity to the cultures of civilian and military departments of government, and strong ties to the private sector.

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of
the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

The Strategic Communication Committee (SCC) should be given the strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation authorities that now exist in Executive Order 13283 establishing the White House Office of Global Communications and the NSC Memorandum of September 10, 2002 establishing the NSC’s Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, the new Strategic Communication Committee also should have authority to plan the work of line agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations. The SCC should assign operational responsibilities, but not direct execution. It should provide program and project direction to the new Center for Strategic Communication.

The Deputy National Security Advisor should have the right to concur in the choices of personnel leading operating entities in the SCC’s departments and agencies including the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for Strategic Communication, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and the Chair of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The Deputy National Security Advisor also should work with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in developing strategic communication budget priorities.

Most of today’s strategic communication instruments were constructed during and after World War II. Missions and interagency coordinating structures reflect Cold War models. Just as an earlier generation of Americans created new ways to meet the national security challenges of the 1940s and 1950s, we must make changes on a similar scale today, and we must ground these changes in legislation.
Recommendation 1

The Task Force recommends that the President issue a directive to (1) strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to understand global public opinion, advise on the strategic implications of policymaking, and communicate with global audiences; (2) coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations; and (3) provide a foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic communication.

Recommendation 2

The Task Force recommends that the President should establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create legislation and funding for a:

- Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication,
- Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC, and an
- Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should chair a Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the equivalent of under secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs; and military information operations; concur in strategic communication personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide program and project direction to the new Center for Strategic Communication.
4.3 Center for Strategic Communication

In seeking ways to enhance government-private sector collaboration in support of strategic communication, the Task Force examined roles, functions, and organizational structures. We concluded that direction, planning, and coordination is a government responsibility requiring change at the White House and NSC level. We also concluded that America’s interests would be well served by creating a Congressionally-mandated independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication (CSC).

The Center should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Rand Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. The Center should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation. The Center’s authority should enable it to provide services to government departments on a cost-recovery basis and contract with academic, commercial, and other non-government organizations.

The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic Communication Committee should provide program and project direction to the Center. The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by an independent nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center’s Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance.

The Center should be guided by three purposes:

(1) Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decision-makers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source intelligence
assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices.

(2) Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats.

(3) Support government strategic communications through services provided on a cost-recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness.

The Center would perform functions in seven critical areas:

(1) Audience polling and analysis including ethnographic, psychographic, demographic, behavioral and tracking research; hypothesis testing (e.g. focus groups); and other “listening” and assessment techniques used in political campaigns.

(2) Cultural influence analysis including values, religion, entertainment, and education.

(3) Analysis of media influences on audiences including content analysis, agendas, political/social tendencies, relevance and credibility, and media organization structure, ownership, and business models.

(4) Foster cross cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information.

(5) Sub-contract to the commercial and academic sectors for a range of products and programs that communicate strategic themes and messages to appropriate target audiences. Broad themes and messages would include respect for human dignity and
individual rights; individual education and economic opportunity; and personal freedom, safety, and mobility. Examples of products would be a children’s TV series (Arabic Sesame Street); video and interactive games; support for the distribution and production of selected foreign films; and web communications including BLOGs, chat rooms, and electronic journals. Programs might include training and exchanges of journalists, support for selected foreign television documentaries; maintenance of databases of third party validators and supporters for conferences; and the design and implementation of country and regional campaigns to support themes and messages and de-legitimize extremism and terrorism.

(6) Mobilize non-government initiatives including temporary communication teams, coalition building partnerships and deployment of language-qualified global messengers.

(7) Continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness, efficiency, and message continuity to adapt themes, products, and programs as directed by the Chair of the Strategic Communications Committee and its members.

The Center should receive core funding that supports steady state operations through a Congressional line item in the Department of State’s annual appropriation. Funds appropriated to the Center should be placed in a revolving fund in the U.S. Treasury without fiscal year limitation.

The Center’s core funding would support basic operations (staff and administration), information and analysis (polling, media research, cultural studies), maintenance of databases and skills inventories, and self-initiated projects and programs. The Task Force estimates that at least $100 million would be necessary to sustain the Center’s core mission and operations. An additional $150 million is recommended for projects and programs the Center would develop through contracts with the commercial and academic sectors as directed NSC’s Deputy Advisor for Strategic Communication. Additional funding for projects and programs would be provided through contracts and task orders from the Strategic Communication Committee’s departments and agencies.
The Center’s success will depend on its ability to serve as a central source of independent, objective expertise safeguarded from special pleadings of organizational interests. Structures and methods that are agile, adaptable, and cutting edge; that are multi-disciplinary and fuse capabilities from a variety of sources; that respect past gains as they lay a strong foundation for the future. Regular critical feedback to key decision-makers based on polling and research, and longer term independent analyses that help refocus and reassess policy and strategic communication initiatives will be essential.

**Recommendation 3**

The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations represented on its Strategic Communication Committee. The Center should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Rand Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual appropriation approved by Congress as part of the Department of State budget. The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the Strategic Communication Committee should provide program and project direction to the Center. The Center for Strategic Communication should be governed by an independent nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex officio member of the Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center’s Director and ensure mission coherence and quality of performance.

The Center should be guided by three purposes:

(1) Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and military decision-makers on issues vital to U.S. national security including global public opinion; the role
of culture, values, and religion in shaping human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences, information technologies, the implications of all source intelligence assessments, and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices.

(2) Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security threats.

(3) Support government strategic communications through services provided on a cost-recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term assignments, deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness.

4.4 Department of State — Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy in the Department of State is carried out by the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary, officials and diplomats throughout the Department, American ambassadors, and officers in U.S. embassies around the world. In today’s world, public diplomacy is not only the core function of a few specialists. It should be in the position description of every Department of State officer engaged in the conduct of diplomacy.

Organizationally, public diplomacy is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Bureaus of International Information Programs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, and Public Affairs; public diplomacy offices in State’s regional and functional bureaus, the Office of Foreign Opinion Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and all U.S. missions abroad. In 1999, the U.S. Information Agency was abolished. Its functions, other than international broadcasting, were distributed among these State Department elements.
U.S. international broadcasting services including the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio/TV Marti were placed under an independent federal entity, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The BBG also directs Radio Sawa and the Al Hurra satellite TV channel, two new U.S. Arabic language services, and Radio Farda, a Persian language service broadcasting primarily to Iran.

Together the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors spend approximately $1.2 billion annually on public diplomacy programs. The State Department’s public diplomacy budget totaled an estimated $628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, $320 million, is spent on Fulbright Scholarships and other educational and cultural exchange programs. Of the remaining 49 percent, approximately $240 million is spent on embassy public diplomacy activities managed by the Department’s regional bureaus and approximately $70 million funds the Bureau of International Information Programs and related activities including opinion and media research ($6 million). The Broadcasting Board of Governors budget for fiscal year 2004 is somewhat in excess of $600 million with recent funding initiatives for Radio Sawa, Al Hurra, and Radio Farda.36

More than fifteen studies since 9/11 have proposed major changes in the State Department’s conduct of public diplomacy. In addition to these studies and this Task Force report, the Department’s Inspector General has drafted reports recommending changes in the Department’s Bureaus of International Information Programs and Education and Cultural Affairs. The General Accountability Office is conducting a study of interagency coordination of public diplomacy. Recommendations in the 9/11 Commission’s report address public diplomacy, U.S. international broadcasting, and “the struggle of ideas” in the conflict against Islamist terrorism.

Public diplomacy clearly falls far short of its potential usefulness and needs to be strengthened. The Task Force has identified five areas in which re-evaluation and action is needed in the Department of State’s conduct of public diplomacy.

**Redefine the role and responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.** The role of the Under Secretary must reflect the reality that public diplomacy is a function of both policy formulation and policy implementation. Today, neither function is adequately served. The Under Secretary must have a mandate to act as:

- Advisor to the Secretary of State, the Department, and Chiefs of Mission on the public diplomacy implications of foreign policy,
- Manager for public diplomacy within the Department of State, and
- The Secretary’s principal representative on the U.S. government’s highest level interagency strategic communication direction and planning body.

To fulfill this mandate, the Under Secretary must have adequate staff and resources for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation. Unlike other Under Secretary positions in the Department of State, the unique advisory and program characteristics of public diplomacy require that the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs have the capability to manage and oversee worldwide public diplomacy programs and operations.

The Department’s decision in the summer of 2004 to create a strategic communication planning and resource management staff within the Office of the Undersecretary is an overdue step in the right direction. This staff should be strengthened to ensure the Under Secretary is equipped to give timely policy advice, effective program direction, and comprehensive program evaluation. Currently this staff can provide support for the NSC’s Muslim outreach coordinating committee and the fusion teams that act as a clearinghouse for military and other sources of information for the public diplomacy community and a point of contact for resources for all public diplomacy products. This staff is well positioned also to assist the Under Secretary in developing task orders for
information, analysis, and services in support of public diplomacy from the Center for Strategic Communication recommended in Section 4.3 above.

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should serve as the Department’s principal representative on the NSC Strategic Communication Committee recommended in Section 4.2 above. The Under Secretary could advise on the implications of foreign public opinion for policymaking by the NSC and its regional and functional bureaus; influence development of strategic communication goals, priorities, themes, and messages; help to create centers of action on key policy issues; and assist the NSC Deputy Advisor for Strategic Communication in providing program and project direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication.

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should direct the State Department’s foreign opinion and media research activities. These activities, previously carried out by the U.S. Information Agency, are intended primarily to contribute to understanding foreign public and media opinion for policymaking and public diplomacy purposes. The Office of Foreign Opinion and Media Research, now located in the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is valued principally for its contribution to all source intelligence products. It should be located in the office of the Under Secretary. This would strengthen the Under Secretary’s representations on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Committee, as well as their ability to foster mutually reinforcing opinion and media research activities with the private sector and other government agencies including the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the BBG, and the DOD. Funds for the State Department’s foreign opinion and media research activities should be tripled.

Congress and the Department of State should strengthen the status, functions, and funding of the Bureau of International Information Programs. Congress should provide legal authority for the Bureau to be directed by a Presidentially-appointed Assistant Secretary of State. This would constitute overdue recognition of the Bureau’s increasingly important public diplomacy functions and give it standing equivalent to the
other Bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary – the Bureaus of Public Affairs and Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Department should modernize and consolidate its international information functions – e.g., website management, radio and TV broadcasting, library management and reference services. It has been a decade since this experimental “I Bureau” was created in the former USIA. It is time for a thorough reexamination of how the Bureau can best serve U.S. interests in a rapidly changing information environment. The Under Secretary should reinforce its effectiveness through a top-down review of its functions, technologies, methods, management structures, and program evaluation capabilities.

Ensure that all foreign policy initiatives have a public diplomacy component. All major foreign policy directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. A principal goal in merging USIA into the Department was integrating public diplomacy into policy making and policy implementation processes. Some progress has been made. However, substantial changes in the Department’s organizational culture are still necessary. Policymakers should be much more conscious of public diplomacy’s value to effective policies. In turn, public diplomacy officers should be much more informed about policies and the relevance of policy priorities to successful public diplomacy programs.

Public diplomacy considerations in the formulation of all major policies should include:

- Shaping themes and messages and choosing means of delivery to ensure that priorities are clear, overall themes are established, messages are consistent, and resources are used effectively;
- Identifying communication tools that will most effectively reach intended targets with the specific messages indicated by the policy;
- Mapping the results of public opinion polling and media analyses to specific policies and issues;
- Analyzing the potential impact of policies on public attitudes, strongly held personal convictions, and divergent interests;
• Understanding what constitutes “message authority,” the implications of cross-cultural communication, and how messages are “heard” in different cultural environments;
• Determining the nature, extent, and limitations of public influence on official decision-making in a given environment; and
• Evaluating results and providing short term and long term feedback to policymakers and public diplomacy program officers.

Redefine the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs’ relationships within the Department of State to improve public diplomacy planning and implementation. Changes in human resource policies are required to strengthen public diplomacy. The Under Secretary should concur in all senior public diplomacy assignments and review the performance ratings of all public diplomacy office directors in the Department’s geographic bureaus, public affairs officers in major embassies, and the Department’s public affairs advisors assigned to other agencies, combatant commands, and international organizations.

Performance ratings for all Chiefs of Mission and Foreign Service officers in political and economic career paths should include mandatory comment on public diplomacy skills. Within a reasonable period of time, officers promoted to the Chief of Mission and Senior Foreign Service level should have served in a public diplomacy or relevant interagency assignment. Public diplomacy officers should be assigned to responsible positions in the Secretary and Deputy Secretary’s offices, and offices of each of the Under Secretaries. This can begin immediately.

The Department should strengthen the public diplomacy offices in its geographic bureaus and their role in managing public diplomacy operations at U.S. embassies and consulates. Within the Department’s hierarchy, they would be more effective as Deputy Assistant Secretaries or senior advisors reporting directly to Assistant secretaries. These changes would raise the profile of public diplomacy in the geographic bureaus and increase public diplomacy’s influence on policy initiatives management in the field.
Triple resources (personnel and funding) for the Department of State’s public diplomacy activities (information programs, educational and cultural exchanges, embassy activities, and opinion research) and place them under the direction of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Department’s current funding for public diplomacy (approximately $600 million), is substantially less in real terms than public diplomacy budgets during the Cold War. When combined with the BBG’s international broadcasting budget (also approximately $600 million) the public diplomacy budget totals $1.2 billion. The Task Force recommends the Department’s public diplomacy funding be increased to $1.8 billion resulting in a total public diplomacy budget of $2.4 billion. In addition the BBG has requested increases in funding. The Task Force also supports increased BBG funding for web based broadcasting services and those radio and television services where research and program reviews demonstrates significant audiences for news and public affairs programming.

The 9/11 Commission, senior political leaders in both parties, and the findings of recent public diplomacy studies are in agreement on two fundamental assumptions. America is engaged in a “struggle of ideas.” Existing levels of investment in public diplomacy are not commensurate with current threats and opportunities. Funds allocated for strategic communications are anemic in contrast to what is spent by corporations and political campaigns. Public diplomacy resources (staff and funding) have eroded by more than 30 percent since 1989. More than 60 percent of the Department’s overseas missions today have only one public diplomacy officer. The Department of State should request and Congress should appropriate significant increases in public diplomacy budgets. Within the Department all public diplomacy resources should be under the control of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Core funding for the Center for Strategic Communication should be appropriated within the budget of the Department of State. As a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation, most of the Center’s project and program funds will flow from cost recovery contracts and task orders from the U.S. government agencies who are members of the Strategic
Communication Committee. However, the Congress should appropriate funding to the Department of State to enable the Department to provide an annual grant to the Center for its core operations.

There are existing models for this in public diplomacy. Funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, a nonprofit corporation, derives from an annual grant based on appropriations to the Department of State. Similarly, funding for U.S. international broadcasting’s nonprofit corporations – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Al Hurra – comes in the form of grants based on appropriations to the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Based on these findings, the Task Force makes two recommendations. The first addresses the roles and responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The second calls for changes in the Department of State’s culture, structure, and human resources policies in support for public diplomacy.

**Recommendation 4**

*The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State redefine the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. The Under Secretary should serve as the Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Committee; have adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation; direct the Department’s foreign opinion and media research activities; approve senior public diplomacy assignments; and review the performance ratings of public diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives should have a public diplomacy component approved by the Under Secretary. The Department’s current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy should be tripled from current levels and placed under the control of the Under Secretary. The Department should provide a core funding grant to the Center for Strategic Communication in the amount of an annual appropriation in the Department’s budget.*
Recommendation 5

The Task Force recommends that public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State should be at the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission positions or the Senior Foreign Service should have served at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in the Department or in an interagency assignment relevant to public diplomacy. The Bureau of International Information Programs should be directed by an Assistant Secretary.

4.5 Department of Defense Strategic Communication Responsibilities

The creation of the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) in October of 2001, and its subsequent implosion four months later, produced a bow wave of effects in the strategic communication arena. The renewed emphasis by the White House and DOD for the need to maintain a firewall between operational and tactical influence efforts (PSYOP) and broader influence efforts like Public Diplomacy (PD), produced a bifurcated interagency process. Two NSC Policy Coordination Committees on information strategy and a new White House Office of Global Communication have proven ineffective thus far in producing an NSC-approved strategic information campaign for the War on Terror.

The Secretary of Defense approved an Information Operations (IO) roadmap in October 2003 aimed at addressing perceived organizational shortfalls within the Department. Among the assigned tasks was to define “lanes in the road” regarding Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy and PSYOP. Work is under way to implement the Secretary’s guidance, but final solutions aimed at assigning responsibilities for what are often overlapping functions have not been established.

Major military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—followed in each case by a very difficult post-conflict phase—produced unprecedented demands on already undermanned and under equipped PSYOP forces. Smaller scale PSYOP programs in support of

37 In both cases, the national radio broadcasting network had been taken down; there was virtually no TV in Afghanistan and limited TV coverage in a few large cities in Iraq. The security environment in both countries prohibited rapid re-establishment of regional or national broadcasting grids, and U.S. PSYOP assets were asked to provide the bulk of Coalition capabilities for several months.
humanitarian crises in Liberia and Haiti have been carried out successfully within current resource constraints.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Public Affairs’ embedded journalist program in Iraq proved to be highly successful; and the Secretary of Defense’s frequent press conferences on Afghanistan and Iraq operations served to define the U.S. Government’s policies in those regions.

The desire within DOD for a coherent and dynamic interagency process is stronger than ever and progress has been made in important areas over the last year.

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) received a significant plus-up in fiscal year 2004 (FY04) for PSYOP and Civil Affairs; $205 million for the next five years for PSYOP forces and equipment—including a trans-regionally focused PSYOP unit—and significant increases in both reserve and active duty force authorizations for Civil Affairs. A $45 million Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is underway, focused on developing better ways to disseminate information, particularly into denied or remote areas.

Two trans-regional PSYOP initiatives have been approved and are in the initial phases of execution. These initiatives are aimed at reinforcing U.S. country teams’ ability to assist selected host nations in their struggle to identify terrorists in their region and to exercise better control over territory that is being used, or will inevitably be used, by terrorists as safe havens.

Regional web sites aimed at providing open source information supporting the U.S. Government and Coalition policies have been proposed by U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

A process has been developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff to monitor and analyze Arab broadcast media in near real time based on open

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sources and using sophisticated translation, storage and retrieval techniques. A cooperative working relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in this area provides the Deputy Secretary, Combatant Commanders, and the Department of State with a better picture of how the U.S. and its coalition partners are viewed in the Arab world.

The Information Operations (IO) Roadmap

The DOD has developed an Information Operations (IO) roadmap that identifies roles and responsibilities within the DoD. The roadmap designates PSYOP as one of five core elements of IO (which also includes military deception, computer network operations, electronic warfare and operational security). Parallel changes in DOD regulations and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) responsibilities have also occurred. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) has been designated by DOD regulation as the “Principal Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Information Operations”; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) has been designated as the lead for IO interagency coordination.

U.S. STRATCOM has been designated in the UCP as the primary supporting command for IO; U.S. SOCOM has been given the responsibility for integrating and coordinating its PSYOP assets—primarily resourced by the U.S. Army—with those of the Services to provide more effective support to the regional combatant commands.

Within USD(P), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) has retained oversight within OSD Policy for operational and tactical PSYOP planning and execution, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD ISA) has assumed responsibility for DoD support to public diplomacy in addition to primary responsibilities for policy coordination and planning for regional areas of the globe involved in countering ideological support for terrorism. These activities are led by Deputy Assistant Secretaries
(DASDs) who work with the Joint Staff (J3/J5) and the Combatant Commanders to insure that public diplomacy plans and policy oversight are consistent and are coordinated globally. A new functionally oriented DASD should be established to provide the necessary public diplomacy and PSYOP expertise to these activities and to support the ASD/ISA in representing DOD in the interagency.

The Secretary of Defense recently approved for NSC consideration a strategy for reinvigorating the Global War on Terror. That strategy includes as a significant component countering ideological support for terrorists, with emphasis on Islamic extremists. This proposal advocates increasing senior DOD level representation at key embassies and missions, and increasing senior DOS representation to combatant commands. A principal task for both would be to ensure that a Strategic Communication plan for each region is developed and incorporated into theater security cooperation guidance and made a part of theater contingency planning. Supporting commands (U.S. STRATCOM, U.S. SOCOM) would develop mechanisms to assist in such planning.

Initial actions to develop trans-regional PSYOP and other informational programs should be expanded and institutionalized at regional combatant commands and at key embassies and missions. Informal arrangements such as the Joint Staff J-3/J-5 strategic communication working group and the interagency counterpropaganda coordination panel should be combined. DOS representatives should work with combatant commands to incorporate strategic communication annexes in applicable plans. U.S. STRATCOM and U.S. SOCOM should build on capabilities represented by the Joint Information Operation Center (JIOC) and the Joint PSYOP Support Element (JPSE) to coordinate and support regional web sites and trans-regional PSYOP planning.

The Department’s current funding for PSYOP is approximately $45 million annually. The level of funding by Combatant Commanders for military-to-military exchanges and public diplomacy programs and coordination activities within the regions of responsibility are hard to estimate. An educated estimate would put the funding level at no more than $75 million for the aggregate across all Combatant Commanders. The Task
Force believes that funding for public diplomacy programs and military exchanges should be tripled. There are plans to increase funding for PSYOP activities and the Task Force supports increased funding to expand activities associated with web based interactive services that are targeted to specific audiences.

The Department should become over time a primary user of the proposed independent Center for Strategic Communication. DOD would bring valuable expertise to its work; and important support for combatant commands in areas such as media mapping, sophisticated measurements of message effectiveness and prototype products for testing and distribution in key geographic regions could result.

In sum, there is much to be gained by the Department preparing, on a priority basis, to act as a full and essential partner in the reconstruction of a capable and effective U.S. Government process for re-capturing the strategic information high ground.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations are aimed at furthering internal DOD efforts at organizing for more effective support to both the interagency and combatant commanders.

**Recommendation 6**

*The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee. The Under Secretary for Policy should coordinate strategic communication activities with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should extend the role and responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to act as the Department’s focal point for DoD support of public diplomacy and create a new Deputy Assistant Secretary to coordinate all activities associated with support for*
public diplomacy; and provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation.

**Recommendation 7**

*The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. STRATCOM’s and U.S. SOCOM’s Information Operations responsibilities to include DoD support for public diplomacy. The Department should triple current resources (personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DoD support to public diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM for expanded support for strategic communication programs.*

**4.6 Recommendations Impact**

If we adopt the recommendations of this Task Force and those of the 9/11 Commission and other study groups, will they make a significant difference? No one can say for sure. But we cannot succeed if we tinker at the margins. Given the enormous challenges we face, we can succeed only if we use all the instruments of national power.

America's response in the early days of the Cold War is instructive for 21st century strategic communication. There are of course substantial differences. Conflict between two superpower states with large armies and nuclear weapons -- and competing ideological claims within a shared Enlightenment tradition -- is vastly different from conflict in which terrorism by extremist networks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fissures within societies are critical threats in a globalizing world. Disseminating scarce information to closed societies was central during the Cold War. Today, there are few closed societies. Satellite TV, the Internet, computers, and cell phones mean political struggles are about gaining attention and maintaining credibility.

But there are similarities and lessons.
First, the challenges and what we must do about them are comparable in scale. Until now Americans could build information instruments in wartime and allow them to rust when the war was over. We did so after WWI and WWII, and again after the Cold War. Fifty years ago, we developed imaginative new approaches to embassy and military information services, to cross cultural exchanges of people and ideas, and to international broadcasting. Today on a scale not seen since the 1940s we are shaping new approaches to intelligence, military force structures, nation-building, and homeland security. We must devote comparable creativity and energy to strategic communication. The 9/11 Commission and other voices agree. We can't get the job done with intelligence and military force alone.

Second, we understood then that actions are the most credible form of communication. The Marshall Plan sparked imaginations around the world. The Berlin airlift brought supplies to the citizens of West Berlin and hope to millions. Ditto aid to Greece and Turkey. U.S. civilian and military information agencies were needed to draw worldwide attention to these efforts. But their messages were persuasive because they were associated with actions and values that were attractive. What we were doing was seen as legitimate and having moral authority. This is just as important today.

Third, those who shaped overseas information and cultural activities believed the challenges required an American response, not just a government response. It was not a task for diplomats and military commanders only. Writers, film directors, scholars, journalists, poets, playwrights, librarians, scientists, foundation executives, business leaders, and labor leaders became involved directly through temporary service in government and indirectly through exchanges and other means. Organizational arrangements in the 21st century will be different; the need for robust public-private partnership is the same.

Tensions and turf struggles were a reality among lawmakers, policymakers, and bureaucrats then, as they are today. Yet the nation developed the political will for efforts
that over two generations played a critical role in ending the Cold War. We cannot succeed again without comparable vision and commitment.
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference -- Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force addressing the Transition to and from Hostilities.

Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursion in the global war on terrorism. We may need to support an ally under attack by terrorists determined to replace the legitimate government; we may need to effect change in the governance of a country that is blatantly sustaining support for terrorism; or we may need to assist an ally who is unable to govern areas of their own country -- where terrorists may recruit, train and plan without interference by the legitimate government.

Our armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory. However, we have learned that sustainment of military success must be accompanied by concomitant location of enemy leaders, location of weapons including WMD, interruption of terrorist's finances, and interdiction of couriers providing communication so as to truly progress in the global war on terrorism. These latter challenges cannot be ensured during hostilities unless there has been effective intelligence preparation of the battlefield in the years -- not weeks or months -- preceding hostilities.

Furthermore, we have and will encounter significant challenges following conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights and a productive economy. Achieving these ends would be facilitated by successfully shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities.

To enhance the effectiveness across this spectrum of pre- and post-conflict issues, the 2004 Summer Study shall focus on the following issues:

1. Understanding and shaping the environment: The gathering of long-lead intelligence and effective preparation of the battlefield — in the absence of an immediate threat — requires diligence, foresight and preparation.
5. Stabilizing the civilian population: There will be an inevitable need to address problems of refugees and displaced persons, mortuary assistance, food supply, housing and health care. DoD will likely be charged with these challenges: what preparation, training and technology can be applied to facilitate these elements of infrastructure?

6. Re-establishing the rule of law: One important step in establishing order is the need to reconstitute a constabulary force. Improvements are needed in our methods for vetting applicants, tracking them and their behavior, and avoiding friendly fire incidents between them and our own forces. Improved technologies are desirable for their selection, training, and interoperability with US forces.

Furthermore, the use of precision munitions results in much less damage to the enemy's military infrastructure and armed forces. Therefore, the post-hostility phase will likely face large numbers of motivated individuals with military training who view the US as an enemy. Are there techniques and technologies which can identify those who will or will not present an insurgency threat in the post-hostilities phase? Can something be done in the pre-hostility phase which will minimize or even eliminate post-hostility phase insurgency and terrorism problems?

7. Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure: This requires reliable communications and interim power and potable water sources. How rapidly can these be inserted? Might there be opportunity for establishing subsequent monitoring capabilities?

After the initial effort, it is critical to put in place the infrastructure, economic enablers, and a political/legal structure to establish a successful post-war economy, a representative and democratic government, and a stable social structure. What can and should DoD do to further these goals? What other agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should be involved? How should DoD work with them?

In responding to the above challenges, it must be recognized that transitioning to and from hostilities requires such a wide range of capabilities that many are not integral to DoD. It is important to manage the transitions in such a way that those capabilities are exploited fully despite organizational boundaries. Sound capability management requires DoD to identify those capabilities resident within other US government agencies, those inherent within DoD and those needing development by the DoD or others. Where the capabilities are external to DoD, provision for their transfer to DoD control if appropriate should be pre-arranged and tested in joint exercises.
Long-lead intelligence preparation of the battlefield will involve terrestrial sensing, tagging and tracking in concert with HUMINT, SIGINT, and open sources; and the application of sophisticated means of data tracking in cyberspace. Are there gaps in our technology? How can we assess our “intelligence readiness,” as we now assess our military readiness, in selected regions where hostilities may occur?

Shaping is extremely complicated, requires significant cultural understanding and a long attention span, well in advance of hostilities.

- The handoff from long-term shaping efforts to shorter term Department of Defense (DoD) interests can significantly impact the intensity of hostilities and its aftermath.

- Likewise, the post-hostility environment is likely to be affected significantly by details of the war prosecution such as collateral damage and treatment of combatants and civilians alike.

- How can our capabilities in shaping, language and cultural understanding be enhanced by technology?

2. **Force protection during transition:** Increasingly, US military forces rely more on speed and mobility than hardening to achieve their objective. In the transition to the post hostilities phase, forces become much more stationary, and become easier targets for residual resistance. What technologies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures can provide force protection during transformation from maneuver warfare to peace keeping operations such as a garrison force charged with establishing order?

3. **Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks:** The deposed regime may leave behind many dangerous devices; e.g., conventional munitions and WMD, and other legacies. What capabilities are needed to address disposal, as well as environmental and security issues associated with these unwanted devices?

4. **Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath:** Rapid, decisive battlefield victory can produce a rich vein of captured documents, materiel, and human sources, but their exploitation, today, is personnel-intensive and requires good language skills coupled with substantive and cultural understanding. What approaches can more swiftly and economically process said collection?
Appendix A: Summer Study Terms of Reference (continued)

This study will be sponsored by the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Additional support will be provided by the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). Dr. Craig Fields and Mr. Phil Odeen will serve as Co-Chairmen. Dr. Jerry McGinn and Mr. R.C. Porter will serve as Co-Executive Secretaries. LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the “Federal Advisory Committee Act,” and DoD Directive 5105.4, the “DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program.” It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any “particular matters” within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as procurement official.

[Signature]
Appendix B: Strategic Communication Task Force Membership

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<th><strong>Chairman</strong></th>
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<td>University of Virginia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Bran Ferren</td>
<td>Applied Minds, Inc.</td>
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<td>Mr. Bruce Gregory</td>
<td>George Washington University</td>
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<td>Mr. Dan Kuehl</td>
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<td>Dr. Joe Markowitz</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. David Morey</td>
<td>DMG, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Nesbit</td>
<td>The Mitre Corporation</td>
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<td>Dr. Michael Vlahos</td>
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<td>Mr. Chris Lamb</td>
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<td>Mr. John Matheny</td>
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<td>Mr. Lloyd Neighbors</td>
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<td>Mr. William Parker</td>
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<td>Mr. Robert Reilly</td>
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<td>Ms. Nicole Coene</td>
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<td>LtCol David Robertson</td>
<td>DSB</td>
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Appendix C: Briefings Received by the Task Force

March 31 – April 1, 2004
Dr. Barry Fulton, Public Diplomacy Institute and Research Professor, GWU
Mr. Paul Hanley, Strategic Communications, Office of the CJCS
Mr. Jeff Jones, NSC
Mr. Rob Tappan, Strategic Communications, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq
Mr. Jim Wilkinson, Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications

April 20 – April 21, 2004
Ms. Mary Catherine Andrews, White House Office of Global Communications
Mr. Jeremy Curtin, Department of State
Mr. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P))
Mr. Peter Kovach, Department of State
Mr. Lloyd Neighbors, Department of State
Mr. Tom O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense, (SO/LIC)
Mr. Steve Schaffer, Department of State
Mr. Frank Ward, Department of State
Ms. Betsy Whitaker, Department of State
Mr. Sam Wunder, Department of State

May 19 – 20, 2004
Mr. Dan Kuehl, National Defense University
Mr. James Farwell, DOD (SO/LIC)
Mr. Mouafac Harb, Al Hurra Network
Mr. Mark Helmke, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Mr. David Morey, DMG, Inc.
Mr. Joe Norris, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Dr. Marc Sageman, Private Practice in Forensic and General Psychiatry
Mr. Mike Vlahos, John Hopkins University

June 8, 2004
Mr. James Farwell, DOD (SO/LIC)
Mr. Scott Miller, Core Strategy Group
Mr. Seth Cropsey, International Broadcast Bureau
Mr. Jim Glassman, American Enterprise Institute

June 10, 2004
Mr. John Rendon, The Rendon Group
Appendix D: Executive Summary and Recommendations of the DSB Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination (MID) in October 2001

Executive Summary

U.S. civilian and military information dissemination capabilities are powerful assets vital to national security. They can create diplomatic opportunities, lessen tensions that might lead to war, help contain conflicts, and address nontraditional threats to America’s interests. In the information age, no diplomatic or military strategy can succeed without them. Yet America’s political and military leaders too often appreciate their value only during a crisis or in retrospect when hostilities are concluded.

Used effectively, public diplomacy, public affairs, and international military information can mobilize publics to avert or resolve a short-term crisis. Sophisticated strategic communications can set the agenda and create a context that enhances the achievement of political, economic, and military objectives. Over time, they may shape foreign perceptions in ways that support America’s interests.

The U.S. Government’s information dissemination organizations today are understaffed and underfunded. They suffer from poor coordination, and they are not integrated into the national security planning and implementation process.

The United States needs a sustained, coordinated capability to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics that is rooted in the information age. It should be multiagency and multiservice, adequately funded and adequately staffed. Its communications channels must be highly differentiated. Its technologies should be state-of-the-art. Products and messages must be credible, consistent, and tailored to different audiences in different cultures. Channels and brand identities must be firmly established in peace so they can be used successfully in crisis and in war. America’s leaders need to give information dissemination a much higher priority and be willing to use it to communicate effectively to foreign publics. It is a critical element in all policy planning and implementation. Without it, no policy or strategy is complete.

The Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination was charged with determining the need for and feasibility of a coordinated U.S. information dissemination capability. Specifically, the Task Force was asked to examine strategic information activities of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DOS). To this end, the study is sponsored jointly by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).

The Task Force investigated a broad range of issues including:

- The roles of DoD, State, and nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting services in a coordinated strategic information dissemination capability.
- Acquisition and use of communications channels and the value of established “brand identities.”
Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued)

- Policy, legal, and resource limitations on U.S. information dissemination capabilities.
- New and emerging technologies capable of enhancing U.S. information dissemination capabilities.

The Task Force assessment went beyond the Departments of State and Defense to include other U.S. entities such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. international broadcasting services as well as nongovernment organizations and individuals skilled in emerging media and strategic communications. The briefings received and extensive internal discussions form the basis for the findings and recommendations in this report.

Early on, the Task Force addressed several basic questions:
- Why study managed information dissemination at all?
- Assuming a study is needed, what do we mean by information dissemination and what should be the appropriate level and scope of analysis?
- What are the salient historical, political, organizational, and technological considerations?
- How should information dissemination be coordinated and carried out?

Arguments against the need for coordinated information dissemination include the notion that CNN, AOL-Time Warner, and other global media already provide an abundance of credible information. In a pluralistic society with a government based on divided powers, there are inevitably diverse, deeply held views on significant national security issues. Some contend this means it is futile even to try to achieve coordinated information dissemination. Others suggest multiple, uncoordinated voices are a positive good—a beneficial consequence of a free society.

Mindful of these arguments, the Task Force concluded that the U.S. Government does require a coordinated means to speak with a coherent voice abroad. Private media, however credible, have their own goals and priorities. They are selective in ways that serve news and business interests. They cannot and should not be relied on to act as advocates for national security policies. At the same time, media increasingly will carry the statements of America’s leaders, when and if they have something of consequence to say to foreign publics, without the need for Government-sponsored channels.

Moreover, there are moments of crisis and issues of long-term importance to which only the Government can speak with full authority. Information—not as "spin," but as policy—is not simply a rhetorical flourish in which solutions to a crisis are presented; it is an integral part of the solution itself. If an authoritarian regime threatens U.S. interests, its population should understand the consequences of its government's actions. If hate radio broadcasts incite to genocide, rational voices should respond. If epidemics threaten populations, accurate information must be provided quickly. If terrorists deploy biological weapons, publics need to know.
Coordinated information dissemination is an essential tool in a world where U.S. interests and long-term policies are often misunderstood, where issues are complex, and where efforts to undermine U.S. positions increasingly appeal to those who lack the means to challenge American power. Whether the issue is missile defense, the Kyoto Protocol, or long-term conflict in the Middle East, effective communications strategies and well-coordinated information systems can shape perceptions and promote foreign acceptance of U.S. strategic objectives.

The Task Force assessed requirements at the strategic level and focused on public diplomacy, public affairs, and international military information activities. This report does not address the topics of information warfare, computer attack, and computer defense. The Task Force looked closely at U.S. international broadcasting services directed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The Task Force determined that the mission, culture, and statutory authority of these broadcasting organizations do not permit their use by policymakers in tailored communications strategies intended to shape and influence public opinion on national security issues.

Although there is ample room to improve operational and tactical information dissemination activities, the Task Force concluded that the U.S. Government's highest priority is to provide an adequate framework to help coordinate strategic international information dissemination. For this reason, the Task Force looked at previous coordination efforts, particularly Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68 on International Public Information. The Task Force found the core principles of PDD-68 to be valid, but also concluded that PDD-68 suffered from a lack of sustained leadership interest and was deficient in its implementing authorities and structure. PDD-68 did not assign specific responsibilities to the Departments of State and Defense. Its interagency coordinating group was understaffed, underfunded, and focused on crises situations. In addition, the coordinating group was underutilized at the strategic level and coordination was episodic.

The Task Force also examined U.S. Government information dissemination systems coordinated in varying degrees under PDD-68: the Department of State’s Office of International Information Programs, Department of Defense psychological operations (PSYOP) and public affairs activities, and U.S. international broadcasting services. In each case the Task Force found deficiencies. The State Department's International Information Programs are underfunded and underutilized within the Department, and they have yet to realize their full potential for information dissemination using the Internet and satellite television. Military public affairs, CINC Theater Engagement Plans, and operational and tactical PSYOP activities need improved coordination. Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and other U.S. broadcasting services face structural weaknesses and fundamental challenges presented by emerging technologies, television, language priorities, and clarification of broadcasting’s appropriate role in national security.
Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued)

The Task Force found that all U.S. Government information dissemination assets would benefit from more effective use of commercial audience research, content production, and transport media (Internet, satellite TV, and radio). Each needs improved surge capacity for communicating in times of crisis. Greater use of commercial production and communication resources can enable them to leverage trends in global information dissemination.

The Task Force also examined U.S.-funded international exchange programs such as the State's International Visitor and educational exchange programs and military exchange programs such as IMET and the National Defense University's International Fellows program. These activities are not and should not be linked to short term policies. Nevertheless, no programs have greater long-term strategic value for U.S. interests.

The report opens with a review of the May 2000 Defense Science Board study that examined psychological operations (PSYOP) in time of military conflict. This study responded to Congressional concerns about limitations on the performance of the Commando Solo (EC-130E) aircraft in disseminating radio and TV broadcasts in the Balkans during Operation Allied Force. The study recommended increased use of the Internet and emerging media, better use of television and radio, and information dissemination policies and practices that respect the power of networking technologies to render tactical/strategic distinctions obsolete.

Chapter 1 establishes the need for managed information dissemination. It examines the objectives and legacy of PDD-68 on International Public Information and its coordinating body, the International Public Information Core Group. Chapter 2 addresses DoD managed information dissemination activities, including military public affairs, the Theater Engagement Plans of regional CINCs, and operational and tactical PSYOP. Chapter 3 addresses the mission, structure, and key issues facing nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting. Chapter 4 discusses current international information dissemination programs within the Department of State and U.S. international exchanges. Chapter 5 examines central trends in commercial information dissemination, media production, and audience research. Chapter 6 offers the Task Force’s conclusions regarding the road ahead for managed information dissemination based on revitalized program and production capabilities and provides a set of specific recommendations.

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Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued)

Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation 1
The Task Force recommends that the President issue a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to (1) strengthen the U.S. Government’s ability to communicate with foreign audiences and thereby shape understanding of and support for U.S. national security policies, and (2) coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international military information. The directive should require all regional and functional National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committees to (1) assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when national security options are considered and (2) recommend or develop strategies for public information dissemination strategies before or in concert with policy implementation.

Recommendation 2
The Task Force recommends that the NSPD establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. The committee should be chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank designated by the Secretary of State. The chair will be assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members of senior rank should be designated by the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Recommendation 3
The Task Force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy Coordinating Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning and dissemination activities, including the authority to require

- Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures,
- Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis response communications,
- Identify appropriate media channels, and
- Produce information products.

Recommendation 4
The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination through a dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the current interagency working group on international public information augmented by an expanded staff and budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A robust, expanded, and multiagency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon expertise from DOS, DoD, the
Joint Staff, 4th PSYOP Group, CIA, and commercial media and communications entities must be established to facilitate audience research and to develop channels and information products.

**Recommendation 5**
The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the Department of State’s International Information Bureau under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee’s Secretariat.

**Recommendation 6**
The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and diversify the products and services of the Department of State’s International Information Bureau to include significantly expanded use of

- Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcast channels;
- American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for both direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels;
- The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreign publics through foreign press and media channels;
- Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) containing key foreign audiences and influence structures;
- Joint State-DoD training and increased interagency assignments; and
- A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DoD officers available for crisis response deployment.

**Recommendation 7**
The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an International Public Information Committee within DoD under OASD(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DoD open information programs carried out under the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. DOD membership should include senior Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives.

**Recommendation 8**
The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DoD’s draft OASD (SO/LIC) guidelines to

- Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff,
- Revitalize the CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plans,
- Strengthen PSYOP capability to support the U.S. Government’s strategic information programs, and
Executive Summary of October 2001 MID Report (continued)

- Effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the Policy Coordinating Committee’s Secretariat.

Recommendation 9
The Task Force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DoD’s information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINC’s Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. Enhancements include
  - Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV,
  - Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue,
  - Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and
  - Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation 10
The Task Force recommends that the President and his senior national security advisors strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by
  - Insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed to the Internet revolution,
  - Taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and
  - Significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments and influence structures.

* * *
Information is a strategic resource—less understood but no less important to national security than political, military, and economic power. In the information age, influence and power go to those who can disseminate credible information in ways that will mobilize publics to support interests, goals, and objectives. What is required is a coherent approach as to how we think about managed information dissemination and the investments that are required for its more effective use by America’s diplomats and military leaders.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13622.pdf

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf


http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/

http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=4754.xml

http://pdi.gwu.edu/


http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/amr20040101.htm
http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/22818.htm


### Appendix F: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTD</td>
<td>Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBG</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Coalition Information Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Center for Strategic Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASD</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFRDC</td>
<td>Federally Funded Research and Development Centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAS</td>
<td>Hard Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>HO</td>
<td>Hard Opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>State Bureau of Intelligence and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIOC</td>
<td>Joint Information Operation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPSE</td>
<td>Joint PSYOP Support Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>OGC</td>
<td>Office of Global Communications</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Soft Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO/LIC</td>
<td>Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Soft Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD(I)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>U.S. Information Agency</td>
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