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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

From the Editor
The following themes and deadlines are established:

October–December 2018, Intelligence Senior Leaders Conference Themes. This issue will focus on the major topics discussed at this year’s ISLC, including:
- MI critical capability gaps with Army PED architecture.
- Improving intelligence sharing.
- Improving multifunction intelligence astride maneuver.
- Terrestrial Layer System Initial Capabilities Document.
- Signals intelligence/Electronic warfare/Cyberspace integration.
Deadline for article submission is 3 July 2018.

January–March 2019, Intelligence Support in Large-Scale Combat Operations. This issue will focus on the challenges of intelligence support in a complex environment against a peer threat. Deadline for article submission is 4 October 2018.

April–June 2019, Intelligence and Special Operations. This issue will focus on how intelligence professionals provide support to special operations forces. Deadline for article submission is 17 December 2018.

July–September 2019, Security Force Assistance Brigade S-2. This issue will focus on the roles of the SFAB S-2 in conducting security cooperation activities. Deadline for article submission is 2 April 2019.

As always, articles from you, our reader, remain important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. We are currently looking for a few good articles to feature in our new recurring department – Know Your Enemies, Adversaries, and Threats. The focus of these articles will be on specific countries and groups whose objectives may be at odds with the interests of the United States.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding article submissions or any other aspects of MIPB. We welcome your input and suggestions. Contact information is located on the inside back cover.

Tracey A. Remus
Editor
The views expressed in the following articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army or Defense, or the U.S. Government. Article content is not authenticated Army information and does not supersede information in any other Army publication.

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Inside back cover: Contact and Article Submission Information
The need for leadership is recognized by most organizations; for example, sports teams, academia, corporate America, and especially the military. Without leadership, raw talent is unfocused and mission success is at risk. Military intelligence (MI) is no exception; we must teach, lead, and mentor our junior Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers to become experts in their tradecraft, within their fields, and as leaders.

This quarter’s theme is leader development. It is essential for you to develop your own leadership skills and to ensure your peers and subordinates are mentored. Only through self-development and the development of others can we create a proficient and decisive MI Corps. To achieve this goal as an organization, we must emphasize certain principles of effective leadership.

The first principle is building trust. Trust is also a prerequisite for the other two principles. In order to lead and be led, an individual must have trust in their organization. Trust in the organization should extend up to the highest echelon of leaders as well as down to your subordinates. Through trust, the competent MI professionals to the left and right of you will support each other and will strive to accomplish the mission regardless of the situation. They have become Value Added, No Issues (VANI); an acronym that describes an individual who places the mission first and is an asset to the organization. Once trust is built and the mission is always completed, a person becomes VANI. This is especially pertinent during war or in a deployed environment. If trust is not present, there will be a breakdown of cohesion within the organization.

After trust is established, the second principle is that leaders must be good communicators. You must both know and understand information and be able to transfer that knowledge to others to build a shared understanding. This principle’s foundation is in self-development. Through the pursuit of self-development, you can expand your technical, tactical, and interpersonal capabilities in preparation to pass knowledge on to your subordinates and peers. A solid foundation in doctrine and its processes are key to the MI leaders’ ability to communicate. Using that fundamental knowledge, the MI leader forms a cohesive intelligence team and provides effective guidance to both leaders and subordinates. SGM Eger explains in his article “Communication is one of the most impactful and basic forms of development and management.” Advanced communication skills will also enable you to develop a congressional delegation (or CODEL) narrative. This narrative prepares you to brief the intelligence situation and posture your supervisors for success. Having a narrative prepared for these congressional delegations and other VIPs ensures relevant and accurate information flows up to the highest levels. It is important to be able to communicate your CODEL narrative because congressional delegations can influence future military funding.

The third principle is that leaders should provide the necessary resources to develop Soldiers in preparation for facing future threats and operating environments. At the start of the year, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center came to Fort Huachuca to teach the lieutenants, captains, and senior leaders about the new FM 3-0, Operations. This event is a great example of senior Army leaders providing an invaluable resource; ensuring that MI leadership understands this major shift in operational thinking. These changes to FM 3-0 directly impact the existing body of MI doctrine, which is our professional body of knowledge. The Intelligence Center of Excellence is meeting its responsibility to provide the necessary resources by updating our doctrine in ADP 2-0, ADRP 2-0, and FM 2-0 to nest with FM 3-0.

Within this edition of MIPB, you will read a broad range of articles on professional development from many talented members of the intelligence community. For example, one article was written by LTC Oh, 304th MI Battalion commander, who oversees the development of over 3,000 MI officers annually. In his article, you will learn of the battalion’s four lines of effort and the support they provide to accomplish the training mission. If trust is not present, there will be a breakdown of cohesion within the organization.

I challenge each of you as the Military Intelligence Corps continues to evolve, to help create an even better MI Corps. By building trust, communicating a solid knowledge base, and providing the resources to develop Soldiers, we will build a trained and ready force for the future. 🌟

Always Out Front!
The United States Army’s ability to develop leaders, especially our noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is why we are the greatest Army in the world. The focus of this quarter’s Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin is leader development. Leader development is not just a focus on the process of leading, but also more importantly a focus on developing others to be leaders. We are all familiar with leadership being the process of “influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation”;¹ but how do we actually develop leaders?

MG Walters stresses that as professionals we need to read and understand doctrine—the enemy’s doctrine, and our own. For an understanding of leader development you need to read FM 6-22, Leader Development, dated June 2015. Combining the principles and procedures contained in this field manual with local NCO development programs will help provide a baseline of shared understanding for your formation’s NCOs, but it is through experience and mentoring of subordinates that we develop leaders.

In order to influence those around you and develop them into better Soldiers and leaders you need to first develop trust. Leading by example helps develop leaders; establish yourself as someone to emulate. Soldiers learn by observing and studying those around them. However, after you have shown someone what right looks like, you need to give him or her the opportunity to execute tasks for themselves, usually with supervision initially, until they have demonstrated the capability to accomplish the task alone. “Leaders are not born, they are molded—by training, practice and experience.”² For example, think of physical training and beginning development of your Specialist to become a Sergeant by giving them the task to lead a physical training session.

Leader development is also tied to tactical and technical proficiency. Subordinates more readily respect and trust leaders they are confident know how to do their jobs already. By stressing to your subordinates the importance of being proficient in their jobs, you are helping to develop them for leadership roles later in their careers as subject matter experts.

When possible, involve your subordinates in planning and decision-making processes, and allow them to participate in the discussion. It can help develop their leadership abilities by understanding the larger picture and understanding why leaders make certain decisions. When possible remove yourself from the decision-making process during training, observe your subordinate’s leadership, and provide feedback.

Remember, you delegate authority, not responsibility, to develop your subordinates; give them the experience they need to become better leaders and build confidence in their own abilities. Underwrite honest mistakes by subordinates who take responsibility for their actions, as learning from our mistakes is an integral part of leader development. Continue to challenge your personnel to grow as leaders.

There will always be generational challenges from senior leaders to junior leaders. That is part of every profession. Mature doctors hem and haw about some young doctor’s new procedure or testing some new tool that they “know” won’t work. It is the same with our Army and our NCO Corps. Remember, you are always developing as a leader, and sometimes a subordinate can give you a new tool for your toolbox. The only constant we have is that we are in a constant state of change and will always need adaptable leaders.

Your goal as an Army leader is to be replaced by someone better than you were. This is our Army. Our mission is to defend our Nation, and to fight and win our Nation’s wars. It is the NCO Corps, the Backbone of our Army, which makes us the best in the world, and you are responsible for developing the next generation of leaders, whether you are a Staff Sergeant or a Command Sergeant Major. What are you doing to make the next generation better than we are?

Endnotes

Always Out Front!
The fabric of our Army is built on the dedication and selfless service of our Soldiers and Civilians. The Army seeks to leverage the three learning domains (institutional, operational, and self-development) within the leader development framework so every Soldier is molded into an adaptive, agile, and innovative leader. In order to accomplish this, the Army requires engaged leaders who are committed to building an environment that promotes effective leader development programs.

All of our institutional programs are committed to delivering the fundamentals of leadership through briefings, seminars, lectures, and evaluations to provide Soldiers with the frameworks and doctrinal approaches necessary to nurture leadership traits desired by the Army. The Intelligence Center of Excellence seeks to ensure that each individual Soldier’s leadership ability is evaluated on more than simulated challenges delivered through traditional written tests, back briefs, or situational training exercises that are oriented toward military occupational specialty (MOS) skill development. While historical instructional methods are still present, our educational design professionals are continually integrating the latest instructional methods with practical applications to ensure the most vital aspects of leadership are rigorously demonstrated and evaluated.

Military intelligence leaders in the operational force tend to rely on the traditional training opportunities afforded by Leader Professional Development, Officer Professional Development, and Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development sessions to help reinforce leader development. Although these leader development approaches serve to instill doctrine and skill development while conveying Army values and a vision of organizational success, they are often overly focused on career development, supply discipline, evaluations, or doctrine. These are all necessary themes but do little to further the development of our Soldier’s understanding of the unique leadership responsibilities associated with being an effective leader. It is imperative that intelligence leaders throughout the Army find time to conduct focused training that emphasizes the special trust and responsibility associated with being a member of the larger intelligence community.

As I visit with young Soldiers, I am deeply impressed with their universal desire to learn and gain insight from today’s intelligence leaders. They all know that they want to improve and aspire to achieve additional responsibility, but often do not fully understand how or what they must do to get there. They require intelligence-focused leader development programs that are oriented toward building trust, developing teams, and having the ability to inspire other teammates. These are not MOS skills or functional capabilities; rather they are imperative leader competencies.

To ensure that we build the bench of future leaders, we must provide the resources, time, and opportunities to learn from mistakes (how) and to understand the leader development outcomes (why). Through a focused leader development strategy that is implemented across all operational levels, we will develop effective intelligence leaders that maintain the ability to protect our great Nation!
The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations

by Lieutenant General Mike Lundy and Colonel Rich Creed

Editor’s Note: This article is reprinted with the permission of Military Review, the Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It was originally published in the November-December 2017 issue of Military Review.

When the U.S. Army rescinded Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, and published Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, in 2011, the world was a different place. The likelihood of large-scale ground combat against an enemy with peer capabilities seemed remote. While the Russians had intervened in Georgia with ground forces in 2008, there were few indications that they would engage in further physically aggressive behavior. Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea seemed to have little to do with Army concerns. The Korean Peninsula remained tense, but resumption of war seemed no more likely than at any other time since the 1953 armistice. The Army’s two remaining armored brigade combat teams in Germany were directed to return to the continental United States, and the Army was downsizing while building momentum toward a decision that would make a significant portion of Army forces in Korea rotational as well.

The strategic environment has changed significantly since then. Russian aggression against the Ukraine and increasingly bellicose behavior by the North Koreans and Iranians are prime examples. The rapidly modernizing Chinese military added to the sense that the Army needed to quickly adapt to the increased possibility of large-scale ground combat against adversaries significantly more capable than al-Qaida, Iraqi insurgents, and the Taliban. As a result, the Army began training for large-scale combat operations during mission command training program exercises and at its “dirt” combat training centers after a decade-long hiatus. It also discovered our current tactical doctrine for large-scale combat operations was inadequate.

In 2016, the Army chief of staff directed Training and Doctrine Command to write an operations manual that would provide the doctrinal basis for prevailing in large-scale ground combat against enemies whose military capabilities, in regional contexts, rivaled our own. While the Army had some doctrine that was relevant to fighting big wars, it lacked a single, up-to-date, unifying doctrinal manual focused on large-unit tactics for use against contemporary threats. There was also a definitive need to address Army operations along the continuum of conflict and the roles the Army fulfills for the joint force as our adversaries challenge the status quo in various regions around the world.

Previous versions of FM 3-0, Operations, and its predecessor, FM 100-5, contained useful ideas relevant to current problems, but none adequately addressed all the challenges of today’s operational environment. Reasonably informed professionals can and do argue which challenges are the most serious, but most might agree that they fall...
into three general categories. The first, and arguably most important, is that the Army’s culture needed to change. The focus on regularly scheduled deployments of brigade combat teams, higher echelon headquarters, and supporting formations to conduct counterinsurgency operations (COIN) from static bases against enemies with limited military capabilities created a view of ground combat incongruent with the realities of fighting large-scale combat against a peer threat. Few leaders with significant experience training or fighting against peer threats remain in our tactical formations, and those with experience at more senior levels were out of practice after a decade or more focused on COIN. The new FM 3-0 addresses the need to change our Army culture by describing the operational environment and threat, emphasizing the important roles of echelons above the brigade level during operations, and addressing the training readiness considerations in each warfighting function during large-scale ground combat.2

Since 2003, seldom have units larger than a platoon been at risk of destruction by enemy forces, and no units faced enemy forces able to mass fires or maneuver large-scale forces effectively.

The second category of challenges is improving our Army’s readiness to prevail in large-scale ground combat against opponents with peer capabilities. Our Army and our doctrine became optimized for limited contingency operations that primarily focused on operations where counterinsurgency and stability tasks made up the bulk of what both units and headquarters were expected to do. Since 2003, seldom have units larger than a platoon been at risk of destruction by enemy forces, and no units faced enemy forces able to mass fires or maneuver large-scale forces effectively. The problem is that the ability to effectively shape security environments and prevent conflict through credible conventional deterrence, or to consolidate gains to achieve the desired political purpose, comes from the demonstrated readiness to prevail in large-scale ground combat against the most lethal threats. This is why the core of FM 3-0 addresses large-scale ground combat operations at the brigade, division, and corps level. It describes the tactics and procedures used during both the defense and the offense, and those familiar with previous editions of FM 3-0 or FM 100-5 are unlikely to be surprised by what they read in those three chapters. There are no new tactical tasks, but there is a renewed recognition and deeper discussion of the tactics required to employ capabilities within and across multiple domains to enable freedom of action for subordinate echelons.

What is new from previous editions, however, are the chapters focused on operations to shape, operations to prepare, and operations to consolidate gains. A large proportion of the Army engages in these operations around the world continuously, and how well the Army does so has a significant influence on both the likelihood of large-scale ground combat and the strategic outcomes of that combat should it occur. FM 3-0 thus addresses the operations the Army conducts across the continuum of conflict as it fulfills its strategic roles as part of the joint force, recognizing that it is the demonstrated capability to prevail in large-scale ground combat that enables the effective prosecution of missions supporting the other strategic roles. As a result, the manual also contains a renewed emphasis on the roles of the Army’s corps and division echelons to employ capabilities as formations.

Corps and divisions play a central role in large-scale ground combat, which is not and cannot be a brigade combat team (BCT)-centric endeavor. When properly constituted, trained, and led, echelons of command unburden subordinate formations by narrowing their focus, reducing their spans of control, and maintaining the broader perspective in time and space necessary for effective planning. The division is the first echelon able to effectively plan and coordinate the employment of all multi-domain capabilities across the operational framework. The same is true for the corps during operations that require multiple divisions. Each higher echelon has a perspective that should look at time, geography, decision-making, and the electromagnetic spectrum differently. This is not a new military idea but reflects a significant change from the formative experiences of the majority of our Army’s leadership during a time when divisions and corps were serving in the roles of joint headquarters or more focused at the operational versus tactical level.

The third category of challenges pertains to the reality that the U.S. Army does not enjoy overwhelming advantages against every opponent it may be required to fight. FM 3-0 recognizes that some adversaries have equal, or even superior capabilities that may put Army forces at a position of relative disadvantage, particularly in a regional context. Some threat capabilities, particularly integrated air defense systems and long-range surface-to-surface fires, severely impede freedom of action in the air and maritime domains, meaning that the other services may not be able to help solve ground tactical problems as quickly or easily as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Against some opponents, U.S. Army cannon and rocket artillery is likely to be both
outranged and significantly outnumbered, which would present a tactical problem even if friendly forces were not contested in the air domain. The potential combination of relative disadvantage in the ground, maritime, and air domains has implications for how Army forces conduct operations against enemy formations designed around long-range fires systems, which employ maneuver arms in support of fires more often than the other way around. Understanding the various methods our adversaries and potential foes employ (systems warfare, isolation, preclusion, information warfare, and sanctuary) is therefore critical to devising tactical plans to defeat them, and it is important to understand that these methods are likely to manifest themselves differently in each situation.

Unlike AirLand Battle, which was focused on one enemy, or previous iterations of FM 3-0, which really didn’t focus on any particular threat, this edition of FM 3-0 is focused on peer or near-peer adversaries (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea) in the current operational environment. For that reason, the operational challenges our Army faces span the range of military operations across all domains, and they needed to be addressed. FM 3-0 is not optimized for any one type of operation or single threat, but rather benchmarked against the most potent adversary capabilities and methods that have proliferated worldwide, and accounts for what the Army is required to do—from large-scale ground combat to shaping the security environment through regional engagement, and all operations in between. FM 3-0 does not change the Army’s foundational operational concept, which remains unified land operations. What it does is better account for the reason behind the operations we conduct to clarify the interrelationship between strategic purpose, planning, readiness, and the tactical tasks assigned to units.

**Organization and Purpose**

FM 3-0 arranges operations by purpose, in accordance with the four Army strategic roles. The Army shapes the operational environment, prevents conflict, conducts large-scale ground combat, and consolidates gains. Army forces do this as part of the joint force, generally in a multinational context, for a joint force commander. Previous versions of FM 3-0 and FM 100-5 did not adequately emphasize the critical linkage between tactical tasks and achieving the strategic purpose for which we conduct them. Categorizing types of operations by purpose aligns with the joint phasing construct found in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, while emphasizing that there is not always a direct linear relationship between those phases (see figure 1). Chapters 3 (Operations to Shape) and 4 (Operations to Prevent) of FM 3-0 describe operations conducted short of large-scale ground combat, when adversaries seek to use methods below the threshold of armed conflict to upset the status quo or subvert friendly nations. Chapters 5 (Large-Scale Ground Combat), 6 (Defense), and 7 (Offense) focus on large-scale ground combat, and chapter 8 (Operations to Consolidate Gains) addresses the echeloned transition from large-scale ground combat to the final achievement of the operational or strategic purpose.

Achieving the strategic purpose of operations is the underlying theory of victory in FM 3-0 and is addressed at the end of chapter 1. There are few acceptable permanent solutions to conflict at the strategic level. The majority of conflicts in the world are managed over long periods of time, with each side trying to increase and exploit positions of relative advantage. In effect, the joint force is either winning or losing a competition that provides opportunities to achieve favorable results during operations short of armed conflict, during armed conflict, and during the transition that occurs after armed conflict. The Army, acting in performance of its strategic roles as part of the joint force, conducts operations across the conflict continuum to ensure the United States maintains a position of advantage relative to actual and potential threats. Operations to shape or prevent are successful when they defeat an adversary’s purpose, such as an
attempt to destabilize the desired status quo or subvert a friendly state. We win during large-scale ground combat by destroying or defeating the enemy’s conventional capabilities and will to resist. We effectively consolidate gains when we follow through to ensure the enemy cannot constitute other forms of resistance to protract the conflict or change its nature in ways that thwart our purpose. In short, FM 3-0 provides a context for commanders and their staffs to successfully practice operational art appropriate for the range of military operations.

Old and New

Any discussion about new doctrine for large-scale ground combat operations tends to generate the discussion that the U.S. Army is pining for the “simpler” days of the planning for the Soviet threat in Europe as an escape from the challenge of COIN. Another is the Army is seeking to bring back large-scale combat as a justification for maintaining force structure. Neither is the case. Chapter 1 describes a very different operational environment than that of thirty-five or even five years ago. The intellectual approach is to
specifically account for today’s adversaries and the broad categories of operations the Army conducts to confront them as part of the joint force. Incorporating the Army chief of staff’s guidance with regard to preparing the Army for large-scale land combat against an opponent with peer capabilities was critical, and FM 3-0 makes it clear that there are linkages between what the Army does during operations short of conflict and what it needs to do if it is to prevail in war. FM 3-0 accounts for both what is enduringly fundamental and what has changed in the context of current environmental realities, Army organizations, and Army capabilities.

There are several big ideas that are not necessarily new to operations but have not been adequately addressed in recent doctrine or experience. We specifically sought to account for the importance of friendly and threat capabilities across multiple domains and the information environment. As a result, we modified the operational framework to approximate the extended battlefield framework found in the multi-domain battle concept (see figure 2). Doing so recognizes the realities of the operational environment, current Army and joint capabilities, and the planning considerations essential for winning. The new operational framework adds the strategic support area, joint security area (JSA), consolidation area, and deep fires area to the previously designated deep, close, and support areas.

The strategic support and joint security areas encompass where Army activities occur outside the areas of operation for which Army tactical level commanders are responsible. Army forces transit and operate in those areas, but the areas themselves are primarily the purview of the other services, combatant commanders, and joint headquarters because they largely encompass domains other than land. We added them because Army forces are heavily influenced by what happens there and have planning responsibilities for Army activities in those areas and the information environment. The deep fires area is that part of the deep area that is beyond where Army forces would immediately plan to maneuver with ground forces and where primarily joint and Army cross-domain capabilities would be employed. The strategic support area, JSA, and deep fires area actually describe what already existed in fact but were not accounted for in previous large-unit tactical doctrine. It is the consolidation area that reflects the biggest change to the operational framework in terms of how Army forces look at areas of operation at the corps and division level.

The consolidation area was designed to solve an age-old problem during operations. The Army has long wrestled with the security challenges behind its forces while maintaining tempo in the close and deep areas, particularly during offensive operations when brigade combat team rear boundaries shift forward and increase the size of the division support area beyond the capability of the units operating there to control terrain, secure populations, or protect themselves against bypassed enemy forces. The typical solution was to assign combat power from brigades committed to operations in the close and deep areas to the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) during exercises, which was satisfactory as long as the division bypassed only small enemy formations and the training scenario was metered to keep the enemy forces from being too aggressive. Actual experience against Iraqi forces during the first few months of Operation Iraqi Freedom indicated this approach entails significant risk both during and after execution of large-scale ground combat operations. The enemy cannot be allowed time to reconstitute new forms of resistance to protract the conflict and undo our initial battlefield gains. Against more capable threats, we need to address the problem directly by planning for and employing the necessary additional combat power beyond what is required for the close and deep areas to consolidate gains during large-scale combat operations.

During the Cold War in Europe, the Army could depend upon its allies to quickly provide the combat power necessary to consolidate gains as large-scale combat ended in a particular area of operations. While this is still the case in Korea, and likely to be true when fighting as part of NATO, there are other places in the world where Army forces would need to consolidate gains ourselves, at least initially. This is especially important when we conduct high tempo offensive operations that bypass significant enemy maneuver forces to avoid being fixed while inside the range of enemy long-range cannon, rocket, and missile fires. FM 3-0 says that corps and division commanders may designate a consolidation area to a subordinate echelon as an area of operations to facilitate freedom of action by unburdening units in the support, close, and deep areas. For a division, this would be typically executed by an additional BCT that must be accounted for when the theater army conducts force tailoring for the joint force commander. A corps would assign a division responsibility for its consolidation area, which would expand as its divisions moved forward and unit boundaries shifted to maintain momentum.

Consolidation areas are dynamic, as the units assigned them initially conduct offensive, defensive, and the minimal stability tasks necessary to defeat bypassed forces, control key terrain and facilities, and secure population centers. Over time, as the situation matures, the mix of
tactical tasks is likely to be equal parts security and stability in each consolidation area. However, security-related tasks always have first priority. Planning and execution to consolidate gains must account for all potential means of enemy resistance and be approached as a form of exploitation and pursuit if we want to create enduring outcomes. It is critical to avoid giving enemies the time to reorganize for a different kind of fight.

When we plan operations and allocate forces, we must account for the requirement to consolidate gains as part of making accurate, responsible staff estimates.

As mentioned above, the forces assigned consolidation areas are additive and not intended to draw combat power away from the close area. When we plan operations and allocate forces, we must account for the requirement to consolidate gains as part of making accurate, responsible staff estimates. The requirement to consolidate gains doesn’t go away when we ignore it, and the longer the delay in addressing it the greater the impact on the force’s ability to sustain tempo and the more challenging the requirement likely becomes overall. The Army has always been tasked to consolidate gains. It did so with varying degrees of success in the Indian wars, after the Civil War during Reconstruction, during the Spanish-American War, during World War II and Korea, and in Vietnam, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. How successful we did it informs how the outcomes of those wars or conflicts are viewed today.

There are obvious implications to this idea. Follow-and-support units task organized to conduct combined arms operations are essential. The units could be in theater, or forces arriving later in the deployment process. Coalition units could often be well suited for assignment to consolidation areas. The biggest implication is that more forces are required and must be allocated to defeat the enemy on the battlefield and consolidate gains to attain a strategic objective. The Army has always been tasked to sustain tempo and the more challenging the requirement likely becomes overall. The Army has always been tasked to consolidate gains. It did so with varying degrees of success in the Indian wars, after the Civil War during Reconstruction, during the Spanish-American War, during World War II and Korea, and in Vietnam, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. How successful we did it informs how the outcomes of those wars or conflicts are viewed today.

Army Echelons and the Operational Framework

FM 3-0 recognizes the importance of cyberspace and space-enabled capabilities, electronic warfare, and the heavily contested information environment. It pulls key aspects of the latest doctrine in those areas into the operations conducted by theater armies, corps, and divisions. Converging those capabilities in support of ground forces to gain and exploit positions of advantage is a critical role played at the division level and higher. Brigade combat teams fighting in the close area generally lack the time or ability to effectively plan and employ multi-domain capabilities other than those already under their control. Mobility, lethality, and protection dominate the cognitive focus at the brigade and lower echelons during ground combat. Theater armies, corps, and divisions are far enough removed from the close fight to have a broader perspective across the operational framework and are where the capabilities resident in each domain are orchestrated and synchronized to converge in time and space to enable freedom of action for subordinate echelons. It is they who identify and exploit windows of opportunity.

How we think about the operational framework has changed. The first difference to consider is that we no longer discuss linear versus nonlinear constructs. Instead, FM 3-0 has contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operation to better account for the nonlinear nature of all operations, regardless of the physical lines on a graphic overlay. The next, and largest difference, is that each area of the operational framework has physical, temporal, cognitive, and virtual considerations that correlate with the focus of a particular echelon. Without an echelon-specific focus in time and space across multiple domains, the likelihood would be that everyone focuses on the close fight and current operations.

The operational framework considerations provide commanders and staffs a way to look at multiple domains and the information environment in the context of operations on land. The considerations are as interrelated as the domains in any specific situation and have different implications for different echelons operating in different areas of the operational framework. The physical and temporal considerations pertain to space and time, and have been with us a long time. Cognitive considerations are those things pertaining to enemy decision making, enemy will, our will, and the behavior of populations. Virtual considerations are in regard to activities and entities that reside in cyberspace, both friendly and threat. Taken together, the four considerations allow commanders and staffs to account for the reality that all battle is multi-domain battle and has been for a long time.

Maritime capabilities have influenced land combat for more than two thousand years. Air capabilities have done the same for more than a century, while space capabilities have been with us for more than forty years. Even cyberspace has played a critical role for almost two decades. By explicitly expanding the operational framework beyond a
tactically focused physical model, FM 3-0 accounts for the employment of capabilities unbound by range constraints during operations short of armed conflict, during small-scale contingencies, during large-scale ground combat, and as we consolidate gains to achieve enduring outcomes to our tactical operations.

**The Way Ahead**

The new FM 3-0 has significant implications for the Army as it reorients on large-scale ground combat while simultaneously conducting other types of operations around the world to prevent peer and near-peer adversaries from gaining positions of strategic advantage. Many of the considerations necessary to achieve military success in the current operational environment are fundamentally unchanged, but what has changed is important. Army forces do not have the luxury of focusing solely on large-scale land combat at the expense of the other missions the Nation requires them to do, but at the same time, they cannot afford to be unprepared for those kinds of operations in an increasingly unstable world. Being prepared for large-scale ground combat generates credible deterrence and contributes to worldwide stability. Being prepared requires doctrine suitable for theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades to conduct operations with the right mix of forces able to execute tactical tasks to achieve operational and strategic goals. We look forward to a spirited professional discussion across our Army as we integrate our new operational doctrine into the force. That professional discussion will undoubtedly inform more changes in the future and make us a better Army.

**Endnotes**

3. Ibid., figure 1-4.

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Introduction
The U.S. Army uses the military decision-making process (MDMP) to make decisions. Almost every Army school teaches the MDMP, and it receives practice at Warfighter exercises and at the Mission Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In training, little is mentioned about problem formulation, how to make good decisions, and how to leverage critical thinking to ensure leaders have sound judgment. Frequently, the MDMP solution is plagued by a lack of analytic depth, faulty assumptions, vague analysis, and wishful thinking.1 It is essential for Army leaders to be able to make sound judgments, and they should focus part of their leader development on advancing their critical thinking skills.

Through the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis and the Brookings Executive Education program, I learned essential tools that offer a different perspective on how to develop problem-solving skills. These tools could make the MDMP more effective.

Leading in the Army
No matter what your position or status is within the Army, you are a leader. You may not lead divisions, brigades, or battalions, but in your current position the way you handle yourself and make decisions matters to the Army. Throughout my years in the Army and public service, I have found it is critical to prepare for and be ready to make hard decisions. You may only be leading yourself at first, but how you develop, learn, and understand yourself matters for the time when you are called upon to act or not to act based on the limited information you have on hand. The Army has a culture of chain teaching or briefing personnel on how to act, whether in ethics or suicide prevention, but learning how to think critically and make appropriate decisions is a skill that Army doctrine calls “art,” specifically the art of leadership.2 I have learned it is more of a skill refined over time through development, but there is art in how the skill is applied. How you approach your development of this skill will ultimately determine if you will be ready to face your next intensely complex decision.

To understand the Army’s viewpoint on making decisions, you will need to have a foundational understanding of mission command. The Army defines mission command as a group of “related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.”3 This definition is straightforward and implies the commander is ready to make sound decisions at a moment’s notice. In fact, deeply rooted in mission command doctrine is another Army tenet—that the commander makes all decisions once the staff recommendations are finished or immediately if the situation requires it. The MDMP is the systemic way Army commanders make decisions. Army doctrine states MDMP “is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order.”4 The MDMP is a process the staff uses to prepare information for the commander to use to make decisions.

How can the staff prepare themselves to provide sound information to the commander? How do commanders prepare themselves to make sound decisions? How do all Army personnel ensure the information they are providing to their commanders/leaders is the information needed to make sound decisions? To be able to do so, Army personnel need to know what the elements of a good decision are and how they can ensure they are providing the best or correct information. If everyone in the Army is a leader at some level, how can each individual ensure they are preparing to make good, sound decisions? Have you ever seen the MDMP fall apart because of the preparation information? Have you ever tried to apply the MDMP in a staffing process outside of decisive operations while in garrison? What seemed to be missing?

Critical Thinking
Critical thinking is the foundation on which staff and leaders should approach decision making. The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies states, “Critical thinking is hard, deliberative work, and it takes an open,
inquisitive mind. It is not easy. Decision making requires deliberate efforts to ensure the decision process includes critical thinking. In the Army culture, fast decision making is a highly preferred skill. How many times has a senior non-commissioned officer or officer thought, “Here we go again, dragging out a decision”? It is part of our Army DNA to make fast decisions and to solve problems quickly, but there are times when further analysis is appropriate for the decision. We also must be careful of pitfalls when seeking to solve problems too quickly. How many times have you gone to a meeting and before the meeting started you said to yourself, “I know the answer to fixing the problem”? Don’t get me wrong; there is a time and place for quick decisions—when in decisive operations with little decision time and within an environment of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.

The problem emerges when the quick decisions become the mode of operations for everything in the Army outside of combat operations. The Army is not in decisive operations 100 percent of the time, but we act as though we are. Senior leaders throughout the Army come to meetings ready to make quick decisions, but at times the facts are not fully developed and the problem may not be framed correctly. Albert Einstein once said, “If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend 59 minutes defining the problem and one minute resolving it.” Critical thinking is essential to ensuring that quality thinking is done to frame the problem correctly—the real problem. Proper framing is vital to problem solution analysis. To underscore why this is important is the fact that 75 percent of business companies, and 90 percent of government agencies, try to solve the wrong problem.

Think about your own experience. How many times have you seen organizations try to solve the same problem repeatedly? Was the problem that hard to fix or was it that the organization selected the right solution for the wrong problem? How many times have you seen mission creep? Was this because of implementing a solution to the wrong problem?

**Leader Development in Critical Thinking**

As we create ways to learn and implement critical thinking into our professional development, you will find it is a hard task to accomplish. Think about it. How much of your daily routine is out of habit? As humans, we love routine. According to Daniel Kahneman, an Israeli-American psychologist notable for his work on the psychology of judgment and decision making, most impressions and thoughts arise in our conscious experience without us knowing how they got there. The mental work that produces impressions, intuitions, and many decisions goes on in silence in our mind. As we navigate our lives, we usually allow impressions and feelings to guide us, and the confidence we have in our intuitive beliefs and preferences is usually justified. But not always.

At times, we are not conscious of the decisions we make or the cognitive biases we have. We must guard against several biases—

- Framing.
- Anchoring.
- Confirmation.
- Self-serving.
- Self-justification.

We are for the most part on cognitive autopilot as we go through our day. When we receive input or information, we use mental models to interpret the information that may not be well-founded or based on logic. These mental models, also referred to as mindsets, are tools we unknowingly create to replicate how we believe the world works. They act as implicit assumptions—unstated, hidden assumptions we do not consciously make but which nonetheless exist.

![Figure 1. Cognitive Bias.](image-url)
requires reflection and insights into one’s self and an understanding of how your thought processes work. Finally, the critical thinker strives for continuous improvement through seeking opportunities to use critical thinking skills as part of their professional development.

One of the ways to improve critical thinking skills is to take courses in critical thinking and attend college seminars. The Army offers critical thinking training through red team training at the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Critical thinking practitioners need to build a good foundation of critical thinking knowledge and the tools to start their decision development. Once they develop an understanding of critical thinking, then they need to practice within the different frameworks of inquiry to enable leveraging the tools of the logic trade.

When launching an inquiry into critical thinking, there are two branches—logical reasoning and problem formulation. Within problem formulation, additional steps ensure the elimination of biases and impediments. By using a critical thinking process to launch an inquiry, we can build in mechanisms for overcoming the biases mentioned earlier. Remember, some of the most significant sources of biases come from moving to a solution too quickly and our egos. When individuals jump to a solution or decision immediately, they make a mental commitment to that solution. This commitment creates a dominant force that leads to many of the biases that contaminate thinking.10

The Army works as a team. Because of this team concept, there are three traps that problem-solving teams can fall into, which can affect critical thinking and problem formulation—information, knowledge, and motivation. In the information trap, team members spend too much time communicating information held in common because of the limited perceived value of unique information. In the knowledge trap, individuals develop tunnel vision anchored in their knowledge, experiences, and perspectives. How many times have we seen senior leaders act like platoon leaders? Tunnel vision limits not only potential solution sets but also problem formations. In the motivation trap, diverse motivations in the inquiry team morph into jumping to a solution and there is an emotional/ego lock-in. These various motives lead to accepting a narrow and flawed problem formulation. The best way to avoid these traps is to follow a well-structured inquiry process.

Structured Inquiry as Part of the Military Decision-Making Process

In the Army, we face volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity in our operating environments and problems that are complex and unstructured. Because of this, there is a need for a formal well-structured inquiry process to ensure correct answers to the correct problems. A structured inquiry process can assist the MDMP. A formal, well-structured inquiry process helps to eliminate the logic traps discussed above and remove the influences of biases. The collaborative structured inquiry (CSI) process, developed by the Olin Business School, offers benefits for staffs asked to find answers to problems in non-tactical environments.11 It is essential during the formal inquiry process to delay thinking of, or mentally committing to, a decision or solution because this will hamper finding the correct problem. The CSI process consists of five steps.

Step 1, Find: This is for leadership to identify a central symptom of the problem. The leadership must be committed to the process and select the team members who are central to implementation. Team members bring key/relevant knowledge and information that spans the problem. Leadership asks team members to commit to the critical thinking process. Leadership must also select a facilitator.

Step 2, Frame: Ask group members to silently write all symptoms they think correlate with the central symptom. Openly discuss each symptom in a group setting that examines the validity of the symptom and how to verify it. Collect quantitative data or qualitative vignettes to confirm the inclusion of the symptom or its rejection. Reach consensus on a written summary statement of all symptoms. Send the statement to constituents asking for additional data or vignettes to support or reject all symptoms. Revise the symptom statement as needed to create consensus. This document frames your problem.

Step 3, Formulate: Ask group members to write all causes they think generate the symptoms silently. Openly address each cause in a group fashion discussing the validity of the cause and how it is verified. Collect quantitative data or qualitative vignettes to verify inclusion of the cause or its rejections. Use the “five whys” to ensure you have found all causes. The “why” technique asks why each time a cause is offered and repeats this five times, drilling further down to the root cause. At the end of the technique, you will have a clearer understanding of the cause. Work within the group to reach consensus on a written summary statement of causes. Send the statement to constituents asking for additional data or vignettes to support or reject causes. Revise the cause statement as needed to create consensus. This document formulates your problem.

Step 4, Repeat: Repeat the process by developing the solutions. Repeating allows for a gestation period, and the group members look at all the solution components they believe will address the causes to eliminate the symptoms. Confirm
addressing of all causes and symptoms. Address each solution component in a group fashion, discussing how and why the solution component resolves the cause to eliminate the symptom. Reach consensus on a written summary statement of solutions. Send the statement that describes the solution components and how they resolve the problem to constituents.

**Step 5, Implement:** Develop an implementation plan based on the set of solution concepts. Who will do what by when? What resources will be needed? What could go wrong and how can the risk be mitigated without diminishing the value created? All these answers make up the implementation plan. Standards. The standards of critical thinking are clear, accurate, logical, relevant, evenhanded, and ethical. Being clear is about being well understood and specific so that others can fully understand your meaning. The next standards are being accurate and logical. Is your thinking verified with facts? Is your logic sound and does it follow logic-based analysis? The next standard is relevant. Is your thinking directly connected to the issue at hand? Are you looking at the full complexity of the issue? The last standards are being evenhanded and ethical. Is your thinking based on being fair-minded and ethical? Are you treating each element of critical thinking fairly?

**Disposition and Reflection.** The final skillsets of critical thinking are disposition and reflection. To improve critical thinking skills, you need to be self-directed, self-disciplined, and self-monitored and have self-corrective thinking. You need to develop a learning mind-set rather than having a fixed mind-set. Only you can improve your critical thinking skills. Cognitive therapy has demonstrated an individual can reprogram his or her thinking to help create the disposition to think critically. One of the critical techniques to reprogram the mind with critical thinking skills and to assist with keeping biases in check is reflection. Reflection is the process of thinking back on what went well and what went poorly with decisions, actions, and other people’s reactions to your actions. Experts recommend reflecting at the end of each day. Some find it helpful to write down their reflections. This helps to identify when emotions emerge in your thinking as well as biases. There is a reflection tool that the Brookings Executive Education program teaches called the Aperio Examen exercise, which helps build new cognitive structures. These new structures can help overcome pre-existing, old cognitive structures because those old structures are not helpful during critical thinking. Having both new structures activated at the same time as the old structures and deciding on which structure to follow shifts from the autonomous, subconscious system in the brain to the executive function, which forces conscience thought. By creating a shift in the focus of decision making from one system to another, you are more likely to attenuate or potentially fully overcome subconscious system biases.

The Aperio Examen Reflection procedure has six steps.

- **Step 1:** Identify three things you did well today.
- **Step 2:** Identify one thing you did today that did not go well.

Critical thinking not only requires a process like CSI, but it also needs to have other components: elements, standards, disposition, and reflection. Elements. The next component in critical thinking is elements. There are eight elements of critical thinking:

- **Point of view.** Points of view are part of all formulating.
- **Purpose.** All formulating has a purpose.
- **Problem.** All formulating is an attempt to find out something, to settle some question, or to solve some problem.
- **Information.** All reasoning is based on data, information, and evidence.
- **Concepts.** All reasoning is expressed through, and shaped by, concepts and ideas.
- **Assumptions.** Assumptions are part of all reasoning.
- **Conclusions.** All reasoning contains inferences or interpretations by which we draw a conclusion and give meaning to data.
- **Consequences.** All reasoning leads somewhere or has implications and consequences.
For the situation that did not go so well, assume you are entirely at fault and “make up” a narrative that supports this conclusion. Alternatively, if you tend to accept blame for yourself, assume you have no fault and “make up” a scenario that supports this conclusion.

Step 4: Only after developing your scenario, evaluate each aspect of the scenario that has validity. Could some element of your scenario be true?

Step 5: Once you have identified valid issues, identify what you could have done differently. Reflect on what you would have done differently and how you would have known to do it differently. Develop a heuristic\(^\text{18}\) that is as general as possible of what you would have done differently and how you would have known to think or act differently.

Step 6: In your mind, run through scenarios of various situations in which your heuristic applies and how you desire to think and act following your heuristic.

Putting CSI and MDMP together offers a solution to the critical thinking errors discussed earlier in this article. Using critical thinking tools, standards, and a process like CSI will help the staff and commanders to make better decisions within the MDMP. CSI integrated within the MDMP would look something like what is shown in Figure 3.

In the figure, the CSI process improves, almost exclusively, the mission analysis in the MDMP. This analysis is critical because this is where the true problem for the mission is discovered. The MDMP framework next to the CSI steps 2 through 5 illustrates where the critical nesting of CSI capability should be used, which is all about finding the right problem. Using CSI steps 2 through 5 with MDMP will greatly enhance the possibility that during mission analysis the correct problem is framed and formulated. Steps 6 through 8 tie in the components of critical thinking and ensure proper lessons learned are internalized by doing the proper reflection. It is important to note that during the MDMP each step should be congruent with the eight elements of critical thinking, which is depicted on the left in Figure 3 as being used throughout the CSI process/MDMP.

**Conclusion**

For us, the MDMP is the Army’s decision process used to provide the commander with information to make decisions. Using CSI and reflection to enhance MDMP will help leaders to make logical decisions. CSI can be used to sort through complex, incomplete, and ambiguous information when using MDMP. CSI is a means to improve the quality of analytics, and the results will be a better process and decisions. Applying the proposed practical CSI recommendations to thinking within the decision process can increase the probability of successful military decisions. Recognizing predictable barriers like biases is a first step in weeding out errors in the MDMP. Commanders should be open to critical thinking-based analysis to ensure overcoming impediments to good decision making.
As leaders, we must be ready to make sound decisions when we are called on to make the hard decisions that may cost our Nation in blood and treasure. As Peter A. Facione says, “The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases.” Our leader development needs to prepare us for using the tools of logic. Using critical thinking and best practices from the logic community as part of our continuous personal learning curriculum will help us become real practitioners of logic as we prepare to make hard decisions in the uncertain future.

Endnotes


3. Ibid., 9.


9. Ibid., 49.


11. Ibid., 11.

12. Ibid., 21.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 26.

16. Ibid., 27.

17. Ibid., 28.

18. “Heuristic,” Wikimedia Foundation, last modified 8 January 2018, 18:22, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristic. In psychology, heuristics are simple, efficient rules, learned or hard-coded by evolutionary processes, that have been proposed to explain how people make decisions, come to judgments, and solve problems typically when facing complex problems or incomplete information.


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Introduction

Over the past few years, you have likely seen a more concerted effort toward ensuring that Soldiers and leaders in the U.S. Army understand and apply leader development in all they do. You have seen the publication of the first-ever Army Leader Development Manual, FM 6-22, as well as the creation of the Master Leaders Course and the Nominative Leaders Course, and an emphasis on building leader development plans within organizations. However, have you taken into account the role that talent management plays in leader development?

I have found that many leaders I encounter speak about leader development in terms of specific schools—in particular, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System (NCOPDS) schooling—and the plans these leaders are putting in place in their organizations. Rarely do I hear leaders speak about the importance of managing talent in order to develop a new leader. These two items work hand-in-hand to ensure appropriately developed leaders are managed for the appropriate position.

Start the Process Early

In order to make this happen, we must first focus on what it means to truly develop leaders. Leader development starts early, at the beginning of a Soldier’s career. It is tied to the Army profession, and what it means to be a professional. Professionals provide a unique and vital service to society, and they earn the trust of society through ethical, effective, and efficient practice. They uphold the discipline and standards of their chosen profession, are responsible for professional development and certification, and provide their service by developing and applying expert knowledge.¹

That development must start early, and professionals—regardless of career field—should be developed, certified, and driven to apply their expert knowledge. However, starting early means that units must have a fully realized leader development plan. The plan should allow immediate introduction and integration to occur for new members, while simultaneously blending those new personnel with veteran professionals. We, as leaders, are charged with turning them into professionals who are developed, certified experts, but that can only happen if we have a plan.

Refine the Plan to Fit Developmental Needs

The truth of the matter, though, is that one size does not fit all. An organizational leader development plan will have overarching concepts and areas that apply to everyone, but it is the leader’s job to take that plan and further refine it to fit the developmental needs of the individuals under their command. This, I believe, is one of our biggest challenges as noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and leaders. We want to take the organizational plan and attempt to make it fit everyone, and understandably so. We know that individual leader development is hard, and it takes time, but if we want to build a future force capable of winning our Nation’s wars, we must develop leaders today for tomorrow’s fight.

Individual leader development plans will create proper talent management, which in turn will give us the opportunity to put the right people, in the right place, at the right time.

When we look at leader development from an organizational viewpoint, we should first be looking toward the Army’s Leader Development Strategy (ALDS). We have incorporated this strategy into our traditional NCOPDS schools, as well as our senior leader courses, like the Battalion/Brigade Pre-Command Course and our Nominative Leaders Course—courses with the focus on how to develop a plan. However, the ALDS is not just for our senior leaders. Junior leaders at all levels must read the strategy and understand both how they fit into the system and what their responsibility is within that framework as they develop their Soldiers.
Three Pillars: Training, Education, and Experience

Whether building an organizational plan or building individual plans, it is important to follow the ALDS lines of effort set forth in the leader development model. That model sets the framework for you to begin building the plan that will ultimately develop your Soldiers and, in the end, assist you with talent management goals.

This framework centers on three distinct pillars: training, education, and experience. As a leader, you should constantly look for opportunities to develop your Soldiers in each of these areas. You should always ask yourself, “How can I get my Soldiers more?” While building your plan, there are three simple answers: institutional training, operational experience, and self-development.

Talent management can play a key role in self-development. If you correctly manage the talent you have, placing Soldiers in specific operational organizations or experiences, it will help your Soldiers gain the knowledge and development they need to be successful professionals. You should strive to provide guidance to your Soldiers by explaining what self-development is and how it broadens their insights and experience. You should also strive to find training opportunities that fit with your Soldiers’ career fields. This not only helps them gain a better understanding of their jobs, but also allows them to gain the broader appreciation of the organization and the Army as a whole. The thing for you to remember and encourage is the knowledge that self-development is not a one-time plan on a piece of paper—it continues throughout the course of a Soldier’s career.

This is why leader development is difficult—it takes time to develop and track the individual needs and successes of your Soldiers. However, it is not enough to simply build a plan, give it to your subordinates, and say, “Ready, GO!” Nor can you fail to follow up on their progress or reevaluate whether they are on the right path. It absolutely takes your undivided attention and involvement. Again, it is continual—it grows and shrinks, changes shape, and changes focus. It is, and should be, ever evolving.

Provide the Opportunity to Learn and Grow

As leader development begins to take shape, you should look for ways to manage the talent you have helped develop. Again, talent management is about the right person, at the right place, at the right time. It is about providing individuals the opportunity to learn and grow, whether that is in a different location or a different position. This means it is quite likely you will lose that person, but if you are truly developing your Soldiers and managing their talent, then you should strive to lose them! That means you did your job well.

We must rid ourselves of the concept that we cannot let people go because “They are my best Soldier.” Keeping someone because they are your best Soldier may in fact be doing more harm than good. You could be unintentionally stunting their career growth by not allowing them to broaden and develop. Managing their talent may also mean that you do not lose them, but instead move them to a different position in the organization, which could allow them to grow and take advantage of how you have already developed them. Either way, talent management is a priority for effective leaders.

The opposite here is also true—we must not always allow our Soldiers to dictate what we do with them because they believe it is what is best or because they are “comfortable” where they are. Many times, and for many reasons, Soldiers do not want to leave or change positions, and that is understandable. However, as leaders it is important that we educate them on the importance of talent management; if done correctly, the once-unwelcome change will have greater benefits for them in the future. This only happens through open, honest, and unemotional communication between leader and Soldier, which of course is also a form of development. Communication is one of the most impactful and basic forms of development and management. Too often however, we choose to communicate indirectly through text or email because it is easier or less intrusive. True communication is face-to-face and person-to-person. Development, talent management, and leadership start with that simple concept.

A Hypothetical Case

A simple scenario can best describe our misguided development and management plans. Let us take, for example, the hypothetical case of a particular Soldier in your

(Continued on page 25)
The goal of warrant officer training and education is to produce “warrant officers who are highly specialized experts, trainers, and leaders who are fully competent in technical, tactical, and leadership skills; creative problem solvers able to function in highly complex and dynamic environments; [and] proficient operators, maintainers, administrators, and managers of Army equipment, support activities, and technical systems.”

– AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development

Introduction
Military intelligence (MI) warrant officers are leaders and skilled technicians—the Army’s premier land force technical experts and systems integrators. The Army expects them to provide expedient solutions to increasingly complex problems. In their unique roles, MI warrant officers must possess the deep knowledge and technical expertise to integrate systems throughout the force and be able to develop innovative methods to support future requirements. They have branch-unique skills, knowledge, and attributes that require professional development, which they receive through institutional training and education, duty in operational assignments, and continuous self-development.

This article examines current and future MI warrant officer education and leader development within the institutional training domain. Specifically, it addresses training provided by the MI Warrant Officer Training Branch (WOTB), 304th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade, from military occupational specialty (MOS) certification through progressive levels of professional military education (PME).

Military Intelligence Warrant Officer Education System
The five-tiered warrant officer education system consists of—

- Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS).
- Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC).
- Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC).
- Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (WOILE).
- Warrant Officer Senior Service Education (WOSSE).

MI Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialties

All Source Intelligence Technicians (350F): Serve as the experts in charge of intelligence analysis and synchronization at multiple echelons. They are responsible for managing information analysis from all sources and intelligence disciplines into finished analytical products in support of mission command. Their key function is to provide commanders with predictive analysis regarding an enemy’s most probable course of action.

Geospatial Intelligence Imagery Technicians (350G): Direct GEOINT operations, project GEOINT requirements, direct GEOINT in support of targeting, and coordinate GEOINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. Their key function is to provide imagery-related evidence in graphic or report format to support the intelligence process.

Counterintelligence Technicians (351L): Direct CI operations and investigations as the principal advisor to the command and staff on CI operations, training, policies, and procedures. They manage CI support to the military decision-making process (MDMP), integrate analysis and automation in support of CI operations, and conduct all CI activities according to applicable laws and policies. Their key function is to protect the force.

Human Intelligence Collection Technicians (351M): Direct military source operations, interrogations, screenings, and overt debriefings. Serve as the principal advisor to the command and staff on HUMINT operations, training, policies, and procedures. Manage HUMINT support to the MDMP, and ensure all HUMINT operations are conducted according to applicable laws, policies, and treaties. Their key function is to manage the collection of HUMINT information.

Signals Intelligence Analysis Technicians (352N): Manage personnel and equipment to collect, process, exploit, locate, identify, analyze, and report on SIGINT information to support the MDMP. Manage training on technical, operational, and tactical SIGINT skills. Their key function is to provide SIGINT products, analysis, and expertise in support of the predictive intelligence process.

Signals Collection Technicians (352S): Manage personnel and equipment to collect, process, locate, identify, analyze, and report on SIGINT information to support Unified Land Operations. Manage training on technical, operational, and tactical SIGINT skills. Their key function is to provide identification and analysis of unknown signals in support of the SIGINT mission.

Intelligence Systems Maintenance/Integration Technicians (353T): Advise commanders and staff on the management and utilization of military intelligence/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and networks. They oversee shop operations and facility work flow for both ground and airborne ISR systems. Their key function is to ensure intelligence architecture, systems, and equipment are operational and responsive.
Each course develops technical depth and prepares students to serve in positions of increased responsibility from the brigade to echelons corps and above. The WOTB executes initial military training to certify MI warrant officers in one of seven MOSs during the MI WOBC. Additionally, MI warrant officers return to the MI WOTB at key points in their career to attend progressive levels of PME, including MI WOAC, MI WOILE, and MI WOSSE.

### The Foundation of Military Intelligence Warrant Officer Education

MI warrant officers are experts who provide technical and tactical expertise and experience, as well as invaluable leadership throughout the MI community at all levels of command. Regardless of MOS, MI warrant officers must possess expert knowledge in what binds us—our doctrine. Each course, along the education continuum from MI WOBC through MI WOSSE, challenges students to demonstrate knowledge in the application of doctrine to synchronize and drive the intelligence warfighting function. Intelligence and operations doctrinal concepts like the intelligence process, the military decision-making process (MDMP), and the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations (ULO) are all used to establish a common frame of reference through which MI warrant officer students demonstrate the specialized expertise of their specific MOS.

Developing a deep understanding of how each MI warrant officer specialty contributes to the intelligence warfighting function and execution of the intelligence process is paramount. From planning and collection to production and dissemination, MI warrant officers are uniquely situated throughout the intelligence process and are directly responsible for ensuring its success. As such, the MI warrant officer must understand how our intelligence core competencies interact to support intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, information collection, and intelligence operations that drive the intelligence warfighting function in support of ULO. This concept of multidiscipline intelligence support is introduced during the WOBC and remains a foundational learning outcome of each progressive level of PME.

MI warrant officers have historically depended almost exclusively on assignment diversity, experiential learning, and personal motivation to obtain additional technical knowledge and understanding of how the MI branch operates within the Army. However, the MI warrant officer educational paradigm has begun to shift dramatically to address this lack of institutional education as well as reduce the knowledge gaps identified by the operational force after 15 years of active armed conflict.

From 2015 to 2017, the MI WOTB, 304th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade, with the support of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) Training Development and Learning Innovation staffs, took steps to address institutional education needs.
educational gaps for MI warrants officers. The resulting changes included increasing the program of instruction (POI) time of the MI WOBC and WOAC and introducing the MI WOILE and WOSSE.

USAICoE conducted an in-depth analysis of MI warrant officer training, and the results indicated the MI warrant officer PME required significant changes. Specifically, MI warrant officers require improved training and education focused on enabling their ability to support mission command and developing commanders’ situational understanding through multidiscipline intelligence collection and synchronization. They must also maintain an agile and adaptive intelligence architecture and achieve mastery in the employment and utilization of the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS–A) system of systems. The Army operating concept further asserts that future leaders must be capable of achieving globally integrated operations with limited resources to be prepared to win in a complex environment against peer threats. These requirements necessitate the need for flexible and adaptive intelligence leaders which in turn requires new and innovative training and education.2

Also taken into consideration by MI WOTB during the analysis phase was the revision of AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, which formally designated warrant officers into three distinct grade and rank categories: company grade warrant officers W01 to CW2, field grade warrant officers CW3 to CW4, and senior field grade warrant officers CW5. This separation added greater emphasis for the need to delineate the critical tasks by grade rather than tasks to all MI warrant officers regardless of rank.

**Warrant Officer Candidate School**

WOCS is a 7-week course that trains, evaluates, and develops Soldiers to become warrant officers for 14 of the 16 U.S. Army’s basic branches, including MI. It includes experiential learning events that provide leadership opportunities while emphasizing lessons relevant to the operational environment.

**MI Warrant Officer Basic Course**

Upon graduation from WOCS and appointment to the grade of warrant officer, each MI warrant officer attends MI WOBC. MI WOBC is an 11-week initial military training resident course that provides MI warrant officers with the technical training of specialized skills, doctrine, tactics, and techniques associated with their specific MOS. As such, the MI WOTB manages seven distinct WOBC tracks designed to certify MI warrant officers in one of seven MOSs. MI WOBC begins with 3 weeks of common core instruction during which students develop an understanding of the role of the MI warrant officer along with an introduction to multidiscipline intelligence support. Training focuses on leader development with a special emphasis placed on MDMP and mission command. Following the common core instruction, students assemble within their MOS-specific courses to train the critical tasks associated with certifying in each MOS. Finally, students participate as multidiscipline teams in a capstone exercise using a decisive action training environment (DATE) scenario. Through this scenario, students demonstrate proficiency toward applying the unique capabilities of their MOS to synchronize and drive the intelligence warfighting function at the brigade level.

Changes to the MI WOBC began in 2014 with the inclusion of a true multidiscipline approach to education for the seven MI warrant officer MOSs. In fiscal year (FY) 2019, MI WOBC will undergo additional significant revisions across all seven MOSs and the common core.

The increased emphasis on MDMP and Army design methodology within MI WOBC introduced significantly more interaction and understanding of intelligence discipline capabilities, roles, and responsibilities between the seven intelligence MOSs. It also introduced an operational understanding of MDMP. Informal introduction of seven MDMP touch points outside of the approved POI focused on student-led discussions and practical exercises to reach Step II of MDMP (mission analysis). The touch points will be included formally in the FY19 POI. Also introduced within the POI was a 5-day culminating practical exercise using a multidiscipline approach to develop the mission analysis briefing, the commander’s priority intelligence requirements, and the intelligence collection plan, along with writing the appropriate intelligence annexes to the operational order.

**MI Warrant Officer Advanced Course**

MI warrant officers in the rank of CW2 with 2 years of time in grade are eligible to attend the MI WOAC. MI WOAC provides students with advanced branch-specific education and leadership skills necessary to integrate their technical expertise in support of the commander’s execution of decisive action. MI WOAC consists of two sequential phases facilitated by the MI WOTB. Phase 1 is accomplished online through distributed learning, which students must complete within 90 days of attending Phase 2. Distributed learning lessons include—

- Leader development doctrine.
- Unit training management.
- Culture and its impact on military operations.
- Fundamentals of mission command.
- ULO.
MI WOAC Phase 2 is a 6-week resident course that employs a multiple module training approach. The POI provides students with a deeper understanding of a warrant officer’s roles and responsibilities as a leader, trainer, and mentor at the division level. This phase also includes a division-level MDMP DATE scenario that develops leaders capable of visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations in complex environments against adaptive enemies. Unique to MI WOAC is the inclusion of seven week-long seminars that students can choose from based on interest or unit focus. These consist of—

- **DCGS–A management.**
- **Information collection management.**
- **Infrastructure and military history.**
- **Violent extremism.**
- **Human dimension.**
- **Open-source intelligence.**
- **National systems in the tactical environment.**

MI WOAC instructors continually explore other options to expand the seminars.

**MI Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education**

MI WOILE is a 5-week resident course, designed to fulfill the training requirement for MI warrant officer staff skills needed to support the operational force. The course prepares senior CW3s and new CW4s for future assignments as a senior staff officer at tactical, strategic, and national-level echelons. CW3s with 2 years of time in grade should attend the three phases of WOILE. The Warrant Officer Career College at Fort Rucker, Alabama, is the proponent for the Phase 1 distributed learning and the Phase 2 resident course of WOILE. MI WOTB provides Phase 3 MI WOILE. The course, offered approximately once a quarter, has three modules: How the Army Runs, Advise the Commander, and Joint Intelligence. MI WOILE employs a non-MOS-specific training model that focuses on—

- **National-level authorities and force management strategies.**
- **The program objective memorandum and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution.**
- **The sustainable readiness model.**
- **MI warrant officer training and professional development.**

### Seminar Options

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Seminar</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DCGS–A Management</strong></td>
<td>The DCGS–A Management seminar focus is to establish the intelligence architecture; planning, preparing, deploying, and redeploying the architecture during unified land operations, as well as familiarization with single source exploitation capabilities within DCGS–A.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Information Collection Planner Course (ICPC)</strong></td>
<td>The ICPC seminar provides training on the principles of information requirements and specific application of collection planning, tasking, asset synchronization, data-mining/research methods, critical thinking/problem solving, and the tactical and national/theater intelligence architecture and capabilities to support unified land operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military History and Security Studies</strong></td>
<td>The Military History and Security Studies seminar includes classroom discussions, guest speaker events, book discussions, independent research, and visits to operating sites and field locations. Participants evaluate the American security community’s interactions with military planning and processes, critique past military and security operations, and consider how past and present events influence military engagements.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Violent/Cultural Extremism</strong></td>
<td>The Violent/Cultural Extremism seminar provided by the TRADOC Culture Center offers an analytic framework of critical thinking and interpretation within a discursive seminar format based upon examination of related problems of violent extremism, radicalization, terrorism, and human conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Dimension/Personal Enhancement Program</strong></td>
<td>The Human Dimension/Personal Enhancement Program includes instruction on stress and trauma, organizational hardiness/leadership, self and team assessments, the science of sleep, memory, behavioral science consultant team employment, moral disengagement, and self-regulation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Open Source Intelligence Course (BOSIC)</strong></td>
<td>BOSIC provides students with an overview of OSINT, its current capability, regulations, best practices in the field, and vignettes from INSCOM OSINT units.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)</strong></td>
<td>The NRO course provides space-based systems overviews, as well as future programs and FADE/MIST training. However, the majority of the course centers on the NRO Support to Tactical Applications and Requirements (NSTAR). This portion enables students to effectively use and apply national systems to meet tactical operational requirements.</td>
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Figure 2. MI WOAC Seminar Options.
The MI WOILE emphasizes rigorous academics within a PME environment. MI WOILE exposes students to functional areas about which many have limited operational knowledge, but future assignments may place them in an advisory or staff role. When overlaid with the technical expertise inherent in senior warrant officers, this education creates conditions for a more rounded, more flexible, and more adaptive leader capable of operating in a complex environment and of providing a multifaceted perspective and advice to the commander.

**MI Warrant Officer Senior Service Education**

The MI WOSSE course is a 4-week resident course designed to fulfill the training requirement for MI warrant officer skills needed to support the operational force. MI WOSSE prepares senior CW4s and new CW5s for future positions as senior warrant officer advisors, command chief warrant officers, and senior field grade warrant officers at the highest levels in the Army. CW4s with 1 year of time in grade should attend the three phases of WOSSE. Again, the Warrant Officer Career College at Fort Rucker is the proponent for the Phase 1 distributed learning and the Phase 2 resident course of WOSSE. MI WOTB provides Phase 3 MI WOSSE. The MI WOSSE has four modules: Advise on the Intelligence Enterprise, Advise on Intelligence Architecture and Multinational Operations, Advise on Warrant Officer Issues, and attendance at the MI Pre-Command Course. The course employs a non-MOS-specific training model that focuses on—

✦ Issues at the Army level and higher.
✦ Professional development for warrant officers at the unit/organizational level.
✦ Information briefings across the intelligence community.
✦ Interaction with the battalion/brigade command teams and division/corps G-2s during the MI Pre-Command Course.
✦ Discussions on policies, authorities, and challenges within the intelligence community and joint, interorganizational, and multinational operations.

**The Role of DCGS–A**

To address equipment shortfalls, the MI WOTB is projecting receipt of initial DCGS–A systems in August 2018. This initial fielding will include Intelligence Fusion Servers, Portable Multifunction Workstations, and Geospatial Intelligence Workstations. These tactical systems will provide students with hands-on experience, which students will be able to apply directly to their duty station. Tactical DCGS–A training during WOBC will have the greatest and most immediate impact for Army intelligence at brigades and divisions. WOBC students will learn how to design an intelligence architecture based on commander and S-2/G-2 requirements. Students will also learn how to holistically incorporate DCGS–A into brigade and division operations. Training throughout the course will culminate in a final exercise. During this exercise, students will use DCGS–A to build an enemy common operating picture, a threat estimate, and an information collection plan. They will also develop courses of action.

**Future of Military Intelligence Warrant Officer Education**

The leader development and military education afforded to MI warrant officers has served the cohort well in the past but must evolve to meet future challenges. In 2015, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander directed all warrant officer branch schools and centers of excellence to conduct an internal review of their respective WOBC and WOAC technical training. The MI warrant officer training analysis determined that both the time and the approach to technical training were insufficient. MI WOBC was the only course with a concentration on MOS technical skills. Even the MI WOAC immersed students in leadership, staff skills, and advanced branch-specific education rather than give them advanced MOS technical training. Moreover, at no point during training provided by the MI WOTB did students interact with the very systems the operational force expects them to integrate.

To address these gaps, the USAICoE staff requested and gained TRADOC’s approval to increase the POI for both MI WOBC and MI WOAC. Starting in FY19, MI WOBC will increase from 55 to 67 days. MI WOBC will use the additional time to expand current MOS technical training. For MI WOAC, an additional 10 days will be included for specific technical training by MOS track, increasing MI WOAC from 30 to 40 days. For the first time, this MOS-specific portion will focus exclusively on developing advanced technical depth. MI WOAC instructors, along with the Learning Innovation Branch, are developing the course material and they will pilot it in late FY18.

The MI WOTB is already developing the POIs to integrate systems at relevant points throughout the MI WOBC and MI WOAC, facilitating digital intelligence architecture training and the MDMP DATE capstone.

Lastly, with the release of FM 3-0, *Operations*, all MI WOTB courses are placing an increased emphasis on executing the intelligence process in support of large-scale combat operations. The MI WOTB cadre recognizes the experience gained
from Afghanistan and Iraq is not representative of the peer conflicts MI warrant officers could face in the future. While undoubtedly dangerous and lethal at times, these past operations reflect an enemy that operated from positions of disadvantage across all domains. The enemy lacked capabilities in the form of sustained long-range precision fires, integrated air defense systems, robust conventional ground maneuver, and electronic warfare. Training for the most likely scenarios, when a peer threat can contest all domains, is imperative. MI warrant officers will contribute to solving these problems through a multi-domain approach that includes integrating the unique expertise of their MOS to drive the intelligence warfighting function in support of ULO.

Conclusion

These new and increased educational opportunities will ensure intelligence warrant officers learn how to conduct the day-to-day business of the Army. These changes also serve the purpose of preparing our intelligence warrant officers for the ever-increasing requirements levied upon them as we conduct operations in even more complex environments. It is ultimately the responsibility of the MI WOTB under the direction of the USAICOE to provide the very best training and education to our intelligence warrant officers to ensure the continued success of our Army’s Intelligence Profession of Arms.

Epigraph


Endnotes

Introduction
Throughout the history of the U.S. Army, leaders have ascribed to multiple means and methods to try to capture and convey the attributes and characteristics of good or great military leadership. They write autobiographies, contribute to biographies, publish professional reading lists, and even make lists or rules for leaders to live by. For example, General Colin Powell published the 13 rules of military leadership that were posted in almost every Army office following the Gulf War. While these leadership references are tremendously useful educational tools for any Army leader, they do not address the unique leadership requirements within the Army’s warrant officer ranks.

The U.S. Army Warrant Officer Cohort/Corps will celebrate its 100th anniversary in July 2018, but very little formal literature has been written to describe the distinctive leadership attributes and characteristics of warrant officers. In fact, until recently, Army policy (AR 600-20, Army Command Policy) failed to recognize that within the warrant officer ranks there was a difference between a warrant officer 1 (WO1) and a chief warrant officer 5 (CW5), and categorized all warrants as company grade officers. In the technical services, this was the equivalent of comparing a Soldier (WO1) with 6 to 12 years of experience to a Soldier (CW4/CW5) with 25 to 30 years of experience. AR 600-20 now separates warrant officers across three categories: company grade (WO1/CW2), field grade (CW3/CW4), and senior field grade (CW5). This formal recognition opened the door for the development of new and innovative educational opportunities for field grade and senior field grade warrant officers and begins to sow the seeds for the delineation of leader development across a Soldier’s career as a warrant officer.

Leader Development and Army Leadership
The Army develops leaders over a career through training, education, and experience. Army guidance describes it as follows: “leader development as a deliberate, continuous, and progressive process, founded in Army Values that grows Soldiers and Army civilians into competent, committed, professional leaders of character. Leader development is achieved through the career-long synthesis of the training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships.”

The Army guidance goes on to describe the Army warrant officer as a “technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and advisor...Through progressive levels of expertise in assignments, training, and education...administrates, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army systems and equipment across unified land operations. Warrant officers are innovative integrators of emerging technologies, dynamic teachers, confident warfighters, and developers of specialized teams of Soldiers.”

Army doctrine describes leadership as being grouped into Army foundational leadership attributes and core leader competencies, specifically into six areas within the Army leadership requirements model:

- Character.
- Presence.
- Intellect.
- Leads.
- Develops.
- Achieves.

The doctrine goes on to describe warrant officers possessing “a high degree of specialization in a particular field in contrast to the more general assignment pattern of other officers...Their extensive professional experience and technical knowledge qualifies warrant officers as invaluable role models and mentors for junior officers and NCOs. While warrant positions are usually functionally oriented, they lead and direct Soldiers the same as other leaders and staff officers. Senior warrants provide the commander with the benefit of years of tactical and technical experience. Warrant officers functioning at higher levels become
systems experts rather than equipment experts. As such, they must have a firm grasp of the environment and know how to integrate the systems they manage into complex operational environments.\textsuperscript{5}

So what are the specific warrant officer leadership attributes and characteristics that form the foundation of a professional leader of character who leads and directs Soldiers “with the benefit of years of tactical and technical experience”\textsuperscript{6} who is trusted as the Army’s technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and educator who administers, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army systems and equipment across unified land operations?

**Five Warrant Officer Leadership Attributes and Characteristics**

In my experience, the majority of senior warrant officers\textsuperscript{7} must process or seek to develop at least five critical leadership attributes and characteristics. First and foremost, the senior warrant officer must be a technical leader, not just a technical expert. The senior warrant officer must also be an ethical leader, a professional leader, a disciplined leader, and a steward of the profession. Many of these foundational concepts are described in ADRP 1, *The Army Profession*, and are similar to the five characteristics of the Army profession.

Together these five foundational leadership characteristics and attributes set the conditions for professional Army warrant officers to administer, manage, maintain, operate, and integrate Army systems and equipment across the range of military operations. Each character trait and attribute provides the senior warrant officer with a unique set of foundational leadership principles and guidelines to try to achieve as they gain experience, education, and training across their careers.

**Technical Leader.** Every Soldier knows that warrant officers are the subject matter experts (SMEs) within their military specialty; however, a technical leader is much more than just a SME or a technical expert. Technical leaders enable others through their years of experience, training, and education. Whereas SMEs may be the most knowledgeable in their respective field, they are not technical leaders if they fail to freely promulgate that expertise across their formations. Technical leaders are SMEs who freely share knowledge and skills with subordinates, other leaders, and peers. They actively engage in the mentorship, training, and education of others. Technical leaders do not hoard knowledge for their own benefit. They freely share their knowledge and take pride in the accomplishments of their team—ultimately building technical readiness across their organization.

**Ethical Leader.** Ethical leaders employ a set of personal values, morals, and beliefs along with the Army’s values and code of conduct while they conduct the day-to-day business of the Army. Ethical leaders serve others before they serve themselves. They are servant leaders who ensure their subordinates, peers, and leaders receive focused and dedicated advice and guidance. The ethical leader is an engaged leader who understands the needs of the people they work with and those who work for them. They understand basic human needs and emotions. Ethical leaders study and prepare for the inevitable ethical dilemmas faced in their field of expertise. Ethical leaders are just and fair, ensuring equal treatment of subordinates and peers. They build communities of interest around their personal investment in the people around them.

**Professional Leader.** The Army is a profession. As such, we are granted unique trust by the people of our Nation, as stated in our sworn oath, to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Warrant officers, as members of the Army officer corps, are sworn to uphold this truth through the application of expertise based on years of tactical and technical experience. Professional leaders understand that they serve the Nation and themselves. Professional leaders strive to maintain a positive attitude as they conduct the business of the Army. Senior warrant officers should also aspire to achieve repose—“A word rarely used now but once descriptive of a unique leadership trait: calm, confident, patient, precise.”\textsuperscript{8}

The concept of the Army profession can be summarized as follows: “*The Army Profession* is a unique vocation of...
experts certified in the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. An Army professional is a Soldier or Army Civilian who meets the Army Profession's certification criteria in character, competence, and commitment.”

**Disciplined Leader.** Disciplined leaders are self-aware and understand their own human fallacies and predispositions. Based on their understanding of their weaknesses and bias, they are self-regulating to ensure they are in compliance with moral and legal regulations, policies, and laws that govern both their personal and professional lives. A disciplined leader aspires to live by the Army’s values.

**Steward of the Profession.** Army senior warrant officers are inherently the stewards of their profession. They must understand the regulations, policies, directives, doctrine, etc., better than anyone else in their chosen fields. They must understand how to administer, manage, maintain, sustain, operate, and integrate Army systems across the full range of military operations. “Stewardship is our duty to care for the people, other resources, and the profession entrusted to us by the American people.”

**Conclusion**

Although not all inclusive, these five aspirational and achievable leadership attributes and characteristics build readiness within the U.S. Army. Readiness is achieved through senior warrant officers who are professional leaders of character, leading and directing Soldiers with the benefit of years of tactical and technical experience, trusted as the Army’s technical experts, combat leaders, trainers, and educators who administer, manage, maintain, operate, and integrate Army systems and equipment across the full range of military operations.

**Endnotes**

2. Department of the Army, Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development and Career Management (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 26 June 2017), 5.
3. Ibid., 17.
5. Ibid., 2-2.
6. Ibid.
7. AR 600-20 defines senior warrant officer as field grade (CW3/4) and senior field grade (CW5).
10. Ibid., 1-5.

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Introduction

What is leader development? According to ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership, “[l]eader development is a deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process grounded in the Army Values.” It is at the very bedrock of what we do every day in uniform and occurs in many fashions. Be it our interactions with our subordinates, peers, and superiors, or during staff rides, brown-bag lunches, and guest speaker events, we continuously encounter opportunities to be “developed.” But how can leaders take these series of disparate events and form a coherent, deliberate process and strategy that is understood and supported by all those involved?

During my tour with 2nd Military Intelligence Battalion, 66th Military Intelligence Brigade, our unit developed a year-long leader development program (LDP) from the grassroots level of the organization. Putting into practice concepts first proposed by COL Douglas Crissman in his Military Review article, “Improving the Leader Development Experience in Army Units,” officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), enlisted Soldiers, and Civilians from across our organization worked together to design a coherent, integrated 12-month LDP. Skeptical of our approach at first, we achieved buy-in from key stakeholders across the organization as we developed, refined, implemented, and executed our annual LDP. The model our battalion developed and its outputs provide an excellent road map for designing successful leader development programs at the battalion level and are easy for others to replicate.

Building the Foundation: Process vs. Events

The foundation of our unit’s LDP found its roots in concepts and leader development theories proposed by former battalion and brigade commander COL Douglas Crissman. In his Military Review article, COL Crissman argues that Army units are approaching leader development the wrong way. He highlights the need to better educate battalion/brigade-level commanders on their roles as “key leader developers” and notes the need for increased oversight and accountability of leader development programs at the unit level by senior leaders. Most importantly, and what significantly resonated with our unit, was his assertion that units must change their approach to leader development by increasing “awareness and understanding about leader development as a process rather than an event.” This concept would prove critical to establishing our unit’s LDP.

Among numerous other valuable concepts, COL Crissman also emphasizes the need for leaders to view leader development as transformational, as opposed to transactional. He highlights that transformational leaders turn followers into leaders, accomplishing this task by ensuring they understand how they contribute to the organization, feel a sense of value, and have ownership regarding the direction of the unit. As we set out to build our program, conversations with leaders at all levels revealed a lukewarm reception to leader development programs in general. Just as COL Crissman highlighted, personnel in our unit viewed the times set aside for leader development as “events.” There was no clear understanding of how the program was constructed or connected, reducing buy-in from participants. The challenges were bridging this gap from the start and achieving shared understanding and buy-in to enable success moving forward, ultimately leading to a mindset of continual development throughout the year.

Setting the Stage and Cohort Analysis

To initiate this process, I led an in-depth review of COL Crissman’s article, emphasizing the above concepts to instill an initial understanding of the methodology we were applying to build the battalion’s LDP for the next year. The review involved several vignettes from COL Crissman’s article, including comparisons to the battalion’s operating environment and challenges facing the unit at the time. From the very opening of the presentation, we told attendees, and then reminded them, that the number one goal was to achieve ownership and buy-in to the overall program. We
wanted to avoid any misconceptions that leader development is only for officers, so NCOs, junior enlisted personnel, and Civilians were invited and encouraged to participate as well. In addition, our unit leveraged video teleconference systems to incorporate our distributed mission command nodes across Germany, Belgium, and Italy.

At the conclusion of the presentation, we divided attendees into six cohorts:

- Senior NCOs.
- Company command teams.
- Warrant officers.
- Staff captains.
- Lieutenants.
- Civilians.

To avoid introducing personal biases or unintentionally influencing the process, we gave the cohorts deliberately broad guidance. We did not designate cohort leaders, nor did we prescribe meeting times or a series of in-progress reviews. We simply instructed cohorts they had 2 weeks to meet internally at their own pace to discuss and recommend topics in four focus areas: leadership/broadening topics, professional reading, military intelligence professional development, and staff rides.

**Topic Screening and “Murder Board”**

After the 2 weeks, each cohort provided the battalion command group with their consolidated recommendations. To say we were stunned with the output would be an understatement, as our cohorts came back with more than a hundred diverse recommended topics across the four original focus areas. The thought and input provided by each cohort was exceptional, particularly several cohorts’ ability to design a series of leader development sessions building toward World War II-themed staff rides, accessible to the unit because it was garrisoned in Germany. With an objective of executing approximately two sessions per month, as well as incorporating a staff ride every 4 months, the next task was to reduce more than 100 recommendations down to 24 specific topics.

The staff achieved this objective by executing a murder board that included members from each of the six cohorts as well as the battalion commander and command sergeant major. Before the session, a list of recommendations from the cohorts was shared with the formation for consideration and review. I first pre-screened the topic list; if more than two cohorts picked a similar topic, I highlighted it as a highly recommended or directed topic because of wide interest across the formation from the cohort sessions. The command group selected approximately 10 recommendations per focus area, which we presented on slides to the cohorts on the day of the murder board. However, the group was encouraged not to feel confined to the topics picked for the slides; if one felt passionate about a particular topic, they were encouraged to voice opinions and defend why their topic should be incorporated into the plan for the year.

At the start of the murder board session, we established clear ground rules for all participants, with the most important being that the session is an open, transparent dialogue in which all stakeholders are encouraged to speak freely. Over the course of approximately 2 hours, the assembled group worked its way through each of the focus areas. Cohort members explained their rationale for their recommended topics. Some participants developed individual slides/presentations connecting a series of related topics to battalion staff rides, while others recommended ways to combine multiple topics into one leader development session. While the group took no “vote” per se, they came to a consensus for the final topics by the end of the session, with individuals who recommended topics volunteering to serve as the lead during the next calendar year. Within 48 hours of completing the murder board, the battalion command team agreed upon the final plan and published it to the entire formation and brigade as a whole. Furthermore, the overall methodology and plan for the next quarter was briefed to the brigade commander at a quarterly training briefing to increase senior leader awareness and garner support for the battalion’s overall plan.
Key Outputs from “Grassroots” Development Methodology

After building the foundation of the battalion’s LDP through a “grassroots” approach involving leaders from all ranks across the formation, our unit had a way forward for how we planned to approach leader development throughout 2017. Three critical outputs also emerged because of the process we leveraged to build our program:

**LDP Calendar.** The first key output was a 12-month LDP calendar that equally distributed topics by focus area throughout the year. Volunteers with a vested interest in their topic were identified early to lead discussions on selected topics. Building a calendar also facilitated stability and predictability within our battalion’s long-range calendar, preventing other training events from overwhelming our LDP. Finally, incorporating our LDP into our overall long-range calendar in turn made it easier to invite our brigade commander and other members of the brigade and garrison to attend and, in some cases, facilitate our various leader development discussions.

**Professional Reading List.** A second and quite unexpected output from our “grassroots” approach was the creation of a battalion-recommended professional reading list. I organized the list, consisting of more than 40 books, articles, and professional journals, which was distributed across the formation. To further increase visibility and shared understanding, we also highlighted those readings already incorporated into the overall battalion LDP. In some cases, leaders at lower echelons used entries from this list that were not selected for the overall battalion program to execute within their own formations.

**Battalion Staff Rides.** The third and final output was a phased/layered approach to battalion staff rides. While our unit had the opportunity to execute battalion-level staff rides on topics such as Operation Market Garden, the Battle of Verdun, and the Liberation of Paris, one of our best staff rides focused on the human aspect of war as opposed to just military operations. Designed by our unit chaplain and two of our company commanders, our battalion completed a series of discussions on the moral foundations theory and moral injury and then examined the resistance movement within Germany and other countries against the Nazi Party. This focus area for the quarter culminated in an extremely moving trip to the Dachau concentration camp and the Nazi archives in Nuremberg. This structured, phased approach to executing staff rides is a best practice from our battalion’s LDP and can be replicated at the unit level.

**Conclusion**

The “grassroots” process described in this article is but one method by which to approach building an LDP. There are countless books and methodologies on leader development at local bookstores, and what worked for our battalion may not work in every unit. That said, I recommend that readers examine COL Crissman’s article, which is filled with stellar recommendations and anecdotes regarding leader development, and revisit the way in which they are approaching leader development in their respective units and as individual leaders. As COL Crissman highlighted in his article, I firmly believe that achieving buy-in and instilling a sense of ownership from members of your organization from the start is vital; failure to do so will likely lead to apathy and, in worst cases, outright rejection of the LDP you are trying to implement. An open, transparent, and inclusive dialogue about leader development theory and those topics most meaningful to the members of your formation on a daily basis will offer you a springboard from which to build the consensus that will form the very foundation of your own successful LDP.

**Endnotes**

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 10-11.

I would like to thank LTC Jason Buchanan for introducing me to COL Crissman’s work and the theories described in his article. They helped form the foundation of the “grassroots” leader development program process described in this article. I would also like to thank my family for their love and support, as well as the members of 2nd Military Intelligence Battalion and their families for their service, their sacrifice, and the development I received working alongside them daily during my time in the unit.

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April - June 2018
Introduction
Leadership within the military is one of the greatest responsibilities our Nation can bestow. It is a role that officers must fulfill—whether commissioned, noncommissioned, or warrant. Leadership develops the intangibles of vision, direction, and motivation to increase the fighting quality of the unit.

ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, notes that a combination of leader competencies and attributes will provide a leader with the influence required to effect change within an organization. Leadership concepts are not “one size fits all,” and leaders must tailor their approach to specific situations. Various cultures within the Army interpret those concepts differently. The “how” of effectively leading depends on several factors, but the focus for military intelligence (MI) leaders should be on how to build teams.

This article discusses how we, as MI leaders, develop our Soldiers and build a team capable of accomplishing goals in support of the MI effort. Examples and techniques are primarily focused on the tactical level based on the author’s experience.

Building a Shared Purpose
The Army MI community is a subculture that must overcome the leadership hurdles of dispersed missions and small elements at the tactical level. The most effective method of overcoming these hurdles is to build intelligence-focused teams internal and external to the organization. However, self-development is important to first building competence.

The MI leader must be competent in his specialty in order to lead subordinates, influence peers, build teams, and leverage their commander’s influence. The ability to influence a supervisor or commander is critical to team building. Such influence can enable an officer’s ability to get things done within their organization and increase an officer’s credibility outside of it. An intelligence leader gains credibility by using critical thinking and providing well thought-out recommendations to peers and supervisors.

The intelligence leader must work to build a shared purpose with subordinate Soldiers within their organization as well as select leaders of other subordinate staffs and units. This will enable the development of synergistic behavior and “flatten” the organization. When building a team with members of organizations external to the leader’s, it is important to talk to maintain relationships with the leaders, or supervisors, of those organizations, not just the subject matter expert working as part of your team. The leader needs to present to the supervisor and prospective team member the rough purpose of the team and any projected requirements. The leader must regularly inform supervisors what team members are contributing to the group and any future expectations. Support from the supervisor will hopefully allow the Soldier to fully participate within the team and provide frank feedback.

The Challenges of MI Leadership
During combat operations, MI organizations are usually task-organized and attached to different units, which makes it difficult for MI unit leaders to influence Soldier behavior. Specifically, within a brigade combat team, an MI Soldier will most likely be part of a staff section or the MI Company. MI Soldiers will often be task-organized to work for other commanders as a supporting unit. This organizational structure puts MI Soldiers in areas and under the authority of leaders who may not be familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of the individual Soldiers or the MI capabilities they bring to the supported unit. Soldiers in these situations, separated from their MI peers, will benefit from more leadership. This highlights one of the differences between situations in which most combat arms Soldiers find themselves, compared to intelligence Soldiers.
The diverse specialization of the MI capabilities can make leading an MI organization difficult. MI Soldiers serve as all-source analysts, signals intelligence analysts, geospatial intelligence imagery analysts, human intelligence collectors, and cryptologic linguists, among many other military occupational specialties and areas of concentration. All intelligence Soldiers, including commissioned officers, have one of these designations. Another element of specialization within Army MI is that warrant officers are often section leaders. In some cases, these technical experts, whose natural focus is on their specialized fields, are not trained as thoroughly on integrating different intelligence disciplines to provide better situational awareness to commanders. Because of this specialization, more than other branches, it is common for MI professionals to be distracted from their role as a leader.

An additional consideration is at what level (strategic, operational, or tactical) is the intelligence organization. The focus of MI at the strategic level is different from that at the tactical level and requires different leadership skills; focused, in some cases, more on working with civilians and developing different technical and tactical skills as opposed to tactical Soldiers. This difference between tactical and strategic billets makes it difficult for MI leaders to draw on shared experiences. For example, in some cases, an MI Soldier may not have worked in a unit below the division level by the time he is a staff sergeant because there are many billets to fill across the Army and few MI Soldiers to fill them. This limitation causes additional issues with leadership development. This can be especially true for commissioned officers.

Leader development among MI officers is inherently difficult due to the low-density population of the branch. The Army’s tables of organization and equipment have created “MI islands” within combat arms and other combat support organizations. While mostly effective in training and combat situations, the organizational arrangements present challenges for MI officer leader development. For example, while serving as a battalion or brigade S-2, an MI officer will not likely have an MI rater or senior rater. The branch detail program, in which lieutenants serve in another branch and transition to MI at the captain’s career course, can limit MI commissioned officer exposure to intelligence units, with some positive and negative repercussions. These programs may preclude a brigade S-2, in the rank of major and with 10 years or more in the Army, from having an MI rater or senior rater up to that point in their career.

For some schools of thought, in which MI leaders do not have other MI professionals in their rating chain, the idea that all leadership is equal, no matter the branch, and that cross-organizational mentorship is effective are tenuous arguments. The first is akin to “leadership, is leadership, is leadership.” This line of thinking denies the cultural particularities of the Army branches when it comes to leader development. Though empirical evidence is not available, a situation in which infantry or armor officers are developed by MI officers until they become majors would likely be met with derision, while the opposite happens often. The comparison, of course, is much more complicated and beyond the scope of this article. However, the contrast should make evident the flaw of the proposition that “leadership, is leadership, is leadership.” The second argument is that the brigade S-2 should mentor the battalion S-2s, the division G-2 should mentor the brigade S-2s, and so on. The MI community should commend those providing this type of development to junior MI officers; this should be the standard. However, experience suggests that this kind of mentorship often does not happen. In reality, raters and senior raters are mentoring most of the S-2s.
MI officers, specifically at tactical echelons, struggle to maintain the relevancy of their units in garrison. Maneuver and other non-MI units frequently focus on their own training and not necessarily on the integration of their enablers, such as MI. MI leaders should attempt to expand training in information collection to every Soldier within the unit. Since there are a limited number of MI commissioned officers at the battalion, brigade, and division levels, the number of infantry and armor officers, as well as officers from other branches, far exceeds those of MI officers. Almost every training event conducted within the brigade can be exploited to train MI Soldiers and build teamwork. MI leaders have to be engaged with other leaders across the formation. MI professionals who are not engaged risk reinforcing the stereotype that MI officers are introverted, in the back room doing “top secret” stuff. An additional stereotype is that intelligence officers are less important in garrison than they are in a combat environment. MI leaders must transcend these stereotypes; they must work to include as many Soldiers as possible in various unit training events. This will help leaders understand how to use intelligence and build an integrated team to support intelligence collection. Intelligence officers must ensure that Soldiers understand what they can do to help collect information and pass on the information Soldiers collect.

MI Team-Building Technique

The primary team the MI leader must work to build is with their peers in support of a commander. For a brigade S-2, their peers are the other staff officers within the brigade headquarters. For a multifunctional team leader, his peers are those other multifunctional team leaders within the platoon. The ability to provide this peer leadership may be easier in some positions than in others. The examples, of the brigade S-2 and multifunctional team leader, both belong to units that share a common mission and commander. The situation becomes more challenging when considering other positions that do not have peers that work directly for one commander or are not all from the MI branch.

The position of an MI company commander would be such an example. The MI company commander has two peer groups for which they should provide leadership. The first comprises the other captains within the MI branch who are part of the brigade. It should be easy to work with these individuals as a team with the help of the MI branch. The MI company commander, based on position and experience, will be familiar with the Soldiers working in the brigade S-2 shop and the battalion S-2s. The second group that requires the MI company commander’s peer leadership is the other company commanders within the brigade. Providing this leadership may be daunting due to the sheer quantity of command faces and their different organizational focus. To gain influence with this group, the MI company commander must first gain the respect of the brigade commander who can help him facilitate relationships with the other company commanders through team-building exercises and emphasis on the MI mission.

An important technique when establishing teams from various backgrounds is to define the team’s “situation and requirements” during an initial meeting with the prospective members of the intelligence group. This may be done on a one-to-one basis or in a group setting. All of this can be done informally and is only defined here to establish guidelines for team building. The leader attempting to build the team needs to have a good understanding of the specific short-term goal of the relationship and the upcoming culminating exercise or deployment. This will enable him to share a common concept of operation, through which others can share their knowledge and experience. General Petraeus noted that strategic thinkers have to “get the big ideas right”; however, the same critical thinking and methodology helps to get any
group of people moving in the right direction. Though the team leader should approach the initial team meeting with an understanding of the next exercise or deployment based on a shared agreement with the higher commander, they should also solicit opinions from others in the team about their perceptions of what the team’s goals should be. All of these views should help form a shared understanding.

The leader must guide the team’s individual members through “practice by thinking (talking) through the situation...[to help]...the collective team envision the execution.” The MI leader can design a larger leader professional development program that targets specific groups with specific programs. This is an important portion of team building, where the shared understanding of the team is helpful in similar situations. Additionally, the leader must lead the group to work through a series of “what if” scenarios. This allows each member insight into how others may react in unexpected situations.

The team must review what it learned and discuss ways to develop a consensus on interacting and working. The leader needs to publish after action reviews after talking through specific scenarios. As a rule, the leader should allocate the same amount of time to review as was allocated to conduct the scenario. When the teams achieve consensus, the leader should consider developing standard operating procedures, and when situations still need to be prepared, he should publish an after action review. The leader should forward as much information as possible to the team members’ supervisor. This methodology to build a team provides well-developed insight by all team members into possible future actions by individual team members. This insight is key to flattening the organization, a key component to a synergistic team.

Conclusion

The MI leader must convey the importance of intelligence to others in their unit who are not directly supporting the intelligence effort. Too often, Soldiers and leaders do not understand what they can do to support the unit’s intelligence effort or the process if they have pertinent information. However, making them understand their importance is not as easy as telling them. The effort must be a constant campaign that shows them, as well as tells them, their significance to the intelligence effort. Intelligence must be involved in as many field problems and exercises as possible. The MI leader must actively use his leadership to ensure planning efforts include information collection and reporting. This role of the MI officer is very much about bringing awareness to Soldiers.

MI leaders have to focus on team building within and outside of their organization to be successful. Focus on the team should be the priority of the MI leader. Providing leadership within tactical MI units can be difficult because of the unique characteristics of their combat support role. An advocacy by MI leaders on intelligence missions, with a specific emphasis on the importance of building teams, no matter the audience, is the key to success.

Endnotes

3. Ibid.

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Leader Development for the Military Intelligence Officer Corps at Fort Huachuca

by Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Oh

Introduction
As the U.S. Army continues to grapple with how to win wars in the emerging operational environments, senior leaders have realized the importance of building leaders who are able to thrive in chaos and uncertainty. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, for its part, is pursuing multiple initiatives toward this goal, such as standing up the Army University and pushing for increased rigor in the training at the various Centers of Excellence. At the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), these initiatives have directly affected how the 111th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade conducts the training and education of MI officers. The purpose of this article is to update the MI Corps on current officer leader development initiatives at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. These initiatives use four lines of effort (LOEs) to develop both the cadre and the students rotating through Fort Huachuca.

Leader Development
As part of the 111th MI Brigade, the 304th MI Battalion is tasked to train, develop, and educate MI officers on the core competencies of intelligence synchronization, intelligence operations, intelligence analysis. The publishing of an updated FM 2-0, Intelligence, will add a fourth competency—intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination, also known as PED. Our vision is to produce intellectually and physically ready leaders who are prepared to provide intelligence support for units to seize, exploit, and retain the initiative in today’s ever-changing environment. Leader development within this context occurs at two levels. First, the battalion focuses on the “class” of instructors who are assigned to the 304th MI Battalion to provide first-rate instruction. Second, the battalion focuses on the “class” of officer students attending the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course (MICCC) and MI Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC). Each year, the 304th MI Battalion graduates two “classes” to the operational force: instructors who are doctrinal experts ready to apply their tradecraft in their next operational assignment and MICCC and BOLC graduates with solid doctrinal foundations on which units can build.

The battalion’s approach for leader development is to conduct “professional military education at the speed of mission command” (to use the tenet of mission command) to educate and train both the instructor cadre and the students. The end state of this approach is that the 304th MI Battalion executes a highly rigorous program of instruction (POI). As shown in Figure 1, the LOEs to achieve the end state are—
- LOE 1: Certification of the cadre.
- LOE 2: Continual training of the cadre.
- LOE 3: Relevant and rigorous POI for the students.
- LOE 4: Recruitment of the cadre.

The 304th MI Battalion in various phases of implementing these LOEs to achieve the end state.

LOE 1: Certification of the Cadre
The quality of the instructors is key to the quality of education in any educational experience. In a perfect world, the educational institution would empower instructors to execute their lessons using a disciplined initiative with...
broad guidance given to them through the course managers while guided by the terminal learning objectives. Unfortunately, this does not always happen for a variety of reasons. The design of this LOE intends to mitigate those potential obstacles.

The battalion is in the process of institutionalizing a robust certification program that infuses the Army’s philosophy of mission command and produces competent instructors who are confident both in classroom management and with the content of the POI. Through the training of the certification program, instructors learn to train students as our doctrine prescribes as they “adapt to rapidly changing situations” and “are given the latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that best fits the situation.”

As part of this effort, the MICCC has switched to a small group leader (SGL) model of instruction whereby SGLs take their students from start to finish, training them in all aspects of intelligence support to unified land operations. For technical training, the warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and contractors assist by providing technical expertise in information collection, intelligence architecture, and exercise control. Otherwise, these SGLs are the center of gravity for instruction to their group of about 15 students, providing instruction based on the adult learning model and personalized mentoring.

To prepare for this task, the MICCC leadership uses a rigorous 6-week SGL certification program, outlined in Figure 2, that starts after they receive USAICoE’s Small Group Instruction Training. Each of these weeks has a different focus, such as operations, intelligence, military decision-making process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and threat tactics, all focused at the brigade level. After guided self-study, classroom observations, and formal demonstrations, each SGL has to teach four classes in front of a board composed of the course manager and senior SGLs, and must complete the IPB certification exam. This rigorous certification process ensures that each SGL has the doctrinal foundation and tactical expertise to lead their small group through the 5½ months of the MICCC.

The MI BOLC is following suit by implementing a similar certification program for both their officer and NCO instructors. Their four-phased approach introduces them to the POI, familiarizes them with content and doctrine, provides an assessment of each instructor, and certifies them through a board that requires the instructor to provide instruction in front of the course manager and senior instructors. Each instructor must also pass the Intelligence Challenge exam that each BOLC student must pass (described below in LOE 3). Because our officer instructors are usually straight out of the MICCC and our NCOs are relatively junior, this is an excellent method to set the instructional standards and give them the confidence to teach.

This leader development opportunity has few parallels in the Army. The by-product of this certification and teaching is an officer’s development not only for this assignment but also for the next. SGLs come out of their certification and teaching experience as tactical and doctrinal experts on both friendly and enemy forces. These officers, with their tactical battalion S-2 background and this broadening experience, are uniquely prepared for success as field grade officers in the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, specifically as brigade combat team S-2s. As a case in point, USAICoE has been using its expertise to help the intelligence branch outside of Fort Huachuca. These SGLs teach the re-blueing course at the Command and General Staff College, which occurs before the main portion of the professional military education courses. Re-blueing helps prepare MI field grade officers for success as they work as S-2s in their staff groups.

Similarly, the experience for BOLC instructors serves to prepare young captains for duties as a company commander or a battalion S-2. The time they spend developing young lieutenants, teaching them the foundations of the branch and the Army, and mentoring, coaching, and counseling their subordinates serves them well as they prepare
for the burdens of company command. If their next assignment is to a FORSCOM unit, the time they spend learning the foundational Army and intelligence doctrine prepares them for success as a battalion S-2. In sum, certification is the basis of leader development for the cadre of officers who “graduate” from this instructional experience.

**LOE 2: Continual Training of the Cadre**

Leader development of our SGLs and instructors cannot be a one-time event. The battalion has emphasized continual training to ensure the cadre remains up to date on current Army and MI initiatives and doctrine. The main vehicle for this LOE is Instructor’s University, our monthly leader professional development program that brings instructors from within and outside the battalion to train and educate our cadre on various topics. We have also established a quarterly professional reading program centered on reading and writing about Army and intelligence doctrine. This, combined with the frequent visitors to Fort Huachuca who speak to our cadre and students, has allowed for leader development from various sources in various ways.

One of the great things about assignment to the home of MI is the number of available subject matter experts. Project Warrior officers assigned to the battalion provide insights from trends they saw at the combat training centers. Senior warrants assigned to the Warrant Officer Training Branch (B Co/304th) provide the deepest technical expertise on single source intelligence, intelligence architecture, and information collection. The battalion ethics instructor provides the latest literature on decision-making and the Army profession. Outside the unit, organizations such as the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate and the Directorate of Training provide the latest on training, employment, and the future of the MI force.

The battalion uses these experts and outside guests to further train our officer cadre. Leader professional development sessions have included—

- Intelligence architecture.
- Intelligence support to cyberspace.
- Ethics at the speed of mission command.
- Russian new generation warfare.
- Joint Readiness Training Center trends.
- Opposing force tactics.

Future sessions will include doctrinal updates on FM 3-0 (Operations), FM 2-0, and the Korean peninsula. The USAICoE at Fort Huachuca remains an institution that provides an unparalleled opportunity for officers to see and learn about any aspect of MI. Through certification and continual training, our officer cadre is ready to provide rigorous and relevant MI instruction.

**LOE 3: Relevant and Rigorous Program of Instruction**

Over the years, the instruction at both the MICCC and the BOLC has shifted toward group exercises and group evaluations. Whereas there is a time and place for such exercises, the importance of ensuring that each individual knows his or her intelligence tradecraft cannot be understated. For example, in a group exercise the weak officer volunteers to brief the weather while the strong officer briefs the enemy course of action. Although this may be comforting at the time, the officer who briefs the weather leaves the course without the confidence that he or she can succeed when truly put to the test. To ensure that officers leaving the MICCC and BOLC have the competence and confidence they need, both courses have added rigor to the POI to challenge and stress each student. Implementation of individual IPB exams is one way in which this is accomplished.

In the MICCC, students conduct multiple iterations of IPB—in defense, offense, and stability operations—using a decisive action training environment compliant scenario. In “Unwelcome Guest,” U.S. forces will attack into a near-peer enemy’s defenses, defend against a counterattack, and then conduct stability operations to consolidate gains. This allows students to experience intelligence support to all aspects of unified land operations except for defense support of civil authorities. The course has reduced the time that students spend in common core and stability operations, and uses the recouped days for preparation and
execution of an individual IPB brief at the brigade level. In the Unwelcome Guest scenario, the enemy forces will once again seek to counter-attack while U.S. forces conduct stability operations. Individually, students will need to prepare their intelligence assessment of this attack as their culminating exercise.

Each student briefs his or her SGL and a senior guest brief taker on the four steps of IPB. The SGLs grade each student based on a pre-published rubric while the senior guest brief taker provides input from his or her experiences. At the Maneuver Captains Career Course, each officer graduates having briefed the five-paragraph operation order. This is their bread and butter. At the MICCC, each officer graduates certified in IPB, an intelligence officer’s bread and butter. The intent of this experience is to cement the lessons an officer learns at the MICCC.

For BOLC, students take the newly developed Intelligence Challenge, an individual exam that tests their doctrinal knowledge, critical thinking skills through analysis of current events, and most importantly, their ability to conduct IPB at the battalion level. This exam increases the tested learning level from comprehension to application. Students apply what they learned throughout their BOLC experience using a historical vignette to conduct analysis on the terrain, weather, civil considerations, and the enemy. The initial reviews from the students who have voluntarily taken the exam have been very positive. It has given students an opportunity to truly test themselves and evaluate how good their skills are as intelligence professionals. By the time of this publication, all BOLC students will need to pass the exam as part of their graduation requirement.

Other minor initiatives continue to increase the relevancy of the courses. Both courses have introduced readings from FM 3-0 and will soon introduce FM 2-0 upon publication of the pending update. Both courses have streamlined common core instruction to place increased emphasis on applicability to the intelligence warfighting function and have increased discussions about the Korean peninsula. The MICCC has placed increased emphasis on information warfare and how the enemy incorporates cyberspace, electronic warfare, deception, and information operations into their scheme of maneuver. The BOLC has incorporated single source briefs into their POI to enable a better understanding of collection operations.

With each refinement, the goal is the same: to increase the rigor and relevancy of these courses. These courses strive to send intellectually and physically ready leaders out into the force who are competent in their tradecraft and confident they are able to apply what they have learned to their next assignments.

LOE 4: Recruitment of the Cadre

To produce great officers, we need great officers. The 304th MI Battalion has been working with USAIcoE and U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) to bring our share of the talent here. Both the infantry and armor branch designate their highest caliber of officers to return to Fort Benning, Georgia, to serve as SGLs in the Maneuver Captains Career Course. These branches recognize SGL positions as top-tiered assignments. Similarly, the MI branch has to change our culture by viewing Fort Huachuca assignments as prime investments in the future of the MI Corps.

One way we have done this is by designating the MICCC instructor positions as SGL positions. This is an important first step because currently upon assignment to USAIcoE, senior captains are not automatically assigned to the 304th MI Battalion as instructors. Designating the 304th MI Battalion’s instructor table of distribution and allowance positions as SGLs allows HRC, USAIcoE, and the rest of the force to better manage talent by recommending and assigning the right type of officers to these positions. SGLs need to be “KD [key developmental] complete,” having successfully completed maneuver battalion S-2 time. FORSCOM military intelligence company command or brigade assistant S-2 time is a bonus. A third of our SGLs have come through the Project Warrior pipeline and have served as observer/coach.
trainers at the combat training centers after successful tactical intelligence officer time. These officers should expect to serve 2 to 3 years as an SGL, followed by selection to the Command and General Staff College.

“SGLs” will also be included in DA Pam 600-3, Officer Professional Development and Career Management, as a broadening assignment for MI officers. Currently, the DA Pam only lists “instructors,” whereas the infantry branch specifically identifies SGLs. In following suit, we are telling the force that those officers with the SGL title on their officer evaluation reports have gone through the certification and instructional experience at the MICCC that prepares them for the toughest assignments as field grade officers.

BOLC instructors are recruited from the MICCC. We are in the process of emplacing a more stringent screening process to ensure we assign officers who can teach; we also want to assign officers whom the young lieutenants will want to emulate. Instructors will need to be able to teach intelligence support to defense, offense, and stability while mentoring lieutenants at this impressionable stage. These instructors will be assigned to the battalion for 1 to 2 years and then command within the 111th MI Brigade to become key developmental complete. Because their broadening experience comes early for these officers, the battalion will work with HRC to assign the top performing captains to FORSCOM units to apply their intelligence tradecraft as battalion S-2s.

Producing intellectually and physically ready leaders for the force simply will not work without the commitment of talent to the endeavor. Commanders and senior intelligence officers can help by identifying officers skilled in their tradecraft with a penchant for teaching and encourage them to serve at Fort Huachuca to invest in the officers who will replace them.

**Conclusion**

The newly published FM 3-0 describes large-scale combat operations as “intense, lethal, and brutal,” with their conditions including “complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty.” For our officers to thrive in such an operating environment and to lead intelligence operations against peer threats, the Army and the MI Corps must put a premium on leader development. The 304th MI Battalion uses the tenets of mission command to drive initiatives supporting its efforts in the institutional domain. The concepts are simple—

- Institutionalize a certification program that produces competent and confident instructors.
- Continually train the cadre so that they stay relevant.
- Execute a relevant and rigorous POI that challenges and stresses students.
- Recruit top-tier officers who can invest in the next generation of leaders.

These LOEs result in the development of two “classes” of officers who rotate through Fort Huachuca: those who rotate through as instructors/SGLs and those who rotate through as students. For both classes, we strive to provide the premier leadership development experience so that MI officers can succeed in the operational force. Instructors with this broadening experience will be able to provide doctrinal expertise on multiple facets of intelligence and operations to the operational force. Students will leave, intellectually and physically ready, with a solid doctrinal foundation on which units can build.

**Endnotes**

3. U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence's small group instruction training teaches new instructors the fundamentals of classroom management based on the adult learning model and small group instruction.
Introduction

The operational environment and threats to the United States have evolved drastically since Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. As a result, the curricula for both the Active Component (AC) Military Intelligence Captains Career Course (MICCC) and the Reserve Component (RC) MICCC were revised to meet current and future asymmetric threats. Shifting back to peer threats as described in FM 3-0, *Operations*, and the decisive action training environment in the Operation Unwelcome Guest scenario allows AC and RC MICCC students to regain essential military intelligence (MI) critical tasks and doctrine. Aspects of these MI fundamentals were lost during the last 15 years, when the basis of the focus and mission were solely on counterinsurgency operations.

The design of the RC MICCC is to develop Components II and III Reserve and National Guard officers and prepare them to provide commanders and staff intelligence support with a program of instruction (POI) nearly equivalent to the AC. This article will discuss the current curriculum structure and changes implemented to the RC MICCC in fiscal year 2017. It will also address the educational equivalency between the RC MICCC and the AC MICCC, showing that the RC MICCC is not only meeting the mission and end state of the 304th MI Battalion, but it is also exceeding expectations by producing the same caliber of intelligence officer as the AC MICCC in a constrained timeframe and non-resident environment.

Reserve Component Military Intelligence Captains Career Course History

The One Army School System concept generated past and present discussion among senior leadership regarding the equivalency between the AC and RC MICCC. The equivalency debate focused on POI hours and minimized the fact that active duty, U.S. Army Reserve, and Army National Guard have three distinctly different mission sets. Nonetheless, the RC MICCC is required to prepare future MI leaders to be successful in the fundamentals of intelligence support and warfighting. This poses a unique set of challenges and ignites several questions. For example, how do you measure the quality of an RC MICCC graduate versus an AC MICCC graduate? And, is the RC MICCC graduate meeting the same standard as an AC MICCC graduate with fewer (POI) hours?

Comparisons are different because of the unique backgrounds of RC officers. The professional civilian experience of the RC is its strength and backbone. Civilian positions held by many RC MICCC students are sometimes in the intelligence and defense community/industry. The RC force can leverage civilian-acquired skills and exploit those unique skillsets on the battlefield or in the classroom. The citizen Soldier and civilian relationships are not brought to bear in course comparisons, learning environment, and future networking. These differences are immeasurable and create diversity between the RC and AC forces.

Previously, differences in phase sequencings caused confusion for the RC officer and the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) administrators because RC officers were taking the phases out of sequence. The current course design rectifies this issue.

Current Reserve Component Military Intelligence Captains Career Course

The AC and RC MICCC fall under the 304th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The 304th MI Battalion’s mission is to train, develop, and educate MI leaders, focused on the core competencies of intelligence synchronization, intelligence operations, and intelligence analysis. The battalion’s vision is to produce MI leaders that are intellectually and physically ready on Day 1 to provide intelligence support for units to seize, exploit, and retain the initiative in today’s ever-changing environment. Three areas of focus enforce this vision:

- Developing a premier faculty.
- Maintaining first-rate systems.
- Investing in individuals through mentoring.
Within this framework, the RC MICCC focuses its education on the core essentials. Emphasis on MI doctrine and fundamentals allows the RC MICCC to conduct professional military education where the rubber meets the road—on a map, with marker and acetate. This is where students can best engage pure analysis and understanding of the fundamentals (thought process). The RC MICCC’s focus is on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the military decision-making process (MDMP), and targeting/collection management at the brigade level in a simulated austere environment. The expectation is that every MI officer is proficient in MI doctrine, MI fundamentals, and MI critical tasks; the RC MICCC ensures exposure of our officers to, and practice of, their tradecraft.

**Scope of the Reserve Component Military Intelligence Captains Career Course**

The RC MICCC produces competent, skilled, and adaptive leaders who are capable of performing the duties of a tactical intelligence officer at the brigade level. The training audience is senior first lieutenants and captains. Students receive instruction in the following areas:
- Leadership doctrine.
- MDMP.
- IPB.
- Targeting.
- Assessments.
- Information collection.
- Intelligence architecture.
- Hybrid threats during unified land operations in the decisive action training environment.

This training provides an educational experience supporting the Army’s all-source tactical intelligence framework. It gives company grade leaders exposure to all available intelligence capabilities, which helps provide situational understanding to the commander and staff at brigade level and below.

Small group instructors help students exercise their skills through practical hands-on exercises, tests, and small group briefings generally led by students. Students also get an opportunity to play different staff roles, gaining a broader understanding of operations and each element’s contribution to a unified mission command. Upon graduation, students transition to their next duty assignment, prepared for staff and command positions.

**Course Description**

The RC MICCC is responsible for enabling the readiness of RC MI officers while retaining tactical competence and technical proficiency, which shapes and sets cultivating strategic and operational perspective. The course is designed for a phased execution; this is reflected in ATRRS as the RC MICCC Phases I and II (distance learning) and Phases III and IV (resident).

The phases build upon each other. The distance learning phases are crawl-walk phases and prepare Soldiers for success in the resident (run) phases of the RC MICCC. The distance learning phases also prepare branch transfer captains for success in the resident phases. Students must take the phases in sequential order.

**Comparison of the Reserve and Active Component Phases**

Figure 1 shows the distance learning and resident phases and a comparison with the AC component modules.

Phase I. The Combined Arms Center hosts Phase I through the Command and General Staff College. It is strictly common core instruction.

Phase II. The 304th MI Battalion facilitates and hosts this 6-week online course. It consists of common core and MI fundamental tasks and is roughly comparable to the Officer Transition Course.

Phase III. This phase mirrors the AC MICCC Brigade Operations I module, which covers offensive and defensive operations. Differences include the omission of common core instruction and the combined arms rehearsal because all common core requirements for the RC MICCC are satisfied in Phases I and II (distance learning). Unlike the AC course, the RC teaches defensive operations using modified condensed message traffic in Phase IV due to time constraints. Instruction in this phase focuses on IPB and MDMP, using the Unwelcome Guest scenario as the training

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**Figure 1. Comparison Chart.**
vehicle. Student assessments include the mission analysis brief, course of action brief, decision brief, targeting test, and annexes B (Intelligence) and L (Information Collection) production, which provide ample leadership opportunities for student evaluations.

**Phase IV.** This phase mirrors the AC MICCC Brigade Operations II module, opening with defensive operations and then moving to stability operations. While meeting the AC’s learning objectives, the primary difference is a compressed exercise and reporting timeline. The student assessments include the Unwelcome Guest Hybrid practical exam and individual briefings. Phase IV is mostly exercise-based, with very few days of traditional classroom instruction.

The areas where the POI differs between AC and RC is the RC MICCC’s omission of the single source intelligence block. The 304th MI Battalion and RC MICCC have accepted risk in this area to focus on unified land operations. We also determined that covering specific single source topics during on-the-job training and in accordance with the unit’s functional mission would be sufficient.

**Way Ahead**

The 304th MI Battalion and the RC MICCC are dedicated to developing future RC leaders who are intellectually ready to provide intelligence support to units as they seize, exploit, and retain the initiative. The skills developed at the RC MICCC improve trust by increasing tactical competence, thereby reinforcing mission command as the Army shifts its focus to large-scale combat operations. The skills that RC officers learn here will facilitate their ability to help their unit prepare for future wars.

**Conclusion**

The transition of the RC MICCC to mirror the AC’s curriculum has created efficiencies in courseware development, saving significant time and effort for both components. These changes have allowed us to tailor courseware, focusing on current, real-world, asymmetric, and peer-to-peer threats. The RC MICCC and its diverse culture give MI officers a full spectrum of skillsets and capabilities to support the total U.S. Army mission. These citizen Soldiers carry dynamic critical thinking skills and experience, which apply to our contentious operating environment. Upon graduation, commanders will receive top-notch intelligence officers who will hit the ground running and tackle challenges as they arise. Graduates will be prepared for new, emerging, and evolving threats and will be critical enablers for the larger force, ready on Day 1, at the speed of mission command.

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Introduction
In the past, the main problem with professional and leader development was that it was limited to a leader or mentor’s knowledge. With limitations to their knowledge came biased opinions. Some leaders and mentors are swayed to lead in a specific direction because of their experience, or lack thereof, or simply because they have a strong passion for a certain field. As the times change, leaders and mentors will adapt and create new methods. They will also develop guides and tools to assist others to have a successful career. This article highlights a tool that has been around since 2011 but has been underutilized—the Army Career Tracker (ACT). ACT is the U.S. Army’s first comprehensive leader development and career management tool that allows individuals to personalize and monitor their career progression. It eliminates the knowledge limitation barrier for leaders and mentors and provides a list of different avenues to effectively develop a subordinate. Essentially, it is the one-stop-shop career management portal for enlisted Soldiers, officers, warrant officers, and Army Civilians.

Guide to a Successful Career
Why is professional and leadership development so important? The purpose of a career development plan is to provide individuals with a guide to a successful career. As children, we were often asked the question: “What do you want to be when you grow up?” Although many of us replied with creative answers, how many of us can say we achieved our childhood dream? The reality is, most aspirations change due to specific events or other general circumstances.

In academia, we learn about the concept of a plan. We then learn how to prepare a personal plan; however, once in the workforce, we have difficulty following a dream. Careers become more diverse, and career fields become more competitive. It becomes confusing and eventually disheartening because things often do not go as planned. This is why Army leaders should actively mentor their subordinates and peers. In turn, subordinates and peers will evaluate the created plan and assess with a mentor the steps to achieve their goals. However, the creation of a well thought-out plan requires a deliberate planning process that has a specific, detailed, and attainable career map. ACT can help create such a plan to use as a compass for reaching the desired destination.

How the Army Career Tracker Works
ACT allows users to view professional development models (PDMs) for any military occupational specialty (MOS) by skill level. A PDM is essentially a standardized blueprint for information and guidance on assignments, education, and training. It serves as a reference for Soldiers, leaders, and personnel managers to build a successful career path. A lifecycle manager of the career management field (CMF) creates and updates, as needed, each MOS PDM.

Users can also view the self-development domain, which includes planned and goal-oriented career paths that reinforce and expand an individual’s knowledge base and self-awareness. Self-development bridges the learning gaps between the operational and institutional domains, and sets conditions for continuous learning and growth. Three types of self-development are viewable under ACT—structured self-development (SSD), guided self-development (GSD), and personal self-development (self-initiated). For example, SSD I, II, III, IV, and V, which are mandatory for progression within the enlisted ranks, are learning modules intended to meet specific learning objectives and requirements. GSD uses optional learning modules that may include credentialing and accreditation, and it enhances professional competence within a specific profession. Personal self-development learning assists with meeting personal training, education, and experiential goals.

Each CMF has a personnel proponent and exception authority. The personnel proponent office for military intelligence (Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence) has the responsibility of managing, updating, and disseminating all military intelligence CMF information. This includes requests for standard of grade reviews, MOS prerequisite waivers, new additional skill identifiers, and any other career management changes for each military intelligence MOS. With regard to leadership development, the personnel proponent representative updates and maintains DA Pam 600-25,
U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide, and DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Specialty and Structure, accordingly. These two pamphlets specifically address career development for all enlisted personnel, warrant officers, and officers. The ACT’s career PDM uses input from the DA pamphlets. The PDM provides users with a quick visual reference, through ACT, for personnel who do not have access to the DA pamphlets.

The Individual Plan

Once individuals view opportunities available via their career path, they are able to create an individual development plan (IDP). An IDP integrates personal and professional development and creates an individually tailored career path. The IDP page has two parts—IDP Timeframe and IDP Goals. The IDP Timeframe section allows users to choose their own start and end dates. These dates are adjustable as needed. Under the IDP Goals section, users create short- and long-term goals. These goals can be anything, whether personal or professional. Here, leaders and mentors must ensure that individuals create their goals with regard to every aspect of their lives. At a minimum, when creating the plan, individuals should ask the following questions:

- Do they enjoy doing their current job?
- How does the current situation align within their personal lives?
- Is it time for a change?
- What will the chosen goals affect, and how will that happen?

These goals need to be very specific; they guide and drive the career development path. Do not create goals just to create or check the block. After individuals create the IDP Timeframe and IDP Goals, their leader or mentor receives a notification and can review the IDP. This allows the leader or mentor to ensure the desired goals are appropriate and attainable within the timeframe chosen.

Upon creation of an IDP, ACT allows users to seek and project future assignments and desired positions. Desired future assignments require coordination with the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC). ACT allows users to view all authorizations for Army positions. These positions include Active, Reserve, National Guard, and Civilian approved authorizations. Unfortunately, the search is not able to determine vacancies or openings for all viewed positions. Users will have to contact HRC for further information regarding availability. The duty position search provides a description of the specific position, as well as the location, unit associated with that position, and requirements regarding security clearance. Far too often Soldiers continue to a permanent change of station with no real understanding of their new duty position and with no guidance about how it will affect their career progression. Leaders and mentors can now assist both outgoing and incoming personnel by providing them with proper guidance for projected duty assignments and expectations for future progression within the field.

Recommended Training for Targeted Careers

ACT also has recommended training for targeted careers. Users can access an easy-to-use catalog that lists all courses available for professional development, degrees, and professional certifications. Available filters assist with narrowing searches down to a specific course or courses. The catalog allows sorting by—

- Date.
- State.
- Colleges.
- Army correspondence course program.
- Army training requirements and resource system.
- Army distributed learning system.
- GoArmyEd.
- In-class or distance learning.

Again, this is only a catalog database meant to inform users of courses currently available with direct links. This allows users to seek out courses, but it does not provide registration through ACT itself. Specific course registration requires completion through the course provider.

Leaders must encourage all subordinates and peers to pursue continued education. Whether it is military or civilian, continuous improvement always benefits the individual, as well as the unit and mission. Incorporating education courses into an already busy life remains the challenge,
but those who truly seek improvement will find a way to succeed.

If more information about any topic in ACT is needed, or if questions arise about any of ACT’s subjects in general, ACT has community-built forums for a user’s exploration. Users can upload and share information with their peers within this community section. Available and creatable bookmarks allow users to organize and expedite quick links to favored locations. Blogging is another option for users to explore. They can either join in on a blog or start a thread of their own. Along with threads, leaders or users can create a sub-community in order to create a private or public location. Here peers can share and assist one another with suggestions or information about career development. Having access to a network of virtual knowledge is a big multiplier for a successful career, and links and bookmarks to external resources are available for unanswered questions. In addition, proponent representatives publish monthly updates for each MOS.

Sponsorship Program

The sponsorship portion on ACT provides access to the Total Army Sponsorship Program. This program assists all Soldiers, officers, and Army Civilians with a means of transitioning to a new duty assignment. Leaders and incoming or outgoing personnel are directly linked before they leave their current unit, which enhances a smoother transition for both parties. Leaders and mentors inform incoming and outgoing personnel of the duties they are expected to perform before departure and arrival, which assists with slotting incoming personnel in accordance with their career development. Proper communication helps to develop a more effective section or team with a solid understanding of the experiences new incoming personnel bring to the unit.

Conclusion

Training, education, and experiences are all building fundamentals for career progression. ACT provides users with more than just a database of information. Leaders and mentors can rely on this multifunction tool for assistance with preparing, approving, and tracking subordinates’ goals, as well as their own personal and professional goals. Leaders and mentors will no longer be limited to pure experience and can resort to ACT for further guidance.

In an era where technology is constantly changing and the resources used by past leaders and mentors become outdated, having a tool that keeps up with changing times makes it easier to be successful and remain competitive. ACT continues to evolve, and as long as leaders and mentors continue to use it, no subordinate should be left unguided or without goals set. Ultimately, finding the balance between developmental and broadening opportunities is up to the individual to determine and to create a professional developmental plan. Plan accordingly, reach your aspired goals, and assist those who follow in the same footsteps.

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Track & Plan Your Career in One Place

Enhanced, Personalized Career Development
Introduction
The staff ride is a tried-and-true leader development technique that military leaders have used for hundreds of years. The modern U.S. Army staff ride was popularized and enshrined into doctrine by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and the U.S. Army Center of Military History. A staff ride provides an excellent opportunity to allow leaders to think critically by examining historical events through a structured process. A staff ride, when done right, is a developmental event that emphasizes intellectual engagement, problem solving, empathy, perspective, and the free exchange of ideas between leaders of different ranks and experience. It forges strong teams through social and intellectual interaction while providing a valuable opportunity to gain professional knowledge. In August 2016, the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater (MIB–T) executed one of its two annual brigade-level staff rides. However, instead of conducting a staff ride focused on an event in military history, we conducted what we called a Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS–A) Staff Ride, or just DCGS–A Staff Ride.

Developing the DCGS–A Staff Ride
The staff ride is a framework for intellectually engaged leader development—something our commander at the time believed was a critical gap in the understanding and employment of DCGS–A. So, we attempted to modify the concept and format of the staff ride to apply to a contemporary equipment, architectural, and conceptual framework rather than a historical event. The event itself was successful, with major gains in understanding, readiness, and feedback on DCGS–A. It’s something we hope the rest of the military intelligence community will take notice of and consider implementing.

William G. Robertson codifies what we call the “staff ride model” in The Staff Ride written for the Center of Military History. It explains that the staff ride has three parts: preliminary study, field study, and integration phase. The preliminary study is the intense academic study of the subject matter to familiarize participants with the facts of the event. Field study is the physical walkthrough of terrain, during which individuals participate in coaching and mentoring about the topic with some element of hands-on experience. The integration phase is the culminating event when the participants put their study and knowledge into application. As we studied the staff ride model, we also began to understand its implied tasks and capabilities. By transitioning from academics, to hands-on, to complex application, the staff ride provides a crawl-walk-run model for leaders on complex topics that don’t lend themselves to training and evaluation outlines or other evaluation checklists. The academics-to-application approach closely modeled two of the three Army spheres of learning—self-development and operational—that leaders could incorporate into their own units. Conducting the staff ride as a group provides an opportunity to build strong teams and friendships among leaders who may not interact with each other daily. Finally, as an academic event, the staff ride facilitated an open atmosphere in which participants could raise innovative ideas and challenges to conventional wisdom regardless of a person’s rank and position.

The Leader Training Perspective
As we worked our concept for the staff ride, we strove to incorporate those key elements of the staff ride model into leader training for DCGS–A. In practice, we identified the DCGS–A suite of systems as the key topic and worked to build an academic curriculum, a field study, and a culminating event that taught and improved leader proficiency in DCGS–A. We completely jettisoned other aspects of the staff ride dealing with historical vignettes while retaining team-building opportunities. We were purposeful from the beginning to invite organizations we wanted a closer relationship with; and we directed team composition and participation centrally, making sure to mix teams from multiple units and ranks. We incorporated physical training and social events into the agenda and identified ways to
maximize team interaction beyond directed events, such as group study time, coffee breaks, and delivered lunches—all to encourage team bonding.

We decided the most critical DCGS–A leader competency is to understand the architecture of intelligence information: how each echelon collects, stores, produces, and disseminates intelligence. If intelligence leaders at each echelon understand how to set up the equipment, internet connectivity, and data flow for their missions, and understand why it is needed, they will be able to extrapolate their training, equipping, and manning requirements to execute their DCGS–A intelligence warfighting function responsibilities.

We decided the best way to demonstrate competency in these leader tasks was by using a vignette and having the group develop a solution. An example vignette places the group as the G-2 of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) preparing to deploy to Liberia to fight the spread of Ebola. What intelligence architecture will they require, and how will they train, man, and equip for this task? Where possible, we chose actual occurrences and their after action reviews, or used well-established operational plans (like the 101st mission) that would be familiar to our participants. For our culminating event, we give each group a similar complex problem to solve; they then present their solution to the wider group to demonstrate proficiency and invite critique.

We established field study events to develop and exercise the skills required for the culminating events. We set up stations for each major echelon of DCGS–A employment from brigade combat team to theater. For each echelon, a room was dedicated to training the DCGS–A architecture. Each room included subject matter experts (SMEs) for that echelon, a whiteboard with preprinted graphics of available equipment and networks, and a template for DCGS–A employment at that echelon.

Our intent was to furnish a template for DCGS–A employment at each echelon by rotating each group through echelon-specific rooms occupied by the SMEs and read-ahead materials. Groups would build an understanding of the baseline and generic employment of DCGS–A by templating the echelon. Upon successful completion of each echelon, teams would be prepared to tackle a culminating vignette without the SME safety-net.

The Staff Ride Event

We executed the DCGS–A Staff Ride in August 2016 over a 5-day period. Before the event, we sent out a series of academic read-ahead packages for participants to study for the staff ride. The event started with 1.5 days of academics, which consisted of lectures on topics not covered in-depth in the read-ahead materials. We then transitioned to 2.5 days of field study, where participants rotated through intelligence architecture mapping rooms focused by echelon. The event culminated on the final day with an integrating event, pitting each group against a vignette, conducting after action reviews, and hosting an awards ceremony.

Ultimately, the event had its strengths and weaknesses, but overall it was successful in every objective. The concept of using the staff ride model outside historical vignettes is a solid one and may be a good fit for the objectives of other units.

If you would like to replicate in whole, or in part, the DCGS–A Staff Ride we conducted, the 470th MIB–T has created a detailed guide that takes units systematically through the development and execution of the event. We have also made available all of our source material, research, and execution data to give other units the ability to replicate or modify the event with minimal effort. This information is available at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/470th-mibt-dcgs-a-staff-ride/content (common access card login required).

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Toward a Ruleset for the Military Decision-Making Process Manual Wargaming

by Captain Sergei M. Garrison

Introduction

Over the last several years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has endeavored to reinvigorate wargaming in the U.S. military.¹ In December 2015, writing for the national security and foreign policy website War on the Rocks, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva described the critical function of wargames as:

"Wargames help strip down a strategic, operational, or tactical problem and reduce its complexity in order to identify the few, important factors that constrain us or an opponent. They provide structured, measured, rigorous—but intellectually liberating—environments to help us explore what works (winning) and what doesn’t (losing) across all dimensions of warfighting."²

Secretary Work and General Selva were referring primarily to wargaming at the DoD level to help prioritize budget allocation and technological development for the Third Offset Strategy.³ However, their insight on wargaming is relevant at all echelons.

Besides its broader usage both within the DoD and in the civilian world, “wargaming” is used in a comparable sense as another name for “course of action (COA) analysis” in the military decision-making process (MDMP).⁴ As Secretary Work and General Selva aptly observed, “structured, measured, rigorous...environments” are key to successful wargaming. I contend that the current Army doctrine for MDMP manual wargaming lacks that necessary structure and rigor. Consequently, I recommend that the Army develop a doctrinal ruleset for MDMP manual wargaming. This article reviews the current doctrine, examines the gaps in that doctrine, offers partial solutions, and proposes starting points for further research for the design of a comprehensive MDMP manual wargaming ruleset.


The authoritative Army publication on MDMP wargaming is FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. FM 6-0 discusses MDMP in detail, devoting 14 pages to Step 4—Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming. The field manual describes wargaming as a process of role-playing friendly and enemy actions to refine COAs—identifying potential friction points, developing contingency plans and branch options, and synchronizing the warfighting functions. The field manual does not formally define “wargame,” but other descriptors are available to help contextualize MDMP wargaming. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, in its discussion of the joint planning process, the joint analogue to MDMP, describes wargames as “representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions.”⁵ Peter Perla, a wargaming expert and researcher at the Center for Naval Analyses, offers another description for both military and civilian use:

“...a wargame is a warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing opposing sides.”⁶

And James Dunnigan, a prolific wargame designer and consultant for the DoD, offers yet another description: “A wargame usually combines a map, playing pieces representing...military units, and a set of rules telling you what you can or cannot do with them.”⁷

Along similar lines, FM 6-0 characterizes wargaming as “a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given the force’s strengths and dispositions, the enemy’s capabilities, and possible COAs.”⁸ Manual wargaming, in contrast with computer modeling and simulations, uses “a tabletop approach with blowups of matrices or templates.”⁹ More specifically,
a manual wargame uses maps, sand tables...or other tools that accurately reflect the terrain along with “a means to...display enemy and friendly unit symbols.” To guide the process, a wargame references the various data files, running estimates, and overlays produced up to that point during MDMP. Additionally, role-players are instructed to consider factors such as movement rates and weapon system capabilities.

MDMP doctrine inherently limits the scope of wargaming, perhaps in anticipation of time constraints. FM 6-0 lists three methods of conducting a wargame: belt, avenue-in-depth, and box. Each of these “zooms in” on only a portion of the area of operation (AO) in a different way. If time allows, successive belts, avenues, or boxes can be wargamed, covering the entire AO. Procedurally, the doctrine uses an event-based model. The commander and staff must identify “critical events” in each COA—events essential to mission accomplishment, involving decision points, or requiring detailed examination. Then, “each critical event...should be war-gamed using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and enemy forces interaction.” The action-reaction-counteraction cycle involves opposing sides taking actions in turn. The side with initiative takes an action, then the opposing side makes a reaction, and finally the side with initiative responds with a counteraction. The field manual includes the following example:

Action: Task Force (TF) 3 attacks to destroy enemy company on Objective (OBJ) Sword.

Reaction: Enemy company on OBJ Club counterattacks.

Counteraction: TF 1 suppresses enemy company on OBJ Club.

Friendly and enemy sides continue taking turns using the action-reaction-counteraction cycle until a critical event is complete. As time allows, the commander and staff continue wargaming each critical event until a COA is complete and then replicate the process for each remaining COA. At a minimum, the decisive operation is wargamed.

Throughout the wargame, the chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) is charged with coordinating the role-players and serving as “the unbiased controller of the process.” He or she exercises their judgment to limit or disallow certain actions to keep the wargame grounded in reality. This practice perhaps has its roots in the “free system” adaptation of 19th century Prussian Kriegsspiel wargaming, wherein an “umpire” who is a “recognized tactical authority” determines the outcomes of friendly and enemy interactions. The operations officer (S-3) is the primary role-player for the friendly side and the intelligence officer (S-2) is the primary role-player for the enemy side. FM 6-0 lists extensive responsibilities for each warfighting function and staff officer on the friendly side.

The Army Training Network (ATN) website has videos from the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) showing examples of a brigade staff conducting a wargame. In the NTC video, the staff uses a 1:50,000 scale map with graphic control measures on an acetate overlay. A detailed execution matrix is already complete before the wargame, listing enemy actions, critical events, decision points, priority intelligence requirements, and friendly wargaming function activities by phase. The staff appears to have chosen a single COA. They place stickers on the map depicting friendly units in their starting locations. The XO has identified four critical events to be wargamed in 2 hours: conducting area reconnaissance, establishing an attack position, securing an objective, and destroying enemy forces on a subsequent objective. The S-2 is tasked with projecting enemy losses. The action-reaction-counteraction cycle during the wargame is not clear. As the wargame progresses, the XO scrutinizes the battle handover of a scout weapons team and the movement rate of a friendly element to an objective. The S-3 walks through how the movement rate is based on the timing of a route

Military Intelligence Captains Career Course students conduct an MDMP manual wargame.
clearance en route to the objective. By the end, the wargame has enabled the staff to adjust force allocation for the decisive operation and identify that the brigade will lose coverage from higher assets before the end of the mission.22

The JRTC video shows a similar process. The staff also uses a map with overlays, a handful of tokens to represent friendly units, and various supporting documents printed out. The XO lays out the sequence that the wargame will follow, saying that he will adjudicate by engagement. It is not clear what method he uses. The staff briefs the initial composition, disposition, task, and purpose for their respective warfighting functions. The XO reviews the critical events. The wargame then proceeds using the action-reaction-counteraction cycle with each warfighting function contributing to the friendly action. The S-2 describes the enemy reaction, and each warfighting function again contributes to the friendly counteraction. One officer chimes in near the end to review friendly and enemy personnel losses. It appears that only one action-reaction-counteraction cycle occurs for each critical event.23 Both the NTC and JRTC videos show a process that seems to closely follow the doctrine laid out in FM 6-0, with the largest difference being the implementation of the action-reaction-counteraction cycle.

**Gaps in the Doctrine**

The wargaming procedure in FM 6-0 is rife with ambiguities and pitfalls for an inexperienced staff. The poorly explained action-reaction-counteraction cycle runs contrary to the goal of synchronization. There is no decisive method to adjudicate combat engagements. And there is a potentially disastrous imbalance between friendly and enemy role-playing. These structural issues undermine the goals of wargaming, render it inefficient, and call into question the fundamental validity of wargame outcomes.

The problem with the action-reaction-counteraction model is that it does not delineate the scope or limitations of an “action.” Additionally, the model seems to artificially localize engagements. In the event-based model, the scope of successive turns is variable, defined by the chosen actions. This is in contrast with a time-based model in which successive turns would be defined by equal periods of time, with actions limited to what could be accomplished during those periods. At first glance, by giving the side with initiative two actions, the action-reaction-counteraction model seems to allow that side to do twice as much as the other during the same period of time. Obviously, this cannot be the intent; that would make for an absurdly lopsided and pointless exercise. A more coherent explanation is that the intent of the action-reaction-counteraction model is not for minute-by-minute synchronization, but rather for relationships between opposing actions and synchronization through triggers. This aligns with the goal of helping the commander and staff think through consequences in appropriate depth, considering responses and follow-ups. However, while initiative is critical on the battlefield, it does not consume all enemy attention such that the enemy is only able to react locally. There has to be some accounting for movement and maneuver elsewhere on the battlefield during engagements. Without limitations on actions, what ensures that actions are realistic and do not break synchronization? Assessing how far friendly and enemy troops can move during the same period of time, for example, is necessary to determine who might reach a piece of key terrain first or when and where an engagement might even occur. With the event-based action-reaction-counteraction model, fudging the math seems inevitable. Given his supervisory role, perhaps this is where the COS is supposed to step in and prevent one side or the other from taking an unrealistic action.

FM 6-0 does not explicitly address how to adjudicate combat engagements, so this task also seems to fall by default to the COS in his capacity as controller. While the COS is empowered to resolve disputes between opposing role-players, that does not mean he is necessarily correct. Arguments over the assessment of casualties are one of the most common disruptions to MDMP wargaming. The S-3 and S-2 may not have the same understanding of the capabilities and limitations of various units and weapon systems. And when the S-3 is a major and the S-2 is a captain, the COS is likely to err in favor of the friendly side. There will always be the need for human judgment in wargaming to match the human element of war. Nevertheless, determinations such as the capabilities and limitations of various units and weapon systems should be made based on technical data and historical records, not subjective judgment. While it may be possible to reference sources such as the Worldwide Equipment Guide for specific points of contention, that is not practical in the middle of a wargame. The reality is that any capabilities and limitations not enshrined in pre-established rules for a wargame are susceptible to arbitrary dismissal in the heat of the moment. The MDMP wargaming process is heavily reliant upon the experience and judgment of the participants to determine options and outcomes. History is instructive here. The “free system” adaptation of Kriegsspiel wargaming was reformed precisely “to make the game practicable even when there was no umpire of established repute.”24

The most concerning problem with the MDMP wargaming process is that it does not give equal and fair
consideration to the enemy. The S-2 role-plays the enemy side alone, whereas the friendly side has the entire staff in support. This is observable in both of the ATN videos. The disparity is staggering and obvious even in the format of the synchronization matrix, one tool recommended by FM 6-0 to record the results of a wargame. For each critical event or phase, the synchronization matrix has one cell to describe the enemy activity and over a dozen to describe the activities of the friendly warfighting functions.\(^{25}\) Even if the friendly force is facing a smaller enemy force, perhaps at a doctrinal minimum ratio of 3:1 for a deliberate attack, surely the complexity of the enemy is not an entire order of magnitude less. This approach cannot possibly consider the full range of options available to the enemy side in the same way as it does for the friendly side. It might be argued that, since only validated COAs—i.e., those assessed likely to defeat the enemy and accomplish the mission—proceed to wargaming during MDMP, full-fledged enemy role-playing at that point is unnecessary. But how has a COA been stress tested at all if it has not faced an equally and fully competent adversary? There is no other part of MDMP where the enemy gets a greater vote than during wargaming. In fact, FM 6-0 admits that discrepancies identified during wargaming “may require the planning process to restart,”\(^{26}\) discarding a COA to develop a new one. Without equal footing, however, enemy role-playing simply serves as a straw man for friendly COAs.

The Way Ahead

Adjusting the doctrine and incorporating additional tools can partially resolve some of the problems with MDMP manual wargaming. In place of the action-reaction-counteraction cycle, wargaming could use a more intuitive turn model where both sides get equal actions. The side with initiative would still go first, but simply proceed to the next turn instead of taking a “counteraction.” After all, each action is some form of response to previous actions, naturally following through consequences. The conceptual distinctions among actions, reactions, and counteractions are superfluous. Considering time scale on a case-by-case basis while retaining the critical event model can better synchronize wargaming. The side with initiative, guided by the COS, would assess how long a chosen action would take. Then the opposing side would be limited to whatever action they could accomplish during the same amount of time. Retired LTC Neil Garra, a former military intelligence officer, proposes this solution in an MDMP manual wargaming system he designed to address some of these very issues.\(^{27}\)

At the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course, one way that instructors help mitigate students’ lack of experience in wargaming is by providing a digital product called a “Correlation of Forces (COF) Calculator” to adjudicate combat engagements. The COF Calculator is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet developed by the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) to estimate casualties for various force ratios for various types of engagements.\(^{28}\) The data used in the calculations are current friendly and enemy force structures and lethality models from simulations by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center.\(^{29}\) The combat power values for different types of units derived from the lethality models could be marked on whatever stickers or tokens are used to represent units on the map during a wargame, allowing manual calculation. The force ratio damage tables could be converted into a look-up chart that could be printed out for use without a computer. However, CGSC does caution about the careful application of the COF Calculator. It does not account for factors such as terrain and weather or weapon system asymmetries. Perhaps adjusting the force ratios can approximate some factors, taking “force multipliers” in a literal sense; that would require further study. While the COF Calculator has limitations, warrants judgment in application, and requires adaptation for manual use, it can serve as an effective tool to streamline MDMP wargaming.

Giving the enemy side an equal number of actions regardless of initiative can mitigate at a minimum the imbalance between friendly and enemy role-playing, as previously discussed. However, to serve as more than a one-dimensional opponent, the staff must allow the enemy side to have all warfighting functions contribute to the fight with an equivalent level of analysis. It is hard to imagine that the S-2 could
accomplish this alone. Just as the S-2 seeks out advice from fellow staff officers when developing enemy COAs in the first place, so he must have their advice available to help employ enemy assets most effectively during the wargame. Since each staff section has a primary and an assistant, they could be split between friendly and enemy sides. Admittedly, getting all staff primaries to participate in a wargame is difficult enough given the usual frenetic nature of MDMP, especially in a field environment. Incorporating the assistants as well seems unlikely. So when the situation precludes full staff attendance, wargaming can still achieve a modicum of balance by at least considering all of the enemy warfighting functions in detail. Expanding the synchronization matrix to include an equal number of rows for enemy activities could serve as a forcing function to achieve this.

Conclusion

While these simple changes would already significantly improve MDMP manual wargaming, I propose going further. A comprehensive overhaul of wargaming through the design of a rigorous ruleset with step-by-step instructions could formalize quantifiable relationships, enforce balance, and streamline the procedure. This, in turn, would allow the commander and staff to run through more repetitions—exploring COAs more fully, exploring more COAs, and perhaps even incorporating wargaming earlier in MDMP. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to begin this project. However, I offer two starting points for further research: First, Wargaming: A Systematic Approach, a book by CGSC professor retired LTC Neil Garra, who embarked on a similar project almost 15 years ago. I came across a reference to his book in a monograph written for the School of Advanced Military Studies by LTC Matthew Hanson. While I did not have time to review the book in detail, it warrants revisiting to extract his analysis and techniques. Second, civilian tabletop wargames. There are many commercial wargames that account for an extensive range of military considerations covering all warfighting functions, with lessons that could be incorporated into the design of an MDMP manual wargaming ruleset. The Folio Series by Decision Games, for example, has a core set of rules that are scalable by echelon and can be supplemented for specific scenarios.

Current MDMP manual wargaming doctrine markedly lacks the kind of structure and rigor it needs to flow efficiently and create space for the commander and staff to effectively isolate friction points in friendly COAs. The wargaming described in FM 6-0 is less a process than a conceptual framework. There is too little procedural guidance, too much ambiguity, too much room for arbitrariness, and a dangerous imbalance that favors the friendly side. Successful MDMP manual wargaming can be needlessly difficult for an inexperienced staff. The Army should revise the doctrine for clarity and begin work toward creating a comprehensive ruleset to address the issues identified in this article. The desired end state is a robust toolkit with a parity of opposing forces that approaches real-world conditions. It must serve as a flexible template that can be expanded and tailored to meet the diverse needs of units across the Army. There is nothing more dangerous than underestimating the enemy and deploying into combat with a false sense of security in an untested plan. An overhaul of MDMP manual wargaming would pay dividends on the battlefield.

Endnotes

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 9-27.
11. Ibid., 9-34.
13. Ibid., 9-27.
15. Ibid., 9-33.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 9-36.
18. Ibid.

(Continued on page 69)
Introduction

In March 2011, Salman Khan stepped onto the TED (Technology, Entertainment, and Design) stage to talk about Khan Academy. As he explained it, what started as an uncle trying to help his niece by recording blackboard sessions on YouTube became a revolutionary pedagogic method. The idea was simple: take a small subject such as fractions, record a short video explaining the concept, and run through an example. The user watches the video, works a problem, and applies the lessons learned. If the user does not understand a sequence, he or she can simply go back to that step. It’s this slow-going back-and-forth at the user’s pace that allows for proper learning. By the time Mr. Khan gave this speech, he had personally posted more than 1,000 videos and his organization had created tutorials that could teach anyone mathematics up to college level Calculus IV. Using the classical classroom method, a teacher has to teach the subject and hope the class understands. If a student has difficulty understanding the subject, then the teacher differentiates the teaching style. This requires a lot of time, and for it to work, the students must admit they do not understand the subject. An open classroom can be a brutal place for students to confess ignorance. The military is no different.

The younger generation of Soldiers learns how to use programs and technology by watching “how-to” videos. Consider the following task:

- Record a macro on Excel to automatically sort imported data.
- How much of this do you understand?
- Do you feel confident that you could do this task?
- What is the first thing you would do?

I imagine you would pull up Google and search for “how to….on excel.” The top results will more often than not contain a how-to video. Tasks such as these require a step-by-step explanation and time for the user to accomplish the task at their own speed. When programs like Excel, which a $600 billion company has exhaustively engineered, tested, and redesigned, are still not that user-friendly to the occasional user, how can Soldiers be expected to know how to utilize the even more complex tools on the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS–A)? Look on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and you will see short clips of random pieces of foreign military equipment, or maybe the random video of an insurgent cell conducting a meeting. Heaven help you if you type “how to” into Intelink; you are likely to get nothing. However, do a random search on Google starting with “how to,” and then click the video tab. A seemingly endless list of videos populates. Obviously, there are a lot more people on the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), and there is a mountain of content with no place in military missions. However, you will never find a “How to create a MCOO [Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay] on the...
MFWS [Multi-Functional Workstation]” video on NIPRNET, and you won’t find it on SIPRNET either.

Why Videos Work
How often does anyone go to a library to find out how to build a website? If you were to do the internet search “how to build a website,” you would get about 29 million results. Hand a paper manual on how to build a website to the average Soldier, and you will see frustration, followed by a quick bowing out of the task. Sit that same Soldier down with a YouTube video of someone showing the step-by-step recording of the desktop, and within a short time, a viable product is available. Instead of reading a step and interpreting what the author meant, the Soldier can watch someone else’s movements, thereby making the learning process more streamlined and accurate. Why is this true? One possibility is that tutorial videos take full advantage of mirror neurons, which are a substrate for humans to imitate. Put simply, mirror neurons are the “monkey see, monkey do” part of the human condition. Primates, children, Soldiers, and others learn tasks by watching and doing. Tutorial videos, like YouTube, take full advantage of these connections. For complex virtual environments such as the DCGS–A MFWS, the fastest way to teach, record, and distribute to the force is through videos.

Too Complex to Use
DCGS–A has amazing capabilities the collective has yet to employ; however, the acquisitions process has created a Rube Goldberg machine of setup criteria that prevents any one person from becoming a fully functional user. Now, making every Soldier a fully proficient user of DCGS–A was never the point. It is a system of systems spanning echelons and drilling down to the team levels of the U.S. Army Forces Command. The basic DCGS–A client has a long user manual, most of which is indecipherable by the operator. Compounding this is whenever a new version of the software releases, an updated manual is issued as well. Reading step-by-step the “buttonology” of setting up a simple map within the MFWS is outmoded and inappropriate considering the complexity of the system. All the Soldier wants to do is to place an icon on the map so they can move it within the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. They are expending all their effort trying to learn the system, and they originally set up the program. Sometimes, Soldiers simply cannot remember a step, or what tab they clicked. Fast-forward a couple of months, and the Soldier has forgotten nearly all the training received. The Soldier has quite possibly spent more time in the motor pool than training on their job. Again, the Soldier has to go back for DCGS–A training. None of this is necessary, and to say that the responsibility for Soldiers to retain that training lies on the military intelligence company commander is nothing short of a cop-out. Technologies exist to record and save all this training on SIPRNET with the steps, notes, links to documents, and comments (just like on YouTube).

Retention of Training
When necessary, units send Soldiers to a refresher course that walks Soldiers through the multitude of setup steps. When Soldiers complete the training, which varies from a few hours to 10 days, they have created an amazing series of crisply analyzed products derived from canned data. However, they usually do not remember how

Usage in the Field
One day in late 2015, out of frustration I interviewed three junior analysts:
✦ One in my brigade [1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division (ID)] S-2 section.
✦ One in the 1/3 [1st ABCT, 3rd ID] Military Intelligence Company.
✦ One from a neighboring brigade [2nd ABCT, 3rd ID] S-2 section.
Below is the question I asked and their responses.

CW3 MICHAEL TRIPP. What tools do you regularly use on SIPR for analysis?
1/3 BRIGADE S-2 ANALYST. I can’t think of anything right now. I’ve used CPOF [Command Post of the Future] and PowerPoint.
1/3 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY ANALYST. Intellink. That’s a pretty good tool.

CW3 MICHAEL TRIPP. Intelink is a search engine. What kind of tools like MFWS, or even Microsoft Excel, have you used?
1/3 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY ANALYST. I’ve never used MFWS outside of the classroom. I don’t know of anything else.

2/3 BRIGADE S-2 ANALYST. I know MWFS has some capabilities, but I don’t have enough experience to use it.

This is a very small sample size, but I can say for certain that the same problem existed at my previous unit, the 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade. The Soldiers did not even know how to set up the system, let alone what the capabilities were.

There are, from time-to-time, the rock stars who delve into their DCGS–A and come up with innovative ways to employ a program or two. These users have, in a sense, cracked the code that even most DCGS–A field service representatives cannot. These are the individuals with a focus on their niche. They see a program like the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise—intended for geospatial analysis—and think, “How can I use this for my discipline?” (whether for geospatial intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence...whatever). At this stage, Soldiers need to use the system as a scientist uses a laboratory, and like any good scientist, Soldiers record their results and share those results in an open forum upon which the rest of the community can build. The best way to record and share these results is through desktop recording.

**The Way Ahead**

At this time, both VLC and QuickTime video player are approved for use on most secure networks. VLC has a slightly complex desktop recording function, but it cannot simultaneously record the audio portion without an open source add-on. QuickTime has a turnkey desktop recording function with a seamless audio recording ability when it has authorization for the QuickTime Pro license. Depending on the status of the requesting unit, an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) can be submitted for the licensing. However, when the unit undergoes system updates, a new ONS must be submitted.

Desktop recording also has the added benefit of allowing the DCGS–A developers to see how the system is being employed—which programs are being used for their intended purpose, which ones are not being used at all, and (my personal favorite) the innovative ways a program is being used by single sources. In the short term, this would be a one-way street. Either the developers or the users are creating videos, but over time, a dialogue can take shape. This dialogue could directly influence the requirements process for future versions of DCGS–A. In economic terms, the market demand will determine the supply.

The final evolution of this concept is to connect the end user directly to the software engineers. When a problem occurs, or a new method is created for using a program, the intelligence Soldier can connect directly to the DCGS enterprise and speak via video chat to the engineer. Currently, the National Security Agency Network regularly uses Skype for Business to directly connect analysts and end users. In addition to connecting multiple users, Skype for Business can record these sessions for future reference. Excluding bandwidth concerns, a system like this could directly connect end users with support engineers to improve DCGS–A support to the mission. This may even reduce the amount spent on TDY, and streamline the requirements process for digital systems improvement.

**Endnotes**

1. TED is a nonprofit organization devoted to spreading ideas in the form of short powerful talks that last 18 minutes or less. They are available online through free distribution at [http://www.ted.com](http://www.ted.com).

2. Pedagogy is the art, science, or profession of teaching, especially as an academic subject or theoretical concept.

3. Differentiation refers to a wide variety of teaching techniques and lesson adaptations that educators use to instruct a diverse group of students who have diverse learning needs.


6. Summarized conversations from notes.

7. The use of Skype for Business is an unclassified aspect of the National Security Agency Network. The author could not verify the use of Skype for Business on other secured and unclassified systems.

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Recognizing the Need

The U.S. Army created the Total Army Sponsorship Program (TASP) after recognizing that reassigning Soldiers and Army Civilians every 2 to 3 years was extremely disruptive. TASP’s purpose is to “improve unit or organizational cohesion and readiness by decreasing distractions that hamper personal performance and mission accomplishment.” Thus, a gaining unit assigns sponsors to incoming personnel to help newcomers adjust to their duty stations. TASP eases the transition and integration of new personnel and their families.

Intelligence professionals are among those who become frustrated when integrating into a new series of intelligence processes. Army intelligence professionals, both Soldiers and Army Civilians, arrive at a new unit with many skills and experiences. Their level of formal education varies from high school diplomas to doctorates, in subject areas ranging from fashion design to intelligence studies. Some individuals have 20 or more years of experience performing intelligence analysis, whereas others are new graduates from Army Advanced Individual Training, which follows basic combat training. In some cases, Soldiers have been in the Army for several years but have never performed analytical tasks because they had other duties or reclassified from different career fields.

Regardless of their background, it can be daunting for newcomers to understand the mission of their unit. New analysts often spend a disproportionate amount of time attempting to identify resources and determining how to assimilate and process new information, rather than spending time doing their assigned job. Section leaders are the primary trainers for new personnel, providing on-the-job training to give new analysts a basic understanding (analytical baseline) of their assigned geographic region/functional area. Unfortunately, the high operational tempo and daily requirements can quickly limit a section’s ability to adequately train and assess new personnel, resulting in a sink-or-swim environment.

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other intelligence organizations have devised training programs for their new analysts.² This baseline usually contains instruction on the organization or mission, writing development, automation tools, and procedural information.

To date, Army intelligence units have not formally developed training programs for new analysts, but units have created their own processes. Military intelligence (MI) organizations frequently employ various training methods to evaluate subordinates and then identify training needs for their specific mission. For example, in some units, supervisors use intelligence readiness checklists to track how their analysts performed on essential mission tasks, and then use the results to identify follow-on training. However, the effectiveness of this process depends on the skills and available time of those supervisors.

Analysis and Control Element Academy’s Objective

The 24th MI Battalion created the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Academy to fill a critical gap in the training and integration of intelligence professionals at the start of an analyst’s tour with the battalion. The ACE Academy provides home-station training, assessment, and validation to develop essential analytical skills to meet mission requirements. The academy includes familiarization with—

- All intelligence disciplines.
- Mission of the MI brigade (theater).
- Systems.
- Area of operations.
- Area of responsibility.
- Research techniques.
- Production automation.
- Intelligence writing.
- Briefing techniques.

The academy also creates a networking environment, which builds cohesive teams that assist students during their time at the 24th MI Battalion.

Nested within Training Guidance

The ACE Academy concept emerged from the 24th MI Battalion’s intelligence readiness training plan and the soldier readiness glide path, which outlined a progressive approach to training and providing experiential opportunities
for Soldiers during their time with the unit; usually 2 to 3 years. It also embraces the concept of “No MI Soldier at Rest.”4 The ACE Academy is an integral component of the Soldier readiness glide path that provides a general timeline for all intelligence military occupational specialties working in the battalion.5

The academy’s model also works in conjunction with U.S. Army Europe’s (USAREUR’s) training strategy and the Army’s learning concept. USAREUR’s guidance reinforces the notion of the fundamentals and the unit’s mission essential task list (METL) when planning for and conducting training events. The guidance also incorporates the need for multinational interoperability and partnership building. “No Cold Starts,” as guided by the Army Intelligence Training Strategy, is the core premise of the ACE Academy. Furthermore, the academy refreshes perishable skills, provides a platform to form key relationships among intelligence capabilities, and promotes a versatile force.6

As an MI organization, the need to adapt rapidly to an ever-changing operating environment is paramount to providing relevant, timely intelligence requirements. Soldiers must acquire and readily apply problem-solving skills to overcome many challenges and fallacies. These are the primary tenants of the Army’s learning concept.7 Not only must Soldiers understand information and have the ability to perform their tasks effectively, but they also need to have the ability to think critically in unconventional ways to find answers within the complex information environment. For these reasons, the ACE Academy was formed using theories presented in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for Training and Education 2020-2040, and designed using a supportive methodology.

**Development Methodology**

Developers selected the analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE) method as a design approach because of its acceptance as a best practice in the civilian education field8 and because it is the standard for Army training development.9 The problem set and concept easily fit with the ADDIE methodology, which provides a structured framework for curriculum design.

**Analysis Phase.** Analysis is the first step, and it involves defining the need. In this case, the intelligence professionals assigned to the 24th MI Battalion need to quickly obtain an understanding of the role and responsibilities of the 24th MI Battalion ACE. They also need to understand how the battalion fits within the 66th MI Brigade and its supporting role within USAREUR. Furthermore, analysts must learn how to become proficient in performing intelligence production by applying intelligence community standards and employing appropriate research techniques.

As an outcome, we wanted the ACE Academy to hone Soldiers’ and Civilians’ skills to create a more efficient trained force, ready to support theater-level intelligence operations within the USAREUR G-2. Soldiers and Civilians receive training on mission requirements, intelligence foundations, and intelligence production. The process reduces the train-up/lag time to produce intelligence and encourages leveraging other organizations within the intelligence community.

In addition to the ADDIE method and prescribed METL analysis, an informal survey of ACE leaders generated a list of possible blocks of instruction to produce training needs. Leaders discussed skills of “new” personnel, capturing not only deficiencies but also core competencies essential in making the ACE function effectively. Across the board, leaders responded that writing skills, knowledge and operation of basic automation programs, and knowledge of the intelligence enterprise in general were severely lacking.

**Design Phase.** In the Design phase, the course developer defined not only student requirements but also requirements for the instructors, the academy’s officer in charge (OIC), and the noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). Students must have the proper clearance level and...
a valid SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) token to access course materials. The OIC and/or NCOIC are responsible for developing the curriculum and potentially instructing classes; therefore, both have certifications from the Army Basic Instructor Course and the Foundation Training Developer Course.

From the METL analysis and mission requirement analysis, developers produced terminal learning objectives (TLOs) and enabling learning objectives (ELOs) that supported the overall goal/intent of the academy. Objectives were crosswalked with the battalion’s METL and the subordinate companies’ critical task lists. The academy’s OIC and/or NCOIC can adjust the course design, TLOs, and ELOs, as the mission dictates; however, TLOs and ELOs must remain measurable.

The academy works in two phases: The first week consists of 3 days of familiarization training intended for incoming Soldiers and Civilian personnel. The second week is 5 days of general intelligence skills training designed for Soldiers only. In the future, the Academy may include an additional week, lasting 5 days, specifically tailored to military occupational specialty skillsets, including ACE mission-specific training.

The lesson outlines and lesson plans were developed following TRADOC’s standard prescribed format. Depending on the individual block of instruction, a student’s assessment is recorded as a go/no-go or is evaluated based on a rubric. For rubric-based evaluations, students submit their work digitally for assessment.

Development Phase. In the Development phase, the course developer used the outlines and concepts from the Design phase to complete the lesson plans. Validated course assessments from the first course iteration led to adjustments to lesson plans.

Implementation Phase. The instructors taught the classes, completed assessments about their students, and provided counseling to the students. The students completed evaluations about the training, instructors, etc. However, the method the instructors used to assess the student analysts while at the academy were found to need improvement. This is because the instructors are also members/leaders of the ACE, and it was necessary to ensure instruction and assessments for analysts would go beyond the ACE Academy, i.e., from cradle to grave.

Evaluation Phase. Evaluation is conducted on several levels. Continual tiered feedback from multiple perspectives is key to limiting bias. Evaluation results drive—

- Facility sustainment and improvement.
- Instructor development.

After action review results for the course are typically released to leadership within a week of the course’s completion and contain the results of student surveys and the academy manager’s comments, observations, and recommendations.

Additional Considerations. Specific elements of intelligence capabilities are outside of current mission requirements, such as space and cyberspace operations. Also, while some skills were deemed important, such as critical thinking, course developers concluded that structured mobile training teams would be beneficial. For this reason, the construct of the final practical exercise during the second week was to be discovery learning and included a project that would assess a Soldier’s capabilities. Students develop a briefing on a topic and present it to the class and the ACE leadership. Their presentation and briefing skills are evaluated using a rubric. This small-group method promotes team building and provides students with an opportunity to use and reinforce the skills taught at the academy.

Opportunities to Overcome Challenges

The ACE Academy classroom was transformed from an empty office to a training area, with the capacity to house
20 workstations with connectivity to the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network, SIPRNET, and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System. This transformation could not have been possible without the support of the battalion and information technology personnel. Although the classroom was designed specifically for the ACE Academy, the battalion has used the classroom for a variety of needs, including other training, conferences, and meetings.

The ACE Academy OIC and NCOIC serve as the course managers and are the continuity for the course. They are responsible for all administrative actions, including pre-course counseling and pre- and post-course surveys. It is their job to ensure resourcing of the main requirements. They also act as the backstop for instruction and are the go-between to work through students’ scheduling issues. The course managers attend all blocks of instruction to observe the students and instructors and to provide feedback. Based on their observations and feedback, the OIC and NCOIC modify the curriculum. As ACE mission requirements change, the OIC and NCOIC keep pace with production requirements and analytical tools for the mission. If necessary, the curriculum is modified to mirror the ACE operational change.

One of the primary topics of debate throughout the academy’s inception and design was that of instructors—internal versus external. We considered several factors, including expertise, cost, and daily mission accomplishment. Ultimately, we selected internal ACE instructors. Although internally sourcing both Soldier and Civilian instructors from the ACE might minimally affect intelligence production, the benefits of using the ACE leadership as the instructor pool substantially outweighed the potential risk. Personnel within the ACE are already familiar with the mission and standard operating procedures.

By internally sourcing instructors, students meet and build a rapport with the ACE team and learn who the team’s subject matter experts are. Although longevity can differ for Soldiers, many of the Civilians have been, and will likely continue to be, a source of continuity within the ACE and the academy. Only a small percentage of the instructors are actually “instructor qualified” by the Army Basic Instructor Course or some other standard. We judged the risk of using potentially “unqualified” instructors to be a far smaller risk than using “qualified” instructors who probably do not understand the mission because they lack experience in the ACE.

As mission requirements can vary, lesson plans are prepared in advance so that any experienced analyst can step in to teach a class. The TRADOC standard lesson plan, which uses objectives and instructor discussion notes, was produced for each block of instruction. The academy’s OIC and NCOIC must also be able to instruct in the event of a scheduling conflict.

With regard to participation, the leadership decided to include all new personnel, both Soldier and Civilian, during the first week (Familiarization); and for the second week (General Military Intelligence Skills), include only Soldiers; making it optional for Civilians.

The ACE Academy faced some challenges. For example, although students are identified early, some of them cannot attend because of exigent circumstances. Also, since the program is designed for new personnel, some students miss a day of class because they are taking care of things related to a permanent change of station, for example, accepting the delivery of household goods.

Initially, some students believe that training such topics as Microsoft PowerPoint and Excel, classified markings, and spillage prevention is a waste of time, but they soon discover that the classes provide a lot of useful information.

This course has received criticism from single-source leaders for not being beneficial to their Soldiers, in particular their linguists. Single-source leaders believe the course is designed for all-source analysts, and single-source Soldiers would be better served by on-the-job training. However, the academy does not seek to replace on-the-job training; rather, the academy provides a general baseline for students. Furthermore, a survey of a group of students that was over half single-source analysts indicated that more than 90 percent of the students would recommend the course to others.

**Initial Implications**

Results thus far have been positive. After action reviews conducted on the final day of class revealed an overwhelming appreciation for the course. Overall, students rated the course as highly beneficial (an average of 4.4 out of 5). Interestingly, many students indicated they believed they benefitted the most from areas they were least excited about, such as classified markings and data transfer.

An additional survey revealed that analysts were pleased with the training and thought it was appropriate to their daily tasks. Furthermore, Soldiers were less intimidated and more prepared to meet production requirements. A few analysts also stated it was the most beneficial training they had ever received for their job preparation and integration.

**Sustainment and the Way Forward**

For this program to succeed, leaders must be committed to the development of their intelligence professionals, and
instructors must remain motivated to devote the time necessary to provide exceptional training and show genuine care for the Soldiers’ growth. Finally, the curriculum must continue to adapt to the changing ACE mission while remaining grounded in good analytical practices to maintain mission relevancy.

Endnotes


6. Department of the Army, Army Intelligence.


10. Ibid.

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Introduction

By 2030, it is expected that more than 60 percent of the world’s population will live in dense urban centers, and the majority of these megacities/dense urban areas (DUAs) are, and will be, in complex terrain environments. Consequently, weather conditions in these areas will influence a greater populace and can negatively influence military operations, community services, and overall situational understanding needed for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Extreme weather conditions will impact DUAs often already overstressed by uncontrolled growth and a degraded public infrastructure. Unique weather conditions experienced within the DUA will highlight, and even magnify, weather sensitivities affecting threat, civilian populations, and Department of Defense (DoD) weapons systems and operations. Looking back over the last 25 years, weather forecasting accuracy hovers around 85 percent for no more than a 24-hour forecast period; this doesn’t adequately meet the needs of the mission planning cycle, especially beyond the 24-hour period. During Operation Desert Storm, over 50 percent of the U.S. Air Force’s F-117 sorties aborted because of unfavorable weather effects over their targets, and A-10s flew only 75 of 200 scheduled close air support missions because of low cloud cover during the first 2 days of the campaign. It is sobering to transpose these atmospheric conditions to the futuristic warfare environment in which the DUA will require weather support on a much finer and physically more demanding spatial and temporal scale.

Current state-of-the-science atmospheric sensing, characterization, and forecasting capabilities cannot accurately represent the rapidly changing and complex atmospheric processes in a DUA environment. Innovative and disruptive solutions are required to revolutionize locally fine-tuned weather support information, which is critical to IPB and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs. Accurately sensed, characterized, and predicted localized DUA weather conditions function as a force multiplier for local commanders tasked with leading operations in these multifaceted and intricate domains. Ignoring these high-resolution local weather impacts will lead to unexpected and unplanned effects on operations and will jeopardize mission success. Accurate planning for advanced weather effects and impacts enables effective timing of operations. Accurate high-resolution forecast support drives military operational planning within the DUA by confidently describing the occurrence of passing rain, thunderstorms, severe weather, snow squalls, gust fronts, fog occurrence, and related operational effects.

Operational Impact of Local Dense Urban Area Weather

Addressing atmospheric environment concerns will improve the potential for military success in the congested
DUA environment. Examples of such concerns are DUA winds, severe weather, battlefield sensor performance, and atmospheric prediction models.

**DUA Winds.** The local, complex terrain (i.e., city areas with large and numerous buildings, man-made urban sprawl, etc.) significantly influences near-surface wind patterns across just a few city blocks. Unpredicted wind funneling between, around, and over buildings will lead to small, unmanned aircraft system failure, inaccurate dispersion plume predictions (chemical, biological, smoke, etc.), and many other related environmental impacts and effects issues for warfighters. Significant research and development efforts are needed to determine these microscale wind effects within unique DUA environments.

**Severe Weather.** Flooding, drought, excess heat/cold, precipitation, and wind influences in specific DUA environments are often drastically different from day to day, hour to hour, and from one section of the DUA to another. Scientific studies must address questions regarding what the populace does during expected severe weather events and how best to cope with or control civilian actions and responses. Equally important are questions regarding how to effectively address the need for new decision support applications. These applications will aid military planners through mission execution in these extreme weather conditions. Decision tools that address how the severe weather affects food and food distribution, communications, fuel, power, and service distribution—for both military and civilian operations—will enhance leadership’s decisions for planning and executing all military operations.

**Battlefield Sensor Performance.** The often complex and varied local weather conditions within a DUA can wreak havoc on battlefield sensor performance. Since target and background signatures influence sensors, the complex and oftentimes densely packed structures of the urban environment will affect visual, infrared, and acoustic sensors.

**Atmospheric Prediction Models.** Spatial resolution of fine-scale atmospheric prediction models must continuously improve to provide accurate predictions within the complex DUA environment. For example, what weather spatial resolution is required to effectively address DUA weather effects? And how often should fine-scale DUA atmospheric prediction models be run to adequately depict the environment? Answers to these questions are critical to determine performance requirements for accurate microscale weather model predictions. Additionally, the scientific community must perform needed research to determine the ideal numbers, types, and placement of weather-sensing capabilities within the DUA. These optimized observations will ensure weather-prediction models are supported using the most recent and accurate local atmospheric conditions possible. DUA weather-sensing advances will provide data to enhance the understanding of megacity atmospheric processes critical to improving the underlying physics and dynamics of microscale atmospheric models tailored to such domains.

**Operational Challenges in Dense Urban Area Domains**

**Military Units.** Military units deploying within a DUA domain will likely operate in small teams conducting short-duration missions. These teams will often execute different types of missions within city blocks of each other. Microscale weather conditions often heavily influence the DUA environment; they can be significantly different from block to block and city sector to city sector. Based on these characteristics, military operations within a typical DUA will need multiple weather forecasts to effectively plan and support operations.

**DUA Environments.** Most DUA environments are located near significant bodies of water (lakes, rivers, littoral), which further influence microclimates associated with these high-humidity and often valley-terrain areas.

**Aviation Operations.** Military planners and leaders will likely use aviation operations as a primary means of mission execution within the DUA. Wind, cloud ceiling, visibility, precipitation, buildings, wires, elevated cables, communica-
tion towers, and urban terrain objects such as large signs and billboards within the DUA will significantly influence all aviation operations.

**Weather Conditions.** Weather conditions within the DUA affect threat operations just as they do friendly forces. Determining the weather impact deltas between friendly and threat forces can positively contribute to the DUA battlefield commander’s IPB knowledge base. Other challenges relate to weather’s impact on concealment of operations for both friendly and threat forces.

**Weather-Sensing and Atmospheric Characterization.** Weather-sensing and atmospheric-characterization capabilities are lacking within DUA environments. Reliable weather-forecasting capabilities (via tailored numerical weather-prediction forecast models) require local surface and upper air weather observations as input to accurately characterize current/initial atmospheric conditions. Sufficient numbers of weather observations enable meaningful mission watch. Mission watch provides operational commanders a real-time weather picture of the area of operations (AO) during mission execution. Effective weather mission watch provides atmospheric monitoring of choke points, avenues of approach, and even military objectives within the AO.

**Solutions to the Dense Urban Area Weather Challenges**

Looking ahead at the megacity/DUA battlefields of 2020 and beyond, there is an overwhelming need to revolutionize the science of atmospheric sensing, characterizing, and predicting microscale conditions in the DUA. The future for DUA operational weather forecasting is short-term weather-prediction technology hosted on computationally complex but extremely efficient general-purpose graphics processing units. Today’s centrally produced weather forecasts, with data and products distributed to battlefield elements via reachback capabilities, will quickly clog communications channels and are not temporally responsive to DUA-scale local weather changes. Forward-deploying such prediction capabilities on local computer platforms is feasible but will depend upon local, reliable DUA battlefield communications for weather data access to produce tailored and rapidly updated predictions. Distribution of these locally produced weather updates will ensure the most current and accurate DUA weather-effect predictions are available down to the Soldier level. A game-changing source of locally sensed weather data in the DUA is the potential for using swarms of autonomous and/or semiautonomous unmanned ground/air micro-vehicles to collect weather observations in megacities. Autonomous platforms could be equipped with weather sensors to dramatically improve currently inadequate local weather observation capabilities. Such multiuse sensors would provide crucial input, significantly improving the accuracy of local DUA atmospheric prediction models.

From the research and development perspective, adequate observed weather data is crucial for the validation and verification of atmospheric modeling weather forecast improvements. The DoD scientific community must quantify how weather observing and forecast improvements add value to the DUA warfighter. The scientific community must answer the question: “How do improved weather forecasts significantly enhance warfighter operations?”

Applying all fine-scale technology improvements to advanced, automated, state-of-the-science decision tools will improve application of military power throughout the DUA. With improved weather support capabilities, DUA commanders can use a full suite of accurate predictions of atmospheric effects and impacts on local operations, including expected losses due to hazardous weather. Forward-deployed local atmospheric prediction technology, crowd sourcing-sensed data, and general-purpose graphics
processing unit advances for atmospheric prediction computing are just a few of the future technologies that will enable these capabilities. Future forecasting may include the capability to run and then push a complex urban terrain atmospheric model to the lowest echelons in the battlefield. Development of deployable hardware and software system prototypes for weather-effects intelligence and decision tools must complement the work on meteorological sensor arrays, microscale atmospheric prediction systems, and unmanned system and atmospheric sensing platform resources to reach these technological goals.

The U.S. Army Research Laboratory is pursuing initial research work in several areas to move these DUA initiatives forward:

- Weather-sensing and atmospheric studies.
- Atmospheric processes and weather-sensing requirements.
- New weather-related decision aids.

**Weather-Sensing and Atmospheric Studies.** Weather-sensing and atmospheric studies are being conducted to characterize the AO and optimize mission execution by providing essential input to weather forecast models. Continuing this work will, in-turn, improve forecast accuracy and therefore confidence in the planning and execution of all military operations. Forecast accuracy improvements mean a safer operating environment for military and civilian personnel, with few, if any, weather surprises within the AO. Weather sensing in DUA domains also provides critical, real-time situational awareness supporting current operations. A comprehensive understanding of current atmospheric conditions enables the commander’s full utilization of the AO, in both time and space, allowing for the selection of tactics, weapons, and targets based, at least in part, on atmospheric conditions. Accurate and timely weather observations are a true force multiplier, protecting military and civilian operations and assets from the uncertainty of mission-limiting weather conditions.

**Atmospheric Processes and Weather-Sensing Requirements.** Research is being done to understand atmospheric processes and weather-sensing requirements in DUAs via advanced microscale weather-prediction model development. The Army Research Laboratory is developing DUA fine-scale, operational local atmospheric modeling capabilities suitable for forecast centers and forward-deployed implementation on the smallest computational platforms possible. Such capabilities will support operational theater forecast centers, as well as the lowest battlefield echelons, with on-scene local atmospheric predictions. These forecasts capabilities will ingest the most current, locally sensed atmospheric data. Today, resolution of currently fielded weather forecast modeling capabilities and the availability of weather observations limit precise prediction of local weather events. Improving the resolution of weather predictions, especially in the complex DUA terrain, requires a significant increase in the number of weather observations and optimized placement of weather sensors to initialize the atmospheric forecast model. Research must continue and consider the value of remotely sensed observations (e.g., satellite and radar) as input to these improved model capabilities. Weather-sensing capabilities, combined with better model physics, will significantly improve the weather forecast accuracies within an urban environment. Developing forward-deployed and frequently updated small computer platform atmospheric modeling capabilities will make more weather available to onboard weather decision tools. This will significantly enhance the timeliness and accuracy of microscale weather predictions and the production of weather graphics and decision aids.

**New Weather-Related Decision Aids.** The new aids include sensor performance tools for multiple modalities, such as acoustic, infrared, radar, and seismic. Decision aid development must continue and include applications supporting a prediction of human domain conditions based on
weather and climate, combined with and including populace reactions to military operations. DUA-focused ensemble probabilistic predictions will produce forecast confidence output for decision support tools of high interest and use by military commanders and decision makers within the DUA.

**Summary**

Weather conditions significantly influence military operations within the DUA. These large city complexes represent a significant portion of the future operating environment and are getting larger and more complex. Confident execution of military operations demands comprehensive weather support at spatial and temporal resolutions that accurately depict microclimates found in every DUA environment. These weather conditions affect all aspects of the geospatial environment within the DUA.

Continued development in increased resolution and accuracy of deployed weather support products is crucial, especially in the DUA. Effective weather-sensing, atmospheric characterization, and prediction will optimize mission execution by providing critical, real-time situational awareness supporting future operations, as well as providing essential input to weather forecast models and decision support tools. These capabilities improve forecast accuracy and confidence in the planning and execution of all military operations. Forecast accuracy improvements mean a safer, more effective operating environment for military and civilian personnel.

Identifying and pursuing environmental support challenges will help ensure DoD DUA battlefield commanders have a full picture of predicted atmospheric effects and impacts on DUA operations, including expected losses due to hazardous weather. As the Army’s operational environment continues to evolve, so must the Army’s capability to sense, understand, and describe the physical environment. Pursuing recommendations highlighted in this article will optimize our understanding and application of crucial weather conditions within the megacity operations, as future urban operating environments become the norm. Investments in basic and applied weather support research are needed to gain and maintain capabilities that help ensure military success in this complicated DUA environment.

**Endnotes**

1. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October 2014), i.
4. Department of the Army, ATP 2-01.3, 3-5.
Forging a Battle-Winning Asset

David Kilcullen, one of the world’s leading experts in counterinsurgency and modern warfare, described the contributions of military linguists when he declared, “Linguists are a battle-winning asset.”1 Linguists apply unique cultural knowledge and linguistic expertise on the battlefield to achieve pivotal tactical and strategic advantages. While some enter military service as heritage speakers, already proficient in a foreign language, most military linguists attend the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and affiliate training centers. Their contributions on the battlefield are the culminating manifestation of months of language and culture training under the tutelage of civilian and military professional educators, including non-commissioned officers (NCOs) serving as military language instructors (MLIs).

Military Language Instructor Roles and Responsibilities

MLIs conduct foreign language-based instruction for civilians and military students of all branches and ranks at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), also known as DLI, at the Presidio of Monterey, California. MLIs are typically DLI graduates who have served as linguists in tactical, operational, or strategic assignments. Inherent in the MLI role is platform time, or personally teaching students in the classroom. They develop programs of instruction (POIs), generating new course material and training scenarios based on relevant current events and their field experience. They also liaise with military units responsible for their students to encourage and support language study outside the classroom (e.g., tutoring programs and study hall) and inform first line supervisors of individual student progress.

The Military Language Instructor Compared to Peers

Human intelligence collector (military occupational specialty [MOS] 35M) and cryptologic linguist (MOS 35P) NCOs may pursue various broadening assignments at similar times in their careers, including becoming an MLI, Advanced Individual Training (AIT) platoon sergeant, or instructor/writer. Inherent differences influence promotion and future opportunities. The following figure outlines notable similarities and differences among these three broadening assignments. Significant distinctions include the MLI’s cultural and linguistic expertise, the magnitude of interpersonal tact in the MLI role, and evolving opportunities in military leadership and management as an MLI to fill existing gaps.

Expertise in Education and Linguistic and Cultural Matters.

Linguists graduate from DLI as competent Soldier-linguists, equipped with an advanced knowledge base and cultural understanding and prepared to embark on diverse mission sets. BG Kevin C. Wulfhorst, then assistant deputy chief of staff, Army Intelligence Office, stated, “Linguists are equipped to not only assess what the enemy might do, but also to provide a deeper, nuanced understanding of how they think.”2 This advanced understanding of language and culture originates in classrooms under the direction of MLIs.

MLIs draw upon their cultural and linguistic expertise while serving as instructors in one of eight undergraduate schools at DLI. They develop training scenarios and design a rigorous curriculum aiming for graduates to achieve at least a score of 2+ in reading and listening (limited working
proficiency, plus) on the Defense Language Proficiency Test and a score of 2 (limited working proficiency) in the Oral Proficiency Interview. Those MLIs who attended and graduated from DLI draw upon their unique experiences and learning models as students, enhancing their coaching abilities for foreign language acquisition as they train students.

The advanced level of language proficiency and pedagogical knowledge among MLIs is evident in the credits awarded to MLIs pursuing academic degrees related to teaching. For example, the University of Louisville offers MLIs 15 credits toward a master of arts in higher education administration and an 8-week accelerated resident track to complete the graduate degree. Awarded credits include material focusing on program development and assessment, teaching and learning styles, and instructional strategies. MLIs may also pursue a professional teaching certificate through the Middlebury Institute of International Studies.

MLIs leverage their expertise in curriculum development, similar to instructor/writers. MLIs develop a constantly evolving POI for language study, atypical of other AIT courses with small variations to POIs certified annually. MLIs also attend the same Instructor Certification Course as their civilian counterparts. This emphasis on teaching certifications, curriculum development, and classroom instruction contributed to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s 2015 modification of eligibility restrictions for instructor badges. It further enabled MLIs to participate in the NCO Education System’s Instructor Development and Recognition Program and earn the Basic Army Instructor Badge (BAIB). In 2017, DLIFLC leadership presented the BAIB to two MLIs, the first to earn the badge in the institute’s history.

Leading through Influence. In an environment with military and civilian policymakers, superiors and peers of different branches, and civilians on teaching teams and in leadership roles, rank grants MLIs limited authority. Instead, successful MLIs must develop and leverage effective communication skills and interpersonal tact to gain credibility and influence.

MLIs experience the unique opportunity of teaching alongside highly educated civilian counterparts who are native speakers of the language they teach. The undergraduate schools at DLI are a melting pot of ethnicities and cultures. Successful MLIs capitalize on this diversity by enhancing the curriculum with unique culture classes and opportunities (e.g., Bible study in Arabic led by native, civilian Coptic instructors). They develop teaching teams by helping teachers recognize and make the most of differences, facilitating discussion within schoolhouses on disagreements to work toward constructive solutions.

Evolving Opportunities for Military Leadership and Management. The direct supervisory role of AIT platoon sergeants and instructor/writers, serving as squad leaders, is an important aspect differentiating them from their MLI peers. In recent years, when promotion rates among MLIs remained relatively low, MLIs belonged to the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 229th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion and served in few formal leadership roles. The 229th MI Battalion leadership recently reassigned MLIs to companies aligned to the foreign languages they teach, fostering increased exposure to students and enabling MLIs to serve in capacities outside the classroom. This transition fills a gap in formal leadership opportunities for MLIs, enabling them to serve in unit leadership positions and to be more competitive for promotion against peers in other broadening assignments. This change will enable MLIs to hold additional duties, play an integral role in the soldierization process, and bridge gaps between schoolhouses and units, ultimately contributing to greater linguist production rates.

Conclusion

Recent developments at DLI make MLIs more competitive for promotion and further enhance the development of military linguists. Leaders in the 229th MI Battalion established a training framework whereby MLIs may earn the BAIB during their tour at DLI. Assigning MLIs to companies aligned to the schoolhouses in which the MLIs teach will increase students’ foreign language exposure outside the classroom and provide MLIs with more leadership opportunities. All of these changes further professionalize the faculty at DLI, which in turn increases production rates of competent Soldier-linguists who are prepared to influence outcomes on the battlefield.
Endnotes


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Toward a Ruleset for the Military Decision-Making Process Manual Wargaming

(Continued from page 53)


20. Department of the Army, FM 6-0, 9-38.


25. Department of the Army, FM 6-0, 9-32.


Retired U.S. Army Major General Fox Conner is heralded as the mentor behind some of the most influential leaders in American history. MG Conner believed in placing the right person in the right position to gain the greatest advantage. In today’s Army, talent management looks to place the right person in the right position to yield the greatest return to the Army and its members. Leadership is the foundation of the Army, and leaders are developed over time through the hard work and patience of other leaders.

Building the fighting force of tomorrow is a primary responsibility of the platoon sergeants across the Army. Being a platoon sergeant of an Advanced Individual Training (AIT) platoon is a difficult yet rewarding duty. SSG Bryan Ivery, the current AIT Platoon Sergeant of the Year, believes building tomorrow’s leaders today is more than a responsibility; it is an honor. He credits some of his success to his first squad leader for demonstrating the tried and true leadership method of “Be...Know...Do.” As SSG Ivery progressed in rank and responsibility, it was the kind and simple words of his squad leader, “pay it forward, not pay it back,” that still ring in his head today. There is an influence leaders have that “commands, not demands, respect.” But leadership is not about the rank. It is about the trust Soldiers give when a leader is willing to listen. Great leaders are humble and do not seek recognition for the things they do. They seek to help others because it is the right thing to do. Recognition comes when Soldiers remember how their leaders shaped them to be leaders. SSG Ivery wants to “build people up instead of tearing them down” to ensure they can grow over time and develop into future leaders themselves.

Leaders today are the “torchbearers” responsible for training the force. A major part of their responsibility is developing “fit and resilient Soldiers” who can bear the torch of leadership into future. The view of military intelligence (MI) professionals is not always that of physically fit and resilient leaders. SSG Ivery aims to shatter this impression and change the way MI professionals represent the MI Corps.

The AIT Platoon Sergeant of the Year competition tests an individual’s physical and mental abilities as well as individual resiliency. SSG Ivery competed against eight other AIT platoon sergeants from across the Army, many of whom were from combat arms specialties. After days of demanding physical and mental events, SSG Ivery was hailed the 2017 AIT Platoon Sergeant of the Year.

MI professionals will always be ready to walk, fight, and win alongside their combat arms counterparts. Their development begins with physical fitness and ends with resilient, leadership-focused Soldiers who are ready to conduct further missions in support of the United States and its allies.

We need to give special mention to the unsung heroes in the lives of each leader. As seen with the effective approach of MG Conner, the effects of leadership are passed down over time. Great leaders often have mentors or unsung heroes who made them into effective leaders. These mentors and unsung heroes may have been family members or fellow Army leaders who encouraged Soldiers to be a torchbearer for others. SSG Ivery takes on this task and is a shining example of how leaders shape the Army.
Biography of SSG Bryan Ivery

SSG Ivery was born in Easley, South Carolina, and graduated in 2003 from Carolina High School and Academy. He enlisted in the U.S. Army and began basic combat training (Iron Soldier) in 2004 at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, before attending the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at the Presidio of Monterey, California. SSG Ivery successfully completed the Russian basic course in 2005 and proceeded to Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, for the remainder of his Advanced Individual Training (AIT) as a 98G, Cryptologic Linguist.

He attended the Prophet Operator Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, with his first duty assignment at the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team/1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, in 2006. SSG Ivery deployed for 15 months to Baghdad, Iraq, in support of “The Surge,” conducting signals terminal guidance operations. In August 2008, he was assigned to the 2nd Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, 66th MI Brigade in Wiesbaden, Germany, where he served as the battalion command language program manager, signals collection team noncommissioned officer in charge, and deployed as a low-level voice intercept operator to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2009.

SSG Ivery went on to Fort Meade, Maryland, assigned to the 741st MI Battalion, 704th MI Brigade in 2012, and served as command language program manager, platoon sergeant, and as a senior transcriber before being selected to attend the AIT Platoon Sergeant Course in 2015. SSG Ivery was assigned to Bravo Company, 229th MI Battalion and served as the AIT platoon sergeant for the Phase IV and V Program. SSG Ivery tested proficient in Spanish on the Defense Language Proficiency Test and is currently enrolled in a certified personal trainer course to improve his knowledge and to better help Soldiers.

SSG Ivery’s military education includes the Master Fitness Trainer Course, the Combat Lifesaver Course, Unit Prevention Leader, Combatives Levels 1 and 2, the Warrior Leader Course, the Advanced Leaders Course, the AIT Platoon Sergeant Course, and the Master Resiliency Trainer Course.

SSG Ivery’s awards and decorations include the following: the Meritorious Service Medal, the Army Commendation Medal (4 Oak Leaf Clusters [OLC]), Army Achievement Medal (1 OLC), Valorous Unit Award, Army Good Conduct Medal (3 Knots), the National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with Campaign Star, Iraqi Campaign Medal with Campaign Star, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon, the Army Service Ribbon, the Overseas Service Ribbon, NATO Medal, and Driver’s Medal Badge. He was selected as the AIT Platoon Sergeant of the Year for Presidio of Monterey, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center of Excellence. He is currently assigned to the U.S. Center for Initial Military Training, as the 2017 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and U.S. Army AIT Platoon Sergeant of the Year.

SFC Derek M. Brame currently serves as a doctrine writer at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. He served on a human intelligence (HUMINT) team with the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Division (Deuce Four), 1st Brigade, 25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis, WA. He studied modern standard Arabic at the Defense Language Institute. He was assigned to the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mech), which included working as a targeting noncommissioned officer in support of the Basrah Fusion Cell in Iraq. He transferred to Fort Hood, TX, transitioning the 66th Military Intelligence (MI) Company, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Armored Regiment) into the 66th MI Company, 3rd Cavalry Regiment (Stryker). During his time with the 66th MI Company, he served as the Headquarters Platoon Sergeant and the Company First Sergeant. He transferred to the 303rd MI Battalion to deploy with the HUMINT Company to Afghanistan. SFC Brame has a bachelor’s degree in intelligence operations from the American Military University and an associate’s degree in education from Cochise College.
**Introduction**

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS, or by the Arabic term *Daesh*, is one of the greatest terrorist threats in the world today, and one that often dominates the Western media. However, often lost in the chaos of *Daesh*-sponsored attacks in Europe or the United States is the fact that Muslims constitute the overwhelming majority of *Daesh*’s victims. Since Islam explicitly forbids killing other Muslims, *Daesh* justifies its killings through a practice known as *takfir*. This practice allows a Muslim to declare that a fellow Muslim is in fact an unbeliever. This practice has a long history, but *Daesh* is using it in a new and radical way. *Daesh*’s leaders claim that their use is in keeping with Islamic tradition and dates back to the Prophet Muhammad. This, however, is false, and pits them directly against a large majority of fellow Muslims. This deep and bitter divide between *Daesh* and other Muslims runs contrary to the “clash of civilizations” theory propagated by political scientist Samuel Huntington and *Daesh* itself. Rather than underpinning a conflict between Islam and the West, *Daesh*’s use of *takfir* exposes a war within Islam itself. Understanding the history of *takfir* is critical to understanding the dynamic between *Daesh* and the Muslims who oppose them.

**Takfir and the Qur’an**

We must dispense with the notion that *takfir* is rooted in the Qur’an or the example of the Prophet Mohammed. The Qur’an is very specific about Muslim-on-Muslim violence: “Anyone who kills a believer intentionally will be cast into Hell to abide there forever, and suffer God’s anger and damnation.” This is why an Islamic extremist must commit to *takfir*. He cannot kill another Muslim intentionally. However, in the mind of the extremist, if that person is indeed an unbeliever, or *kafir*, then there is no sin. On this, the Qur’an is vague. This is where the secondary sources of Islamic jurisprudence, the Sunnah and Hadith (the sayings and actions of the Prophet, respectively), come in. They provide a clear answer. One Sunnah says: “If a Muslim calls another *kafir* [unbeliever], then if he is a *kafir* let it be so; otherwise, he [the caller] is himself a *kafir.*” Another says: “Withhold [your tongues] from those who say ‘There is no god but Allah’— do not call them *kafir*. Whoever calls a reciter of ‘There is no god but Allah’ as a *kafir*, is nearer to being a *kafir* himself.” The list goes on. There is no evidence that the Prophet, nor any of the so-called “Rightly-Guided Caliphs” (his four immediate successors), ever declared a fellow Muslim to be an unbeliever. The first example of such a practice came from a party known as the Kharijites.

**The Role of the Kharijites**

The Kharijites first came to prominence by assassinating the Caliph Uthman in the year 656 AD. Though much of the Caliphate was unhappy with Uthman’s rule, the murder was still shocking. He was killed while praying in *Al-Masjid an-Nabawi* (the Prophet’s mosque) in Medina, the second holiest mosque in Islam. This act started the First *Fitna*, or Islamic Civil War. The effects of this war are still felt today in the form of the Sunni-Shia split. Throughout the war, the Kharijites were infamous for attacking the civilian population of opposing parties, in violation of established rules of Islamic warfare set down by the Prophet. They even assassinated their one-time ally Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet and leader of what would eventually become the Shia. They did so by being the first to label fellow Muslims as unbelievers.

“According to the Kharijites, anyone who disobeyed any of the Quranic prescriptions, or violated the example of the Prophet Muhammad in any way, was to be considered *kafir*… and immediately expelled from the Ummah.” Any “major” sin was grounds to declaring someone *kafir*. The act of doing so became known as *takfir*. This is the first known use of the term. The Kharijites went a step beyond simply targeting individuals. If a leader of a group of Muslims was declared an unbeliever, then all those who followed him were also unbelievers. Their reasoning was that all true Muslims could not possibly follow an unbeliever, so
those who opposed the Kharijites could not possibly be true believers. During the civil war, they saw themselves as the “People of Heaven,” while all others were the “People of Hell.”

The Kharijites Legacy

Although eventually defeated and left to the annals of history, the Kharijites left an unmistakable impact on Islamic jurisprudence. Sunni principles of *takfir* evolved in reaction to the Kharijites. While Sunni Islam rejected the idea that sins could make one an unbeliever, doctrinal differences could. The most significant and lasting example of Sunni *takfir* was the Sunni-Shia split, which formed following the civil war and the death of Ali. The theological differences between Sunnis and Shia are too complex to go into detail here, but suffice it to say that the majority Sunni Muslims came to view the minority Shia Muslims as unbelievers and used **takfir** to persecute the Shia throughout history. Still, Sunni doctrines of **takfir** remained conservatively employed until the end of the 13th century.

Enter the Mongols

Throughout the latter part of the 13th century, the Islamic world faced invasion by the Mongolian Golden Horde. At first, Muslim states resisted without theological issue; the Mongols were pagan invaders that they could and should fight. However, as the Mongols conquered more territory and settled into the Middle East, they began to convert to Islam. Despite this, they continued to make war against other Muslims. There became a question of whether Muslims should resist further Mongol aggression or submit peacefully to Mongol rule. Most scholars remained conservative in their theological interpretations. The Hanbali doctrine, which was the most prevalent of the time, held that God had chosen the leaders of Islamic states to be His regents on earth. One scholar named Ibn Taymiyyah, however, disagreed.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa is one of the most famous documents in Islamic history and had a lasting impact on Sunni interpretations of **takfir**. Taymiyyah reasoned that an Islamic ruler was not simply endowed by God. Rather, for someone to be a legitimate ruler of Muslims, he had to follow Islamic law. Failure to do so made the ruler an unbeliever and his rule illegitimate. Like the Kharijites, Ibn Taymiyyah also reasoned that those who followed an unbeliever were themselves unbelievers. He concluded that because the Mongols did not follow Islamic law and waged war against other Muslims, they were in fact unbelievers, as were all of their subjects that did not resist their rule.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa against the Mongols flew in the face of centuries of established doctrine. Moreover, where before jihad had been a collective declaration made by a qualified leader, Ibn Taymiyyah made jihad an individual obligation. Later in life, Ibn Taymiyyah attempted to backtrack somewhat. He reaffirmed that no Muslim could unilaterally declare another Muslim to be an unbeliever. However, the damage had been done. Ibn Taymiyyah is an oft-cited source for modern usage of **takfir**. Still, there exist radically different interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah’s writings. Saudi Arabia’s Wahabbi clerics used Ibn Taymiyyah to justify **takfir**, but are downright conservative compared to Daesh’s use of the same doctrine. The difference between the two is one final source from which only radical extremists draw—Sayyed Qutb.

Sayyed Qutb’s Influence

Sayyed Qutb was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Following the death of the movement’s founder in 1949, Qutb grew increasingly radicalized along with the rest of the Muslim Brotherhood. He published a number of writings on Islamic principles before being jailed in 1954. His treatment in prison was horrendous. His final book, *Milestones*, was smuggled out of prison one chapter at a time before his execution in 1966. Its contents reflected his treatment. *Milestones* outlined an extreme version of Islam that included a continuation of the **takfir** doctrine.

In *Milestones*, Qutb combined the doctrines of the Kharijites and Ibn Taymiyyah and introduced them to the modern age. He declared that the entirety of the modern world, including nominally Muslim governments, was seeped in unbelief. He bemoaned: “Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and law, is jahiliyyah, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of jahiliyyah.” The only legitimate government to Qutb was one that followed strict *shariah* law, just as Ibn Taymiyyah had argued. Qutb also concurred that it was an individual obligation of true Muslims to fight against all such governments. The jihad could only stop when there was one united government under God’s rule. Qutb also drew from the Kharijites. As they had back in the 7th century, Qutb argued that the sins of an individual Muslim were enough to consider someone to be an unbeliever.

Qutb’s writings went on to influence the next generation of jihadists, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Qutb is the critical link that brought the principles of the Kharijites and Ibn Taymiyyah into the modern age. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), in particular, became the most radical practitioner of **takfir**. AQI in turn eventually evolved into Daesh. They no longer even require a scholar to issue a
fatwa. For them, takfir has become something an individual can do to another individual. This has been largely based on Qutb’s writings. In many ways, Qutb is the grandfather of Daesh.

The Islamic Community’s Response to Takfir

While extremists have become ever more liberal in their use of takfir, much of the rest of the worldwide Islamic community has rejected takfir altogether. This started even before Daesh burst onto the public stage. In 2004, Jordan hosted an extraordinary international conference of the world’s top Islamic scholars. The express purpose was to settle the issue of takfir once and for all. Titled the “Amman Message,” the conference’s fatwa declared that takfir was completely forbidden. What makes this conference so remarkable is the diversity of the signatories. The 552 clerics included representatives from rivals such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Eighty-four countries were represented. For the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims, the Amman Message settled the question of takfir.20

The most recent example of anti-takfir sentiment in the Islamic world is Tunisia. Compared to Syria, Tunisia has gone in the polar opposite direction since the Arab Spring and has managed to stay on a largely peaceful path to democracy. This culminated in a 2014 constitution, the writers of which won a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. Takfir has become such a huge issue in the Islamic world, that the Tunisians felt the need to specifically ban the practice in their constitution. It reads:

The state is the guardian of religion. It guarantees freedom of conscience and belief, the free exercise of religious practices and the neutrality of mosques and places of worship from all partisan instrumentalisation.

The state undertakes to disseminate the values of moderation and tolerance and the protection of the sacred, and the prohibition of all violations thereof. It undertakes equally to prohibit and fight against calls for takfir and the incitement of violence and hatred.21

For reasons such as this, Tunisia is perhaps the ideal partner for the United States in the fight against Daesh from an ideological standpoint. Tunisia is the antithesis of Daesh, affir- ming that extremists are not the true face of Islam.

Conclusion

Daesh, as it does with all its practices, claims that its practice of takfir dates back to the time of the Prophet. The evidence says otherwise. Daesh’s use of takfir comes from the Kharijites and ibn Taymiyyah, and was refined into its modern form by Sayyed Qutb. Furthermore, it has been thoroughly rejected by the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims. As such, the conflict with Daesh should not be seen as a “clash of civilizations.” This is not a fight of Islam versus the West. Daesh’s use of takfir proves that. This is a fight of the world against a band of radical regres- sives. Understanding that simple truth is critical to understanding the current war against Daesh.

Endnotes
3. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 132-134.
12. Ibid., 109.
15. Translates as “the Time of Ignorance.” This commonly used Arabic term refers to the time before Mohammad’s revelations.
17. Ibid., 76.
18. Ibid., 126.

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Introduction

What started out as a year-end review of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence’s (USAICoE’s) Lessons Learned program turned into a team-wide brainstorming session of how the Lessons Learned team may be able to improve the support we provide to military intelligence (MI) leaders at the tactical echelons. We believed that our use of the term “leader” in lessons learned products was understood to include all MI leaders—commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). However, when looking over the titles of our products, and the ranks of those with whom we interacted in developing the products, it became apparent that we unwittingly focused on commissioned officers (which inherently includes warrant officers). Some notable exceptions of support from senior NCOs did result in lessons learned products. This led us to conclude that to better support all personnel in the Army’s operating force—particularly those at tactical echelons—we had to determine how to better serve the “backbone” of the Army.

Army Leader Development Model

At the same time we expanded our brainstorming session to make our products more relevant to MI NCOs, our organization’s sergeant major sent us a copy of the recently updated DA Pam 600-25, *U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*. I have learned that when the sergeant major sends you something to read, it is best to read it as soon as possible. After digesting the pamphlet’s 56 pages, searching the glossary, and using the time-compressed content identification technique of CTRL+F, I saw that the term “lessons learned” appeared only once and only in its generic sense. There were no references to the Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP) or AR 11-33 of the same name.

Despite the omission of direct references to the ALLP or AR 11-33, the self-development domain described in DA Pam 600-25 includes the three components that inform, and are informed by, lessons and best practices—experience, education, and training. Sharing lessons and best practices acts as an integrating influence across the Army’s three learning domains—institutional, operational, and self-development—as shown in Figure 1.

Our year-end review brainstorming session and receipt of the updated DA Pam 600-25 combined to create the opportunity for writing this article. In a slight twist of irony, while primarily focused on the self-development of MI NCOs, the information presented here may also be useful for the self-development of enlisted, commissioned officers, and Army Civilian personnel.

Lessons and Best Practices

Before continuing, I must highlight the term *lessons and best practices*, which the Lessons Learned community uses as a more accurate description of the techniques and procedures identified from observing personal or organizational behavior. The Army’s definitions of lessons and best practices are not entirely helpful in distinguishing a difference between a lesson, a lesson learned, and a best practice. We identify a challenge or discovery of a problem as a lesson—something that must be corrected. A best practice is a manner of performance that remedies an existing
problem or introduces a new technique resulting in superior performance.

**AR 11-33 Army Lessons Learned Program Abridged Definitions.**

- **Lesson**—A potential solution to a problem experienced as a result of an observation.
- **Best Practice**—A change to how something is done that results in improved personal or unit performance or behavior but is not yet fully implemented across force.
- **Lesson Learned**—An implemented corrective action which leads to improved performance or an observed change in behavior.

Regardless of how AR 11-33 defines lessons learned related terms, the purpose remains the same—to support a "rapid adaptation of leaders and units...at all levels...to improve performance and efficiency and to save lives across the force.”

Another slight issue in interpreting guidance occurs in DA Pam 600-25 when advising NCOs to avoid instances in which self-development takes precedence over duty performance. We provide lessons and best practices precisely to help improve one’s duty performance. Does not self-development lead to a corresponding increase in one’s duty performance—maybe, maybe not? Perhaps the problem is not in how the Army defines terms and purposes but in how I interpret the policy guidance? Sometimes the lessons and best practices we observe provide examples in which professionals demonstrate their interpretation or application of policies, procedures, and doctrine in the operational environment.

**Benefits of Using Lessons and Best Practices**

Whatever the case, our unofficial motto captures the reason why we (the Lessons Learned team) do what we do: “The success of USAICOE’s Lessons Learned Team is determined by how successful we make others.” Here are the top 10 benefits of using lessons and best practices in a self-development program that we identified in our brainstorming session.

1. **Saves Time.** Reviewing lessons and best practices can help you and your respective superior and subordinate leaders to determine the most efficient use of your unit’s available time. Time available is the one mission variable that rarely, if ever, increases. (The other mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and civil considerations.) We save time by performing more efficiently. We cannot stockpile time to use later. This condition is why time is referred to as the world’s most valuable commodity. Lessons and best practices often identify time-saving methods to use in performing specific tasks (plan, prepare, conduct, and assess). Time-saving techniques and procedures are frequently presented during the USAICOE Lessons Learned team’s Before Action Report Relevant Exchange of Lessons (BARREL) engagements. The Lessons Learned column titled “Before Action Reports” in the July–September 2016 issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* introduced the BARREL concept.

   We changed the initial name of the strategy from the Lessons Learned BAR to the BARREL to better reflect the seriousness of the effort evident in two key words: Before and Relevant. These two characteristics directly link to the lessons and best practices, which are the most important in helping you save time by addressing those tasks that others found to be the most important. This leads directly to the next benefit of applying lessons and best practices.

2. **Task Prioritization.** Knowing the tasks in which you or your Soldiers should be the most proficient provides an opportunity to develop an informed and efficient training plan. Leaders have shared lessons and best practices resulting from their planning and executing of training—offering successful training strategies or pitfalls to avoid. Learning from both types of experiences provides insights to use in planning training in the most efficient, effective, or appropriate sequence. The overriding benefit of learning which tasks are more important than others is the knowledge to plan and sequence specific training events in order to achieve mastery of the most mission-critical tasks more quickly. The same technique is applicable to your self-development. Learning from the experiences of others may help you avoid inaccurate personal assumptions regarding your individual performance expectations. It may also help you to better understand what areas, topics, or tasks your unit will rely on you to master. Prioritizing tasks also leads to identifying the tasks or areas in which some risk is assumable, thereby conserving (or avoiding waste of) another resource—money.

3. **Saves Money.** We all appreciate the importance of saving money. Saving the taxpayer’s money when planning, preparing, and executing operational environment activities is always of paramount concern. Lessons and best practices often identify cost-saving strategies, often in conjunction with the first two items discussed—saving time and prioritizing tasks. In self-development, saving money sometimes becomes an individual, as well as a unit, concern. Conserving unit funds usually relates to the acquisition and expenditure of resources required to perform tasks during training or operations. Personal resources, including course or participation fees, are sometimes necessary to achieve self-development goals. Examples include attending an off-duty college class, pursuing individual skill certification, or pursuing language training unrelated to one’s career management field. Researching what others have found to be the most useful or cost-effective strategies may enable you
to determine which activities are worth the cost and which ones are to be avoided.

4. Gaining New Knowledge. Lessons and best practices often indicate doctrine, concepts, and skills that you may not be proficient in or that are unfamiliar to you. More than a few NCOs have shared with us that they were initially unprepared to retain the same level of military occupational specialty proficiency as the Army shifted from an Army of Execution to an Army of Preparation; the accompanying shift in emphasis was away from counterinsurgency operations to the full range of unified land operations (ULO). An additional complexity in the shift affected NCOs more so than commissioned leaders. The relatively extended period between when some mid-grade NCOs received their initial institutional training (as privates) and when they were last exposed to ULO offensive and defensive components was much greater than the period in which their subordinate Soldiers (private to sergeant) received ULO institutional training. Those currently serving in mid to senior NCO ranks were justifiably focused on preparing for combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Company grade officers attending the MI Basic Officer Leader Course and the MI Captains Career Course have also benefitted from more recent intelligence support to ULO instruction than their subordinate NCOs.

The first self-development remedy offered is a voracious study of Army, MI, and opposing force doctrine. Researching and learning from recent lessons and best practices is an effective technique to augment the study of doctrine. Saving time and identifying the most important areas to study are two subjects often addressed in lessons and best practices. An underused resource often mentioned by NCOs is USAICoE’s monthly MI Lessons Learned forum. The forum provides an unclassified opportunity for MI Soldiers and leaders worldwide to discuss lessons and best practices firsthand with those who have recently completed an operation or major training event. Discussions often distill doctrinal tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) into the critical items that the MI professional needs to know to be successful. Similar to the Lessons Learned BARREL mentioned earlier, the MI Lessons Learned forum is a mechanism by which your fellow leaders seek to make you more successful by avoiding the mistakes they may have made or to learn from the best practices they offer.

5. Increased Understanding and Adding to Existing Knowledge. Another facet of applying lessons and best practices is to identify the areas to improve in your existing knowledge. An axiom NCOs and officers often share with us is that if you have been out of country for 6 months (or even less), you are out of date. The rapid changes in the operational and mission variables around the globe often necessitate learning what has changed from your last involvement in that area of operations or combat training center. The rapid adaptation of threat TTP is matched by the same rate of emphasis in adapting to U.S. TTP. The informal chain of communication by which U.S. Army professionals share information continues to be strong. Maintaining contact with colleagues and mentors engaged in varying operations worldwide provides a near-real-time transfer of critical information. No Lessons Learned program can expect to match the speed and surety of important knowledge provided by email or social networking. Receiving, reviewing, and applying pertinent lessons and best practices as they are made available by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), or the warfighting function proponent Center of Excellence Lessons Learned elements, may help you identify areas in which you need to gain more knowledge and areas in which your knowledge can help someone else.

6. Learning from Another’s Experience. I don’t have to hold my palm over a lit candle to know that if I keep it over the flame long enough I’ll be burned. This knowledge exemplifies that I have reaped the benefits of someone else’s experience. MI Soldiers cannot employ their MI systems effectively in an operational environment if they have not trained to proficiency on the system while at home station. By applying the lessons and best practices gained through other’s experiences, we are able to receive the benefits of their experiences without suffering the personal or professional costs. This effect will become more useful as the Army continues to prepare for large-scale combat operations. We don’t have to personally experience the effects of large-scale combat operations to apply pertinent lessons and best practices from historical examples of training and preparing for current operations; particularly as all Army operations are multi-domain operations.

7. Talent Management. Learning from others what is important often directly informs what personal skills, knowledge, and abilities are most important in differing types of operations. The skills of an effective team leader in a ULO may not be the same as those needed in an advise-and-assist role supporting a partner nation’s force. DA Pam 600-25 describes talent as the intersection of three dimensions—skills, knowledge, and behaviors—which creates an optimal level of individual performance, provided individuals are employed within their talent set. Two paragraphs later, the DA pamphlet provides an overview of the Army’s human dimension strategy and states its intent to fully develop every Soldier’s knowledge, skills, attributes, and behavior in order to perform in an environment characterized by chaos and ambiguity. Lessons and best practices provide direct feedback to leaders regarding the personal talents and
characteristics that are best applied in the various roles, functions, and organizations. Conversely, lessons also identify personal attributes that are troublesome or potential obstacles to success in certain operations. Leaders can learn from lessons and best practices to determine the most appropriate talent management and human dimension development strategies for their subordinates and themselves.

8. Access. Knowing where to find the most useful lessons and best practices is relatively simple; however, identifying which lessons and best practices are the most pertinent, timely, accurate, and relevant to your personal self-development requires more effort. The Army’s center of gravity—and recognized central repository for lessons and best practices products—is CALL. CALL has made considerable advancements in the ease with which Soldiers and leaders can access, search, and retrieve products based on lessons and best practices. Common access card (CAC) login grants access to almost the entirety of CALL’s holdings. The search function has greatly improved, and a Watson application is available to assist in finding relevant products. Yes, it’s the same Watson made famous on Jeopardy but not quite as powerful as the version shown on television. If you are reading this article on USAICoE’s Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN), you may be able to access the MI Lessons Learned portal. The portal is actually a SharePoint page that serves as the USAICoE Lessons Learned team’s homepage. It’s CAC-enabled, offers links to multiple Lessons Learned sites, and features an extremely user-friendly, efficient search function.

9. Relationships. We would not be able to serve as a self-development resource without the support of Army and MI leaders who share their lessons and best practices with us. Every MI leader whose unit we have observed has willingly shared their mistakes, challenges, and successes with us—seeking to prevent others from making the same mistakes. The collaboration and sharing of lessons and best practices between MI leaders at all levels only strengthens the branch and increases the effectiveness of our support. The free exchange of information is built upon a foundation of trust. The contractors of the Lessons Learned team rely on this relationship network to obtain differing perspectives, discover ideas, debate conclusions, validate opinions, and inform our future efforts. Our unique and relatively stable position in this network affords us the ability to link personnel seeking assistance with those who have lessons and best practices to offer. We are able to link personnel in disparate locations with effective mentors, often crossing organizational (generating force and operational force) and regional boundaries. In effect, we are providing an opening to establish a mentoring relationship. The Lessons Learned effort directly benefits from these relationships because these mentors frequently participate in the monthly MI Lessons Learned forums, contribute to lessons learned products, and identify opportunities for additional lessons and best practices collection. The importance of professional relationships is a key lesson, evident in an interview USAICoE’s command historian conducted with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Commanding General, GEN David G. Perkins, in 2017. The interview is available for viewing or reading (video or document) online via IKN.

10. Developing Others. Self-development extends the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base and self-awareness. A common benefit of sharing knowledge and experiences is the increased understanding gained by all. Discussing lessons and best practices with people of differing ability levels or perspectives often leads to insightful recommendations, unanticipated questions, and points for further study. Many MI instructors have shared that they believe they are more knowledgeable of their instructional subjects because of their academic exchanges with students. It is not the repetition of instructing the same subject that leads to increased understanding; it’s the dialogue among and between students and cadre that is most cited as the cause. By helping the self-development of others, we are inherently developing ourselves.

Endnotes

2. Ibid., 5.
3. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 14 June 2017), 22.
4. Ibid., 3.
8. DA Pam 600-25, 2-3.
9. Ibid., 3.
10. Ibid., 9.
When military intelligence became a full-fledged member of the War Department’s General Staff, it took on a number of responsibilities that are not considered applicable to the intelligence mission today. One of those responsibilities, wartime press censorship, was considered a variant of counterintelligence, or negative intelligence as it was referred to in 1918.

The objective of wartime press censorship was to prevent the exposure of sensitive military information to the enemy. The U.S. Army practiced similar censorship during the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. During World War I, however, the press censorship system was formalized and extended, according to the Army’s official history, to include anything that might “injure morale in our forces here, or at home, or among our Allies,” or “embarrass the United States or her Allies in neutral countries.”

In July 1918, the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division established the MI-10 Censorship Section within the Negative Branch. Under the leadership of well-known author, Major Rupert Hughes, MI-10 had 15 subsections focused on censorship of the mail, publications, telegraph, radio, photographs, and other sources of information. Subsection 10F, Press, implemented a form of “voluntary censorship,” bolstered by the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, as well as several executive orders. Essentially, in a climate of cooperation fueled by patriotism and common sense, journalists dutifully avoided writing about topics recommended off-limits by the military.

In the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), Major Dennis Nolan dedicated the G-2-D section of his intelligence organization to Censorship and Press. Nolan had personally witnessed how contentious relations between the military and the press could lead to negative consequences. During the Spanish-American War, when Nolan was aide-de-camp to the commander of the Fifth Army Corps in Cuba, the press leaked U.S. plans to supply Cuban guerillas with weapons and horses. The operation had to be scrapped as a result. Nearly 20 years later, as the AEF’s senior intelligence officer, Nolan was determined to prevent similar compromises of military information.

The Press Section of the G-2-D was led by 44-year-old Frederick Palmer, a personal friend of General John J. Pershing. Having covered nearly every military conflict in the world between the 1890s and World War I, Palmer was arguably the most experienced war correspondent in the American press community. As the only American correspondent accredited by the British, he had been covering the war with Germany since late 1914. Just two weeks before the U.S. entered the war, Palmer addressed students at the Army War College, promoting the appointment of a civilian censor to work with Army forces. Taking this recommendation, Pershing convinced Palmer to turn down a $40,000 annual salary at the New York Herald and instead take a major’s commission at an annual salary of $2,400 to head the Press Section.

Under Palmer’s direction, the Press Section supervised accredited war correspondents and even provided their transportation and billeting. Unlike the British and French militaries, the AEF allowed the press unrestricted access to the troops. However, when reviewing their dispatches, Palmer insisted on accuracy and censored any mention of specific units, their locations and capabilities, aircraft, supplies, lines of communications, and conditions or morale of the troops. He also suppressed information that cast American soldiers in a negative light, such as an incident in which a German prisoner was killed during capture.

For the most part, journalists willfully cooperated with all Palmer’s requirements; however, at least three were banned from the AEF for publishing articles not reviewed by the censors. Palmer also received criticism from commanders who felt the restriction against publishing information about specific units meant their military successes were being ignored.

For his part, Palmer may have regretted his pre-war recommendation and he reportedly considered resigning his post numerous times. While he wholeheartedly supported...
the need to safeguard military secrets, he struggled to find balance between satisfying the American citizen’s right to the truth and preventing the erosion of popular support for the war. He lamented being “cast for the part of a public liar to keep up the spirits of the armies and peoples on our side” and often “squirmed with nausea as he allowed propaganda to pass.”

Despite his internal struggle, Palmer undoubtedly played a key role in saving the lives of American soldiers and ensuring the support of the American public for the United States’ first large-scale war effort. General Pershing recognized this when he awarded Palmer the Distinguished Service Medal, making Palmer the first war correspondent so decorated.

Wartime censorship remained the responsibility of military intelligence through the early 1970s. While the military does not censor the press today, both entities continue to struggle with the same dilemma that Palmer faced: that delicate balance to protect wartime secrets, avoid propaganda, and defend the First Amendment.

Endnotes


2. Frederick Palmer’s war memoirs, as cited in John Hohenberg, Foreign Correspondence, The Great Reporters and Their Times (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

Contact and Article

Submission Information

This is your professional bulletin. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to Army MI professionals

Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the intelligence community. Articles about current operations, TTPs, and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned, historical perspectives, problems and solutions, and short “quick tips” on better employment of equipment and personnel. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

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