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From the Editor

The following themes and deadlines are established for:

April–June 2018, Leader Development, this issue will focus on developing leaders at all levels within the operational and institutional force. Deadline for submissions is 18 December 2017.

July–September 2018, INSCOM 2020, this issue will focus on how INSCOM supports commanders now and into the future. Deadline for submissions is 3 April 2018.

As always, articles from you, our reader, remain important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them, even if the topic of your article may differ from an issue’s theme. Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. We seriously review and consider all submissions that add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the intelligence community.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or any other aspects of MIPB. We welcome your input and suggestions.

Tracey Remus
Editor
**FEATURES**

The views expressed in the following articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army or Defense, or the U.S. Government. Article content is not authenticated Army information and does not supersede information in any other Army publication.

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Inside back cover: Contact and Article Submission Information
Always Out Front
by Major General Robert P. Walters, Jr.
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

Command at any level is a privilege, and I am truly honored to be afforded the opportunity to serve as the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca, and to serve as the Chief of the Military Intelligence Corps.

As a short introduction, I enlisted in the U.S. Army on 3 September 1981 as a Russian Voice Interceptor. After a tour in Augsburg, Germany, and as a young sergeant, I attended the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was commissioned as an intelligence officer serving initially at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 1986. Early in my career, I served as the S-2 for the Crusaders of 2-72nd Armor, 2nd Infantry Division “Second Tank” in the Republic of Korea and later, as an intelligence officer for the U.S. Army 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. I had the opportunity to command at the company, battalion, squadron, and brigade levels with operational deployments with each command.

Recently, I served as the Senior Intelligence Officer, J-2, at the Joint Special Operations Command, J-2 at NORAD-NORTHCOM, J-2 at U.S. Special Operations Command, and most recently as J-2 for Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan. I have over 10 years serving as a “2,” 12 years serving within the U.S. Special Operations Forces community, and over 5 years deployed in combat operations.

Now that I am back at Fort Huachuca, I will focus on the readiness of the intelligence force and the professional capabilities of our military intelligence Soldiers.

The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) staff developed new themes this fiscal year, where each quarter’s theme builds upon each other, culminating with INSCOM 2020. This issue of MIPB is focusing on the division and corps intelligence operations, and I am excited to share what these talented authors and military intelligence professionals contributed to this quarter’s issue.

Throughout this issue of MIPB, you will discover how units adapted to the challenges faced by divisions and corps in utilizing their expeditionary military intelligence brigade and battalion assets in large-scale combat scenarios. This issue discusses how to employ the expeditionary military intelligence brigade and battalions as corps assets and understand how to enhance home station training for the intelligence warfighting function enablers.

Other authors have shared potential adversary tactics, analyzing Russian doctrine and capabilities with recommendations on how to think outside of the box and train your intelligence staff based on research beyond reading doctrine. We will also look at intelligence support to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and how to create an unclassified common operating picture, which can be shared with our partners, and the countries we are assisting.

It is important for military intelligence professionals to understand the operational and strategic fight and operations occurring at the division and corps levels. These higher echelons routinely partner with other services and have access to additional capabilities, often assisting joint task forces, working together to accomplish a common mission. Understanding the intelligence capabilities available at this level will not only improve your knowledge of the individual intelligence disciplines, but it also helps you accomplish the primary goal of ensuring the Soldiers on the ground complete the mission and return home safely.

Feel free to take the observations and discussions from this issue of MIPB and use them in future exercises, missions, or leader professional development sessions. The material shared by our authors across the force will be a value added to your kit bag.

Always Out Front!
This issue of MIPB is focused on the division and corps level intelligence operations and contains a series of articles that not only show some capability gaps, but also highlight successes and processes that innovative leaders and military intelligence professionals have put in place to maximize current capabilities.

As always, the operational environment (OE) has changed the dynamic nature of the threats we currently face. The rise of near-peer adversaries has resulted in a reverse in the force reductions we were experiencing over the past five years. This shift back to near-peer threats and the decisive action training environment (DATE) has refocused our senior Army leadership on how the Army fights. One requirement that has become apparent during this refocus is the need for division and corps intelligence warfighting capabilities to be more than downward reinforcing to support brigade combat teams (BCTs).

In a DATE scenario, divisions need to focus on the deep fight, but still support BCTs in the current areas of operation; while corps are shaping the fight outside subordinate boundaries and often leading a joint task force headquarters (JTF-HQ). Division and corps staffs need to be robust and well trained to synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance/collection management, and hand off assets and intelligence to support targeting—such as deep fires.

The Focus Area Review Group (FARG) reductions over the past years have had a significant impact on manning levels and capabilities for both division and corps intelligence operations. These reductions occurred at a time the Army was downsizing, and during a period in which we projected less engagement in multiple locations across the world. With FARG II, came the creation of the Main Command Post-Operational Detachment designed to integrate U.S. Army Reserve elements to round out the staff at the division level. These elements, in accordance with the Sustainable Readiness Model, would plus-up a staff prior to deployment, and help not only with intelligence support to the deploying headquarters and the supported BCTs, but also during reach operations or home-station training support.

Despite these efforts, the OE has been unpredictable and operations tempo has increased during our recent draw-down period. The reintroduction of DATE scenarios for division and corps exercises has helped senior Army leaders identify some of the capability gaps, especially for intelligence. Currently, our corps are reaching out to their respective expeditionary military intelligence brigades (E-MIBs) for support in the DATE scenario exercises, and to maintain continuity on assigned target sets when activated as a JTF-HQ. This collaboration between corps and E-MIBs has shown positive results. However, E-MIB personnel may not be available to the corps in a real-world, near-peer event, as doctrinally they downward reinforce the divisions and BCTs across the corps.

With the elimination of the divisional military intelligence battalion, division intelligence capabilities reduced to essentially the G-2 staff and the division analysis and control element. This reduction at the division level not only limited the capability to push down supporting assets, relying instead on the corps-level E-MIBs to support the BCTs, but also has had a detrimental impact on training and certifying of military intelligence companies. This limitation was one of the many reasons the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence created MI Gunnery.

The creation of military intelligence brigades (theater) as the anchor point for forces entering their respective Army Service component command or theater army (8th Army) area of responsibility has been key in supporting phase 0-2 operations. Still, the Army’s job is to fight and win the Nation’s wars, and to do that against a near-peer threat we need the trained and ready capability to fight phase 3 and beyond—force on force.

This all highlights the importance of the ongoing Bottom-Up Review in designing the military intelligence force structure and dependencies needed for our future Army. It is articles like those you see in this edition of MIPB that will lend weight to our arguments for improving capabilities at all echelons and establishing doctrinal requirements to support the Army in 2025 and beyond. I encourage you to continue to stay engaged in discussions, not only with your current commands, but also with the Army and our partners as a whole, on our intelligence warfighting capabilities.

Always Out Front!
Technical Perspective

Chief Warrant Officer Five Matthew R. Martin
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

The U.S. Army intelligence enterprise has spent much of the past 15 years focused on supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, resulting in significant structural and philosophical changes that were necessary to successfully execute security and stability operations. As the Army shifts its warfighting focus back to a decisive action environment, there is a renewed emphasis on the capabilities of the intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) at the division and corps levels. As the technical experts, our leaders expect warrant officers to help lead and shape the effort through improved interdisciplinary collaboration, realistic training, and aggressive innovation that will allow the professionals of the Army intelligence enterprise to obtain the knowledge and skills to succeed in a decisive action environment.

The nature of the conflict over the past 15 years, combined with the focus on brigade combat team-centric operations, has resulted in an increased tendency for the IWfF to operate in intelligence stovepipes that limit multi-disciplined collaboration, and challenges our ability to efficiently visualize and describe the complexities within today’s operating environment. It is especially critical that personnel operating at the division and corps levels are effectively communicating information and requirements, both internally and externally, to ensure we are maximizing limited collection resources and are providing the most complete intelligence picture possible. As technical experts, warrant officers are in a unique position to improve multi-disciplined collaboration through the integration of military intelligence programs of record, mastery of doctrinal processes and unit standard operating procedures, and professional relationships.

Division and corps G-2s operate what is arguably the most complex family of systems in the U.S. Army. Maintaining system proficiency and developing a mastery of these systems requires a commitment to realistic training that incorporates other mission command systems, simulations, and regular practice emplacing and displacing the system components in a field environment. Additionally, intelligence professionals of all ranks must take advantage of every available opportunity to participate in external training for their programs of record, such as the Digital Intelligence Systems Master Gunner Course and the New Equipment Training/New Equipment Fielding conducted by the Field Office Fort Hood. Tough, realistic training built around our programs of record will ensure that we remain capable of providing commanders the battlefield clarity necessary to fight and win in a decisive action environment.

The loss of the division-level military intelligence battalion, combined with the Focus Area Review Group reductions, places a significant strain on IWfF readiness at the division and corps levels. The Army will continue to rely upon warrant officers to provide the technical expertise associated with their tradecraft, and to assume non-traditional roles as units are forced to maximize their available personnel to accomplish the mission. This requires proactive warrant officers who are resourceful, innovative, and most importantly, passionate about their profession. There are incredible opportunities at the division and corps levels for those warrant officers who want to prove themselves as true technical experts, well-rounded officers, and masters of their tradecraft. I strongly encourage you to take an active role in helping to shape the future of the tactical intelligence warrant officer as we continue to adapt to the demands of operating in a decisive action environment.

Always Out Front!
At the request of the Liberian government, we’re going to establish a military command center in Liberia to support civilian efforts across the region...our forces are going to bring their expertise in command and control, in logistics, in engineering. And our Department of Defense is better at that...than any organization on Earth.

—President Barack Obama, 16 September 2014

Introduction

Seventy-two hours after President Obama pledged U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) support to the fight against Ebola, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was alerted to deploy to Monrovia, Liberia, in support of the lead federal agency, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). While a few staff members had experience in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions from Haiti, this was the first time a DoD entity was called upon to help stop a pandemic. This mission required an entirely new intelligence apparatus—one not focused on enemy locations, preventing enemy attacks, or high value target tracking. It required an intelligence architecture that—

♦ Was able to track and provide clarity to epidemiological trends.
♦ Was shareable to nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and international partners in an unrestricted and unclassified format.
♦ Enabled embedding of intelligence analysts into a system that is historically suspicious of DoD intelligence personnel and operations.

The Situation

As part of the largest Ebola epidemic in history, the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa, which began in December 2013, continued to evolve in alarming ways by mid-September 2014. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization announced that without a significant international intervention, the number of Ebola cases in Sierra Leone and Liberia could reach 1.4 million cases by mid-January 2015.

Adding to this urgency, other entities stated tens of thousands of Ebola treatment unit beds would be needed by the end of November 2014. The most severely affected countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) were struggling to control the outbreak on the foundation of a weak healthcare system, limited capacity for response, and widespread fear. In Liberia, the average number of daily suspected and probable cases reached its peak of 81 cases on 19 September 2014. The daily average of confirmed cases rose until it hit its peak of 79 cases on 28 September 2014 with new EVD cases more than doubling during the month of September. Additionally, epidemiologists feared a large unreported population of EVD infected individuals, whose presence could have meant the real number of EVD cases was two or three times what was known. By 20 September 2014, predictions over the extent of the outbreak had gotten so dire that U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon officially established the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, the first-ever U.N. emergency health mission.

Transition from Warfigther Exercise 15-02 to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

Meanwhile, the 101st Airborne Division (AA) G-2 section was entrenched in planning for an event that couldn’t be further from HA/DR—a division level warfighter exercise (WFX), a force-on-force exercise focused on violently closing with and destroying the enemy through relentless brigade level air assaults and synchronized fires. This was an important event for the G-2 section because we were exercising processes that had not been exercised in many years, specifically, division level force-on-force doctrine and employing
a full spectrum Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS–A) intelligence architecture built on Secret and Top Secret information infrastructure. In order to facilitate the training and DCGS–A structure, we were utilizing the services of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence’s Tactical Engagement Team (TET)—a recently assembled group of DCGS–A savvy mentors, engineers, and trainers focused on enabling Army organizations to best utilize DCGS–A in its operations. This group proved to be immensely helpful. They were scheduled for a 22–26 September WFX focused training event at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; but when we were notified of our change of mission on 19 September 2014, we immediately called them to adjust our plan. Working with the TET and the DCGS–A Program Manager, we framed our initial requirements and ordered an unclassified DCGS–A architecture within 24 hours. The TET attended the already-planned training event, and we created a new training endstate and set of metrics. We would finish the next week with our final requirements and a new way ahead that would enable our HA/DR mission.

**Intelligence Architecture**

Our requirements were seemingly easy, if a little non-traditional. First, we needed systems that could work on the “dirty” internet, unencumbered by the restrictions of a Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). This was extremely important, and probably our most critical requirement, as our partners would not be other DoD entities, but Department of State organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and partner nations that did not work within a NIPRNET construct. Second, our geospatial tools needed to be Google Earth-based. All of our existing systems were ArcGIS-based; while ArcGIS is compatible with Google Earth, we needed to work on the same platform as our partners, who were all using Google Earth, often on personal computers and tablets. The requirement to be completely unclassified was a lesson learned from Haiti that we used as a base planning assumption, and it proved completely correct. Because of that preplanning, our geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) operations and common operational picture (COP) functioned seamlessly when in theater. Our third and final requirement was that anything we built needed to be simple and expeditionary. We were entering an immature theater that had no existing information technology infrastructure to support a joint force command (JFC) operation, and we did not have the time to create a complicated architecture. Additionally, we would have to establish this architecture without assistance from field support representatives, and only two U.S. Army Soldiers from the G-2’s intelligence systems maintenance section would be available in country.

**“Disseminate unclassified fused “information” to multi-national aid agencies while collaborating with coalition partners in real-time globally via the commercial internet”**

**Figure 2. DCGS-E Architecture.**

- Process and exploit unclassified information
- Displayed on the OJA COP
- One change in the database updates all views
- Shared with USG, GoL, UN, NGO / IGOs
This architecture was inherently different from anything we had done before. Its primary function would be to share information with our partners, virtually none of whom had access to the Army’s standard information networks. As we looked at what we needed to take into country with us, we realized that we had to build everything; a standard unclassified HA/DR COP toolkit does not exist in the DoD inventory. However, we were able to repurpose the Army’s DCGS—system, intended for classified use, to meet our needs. The DCGS—A program manager, in concert with the Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager—Sensor Processing (TCM–SP), and the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), were able to rapidly acquire, ship, and build a “fly-away” kit of unclassified DCGS–A servers and laptops that gave the JFC a robust capability in Liberia, as well as Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where our intelligence reachback node operated. Important in this is that we did everything at virtually no cost to the Army—it was all done with existing infrastructure and manning.

The most useful data we were able to share with our partners was the location and status of our labs, Ebola treatment units, community care centers, and helicopter landing zones. We were able to post that data, and our COP, on the All Partners Access Network (APAN)—a website for collaboration in a HA/DR environment. Using APAN also allowed us to leave behind a sustainable COP that we could transition to a non-military entity for further development or use. Posting this information onto a website in near real-time was incredibly useful to our partners because they didn’t have a COP and didn’t have a good idea on where to start building one. Our tools gave them a foundation on which to build and greatly assisted them in focusing their efforts in a common direction. This experience with Operation United Assistance highlights the need for a suite of rapidly deployable, unclassified command and control tools for a headquarters that is easily shareable with non-military and nongovernmental organizations.

**J-2 Section Composition**

Our pre-deployment guidance was to keep staffing small. Our division staff footprint would stay below 300 personnel. Our joint manning document initially authorized a full division G-2 section deployment plus intelligence enablers (237 personnel). That number was reduced to 150 personnel, and we deployed with just 33 personnel. In addition to our 22-person J-2 staff, we also brought one-half of our Air Force Staff Weather Office contingent, a human intelligence (HUMINT) team from 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and two Naval Criminal Investigative Service teams for counterintelligence (CI) operations. Our deployed G-2 section was designed to give shallow depth in GEOINT, HUMINT/CI, and systems control and plans, while providing slightly more depth in all-source fusion. We left behind a robust intelligence reachback cell of 64 personnel, led by the division analysis and control element chief, to give us the analytical and production depth we lacked forward. We intended intelligence reachback to do most of our comprehensive GEOINT and analytical projects, the base intelligence summary, all signals intelligence (SIGINT) support (if required), and the bulk of collection management. As time progressed and we refined our information and production requirements, we were able to reduce the size of our intelligence reachback to 14 personnel. In the 14-person construct, we put the G-2X and SIGINT capabilities into an “on call” status, condensed the GEOINT structure, and slightly reduced our all-source capability. The collection management capability remained unchanged.

**Intelligence Operations**

We arrived in Liberia with a traditional intelligence focus—force protection and security. We quickly realized that our focus was on the wrong mission set. The security situation in Liberia was extremely stable and showed no indications of changing in the near term. No violent extremist threat existed in the country, and the populace was (and is) disinclined to support extremism. This required the J-2 section to refocus on our biggest intelligence gap, the epidemiological spread of EVD.

Understanding the already available data became the most important task. As we tried to understand the true spread of EVD in our area of operations, one issue we faced was that the portrayal of most EVD data was cumulative. That meant that the data would never get better, only progressively worse. We knew this was not the case as Liberia did have true success stories. Our first task was to understand the EVD trends and find a way to portray those trends in a way that the commander could make decisions and recommendations to USAID on the placement of DoD assets and capabilities. This ability to receive multiple data streams, analyze the data, and present that information to the commander allowed the intelligence warfighting function to drive operations within Liberia.

There was significant confusion regarding EVD data within the counter-Ebola response community at the time of our arrival—what was EVD data, where did it come from, and what did it mean. There were multiple organizations looking at and reporting the same data in different ways. We immediately looked for the most advantageous locations to embed analysts. The first was in the National Ebola Operations Center (NEOC), where we conducted a relief in place with
U.S. Army Africa. Our senior NEOC analyst was a chief warrant officer 2, all-source intelligence technician, who became the overall Joint Forces Command-Operation United Assistance representative. The second location was the Ministry of Health (MOH), the final destination for all EVD data, where we placed our SIGINT chief warrant officer 2. Having analysts in these two critical locations was immensely helpful in two ways. First, given their analytical background, they were accustomed to sifting through large amounts of data and formatting it for commanders. Second, they were able to understand the data, crosstalk and share information, and add nuance/context that was being lost in daily operations. They became a behind-the-scenes piece of the connective tissue between the epicenter of EVD data collection (the MOH) and the epicenter for counter-EVD operations (the NEOC).

**Analyst Embed Placement**

**Ministry of Health.** At the MOH, we decided to embed two personnel that had backgrounds in data management and analysis. The first was a SIGINT warrant officer with an analytical background in databasing sectarian violence trends in Iraq, and well-versed in managing large amounts of data from both Iraq and Afghanistan. The second was an all-source intelligence analyst experienced in targeting and improvised explosive device trends in Afghanistan. Their objective was to rapidly understand how Ebola-related data was compiled and reported on a daily basis.

Both personnel quickly recognized that data management presented a major challenge at the MOH. MOH employees struggled to develop and improve procedural systems. Although Ebola case definitions existed, interpretations varied and inconsistencies led to duplicate reports and inaccurate reporting of Ebola-related data. The decentralization of Ebola case information to the county health teams produced multiple reporting formats and inconsistent practices, creating information gaps that prevented clear representation of the Ebola data. Based on this knowledge, the JFC analysts advised the MOH staff to follow clear criteria for case definitions and centralize the reporting of confirmed cases based on laboratory results. The efforts of all parties resulted in an improvement in the accuracy of reports and an increase of communications between Ebola treatment units, laboratories, and county health teams. Furthermore, the MOH data became the central repository for Ebola reports, increasing the accuracy of the daily situational report.
Key to the analyst’s ability to advise MOH data managers was the adoption of intelligence principles to improve Ebola case situation reports. Critical thinking and thorough fusion analysis of the data allowed the MOH to identify trends, patterns, and problem areas requiring action. Our experience in presenting intelligence information enabled us to improve the MOH’s methods of displaying the data as a graphical representation across both space and time. Finally, we ensured the dissemination of their data to both governmental and nongovernmental partners, as well as their health volunteers, in order to increase situational awareness and to focus continued efforts towards improved effectiveness.

**National Ebola Operations Center.** Choosing an analyst to embed for the National Ebola Operations Center (NEOC) proved just as important. We placed an all-source intelligence technician in the NEOC because they are the most flexible and agile of the intelligence disciplines. The all-source intelligence technician also assisted in technically managing the integration of a GEOINT analytical capability (we rotated between a geospatial engineer, a geospatial intelligence imagery analyst, and our National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency representative) in the NEOC to liaise with the Liberian geographic information system team that supported the counter-Ebola effort.

The Ministry of Health created the NEOC to be the focal point of Ebola response, and it was held accountable for rapidly responding to and isolating EVD outbreaks in the country. Although over 123 multinational organizations worked within the NEOC, the lack of managerial oversight and prioritization was apparent. The initial assessment of the analyst embedded in the NEOC identified the need to develop courses of action that mitigated operational obstacles. Clusters and pillars worked tirelessly to identify and discuss problems, but meetings often concluded without recommendations on how to solve them. With the support and implementation of additional working groups specifically focused on rapid isolation of Ebola and decision making, these organizations were able to focus on a COP while simultaneously supporting logistics and medical attention. The NEOC embedded analyst worked with international organization leaders from Europe, China, the United Kingdom, and Africa to distribute guidance on international crisis priorities, and to integrate these into a model that nested with the President of Liberia’s overall strategy on isolating and defeating the Ebola crisis.

**Conclusion**

A Division G-2 section can absolutely drive operations in a HA/DR response, but it requires organizational flexibility and agility. While HA/DR is a subset of stability operations in U.S. Army doctrine, its unique requirements are not resident in the Army’s standard capabilities repertoire. The 101st Airborne Division (AA) G-2 section and its partners from around the Army’s military intelligence community were able to rapidly react to a crisis and provide timely, accurate, and relevant products to the joint force commander, enabling him to support the lead federal agency, USAID.

**Endnotes**

1. Estimating the Future Number of Cases in the Ebola Epidemic – Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014–2015, Martin I. Meltzer, PhD; Charisma Y. Atkins, MPH; Scott Santibanez, MD; Barbara Knust, DVM; Brett W. Petersen, MD; Elizabeth D. Ervin, MPH; Stuart T. Nichol, PhD; Inger K. Damon, MD, PhD; Michael L. Washington, PhD; The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, September 26, 2014. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6303a1.htm?s_cid=su6303a1_w.

2. Estimating the Future Number of Cases in the Ebola Epidemic – Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014–2015, Martin I. Meltzer, PhD; Charisma Y. Atkins, MPH; Scott Santibanez, MD; Barbara Knust, DVM; Brett W. Petersen, MD; Elizabeth D. Ervin, MPH; Stuart T. Nichol, PhD; Inger K. Damon, MD, PhD; Michael L. Washington, PhD; Figure 10. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, September 26, 2014. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6303a1.htm?s_cid=su6303a1_w#Appendix-fig10.
Introduction

Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, activity in Eastern Ukraine, saber rattling regarding the Baltics, deployment to Syria, and generally more assertive behavior is often described in the West as “hybrid warfare” or “Russian New Generation Warfare.” Whatever the Russians are doing, and for whatever reasons, it is probably accurate to say that this assertive behavior is simply a Russian application of the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to further Russia’s perceived national interests in the context of the current operating environment. The Russians do not see the current conflict with the United States as primarily a military problem, but instead see the military as a component of the solution. In Russia, strategy is determined at the National Security Council, chaired by President Putin, which consists of various members from the civilian leadership, intelligence/security services, and Ministry of Defense. The Chief of the General Staff is typically always a member, thereby bridging strategy (formed in the council) to operational art (designed and implemented in the Armed Forces).

Since some of Russia’s current ambitions (e.g., maintaining frozen conflicts, destabilizing neighbors, breaking apart NATO, and changing the current balance of European security) are counter to U.S. national interests, these ambitions will likely require a U.S. and Western application of the instruments of national power to counter. Arguably, the U.S. military, especially at echelons corps and below, has little or no control of the diplomatic, informational, and economic facets, as these aspects are often in the purview of our interagency colleagues (e.g., the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury). Therefore, we as military professionals must focus our attention on the military aspect of this effort; namely winning our Nation’s wars.

Although there has been much written about Russia’s application of the instruments of national power, little has been written specifically about what S-2/G-2 staffs should know, and how they should prepare, if military conflict does occur with Russia. The following 11 recommendations provide actionable suggestions for S-2 and G-2 staffs to assist with understanding a potential adversary that we have given little consideration, until relatively recently. I have been interested in the Russian military for over twenty years and have had some experience in both working with and studying the Russian and other post-Soviet militaries. My understanding of what is generally unknown or misunderstood about the Russian Armed Forces by U.S. Army Soldiers, who have been focused on military operations other than war for the last fifteen years, are the basis for these recommendations. All recommendations are solely my opinion, and are by no means authoritative.

Be Aware That the Russian and U.S. Army Military Decision-Making Systems Differ Greatly

In the U.S. Army system, the staff uses direction and guidance from the commander to study the situation and develop courses of action for the commander’s review and approval. In the Russian system, the commander, not the staff, develops the course of action. This difference in planning is very significant, and several aspects of this difference will be explained in detail, but the take-away is that due to this different military decision-making process S-2s should be aware that Russians might develop radically different courses of action than a Western staff would anticipate.¹

Know That Russians Do Not Think in Terms of Warfighting Functions

Since the Russians use a much different military decision-making process than used in the West, applying the Western concept of warfighting functions (i.e., movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, mission command, and protection) to their tactics and operations is difficult at best. The Russians do not use their staffs to develop “effects-centric” plans based upon the warfighting functions.
Instead, the commander simply considers what capabilities his various troops possess (e.g., motorized rifle, artillery, or electronic warfare), and orders what capabilities he wants, and how he wants them applied. This difference in thinking illustrates how an S-2 cannot simply “put on their red hat” and reasonably expect to ascertain the decisions of their Russian counterparts.²

**Study Doctrinal Templates to Understand Russian Tactics**

In the Russian view, the best military decision-making system should not involve an in-depth staff planning process, but should be a system where the commander has situational understanding and rapidly issues orders to perform standard tactics and/or battle drills adjusted for the enemy, terrain, etc., to influence the outcome of the battle. Russians have developed this system due to previous experience with high-intensity maneuver warfare in the Second World War and beliefs about how to best conduct warfare during the Cold War. The Russian personnel system, which has competent enlisted professionals, but no non-commissioned officer corps (in the Western sense), is designed to complement this system of decision making. In practice, the Russian system of decision making requires a somewhat rigid system of tactics. Russian tactics at battalion level and below can best be described as battle drills that are standardized for Ground Forces, Naval Infantry, and Airborne (VDV) units. In an academic environment, officers study these various tactics (doctrinal templates or DOCTEMPs), their historical employment, and how they should be adjusted for operational variables (situational templates or SITTEMPS). These tactics are then repetitively rehearsed in the field, and explain why brigade and battalion-level staffs are substantially smaller than Western equivalents. In short, a Russian commander prefers to execute a previously rehearsed mission that fulfills the mission requirements adequately, than attempting to plan and execute a custom designed mission that fulfills the mission perfectly.⁵

Intelligence professionals have had little experience with doctrinal templates for the last fifteen or so years. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, insurgents, and criminal gangs have
no formalized doctrinal templates, and so a warfighting function model has been applied to better anticipate their actions. In order to understand Russian tactics, threat/adversary overlays (DOCTEMPs and their operational employment [SITTEMPS]) should be studied. This is not to suggest we should abandon what we have learned in the last 15 years. As can be seen in the Ukraine and Syria, Russians are operating in conjunction with entities the United States has labeled terrorists (e.g., Hezbollah), insurgents (e.g., Ukrainian separatists), and even other state actors (e.g., Iran and Syria). It is clear that Russia does not have direct control of these entities, and their ways of fighting are better understood by applying a warfighting function methodology, or may even require new DOCTEMPs in the case of the state actors. Unfortunately, it is a complex environment, and applying both traditional doctrinal templates and warfighting function based methodologies may be required to adequately predict the actions of the various actors on the modern battlefield.

Do Not Confuse the Way the Russians Fight With the Way the Opposing Force Fights

Intelligence professionals should be careful not to confuse the way the Russians fight with the way the opposing force (OPFOR) fights, as described in the TC 7-100 series of manuals. The OPFOR may have similar tables of organization and equipment as Russian units, but the previously described differences in military decision-making process, concept of warfighting functions, and use of doctrinal templates make the adversary faced in the decisive action training environment and the adversary that could be faced in Eastern Europe, very different. The OPFOR is designed to test all command-desired mission essential task list elements within a constricted timeframe. It does not mimic a particular military or country, but is an amalgam of practices from around the planet. Intelligence professionals should be prepared to fight the OPFOR in training environments, but must be prepared to fight the Russians in the field.

Open and Regularly Use an Open Source Enterprise Account

Military activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels are often discussed in the Russian mainstream media, and in Russian military academic and trade journals. Contrary to popular belief, the Russians are remarkably open about these activities. New equipment and tactics are often proposed, explained, and debated in the open media long before they reach an initial operational capability. Unlike the United States, the Russians often trumpet the development of new capabilities, with the notable exception of capabilities that could be construed as being in violation of existing treaties. Arguably, the Russians even have a tendency to exaggerate the capabilities and fielding timelines of new equipment. Fortunately, an S-2 does not need to be a Russian linguist, or even spend a lot of time to ac-
cess much of this information. The Open Source Enterprise, formerly known as the Open Source Center and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, translates Russian open source media to include newspaper articles, military relevant websites, military journals, and certain gray literature articles (trade show brochures about military equipment). Although the Open Source Enterprise does not have the resources to translate all materials, they do an excellent job of selecting the most relevant materials to the military and intelligence communities. These selections can range from organizational reforms to squad level tactics. This information, when fused with trusted information of higher classifications, can provide background and context to allow an S-2 to more accurately not only answer the “what” questions, but also the inherently more difficult “why” questions.

Be Cautious With the Term “Near Peer”

The term “near peer” is now often used to describe Russia as a military adversary comparable to the United States. Although the United States does dwarf the Russian military in almost all metrics, this fact is not particularly relevant concerning likely scenarios where Russia and the United States engage in conflict. This is because the United States and Russian militaries are fundamentally very different. While the U.S. military has a worldwide presence and can project combat power throughout the globe, the Russian military primarily operates within the country’s borders and is not well structured for expeditionary activities. The crux of the problem is that the majority of Russian combat power is near areas where Russia and the United States would likely engage, while the United States has comparatively few assets in these areas. The United States would have to deploy and sustain large forces from thousands of miles away, while the Russians would enjoy operating near their borders and in countries of the former Soviet Union that have robust rail and pipe systems that the Russian military could readily use.

At the strategic level, population totals and capabilities are seriously considered. The ability of the Soviets to reconstitute and field new armies much faster than Nazi Germany was a major contributing factor to the Soviets eventually routing the Nazis. The Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and undoubtedly, Russian strategists have postulated that the Russian Federation would be at an almost insurmountable disadvantage against the larger and more economically powerful United States in any long war scenario, especially if NATO were involved. Due to this situation, it is likely that Russia will pursue relatively moderate military objectives (probably not operating much outside the borders of the former Soviet Union), and will not attempt to destroy all United States/NATO forces, just enough to force favorable terms. In short, a “winnable” conflict for Russia with the United States/NATO likely involves an exceptionally violent but relatively short conflict (i.e., days, weeks, months). A long conflict is not in the Russian’s favor. Intelligence professionals must be able to accurately describe the scope of the threat as it applies to their commanders.

Do Not Assume the Russians Will Fight a Peer as They Fight in the Ukraine and Syria

Most recent studies of Russian tactics have focused on Russian actions in the Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria. It is true that Russia is using the Ukraine and Syria to test new equipment and tactics, and their use should be studied. However, just because the Russians apply certain tactics and techniques in one situation does not mean they will do the same thing in another. General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, paraphrases the prominent Russian strategist Major General Alexander Svechin about this situation, “Each war represents an isolated case, requiring an understanding of its own particular logic, its own unique character.” This suggests that Russians would not fight a peer as they fight a lesser adversary. While there has been much discussion in the West about the hybrid threat (criminal gangs, terrorists, insurgents, etc.) and battalion tactical groups (BTGs) there has been little examination of how Russia executes combined arms brigade and division-level operations.

Although the BTG is the instrument of choice for Russian force projection in Eastern Ukraine, the Russians make it very clear that they favor a combination of divisions and brigades as essential for technologically advanced peer-to-peer combat. Given Russian views, policies and laws on rapid reaction forces, personnel staffing levels, prohibitions on the use of conscripts, and past performance, a general idea of a Russian mobilization and deployment to counter a hostile force can be described. During pre-mobilization, conscription tours would be extended to help flesh out units with lower levels of readiness. The first units to deploy would be the rapid reaction forces, the Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and high readiness conventional units, which would deploy en masse to deter or slow the enemy. Individual BTGs from lower level readiness units may deploy to support the efforts of the rapid reaction forces, or they may wait for their parent brigade or division to come to full strength through the reserve mobilization and then deploy to the front. Meanwhile, the strategic reserve would be called to replace losses at the front and reconstitute units in the rear. Russia appears to be developing a scalable and affordable mobilization capability that balances light and mobile rapid reaction forces, combat ready
elements—BTGs—in all maneuver units, lower readiness brigades and divisions, and an operational and strategic reserve. Intelligence professionals must be able to prioritize threats in relation to these capabilities. Criminal gangs, terrorists, and insurgents may be able to prevent a commander from achieving their objective(s), but these entities generally cannot destroy brigades. This is not the case with the fires-heavy Russian conventional forces. Therefore, S-2s should not fixate on how Russia has fought in the Ukraine and Syria against lesser opponents, but should instead focus on formations and capabilities the Russians are developing, and how these entities are being used in training to fight peer-level adversaries.

**Be Prepared to Fight in Nuclear or Nuclear Threatened Conditions**

Russia is very critical of the role the United States plays in the global order, and is challenging the United States through various multilateral and unilateral means. Russia believes that her most important means of resisting this perceived U.S. hegemony is through the strategic deterrence that her nuclear weapons provide. Russia’s theory of global deterrence is based upon the premise that the threat of a mass employment of primarily strategic nuclear forces will cause such an amount of damage to an aggressor’s military and economic potential that the cost of the endeavor will be unacceptable to the aggressor. In a similar fashion, Russia’s theory of regional deterrence is based upon the premise that the threat of a mass employment of nonstrategic nuclear forces and/or strategic nonnuclear forces against an aggressor’s assault force or economy will be sufficient to deter any aggression. Russia believes these deterrence capabilities are essential, due to the United States’ well-refined ability to conduct actions during the “initial period of war”—a reference to how the United States has used air power to shape operations by destroying enemy command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Clearly, the Russians see a need to retain an up-to-date nuclear force, and train for nuclear war. Russian force modernization includes a rigorous program to modernize and improve tactical, operational, and strategic nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense units are well-equipped and an integral part of maneuver brigades. Russian wargames and major field exercises frequently include nuclear strikes and their aftermath, and unlike in the United States, tactical nuclear strikes happen in the middle of Russian wargames, not at the end. Intelligence professionals must advise commanders and staffs of Russian views regarding fighting in nuclear or nuclear threatened conditions. Russians dislike the idea of full-scale nuclear war as much as we do, but using tactical nuclear strikes or threatening nuclear war is seen as legitimate if it fulfills national objectives that would otherwise not be accomplished. Commanders must know that Russian nuclear weapons and the threat of their use will likely prevent many courses of action.

**Figure 5. Russian Depiction of a Tactical Nuclear Strike on a Reserve.**
Become Accustomed to Disabled or Degraded Global Positioning System Navigation and Communications

One area that Russian Ground Forces are significantly ahead of the U.S. Army is electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. This is no accident; the Russian military is very impressed with the U.S. capability to perform precision strikes and fears how this capability could be used against them. In addition, the Russians are keenly aware that U.S. maneuver brigades have literally thousands of pieces of gear that are dependent upon precision navigation and timing that is serviced through the global positioning system (GPS). In order to counter the U.S.’s precision strike capability and target a perceived general dependency upon GPS and satellite communications (SATCOM) technologies, the Russians have invested heavily in EW. In practice, the Russian Ground Forces, and to a lesser extent Airborne (VDV) and Naval Infantry, have dedicated EW companies, battalions, and brigades. (The Russian Ground Forces even appear to be EW’s main proponent in the Russian Armed Forces.) While the EW brigades are capable of fulfilling operational and strategic objectives, each Russian maneuver brigade has a dedicated EW company with tactical capabilities. On order, these EW companies are capable of jamming communications (R-934B/R-378B R-330B Mandat/Borisoglebsk-2), interfering with radio controlled artillery fuses (SPR-2 Rtut), and jamming GPS and SATCOM signals that are essential for precision weapons (R-330ZH Zhitel/Borisoglebsk-2). In addition to the dedicated EW units, EW capabilities are often incorporated into other assets, such as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and as payloads on multiple rocket launcher system projectiles.

The Russians believe that if there is conflict with a peer, no party will have access to satellite navigation. Hence, Russia is developing UAS navigation systems based upon terrain recognition technologies, still fielding inertial navigation systems on short-range ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles, and is maintaining the ability to deploy massed fires instead of relying on precision strikes. Intelligence professionals must prepare for degraded communications with their collection assets, and prepare PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency) plans, as appropriate. In addition, they must be aware of Russian EW capabilities and be able to communicate this threat to their commanders and the relevant subject matter experts on the staff (e.g., S-6, electronic warfare specialists, and space cadre) and advise them that the Russian capability to degrade or prevent GPS usage will likely significantly slow operational tempos.

Be Aware That Russian Elite Units Are Not Necessarily Special Operations Forces

In the West, the terms “spetsnaz” and “special operations” are used synonymously. In Russia, these terms are related but different terms. The word spetsnaz [спецназ] is a Russian abbreviation of the words spetsialnovo naznacheniya [специального назначения], a term which can roughly be translated as “special designation” referring to troops with a special purpose. The word “special” is used in a very broad way that can indicate that the unit has a very narrow area of specialization, such as signals intelligence, engineering, reconnaissance, etc.; or the unit is experimental or temporary in nature; or the unit conducts tasks of special importance such as sensitive political or clandestine operations. This broad usage of the term means that “spetsnaz” cannot be thought of as equating to the Western concept of special operation forces (SOF).

Perhaps the biggest difference between American/Western SOF and Russian Spetsnaz, referring specifically to personnel serving in the GRU Spetsnaz brigades, is the perception of these forces as elites. In the United States, SOF have the highest prestige, and are considered the crème de la crème of trigger pullers. This is in marked contrast to the Russian system, where the true elite “trigger pullers” are members of the Russian Airborne (VDV). One of the best examples of how Russia values these units is in terms of manning. In the Russian system, units are manned with a
combination of officers, contract soldiers, and conscripts. The more elite the unit, the higher percentage of contract personnel compared to conscripts. Currently, the Russian VDV is manned with approximately 80 percent contract personnel; a far higher percentage than the GRU Spetnaz. Intelligence professionals must be able to explain to their commanders how very different the Russian spetsnaz system is, and how Russian elite (and sometimes not-so-elite) conventional units often perform many missions that we would only entrust SOF units to perform.

**Know That the Russians Are Well Suited to Operations in the “Grey Zone”**

Due to the Russian Federation’s Tsarist/Soviet past, Russia, and by inheritance the Russian military, has developed a nuanced view towards corruption, which makes its eradication difficult. In the Russian system, personal connections and loyalties often trump institutional governance. The Russian military justice system has been amended to allow some crimes that once required dismissal from service to now allow lesser punishments. (There was a concern that the previous regulation was weeding out too many good officers with some ethical problems.) In general, due to historical reasons, Russians do not always clearly discern the differences between legally and morally right. These two concepts are very different in the West, but in Russia, whatever is considered “morally right” is usually interpreted to be “legally right.” This can be seen in state asset seizures of wealthy oligarchs’ property, the annexation of the Crimea, and the conduct of an undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine (in order to destabilize the Ukrainian government, a government which Russia perceives to be illegitimate and installed by the United States). Furthermore, there is no staff judge advocate advising the commander, or legislative oversight in the Russian system. Russian commanders interpret the law and make decisions as they see fit, and are seldom criticized when successful. In sum, the tendency is to interpret morally right as legally right, and the Russian legal system makes the Russian Armed Forces, intelligence, and security services well suited to operating in the ambiguous “Grey Zone” where many operations will occur. Russian commanders are not as constrained as their American counterparts are.  

**Conclusion**

Russia is an important power with modernized Armed Forces and nuclear arsenal. Intelligence professionals should avoid mirror-imaging Russian thinking, warfighting, and desired end states. Given the significance of Russia, intelligence professionals need to understand how a resurgent Russia is asserting itself through Russian New Generation Warfare, or through the application of the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Specifically, military professionals should focus on the military aspect and understand how Russian capabilities and differences in warfighting will affect them and their commanders. Commanders must also know that the Russian military is planning to fight a peer adversary in a much different way than we are currently observing the Russians fight in Eastern Ukraine and Syria.

Intelligence professionals will add great value to their units by working diligently at two things. First, understanding the difference between the counterinsurgency the United States has fought over the last 15 years and the direct action peer versus peer fight a conflict with Russia would entail, and second, by becoming knowledgeable about the Russian way of war. Fortunately, many resources can be queried. The National Ground Intelligence Center produces a variety of vetted and in-depth intelligence products that provide not only detailed order of battle information, but also a systemic understanding of how the Russian Ground Forces operate. Theater-level organizations, such as the U.S. Army Europe G-2 and the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade also have a wealth of useful knowledge. The Defense Intelligence Agency creates a variety of products concerning critical infrastructure and transportation networks vital to the understanding of logistical support. Although not intelligence organizations, the Center for Army Lessons Learned and Asymmetric Warfare Group do periodically produce Russia related reports. Perhaps some of the best resources can be found via open sources. As previously mentioned, the Open Source Enterprise should be the first stop to find translated open source information. For S-2s interested in the specifics of Russian tactics, the journal Army Digest [Армейский Сборник] is recommended. Army Digest provides a wealth of information about current and proposed tactics and capabilities on a monthly basis. For those interested in Russian operational art, the book *Strategy*, by General Alexander Svechin is recommended. Despite the title and being written in the 1930s, *Strategy* is often quoted by the Russian military and is the cornerstone of current Russian military thinking about contemporary operational doctrine and how it would be applied in any confrontation with the West. Finally, the Foreign Military Studies Office does translate and provide analysis of various Russian tactical sources for publication as publicly available articles and books.  

**Endnotes**

2. Grau and Bartles, 55-56.


4. This approximation of the Russian military decision-making process is in no way “Russian doctrine,” and is only intended to illustrate the differences between the Russian decision-making process and the U.S. Army process described in ADRP 5-0.

5. Ibid, 51.


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Introduction

Fresh off our division warfighter, the 1st Armored Division G-2 would like to communicate lessons learned that may be of use to the greater intelligence warfighting function team across the intelligence enterprise. Some of these lessons may sound familiar to those who have recently undergone a decisive action training environment warfighter exercise—and should reinforce some intelligence practitioner conclusions—while illuminating challenges and methods to others, which they may encounter in future exercises.

As with all exercises of this magnitude, we did some things well, while we had other areas that challenged us. We learned many lessons specific to this division and the way in which it fights. Of the various lessons learned, perhaps most important and which have application beyond this division, are—

- The development of the “strike cell.”
- The inclusion of enemy commander decision points to more effectively communicate the threat assessment.
- Re-looking the traditional view of the intelligence handover line (IHL).
- The integration of the Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS–A) with the Battle Command Systems.

This article will discuss each of these observations in more detail and attempt to convey the tactics, techniques, and procedures that our team found useful to achieve a modicum of success in our training objectives and in conducting intelligence operations for the division.

The Division Strike Cell

Summary. The strike cell effectively reduced the time between identification of a target to submission of a fires mission to the Joint Air-Ground Integration Cell. The process went from over 6 minutes to less than 2 minutes on average (less than 30 seconds for pure digital linkage between DCGS–A and the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System [JADOCS]/Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS]).

Discussion. Initially within the Analysis and Control Element (ACE), we established a situation development cell consisting of an all-source intelligence noncommissioned officer, a geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) Soldier, a targeting Soldier, and two fusion Soldiers to enable analysis support for the current operations conducted by G-2 Operations and future analysis conducted by the ACE. Although useful in bridging the gap between the 24 to 48-hour current operations and the 72 to 96-hour analytical/predictive horizons of the ACE, we quickly realized a larger gap existed between intelligence support to targeting and target prosecution. This gap was both locational and capacity in nature. In our initial ACE construct, we established the GEOINT, targeting, and battle damage assessment cells in the main ACE tent for better support to the fusion and operations cells and away from collection management.

After realizing we were not supporting targeting effectively, we changed the arrangement of the ACE and augmented the situation development cell with additional capacity—adding the Field Artillery Intelligence Officer, two additional targeting Soldiers, and a space operator per shift—and converted the situation development cell into the strike cell. The strike cell now possessed—

- GEOINT Workstation (for monitoring Ground Movement Target Indicators and generating quick-turn “detection” products to assist the Field Artillery Intelligence Officer).
- JADOCS/AFATDS.
- DCGS–A.
- Command Post of the Future (CPOF).
- Unmanned aircraft system feed monitoring (i.e., processing, exploitation, and dissemination [PED]) capacity to rapidly detect, deliver, and assess high payoff targets (HPTs); pass to observers for PED; and then disseminate to artillery units for lethal action.
The location of the strike cell in relation to other functions within the ACE was an important decision. The strike cell is in proximity to collection management, G-2 leadership, and is the closest G-2 element to the division fires support coordinator. This new configuration within the ACE allowed for less complex, and faster communications between the sensors (detect) and shooters (deliver) with an added benefit of agility in supporting target execution in either command post.

Additionally, the division signals intelligence (SIGINT) team successfully sent target intelligence data messages from the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) DCGS–A via the Tactical Communications Support Processor directly to the AFATDS reducing the time from high-side collection to target nomination for high payoff targets. In the past, we struggled with linking SIGINT to actionable targets, and found the addition of a SIGINT Soldier (and workstation) to the strike cell further aided in quicker target identification, which increased the lethality of the cell.

The next step for us is to codify this in our standard operating procedures and generate options for brigade combat teams (BCTs) to create and utilize a similar configuration to support their operations. This is now feasible within the context of the DCGS–A version 3.2.4—soon to be 3.2.5—equipped BCT where the requisite hardware is present down to the BCT-level (e.g., National Security Agency Network [NSANET] and JWICS Intelligence Fusion Server with a Cross Domain Solution Suite).

**Enemy Commander Decision Points**

**Summary.** Even though we conducted continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield, we found that our mid-range to long-range assessments did not effectively drive operations, no matter the degree of accuracy. By adding enemy commander decision points—differentiated within each air tasking order cycle—the division staff could better understand the enemy commander’s options and possibilities. They were then able to identify and generate options for our commander to account for and counter the enemy commander’s options in a predictive and anticipatory manner in terms of time and space.

**Discussion.** Using an approach derived from a III Corps G-2 practice, we began looking at enemy commander decision points through the lens of those decisions the enemy commander must make versus those he could make over a 96-hour period. Starting with the strategic end state and working backwards, we were better able to arrange enemy operations over time and space. Those options available to the enemy drove our collection planning, targeting operations, and assessments to focus on how the enemy commander might choose to achieve his end state.

This information provided the division commander multiple decision points and dilemmas he may encounter, better preparing him for the next fight and the subsequent fight. Ultimately, this allowed for greater discussion among the division staff—specifically during the targeting decision board—to fight the enemy and not the plan. Additionally, battle damage assessments allowed the targeting working group to re-attack those HPTs missed in the previous cycle within the next 24-hour air tasking order. This ensured the division executed its deep fight and shaped the enemy—in terms of force ratios—to allow the BCTs the best opportunity to fight and win their close fights.

We will continue to use this format to—

- Generate options for the commander.
- Provide multiple planning opportunities for coalition forces.
- Add a forcing mechanism to review opportunities available to the enemy commander.
Ensure we preserve those enemy options we want them to have, and remove those options we choose for them not to have.

**Intelligence Handover Line**

**Summary.** Wrestling with the IHL\(^1\) became a daily occurrence for targeting, but was largely ignored when attempting to answer priority intelligence requirements (PIR). The concept of tying IHLs to fire support coordination measures is valuable, but may be outdated.

**Discussion.** Our original plan called for the IHL between division and brigade to be the coordinated fire line, and the IHL between corps and division the fire support coordination line (FSCL). This design is a fairly common practice and works well when strictly tying sensors to shooters. However, with our primary detection capabilities residing with Ground Movement Target Indicators and SIGINT/electronic intelligence, anyone who receives those data feeds sees exactly the same thing regardless of echelon. Even though we were not able to target with organic assets beyond the FSCL—without the corps permission—we were able to detect and track those HPTs over time and space. The friction point derives from the sheer volume and scope of those HPTs in the depth of the environment, and the nesting of HPTs by echelon. We found ourselves grappling with trying to classify and track all of the integrated air defense and long-range fire systems—both on our division and on our corps high pay-off target lists—in the early stages of the operation; even those HPTs that were tens of kilometers beyond the FSCL. Instead of this helping the commander to anticipate the next fight or the subsequent fight, we inadvertently focused him in on HPTs that he did not need to shape at that stage of the operation. This further prevented us from making recommendations to shift to different HPTs—such as an earlier shift to maneuver, specifically T-90s, which might have been more helpful at that point in the battle. This also drove us to impatiently use our observation platforms to fly beyond the FSCL to observe a target and then wait for either corps to service the target or allow the division to service it. Had we nested our priorities with corps better, we could have used a traditional sensor-to-sensor handover of HPTs as they presented themselves for targeting and thus prevented redundancy of collection past the FSCL.

The value of IHL to collection and targeting is only a part of the argument. A different view to this argument is the value in looking beyond the FSCL to better answer our commander’s PIR and help the staff anticipate our commander’s decisions. We were relatively successful in our anticipation of enemy actions tied to our decision support matrix. Thereby allowing the staff to posture themselves to set the proper conditions to enact the commander’s decisions proactively. Had we not looked at the FSCL as simply a “guidepost” for our PIR-related collection we might have risked being stuck in the now and lost the ability to shape the next fight and the subsequent fight.

Going forward we will take a harder look at the value of the IHL, specifically as it relates to targeting. With limited observation platforms—particularly full motion video assets for PED—we might not desire to be as impatient with HPTs operating outside of the FSCL when we could be servicing those targets that might be lower on the high pay-off target list within the boundaries of the FSCL. We will also better layer our collection in time and space—within and beyond the FSCL—to continue anticipating enemy commander options and our commander’s decisions.

**Distributed Common Ground System-Army with Battle Command System Integration**

**Summary.** We supported commander and staff situational understanding by publishing the common intelligence picture (CIP) from our DCGS–A systems to the division’s Battle Command Systems. Ensuring CPOF had current and accurate enemy situation efforts published in and through the Data Dissemination Service was an area of specific focus. In addition, we created CPOF pasteboards to display our
intelligence running estimate, which included task/purpose/scheme of maneuver by enemy unit and enemy unit entities/operational graphics. This effort provided the division staff and planners the ability to quickly obtain “live” understanding of the environment and assessed knowledge of enemy actions from our running estimate on the system most staff and planners utilize.

Discussion. DCGS–A is a fantastic data management system but lacks the ability to share knowledge, which makes knowledge exchange with other staff elements in the division headquarters more difficult. CPOF is the system that allows non-intelligence staff—throughout echelon—to share knowledge that facilitates commander understanding. By ensuring the division’s intelligence running estimate remained “live” on CPOF we had to improve our capacity to use DCGS–A in a manner that allowed constant updating through echelon and transport layer. To do this, we relied heavily on database management and constant cleaning of the servers (DCGS–A and CPOF).

At the division main command post, we were fairly successful in maintaining a constant “live” CIP, so long as the data bridge remained operational. Where we struggled was when the division main command post jumped and the division tactical command post (DTAC) assumed the fight. Each of the command posts operated from different intelligence picture schemes and servers, so ensuring a seamless transfer of the updated CIP to the DTAC did not go as well as we hoped. Through discovery learning, we were able to determine we needed to “data move” the DCGS–A Tactical Entity Database (TED) to the DTAC Intelligence Fusion Server. Once the updated TED was under the control of the DTAC, we purged the CPOF repository to ensure no duplication between server pictures remained. Each time the TED exchanged ownership, we repeated the process to ensure a clean live CIP and our intelligence running estimates remained synchronized.

As with all running estimates, the degree of “live” is relative to time. We strove to keep the CIP updated every 15 minutes to ensure we provided the optimal degree of current understanding of the environment. This allowed the commander, operators, and planners to best visualize, describe, and direct operations in time and space.

Conclusion

These lessons learned are intended to help our teammates in other divisions and BCTs not repeat our mistakes, and capitalize on those successes we discovered throughout the challenge that is Warfighter. Our philosophy—from the commanding general down to the Soldiers of the G-2—was to use the opportunity of this warfighter exercise to test our systems, experiment where we identified shortcomings, and assess if our processes and training was sufficient to enable future missions. Perhaps the most important lesson we learned is the importance of building the bench. We used our command post exercises—especially the early ones—to assume risk with accuracy and capability to build a team of teams that prevented single points of failure in our organization. By altering shift compositions and internal arrangements of our Soldiers and leaders, we were able to build two shifts that were able to cope with the challenges the enemy presented regardless of the time of occurrence. As we did, we encourage you to take risk during training exercises—even ones as high profile as Warfighters—to push your Soldiers, leaders, and systems to adapt and find innovative solutions, and apply them to future operations. Most importantly, share those solutions throughout the military intelligence profession. The lessons we learned were worth the risks and will prove invaluable in our division’s future real-world missions. We hope they will be of use for the larger intelligence warfighting function.

Endnote

1. The intelligence handover line is similar to the reconnaissance handover line, which is defined by FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, as a designated phase line on the ground where reconnaissance responsibility transitions from one element to another. 1st Armored Division G-2, and their higher headquarters, uses this graphic control measure to enable the deconfliction of responsibility for the allocation of information collection assets against named areas of interest.

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Introduction
The U.S. Army Forces Command identified the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1SBCT), 4th Infantry Division (ID) (The Raiders) to inform the Army Operating Concept (AOC): Win in a Complex World on the utility of a brigade sized reconnaissance and security element. The AOC called for the analysis of a corps echelon reconnaissance and security brigade, similar to the former armored cavalry regiment, able to fight for information in a contested environment. To accomplish this may require the commitment of significant combat power, and the reconnaissance and security brigade must be able to—

- Leverage all enablers and weapon systems to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations.
- Provide the force with time and maneuver space to react to the enemy.
- Protect the force from surprise.
- Develop the situation so the commander can make decisions.

From 23–28 April 2017, the 1SBCT conducted their brigade level home-station certification training exercise, Raider Focus 17, in preparation for their National Training Center (NTC) rotation 17–07.5. To support the certification training exercise, the 4th ID Commanding General and the 1SBCT commander issued guidance to emulate NTC as accurately as possible. The intent of Raider Focus 17’s exercise design was to validate 1SBCT’s reconnaissance and security concept.

Raider Focus 17 was conducted at Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site, Colorado, and integrated several III Corps and joint enablers to supplement the brigade’s organic assets. The intelligence warfighting function enablers included two multi-function teams and a geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) platoon from the 303rd Military Intelligence Battalion, 504th Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade; and four Shadow unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) providing manned-unmanned teaming support from the 6th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Combat Aviation Brigade.

To best prepare the 1SBCT for the complexity of NTC, 4th ID Headquarters developed a decisive action training environment 2.2 scenario, and employed a corps Higher Command (HICOM) element and an Exercise Control (EXCON) element to ensure the exercise injects reinforced training objectives. The HICOM was composed of eight intelligence Soldiers (including five Main Command Post–Operational Detachment personnel from the Utah National Guard), and the EXCON was composed of nine intelligence Soldiers (including five who were dedicated to processing, exploitation, and dissemination of notional UAS data feeds and ground moving target indicators [GMTI]).

Intelligence Warfighting Function Home-Station Collective Training
The intelligence warfighting function is one of the most difficult to exercise and accurately assess during a home-station, brigade-level exercise. To address this challenge, the division G-2 and 1SBCT S-2 identified a host of efforts to exercise the intelligence warfighting function. These efforts included live opposing forces (OPFOR) and contemporary operating environment, constructive simulation generated by the Foundry Intelligence Low Overhead Driver (iLOD), and an EXCON element inserting reports of enemy activity and then adjudicating notional deep fires. The synchronization of these injects supported the brigade’s intelligence collection and analysis, and the targeting process.

The First Exercise Stimulus—Live Contemporary Operating Environment
The first simulation driving the intelligence warfighting function was live OPFOR and consisting of—

- An infantry battalion representing the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion (see Figure 1).
- Two scout Platoons (40 Soldiers) from 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th ID, portraying the insurgent forces of the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) (see Figure 1).
- Sixty Soldiers, from the 3rd Armor Brigade Combat Team, represented civilians on the battlefield.
The 81st Reconnaissance Battalion was comprised of a battalion from 1SBCT on a rotational basis, with each battalion conducting a 3-day rotation. The unit’s primary tasks changed by phase and consisted of—

- Counterreconnaissance.
- Screening.
- Probing attacks to identify points of penetration in 1SBCT’s cover for follow on forces.
- Establishing a screen for the virtual enemy forces in the main battle area.

To characterize the anti-access and area denial capabilities in the reconnaissance and security fight, the OPFOR employed the Avenger air defense missile system and the Stinger man-portable air defense system to represent the Donovian Crotale anti-air missile and SA-18 air defense systems. Additionally, elements of the 527th Space Aggressor Squadron deployed to Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site to conduct two periods of signal jamming to support OPFOR operations. The high-intensity conflict enabled 1SBCT to exercise multiple intelligence functions including:

- Manage information collection requirements.
- Conduct aerial reconnaissance missions; by employing Raven and Shadow UASs to identify enemy locations, the main and supporting efforts, and supporting fires.
- Conduct signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection; by utilizing SIGINT collection teams to obtain radio frequency intercept and direction finding using the Prophet system.

- Conduct human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and conduct counterintelligence and HUMINT liaison; by conducting debriefings, interrogations, and source operations.
- Provide intelligence support to the targeting process; by executing intelligence support to the targeting process, specifically developing high-value targets (HVT).
- Perform situation development.

The BFB conducted insurgent attacks and supported asymmetric operations that included cyberspace operations and special reconnaissance. The Soldiers portraying the BFB wore paramilitary garb (cargo pants and jackets) and employed improvised explosive devices and small arms during operations to simulate the loosely Donovian-affiliated militant organization. The BFB actions enabled 1SBCT’s S-2 section to conduct network and pattern analysis akin to counterinsurgency operations. The roles given to the BFB by the EXCON supported intelligence analysis of the organization’s hierarchy, attack patterns, and ultimately identifying a disruptive attack (i.e., a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device on the brigade support area). The low-level insurgency forced the 1SBCT to analyze HUMINT reporting from sources within the civilian population, conduct interrogations of detained BFB members, and conduct document and media exploitation. These intelligence operations supported decisions on when and where to increase force protection conditions. 1SBCT successfully linked no less than four disparate feeds, by the live role-players and reports created through iLOD and pushed from the HICOM, to identify the time and probable location of the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device target.

The final layer of this contemporary operating environment simulation focused again on the human variable. Sixty Soldiers dressed in civilian clothes played a multitude of roles that were developed by the EXCON, Division G-3 Information Operations (formerly G-7), and the G-9 Engagements Section. Extensive development of identification cards and scripts integrated into BFB and the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion’s operations supported opportunities for source development and reporting. 1SBCT did
well developing these sources following a simulated source handover from the host nation, publishing intelligence information reports, and utilizing the sources to develop the BFB network. Roles of the civilians on the battlefield included providing news reporting, propaganda injects and products, as well as acting as sources to support 1SBCT multi-functional team HUMINT operations. Other role-players filled specific key leadership positions, like a village mayor and police chief with the Bilasuvar alliance, and supported key leader engagements. The civilians on the battlefield performed displaced personnel movements to disrupt the flow of 1SBCT operations and instigated riots in the village of Goran (a military operation in urban terrain site at Pinyon Canyon Maneuver Site) an objective and key terrain for 1SBCT.

The Second Exercise Stimulus—Virtual and Constructive Injects

The next simulation was the integration of a computer-generated higher echelon. The simulation was developed in concert with Fort Carson’s Foundry Intelligence Training Program and the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT). The Division G-2 planning team developed a comprehensive order of battle for the Donovian 81st Division Tactical Group based on the decisive action training environment scenario and the commander’s training objective to exercise the reconnaissance and security concept at a corps level. The order of battle was given to IEWTPT team, and utilizing the iLOD simulation server, they developed the deep fight for battalion, brigade, and division enemy maneuver, fires, and air defense assets (reference Figure 1). The IEWTPT also provided a synchronized GMTI feed to identify the movement of battalion and higher units and a line of full motion video (FMV) to cross-cue and confirm unit and equipment locations for targeting. The 1SBCT was required to establish upper tactical internet to receive the feeds into their Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS–A) for exploitation. The GEOINT analysts utilized the MOVINT client to exploit GMTI and a video player to receive and analyze the FMV feed. Within the iLOD simulation is a collection apparatus where the corps and 1SBCT were able to construct collection plans and named areas of interest to collect on virtual enemy units’ composition and disposition. Simulated collection within the iLOD resulted in reporting via U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF) messages to the brigade for exploitation. The USMTF types included—

- Reconnaissance Exploitation Reports, containing observations of the enemy composition and disposition from imagery systems.
- Tactical Reports, containing SIGINT generated information of systems and dispositions.
- Tactical ELINT Reports, containing electronic intelligence information.

To succeed at exploiting the iLOD data feed, the 1SBCT configured their Intelligence Fusion Server to receive the USMTF messages into their DCGS-A Multi-Function Workstation’s Journal Entry Viewer and ultimately their Tactical Entity Database to depict unit composition and disposition. Successful exploitation of the iLOD data provided the 1SBCT a current enemy situation template, including the live 81st Reconnaissance Battalion, and the ability to target HVTs in the deep fight to shape the next phase. In addition to the iLOD data, the Division G-2 EXCON injected additional reporting to support the scenario.

The EXCON orchestrated three roles during the exercise:

- HUMINT operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tactical controller (ITC).
- National technical means.

The HUMINT roles provided valuable injects to shape the 1SBCT’s understanding of the local population and the network of civilian and insurgent operations. These injects were implemented by issuing intelligence information reports and personality scripts for the role players who were interrogated and role players who were questioned by HUMINT Soldiers conducting source meets. The ITC played a critical role simulating the Air Force E–8, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, and Grey Eagle and Shadow UASs. The ITC used the DCGS–A multi-function workstation with the iLOD data feed to identify where HVTs were located and communicated directly with 1SBCT collection managers and GEOINT analysts via PSI Chat services to support their targeting process from sensor to shooter. The national technical means operator provided critical injects to support the Donovian use of chemical strikes. Injects provided to the 1SBCT from this operator included overhead persistent infrared; identifying unusual light activity from the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion Headquarters; launches of missiles; and exploited imagery of surface-to-air missile, chemical, and other missile sites for deep targeting. The division signal intelligence (SIGINT) section produced and disseminated serialized reports pertaining to intercepts of the BFB to exercise SIGINT analysts and systems. These reports were disseminated over the Trojan Data Network-2 (TDN–2) to the brigade, requiring the establishment of the brigade Trojan SPIRIT to receive and process reporting. Without these injects, the brigade would have fought a much more two dimensional battle with the live OPFOR.
The Third Exercise Stimulus—Collection Injects

In addition to the virtual and constructive injects from Foundry and the EXCON, the G-2 and 1SBCT S-2 coordinated for real-world effects to enhance the training environment for the brigade. The 1SBCT utilized organic and attached Shadow UASs to exercise their ground control stations and two Tactical Ground Stations (one organic and one from 303rd Military Intelligence Battalion). The JSTARS also provided real-world GMTI for several hours in the middle of the training event to exercise the Tactical Ground Station and GEOINT teams. Additionally, the G-2 Collection Management and Dissemination team coordinated with the Army Technical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Program and the Army Departmental Requirements Office of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for routine daily imagery collection. This collection provided near real-time imagery and radar of the fight for GEOINT analysts to exploit, and exercised the Global Broadcast System (GBS) and GEOINT Workstation’s ability to pull data. The incorporation of multiple collection assets ensured the brigade collection and requirements management section exercised their processes and stressed their systems ability to manage the flow of information from requirements through dissemination of the information at the end of the intelligence process. During the exercise, the G-2 and 1SBCT S-2 were fortunate to have representatives from the TENCAP Program visit to assist with understanding the flow of national collection to the warfighter at division, brigade, and battalion echelons and identify shortfalls in receiving and processing information. Two key observations provided by the team were first, a recognition of the brigade’s reliance on upper tactical internet to enable imagery download, and second, the importance of enhancing the availability of commercial imagery on unclassified systems, such as cellular networks, should the upper tactical internet fabric fail. The addition of the many layers of real-world injects stressed intelligence systems for the brigade.

Enhancing Home Station Training for the Intelligence Warfighting Function—Lessons Learned

Raider Focus 17 was successful at stressing the 1SBCT’s intelligence warfighting function, and valuable lessons were learned from the exercise. The following four lessons and proposed solutions address the preponderance of issues that arose during the planning and execution phase.

During the development of the virtual scenario on iLOD, the intelligence planning team did not provide adequate time to communicate requirements and construct the enemy order of battle to IEWTPT. We recommend providing the order of battle two months prior to the exercise to IEWTPT to enable them to construct units down to the company level and HVTs for the virtual OPFOR. The development of the scenario down to the company level will better support collection, analysis, and targeting and make iLOD reporting more realistic. IEWTPT could shorten this process by defining a requirement...
for iLOD developers to incorporate a tool to ingest pre-configured order of battle schema in a compatible format.

By the conclusion of the exercise, the iLOD proved successful at pushing the USMTF traffic, FMV, and GMTI. However, the bandwidth requirements to support the feeds regularly exceeded that of the brigade’s Joint Network Node. To address this challenge, the Foundry site should inject the FMV and GMTI feeds into the GBS. Utilization of the GBS will exercise the brigade S-2 and military intelligence company systems and provide adequate bandwidth to support these two simulated feeds.

Due to delays in establishing the finalized intelligence architecture, there was a three day period during the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) phase and one day of the exercise phase that the brigade and EXCON were not fully mission capable. To address this shortfall, we recommended that all intelligence participants conduct an intelligence specific validation exercise not less than two weeks prior to the exercise. Furthermore, if the exercise is off-site, an intelligence exercise checklist with a systems specific communications exercise during RSOI is necessary, and replicates requirements at combat training centers.

Finally, the integration of the Home-station Instrumentation Training System (HITS) enabled the EXCON to provide injects from simulated Grey Eagle UASs and to coordinate the constructive OPFOR movement with that of the live OPFOR. HITS is intended to provide a scalable Soldier and system location tracking method that can be integrated into the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), to support force-on-force engagements. The intermittent functionality of HITS during Raider Focus 17 is attributable to the undermanned HITS control team and terrain limitations. We recommend the employment of HITS more frequently at platoon through brigade force-on-force exercises to enhance understanding of the utility of the system. The size of the HITS team must be scaled to support the respective echelon trained. Prior to an exercise, we advise that the HITS team integrate with the EXCON and deploy early to training sites in order to reconnoiter receiver placement adjusting for terrain as necessary. If employed correctly, HITS can provide an excellent means to track the location of OPFOR units and equipment to enable simulated UAS reporting, and provide after action review support.

**Conclusion**

Ultimately, this blended training of live, virtual, and constructive environments successfully stressed the brigade’s intelligence processes and systems across three communications networks (TS, SIPR, and NIPR), providing an excellent brigade-level exercise in preparation for NTC.

**Endnote**

1. IEWTPT was also slow in producing the simulated order of battle because of a contract change one month prior to Raider Focus ’17 that led to two of the three Fort Carson, Colorado, IEWTPT contractors leaving three weeks prior to the exercise with no immediate back fills.

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The Integration of Intelligence with Operations during Danger Express

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Rider with contributions from Dr. William Rierson

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The field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) played a key role in the effective employment of Fires in the 1st Infantry Division’s Warfighter exercise (WFX), April 5-14. With a new commanding general and staff, and facing a WFX against a near-peer adversary, 1st ID focused on building mastery through multiple repetitions, conducting three command post exercises (CPXs) during an eight-month train up. Over the course of the train-up and through the execution of the Warfighter, the techniques, tactics, and procedures used by the FAIO continued to evolve, with the enduring objective being the timely nomination of relevant, targetable intelligence for action by the Joint Air Ground Integration Center. This article highlights the lessons learned and best practices of the FAIO during the 1st Infantry Division Warfighter, which enabled the team to “win with Fires.”

First Infantry Division utilized the decide, detect, deliver and assess methodology as outlined in Figure 1. Throughout this process, the FAIO’s roles and responsibilities were essential to the successful link between intelligence and targeting.

Decide function

During the decide function of the targeting process one of the responsibilities of the FAIO is to provide target criteria to the analysis and control element (ACE), ensure the ACE understands and follows the high payoff target list (HPTL), target selection standards (TSS), and attack guidance matrix (AGM) demonstrated in Figure 2. The ACE targeting analysts along with supervision from the FAIO are responsible for the accurate and timely data base entry into the Distributed Common Ground System-Army incorporating the attack guidance matrix and target selection standards. The FAIO works with the G2/J2 in the development of the high value target list (HVTL) throughout military decision making process.

As stated in Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting, “a high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of a high-value target would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest.”

The HVTL is then analyzed by the targeting officers and developed into the recommended HPTL in order to be briefed.
and approved by the commander. The approved HPTL is then used to focus information collection efforts, and when required, for the execution of a dynamic target, see Figure 3.

During intelligence preparation of the battlefield the FAIO needs to work with the All Source Intelligence technician in the development of the enemy situational template. The FAIO also assists the division artillery S2/targeting officer in the terrain analysis to template the location of the fire support/target acquisition targets on the HPTL. The FAIO works with the collection manager to develop the specific information requirements (SIRs) for the areas that will be a focus of collection and makes recommendations to the commander on the priorities for collection during the targeting working group as well as requesting and synchronizing the resources available to conduct target refinement. These SIRs become the information on the collection deck for the assets that are requested and later resourced. The sensor operators use these requirements during the detect phase; conducting the information collecting and the passing of that specific information that pertains to the HPTL to the FAIO utilizing the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) section.

The FAIO, fire support officers (planners) along with the DIVARTY targeting officer or Fires planner need to conduct offensive fire planning for all of the objectives and develop a target list worksheet (TLWS) for each. This will aid in receiving collection priorities, and targeting guidance from the commander during the targeting process. This integrated planning aids the DIVARTY in the development of the Field Artillery Support Plan and those triggers associated with the employment of the firing units and target acquisition assets required to service planned targets on the TLWS. The target synchronization matrix is one of the outputs during this phase and is the primary tool (if used properly) in executing current operations or the detect, deliver, and assess phases of targeting.

**Detect function**

Once Warfighter 16-04 (Danger Express) commenced, 1st Infantry Division was executing the detect function of the targeting process. One of the key intelligence collection sec-

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**Table 3:** The High-Payoff Target List (HPTL) and Target List Worksheet (TLWS) for 1st Infantry Division. (Table from FM 2-0, Intelligence, April 15, 2014, page 1-13)

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**Figure 1:** The targeting process and intelligence operations. (Information from FM 2-0, Intelligence, April 15, 2014, page 1-13)

**Figure 2:** The 1st Infantry Division’s high payoff target list target selection standards attack guidance matrix. (Courtesy image)
The process above was utilized for the full suite of intelligence collection/target acquisition assets which provided targetable data within the published targeting standards and assisted the FAIO in providing recommendations to the ACE chief on changes to high value targets. The JAGIC received and executed over 400 calls for fire/fire mission requests from the FAIO and the targeting cell in the ACE during Warfighter 16-04. The results were seen at the final after action review with the destruction of 90 percent of all air defense artillery systems, 85 percent of the Operational Strategic Command-2 (OSC-2) fire support assets destroyed, and 70 percent of the remaining OSC-2 Target Types destroyed.

The DIVARTY counter-fire cell’s target acquisition radars located and identified the enemy’s indirect fire weapons locations. The DIVARTY counter-fire officer passed those locations to the FAIO and the ACE. The FAIO relayed the targetable information to the JAGIC and the air interdiction coordinator (AI COORD) using the process that will be discussed in the next paragraph.
The FAIO established a link with the AI COORD within the JAGIC after the initial 48-72 hours of the exercise. In order to open the line of communication the FAIOs created a Transverse Chat window with the AI COORD and the controlling joint terminal air controller in the JAGIC. This chat window allowed the FAIO to request non-tasked intelligence collection from the JAGIC. This process reported target information and situational awareness to available aircraft that were transiting in or through the battlespace, were mission complete on their assigned task or had remaining time on station the ability to be sent over to a historic sites of enemy fire support assets or air defense radar locations. In addition to the 400 calls for fire/fire mission requests sent from the FAIO with the dynamic targeting process; the FAIO additionally passed 100 targets to the JAGIC and AI COORD using this technique. The battle damage associated with this process was the most effective for the 1st Infantry Division Warfighter.

Throughout 1st Infantry Division Warfighter 16-04 the FAIO’s workstation was located in the ACE next to the entrance. The FAIO’s location granted easy access to the JAGIC and the current operations cell. The FAIO was then able to conduct face-to-face engagements with the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), deputy FSCOORD, fire support officer, JAGIC chief, and the targeting officers throughout the day and more importantly when the FAIO had specific information from the ACE that could affect the current operations. The FAIO’s primary tools for mission success were the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, the Effects Management Tool and the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS) in conjunction with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System located on the current operations floor in the joint air ground integration cell. This network of systems proved to be a vital for the integration of multi-intelligence resources into the operations process. This combination of knowledge management systems and physical position within the ACE that could affect the current operations cell. The FAIO’s workstation was located in the ACE next to the entrance. The FAIO’s location granted easy access to the JAGIC and the current operations cell. The FAIO was then able to conduct face-to-face engagements with the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), deputy FSCOORD, fire support officer, JAGIC chief, and the targeting officers throughout the day and more importantly when the FAIO had specific information from the ACE that could affect the current operations. The FAIO’s primary tools for mission success were the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, the Effects Management Tool and the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS) in conjunction with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System located on the current operations floor in the joint air ground integration cell. This network of systems proved to be a vital for the integration of multi-intelligence resources into the operations process. This combination of knowledge management systems and physical position within the ACE that could affect the current operations. The FAIO’s primary responsibility was the vetting and validation of those HPTs that were identified using those tools specified above. Keeping in mind that all of the targets identified were not HPTs but would still be reported for situational awareness for the collective targeting effort.

**Deliver function**

The deliver function of the targeting process begins with and without the FAIO. During Warfighter 16-04 there were numerous instances when the ACE targeting analysts began the vetting and validation process without the FAIO or ITO present. The targeting analysts were developed and mentored by the FAIO and ITO to conduct operations in their absence and executed superbly during the exercise. This allowed the FAIO the flexibility to walk around and engage multiple different staffs during current operations. The FAIO makes target execution recommendations to the JAGIC chief based from the target type, and the activity associated with the target based from the approved and published attack guidance matrix (Figure 2) when passing the dynamic targets (Figure 3) to the JAGIC. During this time the FAIO is also the fire supporter responsible for advising the ACE on the fire support capabilities available for execution in current operations. The overall selection of assets used to execute the dynamic target relies on the JAGIC Chief based on available assets and the most efficient time to execute the target. Once the target was approved and resources to be executed the FAIO maintained situational awareness and provided predicted battle damage assessment to the ACE Chief on the results from the target execution.

The FAIO had to set time aside during the deliver phase for the refinements of those targets nominated, approved, and tasked on the air tasking order (ATO) for close air support and air interdiction at the 48 hours and 24 hours prior to ATO day as well as those priority targets eight hours and four hours prior to mission time. The FAIO’s ability to use JADOCS to track and face-to-face discussions to coordinate updates with the air liaison officer on targets submitted to the battlefield coordination detachment worked efficiently during Warfighter 16-04.

The FAIO continued to nominate dynamic targets during the detect and deliver phase of the targeting process and remains heavily involved with the intelligence collection efforts in the ACE ensuring that those “shiny objects” do not
interrupt and divert the collection priorities set forth by the commander.

**Assess function**

The FAIO’s responsibility during the assess function of the targeting process is to assist in the conduct of battle damage assessment that is orchestrated by a tactical and operational BDA collection team. Initial BDA is conducted utilizing the collection asset over the target area. At times those assets may have been reallocated to higher priority missions and the mission report (MISREP) from the pilot of a fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft is used to determine of the desired effects were achieved. An alternate method to determine predicted BDA is the utilization of the joint weapon system along with the fire mission information containing the munition type and number of munitions expended in executing the target. If the desired effects were not achieved the FAIO in conjunction with the JAGIC can make recommendations to the commander for a reattack of the target.

“The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decision points throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations.” (Army Techniques Publication 3-60 Targeting, 2015).

Planning for the assess phase begins well before the targeting working group which identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and also when the commander makes a decision during the targeting decision board.

“Commanders adjust operations based from this initial assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.” (Army Techniques Publication 3-60 Targeting, 2015).

If future combat assessments reveal that the commander’s guidance or conditions of operational success have not been met, the detect and deliver functions of the targeting process must continue until the desired effects are met.

**The FAIO battle rhythm**

The FAIO and the intelligence targeting officer ensured that one or the other was present in the ACE targeting cell at all times to maintain oversight of target vetting, validation, and authority. The FAIO’s duty day was broken up into two 12 hour shifts (extended longer during peak times and key meetings) associated with the two targeting analysts on shift with the FAIO. The ITO typically attended the targeting decision board every morning which allowed the FAIO to remain in the ACE for the passing of dynamic targets. The night shift FAIO had the responsibility to attend the targeting working Group and pass all information included in the targeting FRAGORD to the FAIO in the morning during the battle hand over. Always considering that the battle rhythm needs to be nested with the higher headquarters’ to allow the right information to be shared and understood at the right time.

The FAIO played a key role in the successful employment of Fires during WFX 16-04. The FAIO’s fusion of multiple means of collection to develop targets through shared understanding of the HPTL and focus of Fires, along with the seamless handoff of targets to the JAGIC ensured success of Fires in the division fight.

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Readiness determines our ability to fight and win our Nation’s wars. More specifically, it is the capability of our forces to conduct the full range of military operations to defeat all enemies regardless of the threats they pose. While the violent and skillful application of land power is the way in which these ends are achieved, ready units, units that are properly manned, trained, equipped, and led, are the means by which the Army generates this capability.

—Chief of Staff of the United States Army’s Readiness Guidance for Calendar Year 2016-17

Introduction

There is nothing in this article that is surprising or earth shattering. We are simply describing and explaining a method to approach military intelligence (MI) military occupational specialty training in a division. Like most U.S. Army intelligence organizations, we too wrestled with how to achieve readiness within our core functions. We grappled with aligning ourselves to competing demands on our time and resources, while attempting to balance training readiness with the expectation for continuous execution of intelligence operations. In our efforts to achieve readiness, we soon realized we did not really understand the term “ready,” and so we attempted to define the term for ourselves.

To get ready, you need to understand ready, or readiness. Being ready is that you are a professional practitioner and that you have created and lead a team composed of like practitioners, all capable of performing critical individual tasks which align in concert with the successful completion of complicated collective tasks embedded/nested within a series of complex tasks. You get ready by training practitioners through individual, crew, and collective training with focus on getting our commanders at the right place, at the right time, and in the right posture to close with and destroy the enemy, which ensures victory in an ever increasingly complex environment.

—LTC Blue Huber, 1st Armored Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Then, we expand on those training plans, by testing them using our own Digital Intelligence Systems Master Gunner (DISMG) program, culminating with the execution of an MI competition, named for one of 1st Armored Division’s own fallen Soldiers—CPT Robert C. Scheetz, Jr.

Finally, we tie all of these efforts together through structured leader training in a bi-annual brigade and battalion S-2 seminar program with consistent and constant foundational mentorship offered by the senior leaders from the division G-2.

Subordinate Unit Intelligence Training Planning

1st Armored Division G-2, using the aforementioned training model, begins to facilitate and support subordinate brigades’ intelligence training through an analysis of our corps’ training guidance and dial with our brigade S-2s. The G-2 publishes an operations order for subordinate brigades to attend a G-2 hosted Foundry training conference that provides input into their brigade training guidance and the division’s annual training guidance/strategy. Using the division’s 3-year training calendar as a guide, the brigade S-2s and military intelligence company (MICO) commanders outline a gated intelligence training strategy during the Foundry conference tailored to their assessment and requirements for culminating training events, upcoming named operations, or regional alignment. The G-2 reviews their tailored training plans and mentors them on how to mitigate potential gaps and risks through discussion of battalion and brigade operations. The key point of understanding is the timing of enabler training. The goal being to have enablers trained to the collective level prior to battalion operations. This ensures the enabler is driving operations/training as opposed to hindering the training. Finally, the G-2 publishes—as part of the division’s annual training guidance—intelligence training requirements for the brigades to execute. Likewise, the brigade S-2s publish intelligence training guidance as part of the brigade training plan to their battalions and MICO to ensure all training is nested in time and space.

MAJ Kristen Shifrin—2/1 Brigade Combat Team S-2—used this concept to work through her training plan with her subordinate MI leaders:

*When I took over as the [brigade combat team] BCT S-2, my MICO Commander and subordinate battalion S-2s and I developed our intelligence training strategy for the next year, which culminated in a combat training center rotation and a deployment. We maximized Foundry resources and internal resources to ensure the intelligence training was integrated into the brigade combat team operations and training glide path towards those culmination points.*

The Foundry conference is our intelligence readiness cornerstone that establishes, synchronizes, and facilitates our plan for building professional intelligence practitioners through the allocation of resources in time and space to enable training readiness.

Evaluation Methodology

In order to measure how well this training model works, we devised two approaches to test intelligence practitioner readiness following successful execution of the brigades’ training plans: the 1st Armored Division Digital Intelligence Systems Iron Gunner program and the CPT Robert C. Scheetz Jr. MI Competition.

As with many other units, we struggled with Soldier and leader ownership of the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) System of Systems. We heard all of the same excuses but heard no real solutions. The watershed moment came with the development of the U.S. Army Forces Command’s (FORSCOM) DISMG program. We actively pursued sending our G-2 leaders to the course, and with the graduation of our first qualified Master Gunner—in conjunction with the Foundry manager—we developed a rigorous DCGS-A course at Fort Bliss that went beyond traditional “buttonology.” Instead, it focused on doctrinally sound employment of the weapons system in a similar manner to that of a weapons squad leader with their machineguns—the 1st Armored Division Digital Intelligence Systems Iron Gunner program. Upon graduation from Fort Bliss’ Iron Gunner course, Soldiers are able to successfully operate, troubleshoot, advise the brigade and battalion S-2 on the employment of the system in terms of basic intelligence architectural design, plan training strategies/events for their units, and are better prepared to take the next step of attending the FORSCOM DISMG course. Beyond the ability to train their respective unit’s Soldiers, division-qualified DISMGs are utilized during each operation as the experts to help develop and communicate the intelligence running estimate, troubleshoot Battle Command Systems interoperability, and enable their commander to be at the right place, at the right time, and in the right posture to close with and destroy the enemy.

Individual and small unit collective training is fantastic, but more compelling is how those teams and crews of practitioners function and operate to support battalion and brigade operations. The method of evaluation for the intelligence practitioners’ individual and team skills resultant from their brigades’ intelligence training—from utilizing a Portable Multi-function Work Station to employing the Prophet system—is the division-hosted CPT Robert C. Scheetz Jr. MI Competition. The 1st Armored Division developed the competition to build esprit de corps and to gain an understanding of how well trained the MICO, BCT, and
battalion S-2s are in their individual and collective tasks. We designed the competition around the execution of the collective tasks and gunnery skills of a MICO—employment of a Prophet system, unmanned aircraft systems, Tactical Ground Station, etc. However, we cannot stop with the MICO tasks, so we test the ability of the BCT S-2 and subordinate battalion S-2s to execute mission analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield on a division-delivered decisive action training environment operations order. Once this is complete, senior leaders within the G-2 evaluate their products and running estimates according to doctrine and unit standard operating procedures. Furthermore, the BCT S-2 will issue their intelligence running estimates and products (Annex B, etc.) to their subordinate battalion S-2s—who will also conduct their own intelligence preparation of the battlefield—allowing the brigade S-2 to assess their battalion S-2s. In the end, the division G-2, each BCT commander, and BCT S-2 will share in a better understanding of the intelligence enterprise across the division. The highest scoring platoons and MICO are formally recognized by the 1st Armored Division Commanding General and earn the division’s recommendation for the FORSCOM MG Oliver W. Dillard Award, recognizing the most outstanding company-sized MI unit assigned to a BCT, in the next fiscal year.

**Mentorship and Coaching**

As the pace of division-level operations and training increases, we can quickly lose sight of our role as leaders and mentors. We previously invested time and energy into the plan to build practitioners, and now capitalize on that plan through maintaining a foundation of mentorship. As the division’s senior intelligence officer, the G-2’s primary role is mentor, coach, and trainer for everything MI related. This role permeates throughout the G-2 leadership. The division senior trainers (officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers) within each of the intelligence disciplines mentor the subordinate personnel and teams within the brigades. When brigade S-2s request observers to evaluate performance of individual, team, and collective training, the division will send subject matter experts or the G-2 will attend—sometimes as an unannounced visitor—to observe and provide recommendations. The G-2 will also provide candid feedback to the brigade/battalion command teams and S-2s to assist in the improvement of their intelligence warfighting function in the lead-up to the organization’s culminating training event.

Mentorship does not end when the unit finishes rail load operations, but continues during the brigade’s combat training center (CTC) rotation. The division G-2 will spend approximately one week at the training site (National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center). The G-2 observes the brigade intelligence enterprise to determine where the intelligence training plan was most and least effective. The G-2 will also bring intelligence field-grade officers who have not been a brigade S-2 to observe a brigade “in the box.” The G-2 continuously interacts with the CTC observer/coach trainers to capture lessons observed, and will provide a trip report to the commanding general highlighting lessons learned and what training adjustments to make prior to the next BCT training exercise. Additionally, the G-2 will host a round table discussion with the brigade S-2s and non-key developmental complete intelligence field-grade officers where we address those lessons observed and learned during the train-up and execution of the CTC rotation. This allows the BCT S-2 to share candid thoughts of what worked and what did not work in an attempt to educate peers and future brigade S-2s.

**Bi-annual Conference**

Finally, the G-2 hosts a bi-annual brigade and battalion S-2 conference, the intent of which is to provide S-2s at all levels tools and skills not normally taught in Training and Doctrine Command, or to reinforce those skills already resident. A key learning point comes from those seasoned brigade and battalion S-2s and MICO commanders providing their candid insights and perspectives. The conference normally begins with opening remarks from the division’s commanding
In general where he provides his perspectives on the intelligence enterprise, and how it relates to commanders across echelons. As the seminar progresses, there are a number of different presenters discussing various topics including—

- Threat and friendly doctrine.
- Intelligence/operations process.
- Foundry program.
- Information collection operations.
- Training management.
- Commander (maneuver) panel discussions.
- Security management.
- Professional development.
- Talent management.
- Support to targeting.

All current or future brigade and battalion S-2s are required to attend the conferences—sometimes multiple times—during their tour at Fort Bliss. Current S-2s will speak of their successes and challenges, what worked, and what did not work, in terms of planning, preparing, and execution of training and operations. This discussion allows the sharing of ideas across the intelligence enterprise, and sharing within a truly learning organization that gains from the successes and challenges of its members.

**Figure 3. Brigade/Battalion S-2 Seminar.**

<table>
<thead>
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<td>DCGS ARCHITECTURE</td>
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<td>1000 - 1050</td>
<td>FOUNDRY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1100 - 1200</td>
<td>MANNING (PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT)</td>
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<td>1200 - 1300</td>
<td>LUNCHEON</td>
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<td>1300 - 1420</td>
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**Conclusion**

The 1st Armored Division G-2 training model provides a method for an organization to undertake the complex combination of art and science that training multiple intelligence formations across multiple echelons can entail. We have found that this model applied against an annual training cycle allows for active mentorship and enables adaptability by echelon to meet mission requirements. The model begins with the analysis of required tasks—garnered from the corps’ training guidance and discussions at the annual Foundry conference with the BCTs—as the cornerstones that begin the journey to the intelligence competition: the culmination point designed to test and validate the division’s intelligence enterprise readiness. In the tactical setting of a division, the training and the certification of intelligence formations requires ownership by commanders. There is often a gap in the current modular construct of our force, where commanders of brigades and battalions focus on training combat arms squads, crews, and platoons—rightfully so. However, the risk for those commanders is dooming their organizations to constant movement to contact-style operations when their intelligence warfighting function lacks training to drive their operations in an anticipatory and predictive manner. The true value of a trained S-2 is the ability to anticipate the next fight and subsequent fight. It often falls on the MI officers of those formations—supported by the experience and knowledge of the division G-2—to fight for the resources, time, and integration necessary to ensure that professional intelligence practitioners are capable of delivering their commanders to the right place, at the right time, and in the right posture to defeat the enemy and win.

LTC Blue Huber currently serves as the senior intelligence trainer at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA, and most recently served as the division G-2 for the 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss, TX. He also served as the senior division/corps intelligence trainer with the Mission Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Additionally, he served as the Chief of the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element and 742nd MI Battalion Executive Officer at Fort Meade, MD.

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MAJ Maximillian Renard currently serves as the 1st Armored Division G-2 Analysis and Control Element Chief. He has also served as a division intelligence operations officer in charge in the 1st Armored Division and as the opposing force and threat scenario planner at Joint Modernization Command at Fort Bliss, Texas. In 3rd Infantry Division he served as a brigade assistant S-2, cavalry squadron S-2, and division intelligence operations officer. He has five combat deployments, serving in positions at the platoon through division level. His education includes an master of arts in security studies from Kansas State University and a bachelor of arts in political science from Whittier College.
Introduction
Russia’s GRU (military intelligence) Spetsnaz, a once ill-favored intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force that for a generation suffered from weak morale and questionable operations, re-established much of their perceived preeminence thanks to successes in the Ukraine. Among the known capabilities of Spetsnaz are sabotage or disruption of key military facilities, assassination of key leaders, collecting intelligence, attacking strategic military targets, and any other special tasks required to support Russia’s conventional forces. Much of what we know about Spetsnaz comes from open sources and analysis of past operations since modern doctrine regarding their combat application is largely classified. However, it is apparent the Spetsnaz mission has evolved considerably since Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia. The world’s first glimpse of Russia’s new army in action occurred when Russian forces covertly invaded Crimea, Ukraine, in February 2014. In Crimea, the world saw Russian Special Forces Operators (SSO) working side by side with GRU Spetsnaz for the first time, almost indistinguishable from each other operationally. However, while some hail the Crimean campaign as an operation of precision by a renewed Russian military, there were several conditions on the ground that greatly facilitated the success of Spetsnaz, SSO, and conventional follow-on forces. The Russian General Staff now faces the question of how to deploy Spetsnaz and SSO more independently while retaining their intelligence-collection capabilities in a technology-driven combat environment.

Covert Employment
With persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capable of blanketing the world virtually non-stop, there is a greater likelihood that spearheading warfare involving Russian forces will be the simultaneous covert employment of Spetsnaz, SSO, cyber operations, and information operations. The resulting plausible deniability from covert warfare was a useful tool in exerting Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. However, with license plates visible on tactical vehicles, soldiers telling news reporters where in Russia they were stationed, and the use of unique weapons systems, Russia’s use of covert warfare in Crimea was poorly executed. Eventually, when Russia realized strong words would be the world’s response, they gave up their covert ploy altogether. A 2013 article by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of Russia’s General Staff, alluded to the covert use of force when he noted how most modern warfare has already been fought outside the (conventional) military realm and is facilitated by actions of Special Forces operating in a covert manner with a country’s “internal opposition.” The implications for Spetsnaz and SSO in this covert style of warfare are profound, as is General Gerasimov’s stated intent to increase Russia’s asymmetric warfare capabilities. That is not to say that covert warfare will be the norm for Russian forces in the foreseeable future. In the Ukraine, a mass deployment in a covert fashion was the right tool, at the right time, for Russia to achieve their objectives. Russia has a large military playbook and will use whatever tools they can to achieve victory. It took six months for President Putin to admit Russian soldiers were supporting local self-defense forces through a “humanitarian mission,” an echo from General Gerasimov’s article, when he noted how Western nations used the same tactic to disguise past military operations.

The Georgian War’s Effect on the Force
To understand the evolution of modern Spetsnaz we need to understand the impact Russia’s 2008 war in Georgia had on the GRU. Despite Russia’s ultimate battlefield victory over Georgia, the GRU and their Spetsnaz suffered some embarrassments that had a profound impact on how Russia arrays its forces today. For instance, Russian intelligence ignored, or failed to identify, that Ukraine sold to Georgia S-200 and Buk-M1 missile systems in the years prior to the invasion. As a result, at least one Russian-made missile shot down a strategic Russian bomber. Another result of this intelligence miscalculation is that Spetsnaz operated more kinetically than was intended, because Georgian air defenses prevented Russia from air lifting more of its infantry deeper into Georgian territory. Additionally, when Spetsnaz discovered Georgian air defenses they had no training to laser designate those targets. Spetsnaz should have fed valuable ground intelligence to the GRU, and other services, as this was a joint operation. However, without Spetsnaz, Russian
intelligence was blind, and bombings of irrelevant targets resulted, including two empty Georgian airfields. Russia’s unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) were also so poor in design and function that they provided no tangible intelligence in Georgia, yet another intelligence gap the GRU failed to recognize until it was too late. The GRU lost operational control of Spetsnaz from 2010 to 2013, a likely result of their poor performance in Georgia. However, a new chapter in GRU Spetsnaz operations began in Ukraine in 2014 where they were used effectively, but not necessarily any differently than in previous wars.

Spetsnaz and Russian Special Forces Operators Delineated

To clarify, authors Dr. Lester Grau and Major Charles Bartles remind us that Spetsnaz essentially refers to “troops with a special purpose.” Spetsnaz are generally specialized and not trained as broadly as U.S. special operations forces. For example, unlike the U.S. Navy’s “Sea, Air, and Land” Teams, commonly abbreviated as the Navy SEALs, who train to operate on any surface of any continent, Naval Spetsnaz specialize in waterborne operations. However, Spetsnaz have and will conduct specialized training for specific missions when required. Spetsnaz units exist within police, border security, intelligence and security agencies, such as the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or Federal Security Service (FSB), and other agencies. Spetsnaz are not “Special Forces” in the Western sense, despite whether they may call themselves this or not. After reviewing social media posts of Russian soldiers in Spetsnaz units, many of these soldiers do in fact refer to themselves as “Special Forces.” However, Spetsnaz do not truly operate independently, and they do not have the level of logistical or combat support as the SSO. It is more accurate to view GRU Spetsnaz as a multi-disciplinary reconnaissance force, similar to a Long Range Surveillance (LRS) unit. The mission dictates the weapons Spetsnaz carry; in this respect, they are modular. The factors on the ground determine exactly what discipline this force may employ, be it mining operations, covert urban reconnaissance, or target identification for conventional forces. Like the U.S. LRS units, the intent for Spetsnaz is not to be a direct-action force, although they have that capability and have fought as such in places like Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Georgia. However, Spetsnaz “are in no way seen as a substitute for the Ground Forces, VDV (Russian Airborne), or Naval Infantry.” This characterization possibly applies to SSO, as well as their limited operations in Syria indicate as much. Additionally, unlike SSO, Spetsnaz are a component of Russia’s conventional military and the intended purpose is for Spetsnaz to directly support those forces. Spetsnaz and SSO have worked together in Ukraine and Syria but the doctrinal extent of their joint operations, if it exists, is still in question.

Employment in Crimea

Altogether, Spetsnaz from at least three different brigades deployed to Crimea. Some Spetsnaz units appeared to support SSO objectives of controlling logistical and communications nodes, as well as critical municipal and military sites. Other Spetsnaz soldiers, from either GRU or FSB, wearing blue jeans or cargo pants, hoodies, and white armbands, operated the GM-94 pump-action grenade launcher, as they appeared to perform reconnaissance. At the time, Russia utilized this weapon almost exclusively. It is likely Russia will proliferate unique weapons systems, such as the GM-94, if they intend to continue to operate with any degree of plausible deniability. Sources conflict as to who the civilian-clad Spetsnaz were. If these teams were conducting pre-invasion reconnaissance, they were likely GRU Spetsnaz, or at the very least agents within the GRU. It is highly believable to imagine GRU Spetsnaz dressed in civilian clothes, traveled to strategic military and civilian sites in Crimea, with a global positioning system to confirm the sites’ operational status and location. However, open sources cannot confirm this, and we only know that some GRU Spetsnaz arrived in Crimea four days prior to the invasion.

Difficulties with Identification

There were no less than six different camouflage patterns from various Russian agencies and military units seen in Crimea. Many soldiers wore Russia’s newest Ratnik (Warrior) uniforms and carried weapons, such as the AK-74M with collapsible buttstock, among others, consistent with those used in the VDV. However, many analysts will
agree that a higher degree of inaccuracy will result when attempting to identify specific Russian units by weapons and uniforms alone. President Putin initially denied the soldiers in Crimea were Russian when confronted with evidence. Putin said, in regards to these unmarked, patch-less soldiers, “you can go to a store and buy a uniform.” He was implying the soldiers in Crimea were pro-Russian Crimean “self-defense” forces who happened to be wearing Russian uniforms. The media were unable to prove him wrong initially due to the strict media control established by Russian forces. The actual self-defense forces certainly did not exist in sizeable enough numbers to secure the approximately 200 strategic sites throughout the Crimean Peninsula. The big takeaway with Spetsnaz and SSO is that the use of uniforms appears to be a fluid concept for many of these units, so identifying their actions provides a better picture of who they are. Spetsnaz and their activities in eastern Ukraine were largely identifiable by social media posts and captured members. Equally strict media control in eastern Ukraine, spearheaded by separatist forces, prevented most Spetsnaz operations from photographic documentation to the same degree as in Crimea. Through social media, however, soldiers discussed unit movements and deaths of comrades. They posted trophy photos, as well as group photos, while wearing service uniforms with unit patches. One success for Ukraine, that contradicted President Putin, was the capture and interrogation of two members of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade who fully identified themselves as active Russian Soldiers.

Contributing Factors to Success

Many consider Russian forces as top-tier and a legitimate counterweight to NATO because of their operations in Ukraine. However, factors on the ground greatly facilitated Russia’s mission and all but guaranteed success for Russian forces.

First, the vast majority of people in eastern Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula speak Russian, and they are culturally pro-Russian. Therefore, language and cultural barriers were less of an obstacle. The Russian-speaking majority also made Russian information operations that manufactured compliance significantly more successful. Russian forces would have much less success at the same type of information operation in a country where the majority of people did not speak Russian due to shortfalls in language and cultural training. Unlike U.S. special forces, most Spetsnaz generally do not receive language training due to the large number of conscripts in their ranks and the lack of missions requiring these skills. However, the government panels in charge of conscription placement have the opportunity to fill the Spetsnaz ranks with recruits who speak sought-after languages. Russia no doubt intends to make language capability and training a priority for SSO, but since the recruitment of most of these soldiers was from within Russia’s Spetsnaz communities the SSO’s language proficiency overall may be lacking.

Secondly, despite claims that “no shots were fired,” dissenters nevertheless were temporarily jailed or killed. There are still reports of missing Ukrainians from Crimea and some protestors, including politicians, were murdered. The lack of dissenters and an intelligence apparatus working in conjunction with the armed forces greatly simplified the Spetsnaz mission in Crimea. There are readily available videos of Russians, or Russian supporters, physically picking up and removing protesting Ukrainians in Crimea. Although Russia reportedly charged the FSB with training local defense forces to remove these pro-Ukrainian protestors, the likelihood exists that the GRU heavily supported them. Based on the timelines given to accomplish their missions, FSB or GRU officers likely commanded small teams of pro-Russian locals instead of training them outright to do the job. (The FSB Spetsnaz is militarized to the extent that few people would be able to recognize the difference between Spetsnaz in the FSB and GRU.)

Lastly, Ukraine’s military forces in Crimea were also in no state to defend themselves when the invasion occurred. Ukraine poorly funded their armed forces for years prior to the invasion. When Russian troops entered Crimea, the Ukrainian government had to raise money from its citizens to buy batteries for military vehicles. Political turmoil in the capital also played
a major part in Ukraine’s lack of military response with the new Ukrainian government possibly unsure whether it could trust its military leaders stationed in Russian-majority Crimea. This is understandable as many if not most of the soldiers in the Ukrainian military serving in Crimea were from that region and pro-Russian. When it was over, Russia was able to absorb and reflag entire Ukrainian units in Crimea as Russian. This may help at least partly explain why Ukrainian commanders did not engage Russia’s military. Considering that, Russia only brought BTR-82As and no armor with them. Some of the better-equipped Ukrainian units may have fared well in battle. Together these factors make Crimea look like the perfect scenario to test out new capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of Spetsnaz, and introduce the capabilities of the SSO.

**Strategic Support in Eastern Ukraine**

Russia reportedly rotated battalions of armor and Spetsnaz through various border checkpoints into eastern Ukraine every six months as part of a rotation cycle and as a means to gain valuable combat experience. Strategic multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), such as the BM-30 Smerch and other artillery, remained on the Russian side of the border in direct support of these Russian armor battalions. Russian artillery had the greatest effect on Russia’s ability to occupy and retain land and provide freedom of movement for Spetsnaz. There were reports of entire Ukrainian battalions destroyed by relatively accurate Russian artillery, various MLRS, and the thermobaric TOS-1 multiple rocket launcher. Spetsnaz undoubtedly worked in conjunction with new Russian tactical UAS to provide a level of target identification redundancy Russian forces never experienced before. The successful pairing of Spetsnaz and UAS to identify targets for strategic artillery forces is a TTP that Russia will undoubtedly add to their playbook for future engagements.

**Stalemate**

Ultimately, the Ukrainian military rebounded and proved to be a stronger force in the east than Russia expected since Russia was unable to connect Crimea to eastern Ukraine by land and stabilize the borders it wanted. A de facto stalemate appeared to occur after the second Russia-Ukraine ceasefire agreement. In the meantime, the full extent of Spetsnaz involvement in eastern Ukraine remains ambiguous because of continued hostility towards foreign media. As regular Russian armored units began their gradual withdrawal back into Russia, the GRU and FSB Spetsnaz mission to train pro-Russian separatists became more decisive. Until Russia confirms borders in the Donbass, or the West uses economic or military means to negotiate the return of land back to Ukrainian control, GRU and FSB Spetsnaz, as well as separatist Spetsnaz units trained by Russians, will continue to operate throughout eastern Ukraine.

**Conclusion**

Although tactical failures of Spetsnaz in eastern Ukraine have somewhat shattered the aura for this force that Russia busies itself cultivating, Russia appears determined to make their Spetsnaz and SSO as successful and renowned as Western special operations forces. As a result, we can expect the future of these Russian forces to be a more active and prevalent component of the Russian Armed Forces. Russia’s military appears to have embraced the concept of “lessons’ learned” that many Western nations have used for decades. This was almost unheard of in the past, as any “lessons learned” would essentially have been an admission of failure. After the acknowledgement of failures in Georgia in 2008, Russia now ensures training exercises involving Spetsnaz and reconnaissance forces include target identification with Russian UAS, as well as laser designation drills with artillery. Two training exercises held in June and August 2016 featured approximately 2000 Spetsnaz flooding a region to accomplish various tasks. The question exists whether Russia will again deploy clandestine or covert forces in the guise of a humanitarian mission, or if they will use their new armored forces more overtly to achieve their strategic objectives. More than likely Russia will continue the historical trend of using Spetsnaz and SSO to create favorable conditions for conventional forces. Due to Russian and Ukrainian cultural similarities, the scale and ease of Russia’s covert operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine may not be possible to duplicate. Despite claims from Russia and others, we have yet to see Russia’s Spetsnaz or SSO operate at a bold level on par with any Western equivalent. Regardless, operations in Ukraine were a rare window into Spetsnaz and SSO operations and demonstrated for Russia the strategic value of covert military operations.

**Endnotes**


6. Ibid., 58.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., 234.


References


CPT Matthew J. Polek wrote this article while at the MI Captain’s Career Course. He holds a bachelor of arts in political science and business from Washington State University and a master of science in emergency management from Jacksonville State University. He is currently in the 902d MI Group and commands the counterintelligence MI Detachment at Fort Gordon, GA.
Editor’s Note: This article is part one of a two-part feature split between this issue and the next quarterly issue. The scope addresses themes of both issues—echelons above brigade and designing the future force. Part one looks to the past; where we have been. Part two will look to the future; where we are going.

Some of the best lessons we ever learn are learned from past mistakes. The error of the past is the wisdom and success of the future. —Dale Turner, American Singer-Songwriter

You have been in the Army for a few years. You have deployed to combat zones, have held leadership positions, have been to various schools and training, and think you understand the Army fairly well. You have just been assigned to a division or corps staff. You look at your modified table of organization and equipment—and cannot help but wonder how in the world this kludge of military occupational specialties, grades, and equipment was developed.

Well, to understand what is happening with today’s force design, it helps to understand the history—good and bad—of how we got here.

The Last Near-Peer Threat: Cold War Bulk and Brinksmanship (1970s-1980s)

From the end of World War II until the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. security strategy focused on containing the expansion of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. To this end, U.S. defense strategy and force structure was geared towards addressing two major threats: general war against a near-peer threat—the Soviet Union and its allies, which included potential escalation to nuclear war—and a smaller set of less-predictable regional threats and crises. The Army’s role was to be prepared to fight and win a conventional war against large, echeloned armored and mechanized formations. The United States developed a strategic approach that relied heavily on a known battlefield, forward-stationed heavy forces, and extensive stockpiles of prepositioned supplies and equipment to support a rapid flow of reinforcements from the United States. This strategic context favored the development of heavy division and corps formations each with the organic enabling capabilities required to fight large-scale combat operations—the doctrine known as AirLand Battle. Our force design in the era of AirLand Battle was large, heavy, and predictable. So, what changed?

In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union was at a level of rough strategic parity with the United States. Towards the later 1970s, that parity changed—the Soviet Union began deployment of a new, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missile, the SS–20, bringing about what was perceived as a qualitative and quantitative change in the European security situation. The SS–20 was mobile, accurate, and capable of being concealed and rapidly redeployed. It carried three independently targetable warheads, and its 5,000 kilometer range permitted it to cover targets in Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and from bases in the eastern Soviet Union, most of Asia, Southeast Asia, and Alaska.

NATO decided in 1979 to respond to the SS–20 by deploying new U.S. intermediate range, nuclear capable missiles—the Pershing II ballistic missile and ground-launched cruise missile—to gain leverage in negotiating reduction of Soviet intermediate range nuclear capability, or to address a perceived gap in the nuclear escalatory ladder if an agreement was not possible. Both countries were unwilling to use nuclear weapons, and understood the consequences of doing so—the Pershing II was a hundred times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. Negotiations began in late 1981.

At the end of 1983, following two years of dismal talks, the sides remained far apart, and the Soviets broke off negotiations. The deployment of U.S. intermediate range nuclear capable missiles ignited protests throughout Europe. Most analysts believed that the Soviets hoped that public opposition in Europe would derail the U.S. missile deploy-
ments. They miscalculated, and deployments proceeded. Both sides returned to the negotiating table with a perception of parity.

The treaty that banned these ballistic missiles was a step back from nuclear war and a harbinger of the Cold War’s end. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed thirty years ago this December, ushered in the end of the cold war. The United States eliminated its Pershing II missiles and the Soviet Union eliminated its SS–20s. U.S. strategy proved successful and, as a result, the operational environment changed significantly—punctuated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The threat of large-scale combat operations in Europe diminished as the Soviet Union dissolved into less-threatening and less-capable nation states.

Contingency Operations: The “Army of Excellence” (1980s-1990s)

In this new strategic environment, the Army envisioned limited contingency operations as its most probable future requirement and sought the changes required to operate in this future. While effective for conventional war against the Soviets, these robust AirLand Battle formations were not optimized for rapid deployment of small, tailored force packages to limited contingency operations. Limited contingency operations emphasized the need for greater agility, versatility, and strategic deployability than the Army’s force structure provided in the past. Army forces capable of responding quickly for limited contingency operations elsewhere were limited to the airborne brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division; a few other airborne units in Alaska, Hawaii, and Italy; and the three ranger battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

To compound the strategic deployability problem, the joint force’s air and sealift capacity was insufficient to rapidly deploy and sustain larger formations. The Army sought to create lighter division designs to increase deployability while retaining lethality, survivability, and sustainability. By the mid-1980s, the concept of a motorized division had shown promise, but still failed to solve the strategic deployability problem. The Army tried another approach, a light infantry division. This division design, first fielded as the 7th Light Infantry Division in 1985, dramatically improved strategic deployability but lacked the ground tactical mobility and survivability against enemy indirect fire and lethality against even lightly-armored enemy vehicles.

During the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the Army continued to experiment with the incorporation of new technology to improve the effectiveness of the division and increase its strategic deployability. During this timeframe, the Army focused on technology to enhance the division’s ability to see the battlefield and effectively command and control land forces using cutting-edge sensors and information systems and improved communications systems. The Interim Division, subsequently renamed the Stryker Division, was a variation on the motorized division concept. This division formation achieved a significant improvement in strategic deployability but was not fielded because it failed to achieve acceptable levels of lethality and survivability. Once again, the whole approach to force design needed to change.


All these previous approaches to Army force design shared one commonality: they were all division-based solutions to the problem of enhancing strategic deployability while retaining acceptable levels of lethality, survivability, and sustainability. What set the Army’s subsequent modular force development apart from earlier transformation efforts was that it was a brigade-based solution. The Army created brigade combat teams (BCTs) with organic enabling capabilities such as artillery, reconnaissante, engineer, and sustainment elements, and a series of functional and multifunctional support brigades and theater enabling commands. Theoretically, the brigade modular force construct allowed greater flexibility to tailor smaller force packages required for contingency operations, while simultaneously minimizing strategic deployment requirements.

During the modular concept’s development, the Army sought to determine the minimum number of echelons of command required to effectively command and control land forces during large-scale combat operations. To encourage revolutionary thinking, the use of familiar terminology for organizational constructs was discouraged. Instead of brigades, divisions, and corps, experimentation centered on two fundamental terms to describe constituent elements of its redesign: the Unit of Action, or UA, intended as the basic tactical warfighting element, and the Unit of Employment,
or UE, intended as the principal senior headquarters. These terms were intended for conceptualization only, not long-term use. BCTs were quickly accepted as the principal UA. However, the Army struggled with defining a single UE, so it experimented with two echelons above brigade headquarters—a unit of employment X, or UEx, defined as the principal tactical senior headquarters, and unit of employment Y, or UEY, defined as the Army’s single operational-level headquarters. Modularity’s attempt at revolutionary development reverted to the familiar division (UEx) and corps (UEY) terminology for echelons above brigade (EAB).

Still, some significant force structure changes were made. Under the modular force concept, the Army divested the division structure of its organic or assigned functional battalions and the corps of its separate brigades. The Army used this divestiture as the force structure to build organic combined arms capabilities into the BCTs and to create functional and multifunctional brigades and theater commands. EAB headquarters were designed to be fully capable of planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing combined arms operations. Based on mission analysis, EAB headquarters could be force tailored with the appropriate maneuver, maneuver support, intelligence, fires, and sustainment formations. Once force tailored, EAB units were no longer just headquarters. They were now warfighting formations, which through the exercise of mission command could operate as a cohesive warfighting team.

While the analysis behind envisioned modular force structure was sound, it was expensive. Due to projected future costs, decrements to the Army budget, and the lessening likelihood of large-scale combat operations against a peer or near-peer threat, the Department of Defense (DoD) cancelled planned technology enhancements. After the “peace dividend” repurposed much of the Army’s budget, there was little appetite for growing the Army.

Then, on September 11, 2001, we were confronted with a new threat, which was made even more real by bringing the war to our homeland. Yet again, the priorities and approaches to designing the force were forced to change.

The Global War on Terror: Decade of Persistent Conflict (2001-2010)

Following the September 11th attacks, the United States initiated an international military campaign known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This ushered in more than a decade of overseas contingency operations, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, characterized by highly decentralized and dispersed operations covering the spectrum from conventional to unconventional operations. The demand for combat units and supporting formations steadily increased from the commencement of combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 through the surge in 2006. The Army met these demands in two ways. First, by growing the force from 36 active component (AC) BCTs to 45 AC BCTs, and second, to manage the resourcing of units and timing of deployments the Army developed the Army Force Generation model. For over a decade, a complex, ad hoc, regionally focused structure was built to manage a largely company and platoon-based fight in densely populated urban areas against a technologically unsophisticated but determined adversary. Divisions and corps headquarters were largely sidelined during this period. By the end of 2008, the Army had grown to 550,000 authorized active duty personnel with an additional ~25,000 active duty personnel in what was referred to as “over structure”—personnel required to perform the mission but not included in approved organizational documents. The approach toward procurement of enhanced technology
also changed—the strictures of regulatory capabilities development and testing were not agile enough to keep pace with requirements, so they were relaxed, as many units deployed with unique commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment.

Because neither the executive branch nor Congress ever included financing overseas combat operations in the DoD budget, the GWOT—including most of the Army force structure growth and procurement of COTS equipment—was resourced by the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. The OCO fund—sometimes referred to as war funds—is a separate pot of funding operated by the DoD and the State Department in addition to their “base” budgets (i.e., their regular peacetime budgets). Originally used to finance the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the OCO continues to be a source of funding for the Pentagon. The luxury of being able to break regulatory “rules” of force design became the norm, which became an issue as the GWOT slowed, funding reduced, and the Army began to draw down.

In our next issue, part two will continue this historical perspective starting with Drawdown: Force Design by Price Tag (2010–2016).

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Introduction

When I was preparing to serve as the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) G-2 in 2004, I attended the old G-2/Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Chief Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. While there, I came across the October-December 2003 issue of Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin focused on intelligence lessons and observations. The keynote article authored by MG James A. “Spider” Marks and LTC (P) Steve Peterson is titled “Lessons Learned: Six Things Every ‘2’ Must Do—Fundamental Lessons from OIF.” The six things include:

- Set the vision.
- Build the architecture.
- Build the team.
- Build analytical collaboration.
- Fight intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
- Influence decision making.

I found this to be a useful framework and relied upon it not only as the 2ID G-2 but also in subsequent assignments as the Joint Readiness Training Center Senior Intelligence Officer, XVIII Airborne Corps Deputy Corps G-2, Multi-National Corps-Iraq Deputy C-2, and the Eighth Army G-2. These six things are emphasized throughout this article.

Division G-2 Operations in Korea (2004-2006)

The combined nature of the fight always influences Division G-2 Operations in Korea, and the exercise schedule heavily impacts the mission. Arriving in Korea in 2004, the vision was set by the exercise schedule, and the deployment of 2nd Brigade 2ID to Iraq in August of 2004. Also influencing the vision for this tour was transformation—the closure of camps following the 2nd Brigade deployment, the subsequent division reorganization based on modularity, and the physical transformation of the division ACE in the command bunker.

The physical transformation of the ACE went beyond the normal “building the architecture.” The renovation planning occurred in earnest from September 2004 to May 2005. In May 2005, we vacated the bunker, established a temporary sensitive compartmented information facility in the G-2 Operations/Staff Weather Office building, and operated in that facility for a year before reoccupying the bunker in May 2006. The original sensitive compartmented information facility supported the old Combined Field Army and was compartmented into three areas—Republic of Korea (ROK), United States, and combined. The physical renovation opened the space into two main operations pits. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence integration transitioned the ACE from a UNIX to Windows operating system, acetate to video wall, and integrated the ground stations into the bunker tethered to their associated vehicles on the “upper pad.”
The Division was preparing to conduct a warfighter exercise in June 2005; a month after the scheduled ACE displacement from the bunker. This was in the early days of the modularity force redesign, and the warfighter would test the unit of employment (UEy)/unit of execution (UEx) concept. The intent of this test was to see if a two star headquarters could operate simultaneously at the operational and tactical levels. Additionally, it would be a combined warfighter with the 9th ROK Infantry Division (9th ROK ID) (Whitehorse) fighting under the 2ID UEy/UEx headquarters. Building the architecture entailed extending it to the 9th ROK ID. We did this by forming a deployable intelligence support element (DISE) attached to the 9th ROK ID headquarters in Ilsandong-Gu, Goyang, west of Seoul, South Korea. The DISE consisted of a common ground station (CGS) team, an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) remote video terminal (RVT), and a small analytic team to enable communications and collaboration.

Building the team with our ROK counterparts was very important and consisted of site visit exchanges in addition to the “warpath” train-ups prior to the warfighter. In alignment with South Korean culture, it was important to include a social component during these team-building events.

At the time, the division’s Shadow UAS platoons consolidated into Charlie Company, 102nd Military Intelligence Battalion. The 9th ROK ID didn’t have any UAS assets, so we supported them through the DISE with UAS coverage based on the division collection plan. The UASs also played...
The UASs supported the suppression of enemy air-defense plan, which the aviation brigade and 2ID fires brigade executed. In the end, the exercise was a success. It demonstrated the ability to exercise mission command over a ROK major subordinate command. Our Korean-American officers and Korean augmentees to the U.S. Army were critical to bridging the language gap. There was little interoperability between our systems; however, we were able to extend the architecture to our ROK counterparts. This included a Prophet and Trojan SPIRIT team at a ROK collection site along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and a Trojan SPIRIT team and CGS team at the ROK VI Corps Headquarters. Additionally, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) J-2 supported the exercise with DIVN-K in order to enable passing ROK/U.S. signals intelligence traffic between the various exercise sites, to include the 2ID ACE in Uijeongbu, South Korea. Another success story in this exercise was streaming ROK UAS video over the network utilizing the CGS and DIVN-K system. This was in conjunction with the North Korean winter training cycle in a larger exercise known as Winter Surge 2006.

In addition to the combined warfighter, 2ID participated in field training with the ROK VI Corps in Pocheon, South Korea. Again, critical to the success of this event was team building with the corps G-2 and the 146th Military Intelligence Battalion Commander (ROK VI Corps’ Military Intelligence Battalion). Also critical to the success of the operation was extending the architecture to our ROK counterparts. This included a Prophet and Trojan SPIRIT team at a ROK collection site along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and a Trojan SPIRIT team and CGS team at the ROK VI Corps Headquarters. Additionally, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) J-2 supported the exercise with DIVN-K in order to enable passing ROK/U.S. signals intelligence traffic between the various exercise sites, to include the 2ID ACE in Uijeongbu, South Korea. Another success story in this exercise was streaming ROK UAS video over the network utilizing the CGS and DIVN-K system. This was in conjunction with the North Korean winter training cycle in a larger exercise known as Winter Surge 2006.

This assignment to Korea was shortly after 9/11 and on the heels of a surge in anti-Americanism. The accidental killing of two South Korean schoolchildren on 13 June 2002 (the Highway 56 Accident) led to mass demonstrations and violence, to include fire-bombings, camp perimeter breaches, and attacks against U.S. Soldiers. The threat of violent demonstrations and the potential for terrorist attacks put a premium on force protection. Collaboration with our ROK counterparts and the local 501st Military Intelligence Brigade counterintelligence detachment (the Uijeongbu Military Intelligence Detachment) was of the utmost importance in order to avoid surprise.
Early warning was key to preparing for large-scale demonstrations in terms of the allocation of ROK riot police and ensuring quick reaction forces were prepared and available. Fortunately, as part of the team, two Korean national employees worked within the G-2X who were responsible for monitoring websites of groups involved in protests, as well as making contact with the Korean National Police (KNP) and the local Defense Security Unit. The G-2 was also successful in identifying and coordinating for KNP intervention against third country nationals who were conducting suspicious surveillance against U.S. camps and training areas. The Republic of Korea has a large number of third country nationals, and many are from countries associated with the Islamic terrorist threat.

The exercises previously discussed constituted the bulk of the ISR fight. The CGS crew operated off-cycle and connected nightly with the Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) flights conducted by the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade. While exploitation of the feed occurred at Camp Humphreys, it allowed us to maintain proficiency in terms of linking with the aircraft, and creating intelligence products and post mission summaries, which were briefed to the command on a weekly basis.

Having matured as a pre-modularity brigade S-2 in both the 2ID and 10th Mountain Division (where the architecture was an FM radio net), serving as a G-2 impressed on me the importance of architecture and the teamwork required to establish an effective architecture. Additionally, working in a combined environment brought home the importance of building relationships with our partners.


The VXIII Airborne Corps G-2/Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) C-2 had been in place for a couple of months when I arrived as an individual augmentee. Having just left the Joint Readiness Training Center as the Senior Intelligence Officer/Observer Controller, my vision was to help better operationalize ISR. I was assigned as the Deputy C-2 (Operations) where I oversaw ISR/collection management and planning.

The Corps fell in on a mature ISR architecture during the relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). Aside from routine maintenance, we did not make significant improvements to the architecture. Much of the maintenance was through the joint acquisition review process; ensuring contracts were in place to maintain quick reaction capability systems. Rapid fielding initiatives continued to facilitate company intelligence support team operations (e.g., One System Remote Video Terminal, Raven UAS, etc.). The most significant architecture effort consisted of planning for the deployment of the Air Force’s MC-12 Liberty Project Aircraft (LPA). At the time, Task Force ODIN was using a relay system for full motion video (FMV) processing, exploitation, and dissemination. Planning efforts included analysis regarding whether the ODIN architecture could support the LPA, and if not, whether we could expand the architecture to accommodate the LPA.

While the corps went through the normal team building process at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in preparation for the deployment, the offset RIP/TOA of individual augmentees, the Marine Expeditionary Force, the Multi-National Divisions, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, and other commands necessitated continuous team rebuilding. Due to the dispersion of the corps, this was accomplished virtually for the most part. Other techniques for building relationships included accompanying the command group during battlefield circulation, periodic conferences (including travel and video teleconferences), and meeting with key intelligence leaders as they transited Baghdad International Airport on leave or temporary duty assignment.

Building analytical collaboration in stability operations is always a challenge. In Iraq, if an improvised explosive device exploded in a company sector in Baghdad, in all likelihood, the battalion, brigade, division, corps, and force headquarters were all on the same forward operating base complex (Victory Base Complex) within no more than a few miles of each other. Each echelon would often have a different perspective on the attack. In an organization as diverse as MNC-I, the commander received many inputs on the enemy situation—subordinate commanders, the embassy, political advisors, special operations forces (SOF) units, other government agencies, etc. It was important for the corps commander to have an independent assessment from his
G-2/C-2, to serve as a point of reference against the competing opinions he received on a daily basis. It was our responsibility to coordinate assessments and tell the commander when we disagreed with other stakeholders and why. In a sense, this was our role in influencing decision making.

The ISR fight was a daily fight from the corps level down. The primary role of the corps was allocation. Most allocations were made long term based on the campaign plan and assessments of that plan. Allocation decisions were often driven by basing and were made in an attempt to build habitual relationships. Other daily allocation decisions were made based on weather, maintenance, or troops in contact. The corps was involved in shaping operations, whereas divisions were more involved in targeting operations. Fusion cells were generally located at the division level, and that is where execution of ISR operations occurred in conjunction with the subordinate brigade combat teams.

Eighth Army G-2 Operations in Korea (2014-2016)

When I returned to Korea after eight years, I was impressed with the changes. First, in 2012 Eighth Army transitioned from an Army Service component command headquarters to the only Field Army; making it an operational headquarters. This transition, which occurred largely under my G-2 predecessor, brought significant growth to the G-2 section in terms of personnel. Eighth Army served as the bill payer for this growth; however, Headquarters, Department of the Army did not foot the bill for corresponding growth in equipment—Tactical Ground Station, ACE Block II, etc. Nevertheless, we had Distributed Common Ground System-Army Intelligence Fusion Servers and received an enemy COP from the Ground Component Command-Combined Analysis and Control Center. The G-6 maintained a functioning Data Dissemination Service server and we were able to push the enemy COP to the Command Post of the Future. Additionally, we had a quick reaction capability imagery system provided by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Geospatial Intelligence Work Stations, and associated communications architecture.

The vision I set was to expand the architecture and to forge closer ties with the ROK Field Armies. While the Eighth Army G-2 had procured two Trojan SPIRIT systems, the Korean intelligence system primarily runs on DIVN-K. Eighth Army G-2 typically begged and/or borrowed DIVN-K from the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade or USFK J-2 to support exercises, but we were eventually able to procure two systems along with the associated bandwidth and field site representative (FSR) support. Eighth Army G-2 also maintained a Global Broadcasting System (GBS) receive suite.

Our building the architecture effort primarily focused on dissemination of the ISR feeds. The initial focus was on exercise FMV feeds—the Multiple Unified Simulation Environment (MUSE) simulation. Dissemination of the simulated FMV feeds occurred via T1 circuit and required a “MUSE box” to serve as the RVT. The number of MUSE boxes was limited, and there were a limited number of FSRS available to install the circuit and MUSE boxes. Therefore, many of our ROK counterparts were not able to view the FMV feeds.

Conversely, the Air Force disseminated FMV simulation assets via GBS out of the Korean Air Simulation Center at Osan Air Base and locally through the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIX). This led to the initiative to disseminate U.S. and ROK Army UAS feeds from the Korean Battle Simulation Center via CENTRIX, which we were capable of doing by Ulchi Focus Guardian 2015.

This contributed to greater collaboration with our ROK Field Army counterparts, particularly the 2nd Operational Command (2OC)—responsible for rear area security, and
critical to the Eighth Army reception, staging, onward-movement and integration mission and logistical responsibilities. We conducted ISR training with the South Koreans on the PRISM (Planning tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management) and embedded both Eighth Army and U.S. Air Force ISR personnel into the 2OC headquarters during exercises in order to coordinate ISR in support of the 2OC counter-North Korean SOF mission.

In the spring of 2016, the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade supported a 2OC counter SOF field training exercise along the West Sea south of Incheon, South Korea. They brought live FMV feeds from 3rd Military Intelligence Battalion ARL into the division headquarters/command center in support of the 32nd Homeland Reserve Division. The FMV feed was pushed over a closed network utilizing DIVN-K. The ARL normally down links to the Ground Station, Operational Intelligence (OGS) at Camp Humphreys; however, at the time, accreditation issues prevented connecting the OGS directly to CENTRIX, hence the closed network.

While team building with 2OC largely centered on ISR, collaboration with Third ROK Army and First ROK Army focused on Eighth Army’s countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) mission. In October 2014, Eighth Army hosted the first Combined WMD Intelligence Symposium attended by the ROK Field Armies G-2s, the 2ID, other Eighth Army units, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the ROK Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Command.

The focus of the inaugural event was collaboration on mission support folders and tactical mission folders that assist in planning for CWMD missions. Another key topic was ISR in support of the CWMD mission. The establishment of the 2ID as a ROK/U.S. Combined Division beginning in January 2015 further deepened the collaboration between the Republic of Korea and the United States on the CWMD mission. The inaugural Combined WMD Intelligence Symposium led to working groups held more frequently by the combined CWMD intelligence community of interest highlighted by quarterly combined Eighth Army G-2/S-2 educational opportunities and monthly meetings hosted by the Combined Division.

The Combined Division was instrumental in enhancing the situational understanding of Eighth Army, especially along the DMZ. The ROK officers within the Combined Division had direct access to information coming from the general outpost line through the forward ROK divisions and corps. In August of 2015, a landmine on the South Korean side of the DMZ’s southern boundary fence gravelly injured two ROK Soldiers. The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission attributed the placement of the mines to North Korea. As such, the Republic of Korea retaliated by reinitiating propaganda broadcasts from speakers along the DMZ for the first time in several years. The North threatened to retaliate against the speakers, and on 20 August 2015, fired a rocket over the DMZ to which South Korea responded with counter-fire. This was the tensest period on the peninsula since the North shelled the Republic of Korean island of Yeonpyeong in November 2010. A few days later, high-level negotiations resolved the situation. In these “provocation cycles,” the Combined Division painted a clear picture of the situation along the DMZ, which influenced Eighth Army leadership decision making with respect to force posture and readiness levels.

The G-2X led another key area for collaboration. In addition to a large number of third country nationals in the Republic of Korea, terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia (e.g., Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, Abu Sayyaf, etc.) are known to tran-
sit through Incheon Airport, which serves as a major transportation hub in the region. The G-2X partnered with the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade and brought in the J-2, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the U.S. Embassy to form a solid community of interest. They conducted liaison with the Korean National Police, Defense Security Command, and other South Korean partners such as the Korean Defense Intelligence Command in order to provide Eighth Army and USFK with up-to-date intelligence as it pertained to anti-terrorism and force protection.

Finally, Eighth Army did not fight ISR on a daily basis, which was the job of the USFK J-2 and the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade. However, monitoring that fight on a daily basis gave us insight into the complexities of the indication and warning problem set. This enabled the team to provide assessments to the command team on the likelihood of a provocation, thereby directly influencing decision making on both force posture and readiness levels (to include recall windows, etc.). Additionally, Eighth Army coordinated requirements in armistice to support the CWMD mission.

BLUF: This Provocation Cycle occurred during UFG 2015; CFC/USFK executed real world deterrence operations while simultaneously conducting the exercise.
Influence Decision Making

The sixth principle in the “must do list” is one I did not touch on much in this article. Although I find the six-step model useful, I would tweak the sixth step. I do not think it is so much influencing decision making as participating in decision making. I feel that in each of the “2” jobs I have held, I had a seat at the table. In some cases, that seat can be hard to earn. It takes establishing credibility, being a team player, and adding value to the conversation. That credibility comes from a number of factors to include tactical and technical competence, communications skills, and presence.

Conclusion

The number one lesson to take away from this article is to read MIPB! You can pick up some really good ideas. The 2003 article “Lessons Learned: Six Things Every ‘2’ Must Do—Fundamental Lessons from OIF” gave me some good ideas as a brand new lieutenant colonel heading into a G-2 job. I find it to be a useful construct, and one I used at the division, corps, and field army levels. I gained experience in division intelligence operations prior to becoming a G-2 from having served in the 2nd Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 10th Mountain Division, and 2ID. Assignments to those units provided me the skills required to succeed as a G-2. The six things served as an organizing construct when faced with the high operational tempo a G-2 faces. The supporting staff tasks of suspense rosters, personnel trackers, etc. underpinned that organizing construct. 🌟
Introduction

Intelligence planning is largely a trial by fire adventure. At the joint level, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3314.01A, Intelligence Planning, and Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, assist an intelligence professional in understanding intelligence planning. However, those documents provide only superficial guidance, and in the case of the first publication, emphasize collection management. Within Army doctrine, there are a number of useful portions within FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations, and ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, addressing intelligence planning that provide helpful considerations. However, both documents lack sufficient detail in addressing the “how” of intelligence planning holistically—not just requirements management. Arguably, it is assumed that intelligence professionals know how to be effective intelligence planners through intuition and experience. This article presumes that assumption is false. The basis of this assertion is on personal experience, both as an intelligence planner and as a chief of intelligence plans, and observing intelligence professionals’ transition to planning billets.

The purpose of this article is to address this gap in tradecraft and to share best practices enabling intelligence planners to better understand their role. Ultimately, this results in intelligence planners increasing their effectiveness and the quality of intelligence support to the mission. The path of success is through iterative processes requiring both hardship and leadership, beginning with an intelligence staff estimate, creating the concept of intelligence operations, and ending with the core deliverables.

The target audience for this article is intelligence professionals at echelons division and above. Although the information is just as pertinent at the brigade level, the abbreviated decision-cycle, the size of the intelligence organization, and the length of the planning time-horizon decreases the need for a separate and distinct intelligence planning team (IPT), or at least it becomes less distinguishable.

Role and Purpose of the Intelligence Planner

On the surface, the responsibilities of the intelligence planner are quite simple and straightforward. The intelligence planner is responsible for two core deliverables: drafting priority intelligence requirements from the planning team and drafting Annex B (Intelligence) to plans and orders, or the equivalent input. However, the intelligence planner’s development of these, particularly the latter, can be a challenge. This strikes at the heart of the dual purpose of the intelligence planner—to be the face of the Army intelligence enterprise to the planning staff while providing leadership for the intelligence planning team during development of the concept of intelligence operations in support of current planning efforts.

One of the main duties of the intelligence planner is to serve as a bridge between the staff, primarily operations and plans, and the Army intelligence enterprise. This is even more important within a division staff, as the intelligence planner is typically assigned to the G-5 staff vice the G-2 staff. This gives the intelligence planner a dual identity—the wearing of two hats. In their role as the face of the Army intelligence enterprise to the planning team, they serve primarily in an economy of force role with four principal responsibilities:

♠ Participate as a member of the planning team, contributing as an objective team member. This is plain old-fashioned, good teamwork.
♠ Represent all intelligence equities relevant to the task or mission. These equities will be discussed in detail later; it is significantly more than an intelligence estimate.
♠ Screen, prioritize, refine, and tailor the requests and leveled requirements from the planning team. The lead planner will always want more from the intelligence warfighting function than its capacity. The intelligence planner is instrumental in protecting and screening the remainder of intelligence assets by negotiating what the intelligence warfighting function will provide in terms of product and schedule and setting reasonable expectations for the customer.
♠ Be the “eyes and ears” for the intelligence staff elements ensuring that they have awareness of operational developments and trends.
The last two responsibilities are critical within a division staff to ensure synchronization between the G-5 and G-2 staffs.

The second key function of the intelligence planner is to lead the intelligence planning team in developing the concept of intelligence operations supporting the current planning effort. This has an internal focus, which is often neglected in favor of supporting external demands of the other staff sections. This leads to the primary point of emphasis for this article—the most important function of the intelligence planner—as they develop, synchronize, and integrate intelligence operations into the operational scheme of maneuver.

Understanding the Intelligence Planner’s Environment

Prior to further discussion, it is best to set the context—environment and challenges—within which an intelligence planner has to maneuver. Understanding this environment up front acknowledges and validates common problems and potentially corrects misconceptions. Below are key aspects and challenges of an intelligence planner’s working environment:

- The G-3 and/or G-5 are primarily interested in the intelligence estimate and sometimes the collection plan, specifically unmanned aircraft systems; this is akin to the Iceberg Analogy where one only sees a small portion of the greater whole.

- Fellow members of the intelligence staff elements will not identify all of their own equities nor are their priorities your priorities—guidance and pulling will be required.

- Know your limits—know when to bring in or ask an expert.

- Not all requirements are created equal; evaluate each requirement based on its importance, customer, time, and against other competing priorities.

- Have reasonable expectations—especially of what others can and will do along with the overall quality of the input.

- Showing up with a number of subject matter experts from the G-2 staff creates the wrong impression with G-3 and G-5 counterparts. It confirms the perception that the G-2 staff has plenty of people and just chooses not to fully support the planning effort. In defense, the G-2 staff is usually larger than any other staff section; however, it is useful to educate G-3s and G-5s that the G-2 staff generally has to replicate every section within the staff in addition to accomplishing its other core function of providing intelligence analysis and support.

- The G-2 will have additional information and context that you will not—coordinate and keep them updated.

The How to—Keys to Success

Keeping in mind the endgame is to build a comprehensive concept of intelligence operations that is fully integrated into the operational scheme of maneuver; the following are techniques to guide the intelligence planner. These guidelines emphasize actions taken within the Army intelligence enterprise.

Build the team. The intelligence planner must establish the IPT early. The IPT facilitates and ensures collaboration by the intelligence staff elements to develop an integrated concept of intelligence operations. The IPT can be physical or virtual depending on a number of variables such as time available, complexity, importance, and relevant stakeholders. Additionally, the planner should tailor the members of the IPT for each planning effort while erring on the side of broad participation vice limited participation—be inclusive not exclusive.

Communication. The intelligence planner must not only be an effective communicator but must be a connector. They must have a reputation of transparency and not limit their

| Facts & Assumptions (Relevant to Intelligence Operation and Activities) |
| Limiting Factors (Constraints & Restraints) |
| Operational Mission Statement |
| Intelligence Tasks & Purpose (Specified, Implied, and Essential) |
| Intelligence Objectives |
| Architecture: Options/Availability/Capabilities and Limitations |
| Troops Available: |
- ISR: Asset Availability/Requirements (Basing, Architecture, PED, etc./Footprint) |
- Analysis & Production: Availability/Capacity/Expertise/Dissemination/ |
- “Reach” Capabilities: |
- Partners/Allies/Inter-Agency/Others |
| Authorities: Existing/Required/Changes and Modifications Required/etc. |
| Foreign Disclosure: Constraints/Requirements/Guidance |
| Intelligence Security Cooperation Activities: Current/Projected/Requirements/Availability/etc. |
| Issues and Shortfalls |

ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
PED: processing, exploitation, and dissemination.

Figure 1. Elements of the Intelligence Running Estimate.
updates to just the G-2 but include the remainder of the intelligence staff elements. They must share and disseminate on a frequent basis ranging from twice a day to once a week depending on the tempo of the planning effort. Exploiting a document management and storage system service and common drive are effective tools to aid in the dissemination of information and current products. Finally, the intelligence planner cannot forget to keep the other staff sections informed as well.

**Task tracker.** The intelligence planner has to develop an accountability system to manage and synchronize many different actions by different actors. Unfortunately, the adage of “what is not inspected is neglected” plays out more times than not. It becomes the equivalent of the proverbial “herding cats” idiom. Documenting and sharing requirements and associated suspenses assists the IPT in moving efforts forward while serving as an internal assessment tool to identify potential problems early. Moreover, it serves as an excellent tool to provide status updates and start conversations regarding the planning efforts. More importantly, it preserves a record of the activities of the IPT for use as a future template. It can also serve as a potential point of advantage—with measured use—when it is presented to the G-2, as no leader wants their section singled out for not meeting a suspense or falling behind.

**Go early and go often.** The worst mistake an intelligence planner can make is go into a deep cave and emerge with the solution—the plan. It is likely to be erroneous and certainly not inclusive of the other intelligence equities. Getting the G-2 and other senior leaders’ guidance and intent early is very helpful in initiating the planning effort. A word of caution, do not go for guidance with a blank piece of paper. The intelligence planner needs to conduct a preliminary analysis and present a general outline. A perfect tool for this initial dialogue is a preliminary intelligence staff estimate (see next section). As the planning effort continues, routine updates are required to ensure the emerging concept of intelligence operations aligns with the G-2’s intent. The updates can take the form of formal briefings and presentations to succinct emails. In any case, an update of “no change,” if necessary, is required as it alleviates ambiguity and uncertainty.

**Build the intelligence running estimate.** A common mistake for intelligence planners is failing to build both an intelligence estimate and an intelligence running estimate (one of the staff section estimates developed in accordance with FM 6-0). Current doctrine refers to the requirement to produce both an intelligence estimate (discussed in ADRP 2-0) and an intelligence running estimate. However, it is common that the two very different estimates get confused both amongst the staff and within the Army intelligence enterprise. The intelligence running estimate focuses on friendly courses of action/operations and the ability of the intelligence warfighting function to support operations. The intelligence estimate has been a doctrinal requirement for many decades and focuses on describing the operational environment, threat, and threat courses of action. See Figure 1, Elements of Intelligence Running Estimate, as an alternative or companion to the basic outline provided in paragraph 5-56 of ADRP 2-0.

**Deft and measured use of others expertise.** The intelligence planner must be measured in what they delegate, and request others assistance. An over reliance on others to do work that the intelligence planner should do will sour relationships over time. The intelligence planner should only ask others to do those things that are in their portfolio and that the intelligence planner cannot do based on expertise, access, etc. However, the planner must never hesitate to delegate tasks to their rightful owners.

**Develop a concept of intelligence operations.** The work of the intelligence planner converges in the development of the concept of intelligence operations. The concept of intelligence operations is the heart of the Annex B (Intelligence). It describes the intelligence scheme of maneuver, the Who, What, When, Where, How, and the Why. Figure 2, Elements of the Concept of Intelligence Operations, lists suggested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Intelligence Requirements</th>
<th>Specific Intelligence Tasks linked to Intelligence Objectives</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISR Plan/Strategy (to include collection and PED plan)</td>
<td>(Federated) Production and Dissemination Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>Resourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>Relevant Intelligence Security Cooperation Activities (if applicable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Sharing plan/arrangements (if applicable)</td>
<td>Operational View–depicting relationships and battlespace geometry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional graphic representation depicting who and how the intelligence enterprise will accomplish the intelligence tasks. (as required)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ISR: Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. PED: processing, exploitation, and dissemination.*

Figure 2. Elements of the Concept of Intelligence Operations.
elements to consider when developing a concept of intelligence operations. However, each concept will be unique as they are tailored to the mission, audience, and requirements. To emphasize this point, in my own planning efforts I have used various methods such as lines of effort/operation, matrix order, and simplistic troop to task, to organize and structure the concept of intelligence operations. The choice and means is completely dependent upon time available, complexity, audience, and scope of the operation. Ultimately, it is mission dependent and the planner should choose the best method to communicate the concept.

Understand the workflow. Develop and follow a workflow. My team created and utilized a standard operating procedure (SOP) that while it supported the joint operations planning process, would be just as applicable to the military decision-making process. Figure 3, Planners SOP, is the overview page from this SOP. The SOP focuses on inputs and outputs at each step of the process and allows the planner to focus on the most pertinent items. A pattern emerges where outputs are naturally improved iteratively. Figure 4, Product Flow, explicitly maps the evolution of the initial and intermediate products to the final deliverables and serves as a method to communicate the value of all the work of the IPT.

These eight guidelines offered keys for the intelligence planner to successfully build a comprehensive concept of intelligence operations. Out of these guidelines, three points become abundantly clear:

- The intelligence running estimate is essential.
- The concept of intelligence operations is the heart of Annex B.
- Intelligence planning is an iterative and evolutionary process.

Other Lessons Learned and Helpful Hints

Now that we have discussed the roles and responsibilities, and key recommendations, this article provides a short list of lessons learned to assist intelligence planners increase the chances of success and decrease the learning curve.

The “Dos”

- Build and maintain relationships.
- Intelligence planning is hard work and often times, under recognized—hang in there.
- Remain flexible.
- Keep the IPT informed and be transparent—over communicate.
- Prevent “stray voltage” (i.e., squash rumors, provide early warning, correct misperceptions—especially staff misconception of enemy intentions and capabilities; etc.).
- Above all, LEAD.

The “Don’ts”

- Overpromise and under deliver.
- Do not become constrained by the template.
- Procrastinate—things tend to come back around and new crisis emerge.
- Focus on one aspect at the expense of others.
Make your own analytical assessments—the intelligence staff needs to have one and only one analytical position, and that is the G-2’s which is generally informed by the analysis and production element (i.e., analysis and control element, joint intelligence center, etc.). Nothing causes more disruption in a planning effort than two different analytical assessments.

Selection and Employment of Intelligence Planners

Thus far, the article has focused on the duties and responsibilities of intelligence planners. However, it is just as important to address the employment of intelligence planners. This section has two primary parts—selecting intelligence planners, and best practices for setting conditions for successful intelligence planning within the organization.

The first topic is selecting the right people for the job. Not having the right person as a planner will be ineffective and disruptive. The G-2 should look for the following attributes when choosing intelligence planners:

- Experienced or mature officers—junior officers will have difficulty not only learning the organization, but also maneuvering within the organization.
- Innovative, flexible, and adaptive.
- Team builder.
- Independent and autonomous.

It is easy for a devil’s advocate to argue that personnel with the above characteristics are needed elsewhere in the organization. That point is true; however, consider that the intelligence planner tasks, either formally or informally, every other section of the intelligence staff. Assigning the wrong person to serve in this capacity will be extremely disruptive or completely ineffective. Additionally, marginalization of the intelligence planner will cause the intelligence staff to be behind the G-3 and the G-5 staffs playing catchup creating an inefficient ripple effect throughout.

The second key for success is for the G-2 and supervisors to set conditions within the organization. The G-2 accomplishes this by empowering the intelligence planner and holding other sections accountable and responsible for their contributions to the intelligence planner. This article does not presuppose planning is the most important aspect of the intelligence warfighting function; however, in order for planners to serve successfully in their economy of force role and not be disruptive; the G-2 needs to empower intelligence planners.

Conclusion

This article clarified the role of the intelligence planner, and provided a number of tips to aid and assist them. The critical path for a successful intelligence planner is establishing the IPT, developing the intelligence running estimate, and fully integrating the concept of intelligence operations into the operational scheme of maneuver. This can only be accomplished through collaboration and the collective work of the intelligence staff elements ensuring that all intelligence equities and requirements are sufficiently addressed. Above all, intelligence planners must lead the intelligence planning team.

Endnotes

1. In the case of a fragmentary order, commander’s estimate, or base plan—without annexes—the intelligence planner provides and integrates the intelligence related contributions throughout the directive or order. For example, the planner must insert the intelligence estimate in paragraph one; priority intelligence requirements in paragraph three as part of key coordinating instructions; specified tasks in paragraph three; etc.


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Introduction
The Pacific Theater’s current operational environment (OE) is dynamic and presents a range of complex factors: state and non-state actors, socioeconomic issues, vast geographical expanses, and the constant threat of extreme weather and natural disasters. These elements create a unique set of challenges for the intelligence community (IC) to overcome, specifically the military intelligence brigade (theater)—also known as MIB-T. The most pressing is addressing how the MIB-T sets and extends the intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) across the theater and provides intelligence support during a contingency operation, while simultaneously providing intelligence support to their Army Service component command’s (ASCC) daily mission requirements.

In the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), providing intelligence support to joint and land component commanders in a combined environment requires accounting for many considerations. The particular nuances with mission command and command and control relationships are a reflected requirement within intelligence systems creating many joint service interoperability and integration challenges across foundational information technology/information management (IT/IM) intelligence systems. Compounding this is the inherent joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational relationships that the MIB-Ts must leverage to operate successfully. In addition, the ability to properly project combat power across the vast OE necessitates developing sophisticated and innovative ways to reduce additional stress to lines of communications and logistics. Finally, in some cases, there are policy and intelligence oversight challenges coupled with poorly structured, or un-defined, reporting and authority requirements that could initially hinder intelligence sharing with allied and partner nations. These are issues the MIB-T must consider and solve on behalf of the ASCC while simultaneously serving as an anchor point for the tactical warfighter.

Expeditionary Intelligence Elements
The challenge for the 500th MIB-T lies in building expeditionary intelligence elements. They must work with the existing force structure to balance what the Army designed the MIB-T to do against what the ASCC requires the MIB-T to do. The current construct requires the MIB-T to organically resource these deployable units (e.g., deployable intelligence support elements). To this end, the 500th MIB-T prioritizes mission requirements to determine where they can best assume risk to daily missions. If, after mitigation, the residual risk is acceptable, personnel are reassigned to source tailorable and scalable intelligence teams in support of expeditionary and contingency mission requirements throughout the PACOM OE.

However, manning is not the only issue facing the MIB-T. MIB-Ts must source these intelligence teams with equipment that supports expeditionary operations—often in extremely remote and austere environments. The MIB-T must be able to leverage information from multiple sources, correlate it rapidly, and then disseminate it to decision makers at multiple echelons. Current expeditionary communications packages are sensitive to high humidity, atmospherics, and other weather effects, which make them prone to failure. Therefore, to properly set the theater and extend the IWfF network within the PACOM Theater, the 500th MIB-T is in the process of requisitioning additional network agnostic expeditionary communications platforms. This often means looking toward rapid fielding and commercial-of-the-shelf solutions.

Generating and maintaining training and operational readiness is, perhaps, the greatest challenge a MIB-T faces when organically sourcing expeditionary intelligence elements. MIB-Ts must first develop trainers across the multiple intelligence disciplines who retain their resident, technical expertise. Once the expeditionary intelligence elements are...
trained, MIB-Ts must then “fence off” these teams in preparation for deploying in support of contingency or other expeditionary operations. Nonetheless, when MIB-Ts dedicate the time and repurpose resources to train and deploy expeditionary intelligence elements they correspondingly increase operational risk to daily missions.

The Army only resources MIB-Ts to conduct Phase 0 and 1 operations, as evident by the MIB-T’s inability to organically transport and protect itself without the support from outside enablers. PACOM’s OE largely consists of the sea and air domains, forcing the use of joint assets, which compounds this challenge. Additionally, when called upon to commit expeditionary intelligence elements into theater the MIB-T must draw upon its own organic forces that are already conducting the ASCC’s daily intelligence support. At this point, a MIB-T must balance how “expeditionary” it can become with the acceptable level of risk concerning degraded ASCC intelligence support.

500th Military Intelligence Brigade (Theater) Tabletop Exercise: Support to Corps and Below

In June 2017, The 500th MIB-T hosted the 501st MIB-T and over 100 intelligence leaders from across the Pacific Theater and IC for the Set the Theater (STT) tabletop Exercise (TTX). The purpose of the exercise was to define and codify requirements enabling U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) to set the IWfF in the Pacific Theater in support of contingency operations in a multi-domain environment. There were three objectives for this exercise:

- Establish a baseline framework for providing foundational intelligence IT/IM support and improve network capability and capacity.
- Strengthen lines of communication and open dialogue among USARPAC stakeholders and joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners.
- Identify and begin to work toward mitigating capability and capacity gaps.

The STT TTX’s greatest success was identifying and beginning to work toward solutions for filling gaps to set the theater and extend the network to regionally aligned, rotational, and forward forces. These solutions included strengthening relationships between the MIB-Ts and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) units. Identified as an issue was the lack of a formal policy requiring, or codifying, the functional relationships between the MIB-Ts and FORSCOM units while training and generating readiness in garrison. Relationships between these units are currently transactional and personality driven. Instead, they must be formalized and habitual. MIB-Ts cannot wait until phase 1 or phase 2 to start extending the network to echelons corps and below (ECB). This must occur now during phase 0. This strengthened relationship would include the MIB-Ts not only providing anchor point support to units deploying and rotating into the Pacific Theater but to ECB during their combat training center rotations and validation exercises. These habitual relationships would enable maneuver commanders to learn how to better incorporate and leverage echelons above corps intelligence enablers. They would also gain better situational understanding of the common operating and intelligence pictures, thus improving their ability to visualize the OE, and the exercise of mission command for their forces. The foundational architecture and common intelligence picture is critical to providing these services to aligned and rotational forces.

PACOM is the only combatant command with two MIB-Ts; the 501st MIB-T executing intelligence operations in support of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and the 500th MIB-T supporting the rest of the PACOM OE. Accordingly, the 500th MIB-T conducts daily operations across 4 states, 2 territories, and 6 countries. As the STT TTX brought together the two PACOM MIB-Ts, it also highlighted the differences between their structure and resourcing. Over time, the ASCC’s (USFK and USARPAC) have tailored and altered the MIB-Ts to fit their specific requirements. For example, the 500th MIB-T no longer possesses an Aerial Exploitation Battalion, while the 501st MIB-T does. This means that the 500th MIB-T does not possess the organic processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities that the 501st MIB-T has and is unable to readily replicate a like capability in the event of a contingency or crisis.

How does this affect the PACOM MIB-Ts’ intelligence support to ECB? Those ECB organizations that have a phase 0/phase 1 relationship with the 501st MIB-T are accustomed to receiving a specific level or type of support. However, in
a contingency or crisis, it is reasonable to estimate that at some point the 501st MIB-T may no longer have certain capabilities or the level of capacity to continue providing the same level of support to ECB. Under the anchor point concept, the ECB would then look to the 500th MIB-T to provide additional support. However, it is entirely possible that the 500th MIB-T will not have capabilities or capacity to provide the needed support. In this case, it would be the MIB-T’s responsibility to leverage the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and the greater IC’s capabilities to fill the gaps. This scenario presents a difficult challenge for planning considerations as it requires the MIB-T to identify gaps, in order to generate capability and capacity requirements, based on assumptions that derive from other assumptions.

Another result of the STT TTX was that the MIB-Ts clearly defined and captured intelligence requirements and identified additional previously unknown requirements. Yet questions remained regarding the providing of intelligence support to ECB. Should MIB-Ts provide this support? On the other hand, is this the intended mission of expeditionary military intelligence brigades (E-MIBs), or should the larger IC fill the gaps through reach and federation support? These questions are especially true regarding the requisite level of built in redundancy resident in phase 0/phase 1 operations to support continuity of operations and PED in phase 2, as necessary.

The expanse of intellectual capital present at the STT TTX, and the discussion amongst the diverse subject matter experts, enabled moving beyond discussing requirements conceptually and instead clearly defining them quantitatively. This open dialogue generated a sense of urgency to put concepts into immediate action and practice. To that end, the 500th MIB-T refocused and repurposed working groups and created the Set the Theater Action Group. Its primary purpose was to put the MIB-T as an anchor point and intelligence support to multi-domain battle concepts into action. Additionally, INSCOM implemented a TTX working group whose focus is flattening the network across all MIB-Ts and creating a forum to share ideas and best practices. As MIB-Ts improve synchronization and unity of effort by sharing best practices, their ability to provide intelligence support to ECB will improve.

Conclusion

Although questions remain regarding the level of intelligence support MIB-Ts should provide to ECB, the STT TTX did validate the MIB-T as an anchor point concept. Furthermore, the STT TTX highlighted the complexities of the Pacific Theater and solidified the requirements for MIB-T expeditionary intelligence elements. Finally, in an environment where U.S. forces may be called upon to “fight tonight,” the STT TTX established the framework for developing solutions and working through the problem sets of transitioning from phase 0/phase 1 to phase 2 operations.

References:


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Introduction

Perspicuous Provider is an 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) G-2 initiative to ensure military intelligence force readiness for sustainment and enabler focused units across the Pacific Theater. Perspicuous Provider is the only formal sustainment and enabling intelligence focused humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) collective training event within the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of operations (AOR). The purpose of this training event is to provide an environment conductive to increasing the intelligence warfighting function’s capacity to conduct intelligence operations for commanders decision making through a HA/DR scenario. The 8th TSC G-2 executed the fourth iteration of Perspicuous Provider at the Mission Training Complex-Hawaii (MTC–H), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, from 30 May to 16 June 2017. Participating units included—

- 8th TSC G-2 and the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion from Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
- 8th Military Police Brigade S-2 and the 130th Engineer Brigade S-2 from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
- 1st Intelligence Battalion, Australian Intelligence Corps.

Background

In the fall of 2013, the 8th TSC G-2 recognized the need for a sustainment-centric intelligence training exercise due to the unique mission of a theater sustainment command in the Pacific Theater. As the focus of institutional training is on intelligence support to maneuver units for decisive action, developing this kind of training event fills an organizational training gap. The 8th TSC G-2’s intent was to develop an exercise for intelligence professionals to conduct sustainment and enabler-centric intelligence analysis, reporting, and dissemination providing the commanding general situational understanding and supporting informed decision making. This realization gave inception to a computer-assisted command post exercise now widely known across the Pacific sustainment and intelligence enterprises as the “Perspicuous Provider” intelligence exercise. Each year by the conclusion of Perspicuous Provider, the participating units’ intelligence staff gains a greater understanding of processes and products expected to support the synchronization of sustainment and enabler capabilities in the USPACOM Theater or any theater of operations.

The establishment of a strong foundation for future execution of Perspicuous Provider occurred in 2016 under the leadership and mentoring of the Army Sustainment Command (ASC) G-2. The ASC G-2’s vast experience as an intelligence professional in the sustainment enterprise provided the needed insight and guidance to further focus Perspicuous Provider on sustainment-centric intelligence supporting the commander’s understanding and decision making. The ASC G-2 ensured all participants understood the importance of building products and assessments for use by not only tactical leaders but also a strategic audience. Great emphasis was placed on leveraging social media and open source intelligence as well as the importance of sharing intelligence with partners. Sharing intelligence may be the most daunting task for the Pacific Theater given the 36 nations (encompassing multiple treaties and agreements) with which U.S. forces engage. The lessons captured in 2016 were brought forward into 2017’s planning and execution with the added complexity of incorporating our Australian partners.

Perspicuous Provider 2017

From 2016 to 2017 the scope, breadth, and depth of the Perspicuous Provider intelligence exercise expanded. In 2016, exercise participants consisted of over 50 intelligence professionals from—
ASC.
8th TSC.
593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command.
10th Regimental Sustainment Group.
130th Engineer Brigade.
8th Military Police Brigade.
402nd Army Field Services Brigade.
196th Infantry Brigade.

The number of participants more than doubled in 2017 with the participation of the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion and the 1st Intelligence Battalion, Australian Intelligence Corps. Perspicuous Provider 2017 increased—

- The level of complexity in exercising unit intelligence architecture.
- Usage of intelligence specific mission command systems.
- Depth of analytical skills.
- The number of participating units in the USPACOM AOR.

Additionally, unique to Perspicuous Provider 2017 execution was the in-depth development of intelligence architecture connectivity threads that tested the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion's ability to provide anchor point services to regionally aligned forces and Five Eyes partners.

The 8th TSC G-2 ensured Perspicuous Provider was nested with the Army Chief of Staff’s number one priority—Readiness. Perspicuous Provider 2017 provided a venue to evaluate the intelligence warfighting function’s collective mission essential task proficiency to achieve Objective-T requirements. To this end, Perspicuous Provider 2017 was executed in-line with the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2’s Military Intelligence Gunnery concept in what equates to execution of Table 12 proficiency for intelligence. Observer controllers from the 8th TSC, 25th Infantry Division, and 500th Military Intelligence Brigade assessed performance with the Army Universal Task List’s task, conditions, and standards.

With the understanding that any conflict or HA/DR event in the USPACOM AOR is inherently joint and multinational, Perspicuous Provider 2017 included exercising the deployment of a multinational deployable intelligence support element (DISE) from the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. In the DISE, U.S. Army Pacific analysis and control element (USARPAC ACE) Soldiers were integrated with the 1st Intelligence Battalion soldiers. The DISE was responsible for—

- Collection management and dissemination plans and asset allocation.
- Request for information process.
- Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A).
- Future operations.
- All-source intelligence reporting.
- Single source intelligence collection.

The DISE exercised the use of an Intelligence and Security Command cloud initiative-type capability for multinational intelligence collaboration. Participating units’ G-2/S-2 staff executed sustainment-centric intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures; developed emerging practices for intelligence support to and from theater enablers (i.e., 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, 130th Engineer Brigade, and 8th Military Police Brigade); and practiced leveraging joint and national capabilities. The USARPAC ACE provided intelligence support from Shafter Flats, Hawaii, to exercise intelligence reach capabilities.

The MTC-H at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, provided—

- Constructive simulation.
- Mission command enablers.
- Virtual unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
- Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT).
- Command post facilities.
Observer Controller Academy support.
After action review support.

The MTC-H created a realistic operational training environment and supported training objectives during the exercise. They also provided newscasts and written media injects to support training objectives during the exercise. The I EWPTT team, with augmentation of Soldiers from the 8th TSC and the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion, built a robust simulated and live intelligence environment to drive the training. The simulation included full motion video feeds, signals intelligence, electronic intelligence and human intelligence injects.

The TRADOC G-27 Operational Environment Training Support Center (OE TSC) provided a team from Fort Eustis, Virginia, for exercise support. The OE TSC team helped integrate social media chatter, and open source information reports into an online NIPRNET portal for the exercise. This portal, known as Information Operations Network, realistically replicated how critical information about the operational environment is obtainable through unclassified open source websites and social media during HA/DR operations. The OE TSC team also incorporated the Traffic Integration Messaging System (TIMS), which allowed 8th TSC to take large volumes of reporting and modify dates and geographic coordinates to meet the specific scenario dates and training locations. This TIMS data was then published to DCGS-A allowing analysts to query for key intelligence injects that supported the exercise scenario. Additionally, TIMS was used to publish intelligence reporting to a stand-alone Five Eyes intelligence file server for use by the combined 205th Military Intelligence Battalion and 1st Intelligence Battalion DISE.

The 500th Military Intelligence Brigade Foundry Program technicians and trainers provided training and technical support throughout the exercise. The 25th Infantry Division G-2 supported the exercise as the senior mentor, providing the intelligence observer controllers, the UAS operators, and two of their military intelligence systems maintainer/integrators (military occupational specialty 35T) all of which were critical to the success of the exercise.

DCGS-A was also an essential element for the successful execution of Perspicuous Provider. None of the sustainment units’ modified table of equipment authorizes or requires any systems or equipment to enable intelligence operations above the collateral level. The over 100 participants of Perspicuous Provider 2017’s were charged with building a common operating picture to enable the command to make actionable decisions in a timely manner. All participants in the exercise collaborated to create products, utilizing our DCGS-A system, which supported both their respective commands as well as the combined joint task force. The MTC-H support team and the 25th Infantry Division G-2’s military intelligence systems maintainer/integrators played a critical role enabling exercise participants to fully utilize all aspects of the DCGS-A system during the exercise.

Conclusion
Given the range of units represented (i.e., infantry, engineers, military police, and sustainers), the training allowed the participants to bring together their respective unit’s focus to create holistic sustainment and enabler-centric intelligence products for final consumption by sustainment professionals and commanders. Looking to the future evolution of the 8th TSC’s intelligence exercise, the 8th TSC G-2 submits Perspicuous Provider to be included in the Foundry Program catalog.

Planning for Perspicuous Provider 2018 is underway. The 8th TSC G-2 is looking to apply lessons learned from Perspicuous Provider 2017, maintain the incorporation of our Five Eyes partners, and expand to sister Services’ intelligence professionals in USPACOM. Continued growth and execution of Perspicuous Provider will enable the intelligence warfighting function to become more responsive and interoperable with other services and with our partners and allies in the USPACOM Theater. Perspicuous Provider is enabling sustainment operations in a complex world, and it will continue to enhance intelligence professionals’ ability to provide clarity and focus to sustainment and enabler operations helping inform commanders’ decisions.

MG Susan Davidson, 8th Theater Sustainment Command Commander, speaks with our Australian allies and 205th Military Intelligence Battalion Soldiers during exercise Perspicuous Provider 2017.
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MAJ Jay Bao with the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion S-3, Mission Training Complex staff, and participating unit representatives plan systems architecture for Perspicuous Provider 2017. Soldiers from the participating and supporting units receive recognition for their achievements during Perspicuous Provider 2017.

Mission Statement: Established in 2004, TCC provides relevant and accredited cultural competency training and education to Soldiers and DA Civilians in order to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of cultural competency capabilities to facilitate a wide range of operations, now and in the future.

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Introduction

Earlier this year, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (USACAC) announced the planned release of an update to FM 3-0, *Operations*, for October 2017. The USACAC states the primary purpose of the update is to describe how Army forces defeat a peer competitor. Inclusion of the division’s role in large-scale combat operations against a regional peer competitor augments the assertion in FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps and Division Operations*, that the division is the Army’s primary tactical warfighting headquarters for decisive action. The division’s primary means of conducting decisive action is through the striking power concentrated in its brigade combat teams (BCTs). The division sets the conditions for BCT success by integrating joint and Army fires in the deep area. The success is inherently dependent upon the effectiveness of their reconnaissance and surveillance results.

To support the division and corps intelligence operations theme of this issue of Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, we combined our own lessons learned (LL) reporting with division-level lessons and best practices (L&BP) from recent combat training center (CTC) rotations, mission command simulations, advise and assist operations, and regionally aligned force deployments. We focused on summarizing the LL, which apply, or could be applied, to division-level combined arms maneuver. Many of the lessons involve the challenges division staffs experienced in looking deep enough in time and space (including the security area) to conduct shaping operations, which set and maintain the conditions for the success of the division’s decisive operation. We retrieved L&BP from direct observations, interviews, and after action reports of U.S. Army, U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, and U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence personnel. Some of the generalizations made provide context for these lessons and best practices; these generalizations are illustrative and should not be misconstrued as a performance evaluation of any individual or unit.

Shaping Operation Trends

Multiple Army commanders and training center cadre offered their assessments that division and BCT staffs are unpracticed in planning shaping operations. Two major shaping operation trends emerged from observing echelon above brigade operations; division staffs are terrain-focused and locked on the close fight.

Lessons Learned reporting indicates a lack of commander involvement in integrating the full range of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products into the deliberate military decision-making process (MDMP) as a potential cause of division staffs focusing on the terrain with the unintended consequence of concentrating on the close fight.

Absent specific guidance from the commander, division staffs tend to view terrain only from the perspective of U.S. effects or application of capabilities within the area of operation (AO). In order to shape operations and set the conditions for success within their AO, the division must collect information or leverage the intelligence enterprise’s capabilities, which range throughout the area of interest (AOI). An observer controller/trainer reported that the common experiences of division staff officers from Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the misapplication of the successful counterinsurgency (COIN) concept—intelligence drives targeting, and targeting drives operations—during combined arms maneuver. When conducting large-scale combat operations, a more accurate conceptual approach is commanders drive intelligence, and intelligence drives decisive operations.

Course of action development left solely to the G-3 provides some evidence of commanders not driving operations or operational planning. Eliminating the issuance of planning guidance to the G-3 was a result of the myriad of tasks and responsibilities division commanders perform in leading the division during current operations (or training simulations). The Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE) addressed this challenge in the Army Lessons Learned Forum.
(ALLF) earlier this year. The forum explains the problem as, “Commanders do not adequately drive the operations process by understanding, visualizing, and describing their operational environment; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. This results in a staff not generating the conceptual and detailed planning necessary for subordinate organizations to fully succeed in Unified Land Operations.” The MCCoE further describes implementation of several mitigating and resolution strategies to address the concern.

Complementing the ALLF topic of the commander’s role in driving operations, the USAICoE Commanding General’s strategy, and remediation actions were already underway to emphasize to commanders that they must also drive the intelligence process. The intelligence process supports the operations process; commanders must drive both processes.

A symptom of the commander not driving the intelligence process is the G-2 developing and unilaterally selecting the priority intelligence requirements (PIR). As the G-3’s terrain-based focus led to concentrating the division’s planning effort on the close fight, so did the G-2’s PIR. This deficiency also relegates the conduct of the division’s counter-reconnaissance fight to be in the close, and not the deep, framework.

A “best practice” occurs when a division commander ensures or directs the G-3 to integrate intelligence products into the MDMP and orders production. An example of routine IPB products, which serve as a best practice, in supporting MDMP is using the event template and event matrix to identify decisive points at which division-level shaping operations, fires, and air-ground integration can disrupt the enemy’s operation or preparations. Employing the event template and event matrix may also have the beneficial effect of causing the staff to be force oriented (on the enemy) throughout the AOI, and not simply focused on the terrain within the AO. Focusing on the AO, and not the AOI, invariably leads to the staff locking on the close fight.

Commander involvement is just as important to breaking the staff’s lock on the close fight as it is in directing the focus on the enemy. A compounding condition, which unintentionally supports continued focus on the close fight, is the lack of training areas providing the distances (depth and width) at which shaping operations occur. Even the vastness of the National Training Center requires simulations to realistically replicate the distances tactical units can leverage joint/theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets or the intelligence enterprise can look throughout the AOI. The necessity of using simulation-based training to expose division staffs to the increased distances and speed at which large-scale combat operations will occur competes with their hard-earned COIN expertise and familiarity in using ISR assets.

Without the experiences strengthened through repetition, U.S. division and BCT staffs remain relatively unpracticed in planning shaping operations to support U.S. forces’ combined arms maneuver in major training events. Without the familiarity gained by practice in looking deep with ISR assets, G-2 event templates do not routinely depicted the enemy at sufficient time or distances to support the division shaping operations tactical enabling task employment.

Conversely, the division must also collect information to support shaping operations in the division’s security area in which enemy reconnaissance or special purpose forces will operate. Adding further complexity is the acknowledgement that cyber and space-based shaping operations may occur worldwide. The intelligence enterprise will need to address a potentially global AOI.

**Conclusion**

Hopefully, this column has been of some value in alerting you to challenges others have experienced. The Army is already addressing the challenges discussed in this column through updated doctrine and leader development opportunities. With practice will come increased familiarity and proficiency planning and executing shaping operations. We look forward to receiving any lessons and best practices you and your unit can provide.

To learn more visit the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) [https://call2.army.mil/](https://call2.army.mil/) or USAICoE MI LL portal [https://army.deps.mil/Army/CMDS/USAICoE_Other/LL/SitePages/Home.aspx](https://army.deps.mil/Army/CMDS/USAICoE_Other/LL/SitePages/Home.aspx).
In May 1917, General John J. Pershing had cause to celebrate and lament his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of a “theoretical army which had yet to be constituted, equipped, trained, and sent abroad.” As his first step in the monumental effort to build the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), he carefully chose his Field General Staff comprised of Administrative (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Operations (G-3), Logistics (G-4), and Training (G-5) sections.

While Pershing searched for his most trusted staff members, MAJ Dennis E. Nolan was completing a two-year assignment on the War Department General Staff. His first experience in intelligence work was preparing products used by the General Staff for planning and mobilization purposes. This included a threat estimate on Germany’s capability to invade the United States. Nolan had been commissioned a second lieutenant in infantry following graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1896. He received two citations for gallantry in action during the Spanish-American War and commanded a squadron of the 11th U.S. Volunteer Cavalry during the Philippine Insurrection. It was during this latter assignment that Nolan had come to know Pershing and the future AEF Chief of Staff, James Harbord. Between 1901 and 1915, Nolan held a variety of positions including instructor of law and history at West Point, director of Southern Luzon in the Philippines, and officer with the 30th Infantry.

Despite his impressive service record, Nolan was hardly holding his breath for a position on the AEF staff. Consequently, when MAJ Harbord summoned him for dinner one night and informed him of his appointment as the AEF G-2 in charge of the intelligence section, Nolan declared himself “surprised and delighted.” He sailed with Pershing and the rest of the AEF staff less than two weeks later.

Once on the ground in France, Nolan built, from the ground up, the Army’s first multi-discipline theater intelligence organization. Following the British model, Nolan divided his Headquarters G-2 section into four divisions: Information, Secret Service, Topographical, and Censorship and Press. Nolan’s staff, totaling nearly 350 personnel, compiled daily intelligence reports based on a multitude of sources. In addition to the traditional methods of intelligence collection, such as patrolling, observation, prisoner interrogation, and document translation, Nolan added aerial observation, photographic interpretation, sound and flash ranging, and radio intelligence. He also played a direct role in organizing the Corps of Intelligence Police, the Army’s first permanent counterintelligence organization. Venturing outside the normal intelligence arena, Nolan’s press division started up The Stars and Stripes newspaper to communicate orders and regulations, provide news of events, and boost the morale of American Soldiers in Europe.

Because Pershing’s General Staff organization was repeated in the tactical units, intelligence officers were appointed at every echelon down to battalion. To increase their effectiveness, Nolan drafted a set of intelligence regulations applicable to each echelon and established a school at Langres, France, to train all intelligence officers down to division. Throughout the war, these tactical intelligence sections pushed intelligence up through higher headquarters to Nolan’s G-2 section, which also pushed intelligence down to give lower echelons a broad picture of the enemy’s situation.

In the closing days of World War I, Nolan was given an opportunity to command the 55th Infantry Brigade, 28th Division, for 10 days. For extraordinary heroism in action near Apremont, France, on October 1, 1918, he received the Distinguished Service Cross and the respect of his men, who recalled Nolan was “right up there with us doughboys.” He then returned to his G-2 section for the duration of the war.

Nolan’s G-2 section, the Army’s first theater intelligence organization, unquestionably contributed to the AEF’s success. Declaring that, “no army was better served by its intelligence bureau than our own,” Pershing awarded Nolan the Distinguished Service Medal. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker praised “the fidelity and intelligence with which General Nolan supplied [Pershing] eyes to penetrate the fog which clouds military actions.”
After the Armistice, Nolan was detailed to the Peace Commission until returning to Washington in July 1919. After a year instructing military intelligence at the Army War College, he was named as the War Department’s Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Perhaps his most important contribution during this assignment was the establishment of the Military Intelligence Officers Reserve Corps—the first formal recognition of the Army’s need to retain professional military intelligence officers. From 1924–1926, he served as the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, receiving promotion to the rank of Major General in 1925. His final assignment was Commander, Second Corps Area and First Army. In 1936, Nolan reached the mandatory retirement age of 64; he served 44 years and was the second-highest ranking officer of the U.S. Army.
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