From the Editor

Correction: In the July – September 2016, Intelligence Support to Dense Urban Areas issue, the MIPB staff failed to publish credit to Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger for his contribution to the article titled “Intelligence Preparation of the Urban Operational Environment.” We sincerely apologize for this oversight.

The following themes and deadlines are established for:

July – September 2017, Military Intelligence Programs, (e.g. Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program, Army Intelligence Development Program, etc.), deadline for submission is 7 April 2017. This is a change to the previously published theme for this quarter.

October – December 2017, Division and Corps Intelligence Operations, deadline for submissions is 7 July 2017.

As always, articles from you, our reader, remain important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them, even if the topic of your article may differ from an issue’s theme, do not hesitate to submit it. Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. We seriously review and consider all submissions that add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the intelligence community.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or any other aspects of MIPB. We welcome your input and suggestions.

Tracey Remus
Editor
FEATURES

The views expressed in the following articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army or Defense, or the U.S. Government. Article content is not authenticated Army information and does not supersede information in any other Army publication.

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Inside back cover: Contact and Article Submission Information
Always Out Front
by Major General Scott D. Berrier
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

Before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, training and readiness were the Army’s top priorities. During the wars, training was largely confined to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism roles within the Army Force Generation cycle. Before 9/11, superior training was the primary difference between excellent and mediocre performance. Those who trained their Soldiers and leaders well were promoted. Following 9/11, operational performance became a primary discriminator for promotions. As our multi-domain operations evolve, readiness is the focus area again. Ultimately, commanders are responsible for all aspects of unit training and readiness. However, it takes strong noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and warrant officers to train Soldiers, teams, and units to standard and to ensure we train as we fight. Those officers and NCOs who prioritize training efforts, develop their subordinates, and conduct realistic training will ensure the readiness of their units.

Intelligence training management and unit training management from ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, share a common theme: mission-essential task list (METL) and collective task proficiency are the keys to ensure mission success, especially during unexpected situations. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICOE) understands the intelligence training management challenge is significant. Each intelligence staff and unit has many competing training requirements. Supported unit commanders and their G-2s/S-2s must work collaboratively as one team with military intelligence (MI) unit commanders and staffs to establish training priorities and execute meaningful training. The team must work tirelessly to fight for resources and prioritize precious training hours amidst decreasing resources. Intelligence leaders must develop realistic and relevant training using a number of different tools. The first and most important tool to read, understand, and apply is Army training doctrine. The Army plans to release a revision to the primary doctrinal publication for training, ADRP 7-0 by the end of FY 17. Other tools include doctrinal publications, exportable training products, lessons learned, higher commander’s intent, the unit mission and METL, a METL crosswalk, and the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT). IEWTPT is a great training capability that allows Soldiers to train on their MI systems within each intelligence discipline. The Army Training Network (http://atn.army.mil) is another valuable resource. It houses all MI Universal Task Lists for reference in addition to many other training resources.

At the conclusion of FY 15, we completed our library of Army intelligence publications as a part of the Army Doctrine 2015 effort. Based on these efforts, we have a complete set of publications that provide a solid doctrinal foundation, covering the breadth of the intelligence warfighting function. However, the effort to maintain current and relevant doctrine never ends. There are several trends we must address within our doctrine in concert with higher level Army combined arms doctrinal efforts. Some of those trends include: a sophisticated hybrid threat, the inherent complexity of the operational environment, the ongoing conceptualization of multi-domain battle, and the corresponding demands on the intelligence warfighting function. In FY 17, we started working a top-down deliberate and meticulous approach to update our doctrine based on those trends. Some specific projects that are underway include updating ADP and ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, and ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, to address multi-domain considerations. Other doctrinal projects include: providing specifics on analysis for cyberspace operations, updating techniques on developing an intelligence architecture, addressing analyzing social media, and providing additional doctrine on company intelligence support team and multifunction platoon operations.

USAICOE continues to update schoolhouse training and develop new training programs to address the Army’s needs and to create competent, confident, and adaptive intelligence professionals. One of many current initiatives is the development of the “MI Gunnery” training circulars (TCs) to clearly show MI leaders and Soldiers how to perform MI tasks to standard on intelligence systems. Armor and infantry units use gunnery tables to drive training and assess skills to a certain standard while integrating training plans; MI Gunnery manuals will do the same. The end state of these MI Gunnery TCs is to standardize MI training across the force, allowing commanders to objectively evaluate and certify their intelligence Soldiers and teams. (Continued on page 4)

Military Intelligence
Intelligence Training Management: Creating a Ready MI Force

Intelligence training management is the responsibility of all military intelligence (MI) leaders in the operational force, U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. Institutional intelligence training is not enough to sustain proficiency in individual, crew, and collective tasks. A ready Army demands noncommissioned officers that train their Soldiers, crews, and teams in the individual and collective tasks needed for mission accomplishment. Training is sergeant’s business—and always has been.

Knowing what to train begins with understanding your higher commander’s training priorities and mission. Demand commander’s training guidance from your higher headquarters or supported command. If you have not reviewed the annual/quarterly training guidance from your higher echelons, at least two up, do so. Then identify upcoming events that will have large impacts on training, just as we used to see in the old Army Force Generation model. Mitigate those impacts by reverse planning from major events and forecasting periods of downturn in proficiency following redeployment. Doing this will help you sustain individual and unit readiness.

Effective training leadership begins with knowledge of training doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World, was just published in October. This new manual contains some changes and updates, but it reinforces tried and true methods like the eight-step training model. It contains information you need to know. Read it.

Battalion and company level training meetings are essential to successfully planning, resourcing, and managing training. Planning effective future training events starts with assessing completed training. Incorporate results from evaluations of training and after action reviews into your training meetings. This provides your entire team with a common understanding of the unit’s ability to conduct its mission—both its strengths and weaknesses. It also allows the team to identify any obstacles to training.

Leaders need to prioritize. Time is a precious resource, and you will not have time to train every collective task. You need to battle-focus your training based on your pending mission. There are many tools to help you with this. Standardized mission essential task lists (METLs) for Table of Organization and Equipment units, combined arms training strategies, and the Digital Training Management System are readily available on the Army Training Network. If your unit does not have a METL, use these resources to develop one. If you are leading Soldiers in a Table of Distribution and Allowances organization, review the METL for a similar organization. It may provide ideas for managing your training.

Take every opportunity to go to field or to train in a simulated operational environment. Utilize resources readily available and be aware of what other organizations to your left, right, higher, and supported are planning for training. It does no good to plan a large training event only to find out your organization is not your commander’s priority. When you are supporting other organizations, work with your counterparts to weave intelligence training into their events. Sometimes you need to lessen the intensity or scope of your training event to support another unit. There is value gained from emplacing and displacing your intelligence systems and practicing setting up and tearing down your architecture and networks. You may not get to the level of collective tasks you need for your own purposes, but you can increase individual and crew training opportunities that will move you toward meeting your own mission requirements quicker. Keep in mind the sustained readiness model described in FM 7-0. Work for fewer peaks and valleys between training events and more sustainment training. Take advantage of every training opportunity.

First sergeants and platoon sergeants—you should be identifying hip-pocket training individual tasks you want your Soldiers to focus on based on the unit’s mission. First-line leaders—don’t overlook the importance of training during opportunities when no major events are planned. This is
the time to reinforce individual level military occupational specialty (MOS) tasks, and supporting collective tasks and crew drills. They form the foundation of your Soldiers readiness and proficiency. Several products to help you with this are under development. MI Gunnery Gate 4 Individual Tasks for all MI MOS except for MOS 35Q, Cryptologic Network Warfare Specialist, and Gate 3 Crew Tasks are scheduled to be published by end of fiscal year 2017.

“Always Out Front and Army Strong!”

Always Out Front

USAICoE leadership continues to emphasize partnerships with the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to ensure our institutional training is timely, effective, and supports the training readiness of Army units as measured in part by performance during CTC rotations. Collecting operational lessons learned during CTC rotations better enables USAICoE in our mission to modernize intelligence training for MI Soldiers and leaders. Additionally, by maximizing a decisive action training environment (DATE) scenario as the training driver across all MI institutional training, our Soldiers and officers learn how to provide accurate and timely intelligence to support operations. The DATE scenario provides the structure used to teach MI Soldiers how to plan and leverage a complex intelligence architecture and the necessity of intelligence operations and analysis across all intelligence disciplines. The mission of every USAICoE cadre and faculty member is to graduate competent, committed, and physically fit Soldiers, with strong character and culturally capable of immediately supporting the combat commander as they prepare to win in any conflict.

The last tool I will discuss is Intelligence Leader Development Resource (iLDR) which resides on IKN (www.ikn.army.mil/apps/iLDR). iLDR is a great resource for learning. This website offers a variety of resources for MI professionals, including the latest iTalk videos—a series of videos to help MI Soldiers and leaders conduct critical MI tasks. I encourage you all to browse the site when you have time; it will definitely be worth it.

As the world changes exponentially and emerging threats create unique multi-domain challenges for our Nation and the Army; the necessity for timely and accurate intelligence has never been greater. Moving into the future, the Army must prepare to fight near-peer competitors, neutralize cyber threats, deter rogue countries with nuclear ambitions, and deal with a number of other capable hybrid threats. To provide that level of intelligence support, MI Soldiers and leaders must be technically and tactically proficient in the craft of intelligence. We must develop leaders of character who persevere during adversity, are committed to learning, and use all available resources to accomplish their mission in this uncertain world. President John F. Kennedy once said, “Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.” As a result of this reality, we face an incredibly complex task to train for the many challenges of establishing and maintaining a ready Army.

“Always out Front and Army Strong!”
Future operations promise to be complex with highly adaptive adversaries operating across multiple domains—air and land, sea, space, and cyberspace. As such, military intelligence (MI) needs to focus on the three priorities of Chief of Staff of the Army—readiness, future Army, and taking care of our Soldiers—to develop Soldiers and leaders ready to fight today while posturing a MI capability for the future. This requires “realistic” MI training and education that involves rigorous interaction with operational environment conditions while incorporating our intelligence systems across the three learning domains—institutional, operational, and self-development.

Historically, the training and education paradigm focused primarily on foundational basics, often termed as blocking and tackling. Although those skills remain important, the future demands that our Soldiers have the ability to operate in a complex environment that stretches the limits of our current capabilities—physically, intellectually, structurally, and technologically. To prepare and sustain a ready MI force for the current and future fight, we are exploring ends, ways, and means to advance the training environment, training management and assessment tools, and training infrastructure by incorporating elements of the Army’s Strategic Vision, Operating Concept, and Human Dimension Strategy.

The decisive action training environment (DATE) is an effort to shift our training conditions from a counterinsurgency-centric training environment to address an adaptive adversary that will employ hybrid, conventional, unconventional, criminal, cyber, space, and other low-cost effects to decrease our advantage. Currently, all U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), Mission Command Training Program, and Combat Training Center scenarios use DATE scenarios that intellectually challenge and stress our intelligence Soldiers, leaders, systems and processes. To complement foundational training events, MI leaders should continually stretch the boundaries of individual and collective teams with DATE-compliant home-station training events that address military operations across the operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time.

We are exploring several ways to objectively advance training management and assessment tools. The development and execution of MI Gunnery will allow commanders and leaders to optimize the responsibilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess individual, crew, and collective readiness. In addition to unit-level training, Foundry-training platforms remain an outstanding opportunity for noncommissioned and warrant officers to lead and execute MI training. Additionally, USAICoE is seeking to expand its application-based training with our intelligence systems to enhance critical skills and generate a deeper understanding of enterprise operations and intelligence architectures.

To maintain effective skill sustainment, we must challenge ourselves to leverage and develop low-cost solutions such as distance learning and interactive multimedia instruction, as applicable. Our MI force remains actively engaged, and in a transition period, posturing to address the complexities of the future. To do so, we must maximize our current capability, develop affordable solutions, and challenge our Soldiers with realistic training to develop and sustain adaptive intelligence professionals.

Always Out Front!
Maneuver senior intelligence officers (S-2s) are in the unique and challenging position of being responsible for the skill level and training of a unit’s entire intelligence warfighting function (IWfF). No other Brigade Combat Team (BCT) staff officer has the same level of responsibility. However, if subordinate battalion S-2s are not providing their commander the information needed to be successful or the military intelligence (MI) company’s (MICO’s) collection assets are not mission capable, the first person the commander will look to is the brigade S-2. Therefore, it is imperative that brigade S-2s have a comprehensive training strategy that accounts for every intelligence discipline and echelon in their unit. An effective and easily understood method for developing a successful training strategy is to use the Army leader development model outlined in Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, as a framework.

The Leader Development Model

As indicated in ADRP 7-0, leader development is a continuous and progressive process, spanning a leader’s entire career. Leader development comprises training, education, and experience gained in schools, while assigned to organizations, and through the individual’s own program of self-development. The Army leader development model identifies three supporting domains—operational, institutional, and self-development—supported by training, education and experience respectively.

For the purposes of an IWfF training plan at the brigade level the operational domain translates as unit internal training. This includes all training conducted by the individual unit, from sergeant’s time training to a brigade command post exercise. Institutional training translates into Foundry training events, like mobile training teams (MTTs) and live environment training. The self-development domain, although more structured, remains relatively the same as the Army model. Effectively working each domain simultaneously is key to a successful training plan.

Where to Begin?

The first step to an effective training plan is deciding the end state. For some units it will be their next Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, for others it could be their Afghanistan or regionally aligned force deployment to Korea, Europe, or Africa. Whatever the case may be, es-
tablishing that end-state goal provides a focal point toward which the training plan will lead the organization.

Once the end-state goal is established, the next step is identifying the necessary skill sets to achieve that goal successfully. For example, one intelligence discipline may be more effective than another for achieving the end-state goal. This will lead to focus more on that discipline during training. The type of operational environment, counterinsurgency, or decisive action will also affect training.

After identifying the skill sets that will most effectively achieve the unit’s goal the next step is determining which domain most effectively trains that skill. For example, is a command post exercise (operational domain) that allows analysts to conduct multiple repetitions of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) the best way to train the skills needed? Or is sending the unit’s military occupational specialty 35Gs to a Foundry course (institutional domain) on the Tactical Ground Station functions a more effective use of finite training time? Maybe both are needed.

The Domains

As previously mentioned, the Army leader development model is divided into three domains—institutional, operational, and self-development. What follows is a breakdown of each domain and how they apply to creating a brigade intelligence training plan.

The Institutional Domain. The Institutional Domain consists of different professional military education schools, such as the Officer Basic Course or Command and General Staff College. From a brigade intelligence training perspective, the institutional domain consists of training provided by the Foundry program. AR 350-32, The Army Foundry Intelligence Training Program, states “Foundry enables Army intelligence personnel to sustain intelligence skills pertinent to their unit’s mission, to improve their individual and collective technical and analytical skills, and to receive required accreditation and certification training to successfully execute intelligence missions in support of the unit’s mission.”

Regardless of a unit’s location, Foundry should be the cornerstone of a brigade intelligence training plan. For units at locations like Joint Base Lewis McCord, Washington, Foundry has a very robust footprint, thus the use of the program is easy. For units at a place like Fort Wainwright, Alaska, it can be significantly more difficult. Regardless of the type of location, the following guidelines can help streamline a unit’s Foundry training plan to get the most out of the program.

❖ Establish good relationships. Getting to know the Foundry director, and explaining the unit’s goal ultimately benefits the unit. Offering to support training initiatives and being willing to support the location’s overall Foundry program makes others more willing to support the unit.

❖ Identify a Brigade Foundry Manager. Each brigade should identify a primary and assistant Foundry manager to coordinate between the higher-level Foundry manager, the post Foundry director, and the brigade’s subordinate units. The Foundry manager should be an outgoing, well organized, resourceful, and detail-oriented person who can assist in obtaining training for the organization at the best value for the unit’s Foundry plan.

❖ Lock in training early. A good Foundry plan should be forecasted for the entire Fiscal Year. The exact dates/times of MTTs should be locked before training events during a Foundry training meeting between the post’s Foundry director, the chiefs of the brigade’s intelligence disciplines, the MICO commander, the brigade S-2, and the brigade Foundry manager. The expected inputs and outputs of this training meeting include:

❖ Inputs. The unit’s tentative plan for the next quarter’s Foundry training, a long-range training calendar for all subordinate units, current assessment of each intelligence discipline’s skill level.

❖ Output. A comprehensive Foundry training plan for the next quarter’s training events.

❖ Be creative. Creativity is vital for units located away from a Foundry node. During quarterly Foundry meetings, discuss the unit’s training gaps with the Foundry director, focusing on those not covered by the standard Foundry catalog. Tailored training events can sometimes be created to resolve a unit’s training gaps. Additionally, hold discussions with other units using Foundry training about how they resolved training gaps and ways of supporting each other’s training needs. Develop a relationship with units offering live environment training, which can assist in eliminating temporary duty expenses.

An effective Foundry training plan will go a long way towards accomplishing the goals set by a unit. However, it must be complimented with a good unit internal training plan.

The Operational Domain

The Operational Domain is the domain of unit managed training events. With the exception of a CTC rotation, the unit conducting the training generally organizes
and resources these training events. For the purposes of the brigade intelligence training plan, there are training events solely for the IWfF and those including the other warfighting functions.

**Organization Training Events.** Many S-2s find large unit training events to be challenging. These events tend to focus on maneuver units and do not have the scenario depth to exercise fully the IWfF. To mitigate this shortcoming, the S-2 should be involved early in the exercise planning. Shaping the depth and direction of the scenario helps S-2s to integrate IWfF training objectives effectively. Waiting for the higher echelon order at the beginning of an exercise is too late for the S-2 to have any effect on the IWfF’s analysts and collectors roles during the exercise.

The S-2 gets opportunities to develop enemy courses of action by getting involved with the brigade S-3’s internal planning sessions, offering to build the scenario for the brigade’s command post exercise or live fire exercise, and using it as a training event for the S-2 section.

It is important in the scenario development phase to build in reporting from collectors so subordinate units get a feel for what to expect during larger collective training events. This is a great opportunity to build habitual relationships between subordinate units and collectors. For example, deploying human intelligence (HUMINT) teams or low-level voice intercept teams to battalions they will work with in the future is important for relationship building. This is only effective if the supported unit sees the value of having the enablers present—the way this happens is by the S-2 building collection opportunities into the scenario.

**Intelligence Warfighting Function Training Events.** IWfF members plan and execute IWfF training events, including but not limited to sergeant’s time training, MICO field training exercises, and S-2 IPB tabletop exercises. There are many advantages to coordinating a unit’s IWfF training:

- **Training Objectives.** The single most important advantage of creating a training event internal to the unit is tailoring the training to meet the unit’s training gaps.
- **Flexible Training Plan.** The exercise director can adjust the training to focus on deficiencies identified during the event.
- **Cost.** Generally, internal training events cost little more than the time needed to create the event.
- **Flexible Scheduling.** There is minimal interference with scheduling as long as events are on the training calendar.

- **Focused Training Audience.** The training audience can be tailored to influence the element that needs to be trained.

Internal unit training, unlike Foundry training, has significant front-end costs in time and effort. For a training event to be successful, planning should occur several months in advance. The scenarios developed for IWfF training should have a level of complexity that stresses the training audience. Providing a signals intelligence (SIGINT) team with an IPB product but nothing to collect against will not achieve the training objective. Equally, not having a fully developed division operation order for the brigade intelligence support element (BISE) analysts to review while giving the HUMINT teams multiple interrogations will make for an ineffective training event.

**Self-Development Domain**

The self-development domain focuses on Soldiers’ ability to identify weaknesses or areas they wish to emphasize in their own professional development. Upon identifying areas of emphasis, Soldiers can develop their own training plan for those areas. Training plans in this domain generally consist of professional reading or taking courses outside the military education system.

In terms of the IWfF training model, the self-development domain is a little more structured. While self-study is involved, it also consists of analysts researching in a live environment, conducting deep dive analysis for senior leaders on topics of interest, providing analysis on the commander’s priority information requirements or building commander’s read books.
The self-development domain is used to fill gaps in a unit’s training calendar between collective training events. It keeps unit analysts’ skills in constant use and achieves the Army G-2’s goal of “No MI Soldier at rest.”

As with the IWfF training events, building on the Self-Development Domain takes hard work and creativity. Most BCTs do not start with their own intelligence collection mission. Brigade S-2s develop relationships with their higher headquarters who can provide a mission set. For S-2’s in BCTs lacking a clear divisional support relationship, some creative thinking and relationship building outside the organization may be required.

**The Art of Bringing It All Together**

Developing this framework is the science behind a good brigade training plan. The art is bringing all three domains together to create a comprehensive training plan that effectively synchronizes the Foundry program, unit training, and self-development in a way that brings the IWfF towards the unit’s goals.

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One way of bringing it all together is backward planning. Start with the goal on a calendar and work backward. After locking in the goal add the events that cannot be changed. These generally fall in the Organization Domain. Use these organizational events as waypoints in the plan. Think about where the unit should be in its training path and use the organizational events to evaluate progress. Then overlay the IWfF training events and Foundry events onto the calendar. The Foundry and IWfF training should focus on getting the unit to each waypoint, and each waypoint should progress the unit to its goal.

**In-Progress Review**

Oftentimes, the organizational training waypoints are not robust enough to exercise the IWfF fully. The brigade S-2 may need to add in-progress reviews to the training plan. This review must be far enough into the overall training plan to allow training to develop skills and also allow enough time for course corrections to be effective. An example is the use of a mid-course self-developed IWfF certification exercise to gage the skill level competencies of the brigade’s intelligence disciplines. This certification would identify shortfalls and allow the brigade S-2, battalion S-2s, and MICO commander time to adjust their training plan before any deployment or CTC rotation.
Identifying the need to understand the current capability of the brigade’s intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) prior to the major collective training event and the upcoming National Training Center (NTC) rotation the IWfF from 1/25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team wanted to conduct an exercise to measure its proficiency in each of the intelligence disciplines. To accomplish this, a plan was developed with help from I Corps G-2’s Foundry team, Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT), U.S. Army Alaska G-2, and the Fort Wainwright Mission Training Center staff to exercise each of the intelligence disciplines. The result was a training event that encompassed brigade and battalion current operations battle tracking, collection management, brigade and battalion intelligence preparation of the battlefield, human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, geospatial intelligence analysis, targeting, and all-source intelligence fusion.

The Fort Wainwright Mission Training Center provided a secure training environment by creating brigade and battalion tactical operations centers (TOC) that operated on a closed collateral network. Each TOC was outfitted with Command Post of the Future, Distributed Common Ground System-Army Ballistic Analyst Laptops, secure voice over internet protocol phones, and analog maps. I Corps provided the scenario (based on an NTC rotation that was recently executed by a unit from Joint Base Lewis-McChord), helped create the current operations injects, and provided the SIGINT and HUMINT collection opportunities along with trainers for each discipline. IEWTPT provided the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance feedback and current enemy activities. Over the course of three weeks, the brigade S-2 section and battalion current operations battle tracking, collection management, brigade and battalion intelligence preparation of the battlefield, human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, geospatial intelligence analysis, targeting, and all-source intelligence fusion.

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While the all-source intelligence analysts were conducting IPB each of the current operations cells were receiving significant activity injects which they used to develop the battlefield picture. At the same time, the single source elements were collecting information at a remote location. That information was fed back to the all-source intelligence analysts at the Mission Training Center for further development into the brigade intelligence summary.

Upon completion of the event the brigade’s IWfF executed a comprehensive after action review (AAR). This AAR provided the brigade IWfF with a realistic understanding of where their skills matched up in comparison to where they were projected to be based on the initial training plan. This review was key to the adjustments made in the training plan leading up to the NTC rotation.

Commander’s Buy-in

A brigade S-2 can have the most effective training plan but without the commander’s backing, the plan will go nowhere. The brigade S-2 should discuss IWfF training with the brigade commander to lay out the vision for the training. The brigade S-2 should also get the commander to approve and publicly back the plan with subordinate commanders. Each event must be published in a brigade tasking order to ensure events are a brigade-level directive. In addition to the commander’s approval, the brigade S-2 should involve the commander in the training by taking briefings from junior analysts or visiting training sites.

Conclusion

Developing a comprehensive training plan for a brigade IWfF can be challenging. By embracing this task and developing a well-thought-out training strategy, brigade S-2s can significantly increase their units’ IWfF skill sets, which will lead to successful CTC rotations and deployments. Using the Army leader development model as a framework is an effective method of building a successful training plan.

Endnotes


Example IWfF Certification:
1/25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Major James King is currently the Brigade S-2 for 1/25 SBCT at Fort Wainwright, Alaska and a contributor to the Modern War Institute’s War Council Blog. Major King previously served as the Light Task Force S-2 Observer/Controller Trainer (Airborne) and scenario planner at National Training Center, Fort Irwin. He has deployed three times in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as both an Infantry and MI officer. His deployments were as an Infantry Platoon Leader in 1st SBCT 25th ID (2004-2005), then as an intelligence advisor to an Iraqi Army battalion as a part of a Military Transition Team (2007-2008), and finally as the brigade assistant S-2, targeting officer, and surveillance troop commander in the 4th SBCT, 2nd ID (2009-2010). Major King holds a bachelor of arts in sociology from the University of Washington and a master’s degree in strategic intelligence from American Military University.
Introduction
Screening detainees for intelligence information is a crucial but often under-emphasized element of the human intelligence (HUMINT) collection cycle. Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, describes screening as follows: “Screening is possibly the most difficult HUMINT skill. A HUMINT collector must use his experience, questioning skill, cultural knowledge, and knowledge of human nature to decide in a matter of minutes or possibly seconds whether limited HUMINT collection assets and valuable time should be spent talking to an individual.” Without effective and efficient screening operations, follow-on interrogators have to spend time re-evaluating and re-assessing subjects, and may find that they are interrogating a mis-categorized subject without intelligence value, thus wasting time and resources.

Unfortunately, screening is often relegated to a lesser position in HUMINT element training plans, prioritized behind interrogation and debriefing training, despite the value that screening provides for both collection methods. This is in part because of the difficulty in providing objective training to Soldiers on how to properly assess a subject. Examining the difficulties inherent in training screening, identifying the critical tasks inherent in screening operations, and recognizing the benefits that effective assessment provides to interrogation can lead to a redesign of screening training with the assistance of interrogation research.

Subjective Evaluation
The heart of screening is the process of detainee assessment, which is generally a difficult subject to define. Evaluation of another human being is a highly subjective matter, dependent on a wide variety of factors ranging from the perceptions of the screener to the time allotted for the session. Two interrogators or screeners will likely not evaluate a subject in the same way, based on their differing perceptions of the detainee’s answers, communication style, cultural references, and body language. It is possible for training to minimize some of the subjectivity, but it is effectively impossible to get a uniform assessment without objective criteria or methodology.

FM 2-22.3 provides basic categories of source assessment, but offers little instruction on methods to assist a screener in reaching that assessment. Screening is broadly described as “asks some general questions to determine the source’s level of cooperation and knowledge”¹. Detainees are assigned an alphanumeric screening code based on the subject’s willingness to respond to direct questions and the interrogator’s assessment of their intelligence value. Unfortunately, this basic evaluation is too broad for effective training. A detainee may respond to direct questions and yet be uncooperative. Providing one’s name when asked is wholly different than providing their full unit designation and chain of command. Moreover, counter-interrogation training, deception, culturally relevant behaviors, and language barriers can lead to erroneous assessments.

When conducting screening training, units will typically develop evaluation criteria based on the experiences of senior HUMINT personnel. This can be effective, but for units lacking seasoned interrogators (or having experience with only a single culture or country), another method must be found for effectively developing training for screening operations. In the absence of large-scale detention and interrogation operations, there are too few senior interrogators to manage the needs of the force.

Facilitating Communication
The key element of HUMINT operations is communication, and screening is no different. At the most basic level, a screener must be able to encourage the subject to talk, and to provide enough of a communication sample for the collector to identify the subject’s basic mannerisms and communication styles. Essentially, the more the subject talks, the more information the screener has to assess, and the more time the screener has to identify indicators of cooperation and knowledge.

The time factor is also critical in identifying difficult topics or deception. Maintaining a deceptive facade or mannerism becomes more difficult over time, as the subject’s cognitive load increases and they have to devote more and more attention to keeping their deceptions in line. Cognitive load is the total amount of mental activity being used on the work-
ing memory, which is vulnerable to overload. Extending the screening using conversational rapport, and specifically encouraging the subject to speak at greater length, adds to the subject’s cognitive load, and makes it more likely for them to make a mistake with some aspect of their story. As the subject talks, the screener has the opportunity to identify those key words and ideas that crop up repeatedly, giving the collector insight into the types of interrogation approaches that may prove effective on the subject.

However, maintaining this kind of a conversation can be a challenge for a young Soldier. The average Soldier attending the 35M HUMINT Collector Course is 19 years old with some college experience. They have most likely held down a job of some sort before joining the US Army. Finding a suitable communication style to use when dealing with a refugee biochemist or Syrian Aq’id [Colonel] can be challenging at best. Add the shock of capture or disaster, and it is far more likely that a Soldier will be dealing with an exceptionally stressed individual, who is uninterested in speaking with the person in front of them. Therefore, to reach the stated objective of delivering an accurate assessment of the screened individual, the relevant focus of training becomes how to quickly get the subject talking and how to keep them talking through the session.

**Methodology**

With this key consideration in mind, the task becomes one of preparing Soldiers to manage the interactions with subjects long enough to develop a viable assessment that supports the follow-on interrogation mission. One possible method for improving screening and assessment training is the Observing Rapport-Based Interpersonal Techniques (ORBIT) method developed by Laurence Alison, Ph.D., of the Centre for Critical and Major Incident Psychology, University of Liverpool. Dr. Alison developed this method while examining counterterrorism subjects in coordination with the Metropolitan Police in England. Dr. Alison has examined more than 900 hours of interrogations of terrorism suspects to date. The ORBIT methodology focuses on maintaining effective communication and rapport with the subject while steering the conversation, allowing the screener to get a more accurate appraisal of the detainee’s cooperation and intelligence value.

The ORBIT method establishes two congruent conversational interactions, with one aspect being adaptive and the other maladaptive. The intensity of the demonstrated behavior is measured outward from the center. Figure 1 represents the adaptive behaviors, in which a person is able to be confident without becoming overbearing, assertive without becoming punitive, seek guidance without being submissive, or provide emotional support without sympathizing with their subject. Conversely, Figure 2 describes maladaptive behaviors to be avoided, such as exceptional or unwarranted demands, verbally attacking the subject, caving or allowing one party to dominate the interaction, or becoming patronizing and insincere. This evaluation applies equally to the collector and the subject; the collector must be as aware of their own presentation as they are of the subject’s demonstrated behavior.

![Figure 1. Adaptive Behaviors.](image1)

![Figure 2. Maladaptive Behaviors.](image2)
The primary value in illustrating the demonstrated characteristics of each participant in this manner lies in that the behaviors of one participant could and would affect the behavior of the other. Dr. Alison refers to the relationship between capitulation and control behaviors as reciprocal; a dominant or aggressive person encourages a submissive response, and vice versa. The relationship between cooperation and aggression is correspondent, in that adaptive cooperative behavior is likely to draw out a cooperative response. Dr. Alison’s research has indicated that while displaying adaptive behaviors and mannerisms will not guarantee success in the interaction, continued demonstration of maladaptive traits will ensure that the interaction fails, particularly if sarcasm is demonstrated. This is of particular note for HUMINT collectors, for whom sarcasm is often an essential and well-cultivated character trait. However, repeated studies have shown that the inherent disrespect and demeaning nature of sarcasm will universally elicit a negative response. It should be noted that these behaviors are not approaches, though this methodology can be used in conjunction with the approaches listed in FM 2-22.3. Instead, the focus of this method is on demonstrated behavior and presentation rather than a crafted process to encourage cooperation.

A competent and versatile communicator is able to remain on the adaptive wheel, can often draw the subject away from maladaptive behaviors during the session, and can move their own behavior posture around the wheel to maintain the optimum rapport during the session. A screener cannot be static, or they risk devolving into maladaptive behaviors. Being sensitive to the changing demeanor of the subject, and adjusting their rapport posture appropriately will take practice and training. Effective use of the behavioral wheels to identify the subject’s position and to map out a complimentary rapport demeanor will prolong the conversation, assist in eliciting narrative responses, and give the screener a better sample of behavior to evaluate.

For example, an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) mid-grade officer consistently demonstrates demanding behaviors, occasionally confronting the guards, and offers a patronizing demeanor to the enlisted guards in the facility (the red lines on Figure 3). The screener, having this information from the guard force or from observation, initially interacts with the EPW in a patient fashion, asking the subject to present their viewpoint, specifically as it relates to his interactions with the guards and his position, but avoids condemning the subject or being drawn into a confrontation (the blue lines on Figure 3). Based on both Dr. Alison’s body of work and experiential anecdotes, it is likely that the EPW will be willing to speak when offered the chance, and will “leak” information during the screening more readily when handled in a cooperative manner that seeks the EPW’s guidance in resolving issues. Because this conversation will almost certainly address the EPW’s position in their unit and the events that led to their capture, it will meet the information requirements for the screening as well and provide a reasonable baseline for assessing the subject’s intelligence value and cooperation.

In Conclusion

The ORBIT method requires practice and attention to detail, but offers HUMINT personnel a model to follow when conducting the initial screening of a subject. As a training method, it can be implemented with moderate preparation, mostly centering on the development of roles. Additionally, while this method is presented in relation to detainee...
screening, it could be applied equally to refugee or post-detention screening as well. In the absence of operational experience, HUMINT trainers will need other developmental programs to build and maintain a trained force in support of their commanders’ requirements, prepare for certification exercises, or practice for a Combat Training Center rotation. Utilizing behavioral and cognitive scientific models to support intelligence training can partially close this “experience gap” and facilitate the growth of a rudimentarily-trained initial entry Soldier into an effective, journeyman-level collector. It also supports the continued development of mid-level collectors and leaders, allowing them to hone their own skills while developing those of their subordinates.

Endnote

CW3 Clark is currently assigned as a program manager with the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group in Washington, D.C. He previously served as the senior HUMINT Technician for 502nd MI Battalion, where he oversaw training and implementation of HUMINT collection methodology. Mr. Clark is a graduate of the Source Operations Course, the Defense Strategic Debriefer Course. He has served multiple combat tours as an OMT Leader in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Introduction

General Mark A. Milley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, has made readiness his top priority. Inherent in readiness is the brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) ability to perform the Army’s core competencies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security. It can be argued that the Army has a great deal of experience from performing wide area security over the past 15 years, but we do not have the same level of recent experience performing combined arms maneuver. Collective training is essential to improve our ability to perform these core competencies and maintain readiness.

General Robert Abrams, Commander, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), said, “Certifying your intelligence warfighting function (IWff) is critical to unit readiness.” Military Intelligence (MI) Gunnery is a standardized training strategy for commanders to assess, train, and evaluate their tactical IWff capabilities objectively and quantifiably.

Over the past several years, there have been many attempts at various locations and echelons to address the combined arms maneuver training deficiency. Locations with expeditionary military intelligence brigades (E-MIBs) relied on that expertise to develop training programs that varied from recommending Foundry courses to actual employment of components of the Distributed Common Ground System-Army. Others relied on tactical formations, such as division or corps G-2 elements, to design a comprehensive training regime. While there are many good ideas in each of these, there is no standardization across the force—no definitive list of tasks to accomplish. With no single standard, the IWff lost the ability to have a common analyst that could move from one BCT to another and still function immediately upon arrival. To create a standard for MI Gunnery, FORSCOM looked to USAICoE to develop tasks that applied across the force and would be transferable, translatable across any formation.

USAICoE appraised the various organizations on Fort Huachuca and identified a uniquely qualified multidiscipline group to spearhead the development of MI Gunnery—the Discipline Technical Advisors (DTA) within the Training Development and Support Directorate (TD&amp;S). These individuals are senior warrant officers from each of the intelligence disciplines and serve as the Commanding General’s primary staff officers for the content and analysis, design, development, integration, and evaluation of institutional training within an intelligence discipline. These senior warrant officers became a focused working group with discipline expertise, institutional and operational training experience, and fewer external influences. Upon identifying the developers, the process of task analysis and data gathering began. The DTA first asked the question, “Who is MI Gunnery for?”

The working group focused on the military intelligence company (MICO), but soon realized that to be successful the focus had to be on the BCT IWff because for the MICO to succeed in its wartime mission, it had to integrate with the brigade S-2. It was apparent that as the MICO allocated resources to the battalions through multifunctional teams (MFTs), human intelligence collection teams (HCTs), and company intelligence support teams (COISTs), evaluating the effectiveness of the IWff became vital. Next, there were external resources, such as the E-MIB, counterintelligence teams, and other enablers, that doctrinally support and are operationally controlled by the MICO. This built more complexity into the eventual MI Gunnery design, but ultimately, to evaluate the IWff at the BCT, all of these factors required consideration. In addition, the BCT is the lowest echelon at which the IWff fights collectively with all of the intelligence subdisciplines. It would be impossible to address the IWff from the start or in one volume. Units would be able to translate BCT tasks and skills to higher MI echelons when employing tactical systems whereas; the same is not conversely true. Additionally, a new problem emerged, “how does MI Gunnery fit or coexist with current doctrine?”

Don’t Re-invent the Wheel

Clearly, MI Gunnery would not replace existing doctrine. Therefore, it cannot be a substitute for individual critical
task lists (ICTLs); the Soldier Training Publication; combined arms training strategies for MI; unit training management; ADP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, or other resources found on the Army Training Network. MI Gunnery would not be able to list every possible task that may be expected from an MI Soldier or be a replacement for leaders designing and planning quality training for their Soldiers, sections, or units. MI Gunnery will be another resource to assist leaders in identifying and evaluating critical skills and tasks that must be performed to be successful in any type of operation—from decisive action to counterinsurgency operations. When implemented correctly, MI Gunnery should simplify designing a unit training plan and assist in focusing on MI skill mastery to enable faster execution and maintain proficiency.

We have discussed what MI Gunnery is trying to be, but how do we identify what it should include? We accomplished this by reviewing training resources, tasks, and skills outlined and described in doctrinal resources. Additionally, it was important to identify what tasks were so critical that Soldiers needed maximum ‘reps and sets’ to build ‘muscle memory’ for high-intensity operations requiring them to move fast and methodically through a task or procedure, akin to SPORTS on an M4? For the MI Soldier, examples include intelligence preparation of the battlefield, modified combined obstacle overlay, situational template, event template, and the setup of intelligence systems and components in a command post. Many of these tasks are complex or have multiple ways to get to the same answer. This led to the working group’s biggest dilemma—how to objectively evaluate the art and science of intelligence similarly to maneuver, which grades literally with steel on target. Ultimately, the goal became identifying grading criteria that was objective and went beyond the old GO/NO-GO standard.

In designing a universal standard to apply in tactical formations, the group decided to look at one of the Army’s most successful programs for certifying gunnery crews and units. The working group collectively reviewed the Integrated Weapons Training Strategy (IWTS) published by the Maneuver Center of Excellence. The IWTS structure is a series of four gates that start at the individual/crew served weapons in Gate 4 and progresses to battalion combined arms maneuver in Gate 1. Each gate is subdivided into six tables, beginning at Table I, with fundamental tasks such as pre-marksmanship instruction and evaluation and drills, and then increasing in difficulty up to Table IV. Tables V and VI are the Rehearsal and Certification tables, respectively. They are nearly identical except that Table VI is for record scoring and Table V targets are three-quarter size. Another unique aspect of the IWTS is Table VI’s scoring, which is on 1,000-point scale. There are “crew cuts” that range from minor five point deductions to immediate disqualification based on the severity of the safety or policy mistake. This system has been around for some time and ingrained in maneuver commanders; therefore, it is the language they use to speak and plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Cycle</th>
<th>Table I</th>
<th>Table II</th>
<th>Table III</th>
<th>Table IV</th>
<th>Table V</th>
<th>Table VI</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gate 1 Unit to T-1</td>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Simulations</td>
<td>Maneuver</td>
<td>STX</td>
<td>Rehearsal</td>
<td>Qualification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gate 2 Unit to T-2</td>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Simulations</td>
<td>Maneuver</td>
<td>STX</td>
<td>Rehearsal</td>
<td>Qualification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gate 3 Unit to T-3 Squad / Crew / IFC / Mortar</td>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Simulations</td>
<td>Proficiency / Order / Maneuver</td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>Practice / Rehearsal</td>
<td>Qualification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gate 4 Unit to T-4 Individual / Crew Served</td>
<td>PMIE</td>
<td>Simulations</td>
<td>Drills</td>
<td>GroupZero</td>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>Qualification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gate 1 Brigade IWF</td>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Orders Drill / Staff</td>
<td>COMMEX</td>
<td>TOCEX</td>
<td>Simulation / Rehearsal</td>
<td>BCT IWF Certification (EXEVAL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gate 2 BCT EVOL</td>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Orders Drill / Staff</td>
<td>COMMEX</td>
<td>TOCEX</td>
<td>Simulation / Rehearsal</td>
<td>BCT Qualification (EXEVAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate 3 Crew / Team / Section</td>
<td>Collective Task Practice</td>
<td>Collective Task Practice</td>
<td>Collective Task Practice</td>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>Rehearsal</td>
<td>Crew Qualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate 4 Individual Tasks (by discipline)</td>
<td>Individual Task Practice</td>
<td>Individual Task Practice</td>
<td>Individual Task Practice</td>
<td>Individual Task Practice</td>
<td>Rehearsal</td>
<td>Individual Task Practice</td>
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Figure 1. Integrated Weapons Training Strategy and Tactical Military Intelligence Training Strategy Comparison.

Military Intelligence
By using the same structure and vocabulary as the IWTS in MI Gunnery, MI commanders will have an easier time explaining the training events they are conducting and fencing the unit and Soldiers for MI training. During discussions with incoming BCT commanders in the pre-command course, the importance of aligning MI Gunnery with the IWTS was emphasized. In addition, division leaders will understand what training is being executed across all of the BCTs due to the common lexicon and structure in MI Gunnery. Ideally, as MI and maneuver commanders begin to talk in the same language, operations and intelligence should begin to synchronize training events on the calendar to maximize training effectiveness and facilitate realistic operational environments. As the unit progresses through the gates, collective training across warfighting functions increases and builds efficient teams.

We have discussed the need for MI Gunnery, the training gap that it fills, how the IWTS is structured, and some of the secondary benefits of staying within the IWTS model for the design of MI Gunnery. Now, what does the design of MI Gunnery actual look like? MI Gunnery will have four gates with six tables per gate. The next paragraphs detail each gate with IWTS similarities and differences highlighted.

**Gate 4 Individual Tasks.** Gate 4 begins at the individual level, which is the same as IWTS’; however, unlike IWTS, there are different tables per MI military occupational specialty (MOS). This was determined as necessary because of the unique skills required for each MI MOS. There are fundamentals a Soldier must be able to perform before they can effectively integrate into a crew. Combat arms actually perform a similar certification; however, it is a single test called the Gunnery Skills Test, which verifies Soldiers’ knowledge of the basics before they are integrated into a crew. Gate 4 includes Tables I-IV, which as previously discussed are GO/NO-GO, and Tables V-VI, which are scored on the 1,000-point scale with the final table counting for certification. Many of the skills evaluated throughout Gate 4 are derived from the ICTL and the Soldier Training Publication, but this is not a full review of the ICTL, nor is it a complete review of individual entry training.

**Gate 3 Crew/Section.** Gate 3 steps up to the crew drill level and begins to integrate the various MI MOSs into the teams present at the MICO. For some MOSs, these are homogenous teams with the same MOS. For others, they may be in one of several teams depending on what section they are assigned. Soldiers will only certify in Gate 3 with one team, and it is the team that is certified—not the Soldier. Units will need to build redundancy between positions on a team and between crewmembers; however, MI Gunnery will not test or certify this flexibility. The grading style is the same as Gate 4’s with Tables I-IV being GO/NO-GO, and Tables V-VI scored on the 1,000-point scale.

**Gate 2 Brigade Intelligence Support Element.** Gate 2 is designed to certify the brigade intelligence support element (BISE), with HCTs, Prophet teams, MFTs, or COISTs supporting their respective companies. This gate will exercise the BISE through the tasks required to support a BCT commander’s decision-making process. It is planned to have tables similar to the previous gates and testing supporting functions such as collection management, targeting, battle tracking, battle damage assessment, and the military decision-making process. Gate 2 is still highly focused on processes within the IWfF, but it may require external support from other warfighting functions within the BCT and may be tied to battalion-level maneuver or communication exercises. The goal at the end of Gate 2 is a BISE certified and ready to integrate into a BCT-level warfighter exercise.

**Gate 1 Brigade Intelligence Warfighting Function.** Gate 1 is the final and culminating event in MI Gunnery. At this point, the MICO has certified as a BISE and will be performing its duties while fully integrated with the other warfighting functions. Gate 1 will establish grading criteria that are objective and quantifiable for evaluating the effectiveness of the BISE to support the BCT commander. This gate is still under development and current speculation is that it will not be able
to follow the same number of tables as the previous gates. Gate 1 may be a single evaluation with no preliminary steps or rehearsals. It may have multiple sections that are evaluated by different personnel to understand and evaluate sections or tasks being performed instead of a mere evaluation of the effectiveness of the S-2. At this emerging stage of MI Gunnery development, details regarding Gate 1 are speculative.

This provided a look at the basic outline and structure of MI Gunnery gates. Now, what are the fundamental design principles that constrained its development? As stated earlier, MI Gunnery development was collaboration between FORSCOM and USAICOE. FORSCOM set forth some basic principles:

- Mirror the IWTS so operations and intelligence would speak the same language and use a similar lexicon.
- Objectively certify units.
- Use external evaluation for credibility.
- Use internal resourcing as much as possible.
- Be as prescriptive as possible.
- It must evaluate the entire intelligence cycle and core competencies.10

These major constraints continue to be considered as the design process moves forward.

**Speak The Same Language.** Why should MI Gunnery mirror the IWTS? It builds upon the lexicon already spoken in combat arms units. By using this language and structure, MICO commanders can brief the quarterly training brief using terms and events similar to their fellow commanders. Operations officers will be able to template MI training and certification alongside combat arms gunnery events. This will build BCTs’ understanding and cohesiveness. MI commanders will be able to defend their need to conduct this training to their next higher command and potentially wave off additional tasks during critical gunnery events, thus increasing unit and IWfF readiness levels, which is probably the most important design principle.

**Objectively certify units.** Why do we need to certify units objectively? This may seem obvious, but currently, who determines the readiness of a MICO? MICO commanders do. What criteria do they have at their disposal to conduct this evaluation? Personal judgment—possibly a locally developed standard. How can the Army G-2 substantiate the readiness of the entire IWfF based on multiple standards and evaluation criteria? How can a division or corps G-2 speak confidently about IWfF readiness to commanders? By establishing a singular criterion, we build a common reference. For example, when Unit A scores a 920 on Gate 1 and Unit B scores a 760, then we can make a direct linear comparison, thus allowing leaders to make decisions on resourcing and training to ensure the entire IWfF is ready for the next engagement. This is arguably the second most important constraint.

**External Evaluation.** Why can’t individuals grade themselves? The bottom line—external evaluation builds credibility. In looking at the IWTS, units are certified by the headquarters two levels up. MI Gunnery does not adhere strictly to this, but it does value external evaluation once a unit gets beyond Gate 4. At Gate 4, most evaluators are senior noncommissioned officers within the unit. They are experts in their discipline and should be trusted to evaluate their subordinates fairly on individual tasks. This is no different from testing common Soldier tasks such as physical fitness or marksmanship. Typically, evaluations in the IWTS are handled two levels up; however, the current MI force structure in FORSCOM makes this design awkward at best. When we get to Gate 3 and above, evaluators must be from outside the unit and the certifying official should be at the BCT commander level for Gate 3 and the division level for Gates 2 and 1. By stepping up the level, we begin to build the common standard for evaluating the entire IWfF. This is why we will be de-
veloping courses of action for evaluation. Individual training circulars provide more details about evaluators and the validators who certify the evaluators.

**Internal Resourcing.** Why is internal resourcing a constraint? Throughout development, discussions arose about how units would be able to support an effective training environment, and the constraint of internal resourcing reminded us to think like MICO commanders. An MI captain who commands a MICO will not easily be able to go to the BCT S-3 and say, “I need fires, operations, and others to participate in a small exercise so I can train my unit.” An S-3 would certainly ask, “Why can’t you train yourself at that level?” Therefore, as we developed MI Gunnery, the DTA planned internal resourcing at Gate 4; MI resources, such as IEWTP and Foundry, at Gates 3 and 2; and integration into a full-blown warfighter with all brigade resources available at Gate 1. This maximizes the use of internal resources at the lowest training level and integrates external resources when they become readily available.

**Be Prescriptive.** Why is MI Gunnery so prescriptive? If MI Gunnery were not prescriptive, we would be back where we started—with no standards and no way to compare readiness across the force. If the manual says “in a field environment,” it means “in a field environment, not the motor pool!” It is expected that units and commanders are going to ask for waivers and exceptions to policy. While provisions will be made in each training circular, it will be up to FORSCOM to establish strict procedures that maintain the integrity of the program while accommodating the flexibility required of a tactical unit. The bottom line—MI Gunnery is written to help support MICO commanders, so use it as intended.

**Evaluate Intelligence Cycle and Core Competencies.** If MI Gunnery is a certification of the IWfF, it must evaluate the entire intelligence cycle and core competencies. How could a unit not be competent in all of these and be combat effective? If a unit cannot perform a core competency, how can it do what is needed to support the BCT commander’s decisions? The difficulty comes with determining what portions of the core competencies are evaluated at which table or gate. They must all be covered but not in every gate. MI Gunnery is a cumulative and progressive process that builds on tasks and skills. One weak link may cause a gap, which is then amplified in higher gates, making it more difficult for the IWfF to effectively support the BCT commander.

The concept of making the final evaluation “a thing” was not an original constraint outlined with FORSCOM. Director, TD&S, described the importance of having the final evaluation conducted during Table VI, as formalized and structured as possible. The director used as a comparison the Army Physical Fitness Test, which has very formal explanations and scripts, to describe the tasks that must be performed and to what standard. This formality builds credibility in the institution. It also makes the task and testing standard across the U.S. Army formation, so a Soldier at Joint Base Lewis-McCord is tested and evaluated exactly the same way as a Soldier at Fort Drum. By making Table VI “a thing,” Soldiers can count on fairness and objectivity in the evaluation process.

**Conclusion**

Force design does not seem to rest; therefore, the MI Gunnery design must be adaptable since the MICO is task organized from battalion to battalion. The MICO may remain subordinate to the engineer battalion or it may move to the cavalry squadron—the bottom line is that training and certification must remain the same since the MICO will continue to perform the same mission. MICO commanders must be able to explain their training strategy and plan to their battalion commanders, regardless of the battalion.

Currently, we are focusing on developing Gate 3. While many units are running good training programs that ensure their Soldiers can effectively perform their intelligence mission, there are units that are struggling to train their Soldiers. As stated in the introduction, MI Gunnery is a standardized training strategy for commanders to assess, train, and evaluate their tactical IWfF capabilities objectively and quantifiably. MI Gunnery is simply another tool to assist leaders in preparing and training their warfighting function. The DTA is working hard to ensure that these manuals are created correctly by coordinating with the force to ensure we remain on target. Development and acceptance of MI Gunnery will take time, although once implemented, it will be a game changer for the Intelligence Corps.

**Endnotes**

1. Mark A. Milley, in remarks by the Chief of Staff of the Army, at the U.S. Army Reserve Command Senior Leader Conference at the Iron Mike Conference Center, Fort Bragg, NC, April 25, 2016. General Milley said the readiness of the Total Army is his number one priority.


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9. The Integrated Weapons Training Strategy training cycle for maneuver forces depicted on the left side of Figure 1 was obtained from TC 3-20.0 page 1-4.


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How Military Intelligence NCOs Develop Training
A Pragmatic Approach
by Sergeant First Class William A. Freund

Introduction
Military Intelligence (MI) non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are required to train themselves, subordinates, and enabling counterparts on clearly defined individual and collective tasks that support the commander’s intent and mission. Ask a junior MI NCO what system or tools they should use to train, and ask them how they train subordinates. The answers will vary, as they should. Intelligence professionals in today’s operational force have a diverse and dynamic set of responsibilities. Some may claim they train on a specific system, others that they train on detailed procedures or collection processes. What most will not answer with is that they train on individual and collective tasks nested with the commander’s intent and mission that have been resourced, scheduled, and approved through an organizational training meeting. Why is that not the standard answer? It is because the force has the most technically skilled and highly competent MI NCOs the Army has ever seen...who do not understand organizational training. They can meet the highest of expectations and accomplish any given mission, but generally lack the ability or experience to train and develop Soldiers through organizational and doctrinal methods. This article will examine the causes of, and solutions to, this deficiency.

Obstacles: Obstacles prevent leaders from planning, developing, and implementing training plans that focus on organizational goals.

There are many obstacles that keep MI NCOs from understanding the importance of nesting a developed section training plan with the commander’s intent and unit mission. NCOs should examine these obstacles in order to explain, debunk, or understand their effects on unit readiness. In doing so, the MI NCO is better equipped to overcome these challenges. Positive change will not take place without recognizing past mistakes, biases, or pitfalls that preclude proficient training.

Some leaders are quick to blame ineffective training or lack of training on the absence of guidance. This problem set is a derivative of two distinct ideas: “no one told me what to train,” and “that’s not my job”. The solutions to overcoming these hurdles are simple: involve yourself in unit readiness and training, know the unit mission-essential task list (METL), fully participate in the planning process, and read the operation order. These documents and processes help leaders define their roles and responsibilities. Duties and responsibilities are not necessarily military occupational specialty dependent. Just as an infantryman may collect biometric data on a patrol, an intelligence analyst may be required to track operational or friendly assets in a tactical operations center. Both of these tasks would seem to fall outside of the typical assignments associated with that position, but would fully align with individual and collective tasks identified in the unit METL. It is more efficient to identify, train, and perform mission-related tasks early in the unit readiness cycle than discover them later and supply excuses.

Intelligence professionals often feel marginalized during training events and exercises across the Army, as though providing relevant and consumable intelligence data is an afterthought during scenario development. This obstacle does hold some weight, although the common framework of scenarios and decisive action training environment development and implementation is bridging the gap. Despite the lack of data or emphasis applied to the intelligence warfare function’s role in exercises, the ability to overcome this lies in MI NCO’s proactive approach to training the tasks and not the material. Regardless of the amount or clarity of exercise data, the processes that are trained and exercised are the critical factor in determining their ability to support operations. In training these tasks, intelligence professionals are less reactive in providing timely and relevant data to decision makers.

The Army has inadvertently vilified the word “training” by over-training Soldiers on the “hot topics” and implementing numerous web-based training requirements; this can lead to NCOs who are hesitant to use the “T” word for fear of losing Soldiers’ interest, and worse, their own interest or motivation. Training is a fundamental responsibility of the profession and must be approached with enthusiasm and vigor. This enthusiasm for training is especially vital when
NCO's train job-related tasks. It is difficult to self-motivate while conducting mandatory training online for the fourth time in a year, but it should not be a stretch to maintain motivation while planning and executing job-related training that builds unit cohesion and an environment of shared understanding. Do not fear or dismiss the word “training,” own it – this is the responsibility of NCOs.

Junior MI NCOs do not always believe their organizational leadership will support or resource their training plan. This is a valid statement only if their training plan is not compliant or focused on tasks that support the unit METL or specific mission requirements. When an NCO is told to train their Soldiers, and that is the only guidance they receive, they make training happen. The issues arise when NCOs develop and implement training based on personal experiences, warrior tasks and battle drills, or randomly piecing together a Foundry training calendar for their section. The commander is more likely to approve and resource training events when the plan methodically incorporates events that support the METL, and more specifically key collective tasks. When the MI NCO displays the ability to meet the commanders needs through the doctrinal use of training management processes, the commander will usually provide support and resources.

**Plan: Army forces train at the individual level and collectively as organizations.**

Leaders must begin planning job-related training that assists in meeting overall unit training guidance and operations. The Army Training Network (ATN), a component of the Army Training Management System, is the Army’s online entry point for unclassified training information and doctrine, unit training management tools, multi-media training products, and training links. The ATN is accessible at the following web address: https://atn.army.mil. The ATN is a valuable resource to utilize in developing an effective training plan. Thorough preparation while time-consuming and detail oriented, results in a well-developed and complete plan.

The first step in developing a training plan is to understand the unit’s METL. It is difficult to understand a METL if you do not know what it is or where to find it. The METL is a list of unit collective mission-essential tasks that commanders generally have responsibility to accomplish. They will mold, update, or prioritize these tasks into a unit-specific METL that is based on current mission requirements. If a command has not published a unit METL that meets the current responsibilities of the organization, the ATN website has standardized unit METLs down to company level associated to assigned functional roles. Review the collective tasks in the unit METL that directly and indirectly apply to the intelligence section. NCOs should not make the mistake of focusing only on the S-2 collective tasks and ignore the staff, reconnaissance, or operational tasks that the section provides intelligence support. Each task clearly identifies responsibilities and standards for completion, as well as supporting individual and collective tasks. These are the single most important training requirements for an organization.

Once a commander and staff identify the unit’s METL, it is compared with orders and mission requirements that assist in identifying the most critical tasks for mission accomplishment. These tasks receive a high priority for training and are designated as key collective tasks. Key collective tasks should be trained multiple times and to a higher level of proficiency than other tasks within the units METL.

Once the MI NCO derives a list of METL collective tasks, key collective tasks, and associated individual tasks, they should organize them in a manner that will help facilitate prioritization and planning. Relationships between the tasks are displayed on a spreadsheet or other graphical representation. This time consuming, methodical process clearly articulates the responsibilities of the section in supporting the organizational mission.

Based on the organization and prioritization of tasks, training requirements and steps are analyzed and arranged into blocks of time. Without determining a timeline for training individual or collective tasks, it is very difficult to move forward in the planning process. It is crucial that enough time is allocated to each task, within the constraints of time available in the planning cycle. If too little time is allotted to task training, it could result in rushed, ineffective, or unmet training requirements. Any of these pitfalls may lead to the organization not being able to meet operational goals or standards.
Before leaders brief the Commander on a training plan and calendar, de-confliction must take place. The NCO should obtain a copy of the current organizational training calendar and identify previously scheduled training, operations, and commitments. This will allow NCOs to associate their training requirements with already planned events, as well as identify open calendar times to template their section training events. By doing this, it displays willingness of the section to work with the command in planning and organizing training. Template times and days for training and consider alternate timeframes, should last minute requirements force a delay in scheduled training.

Bring the developed training plan and calendar to the unit training meeting and present it to the commander and staff to integrate section training events onto the unit approved calendar. Be prepared to justify actions taken in preparing the training plan, and describe the relevance of each training event in relation to the success or failure of the organizational mission accomplishment through the METL and key collective tasks. Once approved by the commander and added to the calendar, it should be difficult for competing requirements to derail implementation of a solid training plan.

**Prepare: Preparation and resourcing considerations affect the outcome of training.**

The coordinating MI NCO is responsible for conducting resource analysis for all planned training events. This starts with determining the objectives of each training task. Once the objectives are identified, the coordinator is responsible for developing or adapting an evaluative strategy. The evaluation strategy can mirror or be further developed from the performance steps and measures associated with each collective and individual task. In understanding the end state of each task, the NCO will be able to identify the level of training required to meet the targeted proficiency standard. The objectives and evaluation strategy are the foundational pillars of building and resourcing a thorough and well-developed training event. Once these are understood, the NCO can begin building the training event with stepped measures and processes that support and align with the objective. Although training support packages (TSPs) that contain all required material for some of the identified training tasks may already exist, the NCO must be prepared to conduct analysis and design task performance and evaluation when TSPs are not available.

The next step requires the NCO to identify and secure equipment, references, material, and internal and external organizational support personnel. This responsibility is not as daunting as it seems, and most NCOs are successful at acquiring resources and applying networking skills to assist in achieving an objective. Resources for each task should be clearly identified. Equipment could range from markers to computers, and a detailed list should be prepared. References pertaining to the given task are outlined below the task description, performance steps, and measures. This information is available on the ATN website. It is also beneficial to research and incorporate internal and external organizational lessons learned into the references. Resourcing is a collective unit function that the commander has approved; therefore, coordination across staff and subordinate elements will ensure timely and accurate resources are available for training.

A general timeline for each training event was produced during the initial planning phase, but must be refined at the time of resourcing. All detailed elements of the task specific training plan have been identified through evaluation strategy, a training outline, equipment, manpower, and training location. This allows the NCO to determine a timeline that is specific enough to dictate intricate parts of the training plan, to include movement of equipment, setup, instruction, evaluation, retraining, and after action reviews (AARs).

**Execute: Conduct meaningful unit intelligence training that meets organizational requirements.**

Following planning and resourcing for command approved job performance training, the final step is execution. All of the hard work is done, and the fruits of the MI NCO’s labor reside solely with training performance and evaluation. If planning and resourcing were accomplished deliberately, there should be minimal issues during this phase.

Some considerations during the execution of the training phase include not altering the training events unless necessary, train for proficient application of the task (not just knowledge), and involve the commander and staff elements in training events. Always conduct an AAR after each training event in order to carry forward improvements and best practices to future events. Lastly, provide the commander with continuous updates to training readiness. Once the commander approved the training plan and training was added to the organizational training calendar, they assumed personal responsibility and command authority over the training.

**Conclusion**

In summary, many obstacles were identified and addressed that preclude MI NCOs from seizing the initiative to train job-related tasks that support the organizational mission. Through the Army operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), detailed steps and considerations...
were provided as a guide to the task of developing a training plan. NCOs must understand organizational training, as they are required to train themselves, subordinates, and enabling counterparts on clearly defined individual and collective tasks that support the commander’s intent and mission. MI NCOs may claim that operational tempo and time constraints prohibit their ability to apply the steps of the training management process. However, this process empowers NCOs to fight for and receive the time and resources necessary to plan and conduct mission-oriented training that is critical to unit operational readiness. Without applying this process, it is difficult to train the right Soldiers to do the right job for the right mission.

Endnote

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Introduction

Intelligence professionals must maintain a high degree of knowledge and expertise in their intelligence field to best serve their command. Upon initial receipt of a new Soldier into the formation, their primary skills as an analyst or collector can only take them so far; they must receive continual development and training to advance as enablers. Therefore, essential training must occur to increase Soldiers’ skills and abilities. This training occurs in multiple forms and at multiple levels, and applies to a unit’s mission.

In special operations forces (SOF), the need for qualified, knowledgeable, and experienced military intelligence (MI) professionals is increasing. One particular realm of SOF, Special Forces (SF), habitually needs intelligence professionals, requiring their use operationally worldwide. SF conducts a variety of missions, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, information operations, and counterproliferation. SF deployment operations occur regularly, as often as every 12 months. Amidst the deployment rotations, SF units also employ MI Soldiers to enable their pre-mission training and for tactical readiness. MI Soldiers support these missions by providing the information collection and intelligence collection to drive these operations, and the analysis to understand the environment and identify enemy forces and their characteristics.

Military Intelligence Support to Special Forces

Within an SF battalion, the MI footprint continually grows. The breakdown, although not aligned as such in all battalions, includes two MI entities—the S-2 element and the military intelligence detachment (MID). The S-2 element is composed of the administrative section and the all-source production section (ASPS). The administrative section focuses on the security upkeep of the battalion, including:

- Personnel, physical, and information security.
- Passport processing.
- Other administrative duties.

The ASPS contains primarily all-source intelligence analysts (military occupational specialty [MOS] 35F) and several geospatial intelligence imagery analysts (MOS 35G). The ASPS remains at the staff level since most of the analytical power focuses on supporting the battalion mission, including:

- Analyzing current threats.
- Country and area studies.
- Requests for information.
- Building intelligence support packets.

Ultimately, the 35F analysts will deploy to support specific SF teams, known as operational detachment-alphas (ODAs) and SF companies, known as advanced operations bases (AOBs), or the 35F analysts will remain at the battalion level, also called the special operations task force (SOTF), to support the collective mission.

The MID is the main entity for intelligence collection and analysis efforts. The MID is comprised of four primary sections:

- The headquarters element - Consists of the commander and the noncommissioned officer in charge. They oversee the welfare and training of the Soldiers, allocate manpower to SF problem sets, and maintain property accountability.
- The special operations team-alpha (SOT-A) section - The MID’s larger focus, is composed of three subteams consisting of cryptologic linguists (MOS 35P), who specialize in linguistics and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, and signals collector analysts (MOS 35S) who conduct similar tasks.
- The special operations team-bravo (SOT-B) section - Consists primarily of SIGINT analysts (MOS 35N) for allocation to SOT-A teams and the SOTF for analysis and dissemination. The SOT-B section also has MI systems maintainers/integrators (MOS 35T) to ensure the MID equipment is up to date and maintained.
- The human intelligence (HUMINT) analysis team - The HUMINT analysis team has several HUMINT collectors (MOS 35M).

From this general understanding of the unique MI footprint in SF battalions and the important missions supported,
it is imperative for these MI Soldiers to grow and develop through regular and intensive training. To serve with the Green Berets, it is imperative for MI Soldiers to develop their technical proficiency, tactical proficiency, and physical training. These three training areas will shape the MI Soldiers into quality and expert MI professionals, confident in their skills and ready to support the highest mission needs.

**Technical Proficiency**

Technical proficiency involves personal training to ensure Soldiers are qualified in their MOSs, and can learn and use the new technology and intelligence methods needed to conduct missions. Technical training includes MI-specific schools, Foundry courses, equipment familiarization, language training, and team-level training.

Aside from the initial entry training that Soldiers receive upon joining the U.S. Army, advancement through additional schooling is necessary for growth and development. It is imperative for senior leadership in the S-2 element and the MID to assess new Soldiers and determine the necessary technical skills they will need to accomplish their mission. For example, upon arriving to an SF group, many 35P, SOT-A Soldiers are not familiar with, nor qualified to use, the essential collection equipment. Therefore, there is a baseline training for new 35P Soldiers; they receive instruction and perform crawl, walk, and run exercises. This training familiarizes them with and certifies them on the equipment. Regular in-house training and familiarization is always recommended.

For analysts, operational environment familiarization is a key necessity for success. Some quality tactics, techniques, and procedures include conducting section briefs on recent reporting or threat updates and producing weekly intelligence summaries for staff consumption. This enables analysts to conduct operational and intelligence briefs for battalion staffs during weekly meetings. This training builds essential briefing skills, gives analysts face time with the battalion leadership, and boosts their confidence and trust. Analysts can make pre-mission products, fulfill requests for information in their respective operational environment, and often use the same systems they will employ when deployed.

Although in-house training can cover several topics, advanced MI schooling is optimal for the growth and development of MI professionals. The SF group has funds for home-station training, mobile training teams, and temporary duties (TDYs). Local Foundry training is essential for 35P, 35S, and 35N Soldiers; they can obtain new analysis methods and tools applicable to their units’ deployed operational environments. TDY training is imperative, particularly for specific MOS courses. HUMINT collectors often seek training opportunities at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, such as the Source Operations course, Defense Strategic Debriefer’s course, and the Joint HUMINT Analyst Targeting course. The Advanced Leadership course, an essential school for non-commissioned officers’ (NCOs’) development, teaches new and emerging analytical methods. Specialized TDY training, such as foreign disclosure training, can offer varying skills to MI Soldiers, depending on their interests and applicability.

Language training is an essential task for 35P Soldiers (and becoming a more common capability for 3SM Soldiers) to maintain their proficiency and remain effective. Army regulations allow linguists to conduct one month of language training per year to maintain proficiency. In SOF, language facilities provide linguists multiple options to meet their needs. The language manager provides options and available training at the home-station language lab as well as other locations, including the Global Language Centers (GLCs) at either Fort Gordon, Georgia, or in Maryland, as well as the Partner Language Training Center Europe (PLTCE) in Garmisch, Germany. Options are based on availability and linguists’ preferences. Although training at home-station language labs is ideal, students may struggle as normal work duties can distract their progress. At the GLCs and PLTCE Soldiers can focus better since they are at locations to solely concentrate on studying their language and passing their Defense Language Proficiency Test. Language training and general linguistic upkeep can always be performed in the MID since Soldiers can find creative ways to use their language and keep it familiar.

Personal technical ability develops individuals’ knowledge of their intelligence discipline. This knowledge of their capabilities and limitations enable Soldiers to provide complete capabilities briefs to their SF leadership. Soldiers must brief SF unit commands on these capabilities and limitations, letting leadership know what they bring to the table, their needs, and boundaries. Once they are integrated into the ODA or AOB, they then work alongside their Green Beret counterparts, build rapport, and develop their trust and relationship through the capabilities they provide.

**Tactical Proficiency**

Tactical proficiency is an essential skill for Soldiers supporting SOF operations. MI Soldiers maneuvering side-by-side with Green Berets occurs more often than not, and depending on Soldiers’ collection and analysis abilities, coupled with the ODA’s trust, tactical skills will be employed regularly. Therefore, before deployments, and even before pre-mission training or a full-mission profile, MI Soldiers must be competent in their tactical abilities.
Tactical abilities range from knowing how to maneuver in a dismounted, squad-sized element, to knowledge of small arms and heavy weapons. During the calendar year, tactical training typically revolves around company-level events, such as airborne operations, which allow Soldiers to become proficient and/or maintain proficiency as a parachutist, become familiar with and trust the equipment, and maintain self-confidence. Through the headquarters support company, weapons ranges are often scheduled to ensure Soldiers maintain familiarization with and proficiency in small arms, such as the M9 and M4, and also heavy weapons, ranging from squad-level machine guns to vehicle-mounted weapons. A company-level culmination exercise, called the Special Forces Basic Combat Course-Support (SFBCS-S), usually occurs yearly and focuses on teaching support Soldiers newly assigned to SF battalions, the tactical skills akin to SF units. Experienced Green Berets teach techniques in field craft including land navigations, convoy operations, weapons familiarization, airborne operations, dismounted patrolling, and ultimately a field problem. This training gives support Soldiers the same knowledge and understanding of the specific qualities needed to perform in SF units.

Additional courses also build tactical skills. Specialists must attend the Basic Leader’s course before promotion to sergeant. They gain essential skills to become young leaders and NCOs and grow their basic tactical abilities, including briefing tactical movements and incorporating them into a field environment.

MI Soldiers heavily stress and pursue additional advanced schooling, including Air Assault, Survival Evasion Resistance Escape, Pathfinder, and Ranger Schools. These schools offer skills that can be used in a deployed environment and build the tactical resume of any support Soldier. Ranger School is a preferred school for support Soldiers, particularly for MOS 35P, SOT-A Soldiers because they are coded in a V slot in the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). As the Army’s premier leadership school, SF leadership desires Soldiers to attend Ranger School to develop their leadership abilities, knowledge and application of tactics, and mental toughness, as well as those factors sought by Green Berets.

Physical Training

The physical fitness of MI professionals is a necessary attribute. Although physical fitness is imperative of every Soldier, physical fitness for those Soldiers supporting Green Berets is regularly put to the test. When assigned to ODAs, MI Soldiers are expected to maintain a similar physical fitness profile as Green Berets. This enables them to conduct their intelligence collection or analysis mission, carry their gear and equipment over dismounted patrols, and, if needed, be prepared to fight alongside their SF counterparts. Physical fitness regimens are often mandated at the team level, but it ultimately falls on Soldiers to maintain their level of fitness. In the S-2 element and MID, fitness regimens involve team-level strength and endurance workouts, and often Soldiers exercise during off times. Physical training is often conducted at the company and detachment levels to maintain unit camaraderie, offer challenges, and work on collective group needs. SF regards physical training highly; if Soldiers are not fit, they cannot perform their field duties and therefore cannot complete the mission.

Although all of this training is excellent, the constant training cycle, particularly several TDYs followed by a rigorous deployment cycle, can take a toll on Soldiers. Soldier burnout can occur especially when they are away from their home and families for some time. To ensure the wellbeing of Soldiers, their physical and mental state must be routinely observed and assessed. Additionally, dwell times in SOF are vigorously tracked since combat rotations increased, and TDYs away from the home station remain constant. Although these variables have decreased slightly, the need to deploy and stay current on training requirements remains. Bottom line—minimize training away from the home station to allow Soldiers to spend more time at home since they will likely deploy for an extended periods. As this recommendation dictates less time away from the home station, in-house
Training must be optimized. Soldiers must think of ways to maintain proficiency on their technical abilities with local mobile training teams, Foundry training, in-house familiarization, and local language centers. Ensuring Soldiers do not overuse their dwell time is a new hurdle to overcome, but as new training tactics, techniques, and procedures are developed, training plans will adjust accordingly.

**Conclusion**

Training and Soldier development are constant efforts that must be implemented at the company level and below. Training that involves technical, tactical, and physical abilities must be encouraged in MI Soldiers. Their ability to perform their mission and support an SF unit is critical and their expertise sets them apart from the rest of the Army. This expertise must constantly be refined, whether through formal instruction or in a team room with a white board. Training can occur in many forms—all requiring creativity and the desire to learn. 

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Introduction

As the twenty-first century strategic environment becomes increasingly complex, the Army profession requires competent and agile critical thinkers to win. The security environment officers will face “is not only unknown, but unknowable” and inherently unpredictable. The Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course (MICCC) created innovative approaches to develop its students into cohesive teams and adaptive leaders using the human dimension framework; focusing on the cognitive, physical, and social aspects. The MICCC prepares officers to meet this challenge through a rigorous and realistic curriculum using the decisive action training environment (DATE) framework through Operation Unwelcome Guest.

This article seeks to achieve three objectives. First, to open a dialog with Army leaders to ensure a common understanding exists between the operational Army and institutional Army regarding the MICCC. Specifically, it will address what leaders can expect from graduates, and how this course in particular is educating the force. Second, to inform future students what they can expect to learn, so they arrive at Fort Huachuca more informed and better prepared. Third, it will articulate to the force what the MICCC has done to prepare future intelligence leaders to win in complex environments.

A Knowledge Gap

Students attending the course come from various branches with mixed tactical experience; therefore, forming diverse classes. Students transferring from the operations division to MI, as branch-detailed officers, often comprise the majority of students. Additionally, non-MI officers, including some functional area officers and aviators, also attend the course. Nevertheless, MICCC cadre expects students arriving at Fort Huachuca to possess a general understanding of some fundamental concepts. This includes knowledge in oral and written communication, foundational Army doctrine, leadership, the MDMP process, operational terms and graphics, and DATE. This is the necessary foundation for small group instructors to successfully educate students on intelligence doctrine. Although usually experienced with platoon and company operations, students often arrive with little or no understanding of these basic requirements.

Through a series of pre- and post-course surveys and cadre experience with the students, an average class historically displays weak knowledge in the following:

✦ **DATE view of the operational environment.** The Army has transitioned beyond a counterinsurgency centric mindset to a holistic view of the operational environment. Few students arriving at Fort Huachuca have even a rudimentary understanding of DATE. On average, approximately 15 percent of a class has participated in a recent combined arms training center rotation using a DATE scenario.

✦ **Managing intelligence support to MDMP; specifically, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).** The majority of students have no experience applying intelligence support to MDMP, and a sophomoric understanding of the IPB process. Expertly applying intelligence support to MDMP is an essential skill for an MI staff officer, especially at maneuver battalions and brigades. Although it is not expected students will
Arrive with vast experience with, or a thorough understanding of MDMP, students should generally be aware of the process and have reviewed the doctrine.

- **Application of collegiate writing and oral communication.** Although all students have an undergraduate degree, most have gone years without writing an academic paper. Student papers often reveal poor writing skills and little understanding of the Army writing style. Passive voice, poor grammar, and poor sentence structure remain common mistakes.

- **Operational terms and graphics.** Fewer than 20 percent of students have a requisite understanding of operational terms and graphics: particularly applying correct “tasks” and “purposes.” Additionally, students struggle with identifying and applying operational graphics on overlays.

Given these identified inconsistencies, the future student and operational Army can help reduce knowledge gaps by developing these foundational skills before student attendance at the course. By increasing the knowledge for the average incoming student, the MICCC can educate at a higher standard. A more prepared student allows cadre to produce a more capable officer, proficient in the critical tasks necessary to succeed in the operational Army.

**Understanding the MICCC**

To increase the rigor of the MICCC, the course underwent considerable revisions in fiscal year 2015, and continued into fiscal year 2016. Students now face a more academically challenging curriculum where they must think broadly, creatively, and critically about the academic and tactical problems they face. According to the Army’s Human Dimension Framework, officers who demonstrate professional judgment, cultural understanding, and technical aptitude succeed in complex environments. Success in the MICCC requires these same skills. Increased rigor produces a more competent and confident officer capable of operating in environments where “the enemy is unknown, the location is unknown, and the coalitions involved are unknown.”

Historian Sir Michael Howard contended, “No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict.” National strategic documents reflect similar thinking. The 2015 National Military Strategy drafted by Gen. Martin Dempsey revealed that, “[The United States] now face[s] multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks ...” Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told West Point cadets, “When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right.” Howard, Dempsey, Gates, and others illustrate predicting conflict has proven fatuous.

What does appear evident is the United States and its allies will face a hybrid threat in future operational environments where actors often unify in effort, but not necessarily in command. Incorporating lessons learned from historical conflicts, such as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, *Operation Unwelcome Guest* is the scenario used throughout the MICCC. Using the DATE framework, the operation duplicates the conditions of a complex strategic environment; presenting multiple layers of complexity and a multiplicity of actors challenging students with requirements beyond traditional warfighting skills and training. More significantly, the scenario replicates future operating environments intelligence officers will likely face.

*Unwelcome Guest* challenges students with a fictitious conflict between the aggressor nation-state of Donovia invading an ally of the United States, the nation-state of Gorgas. The practical exercise enables students to apply historical lessons learned, leverage the intelligence enterprise, and apply MDMP. Designed as a comprehensive exercise, the operation starts with an extensive road to war; allowing students to digest data and discuss the tactical, operational, and strategic concept of the upcoming conflict in broad terms. The adaptive enemy includes conventional, guerrilla, criminal, special forces, and insurgents operating in difficult terrain in various phases of the operation. All of these threat groups exist in a robust operational environment based on the operational variable framework, allowing students to understand and account for population dynamics in the region down to the local level. Successful students need to understand enemy threat tactics, properly assess
enemy operations, and anticipate reactions. Furthermore, thorough understanding of the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series (hybrid threat doctrine, tactics, and structure) along with a conceptual grasp of significant enemy war fighting equipment best prepares future students for success.

*Unwelcome Guest* provides the necessary means for students to apply skills learned and demonstrate proficiency in the course objectives. These objectives include the following:

- **Proficiency in intelligence support to MDMP.** This includes all the outputs associated in MDMP. For example, a comprehensive understanding of terrain analysis, civil considerations, enemy situational overlays, event templates, and other outputs.

- **Comprehension of intelligence disciplines.** The MICCC introduces the major intelligence disciplines so students become familiar with capabilities and collection planning at the classified level.\(^\text{10}\)

- **Mastery of leadership and Army doctrine.** The MICCC is inherently a leadership course based on Army doctrine and therefore leadership studies continues to remain a significant objective. Students spend considerable time learning and employing doctrine as well as basic and advanced leadership abilities.

To accomplish these objectives, the MICCC divides the instruction across three “blocks.” A class (approximately 50-60 students) starts with two days of in-processing, followed by ten days of common core, 22 days of single source, 59 days of brigade operations, and ends with a final ten days of common core. Additional common core days are included between blocks to get to 105 training days.

**Common Core.** TRADOC mandates the common core curriculum and ensures common understanding across the officer corps. The emphasis is primarily on the profession of the Army, leadership, and understanding of foundational doctrine (including FM 6-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0). According to the Common Core Curriculum Development Division, the proponent of common core, the curriculum seeks to establish a foundational and conceptual baseline that sets the conditions for subsequent learning within the MICCC and other career courses.\(^\text{11}\) Lessons include mission command, unified land operations, and commander’s programs.

**Single Source.** Single source intelligence focuses on the significant intelligence disciplines of signals intelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, counterintelligence, and open-source intelligence, as well as the complementary intelligence capabilities of cyber-enabled intelligence and biometric-enabled intelligence. Major outputs from the block include comprehension of the U.S. intelligence community; joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational fundamentals; Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A); and collection management. The block provides a fantastic opportunity for officers to work with and see classified information for the first time, and understand how classified networks work.

Each intelligence discipline class reviews the collection assets assigned at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. Discussed on classified levels up to top secret, instructors discuss the capabilities, limitations, and employment of these assets, and more importantly, how students, as future S-2s and/or commanders, leverage them in an operational environment.

Students visit Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona, and tour the 612\(^\text{th}\) Air and Space Operation Center and other sites to gain an appreciation of joint operations.

**Intelligence Support to Brigade Operations.** Brigade operations one and two comprise the Intelligence Support to Brigade Operations block. In this block, students learn about the Army’s primary iterative planning methodology, MDMP, specifically intelligence support to MDMP. Students focus on planning for offense and defense operations by means
of the Army’s core competencies combined arms maneuver and wide area security. MICCC students conduct two iterations of MDMP; an offensive operation followed by a defensive operation. Though the focus is primarily planning for combined arms maneuver, there remains a constant hybrid threat, which adds to the realism and rigor of the instruction. Once students complete the defense, they transition to brigade operations two and begin planning for stability operations by means of wide area security.

Brigade operations two is the transition from a combined arms maneuver focus to a wide area security focus where the students continue to build upon the competencies learned in brigade operations one. Students learn advanced structured analytics tools such as analysis of competing hypothesis, alternate futures generation, and multiple scenario generation. This block utilizes techniques that emphasize the value of effective thinking and understanding how the brain works under pressure. Additionally, students learn interpersonal communication and group dynamics to better assess operational demands and cultivate mentally and emotionally proficient leaders. Officers conduct historic and contemporary case studies allowing students to apply learned skills and highlight the traditional hybrid techniques that transcend borders and time.

In brigade operations one and two, Unwelcome Guest challenges the students’ analytic and planning abilities. They must demonstrate proficiency in collaborative planning by applying thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. Major outputs include a brigade level operations order including an Annex B (Intelligence), assessment products, running estimates, and information collection plans.

Other Opportunities. Two other opportunities within the MICCC optimize a student’s intellectual and physical potential. Students who demonstrate exceptional aptitude and performance participate in the Advanced Seminar Program, the Emerging Leader Program, or both. The programs provide students additional learning opportunities and challenge students in ways not offered in the core curriculum.

The Advanced Seminar Program leader describes it as a combination of classroom discussions, field trips, and independent research to increase student’s knowledge of the American security community and enhance their professional relationships. Recent events include visiting research facilities at the University of Arizona, meeting with defense experts at the Raytheon Missile Systems plant, exploring local national parks, and site visits to local law enforcement and city management facilities. Participants even have the option of receiving graduate credit from the University of Arizona.

The principle idea of the Emerging Leader Program is mentorship. The program pairs second lieutenants from the MI Basic Officer Leadership Course with captains in the MICCC. The program challenges the officers with rigorous physical fitness to prepare officers for the enduring rigors of a nominate assignment selection process. Additionally, the captains host the lieutenants for relevant officer development programs.

Closing the Knowledge Gap: Considerations for Army Leaders

The MICCC is considerably more rigorous than previous versions; the strategic environment demands it. A consistently changing environment leaves little room for ill-prepared officers. With the introduction of Unwelcome Guest students graduate immensely better prepared for the challenges that lie ahead, and ready to assume the duties of an intelligence company commander or intelligence staff officer at the battalion or brigade level.

Regardless, the MICCC is not an all-inclusive intelligence course. Students do not recieve training on many staff and command aspects. This is primarily due to time constraints. Among others, for example, students do not become experts in human intelligence collection, experts on DCGS-A, or knowledgeable in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Rather, the objective is for students to become proficient in intelligence support to operations and MDMP. Operational assignments, and to some extent self-development, remain essential in building on the fundamental skills, knowledge, and behaviors developed in institutional training.
To continue to bridge the gap between the operational Army and institutional Army, leaders, specifically at the battalion and brigade echelon, can help prepare future students in a variety of ways. First, if possible, assign future students to intelligence positions to gain experience as early as possible. This could include assignment to the S-2 section, military intelligence company as a platoon leader or executive officer, special security officer, or nearly any position in the analysis and control element. Secondly, consider assigning future students a real world tactical or strategic global problem followed by briefings and a written assessment on their analysis. This allows officers to train on classified networks, sharpen analytical abilities, and improve writing and presentation skills. Additionally, exposure to operational planning and experience at combat training centers remain invaluable.

The Army’s greatest asset is the people. In recent years, the MICCC implemented considerable enhancements to the course; cultivating adaptive intelligence officers. The recent improvements aimed to enhance the capabilities of the Army’s future S-2s at the battalion and brigade level through the framework of DATE and Unwelcome Guest. Regardless of the unknown future operating environments, captains graduating the MICCC stand ready to provide timely and accurate intelligence support to meet their commander’s intent.

Endnotes


3. Ibid.


8. Unwelcome Guest is currently used exclusively at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) with plans to incorporate it in other Centers of Excellence. The exercise can be a training tool for 10 level up to majors. Although an unclassified exercise, it maintains the capability to become classified. Additionally, it can be tailored to various military occupational specialties.


10. Follow-on courses allow students to earn skill identifiers, including MOS’ 35G (signal intelligence), 35E (counterintelligence), Skill Identifier 1D (geospatial intelligence) and others. Contact the 304th S-3 and your career manager for additional information.

11. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics.


Major Mullay is currently a student at the Command and General Staff Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His past assignments include: Instructor at the MICCC, where he taught intelligence support to brigade operations; Commander, MI Troop, 2nd Cavalry Regiment; S2, 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment; and served as a platoon leader, troop executive officer, and S4 with 4-10 Cavalry, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. He deployed to Iraq in 2008-2009 and Afghanistan in 2010-2011.

Major Dean is currently a student at the Command and General Staff Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His past assignments include: Instructor at the MICCC and block chief for intelligence support to brigade operations; Commander, HQ Company, 303rd MI BN, 504th BFSB; BN S2 4-6 INF, 1 AD; DIV G2, 1AD (Provisional); company Fire Support officer 2-325 (AIR), company executive officer, 2-319 (AFAR), 82nd ABN DIV. He deployed to Iraq in 2007-2008 and 2010, and Afghanistan in 2013-2014.
A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say—we did it ourselves.
—Lao Tzu

A well-trained force is crucial to the U.S. Army’s mission of winning our nation’s wars. While much of Army training and education happens in a formal schoolhouse environment, some of the most important training Soldiers receive happens at the unit level. In the Army Human Dimension Concept1, the Army has developed a framework for training in response to predictions for the future operational environment. It articulates the next steps in the implementation of learner-centric education and training, and includes building a culture where Soldiers engage in continuous self-development, accelerating critical and creative thinking skills, and building cohesive teams—a holistic learning program. The Small Group Instructor Training Course (SGITC), at USAICoE’s Staff and Faculty Development Branch, models how these goals can be realized in training. Since much of unit training is informal, it lends itself well to small group methods. The grounding philosophy behind learner-centric small group training is that each person in a group has a wealth of knowledge, experience, and talent that can benefit the whole. This article will provide clarification and examples of how this philosophy looks in practice.

The SGITC equips leaders with the knowledge and skills to conduct enhanced unit level training that:

✦ Motivates Soldiers to increase individual competence in their jobs and as Soldiers.
✦ Helps Soldiers fuse the many concepts, principles, and processes learned in the schoolhouse into a strong image of what it means to perform their jobs and duties in unpredictable job scenarios.
✦ Provides Soldiers opportunities to employ creative and critical thinking to solve realistic problems.
✦ Enables Soldiers to connect how their individual job or duty connects with the jobs and duties of others in their unit, and how these collectively contribute to the unit mission achievement.

While standard Army training is consistently adept at addressing two of Bloom’s learning domains2, the cognitive (mental skills) and psychomotor (physical skills), what is unique about SGITC is that it teaches students how to maximize the third leg of the stool, the affective or emotional domain. The SGITC brings about group member buy-in and enthusiastic participation through use of the innate abilities and unique experiences of each group member to develop solutions to open-ended, relevant, real-life problems. Problem solving abilities are enhanced by assessing and working with personal conflict styles of group members, developing listening skills, and discovering leadership strengths.

The SGITC employs reflective thinking via the experiential learning cycle after each discussion or problem-solving experience to facilitate learner discovery and awareness of the learning process. It challenges participants to consider group dynamics (affective domain), thought processes, how the exercises worked or did not work, and, most importantly, how they can apply what they learn from each experience.

Effectively teaching adults requires methodologies different from those used to teach children. Given that the Army is comprised of adults, this is an important distinction. For example, adults have a foundational need to see the immediate and practical relevance of the material to their lives. They also need the opportunity to involve themselves in the planning and evaluation of the instruction. Adults have a breadth of knowledge, and they benefit most from opportunities to learn experientially in problem-centered ways rather than focusing on the knowledge acquisition or comprehension that they might receive passively in a lecture or presentation. The SGITC teaches its students to address adult learning needs and to recognize the experience and knowledge backgrounds of adult learners. Students in the SGITC also learn to assess the interests of a group and to measure the experience level a group has with a given
topic, and based on these assessments to adjust training appropriately.

Rather than lecture, the SGITC provides open-ended learning experiences, which allow for self-direction and multiple possible solutions or insights. Students eventually practice teaching each other using the various instructional methods and military-relevant topics of their choice. The first day of class is a buzz session, a student led discussion, on listening. This is a leaderless discussion technique often used before a content block of instruction to obtain information on student interests as well as measure their experience with the topic. If it is evident that the Soldiers already have extensive knowledge on the specified content, the trainer can either shorten training, or take the participants deeper into the topic. When providing the discussion starter, it is important that it is phrased in a way that promotes open discussion and not an invitation to find an answer for a follow-on brief.

The starters used for the SGITC buzz session, conducted in small groups, are, “Some people say we aren’t good at listening anymore. Why?” The third question is, “How does our ability to listen affect us?” This has proven to be a lively discussion, and has revealed pertinent information for trainers in terms of what they are facing. Groups consistently talk about the fact that the incentive for listening for information in class has gone down because the Internet is so accessible. Another common thread is a cultural tendency for impatience, and the habit of listening to respond rather than listening to understand. Technology is blamed for reducing our understanding of each other, because it limits the non-verbal cues we have available. Throughout the week, students keep this information in mind as they look for ways they might improve their listening. Self-reflection is a powerful technique for generating positive change, whether in a class or in the unit.

Another method of instruction that could be adapted to unit training is the incident process case study. This is a method for developing critical thinking, fact-finding ability, and questioning skills—all extremely relevant to the military intelligence (MI) professional. Each person in the group has pieces of the information necessary to solve a problem, and each of the groups must devise a strategy for generating a solution, to include a plan for discovering what information is still missing from the puzzle. This game-style method of instruction can also be used to develop teamwork and unit cohesion. Two Soldiers, who recently facilitated this particular class, demonstrated how this technique could work on multiple levels as they set up a murder scenario based on the game of Clue. Within the first five minutes, they thoroughly deviated from the usual way the technique was to be presented. Since creativity is an important element of the SGITC, the trainer needs to avoid jumping in too soon to correct, even when it looks like things are veering off course, keeping in mind that mistakes are often the best learning opportunities. It seemed these two facilitators were intentionally frustrating the teams they set up by changing the rules randomly and suddenly switching team members from one group to another. The instructions were difficult to understand. People in the groups began to lose patience. Despite all the imposed obstacles, one team eventually solved the problem. As it turned out, success in problem solving was not the main experience the teaching team wanted to create. The class discovered that the trainers set up the obstacles intentionally in order to provide “teachable moments” regarding the affective or emotional process of group work and team building.

Making students aware of the learning process is why reflection is such an important part of SGITC. When these facilitators asked the students to discuss what they felt during the experience, they reported that they were disgruntled at not having all the information and having to constantly figure out new rules. They observed how they experienced difficulties dealing with team loyalty, cooperation versus competition, communication issues, and who took credit for progress. The instructors took advantage of the oppor-
tunity to encourage personal growth through self-reflection. Students saw that listening was the key to overcoming the imposed problems. This exercise provided an excellent example of the use of an experiential approach, versus lecture, to bring attention to the importance of managing group interaction and effective teamwork.

After considering the affective aspect of the experience, students turned to the practical applicability of the method, the most important aspect of training. One Soldier said he could use it to teach troubleshooting to his students who are learning to prevent hacking. Other ideas were to use the technique to teach predictive analysis or targeting. This method, the incident process case study, has significant relevance for intelligence professionals, who are constantly tasked with developing recommendations based on limited available evidence. Using the exercise and the reflective process, the instructors deepened the class’s understanding of the importance of constructing an engaging process for interaction and then facilitating effective group dynamics.

Through active participation, students experience for themselves how important skillfully integrating the affective domain is to facilitating a successful class, to good group dynamics and to inspirational leadership. Positive group dynamics create teamwork, effective conflict resolution, engagement, and mutual support. According to a student in the last class, “Using these techniques can ‘fast forward’ team building and progressive thinking.” As the previous examples demonstrate, seasoned and new practitioners alike are finding plentiful opportunities during the course to develop themselves. Sharing ideas leads to increased enthusiasm for their work. When participants see that there are new and innovative ways they can operate, it opens their minds to fresh insights and even the possibility that, with a dose of intellectual humility, they can learn from their subordinates.

Soldiers train for efficiency, and slowing down to observe the process of learning goes against the common assumption that task completion is always the preferred goal. At the beginning of the course, some are irritated that they are not provided with a highly specific desired end state. Instead, they are required to solve problems and determine key points inductively. Moving from examples and evidence to conclusions; a more challenging approach than the familiar “Bottom Line Up Front.” This also requires trust on the part of the trainer, that his or her Soldiers have the ability to make inferences and think critically. Naturally, Soldiers want to succeed; yet, the ill-structured problems they work with in the course, like the real world problems they face in the operational environment, do not have only one correct answer. Their left and right limits are left broad. They may feel frustrated at first, but when MI Soldiers are required to step out of the box and are truly given freedom to be creative, they nearly always achieve far beyond the requirements of the task.

Recently, a student who taught geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) attended the course. He had been command directed to attend, and while courteous and cooperative, he frankly could not imagine that there was anything he could use from SGITC that would help him teach his technical discipline. After discussing some options, he devised an innovative solution to this dilemma. With the committee problem solving technique as his method, he employed the class as a committee of experts to provide recommendations on how to use small group methods to teach GEOINT. Since the class is comprised of Soldiers from diverse backgrounds, he gave the class a brief paragraph explanation of GEOINT. His success amazed him. Through his creativity, he made his class relevant, practical, useful, and a revelation to a few other participants who had assumed that their technical disciplines require the lecture technique. He also demonstrated the innovative problem solving capacity of a group in an educational environment where people are actively developing the 21st century Soldier competencies of creativity, teamwork and collaboration, communication and engagement, and critical thinking and problem solving.
Even larger groups can benefit from a focus on active learning and group dynamics. The course manager for the Warrant Officers Advanced Course used SGITC methods to teach his large group of 36 students the required block of instruction on Soldier 2020, integrating women into combat arms specialties. It was a powerful experience. First, he provided a common background for the class through both dramatized and printed case studies. Next, he divided the class into groups, giving each group one of the barriers to successful integration. The warrant officers analyzed issues, developed recommendations using committee problem solving, and presented to the class. The students led the class in a dynamic and professional discussion. The fact that it was a three-hour block of instruction was barely noticed. The officers were able to build on their prior experience while learning to move beyond their biases and assumptions. It was highly relevant and addressed the need adults have to direct their own learning whenever possible. Much of the conversation was about change, conflict, and influence. This class itself was a demonstration of implementing effective change, a radical change in the method of delivery, which maximized student engagement and influenced them to open their minds by learning from each other. It surprised and energized them, evident in their positive after action report comments on the class: “It was student led.” “It left latitude open.” “It gave us all a chance to participate in small groups.” This kind of opportunity empowers Soldiers to participate as adults in conducting their own training. Expanding the use of such learner-centric training opportunities will stimulate initiative and prepare Soldiers well for the adaptability and responsiveness necessary in today’s rapidly changing operational environment.

**Endnotes.**


2. Bloom’s taxonomy is a set of three hierarchical models used to classify educational learning objectives into levels of complexity and specificity. The three lists cover the learning objectives in cognitive, affective and sensory domains. The models were named after Benjamin Bloom, who chaired the committee of educators that devised the taxonomy.
Introduction

Army counterintelligence (CI) has been engaged in the “long war” for the last 15 years. During this time, Army force structure changes, unit mission essential task lists (METLs), and the burgeoning cyber missions of the land component changed some of what CI special agents do while deployed and in garrison. These changes reflect the Warfighter Challenge “to improve the rate of innovation to drive capability development and deliver [Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy] DOTMLPF-P solutions to the warfighter at a pace that meets operational demand within the existing constraints of the acquisition and budgeting process.”¹ This has led to a serious reexamination of how we train CI special agents both in the Counterintelligence Special Agent course (CISAC) and the Counterintelligence Officer course (CIOC), referred to hereinafter as the CI Committee.

The CI Committee integrated various battlefield lessons learned into the program of instruction (POI). Overall, these lessons were valid additions to the course; however, some additions were reactions to temporary crises. Furthermore, the changes in tactics and strategies by peer competitors and hostile forces required changes to the POI—some of which harkened back to more conventional warfare. Over time, these changes resulted in a return to the core competencies needed in a CI special agent because, in a hybrid environment, the Army requires CI special agents who are intellectually agile, capable, and trainable.

The Army POI now requires CI special agents who can articulate CI concepts, intelligence law, and CI information to decision makers and senior officers. Therefore, CI courses focus on training CI special agents to communicate effectively with decision makers and think critically about the enemy. CI courses require proficiency in verbal and written communication from officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), Department of Army civilians (DACs), and Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program (MICECP) members. It is not enough for CI special agents simply to conduct investigations and operations effectively and legally; they must be able to explain what they have done and think critically about why they have chosen a particular course of action.

With decreased resources and the hybrid threat², the Army requires CI special agents to perform basic CI functions proficiently, communicate effectively, and think critically about the enemy. These have become the bedrock for training the next generation of CI professionals. To get there, the CI Committee has had to identify past training gaps, integrate cyber, transition to the Army Learning Model 2015 (ALM 2015), improve management courses for officers, and develop a rigorous and sustainable writing program. While not easy changes, these are critical improvements for moving CI forward in a new strategic and tactical paradigm, while remaining relevant to the force.

Identifying Past Training Gaps

Since 2006, the needs of the force—especially the deployed force—have been driving CISAC training. At the time, officers and NCOs trained together. As the situation on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq changed, so did the CISAC. Some of the changes were necessary to support the fight; however, they were made quickly and led to imbalances between different modules of instruction. Additionally, CISAC, and later CIOC, provided trained CI special agents to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which have different requirements for CI training. The U.S. Central Command’s training requirements for the conduct of certain operations added an additional level of complexity. Lastly, and often most significantly, the force had some confusion between human intelligence and CI. Despite these challenges, CISAC was required to quickly produce and then deploy hundreds of CI special agents.

Between 2006 and 2011, policy changes and experiences influenced how CI needed to be trained. From a forward operating base, to support to specialized units, to network intrusions and intentional disclosures of classified information, the newly minted CI special agents had to be well trained, knowledgeable about a myriad of issues, and prepared to operate in peace, crisis, and war—and the Army needed a lot of them. This situation was not sustainable for the long term and the POI could not keep up. As more changes occurred, without adequate revision and technical oversight, coherency in training began to suffer.
Integrating Cyber

One particular area of concern that has become part of every CI investigation and operation is cyber. Cyber issues span the spectrum of intentional disclosure of classified information to network intrusion by unknown foreign actors. Between 2006 and 2011, with the advent of the smartphone, friendly and enemy forces had more hand-held computing power than NASA had access to during the mission to the moon. INSCOM and FORSCOM recognized the need for cyber-aware CI special agents as critical to mission success.

The first iterations of cyber training lacked hands-on components and provided brief overviews of the criticality of the cyber domain. This eventually was deemed as insufficient to the field’s needs, so the cyber POI was reassessed. This reassessment led to an overshooting of the target. Students were subjected to a week of cyber training that included forensic concepts and network security issues. This proved difficult to teach and support because, in the span of a week, students were expected to learn the concepts of computing, digital memory, and forensic analysis. These concepts take months to develop for a trained CI special agent cyber investigator. Furthermore, the number of trained cyber investigators in the Army was not enough to support the hundreds of students being trained at any given time.

To rectify this, the CI Committee, in coordination with INSCOM, developed a training program for CI special agents that focuses on what agents need to understand to preserve evidence, communicate effectively about cyber, and identify cyber issues requiring further investigation or analysis. Instead of attempting to produce cyber special agents, the CI Committee focused on what the field truly needed—special agents able to operate with supervision and maintain the integrity of an investigation or operation. In coordination with the Army G-2X, the CI Committee obtained funding to train CISAC and CIOC cadre in cyber, enabling the courses to grow their own expertise. In coordination with the Cyber Program Manager at the Army CI Coordinating Authority, the CI Committee developed the right mixture of technical expertise while maintaining a curriculum that did not overtax the cadre or students.

Transitioning to ALM 2015

As part of the CI Committee redesign, hybrid threat was integrated into the roles, scenarios, and curriculum mainly to develop and encourage officers’, NCOs’, DACs’, and MICECP members’ operational adaptability in the CI field. The operational influence of the hybrid threat requires CI special agents to be mentally agile to operate in peace, crisis, and war while applying CI during the different phases of warfare. The move to hybrid threat required CI special agents to understand and articulate the threat posed by conventional, unconventional, and irregular foreign intelligence entities (FIEs). To achieve this understanding, the CI Committee designed courseware in the context of the ALM 2015.

The ALM 2015 redesign and implementation led to an outcome-oriented POI that is not lecture-based. To achieve this, the CI Committee integrated video content, online training, and peer-based learning activities. Additionally, the CI Committee reduced the use of PowerPoints and integrated novel learning activities, such as concept mapping, to better instruct the more complex CI concepts. Live role-playing is a critical part of training CI special agents. Asking direct questions about sensitive issues is not a broad-based core competency of most Soldiers; it requires attitude changes and new skill development. Inculcating a special agent’s instinctive behaviors leads to intellectual muscle memory. This kind of training can only be accomplished in a live role-playing scenario where “convergent thinking” can be mastered. In addition to instinctive behaviors, CI special agents are expected to have minds that are more adaptable. This mindset is trained in role-playing scenarios as well as in situational training exercises. These modules of the course present students with “near real-world mission rehearsals” that have multiple right and wrong answers. Students must use the tools they have been provided to successfully complete the task.

By using ALM 2015 and hybrid threat documentation, the CI Committee seeks to train CI special agents, who are ready through common critical task list (CTL) training, to engage in unit METL skills. By focusing on critical tasks, the CI Committee can ensure special agents arrive at their units ready to assist in accomplishing the mission and learn
quickly from more experienced agents. Critical to the training of special agents is their ability to operate in joint or combined environments and between INSCOM and FORSCOM missions. To operate in this space, and at differing echelons, CI special agents must have the mental agility, awareness, and intellectual stamina to conduct operations immediately after leaving Fort Huachuca, Arizona, anywhere, worldwide.

Because critical tasks are based on real-world experiences as well as the issues CI faces daily, it became necessary to focus CI training on global drivers. Previous training drilled students on the proper method of filling out reports and forms. While this is important and significant, it cannot be the primary means by which new special agents understand the FIE threat. Using the new Unwelcome Guest scenario and rewritten POI, the CI Committee has formed a training environment that uses global drivers as the basis for understanding CI investigations, operations, and collection. The “contest of wills” between the FIE and U.S. Army CI is the critical space in which CI special agents need to be trained—the capability to fill out a form does not prepare them for this dimension of persistent conflict.

**Improving Management Courses for Officers**

Officers faced a specific difficulty in identifying the art of CI at the tactical level. Previous POIs did not focus officers on how to think about CI at the operational or tactical level. Given the global drivers in the modern operational environment, the CI Committee designed the management module to train officers to lead CI operations in a multitude of environments.

CI differs along the operational spectrum and at various echelons; this has been reinforced in the CIOC. CI doctrine and publications cover a multitude of technical and complicated issues, and 2X publications provide an excellent overview of how to manage CI operations. The CIOC also produced a management document for students that guide them through the process of thinking about how to implement CI to support a combat commander’s operation plan.

To bridge the gap between INSCOM and FORSCOM CI missions, the CIOC coordinated with FORSCOM elements at the division, corps, and FORSCOM levels. This afforded the opportunity to include CI missions, concerns, and perspective not captured by INSCOM elements that operate at the theater level and above. The coordination with officers in FORSCOM elements resulted in positive feedback—a major with multiple deployments commented that she wished she had the document when she was deployed as an S-2X. A warrant officer commented that it was the first time he saw what he did at the corps level captured in writing.

Developing a Rigorous and Sustainable Writing Program

CI includes some of the most specific report formatting requirements in the Army; poor formatting can result in stalled reports at multiple echelons. However, formatting a report properly does not mean the content is correct or relevant. Training agile thinkers requires special agents who can identify what information is relevant and how to correctly convey and articulate that information to the next higher echelon. Although formatting is still important, previously a student could fail content and still pass if the report was formatted correctly. With the new standards, students will be required to correctly format their documents and report relevant content.

Officers in the CIOC are also required to write an academic research paper on an assigned topic. The topics are restrictive to ensure students achieve not only the ability to write academically but also to learn about a CI topic. Topics include hostile foreign entities; tactics, techniques, and procedures; as well as discipline critical books. Given the CIOC’s time restriction, a number of valuable topics cannot be instructed during the training of fundamental CI tasks from the CTLs. Therefore, the CIOC research paper provides the information to fill this gap.

Regarding CI reports and research papers, the CI Committee focuses on critical thinking and ruthless efficiency with words. Training students to use words and the concept that words have meaning are the greatest challenges for the cadre and students in the CI Committee. Students develop their own style of writing, learn that speaking and writing are two different ways to use the same words, and become reflective writers who concentrate on readers instead of themselves. Students who graduate from the CI Committee learn to write and may be the most capable writers in the Army. This focus on content, format, and style is critical to the legal admissibility of documents and conveyance of intelligence information.
Conclusion

The U.S. doctrine of hybrid threat requires agile, creative, and critical thinkers with the ability to synthesize information and analyze outcomes in real time. By focusing on critical tasks and returning to basics, the CI Committee has provided room to use the Unwelcome Guest scenario for students to begin understanding CI in the hybrid threat context. Although, current training circulars and doctrine for hybrid threat do not articulate the role of CI, a quick perusing reveals that hybrid threat doctrine is full of CI issues. By teaching the basics and synchronizing the POI in the scenario, the CI Committee can instruct students about today’s battlefield and the hybrid threat.

Endnotes

2. hybrid threat – The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADRP 3-0). See also TC 7-100.
6. Ibid., 67.

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The insights and lessons learned in this article are the observations of the Fort Carson HUMINT Foundry Instructor as he trained collectors from multiple units both active and reserve component. The opinions expressed herein are his alone and do not represent the Department of Defense, the Foundry Program or any unit.

Background

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (2001-2012), many Army human intelligence (HUMINT) managers developed a paradigm for training and employing tactical HUMINT collectors in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment primarily to conduct targeting operations. However, with those conflicts largely scaled down and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) becoming regionally aligned, HUMINT collectors – even in U.S. Army Forces Command Units – now perform a variety of missions in permissive and semi-permissive environments, often in areas where sophisticated adversaries may not look kindly upon the presence of U.S. intelligence personnel. HUMINT collectors will need to train for those missions while remaining prepared for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan as well as potential decisive action conflicts with “near-peer” nation-states.

A period of stability operations and/or counterinsurgency will likely follow a decisive action campaign against a near-peer adversary. This could look similar to Iraq and Afghanistan, except most of the enemy will be nation-state intelligence and special forces operatives with years of training and experience. HUMINT collectors must employ sound tradecraft when conducting military source operations (MSO) in this type of environment, as the potential for compromise of operations and sources will be high. It takes a significant amount of time for collectors to build and maintain a core level of tradecraft competency. If the Army attempts to build this knowledge after a war has already started, HUMINT collectors fail and people die. If the Army fails to maintain HUMINT tradecraft knowledge, then collectors who have been to advanced level training will see their skill sets atrophy.

With the idea of tradecraft maintenance in mind, the Fort Carson Foundry site is responsible for training HUMINT collectors from several active and reserve component units for current and potential future mission sets. The Foundry site seeks to expose Soldiers to tradecraft concepts before their attendance at advanced schools and provide sustaining and enhancing training when they return. The site also conducts training in report writing, debriefing, HUMINT management, and interpersonal skills.

Train Progressively

HUMINT training is most successful when it begins with mastering the basics of report writing and debriefing prior to moving on to advanced concepts and culminating with an event to exercise the HUMINT platoon’s full skill set. The idea of training progressively toward a culmination exercise should not be new to anyone in the Army. However, units may struggle with how to accomplish this with HUMINT collectors. Furthermore, units sometimes neglect important basic skills such as report writing to train the more advanced concepts more frequently. Therefore, it is imperative that military intelligence (MI) company commanders and HUMINT warrant officers are actively involved in unit training so that skills train progressively.
As units attempt to implement a progressive training model, they sometimes neglect to send NCOs to Foundry courses when it is believed the NCO knows the material through deployment and/or graduating the SOC. This is roughly equivalent to saying, “That NCO qualified Expert on their rifle four years ago, and so we have not sent him to the range since. We just assume he can still shoot Expert.” These NCOs may then fail when they get to a HISC, a Combat Training Center (CTC) or a deployment because their skill set atrophies just like anyone else who fails to continuously train.

On the other hand, sometimes there is a temptation to become over-reliant on Foundry, and view Foundry 300-level classes as the only way to conduct HUMINT training. However, there is a significant amount of HUMINT training that can be conducted at home station or unit level. Most Foundry sites have secure classrooms and systems that units may reserve for internal training, as long as units make reservations in advance. This space is especially critical for reserve units, who, in Colorado at least, do not have ready access to organic secure systems or facilities where they can conduct classified training.

The units that are most successful in their progressive training are the ones that involve Foundry in the discussion early in their planning process to determine appropriate places within their training cycle to inject Foundry 300-level classes. For most units, this training plan culminates in a HISC that is tailored to the unit’s mission.

Fort Carson’s BCTs utilize the Foundry Platform for HUMINT collectors to conduct the culmination exercise as a HISC before going to CTCs or on deployment. The feedback is that the expanded HISC is far more useful than previous training events in preparing HUMINT collectors because it is HUMINT-focused and allows them to train on CTL tasks. The HISC also enables the HUMINT platoon to receive detailed feedback from Foundry cadre identifying strengths and weaknesses, and explore management procedures. Therefore, the Foundry Platform on Fort Carson is sustaining this model.

There are two impediments to the progressive training model for HUMINT: The first is turnover. During a 9-12 month training cycle, a unit is inevitably going to lose Soldiers to PCS/ETS and may get new Soldiers right before the HISC who did not go through the train-up. The second is that HUMINT platoons often receive taskings that may interfere with their training cycle.

Due to these issues of turnover and taskings, Soldiers frequently come to a HISC who have not gone through the lead up progressive training cycle. To overcome this, the Fort Carson Foundry Site has tailored a 3-5 day train-up leading into the HISC designed to be refresher training for Soldiers who went through the progressive training cycle and a “crash course” for those who did not. It is recommended that units cross load teams with a mixture of experience levels, including at least one member who went through the full progressive train up.

Educate and Coordinate

Before conducting any tradecraft training, it is important to educate commanders, S-3s/G-3s, and S-2s/G-2s at all relevant echelons regarding the training plan, tasks, conditions, and standards of HUMINT tradecraft training. Many officers already understand this, and Fort Carson has been especially fortunate that tenant organizations there fully support the Foundry program. This is not always the case. Based on discussions with Foundry instructors at other locations, there may be a misperception that Soldiers only need exposure to HUMINT tradecraft training when they attend HUMINT Training - Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE) or Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA), and then not again until a deployment. Therefore, HUMINT training managers should conduct formal and informal briefings to ensure that their chain of command understand what HUMINT collectors are training, why they are training,
and what steps have been taken to mitigate risks associated with training.

It is also important to educate commanders that Foundry is an Army Training Requirements and Resources Systems school and is treated as a temporary duty. If a unit schedules a Foundry course, they should not be pulling students out for details. Units do not pull someone out of Air Assault School midway through to go to the motor pool. They should not be doing the same for Foundry, as it will severely affect the training effectiveness.

When off-post training is being conducted, it is important to inform local and federal law enforcement agencies. This is generally best coordinated through the local 902nd Field Office. Training managers must take proper risk mitigation measures and ensure intelligence oversight procedures are being followed. They should brief Soldiers before training events, use common sense, and keep commanders and key staff informed. Off-post training can be conducted safely and without drawing attention. The Fort Carson Foundry site has conducted extensive off-post training without incident.

It is also important for training managers to understand if their unit has any additional administrative requirements that must be met in order to conduct off-post training, and plan to meet those requirements.

Engage in Network-based Training

Tradecraft training and the HISC (or similar exercise) requires a significant amount of time outside the classroom, as well as resources and instructor/observer controller interaction with every student. In the current fiscal environment, everyone is facing budgetary and personnel constraints. Therefore, in order to provide the most effective HUMINT tradecraft training, instructors and managers should network with each other and with outside entities for support. The Fort Carson Foundry site has been able to successfully incorporate local and federal law enforcement agencies, as well as ASO-trained 18-Series Soldiers, to support large-scale tradecraft exercises. The following are recommended best practices for networking with outside entities for training support. Coordinating for training support is a separate activity from coordinating with the 902nd to notify law enforcement of upcoming exercises.

To begin with, all HUMINT warrant officers on any post should know each other and seek to support each other, whether those warrant officers are working in a BCT, a Battlefield Surveillance Battalion, a Special Forces Group or an Intelligence and Security Command Unit. The Foundry platform has a Mobile Training Team (MTT) with four instructors responsible for covering every Active, Reserve, and National Guard unit in the Army. This MTT is stretched thin quickly. Therefore, a unit may have to look to other units for role player or observer controller support.

An overheard remark questioned, “Why should we support that other Brigade with their training? We don’t get anything out of it.” This is extremely short sighted. First, Soldiers who act as role players and observer controllers get a tremendous amount of training from providing this valuable support. Second, if unit A supports unit B in their training exercise, unit B will likely feel obligated to support unit A on their future training exercise.

It is recommended to create a single point of contact for networking with outside entities that could support training. The Fort Carson Foundry site trains ten different units. If every unit were to independently go to the FBI or local police for training support, it would likely damage rapport to the extent that no one would get support. On Fort Carson, the central point of contact for coordinating HUMINT training support with outside entities is usually the HUMINT Foundry instructor. This is a logical choice because they should have at least 2-3 years in the position to build and maintain relationships with outside entities, and they have relationships with every unit in the area. Conversely, the central point of contact could also be someone in the G2X/J2X office.
If an organization does not currently have any contacts with outside entities, one way to establish them is by speaking with some of the Reserve and National Guard HUMINT Collectors in the area who may have day employment in law enforcement or local government. Additionally, it may be possible to go through the 902nd Field Office, which frequently sits in on meetings with law enforcement agencies. Outside entities are usually willing to assist, but may be limited by their own operational tempo.

When seeking outside entities to support training, it is important for managers to emphasize how supporting a HUMINT training exercise could help an outside entity achieve their own training goals. For instance, 18-Series Soldiers that have trained on ASO need annual refresher training. If HUMINT collectors are conducting certain types of MSO training, many of the concepts overlap. In addition, certain elements within law enforcement agencies look to capture enemy HUMINT collectors or criminals performing tradecraft. Therefore, if a unit is training on tradecraft and these outside entities support that training, it benefits everyone. It is important to keep in mind the classification of the training and what level of detail can be shared with the outside entity.

Another consideration is to ensure that if an outside entity does support a unit’s training exercise, that unit demonstrates its gratitude through giving out coins and/or certificates of appreciation. A little gratitude can go a long way in maintaining relationships.

**Utilize Outside Training Platforms**

When building long-range HUMINT training calendars, it is important to take full advantage of courses at JCITA, HT-JCOE or Camp Bullis. There seem to be three main obstacles preventing units from sending Soldiers to these schools.

The first obstacle is funding. Training at these facilities requires unit funds. Managers may be reluctant to ask to fund HUMINT training or their unit may not have the funding. Reserve and National Guard Soldiers still require funding to be placed on activation orders and attend training regardless of whether there is a cost for the course. The Foundry program will cover the cost for students to attend most HT-JCOE and JCITA courses. These courses are listed independently in the Foundry catalog (JCITA courses are listed as IC304). However, units should attempt to fund these schools internally before turning to Foundry for funding. Foundry funding needs to be requested at least one quarter in advance of training. Foundry’s budget like everyone else has been reduced and they will not be able to fund everyone in a unit. Therefore, it is recommended that units select one or two candidates with longevity and follow the “train the trainer” model.

Reserve and National Guard units training managers will have to continuously fight to educate their commanders on the importance of paying for HUMINT training. Policymakers seem to consider the Reserve and National Guard to take on more mission sets with the expectation that they are trained to the same level of proficiency as Active units. However, if a Reserve or National Guard unit has 0 to 3 SOC graduates per HUMINT platoon, they are not prepared to execute the same mission set as an Active component HUMINT platoon with 6 to 8 SOC graduates.

The second obstacle is many HUMINT training managers are not aware what these schools have to offer, especially the fact that HUMINT collectors may attend certain JCITA courses. This is easily fixed by educating HUMINT training managers on the full scope of the JCITA and HT-JCOE course catalogs and reaching out to Camp Bullis to ask what kind of training they offer.

The third obstacle is in the case of SOC and the DATC, units are afraid to lose a competent NCO for an extended period. This requires HUMINT training managers to vocally advocate sending Soldiers to schools, and get commanders and platoon leaders to understand that not sending NCOs to schools is detrimental to that NCO’s career as well as the unit’s ability to perform a range of mission sets.

**Conclusion**

In order to be effective, HUMINT training managers need to anticipate a complex variety of mission sets beyond the Iraq/Afghanistan paradigm and train them in a progressive manner. Managers will also need to educate the force on those aspects of tradecraft training that may seem unusual to military leaders unfamiliar with the unique requirements of HUMINT training. Finally, managers should establish mutually beneficial training support relationships with other units and strategically incorporate all available support from Foundry, HT-JCOE, JCITA, and other outside entities in their training.

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Solarium Concept
The Commanding General (CG) of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) hosted the 2016 Military Intelligence (MI) Majors’ Solarium at Fort Huachuca, Arizona from 9-13 May 2016. The purpose of this year’s event was for key MI Majors (selected by senior MI leaders) to consider the present and future state of the MI Corps, and provide senior MI leaders with their concerns and recommended solutions.

The MI Majors’ Solarium was modeled after President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium from 1953 that convened to develop the U.S. National Security Strategy for reacting to Soviet expansionism after World War II. In July of 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, reintroduced the Solarium Project to Army culture. USAICoE hosted the first MI Captains’ Solarium at Fort Huachuca in May 2015.

In January 2016, the CG USAICoE wrote to Division G-2s and MI brigade commanders asking them to select the best MI majors in their formations to participate in the 2016 MI Majors’ Solarium. Twenty-five majors were selected by their commands or organizations. Of the 25 participants, there were two females and 23 males. Ten majors represented U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, 13 represented U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) units, and one major represented the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and one the Army Reserve. The average time in service for the participants was 14.5 years.

The MI majors were divided into three working groups based on their answers to a survey regarding what they consider the top organizational, personnel, and training issues affecting the MI Corps. The top nine issues were broken down, and each group was given three issues to discuss. The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (Red Team), from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas facilitated the Solarium by teaching critical thinking skills and facilitating the working groups. A Red Team member was assigned to each working group.

Before arriving at Fort Huachuca, the working groups used online discussion forums to refine their issues and begin developing solutions for improving the MI Corps. After three days of continued discussion at Fort Huachuca, the MI Majors’ Solarium culminated with the majors briefing USAICoE leadership on their recommendations. The CG USAICoE reviewed and discussed their recommendations, and indicated that USAICoE would further pursue 14 of the majors’ proposals. The following are the issues and recommended solutions from the majors on those proposals.

Organizational Recommendations
Delineate Roles within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
Doctrine must be updated to clearly establish the roles and responsibilities of the military intelligence company (MICO) commander, particularly within a deployed environment, to ensure proper employment and optimization of capabilities. MICO commanders across the force are frequently employed in various roles outside of their command while deployed, decreasing their ability to manage their personnel and systems.

Way Ahead: USAICoE is currently drafting the MICO Commander’s Training Handbook in order to address the myriad challenges that face MICO commanders, both at home station, and while deployed. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-19.4, BCT Intelligence Techniques is in the process of revision to address changes to the MICO. Additionally, a Bottom Up Review that includes the BCT MI grade plates is underway.

Standardize Intelligence Readiness. In order to accurately understand and address capability and capacity gaps across the intelligence enterprise, senior leaders of the intelligence warfighting function need to establish standards of intelligence readiness for all echelons and organizations through quantitative reporting metrics. Currently, MI units have different metrics for readiness; standardization of these metrics promotes an objective instead of subjective assessment
of deployment readiness. Solarium majors specifically recommended that Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) utilization should be a pacing item.

The majors also provided specific recommendations for MI Gunnery.

Solarium majors recommended that, once the MI Gunnery manual is published, completion of Tables I-IV of MI Gunnery should be mandatory before conducting BCT collective training.

Way Ahead: USAICoE will incorporate their recommendations, and ensure that the MI Gunnery manual establishes baseline requirements for individual and crew readiness. The MI Gunnery manual will clearly define standards of performance, evaluation criteria, and tasks for individuals/crews.

Personnel Recommendations

Establish Formal Selection and Development of BCT S-2s. Solarium majors agreed that some BCT S-2s are not performing to standard, for a variety of reasons, resulting in higher than normal attrition. In order to fully prepare majors for success as BDE S-2s, the majors recommended that U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Division G-2s, and BCT commanders be involved in screening and selecting BCT S-2s. Further, selection for a major’s key developmental assignment should be delayed until after Command and General Staff College. This will permit further broadening and developmental experience.

In addition, the majors requested added training to prepare for serving as a BCT S-2; such as a BCT S-2 course.

Way Ahead: In response to this recommendation, USAICoE has created a weeklong MI Preparatory Course for majors attending resident Intermediate Level Education at Fort Leavenworth.

Improve Development, Utilization, and Retention of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35Ts. The limited number of MOS 35Ts (MI Systems Maintainer/Integrator) coupled with an over reliance on external contractor support, hinders the MI Corps’ ability to establish and maintain an effective intelligence architecture. The MI Corps should examine the feasibility of increasing the number and grades of MOS 35Ts.

Way Ahead: USAICoE is conducting the Bottom Up Review of the MI force which will include consideration of the distribution and grades of MOS 35T authorizations.

Training Recommendations

Establish an MI S-2 Online Resource. Solarium majors requested a site where S-2 information such as enemy templates, S-2 products, standard operating procedures, and best practices can be easily found, accessed, and pushed to S-2 personnel. Providing resources and templates in a consolidated location will facilitate closing the decisive action training environment knowledge gap that has developed after 15 years of counterinsurgency-oriented training and combat operations.

Way Ahead: USAICoE has established an S-2 resource link on iLDR (accessible at: https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/ildr) and will populate with key resources targeted to assist the S-2.

Develop an Intelligence Architecture Course. Solarium majors recognized trends at Corps, Division, and from combat training centers reflecting a corps-wide inability to establish/maintain intelligence architecture, resulting in “stop-gap” solutions that do not leverage the full capability of the intelligence enterprise. MI majors should fully understand how to employ their systems and manage the personnel supporting intelligence architecture effectively. Solarium majors recommended that intelligence (Continued on page 50)
Introduction

Today’s world operates in an ever-increasingly complex and rapidly changing, electronic environment. Cyberspace remains the U.S. military’s most difficult domain to protect. The enemy can operate within cyberspace from anywhere in the world, and in cyberspace it is nearly impossible to gain and maintain dominance. The U.S. Army’s Chief Information Officer, Lt. Gen. Robert Ferrell, addressed this complex dilemma while describing how to shape the network for future operations:

“The Army must continue to seek and evaluate emerging technologies in order to constantly modernize our network and maintain our technological edge. One development the military must closely watch is the growing availability of ever-increasing data processing power and faster transmission speed at lower cost. This trend not only creates an easily accessible information-rich environment, but also gives resource-poor states, criminal organizations and even individuals access to capabilities traditionally monopolized by advanced countries. The pace of innovation in information technology is increasing the pace of operations, and our adversaries’ ability to influence our operating environment.”

A missing key link to protecting against adversaries is the production of timely intelligence reports on cyber threats. The Theater-Defensive Cyberspace Operational Intelligence Support (T-DCOIS) provides a solution to that very problem. It began as a U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) pilot program in October 2015, and has since rapidly evolved into a large focus of the utmost priority for intelligence operations, garnering major support from the U.S. Army Cyber Command. The T-DCOIS incorporates a required balance between two fields that are both essential to achieve success in a complex task. Intelligence professionals analyze capabilities, recognize patterns of behavior, and view situations through many different lenses, as they possess a thorough understanding of the cultural norms in which they work. These Soldiers incorporate the art of analyzing cyber threats to produce useful reports. The technical skills of network professionals enable incorporation of the necessary science in tracking the adversaries’ activities within the cyber domain. Through their unique skill sets, the enemies’ capabilities, techniques, and procedures are measured and codified. This brings together the essential team of professionals to gather data and analyze it, producing the reports on cyber threats, and relieving the issue of a major intelligence gap.

The Concept

The T-DCOIS concept is simple. It places intelligence professionals, their systems’ analytical tools, and information report sharing capabilities within the cyber operations domain. Network data is delivered to this team from a crew of cyber technical experts. Research and information are leveraged from multiple intelligence sources in a cycle of requests for information and answers. Finished intelligence production occurs based on threat activity analysis and the adversary’s intent. The team then assesses attribution for the cyber-attack and is able to create an overall assessment of the enemies’ capabilities. This process theoretically shapes future network defensive and offensive operations. However, the greatest challenge to effectively fusing intelligence with cyber operations remains countering one’s desire to fit adversaries in neat, little diagrams in a similar manner to conventional warfare versus asymmetrical. Understanding the process, while keeping a readily adaptive freedom of maneuver, is needed to maximize a team of teams. In fact, Retired Army General Stanley McChrystal, authored the book, Team of Teams, conceptualizing this very idea within the special operations community.

There are no doubts among senior leaders that the military still faces large gaps in successfully maneuvering in cyberspace. While the Department of Defense works diligently to assemble and train the most agile operators in the world, it misses the mark due to recruitment issues in attracting the necessary workforce. Emerging technologies and threats drive the necessity to improve force capabilities. Unfortunately, there remains a negative perception amongst needed professionals, who may not want to wear a uniform to work, or receive a reduction in pay compared to what the potential earning is as a civilian information technology (IT) professional.

Additionally, training those who have the requisite knowledge within our ranks is not as easy as it would seem. There is a language barrier of sorts between “geek speak” and
intelligence writing. The Army has developed courses in the field of intelligence that are currently provided to signal Soldiers. In-turn, IT certificate accreditation is offered for intelligence professionals. This two-way educational training, benefits the force greatly, and serves as the foundation for the T-DCOIS. A small group of binary speaking intelligence professionals, together with their defensive cyber operations (DCO) colleagues, is beginning to forge the way in identifying adversaries, who hope to gain access to valuable information or disrupt military operations.

**T-DCOIS Operations**

The team generally consists of four to six intelligence analysts, paired with 12 or more network defense IT professionals that make up the DCO, and in some cases is augmented with Army Reservists. The 513th Theater Intelligence Brigade’s motto, “Strong Partners!” rings true as the brigade supplied Soldiers for training without hesitation and deployed them to theater, supporting the stand-up of the T-DCOIS. The 513th’s swift actions resulted in a rapid operational timeline, as the Southwest Asia Cyber Center T-DCOIS’ initial operating capability was reached nearly two months ahead of schedule. The 335th Signal Command Theater Provisional also aided to this commitment by allowing its G-2 to head the team until additional employees could be brought on for mission sustainment.

Thus far, the T-DCOIS’ success in conducting cyber operations has come from providing common training in both intelligence and signal fields from Project Foundry and the U.S. Army Central Command Signal University. Additionally, communication between the Defensive Cyber Operations Directorate (DCOD) and the T-DCOIS workforce is crucial. These arts and science professionals work together, side-by-side to maintain that vital communication and produce accurate reports. The cycle of the DCOD recognizing malicious or suspicious activity, allows the T-DCOIS to execute intelligence reporting with the goal of gleaning enemy attribution and intent.

**Securing Department of Defense Networks**

Various actions go into securing Department of Defense (DOD) networks as well, such as regular standardization and modernization arrangements. The ultimate goal is to provide the most strategic network possible across all echelons and formations, to allow for faster, better-informed, decision-making by maneuver commanders, without sacrificing the security of this information.

The Commanding General of the 335th Signal Command Theater Provisional, Brig. Gen. Stephen Hager, verbalized the importance of defending the network with the most-enhanced, available technology.

> “The 335th Signal Command Theater Provisional has always been customer-focused. To remain so, we need to be able to modernize the communications infrastructure and test it at a more rapid pace for implementation. This enables our ability to better refine data sets for intelligence folks to analyze, without looking through false positives of irrelevant data sets. The T-DCOIS adds important capabilities to our security and when paired with infrastructure improvements, such as the Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS), the command gets closer to its overall goal of reducing our soldier footprint abroad while maintaining a secure network.”

JRSS presents an important change to how traffic flows across military networks and is a large step forward in achieving a global network. It converts complex trafficking paths throughout cyberspace to a more efficient, streamlined process while also maximizing passive and active security features. For further explanation, it is similar to an analogy of motor vehicles traveling on numerous, jammed-packed highways; then converting these vehicles over to a faster interstate system with high occupancy vehicles lanes. The traffic can also be prioritized and secured with additional features like state troopers and highway patrol officers. This is a drastic change to the DOD network’s current traffic flow, where requests pass through multiple security
features that are often redundant and create incessant traffic jams.

Conclusion

The cyber domain brings many benefits to the warfighter, but with its added value and advantages comes multiple opportunities for high-consequential risk. In today’s operating environment, necessary strides must be taken if the DOD and its military organizations are to remain fully functional in a more efficient and secure network environment. Collaborating efforts between the U.S. Army’s signal and intelligence communities are achieving sizable feats in securing the DOD network and protecting the American public with our Team of Teams.

INSOM Deputy Commanding General, Brig. Gen. Robert Michnowicz, precisely summed up the T-DCOIS cyber efforts while conducting a leaders’ professional development session to soldiers of the 335th Signal Command Theater Provisional in Kuwait,

“At the end of the day, cyberspace is a component of maneuver space. We need to take and maintain the initiative, supporting the Army core competency of combined arms maneuver in the cyber environment. Only in this way can we leverage cyber and intel to provide targeting capabilities, and achieve lethal and non-lethal effects against our adversaries. Semper en hostes! (always into the enemy).”

Steady improvements are being made to the T-DCOIS at a very rapid pace. Although the teams are not perfect, their results are getting better every day. Together, through continued partnerships, these teams will not only keep the DOD network secure, but will ultimately provide an advantage in cyber operations.

LTC Jason Dickinson is the G-2 for the 335th Signal Command Theater Provisional in Arifjan, Kuwait. He was officially tasked to lead the standing up of the Theater Defensive Cyberspace Operational Intelligence Support (T-DCOIS) team for Southwest Asia in May of 2016 by the Commander, as a joined effort between Army Cyber Command and Intelligence and Security Command to provide better intelligence support in the cyber domain. He is a graduate of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence University and a Senior Executive Fellow of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government. His previous assignments were as the Deputy G-2 335th Signal Command Theater, Chief of Operations, Military Intelligence Reserve Command, Executive Officer for the 3100th Strategic Intelligence Command.

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architecture be codified into the MI Gunnery, and potentially within the Critical Task Lists for the upcoming 35 series Critical Task Site Selection Board.

Way Ahead: USAICoE is incorporating intelligence architecture within the programs of instruction (POI) through several lines of effort (LOE). The first LOE is the development of training software to train MOS-specific intelligence architecture tasks; this software is expected to become available in the 1st Quarter, FY 2017. The second LOE is the implementation of a capstone exercise, which incorporates multiple intelligence MOSs from across the institution. Finally, courses will update their POI and systems training plans and future critical task site selection boards will ensure specific consideration of Soldier performance standards with respect to intelligence architecture. In addition to training, USAICoE is updating MI Publication (MIP) 2-01.2, Establishing the Intelligence Architecture; a reference guide to assist MI professionals in planning, preparing, deploying, and redeploying the intelligence architecture.

Conduct Periodic DCGS-A Forums. The majors stated that DCGS-A best practices are not codified and widely publicized. To remedy this, the majors recommended holding a semiannual DCS online forum to discuss tactics, techniques, and procedures, observed trends, and provide a means for communicating changes and updating the force.

Way Ahead: To date, both the CG and Chief Warrant Officer of the MI Corps have hosted multiple DCS sessions with MI leaders on DCGS-A related topics.

Conclusion

The 2016 MI Majors Solarium provided substantial input for MI Corps leadership to consider in refining and shaping the future MI Corps. As the Army moves forward in an era of decreasing resources, ensuring that MI professionals are fully trained and deployment ready are key tasks to improve the readiness of MI Soldiers and the units and organizations they support.

CPT Andrew Nesbitt has deployed several times to the Middle East in support of combat operations. He currently is assigned to Training Development and Support staff at the U. S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence.

CPT Molly McIntyre is from Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Commissioned from Colorado State University’s Army ROTC. CPT McIntyre is currently the Commander for C Co, 304th MI Battalion. Previously she was a Deputy Director of the Leadership Development Branch in the Training Development and Support Directorate at Fort Huachuca, Arizona where she helped plan the Majors’ Solarium. She has also been a battalion intelligence officer, analysis platoon leader, and assistant brigade intelligence officer.
Interoperability—What Does That Mean for Human Intelligence?

Multinational interoperability poses significant challenges for human intelligence (HUMINT) in a combined-joint operating environment (OE). A reoccurring issue encountered in the conduct of multinational combined-joint counterintelligence and human intelligence (CJ2X) operations, is the inability (or reluctance) to produce and share an intelligence common operational picture (COP) derived from HUMINT. Units often produce intelligence information products within specific analytic sections such as the analysis and control element, counterintelligence and HUMINT automated reporting and collection system, and other adjacent intelligence elements that remain in a “stove-piped”, unshared status. This situation leads to limited analytical intelligence COPs robbing commanders and senior intelligence officers of a complete operational picture. Even within U.S.-only intelligence sections, a pattern of limited intelligence synchronization occurs within staff sections. This is often based on specialized elements withholding useful products due to over classification or poorly developed foreign disclosure release procedures. Moreover, HUMINT collections are not often incorporated into operational synchronization planning matrices in collection management and dissemination cells. The threshold upon which sharing of intelligence should legitimately be limited, occurs when potential compromise of sources (such as HUMINT) and sensitive source methodologies may be revealed—either overtly or through derivative means.

Interoperability. Interoperability is a continuous challenge for U.S. and multinational intelligence operations in combined operating environments. Frequently, U.S. and NATO classification levels impose restrictions on information sharing, dissemination, and fusion of intelligence products. To compound the issue further, reporting sensitivities derived from HUMINT source management restrictions pose an operational risk across the intelligence warfighter formation. However, when collection managers misunderstand handling procedures, useful information is often “stove piped” in the production of U.S. intelligence information reports (IIR) at the “SECRET//NOFORN” level. Either the IIRs are over-classified, or report officers do not use “tear lines” in accordance with reporting manuals.

Multinational fusion. When U.S.-generated reports are used in conjunction with NATO intelligence reports, mechanisms must be used to fuse production, while still preventing unauthorized disclosures. Without multinational fusion, valuable information may not be released and used in combined-joint intelligence analysis. Operational units often fail to capture valuable information requirements that are releasable. When units do not capture such requirements through multilateral sharing, useful knowledge is not analyzed by multinational partners. NATO’s Kosovo Forces (KFOR) are managing this vital intelligence production, sharing, and dissemination system. US forces in partnership with KFOR utilize this intelligence fusion process through streamlined tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Solutions

Units must acknowledge foreign disclosure challenges. A procedure to formally evaluate categories of intelligence to identify releasable information and process them through the foreign disclosure release process needs to be established. U.S. units in particular, must practice streamlined use of “tear lines” in intelligence reporting to ensure widest dissemination to multinational partners. Too often, intelligence information that can be shared is not due to a lack of understanding of classification levels, caveats, and/or over-classification. Senior analysts, to include interagency intelligence community partners in a particular OE, do not consistently review classifications of products to process multinational releasability. S2X synchronization faces limitations with “stove piping” and withholding of intelli-
gence due to not knowing how to separate U.S.-only information from actual releasable portions in the single-source discipline. Although U.S. HUMINT has ample “no foreign national” restrictions in very specific areas, the preponderance of deliverables in tactical HUMINT can, and often must be shared, synchronized, and fused with CJ2X operational partners. KFOR is such a current example in which collections and sharing is standard.

Classification Guidelines

Clear concise guidance must be established for all HUMINT operations, tailored specifically to the given multinational mission. Foreign disclosure officers must be task-organized into the intelligence formation so that U.S.-only sensitive information is protected, while vital intelligence is shared and synchronized across the multinational array of forces. Overall classifications, classification for specific intelligence products, and formatted “tear lines” serve to streamline an effective end-state.

A Shared Understanding

What does multinational HUMINT interoperability mean? How does it work effectively? What does it actually look like? HUMINT collectors, classified systems, NATO networks, and both classification caveats and operational caveats that might restrict sharing and/or integration, pose critical problems to resolve. Achievable resolutions must be sought; particularly as multinational Army brigade operations—and specifically multinational HUMINT operations—are only increasing in the NATO footprint, and in other theaters such as U.S. Army Pacific. A shared purpose and a shared understanding are critical to successful intelligence operations—at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.

Need-to-Know. Units performing operations in support of a CJ2X OE, must identify key intelligence personnel organic to the formation to conduct reviews of HUMINT and all-source analysis products, intelligence information reports (IIR), any associated production, and push useful information to units/elements which have a need-to-know in a particular deployed mission. Foreign nation partners working in concert with U.S. elements facilitate combined mission success when the COP is prepared with fidelity and shared with important staff sections.

Standards. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) must be scrubbed for NATO unclassified releaseability, classified release levels, sensitive caveats, and address specifically foreign disclosure release procedures. The SOPs also must incorporate current allied joint published doctrine to streamline the common operating language, and be translated into key NATO approved target languages. SOPs must function with identified key personnel who perform designated tasks and purposes that facilitate streamlined intelligence. To streamline the intelligence information production—managers, staff officers in charge, and commanders must ensure dissemination, releaseability, and fusion systems are in place.

Write for Releaseability. HUMINT collection teams operating in a multinational environment, in support of any tactical echelon, should make the effort to write for releaseability. Just because an IIR results from HUMINT activity, does not mean that it is automatically classified “SECRET NOFORN.” Moreover, HUMINT reports either an IIR or NATO formatted are not automatically classified secret by virtue of activity. Collectors should attempt at all times not to over-classify reports and products as this limits valuable distribution and synchronization with multinational partners. Shared understanding—in any intelligence formation—is the key to effective decision making.
Operational Precedent

NATO still conducts streamlined multinational HUMINT operations, as in the ongoing KFOR mission. Multinational collection teams operating in the NATO OE, perform as one team, with one mission, producing answers to intelligence requirements, and function with a shared understanding and shared mission. Respective reporting architecture and systems are incorporated into the mission requirements accordingly. U.S. Army brigade combat teams (BCT) must recognize this fact. BCT level HUMINT in KFOR, as an example, is a reality, and multinational HUMINT operations are a critical function of the KFOR mission. Combined HUMINT missions—particularly in a NATO footprint—are a reality, which BCTs must recognize and incorporate into a mission planning cycle.

Epigraph


CW3 Sean Idol is the JMRC Senior Brigade S2X Trainer and Deputy BDE S2 All-Source Trainer. As a multinational trainer, he was the lead intelligence integrator with the Czech Republic Army in Exercise Allied Spirit II & IV, KFOR 19-21, Lithuanian-led Saber Junction, and lead all-source intelligence officer for Allied Combined Joint Entry Force (ACJEF) in Swift Response 16. CW3 Idol has conducted intelligence operations in Iraq, Korea, Mongolia, Kosovo, and Republic of Georgia. Currently, CW3 Idol is an MA candidate in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University, with thesis specialization in International Security.

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Introduction

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) Lessons Learned (LL) Branch presents intelligence training best practices learned from observing or interviewing Army Active, Reserve, and National Guard leaders, Soldiers, civilians, and contractors conducting operations (Operations Resolute Support, Inherent Resolve, Spartan Shield) or involved in major training events (combat training centers [CTCs], joint exercises, Army warfighting assessments) in the past two years. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, characterizes the environment in which observations were made as the operational training domain—the training activities organizations undertake while at home station, at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed.

1. Commanders and Other Leaders Are Responsible for Training. We discovered that the most effective intelligence training best practice is commanders and military intelligence (MI) leaders must be engaged in integrating and resourcing the intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) training in their formations. The best training practices observed stem from commanders’ direct involvement in IWfF training and the integration of this training into a comprehensive unit training plan. The Soldier’s adage still applies, “Soldiers only do well that which their commander checks.” If it is a priority for the commander, it becomes everyone else’s priority. USAICoE LL observations indicate commanders’ oversight of planning, resourcing, conducting, and assessing training results in superior IWfF performance in the operational environment.

An important distinction regarding the commander must be made before proceeding. In current IWfF operations, the echelon at which one serves is not as important as leveraging the intelligence enterprise to provide effective intelligence support to one’s commander. Conversely, the unit commander at each echelon affects all aspects of training at each respective level. The key to successful brigade combat team (BCT) IWfF training is linking a BCT subordinate unit’s MI-specific training to the BCT commander’s IWfF training priorities. The BCT S-2 is the senior intelligence officer in the BCT but does not control all of the MI assets in the BCT. For example, although the MI company (MICO) is subordinate to the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) during operations the MICO is task organized to perform as best meets the BCT commander’s intent. Observed best practices occur when the BEB and MICO commanders along with the BCT S-2 and BCT S-3 coordinate (and integrate) MICO training focused on meeting the BCT commander’s requirements. We have seen instances of the MICO mission essential task list (METL) nesting within the BEB METL, focusing on maneuver support tasks at the expense of the BCT’s IWfF tasks. The same has been observed in other formations and echelons. The BEB commander’s responsibility for ensuring the training readiness of subordinate companies, including the MICO, cannot be discounted or ignored—there are individual and collective training, and readiness requirements within the MICO that the BEB commander must ensure are met for the success of the BEB and BCT. The most successful training strategies observed by USAICoE LL Branch members include those that ensure the integration of MICO training events into the BCT training strategy. An observed best practice underscoring successful training strategies is the MICO METL nesting within the BCT METL. This aligns MICO mission essential tasks with those of the BCT commander’s.

We visited an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) three times in one year that exemplified how a commander’s involvement leads to success. Upon arriving at the unit, the ABCT S-2 assessed the proficiency of the ABCT’s IWfF, from the BCT headquarters down to the company level, and the integration of the IWfF into the ABCT’s planning, training, and operations. The S-2 gauged the IWfF and MI Soldiers’ ability to accomplish the tasks required to be successful at a major operational environment event occurring within a year. The S-2 also assessed MI Soldiers’ proficiency in performing their specific military occupational specialty (MOS) tasks using analog/manual and automated/digital methods.

With the ABCT commander’s support, the S-2 also determined the familiarity with the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) and IWfF support throughout the...
ABCT, including subordinate battalion headquarters and staffs, the BEB (to which the MI and signal companies were subordinated), and other key elements.

The ABCT S-2 developed a comprehensive training plan to address assessment results; the plan culminated before the major event’s initiation. The S-2 socialized the plan with aforementioned assessment subjects and obtained the ABCT commander’s endorsement to implement the plan through an operation order (OPORD). The OPORD authority enforced the commander’s training priorities and eliminated the ABCT S-2’s reliance on persuasion to garner support or participation throughout the ABCT. The S-2 (and the unit) achieved mission success, and documented the unit’s best practices in a comprehensive and detailed training plan and standard operating procedures (SOPs). The unit disseminated the training plan and SOPs to the tactical MI community. They are available on the new USAICoE LL homepage at https://army.deps.mil/Army/CMDS/USAICoE_Other/LL/SitePages/Home.aspx.

2. Noncommissioned Officers Train Individuals, Crews, and Small Teams. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) train Soldiers. One cannot deny the effectiveness of this principle, faithfully executed by the NCO Corps since our Army’s founding. Several techniques implement this principle—from which we identified three best practices.

Select the best to train the rest. It is neither disparaging nor disrespectful to propose that rank does not always equal competence. Existing objective evaluation events, such as the Army Physical Fitness Test and individual weapon qualification, confirm this perspective. Reasonably, the subject matter expert for any one of a number of highly technical MI skills may be a specialist or private first class. In fairness, the USAICoE LL Branch has interviewed joint task force (JTF), aerial intelligence brigade, BCT, other echelon commanders, and primary staff officers who demonstrated subject matter expertise in every facet of every system within their respective organizations.

DCGS-A Training and Innovation. An NCO responsible for the unit’s DCGS-A training implemented a DCGS-A collective training best practice. The NCO selected the unit’s most highly skilled and competent DCGS-A operators, regardless of their rank, to provide hands-on training. Having “the best training the rest” resulted in DCGS-A operators with more knowledge and practice in their individual operator skills.

The unit augmented DCGS-A training by creating a spreadsheet to link DCGS-A (including the Ozone Widget Framework) tools to products that support the unit’s staff processes, actions, and tasks. The following is a key attribute that demonstrates how the spreadsheet leads to success—the level of detail used to identify the DCGS-A tool required to construct a specific product (input) that supports a particular step in a process (intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB], military decision-making process [MDMP]) to produce the result (output) required by the commander.

Warrant Officer Mentoring. NCOs implementing the unit’s training frequently mentioned the benefits of the mentoring, guidance, and assistance provided by chief warrant officers (CWOS). The CWOS’ expertise in their specific MI disciplines combined with their knowledge of the unit’s placement in the intelligence enterprise injected clarity of purpose into unit training. The NCOs referred to this clarity as the “so what” or the “why this is important” effect. An additional benefit of CWO involvement is how they apply their knowledge, skills, and abilities to the operational domain to identify challenges, conditions, or resolution strategies to problems likely experienced during operations, but not fully recreated or simulated during training. We observed CWOS’ and warrant officers’ willingness and commitment to provide support to those requesting it, even if the request originated from another unit.

3. Train to Standard. An inherent benefit of using “best in their craft” Soldiers to train others is the likelihood that they have already met or exceeded their commander’s standards for the task. As individuals and collective tasks have standards of performance, the unit commander has expectations of the quality, accuracy, timeliness, format, and means of the intelligence products or performance of the IWfF. The commander’s expectations or preferences become the de facto standard for the associated intelligence tasks. Identifying the commander’s standards is often more difficult than meeting an Army-specified standard. Collective training events for which the commander provides specific and timely feedback are cited as a good way to establish minimum levels of acceptable performance. BCT S-2s have reported that in addition to the commander’s direct communication-seeking guidance from primary staff officers, the deputy commander/executive officer, S-3, or other sources (including former staff members) also assist in determining initial standards of performance.

4. Train as You Will Fight. During observations of the conventional force, USAICoE LL members identified a significant disconnect—“we do not train as we fight.” MI units/elements, observed during multiple successful CTC rotations, conducted home-station training (HST) with the same systems they used at NTC or JRTC. This recurring best practice is conducted using the same systems employed in the same concept of operations (CONOPS) used during CTC events. Our most recent observation of a unit at a CTC rotation re-
vealed that the unit abandoned its HST placement of intelligence enablers and nodes for a novel implementation; the lesson confirmed the value of implementing the CONOPS developed during HST as a recurring best practice.

Units succeed not only through operator-level familiarity with the specific hardware gained during HST, but also through the associated learning gained by integrating the IWfF into the various facets of the supported unit’s CONOPS. An example of this success is the best practice of integrating organic equipment into the operational information architecture. Units demonstrate greater effectiveness in the operational domain when proficient in establishing, displacing, and re-establishing positions using the equipment they will bring to war (operations). Training in setting-up, troubleshooting, using, tearing-down, moving, and repeating the cycle using the equipment that Soldiers will deploy with leads to superior performance. Occasionally, there are serious legal, regulatory, and/or policy restrictions placed on when, where, and the type of activity certain MI collection platforms or personnel are used. These factors may limit the degree to which organic equipment may be used during HST events. Coordinating how, when, where, and what type of IWfF training may be allowed in the specific operational domain is critical.

Successful units integrate what they have learned from their HST experiences into techniques and procedures listed in unit SOPs or tactical SOPs (TACSOPs). A complementary best practice one unit employed was embedding its training plan into the SOPs as a reference for future use. Fully integrating MI elements into a BCT’s HST often results in improved integration into the BCT’s scheme of maneuver as it accomplishes offensive and defensive tasks at CTCs. Maneuvering MI collectors/enablers as part of the supported force provides mutually beneficial familiarity gained through repetitive rehearsals. This type of integration increases confidence in and reliance on MI-enabling functions and minimizes harmful actions or decisions. Confidence in MI capability performance often results in increased adaptability and flexibility in applying IWfF enablers to achieve the commander’s intent. Many non-MI unit personnel specifically emphasized that the successful integration of Prophet systems and multifunctional teams into the scheme of maneuver at CTC rotations led to more effective intelligence support than leaving these capabilities “in the rear.”

Currently (and in the near future), the Army and IWfF operate as part of a combined operations team; foreign partners are inherent to the term combined. For the IWfF, to “train as it will fight” reveals the implied task of sharing information with our combined partners. Observed best practices include having at least one person in each section trained and certified to perform foreign disclosure tasks and MI collectors trained and proficient in “write for release” procedures.

A final “train as you will fight” observed best practice included a BCT S-2 who coordinated with the home-station mission support element and other pertinent authorities to install and use DCGS-A on the garrison network. This enabled DCGS-A operators to perform daily operations tasks on the same system in garrison that they would use during actual operations.

5. Train While Operating. Units that continually train while deployed or conducting operations are “learning organizations.” These units continually apply lessons and best practices to improve performance. While this is a best practice, a better practice is units codifying their techniques into SOPs/TACSOPs and sharing their knowledge. Several instances of this best practice were observed in current operational environments by a brigade-sized JTF providing multidiscipline intelligence support, the intelligence component of a combined JTF, an MI platoon performing processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) tasks, and multiple MI teams at varying echelons.

6. Train Fundamentals First. Units proficient in fundamentals are more capable of accomplishing higher level and more complex collective tasks that support the unit’s METL (see ADP 7-0). An observed best practice is the sequencing of MI-specific training to complement and add value to the unit’s overall training plan. An example of this occurred when a BCT S-2 studied the unit’s Long Range Planning Calendar to identify BCT collective training events dependent upon effective intelligence support/inputs. The BCT commander’s objective was to train and assess the BCT staff’s MDMP proficiency. Knowing that quality IPB conclusions and products (inputs) contribute to a successful MDMP, the BCT S-2 scheduled MI-section IPB training to be completed before the BCT began its MDMP collective training event. This approach enabled the S-2 to fully support the BCT commander’s intent of assessing MDMP proficiency.

Another best practice is proper sequencing of MI-element training to achieve tactical-movement proficiency before it engages in (decisive action) collective maneuver training. IWfF or MI teams’ unilateral proficiency in dismounted or mounted maneuver before joining maneuver warfighting function training events lends immediate credibility to the team’s professionalism and avoids diverting
resources (mainly time) from the main training objective or population.

7. **Train to Develop Adaptability.** The only constant is change. Leaders focus training on METL tasks with the understanding that their units must be ready to perform tasks for which they have no training. By mastering the few key tasks under varying, challenging, and complex conditions, Soldiers and their leaders become confident that they can adapt to any new mission. A critical component in adapting to changing mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations [METT-TC]) is establishing, training, rehearsing, and documenting in orders or SOPs/TACSOPs a feasible communications primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (also called PACE) plan.

An MI platoon supporting a specific operational environment provided an expanded PACE plan best practice by identifying PACE components for each mission in the following areas: command and control information, intelligence product dissemination, power generation (commercial, generator, etc.), supply, transportation, maintenance, and administrative information. Most of these areas were identified in the unit’s TACSOPs; however, certain aspects of the PACE plan affected by dynamic mission variables were updated in orders (fragmentary orders, warning orders [WARNORDs], OPORDs).

A critical LL is including the PACE plan in pre-combat checks or inspections. A best practice is rehearsing the PACE plan. A rehearsal would have prevented a unit learning during operations that its very detailed PACE plan was impossible to implement because the unit’s subordinate elements were not equipped with the means of communications required to implement the plan.

8. **Understand the Operational Environment.** Training conditions are drawn from the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) that must be replicated to prepare the unit for operations (ADP 7-0). The first two operational variables (political, military), when combined with the mission variables (METT-TC) usually specified in a WARNORD, indicate the foreign partners with which U.S. forces will operate. Unfortunately, units cannot wait for a WARNORD to train on the specific techniques or systems/processes to be used in combined operations. In addition to the operational and mission variables sometimes identified too late to effectively inform the unit’s training strategy, so too is identifying the specific theater architectures and intelligence enterprise entry points.

There are several best training practices identified to understand the operational environment. The tenet of “No Cold Starts” drives many to leverage Foundry facilities and opportunities to familiarize Soldiers with the operational environment. Foundry training is frequently identified as a best practice. A complementary best practice implemented by a division G-2 sent counterintelligence and signals intelligence Soldiers to locations where they would be able to train and practice their technical skills. Despite not training with their organic unit, these Soldiers were able to train to proficiency in their respective skills and then apply what they learned in appropriate HST events upon their return. Another best practice was observed in four separate division/corps training exercises in which MI brigades (theater) served as anchor points for the intelligence enterprise.

It is critically important to integrate other key operational environment factors into collective training events—the effects of weather and terrain on the unit’s collection systems, PED architecture, and intelligence product quality. A best practice is researching and applying (or simulating) the area of interest terrain and weather conditions’ effect on U.S. forces and systems during training events. Simply identifying phenomena, such as thermal cross-over times, intervisibility lines, extended periods of high-winds, extreme temperatures, and electromagnetic environment, is not as effective as imposing (or simulating) the effects on personnel or systems during training. An observed best practice during a BCT field training exercise was developing subordinate leaders by having them determine mitigating procedures to address some of the terrain and weather effects.

9. **Train to Sustain.** Training must prepare units and Soldiers for the stress of operations. Unit training plans must incorporate programs that improve individual and collective mental and physical fitness (ADP 7-0). A best practice reported by multiple sources confirmed the difference in performance of dismounted MI elements that underwent rigorous training under conditions that replicated the difficult terrain and Soldiers’ loads (dimension, weight) in the operational domain with the performance of those elements that did not train to standard in similar conditions.

10. **Train to Maintain.** Maintenance training is an integral part of the unit training plan (ADP 7-0). The reliance of the IWfF (and other warfighting functions) on contractor personnel to maintain complex mission command and IWfF systems is often overlooked or non-resourced component of unit training plans. A best practice observed at two BCT and two corps-level exercises was the integration of appropriate contract vehicles that ensured adequate contractor resources, availability, and performance to allow the unit to
train to standard. Two separate LL observations confirmed that units with systems dependent upon contractor maintenance or performance for operations but not resourced for pre-operations training prevented the units from achieving their training objectives.

A recent LL in this category is the importance of planning, resourcing, and conducting training events for a unit’s MOS 35T (MI Systems Maintainer/Integrator) Soldiers and MOS 353T (Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Equipment Technician) personnel. Despite mentioning the value of concurrent training in the next paragraph, lessons prove MOS 35T/353T Soldiers are often fully committed to performing tasks of their MOS during unit collective training events. Specific training opportunities for these Soldiers and technicians are best scheduled when units are not dependent upon the Soldiers’ support to achieve their mission or training objectives.

11. Conduct Multi-echelon and Concurrent Training. Multi-echelon training allows for the simultaneous training of more than one echelon on different or complementary tasks. In the Train the Fundamentals First section of this article, we highlight the best practice of MI elements coming to the unit’s multi-echelon collective training events fully proficient. The following best practices complement—not invalidate—the Train the Fundamentals First best practices.

USAICoE LL collectors observed three separate BCTs while USAICoE’s DCGS-A tactical engagement team (TET) was on site. BCT personnel’s direct comments combined with LL collector observations identify the DCGS-A TET as a best practice of the conduct multi-echelon and concurrent training principle.

An Army National Guard infantry division also employed this principle during an annual training period when consolidating all of the division’s MI elements under the auspices of the G-2 for training. The time-compressed nature of the annual training period facilitated using a multi-echelon and concurrent training approach to save time, and in this instance, with highly effective results.

Conclusion
We did not intend to present our Top Ten (+1) Intelligence Training Best Practices aligned with the 11 unit training principles of effective collective training. It made sense to do so when we realized our four most important observations aligned directly with the first four principles listed in ADP 7-0. The following is the most important complementary lesson to take away from this article—you are not alone in developing an effective intelligence training plan or integrating intelligence training into your unit’s training events. The articles and columns in this MIPB issue prove this lesson. The breadth and scope of the intelligence enterprise available at any echelon often exceed the capability of one MI leader to orchestrate training for each portion of the enterprise to maximum effect. Sharing information based on our individual experiences with each other assists in reducing the burden of planning MI training. Send your lessons and best practices to the USAICoE LL Team or contact us to see how we may help you or your unit become more successful.

Fort Huachuca Museum

Check out the Fort Huachuca Museum website at: https://www.ikn.army.mil
Click on the Fort Huachuca Museums link
The real line is: “If you build it, he will come.”

In the spirit of this famous quote from the Universal Pictures 1989 movie, *Field of Dreams*, the latest website created for the Army Training Network (ATN) seeks to increase the ability of Army users to access culture education and training products. This fills a critical need for culture products that support U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) requirements. The TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) worked extensively with ATN developers to build a site that is both accessible and informative. The TCC’s ATN page serves as a central access point for these products, and provides a reachback capability by which a request for information or support can be sent to the TCC.

You may still be wondering about the phrase that is included in the first paragraph. You might be thinking, “Just because you build a website, is no guarantee that a large number of users will visit the site.” You also may be asking yourself, “Why should I visit a website that is solely focused on culture education and training products?” “Why is it important for me to spend time on this website?” The short answer is that culture products can help you stay ahead of the game, enhancing your capability to address the three paradigm shifts that the Army Leader Development Strategy notes are occurring in the operational environment: the effect of complexity and time, the effect of decentralization, and the need to frame ill-structured problems.

Mission-tailored culture products and lessons address the core concerns of each of these paradigm shifts. Anticipating change, creating opportunities, and managing transitions aligns with cultural adaptability, leveraging contacts, and the ability to influence and shape a situation. This is one example of how seamless cultural competencies align with the leadership competencies required in the 21st Century Army. Additionally, the primary objective of the Culture, Regional Expertise, and Language (CREL) strategy is to provide the right education and training to the right individuals at the right time. The products and lessons available on the TCC’s site on ATN support the objectives and competencies put forth in the Army Leadership Development and CREL strategies.

Although the *Field of Dreams* line is often misquoted as “If you build it, they will come,” in this case it is appropriate. They, in this context, include Soldiers and civilians within all branches of the U.S. Army and, by extension, the Department of Defense. Despite being a small organization, the TCC works to support all Army organizations. If you can’t find what you need on the website, click on the “Ask the TCC” request function to inquire if the TCC could develop the product or lesson. The TCC invites everyone to visit our new website, provide us feedback, and to take advantage of the ability to download and use the material to support your mission. Call us today for all your culture training needs.

Phone: 520-538-5502
The United States program to develop the atomic bomb, code-named the Manhattan Project, began in August 1942. From the beginning, the need for security was paramount. The project had to be protected from sabotage and espionage, and equally important, the fact that the U.S. was working on such a program had to be kept under wraps at all cost. Early on, a Protective Security Section (PSS) handled personnel and information security, facility protection, and security education.

By February 1943, a more comprehensive counterintelligence program was warranted and Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) agents Capt. Horace K. Calvert and Capt. Robert J. McLeod were assigned to the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) to organize the Intelligence Section. More CIC personnel followed, with agents stationed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Chicago; St. Louis; Site Y (Los Alamos, New Mexico); and Berkeley, California. By August 1943, when the project transferred to the Corps of Engineers, the Intelligence Section merged with the PSS and established its headquarters at Oak Ridge. At this time, the Section assumed responsibility for every aspect of security within the MED. Four months later, on December 18, 1943, a special CIC Detachment, commanded by Lt. Col. William B. Parsons, was organized, and Lt. Col. John Lansdale became the chief of intelligence and security for the entire Manhattan Project.

In the early 1940s, Lansdale, a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and a U.S. Army Reserve officer, was a successful trial lawyer in Cleveland, Ohio. He had turned down several calls for active duty before finally taking the advice of one of his VMI classmates to accept special duty within the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division (MID). Lansdale initially worked in the Investigation Branch, Counter Intelligence Group, reviewing investigative reports of prospective War Department employees. He eventually became chief of both the Investigation and Review branches of MID. Another one of his duties was to act as liaison between the PSS and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. When the Manhattan Project transferred to the Corps of Engineers and the CIC Detachment activated, Lansdale had the background and connections to move effortlessly into the position as head of intelligence and security. Due to the criticality of his mission, Lansdale quickly became special assistant to Gen. Leslie Groves, the chief of the MED.

The CIC Detachment was initially comprised of 25 officers and 137 enlisted agents, each one hand-picked by Captains Calvert and McLeod. Over the next year, the Detachment grew to 148 officers and 161 enlisted agents. This included non-CIC military personnel with specific technical abilities critical to the security of the program. Detachment Headquarters was centralized at Oak Ridge, but personnel were placed on detached service in 11 branch offices around the nation. At times, these agents were so highly classified that they were referred to by code symbols and only the finance officer computing the pay of the agent knew his exact location.

Lansdale assumed full responsibility for all intelligence and security matters affecting the MED. In addition to preventing unintentional disclosure of information and infiltration by enemy agents, Lansdale’s responsibilities included preventing fires and explosions, monitoring courier duties, protecting classified shipments, educating personnel about the importance of security measures, obtaining newspaper cooperation, and conducting 400,000 background investigations of potential personnel. His agents acted as bodyguards for the project’s top scientists and went undercover to monitor local rumors about the various installations involved in the bomb development. Lansdale also planned and executed the security measures for the 509th Composite Group, the special Army Air Forces’ organization formed to deliver the bombs. Additionally, he was deeply involved in the Alsos Mission, an overseas task force that seized the technology and scientists involved in German atomic research.

The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan brought about the end of World War II and saved the lives of thousands of U.S. and Allied troops who would have died in an invasion of Japan. The procedures put in place by Lansdale and his CIC Detachment led to the successful protection of the atomic bomb program, later called the “War’s Best Kept Secret.”
This is your professional bulletin. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence and Intelligence Communities.

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- A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
- Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.
- Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.
- The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications.

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