Subscriptions: Free unit subscriptions are available by emailing the Editor at usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil. Include the complete mailing address (unit name, street address, and building number) and the number of copies per issue. Don’t forget to email the Editor when your unit moves, deploys, or redeploys to insure continual receipt of the Bulletin.

Reprints: Material in this Bulletin in not copyrighted (except where indicated). Content may be reprinted if the MI Professional Bulletin and the authors are credited.

Our mailing address: MIPB, USAICoE, Box 2001, Bldg. 51005, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, 85613

Issue photographs and graphics: Courtesy of the U.S. Army and issue authors.

Commanding General
MG Scott D. Berrier

Chief of Staff
COL Todd A. Berry

Chief Warrant Officer, MI Corps
CWS Matthew R. Martin

Command Sergeant Major, MI Corps
CSM Thomas J. Latter

STAFF:
Editor
Sterilla A. Smith
usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil

Design and Layout
Gary V. Morris

Cover Design
Gary V. Morris

Military Staff
MAJ Derek L. Tureson

Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

From The Editor
As a reminder, MIPB is now online at IKN on the open front page at https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2248. You will find several of the most recent issues there as well. For earlier issues (2013 and earlier) please go to the MIPB site on IKN after you CAC in.

The following themes and suspenses are established for:

October-December, Intelligence Support to Situational Understanding in 2025 and Beyond, Please contact the editor.

January-March, Institutional Training, deadline for submissions is December 11.

April-June, Considerations for Separate Brigades Intelligence Teams, deadline for submissions is 3 March 2016.

July-September, How to Fight Intel through all Phases of Operations, deadline for submissions is 10 June 2016.

Articles from the field will always be very important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them. Even though the topic of your article may not coincide with an issue’s theme do not hesitate to send it to me. Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. Your thoughts and lessons learned (from the field) are invaluable.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or upcoming issues.

Sterilla Smith
Editor
FEATURES

6 38 Days: Maximizing the Military Intelligence Readiness Command
by Colonel Stephen E. Zarbo

10 USNORTHCOM’s RC Military Intelligence Brigade
by Captain Glenn Draughon, MIRC G3/5 Future Plans

11 Taking MI Professionals from “Provide, Trained, and Ready” to “Provide an Operational MI Army Reserve”
by Major Ernesto Clark

15 The Evolution of MI in the Army Reserve: An Informal and Unofficial Historical Summary
by Colonel Gregory K. Williams, (USA, Retired)

19 INSCOM Reserve Component Support and Integration
by Major Donya Dugan, Deputy Chief, Reserve Programs Office; Captain LaTonya Hama, Operations Officer; and Major Jason Elphick, NG Liaison

22 Maximizing Reserve Component Intelligence Support
by Colonel Steve G. Stevens, Army National Guard

27 The Federated Intelligence Program at the State Level
by Captain Timothy Kirschner and Major Brian McGarry

30 Intelligence Missions and Realistic Training Boost Readiness and Retention for MI Soldiers of the IL ARNG
by Captain Craig M. Robbins and Lieutenant Colonel Douglas M. Masters

32 Language and Culture Training for the Traditional Drilling Linguist
by Sergeant Thomas McLaughlin, Sergeant Elizabeth Stegeman, and Major Brian McGarry

35 Training the Reserve Component HUMINT Force
by First Lieutenant Joseph Hardin, First Lieutenant David Wachtveitl, and Major Brian McGarry

39 Living the ARNG Culture of “No Cold Starts”
by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Church

45 Winning Warfighter: The Intelligence Enterprise
by Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. East and Major Oliver G. Wells

51 Developing an Open Source Intelligence “Battle Rhythm” - Meeting the Challenge of Maintaining Situational Understanding in a Complex World
by Colonel Kevin C. Wulfhorst

56 The MI Effort to Maintain Individual and Unit Readiness: Reserve and National Guard Challenges
by Sergeant Major Brian R. Hale and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Kimberly A. Swasey

60 Intelligence Challenges in Eastern Afghanistan (Part 2)
by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Reed, Major Ken Wright, and Chief Warrant Officer Five Erin O’Hara

65 Things I Wish I Had Done Before Going To NTC
by Major James King

76 The MI Soldier Heritage Learning Center
by Ruth Quinn

DEPARTMENTS

2 Always Out Front
4 CSM Forum
5 Technical Perspective

64 Contact and Article Submission
68 MI Corps 2015 Hall of Fame Inductees
79 Professional Reader

Inside Back Cover: 2015 LTG Sidney T. Weinstein Award
Always Out Front

by Major General Scott D. Berrier
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

The United States Army of 2015 remains the most powerful and professional Army in the world. A Total Force assembled of Active, Reserve, and National Guard professionals founded on the hard work and dedication of our Soldiers, our incredible civilians, and families. Throughout our 240 years, all three components of the Army secured our Nation by preventing conflict and, when necessary, winning its wars. We are successful because we are well trained, well educated, well led, and dedicated to our Profession and our country. We are the strength of our Nation and continue to serve with distinction and honor and have rightfully earned the title, “Trusted Professionals.”

Whether on the battlefields of Western Europe, the jungles of Vietnam, or the deserts of Iraq, our Total Force has stood ready to defend the Nation. As we examine the emerging operational environment, the world has become incredibly more complex, unknown, and constantly changing. In order for our Army and our MI Professionals to retain our edge, we must not only meet, but exceed the demands posed by ever-changing threats and environments.

It has become increasingly difficult to predict who we will fight, where we will fight, and what coalition we will partner with in the future. The Army Operating Concept states, “we must anticipate changing conditions to ensure that Army forces are manned, trained, and equipped to overmatch enemies in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and we must assess our efforts continuously and be prepared to adapt to unexpected opportunities and unanticipated dangers. Our Army must continuously learn, adapt, and innovate.” In order for our MI Professionals to anticipate changes and adapt to unexpected opportunities, our Total Force must maintain its readiness and operational relevancy. We must remain globally engaged and take full advantage of training tools and opportunities despite projected force reductions and diminishing resources. Our primary tasks across all components are to keep our Army intelligence force in the fight with the best trained, multidisciplined intelligence force to enable decisive action, and to build the MI force of the future to ensure No Cold Starts, No MI Soldier at Rest.

Army readiness starts with intelligence readiness and intelligence readiness starts at Fort Huachuca. As Military Intelligence Professionals, we must remain vigilant in examining the future. Our goals are not merely to predict the future, but to describe the future and design an intelligence strategy to build capability to win. Leveraging the Army’s intelligence Total Force and balancing resources and capabilities across the Active Component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve are vital to remaining ready to “Win in a Complex World.” As stated by the Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley, “In order for the Army to win, it must integrate the Guard and Reserve. Today, the Army is implementing its Total Force Policy, integrating all three components, particularly in training and relationship building. The Guard and Reserve are part of the Army’s regionally aligned forces effort, supporting theater security cooperation activities around the world. The United States Army cannot execute operations anywhere without the Guard and Reserve.”

Standardization of training, whether at Fort Huachuca, Utah, or Georgia, training Soldiers, NCOs, warrant officers and officers from across all three components, is crucial to mission success. Training that is responsive to the needs of the Total Force, regardless of component, must be designed to provide relevant and realistic institutional training for our warfighters. We must continue to improve the integration of active and reserve training systems by standardizing training, leveraging resources, and incorporating lessons learned from over a decade of conflict.

After 14 years of war, significant budgetary pressures, and an increasingly complex security environment, the Army is building on its long history of success, adaptation, and strong leadership to change and evolve. A key component of this change is the sustainment of symbiotic relationships among the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces to help create opportunities by getting the right units to the right place at the right time.

We recognize today that by engaging regionally we have an opportunity to shape the battlefields of tomorrow. The goal is preventing another war, yet we realize the enemy always gets a vote. Regardless of our best efforts at pre-
venting conflict, there remains a high likelihood that America will find itself at war once again in the coming decades. When that day comes, there will always be a military made up of professional men and women standing ready to defend America’s national interests. As Minutemen stood at Lexington Green on the morning of April 19, 1775, and led the attack on Concord Bridge, our Nation’s Citizen Soldiers were always the first to appear at or await battle, ready at a minute’s warning to take to the field with arms.

We have made significant strides in embracing the concept of operational relevancy and internalizing the phenomenon of “No Cold Starts, No MI Soldier at Rest.” Additionally, sustaining MI proficiency and readiness across all three components is costly and time intensive, but we have the tools and the leaders to achieve our goals and remain globally engaged. As stated by General Robert B. Abrams, “FORSCOM is by design a ‘Total Force’ command—Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and the Active Component. We are one Army, one Army working together—shoulder to shoulder to build and sustain highly trained and disciplined Soldiers and formations in accordance with Army standards. We are expert in our warfighting skills, ready to deploy and win in ground combat against any enemy.”

In order to ensure the Army remains ready as the world’s premier combat force, we must ensure our Total MI Force is ready to fight today, and always prepared to fight tomorrow as readiness is our #1 priority. Army readiness starts with intelligence readiness and intelligence readiness starts at Fort Huachuca.

“Always Out Front, Army Strong!”
As we execute the Army’s new Operating Concept to “Win in a Complex World” and get after what the Army Chief of Staff General Milley calls the unknown and unknowable adversaries, Army intelligence professionals need to embrace the challenge to shed light on the unknown in a timely manner for decisive action to be taken. Intelligence is a core Army Warfighting Challenge and the principle requirement for the first order capability to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

Chief of Staff of the Army General Milley continues to emphasize we are “one Army 980K strong composed of Active, Guard, and Reserve Soldiers” and in order for us to retain an overmatch capability on our adversaries in the coming decades, we need to train as one team, to one standard. You have all seen over the past 14 years of conflict that Active, Guard, and Reserve forces need to blend together for the Army to be successful in its mission to Win Our Nation’s Wars. Military Intelligence (MI) Soldiers in all components must have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to be interchangeable throughout our intelligence enterprise. Simply look at the break down of Theater Intelligence Brigades and Expeditionary MI Brigades and you can easily see we cannot react to multiple regional efforts or sustain a large scale operations in the future without the Guard and Reserve forces.

The Army’s efforts to develop regionally aligned forces to better support theater security cooperation efforts to prevent conflict are not just complemented by, but dependent upon Reserve and Guard forces. Efforts such as the State Partnership Program build and sustain symbiotic relationships with our (joint and international) partners forward and Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers provide reach back support to current and future missions. Interoperability between Active, Reserve, and National Guard Intelligence Soldiers is key to demonstrating the ability to dominate diverse regions and varying situations as they develop around the world to deter aggression before it starts and provide decisive intelligence to regional forces to win across the entire spectrum of mission requirements. This year, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is further developing multi-component unit headquarters at corps and division levels, consisting of Active, Guard, and Reserve Officers and NCOs, as part of the future Army Total Force construct. This design allows for a reduced active component element by using reserve components to ensure the units maintain the capacity needed for successful execution of operations. It establishes habitual working relationships to eliminate the need for integration prior to implementation as a headquarters.

Our Army has yielded noticeable achievements in integrating Guard and Reserve resources into reach back capabilities to ensure “No Cold Starts” in our efforts to defend the Nation against current and future adversaries. We need to continue the momentum gained over the past years of conflict by utilizing Foundry Training Facilities supported by FORSCOM and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command to maintain skills, currency, and connectivity to organizations and systems required to provide intelligence to decision makers. For an MI Soldier, your primary weapon needs to be the Distributed Common Ground System-Army. If you are not utilizing this during your daily duties and during Annual Training, you need to ask your leadership why.

There is no way to know for certain who our adversaries will be in the next 20 to 30 years. To ensure we have the cognitive dominance to adapt to any challenge, we need to continue to invest in the leadership development of our MI force, and especially the NCO Corps to develop the critical thinkers and innovators needed to thrive in chaos. We are working toward the goal of there being no difference in where Soldiers go to attend their appropriate level of professional military education, especially as part of their Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System (NCOPDS). The overall effort by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to create one school system also supports the Army’s new Select, Train, Educate, Promote (STEP) by providing greater opportunities for MI Soldiers to attend courses offered by any component to be eligible for promotion.

The Intelligence Center of Excellence is continuing its efforts to ensure the same level of professional military edu-
The foundation of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The Army Operating Concept (AOC), is to “Win in a Complex World.” Our leadership highlights the need to prepare the Army to protect our nation and secure vital interests through partnerships within a Joint, Interorganizational, and Multinational (JIM) environment against an unknown but capable adversary.

The predictive nature of the AOC recognizes that the Army will continue to operate shoulder to shoulder with JIM partners in conjunction with our Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces to prevent or win our nation’s wars and shape security environments.

Today’s Citizen-Soldiers are an essential part of the Army Profession of Arms, a community within the Army Profession across all three components. Regardless of component, our Military Intelligence professionals are held to a One Army School System standard. The One Army School System ensures all Army components receive and are held to the same rigorous training, education, and evaluation standards. Many of our National Guard and Reserve force Soldiers and Leaders are uniquely trained with cross cutting capabilities due to long term relationships within the JIM spectrum and special skills from their civilian backgrounds. Organizational leaders that seek to leverage these inherent capabilities quickly realize that the National Guard and Reserve force professionals are a force multiplier towards maintaining a global landpower network that is critical to shaping the security environment, preventing conflict, and when necessary, winning wars.

Our total Army MI force across all three components is comprised of approximately 41,109 professionals. Roughly 40 percent are Army National Guard and Army Reserve who serve to protect this great nation. To deter our adversaries, total Army readiness remains our number one priority. Given the complexity of our environment, it is important that we choose not to draw distinctions among the Army’s components. During times of downsizing and constrained resources, we need to recognize the utilization of our total force and maintain a proud and capable institution.

Thank you for your continued support, commitment, and service.  

One Team, One Fight!  
Always Out Front!

CSM FORUM (Continued from Page 4)

cation presented in the classrooms at Fort Huachuca, is also being taught in the Reserve and National Guard courses. In Fiscal Year 2015, the 1st MI Brigade, 100th Training Division moved its Headquarters from Providence, Rhode Island to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This move has already produced increased opportunities for cross training and instruction to ensure MI Reserve Soldiers are receiving the same level of current training as active duty Soldiers. The Brigade currently trains MOS 35F, 35G, 35L, and 35M primarily for MOS-T Soldiers reclassifying into MI MOSs and NCOPDS Advance Leader and Senior Leader Courses and is developing MOS 35N capabilities for Fiscal Year 2016. USAICoE must continue to provide trained, equipped, and ready MI Soldiers to help meet the intelligence capacity demands posed by an ever changing environment.

Finally, it is an individual responsibility for professional Soldiers to maintain an awareness of emerging threats and continuous professional development. Utilizing available resources such as the Intelligence Knowledge Network and the Intelligence Leader Development Resource portals to keep abreast of the latest research, articles, and insights by senior MI leaders needs to be routine for intelligence professionals from all three components. Active, Guard, or Reserve does not matter, as intelligence professionals you need to keep reading, keep learning, and keep analyzing to identify who, where, and when the next adversary is going to be so our Army can “Win in a Complex World.”

One Army...One Military Intelligence Corps
Introduction
The Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC) is a functional command under the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM). Comprised of seven Major Subordinate Commands and 6,200 Soldiers, the MIRC Commanding General's number one priority is to provide trained, equipped and ready MI units, and force packages in support of FORSCOM requirements. The mission is organized around all of the intelligence disciplines, and MIRC formations are made up of both Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) and Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units.

In fact, close to 40 percent of the MIRC are TDA units supporting Combat Support Agencies and Combatant Command J2s. In reality, these non-deployable organizations have been better trained, and are more prepared to conduct intelligence operations because they have been plugged into the Active Component (AC) and they have been tasked during weekend battle assemblies (BA) and annual training (AT). Using this knowledge as a guide, the MIRC is currently undergoing the most comprehensive and sweeping change in its history to proliferate this readiness model to the entire force.

As the Army draws down and resources diminish, much has been said regarding the need to rely on Reserve Component (RC) intelligence capacity to meet the demands posed by ever changing and complex threats. As our leaders address and mitigate the impact reduced funding will have on our plans and programs, the MIRC has taken concrete steps to weather the storm and has postured itself to assist in the mitigation while simultaneously becoming more prepared to deploy.

Central to this effort is the clear and laser focus on what can actually be controlled—38 days per year. Short of a mobilization, reliance on the RC will be predominately restricted to 38 days per year, which is the statutory requirement for RC participation. Anything beyond that is either a volunteer endeavor or an involuntary mobilization. This constraint will solidify as funding for AT reduces, thereby restricting Soldiers to only 14 days. However, even in the days of plenty, only 17 percent of MIRC Soldiers volunteered to do more than 14 days when 29 days were available. Using this experience as a model, the MIRC attacked the central question of how to maximize available time.

MIRC 2020: Capitalizing on Regional Alignment and Networked Facilities
Over time the MIRC learned that developing a symbiotic relationship with our AC counterparts was fundamental. By doing so MIRC units help mitigate AC short falls while simultaneously creating training opportunities for themselves.

The MIRC is in a unique position to capitalize on strong AC relationships for three fundamental reasons. First, the MIRC is and has been regionally aligned; relationships with the AC are easy to come by. Second, the MIRC owns nine classified facilities, or Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs), with over 200,000 square feet of training and classified work space. Third, the ARISCs, as part of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program enterprise, are provisioned with JWICS, SIPR, NIPRNET, NSAnet and FSE support by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Using these three fundamental advantages as a start point the MIRC staff developed MIRC 2020 as a strategy to nest with both the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and INTEL 2020.

Anchored by the growth of the 505th MI Brigade (Theater) (MIB(T)), two Expeditionary MI Brigades (EMIBs) HQ, and seven battalions, the strategy takes a holistic view of all MIRC deployable force structure. Additionally, the strat-
and Control Elements (ACE) made it blatantly obvious that provision of building RC extensions to each ASCC theater Analysis cannot run DCGS-A over DIA provisioned SIPR and JWICS. Have robust connectivity, the current reality is that units weapons system. Additionally, despite the fact that ARISCs have trained better than an accountability issue vice an intelligence current knowledge, these systems quickly become not that. Second, without the right connectivity it doesn’t matter how many systems are on hand. If units can’t plug them in and keep them refreshed, these systems quickly become nothing more than an accountability issue vice an intelligence weapons system. Additionally, despite the fact that ARISCs have robust connectivity, the current reality is that units cannot run DCGS-A over DIA provisioned SIPR and JWICS.

Third, though the MIRC has abundant SCIF space, the vision of building RC extensions to each ASCC theater Analysis and Control Elements (ACE) made it blatantly obvious that SCIFs were not configured properly to establish an operational footprint. The challenge became balancing the competition between training space (the ARISC mission) with production space. Fourth, even if units have the systems, the right connectivity, and properly configured space, these units are at risk if they cannot assure 24/7 functionality of SCIF IT and critical infrastructure. The MIRC desperately needed programmed sustainment dollars to secure its investment in its ARISCs.

What has been accomplished by the 149 Soldier and civilian strong MIRC staff since 2012 is remarkable. The MIRC secured resources in the Fiscal Year 2016-Fiscal Year 2020 Program Objective Memorandum process to provide the maintenance and sustainability for its critical infrastructure. Though not optimal, the MIRC can at least keep the SCIFs up and running on a 24/7 basis. In the spirit of great cooperation between ARISC commanders and battalion commanders, training and operational sets of DCGS-A are now consolidated and accounted for at all nine ARISC sites. Though this too is not optimal, the DCGS-A footprint is currently robust enough to bridge the gap until fixed DCGS-A work stations are issued based on the basis of issue plans that accompany new MTOEs. Additionally, with substantial help from the Army G2, INSCOM, and USARC, the MIRC converted close to 10,000 square feet of SCIF space and acquired 15,000 square feet of additional SCIF space. It also acquired close to 50,000 square feet of administrative space to prepare for growth. Perhaps more importantly, and with significant help from INSCOM and DIA, all MIRC facilities can currently run DCGS-A and plans are in place to improve connectivity by the end of FY 2016.

The most challenging aspect of maximizing advantages involves getting the right units to the right connectivity, and standing up units in places were connectivity is already in place. The tasks for planning fell on one iron major, one captain on orders, one very squared away sergeant first class, and two under-paid and over-worked civilians. Three years later, that same staff planned and is currently executing 44 approved stationing/re-stationing/stand-up actions that will posture the MIRC to relevant connectivity by the beginning FY 2017. In the end, over 50 subordinate MIRC units will move and seven battalions and three brigade HQs will have been stood up. This entire effort is focused on providing better support to the AC while simultaneously increasing opportunities to provide MIRC Soldiers more realistic training by positioning units to maximize their 38 days.

Despite the magnitude of what has been accomplished, the decisive factor of tethering a 38-day-per-year force to active requirements comes in the form of the Army Foundry.
program. In 2004, the Army Chief of Staff directed the Army G2 and INSCOM to establish the Foundry program to ensure all MI Soldiers had the opportunity for advanced immersion training before deployment to a theater of operation. The MIRC has always been a Foundry participant and its five main ARISCs are Army Foundry sites. However, driven by the Army Force Generation process, the focus of the MIRC’s Foundry program is on individual training usually scheduled and conducted outside of the 38 days per year that commanders control. With advent of the Army G2’s Foundry 2.0 concept, that mentality changed.

The current focus of the MIRC’s Foundry 2.0 program is to enable collective training during BAS and AT. Centered around ASCC Live Environment Training opportunities, the MIRC embeds its Soldiers into INSCOM MIB(T) on long tours in order to develop expertise. Success comes by applying restrictions on the tours the MIRC pays for. Before the MIRC invests in a tour the supported battalion commander has to demonstrate how the expertise gained by a Soldier will be used to train his/her formation during BA and AT. In essence, the MIRC uses Foundry to build an adjunct faculty for BA and AT. Therefore, Soldiers on tours are typically restricted to home station and embedded via reach, which highlights why the vast majority of the effort previously described centered around connectivity and stationing. Finally, supported commanders must also demonstrate how MIRC dollars spent will equate to increased Mission Essential Task List (METL) proficiency.

This philosophy was put through a test in FY 2014 when the MIRC developed a pilot focused on the relationship between MIRC TSB (a total of 1,260 Soldiers) and INSCOM MIB(T). In total, the MIRC spent a little over $3 million from two funding sources to put 86 Soldiers on tours of various lengths. At the onset, each Soldier on tour was training three additional Soldiers. By the end of the fiscal year, six Soldiers were being trained for every Soldier on tour. Collective training events rose from an average of 18 per month to an average 55 per month involving roughly 500 Soldiers per month.

As a result of these events, TSBs reported an increased level of readiness on Key Collective Tasks (KCT) that support battalion’s METL 89 times, and four of the five TSBs reported an increase in METL proficiency in seven instances. In all, TSBs used the program to work on 64 percent of the KCT that supported their METL. Return on investment statistics also pointed out that the program was hitting a respectable percentage of the pilot population at the right ranks. 44 percent of TSB Soldiers received training during the FY and roughly 84 percent of the training was provided by E7s and below. Sixty percent was provided by E5s and below.

The success of the program continues in this 2015. To date, 92 MIRC Soldiers have been put on tours of various lengths. The current training ratio is about eight Soldiers trained for every Soldier invested in.

The Foundry relationship has borne fruit on the AC side of the house as well as the training previously discussed is predominantly on-the-job (OJT) training when 38-day-per-year Soldiers show up for BA. This once-a-month “surge” support has been remarkably well received. Three of the five Regional Operation Companies (ROC) that support MIB(T) have been assessed as being highly proficient by MIB(T) commanders based on the real world support they provided the ASCC. In one instance a brigade commander assessed, in writing, that the TSB ROC that supported him was wartime proficient.

And as success breeds success, capabilities quickly expanded. For example, during FY 2014 the success achieved by the 301st TSB in support of the 500th MIB(T) expanded into three additional mission areas, to include providing opportunities for 301st CI and HUMINT Soldiers. This fiscal year that success has bred concepts to incorporate 301st Signals Intelligence supporting NSA CSS Hawaii from their Phoenix Reserve Center. Similar results can be written about every TSB supporting every MIB(T).

Despite these successes the program still has a way to go as key weaknesses continue to provide opportunities for improvement. For example, and as alluded to earlier, most of the support provided revolves around ACE analytical support. Only 17 percent of the support provided in FY 2014 involved elements outside of the ACE. Additionally, the MIB(T) relationship is not currently robust enough to provide opportunities for MIRC Battlefield Surveillance Brigade collection battalions (soon to become EMIBs) and interrogation battalions.

To overcome this, a number of initiatives are under way to holistically train “hard-to-train” disciplines. For example, based on great support from INSCOM, MIRC interrogation battalions cycle through the INSCOM Detention Training Facility during battalion level culminating training events during AT. This is critical since MIRC interrogation battalions are the only organizations within the MIRC expected to mobilize, deploy and fight as a battalion. The MIRC is also in the process of designing a MIRC driven exercise as a catch all to assess all MIRC collection capacity not afforded the opportunity to collectively train in a field setting during any given fiscal year. The exercise, named “Always Engaged,” will be conducted at Camp Bullis, Texas where low density, hard to come by equipment not typically available for training will be stored and maintained.
As the MIRC moves forward, it will continue to be challenged to adapt its new training philosophy as new capabilities come on board. For example, though the new EMIB construct will relieve the difficulty in training CI and HUMINT Soldiers as those authorizations decrease, the need to train and ready 16 PED platoons takes its place. Highly dependent on having the correct architecture, training PED in a 38-day-per-year construct is perhaps the most daunting challenge the MIRC will have. Therefore, the MIRC staff is looking at a variety of methods to ready the PED force from developing a series of volunteer rotations for real world requirements, to developing a virtual training capability such as the IEWTPT.

The command is also in the middle of a pilot program in conjunction with the 116th MI Brigade focused on establishing the brigade’s converged architecture in the MIRC’s Southeastern ARISC. There is much confidence that this effort will succeed, thereby paving the way for MIRC units, with the proper training and certification, to conduct PED from home station. Additionally, the vision is for SEARISC cadre, based on joint standards currently being worked with the 116th, INSCOM, and the Army G2, to eventually become the MIRC’s PED training center in order to provide persistent focus on this perishable, high demand skill.

Conclusion

Nearing a point of evolution, the MIRC is undergoing the most comprehensive and sweeping change in its history. Central to this change is the sustainment of symbiotic relationships with the AC that help create intelligence training opportunities. These opportunities have inherent challenges. The endeavors of getting the right units to the right connectivity, and standing up units in places where connectivity is already in place are complex. Once connected, additional hurdles exist with training and sustaining perishable intelligence-systems skills. Where demand dictates design, the MIRC’s Foundry 2.0 program helps overcome these hurdles by tethering a 38-day-per-year USAR MI force to AC requirements through OJT training at BAs and AT. Through Foundry 2.0 training, the MIRC may continue to provide a trained, equipped, and ready USAR MI force to help meet the intelligence-capacity demands posed by an ever-changing environment. Positioned for success, the MIRC is well postured to address these demands, whatever these demands shall require.

COL Zarbo is currently assigned as the Deputy Commander of the MIRC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He enlisted in the USAR in 1983 and served until his commissioning as a Second Lieutenant, Military Intelligence in 1986. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions as an Active Duty Soldier, Department of Defense Civilian, and Active Guard and Reserve Soldier. His service includes assignments as a tactical intelligence officer for artillery and infantry units as well as senior positions on Departments of the Army and Defense staffs. He also served as a defense analyst focused on international drug trafficking for the Department of the Army and DIA. COL Zarbo’s overseas service includes tours in the Republic of Korea, Germany, Panama, and Colombia. He also deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. His military schools include the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Service Staff School, Western Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation Command and General Staff Course, and the U.S. Army War College. He holds an MA in Organizational Management and an MS in Strategic Studies.

Fort Huachuca Museum

Check out the Fort Huachuca Museum website at http://huachucamuseum.com

The Fort Huachuca Main Museum reopened 25 June. The hours for the museum are 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., Tuesday through Saturday. The Main Museum is closed on Sunday and Monday, federal holidays, Christmas Day, and New Year’s Day.

The MI Soldiers’ Heritage Learning Center (MISHLC) opened to the public on 29 June. Its operating hours are 9:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., Monday through Thursday; 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Friday, and 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.

The MISHLC replaces the MI Museum and is located next to the CW2 Christopher G. Nason MI Library on Hatfield street. It is closed on Sunday, federal holidays, Christmas Day, and New Year’s Day.

The Museum Annex remains closed pending the installation of new exhibits.
The Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC) activated the only Army Reserve Component flagged Military Intelligence Brigade supporting the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) on 16 September 2015. The 505th MI BDE (TIB) is headquartered at Camp Bullis, Texas and consists of 82 COMPO 3 (USAR) and 11 COMPO 1 (AC) requirements for a total of 93 military billets arranged in a traditional brigade staff design. The 505th also has one Operations Battalion, the 549th MI BN (OPS), and one Theater Support Battalion (TS), the 383rd MI BN, totaling 619 authorizations. It is administratively controlled by the MIRC and operationally controlled by USARNORTH with Memorandums of Agreement between the MIRC and the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) detailing specific authorities.

The activation of the 505th is in response to the Chief of Staff of the Army’s directive to provide an intelligence enabler to USNORTHCOM. The brigade concept was approved during Total Army Analysis 15-19 and includes 39 COMPO 1 (AC) billets. The 505th will provide Mission Command and Training Readiness Oversight for assigned and attached units, direct missions in support of Combatant Commander Directed Operational Requirements and deploy capabilities in support of Contingency Command Post deployments. It will also provide intelligence products as a member of the distributed Joint Intelligence Operations Center architecture. The 505th will also grant access to national intelligence community capabilities and products to tactical ground units operating within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). A Mission Area Analysis was conducted by the MIRC, INSCOM, ARNORTH and the Intelligence Center of Excellence to determine the 505th intelligence requirements. This analysis led to the discovery of 361 specific intelligence requirements encompassing intelligence missions such as immigrant screening, protecting the homeland, and transnational criminal organization monitoring.

The 549th MI BN (OPS) conducts multi-disciplined intelligence analysis operations in support of USNORTHCOM/USARNORTH operational requirements. They will provide critical Intelligence analytical support to Theater level intelligence production requirements and support regional training exercises in accordance with Theater Security Cooperation Plans. On order, the 549th MI BN (OPS) provides intelligence analytical support to a deployed contingency operation within the committed AOR. The 549th will be co-located with the 505th BDE HQs at Camp Bullis and will use the production space at the Southwestern Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center for intelligence operations.

The 383rd MI BN (OPS) will be split stationed between Belton, Missouri; New Century, Kansas; Kansas City, Missouri, and Leavenworth, Kansas and will conduct multi-disciplined intelligence operations in support of USARNORTH operational requirements. It will also provide critical Intelligence analytical support to Theater level intelligence production and Intelligence support to Building Partner Capacity and Theater Security Cooperation tasks and to support regional training exercises in accordance with Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Additionally, it provides Counterintelligence, Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and Document Exploitation capabilities to the Army Service Component Commands for use in Force Protection and Situational Awareness missions. They will use the Fort Leavenworth JRIC site for operations, training and contingency mission support.

The activation of the 505th and its subordinate battalions provide robust opportunities for MIRC Soldiers to conduct intelligence operations. This new capability gives the MIRC another high visibility mission allowing for the broadening of our intelligence Soldiers and the satisfaction of helping to defend the homeland.
Introduction

As Army Reserve Intelligence professionals, we’ve balanced guidance from both the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), and Department of the Army (DA) Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 in order to operationalize our force.

“Over the past ten years of war, the Army Reserve has been engaged globally in support of our Army and in service to the Nation, demonstrating we are America’s enduring reserve force of decisive action. In order to ensure we can maintain our unique capabilities and capacity, it is appropriate to “rally” as we move forward as an Operational Army Reserve to Objective (OBOJ) Army 2020 and Joint Force 2020.”

–LTG Jeffery Talley, Commanding General, USARC

“Rally Point 32

“As we look ahead, it is clear the intelligence challenges that our Army and our Intelligence Corps will face will only grow more complex, requiring greater cohesion, interoperability and collaboration across our force. In this effort, Army intelligence 2020 will provide the Army with the force structure, capabilities and skill sets to allow our commanders and our warfighters to move forward to gain access to the intelligence and technology that are available, to answer the critical questions, and, ultimately, to survive and succeed in the complex environments we envision in the future.”

–LTG Mary A. Legere, Deputy Chief of Staff, G2

Army Intelligence 2020

By Fiscal Year 2017, USAR will provide 9,992 MI Soldiers to the total Army Intelligence Enterprise from tactical to strategic. Of that number, the Commanding General (CG) of the Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC) will command 73 percent of the Army Reserve (AR) MI force, while the remainder are found in intelligence positions within other USARC battalions/brigades. The MIRC Commander is also the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) for the CAR. As the AR SIO, the MIRC CG sets policy and strategic guidance for all matters MI in the AR.

With 70 percent of the total USAR MI force assigned at echelons above corps, the Army Reserve Intel Enterprise has had to analyze and assess itself. We are continually evolving and changing the way we do business to continually seek improvements to readiness and the operationalization to the force. To meet the 2020-2025 vision, the Army Reserve is growing by 25 percent. Simultaneously, it is realigning and converting most unit structures to meet the needs of the Army under its “plan, prepare, and provide” via all related planning–strategic, operational, training, and readiness.

“Plan” refers to the regional alignment of Army Reserve theater commands with Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and Geographic Combatant Commands. Figure 1 is a representation of current, future, and pre-decisional USAR MI formations that are regionally aligned throughout the Army Intelligence Enterprise. In the absence of an already aligned force, the USAR is analyzing and planning new units.
**AREC/ARET.** The AR now has planning and coordination elements known as Army Reserve Engagement Cells (AREC) and Army Reserve Engagement Teams (ARET) aligned with each ASCC and the Geographic Combatant Commands. Each contains an intelligence integrator who assists with reserve MI planning, identifies requirements and matches AR MI capabilities with the needs of the ASCC and Combatant Commands.

**505th MI BDE.** In early Fiscal Year 2015, the AR’s 505th MI Brigade, aligned to USARNORTH and USNORTHCOM received its permanent order to activate on 16 September 2015. This brigade, stationed at Camp Bullis, Texas, will have two subordinate AR battalions: the 549th Operations BN (co-located with the Brigade HQ) and the 383rd Theater Support (TS) BN stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Creation of the 505th MI Brigade was in response to Chief of Staff of the Army’s guidance within Total Army Analysis (TAA) 15-19 to provide an intelligence enabler to USNORTHCOM. The 505th MI Brigade activated in the Modular Theater Intelligence Brigade (TIB) design with 619 personnel, most of whom will be inactive drilling reservists–or Troop Program Unit Soldiers. A small percentage of the brigade will be full-time officers and enlisted Soldiers, as well as some civilians.

**Army Cyber.** As new capabilities are required to meet the emerging and evolving cyber threat, the USAR is preparing for the creation of 400 Army Reserve cyber-warriors to support the cyber force. Gone will be the days of the typical one weekend a month battle assemblies as our cyber-warriors provide support to Homeland Defense.

**752nd MI BN.** In Fiscal Year 2014, the AR activated the 752nd MI BN, also known as the USAR Operational CI Activity. The organization is in direct support of the U.S. Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)/902d MI Group capable of surging up to 27 trained and ready Counterintelligence teams in support of Army or Joint requirements.

**Re-stationing.** The AR is re-stationing MI units at or near classified networks to improve training and support operations. AR MI is now actively engaged at 21 of the 26 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) located throughout the continental U.S. The Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs) are missioned as nine JRICs and are among the primary, largest, and most capable sites. Unlike non-Army JRICs, ARISCs will also be fully connected to the Army’s Trojan network and have robust DCGS-A capabilities at all ARISC sites. Moving Soldiers to ARISCs and JRICs for training and operational support will no longer be the restricted to only those units fortunate enough to be near one of these sites. Nearly all AR MI units will be within range of sites such that Reach and Overwatch via JWICs, SIPR, NSANet, CENTRIX-K, and DNIU can be incorporated into operations and training.

**Conversion.** Not all units are affected by re-stationing actions. However, virtually every MTOE BN design in the MIRC has changed and is converting structure with September 2016/2017 E-dates. All INSCOM aligned MI BNs: 301st, 323rd, 345th, 368th, and 377th are converting to new Theater Support BN designs and BfSB MI BNs. The 321st, 325th, 373rd, and 378th are converting to the new Expeditionary MI BNs (E-MIBs).

“Prepare” describes how the Army Reserve trains, assesses, and certifies Soldiers, leaders, and units for pre-planned and contingency missions.

**Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF).** AR MI and the MIRC have prioritized resources towards RAF, particularly TIBs aligned MI BNs to increase relationships, develop train-
The MIRC Foundry 2.0 Program. This program is focused on improving units’ METL proficiency and Soldier readiness through collective training conducted at ARISC platforms and during LET/OIS missions. Soldiers participating in embedded support missions are expected to export that real world OIS experience back to their units and teams during IDT and AT events and train their fellow unit and team members on their experiences with associated Tasking, Collecting, Processing, Analyzing, Exploiting and Dissemination processes—a true Train the Trainer process to “Invest in 1 to Train 10.” For all units, the train-the-trainer philosophy is a key enabler for maximizing the limited training time available during IDT weekends and AT.

Unit commanders receiving Foundry dollars must justify their use of Foundry resources by communicating the return on investment based on METL-based readiness gains. The end state was the development of local cadre capable of training and integrating the traditional part-time force to answer AC requirements. The LETs targeted METL weaknesses at MI Team levels. This provided a versatile mix of capabilities that met real world AC demand. What followed was intelligence output where aligned units were actually producing for their mission partners. This not only created NCO led “adjunct faculty”, but also developed regional expertise for all Soldiers. If you took a snapshot in time of total MIRC Soldier intelligence support conducted to date this fiscal year, that number would be 43,230 mandays (As of 15 February 2015). This is the equivalent of nearly 360 Soldiers on AD for first 120 days this fiscal year.

PED. Two E-MIB HQs will activate on 16 September 2016 in response to the directive in the TAA Fiscal Years 2016-2020 Army Structure Memorandum. The E-MIB, an expeditionary force, is organized to accomplish specific intelligence enterprise activities in a joint operations area, and has the mission to conduct multidiscipline intelligence operations in support of corps, division, or JTF operational requirements. These brigades will each Mission Command two E-MIBs located at Fort Devens, MA; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; Orlando, FL, and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. The E-MIBs will have four Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) platoons co-located with the E-MIBs.

With the conversions, activations, and re-stationing actions ongoing, another challenge for AR MI will be the development of sound training for the new E-MIBs and their subordinate PED Platoons. Recognizing the future requirements, the MIRC and the Southeastern ARISC are leading the development of a PED Program of Instruction (POI) that is feasible within the environment of the AR MI forces (fits the typical training days of an AR MI Soldier and still train and qualify those Soldiers on PED). The POI is being developed in conjunction with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Army GEOSTBN, and the 116th MI Brigade. The SEARISC already has the necessary cadre, space, connectivity, and systems only requiring PED-specific intelligence architecture to fully enable this AR MI PED training location. Once the PED-specific intelligence architectures to enable the facility is complete, the site will train Soldiers, while simultaneously answering real-world PED requirements.

Training Highlights. The MIRC and AR MI currently provides five of the seven ASCCs and TIBs with a TSB Support BN. With the “Prepare” and Foundry 2.0 initiatives (discussed previously), AR MI TSBs can effectively...
integrate with INSCOM TIBs. This results in improved training for AR MI units and greater accessibility for RAF units (i.e., TIBs and ASCCs), while exposing units to actual mission requirements that minimizes pre-mission and pre-mobilization requirements. By 2017, all seven ASCCs will have an AR MI TSB. (ARNORTH and NORTHCOM will, in fact, have an AR flagged TIB with a TSB and an MI Operations Battalion).

Concurrent with AR MI and the MIRC’s increased emphasis on collective training, the MIRC Intelligence Skills Training (MIST) program is designed, as a part of AR MI’s Foundry strategy, for units to access individual training courses to ready Soldiers for MI teams and collective training. This program provides technical intelligence training by an experienced ARISC cadre of full-time trainers to AR, ARNG, and AC MI Soldiers. MIST provides MI Soldiers of all intelligence disciplines with training to sustain and enhance perishable skills. This training is available and executed based on the specific METL training needs of the unit commanders.

**EXERCISE Globally Engaged.** This AR MI exercise focuses on operational/non-rotational MI units’ (MIGs/SIGs/AREs, etc.) capability to plan and execute tactical to strategic intelligence operations using current intelligence architecture. This exercise is designed to improve training readiness of MIRC formations and Soldiers through execution of OIS, LET, and reach-back support using MI weapons systems pointed at real world, regionally focused mission data, in support of Combatant Commands and the Intelligence Community worldwide. This event provides constructive credit for participating unit’s CTE requirements.

**EXERCISE Always Engaged.** This AR MI exercise develops and sustains MI Soldier technical skills by focusing on Corp and Theater-level intelligence operations. It is designed to train and evaluate rotational MI MTOE units and low-density sections/teams from non-rotational MI units in a fully integrated, multi-site, multidiscipline training environment.

“The Provide” focuses Army Reserve Soldiers and units on rapid responses to global requirements.

**Shaping the future Force.** By 2017 the AR MI force will have grown by ~1,500 position (+20 percent) and increased its force structure from 12 to 17 deployable MI BNs and from 0 (zero) to 3 deployable MI BDE HQs. Seven of seven ASCCs will have a Theater Support BN and four of the six geographical combatant commands will have an aligned MI ARE unit. AR MI force growth includes adding 2 Interrogation BNs, for a total of 4 Interrogation BNs, where all are regionally aligned.

**Intelligence Architecture.** The MIRC and AR MI have (and are) intensively working to breaking new ground and barriers so that the MI weapons system (DCGS-A) has a robust presence at all nine ARISCs. Further, the MIRC is pressing to ensure these systems are synchronized and pointed at real world, regionally focused mission data. Once these efforts are fully mission capable at all sites, AR MI and MIRC units will have interoperability with all AC/RAF aligned commands and units, ASCCs, and all TIBs. AR MI forces will be able to plug in from any ARISC site during any drill, AT, or other active duty period. They will be able to train, as their AC counterparts train and they will be able to provide tasked operational support (Reach and Overwatch) as a part of collective training.

**Mobilization.** The AR MI enterprise has the capacity to rapidly mobilize multiple units and several thousand AR MI Soldiers to satisfy DoD and Army contingency requirements. The pool of AR MI units, teams, and Soldiers is, however, not without limits. The AR MI force is designed to support contingency operations, as limited by and based on TAA rules of allocations (by design), specific Request For Forces (by need), and DA and FORSCOM’s direct guidance. As such, the AR MI force is as tailorable as the AC MI force.

**End State: USAR/MIRC 2025 Vision**

An enduring operational force, the regionally aligned MIRC produces intelligence in support of Theater intelligence requirements and presents relevant and trained Army Reserve MI formations and Soldiers in support of Combatant Command requirements worldwide. Stationed across the U.S. and in the United Kingdom, MIRC units access national capacity and provide strategic depth while using current intelligence architecture systems to provide real world intelligence and relevant training.

---

14 Military Intelligence
Introduction

Though the general concept of a federal reserve can be found in all American conflicts since the American Revolution, it wasn’t until 1908 that a formal federal reserve became a permanent part of the Army—today’s U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). Four years later, in 1912, a Regular Army Reserve in addition to Medical Service was established. General organization was revised in 1916, with the creation of Officers and Enlisted Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers Training Corps. In 1917, the original Medical Reserve Corps merged with the new Officers Reserve Corps. It is surprising to many that intelligence was formally added only three years later (1920) to the AR. Its presence in the AR has ebbed, flowed, surged, and receded over time, but it has been a part of the AR for 95 of its 107 year history.

First Steps in Army Intelligence

Portions of this new reserve were first called to duty in 1916, as a result of Pancho Villa’s raids into U.S. territory. This became a good test for the new AR prior to the U.S. entry into World War I. The Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) established in 1917 for the First World War was partially formed from reserve officers who had at least some experience with counterintelligence (CI) related skills. There were, however, too few of them and they were largely limited to “on-the-job” training. Recruitment to build the CIP for the war came from recent recruits and from the nation’s large civilian population with applicable skills.

In 1920, U.S. land forces were reorganized into the Regular Army, a National Guard, and an Organized Reserve (Officers and Enlisted Reserve Corps). Simultaneously, intelligence was recognized as a function of the new Officers Reserve Corps and a military intelligence (MI) reserve was established within it. With this step the reserve became a way to expand the number of MI specialists in time of war. Though the size of this force was very small, this was the formal start of MI in the AR.

Between the world wars, AR MI assisted in building at least a small training base for the Army. An MI Officers Reserve Corps (MIORC) was established from a group of World War I veterans associated with MI (1923) and a MIORC correspondence course was initiated to standardize combat intelligence training and conduct. By 1933, the MI Division had only added four basic courses for MI reserve officers. In 1930, the newly formed Signal Intelligence Section did add extension courses for reserve officers such that a cryptology manpower pool might be available for wartime mobilization. Exams were also written to test the language capabilities of MI active and reserve officers. These efforts, unfortunately, were to prove of limited value during World War II, as they were not adequately developed. Still, MI reserve officers and personnel from the Military Intelligence Division staff were successful trainers at the new MI Training Center that standardized training at Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

At the end of World War II, MI planners recommended a peacetime organization for MI, based on the principle that a more efficient system was needed before a war begins and that key assets were only resident in a too small pool of reserve officers. One of their concepts was the creation of an MI Corps. An MI Corps, however, would have to wait 42 years before it was finally formed. MI and Army Security Branches would come sooner, as these branches would be authorized in the AR after only a seven year wait (1952). Unfortunately, it would be a 17 year wait (1962) before MI and Army Security Branches would be recognized for the active Army.

Another recommendation and initiative after World War II to integrate greater AR MI support arrived via the formation of 50 AR MI Detachments (MIDs). The mission of these units was to provide focused intelligence support utilizing expertise from specific universities, professions, and other specialized groups. Eventually, these small support units would be aligned to support analysis functions at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). Later, they would be reformed into today’s DIA MIDs and NGIC MI Groups (MIGs) and used as templates to build the current MI AR Elements (AREs) in support of European, Central, and Pacific Combatant Commands.

Post-Korea and Post-Vietnam Downsizing

AR MI has not only evolved along with the complex changes in Army intelligence over the years, but also with the changing nature and strategy for the AR as a whole. In 1947, there were 22 combat divisions in the AR; but by 1963 that number had been sliced to 6, one per each of the regional Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs). Some combat units would endure for another 28 years, but the nature of the AR was forever changed. This is relevant to the AR
Military Intelligence

MI story, as many of the previous divisional organizations would retain their colors and be reorganized to form small regional C2 headquarters for the AR. Twenty CONUS Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) were formed and assigned to the geographic CONUSAs to provide C2 to all AR units in that region—including AR MI units. This generic and regional peacetime C2 would endure for the next 40 years.

AR MI units changed to match the times and to stay in stride with changes in Army strategy. In 1950, the new plans for an Army Support Agency (ASA) were developed and drawn up. As a result, ASA general reserve units were aligned to ASA’s above field army levels. For the Korean War, four MI Service groups and ten MI Service battalions were activated in the Organized Reserve Corps (which was formally redesignated the U.S. Army Reserve in 1952). However, at the end of the Korean War, it was determined that MI groups and battalion sized AR MI units were not needed and all were inactivated. For a time, MI in the AR was reduced to small detachments focused on CI, censorship, and strategic research and analysis only. An Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion was activated in 1959 as the first MI battalion in the reserve since the Korean War.

During the Vietnam War, the Reserve was unable to fully participate or offset gaps and shortages in the active component (AC). Though there was a substantial MI presence in the Reserve, civilian leadership and the administration declined to deploy them. It may not have mattered, as reserve unit readiness was very low. In fact, an ASA CG deemed the ASA reserve units “almost useless.” Still, with the great reductions on the active Army at the end of Vietnam, it seemed reliance and resources for AR MI would have to eventually increase.

In the late 1970s, the new Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) concept was introduced to integrate ASA, MI, and Special Security Office organizations into CEWI battalions at the division level and CEWI groups at the corps level to be controlled by field commanders. By the late 1980s, AR MI unit structures also reflected the CEWI design; but the intensive equipment, skills training, and resource requirements proved difficult to ready in the AR resource and C2 environment of the day.

Early Reserve Intelligence Training and C2

As the AR MI entered the 1980s, there were few intelligence resources at its disposal. It was, however, included in a new intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program that was instituted to improve AC and RC MI readiness. REDTRAIN would include temporary duty to units with operational missions and sending training resources to units. Executing REDTRAIN was challenging, as MI units and Soldiers were still “buried” under layers of AR regional C2. It would not have been uncommon for an AR MI unit to report to an MP Brigade that reported to a theater logistical support command that relied on the command and control of a regional ARCOM for formal authorities and directives guidance, as well as resource authorities for all annual training, schools, or other types of active duty orders.

In what would prove to be key for the future AR MI force, five Consolidated Training Facilities (CTFs) were established by Forces Command’s regional CONUSAs in 1981. These facilities were to focus on individual MOS skills training, to include MI. In 1990, CTFs evolved into Regional Training Sites-Intelligence (RTS-I) to enhance and improve the collective and individual training of MI units and Soldiers. Five years later (1996), with a new emphasis on mission-related training and real-world MI and operational intelligence support (OIS), the RTS-I were redesignated as Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs). They were also assigned an MI Lanes training mission for AR MI and enhanced National Guard units. The evolution of ARISCs from CTFs and RTS-Is has proven invaluable. Since 1981, the nine ARISC sites (five main facilities and four smaller sites) became well-resourced with robust training and operational systems, as well as permanent training staffs.

The 1980s also saw the first attempt to improve the C2 of AR MI units. In 1985, the USAR 2nd Army MI Command was established. This effort was initiated by the 2nd CONUSA and, during its short existence, provided C2 of all MI units in the southeastern U.S. Though effective in improving MI planning and exercise support for four CEWI units and an aerial exploitation company, it deactivated in 1990. Though it was ahead of its time, it did plant the seed for future efforts to establish a lasting MI headquarters for AR MI units.

Significant changes continued into the late-1980s that would affect the AR MI force. In 1986, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command’s multi-discipline groups were re-designated as brigades—today’s Theater Intelligence Brigades (TIBs). AR MI Theater Support Battalions were formed and aligned to augment those TIBs. The MI Corps was finally activated in 1987 and that same year the Army Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Target Acquisition Master Plan (AIMP) was published as a new plan for systems and organizations for high-tech warfare.

Reserve Readiness Issues

AR MI units played only small roles during the 1990/91 Gulf War and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Lack of readiness was the main reason, although individual Soldiers did contribute and reinforce two deployed Corps CEWI brigades and divisional CEWI units. At the same
time, a 1990 DOD IG report found almost all RC intelligence units as underfunded and unable to fulfill wartime requirements. Resource levels were certainly elements in AR MI’s readiness issues; but it was also speculated that the AR regional C2 model may also have been a factor.

A hopeful new resource emerged in 1993 with the Defense Intelligence Reserve Program (DIRP). DIRP provided funding to integrate reserve intelligence assets in support of active intelligence requirements within the intelligence community (IC). The name of the program was later changed from DIRP to the Army RC Intelligence Program (ARCIP). By 2000, changing priorities led to a steady de-emphasis of ARCIP at the DA level. Ultimately, what remained of the program was terminated in 2005 and funding lines were transferred to the new Foundry program. ARCIP remains the only attempt to provide programmed funding specifically for operational reserve MI support, though it did have a positive and secondary effect on AR MI readiness.

A tremendous boost to AR MI came in 1994 with a directive signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense titled the Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements (PURCIE). It mandated an implementation plan for the integration of the reserve forces into IC intelligence systems and support. It called for the reserve to improve readiness through peacetime engagement by filling operational intelligence shortfalls. PURCIE revolutionized support from the RC and led to the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP) with its Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs). A by-product of PURCIE added a provision in the Title X U.S. Code for employing MI support using a specific funded reimbursable authority. This very effective process allowed (and allows) AC commands/agencies to provide their funding (O&M) in exchange for reserve active duty orders. Since established in Title X, AR MI has been able to maintain hundreds of Soldiers on active duty in support of Army and DoD IC requirements each year. The 1994 AIMP publication seemed to agree with this new utilization concept, recommending an emphasis on interacting systems that would allow for a smaller active MI force and a greater reliance on reserve forces.

The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program

JRIP was formally established in 2000 and replaced PURCIE as the overall term for this initiative. JRIP would support readiness and requirements for intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination by enabling RC intelligence support from personnel in any reserve duty status. JRICs provided connectivity and systems to reserve intelligence facilities such that units across the U.S. could improve readiness through realistic training and direct operational support to the IC. The JRIC mission was (and is) a key mission set for RC intelligence facilities and affiliation with JRIP gains first class connectivity and systems support and training for ~28 JRICs across the U.S. From these sites, RC intelligence personnel provide virtual support to nearly all members of the Army and DOD ICs. Unfortunately, JRIC application to Army IC requirements was limited, due to system policies and compatibilities.

Though JRICs have had very positive effects on AR MI elements aligned to joint commands and national agencies, they did not directly address Army intelligence requirements. Until 2012, the Army provided little of the MI connectivity and associated hardware at ARISCs, though the Army did reap some secondary training and support benefits. The Intelligence Readiness Operational Capability (IROC) concept, begun in 2010, assisted greatly in adding Army MI communications to ARISC sites. With robust TROJAN and DCGS-A capabilities now being added, AR MI units will be able to train with and support aligned Army organizations from any duty status from all ARISC sites. Unit readiness and advances in operational support for the Army through the MI weapons system (DCGS-A) is now achievable. Improved training and operational support is already improving between AR MI units and their aligned TIBs and ASCC G2s.

As JRIP was forming, another attempt was made in to consolidate AR MI units under MI AR C2. Approval was gained in 1997 to stand up separate C2 headquarters for AR MI units in CONUS: the 259th Group (West) in Phoenix, Arizona and the 505th MI Group (East) at Fort Gillem, Georgia. However, as the AR’s regional commands retained authority for all infrastructure and resources, these Groups were not empowered to effectively provide or execute C2. As a result, they did not endure and by 2000, were already being deactivated. The USAR command with its G2 staff was created in 1991; but AR MI units remained under a regional C2 system that could not well manage or support MI OIS, programs, relationships, or IC communications.

Advent of ARNG MI Units

No AR historical summary can omit the 1993 Army Off-Site Agreement made by senior leaders of the active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), and USAR. The agreement re-focused RC missions and established that the ARNG would generally be oriented towards combat arms and division level combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS); and the AR would specialize and focus on CS and CSS at corps and above levels. All remaining combat and Special Forces in the AR were inactivated as a result of this agreement. A policy change from the Director of the National...
Security Agency also removed a previous restriction of Signals Intelligence capabilities in ARNG structures.

As a result, AR MI units previously aligned to ARNG divisions and brigades were inactivated and new ARNG MI units were created. The effect slashed AR MI structure from the early to late 1990s from nearly 10,000 AR MI positions in 1991 to barely 5,000 by 1998. A later 1990s MI force design update further outlined reductions to AR MI structure that would take AR MI strength to less than 4,000 positions by the year 2000. This 60 percent reduction in structure was painful for the AR, as it seemed in direct contradiction to other simultaneous actions calling for greater reliance and responsibilities on AR MI. However, before the attacks of 9/11, the reduction in AR MI forces began to stabilize and to reverse with proposals for new CI and Human Intelligence structures.

AR MI Command Established

After 9/11, and after 84 years and two prior attempts, a lasting AR MI command was finally established in 2004. That year, the MI Readiness Command (MIRC) entered provisional status and formally activated the following year (2005). As the AR began moving away from generic regional C2, the MIRC acted as the AR’s test bed for operational and functional commands in the AR. As it was the first attempt by the AR to abandon its regional approach to the C2 of AR units, it was experimental and controversial. As such, there was a high degree of visibility from AR leaders, as operationalizing and functionalizing the USAR was not favored by many. The MIRC, unlike previous efforts to build AR MI C2, would be made a capable AR headquarters, as it would have authority over resources applicable to its own subordinate units without the supporting infrastructures of a regional command.

USARC approval of the MIRC was based on an assumption that the MIRC HQ and staff could act as the G2 staff for USARC and OCAR. In fact, much of the structure “bill” for the original MIRC headquarters was paid using the positions from the previous USARC G2 staff. Flaws in this assumption were noted within the first few years of the MIRC’s existence, and the assumption was later invalidated in a 2010 manpower survey. However, the MIRC CG is formally recognized by USARC and OCAR as the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) to the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), such that the MIRC CG/SIO sets policy and strategy for all MI in the AR directly for the CAR. To correct the flawed planning assumption, the CAR approved a plan in 2013 to establish a new AR G2 staff (for USARC and OCAR). This G2 staff, once fully developed, will fill gaps in planning and coordination technically left vacant since 2004.

The Way Ahead

If growth is a primary indicator of success, then the AR MI force has been extremely successful over the last decade and a half (since 9/11) and reliance on the AR MI force appears now to be indisputable. After the blow to AR MI strength in the mid and late 1990s, AR MI structure began increasing and becoming more relevant in relatively small increments. Two interrogation battalions, a CI battalion, and CENTCOM and EUCOM MI AREs, were added between 2002 and 2013, for example. However, from now through 2017, AR MI and the MIRC will go through an explosion in growth and add up to seven more battalions, three MI brigade headquarters, and approximately 1,500 additional positions. When this period of growth is completed, AR MI may again approach the 10,000 MI authorization level of 25 years ago.

This period of rapid growth not only presents great opportunities for the AR, it also poses some extraordinary challenges. Not only is AR MI establishing new units, it must reorganize most of its existing units, while relocating many to better leverage ARISC sites for training, OIS, and relevance to the Army IC’s requirements. This is being attempted while the Army and AR face a severe restricted resource environment. Routine AR infrastructures and processes will be taxed to their limits in order to respond effectively in retention, recruitment, full-time support, training, facilities, etc. The challenges are indeed large in the extreme and it will take time to fully absorb the changes and attain stability for the force. However, the opportunities for improvements to training, readiness, OIS, and relevance are equally high. Success will depend on continued sound but innovative planning with adequate resources from which to build and maintain this larger AR MI force. With time, pressure, and some patience, it will succeed.

References


Colonel Elizabeth Coble, Military Intelligence Officer, 19 May 2015.


AR 71-32, Force Development and Documentation, 1 July 2013.


Department of the Army, Historical Summaries, CMH.
Background

The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is the Army’s Force for Dominant Intelligence in the Land and Cyberspace domains. Its mission is to execute mission command of operational intelligence forces; conduct worldwide multi-discipline and all-source intelligence operations; deliver advanced skills training, linguist support, and specialized quick reaction capabilities. It also conducts intelligence-related logistics, contracting, and communications in support of Army, Joint, and Coalition commands and the National Intelligence Community. The Reserve Component (RC) is fully integrated within INSCOM and is vital in enabling INSCOM to sustain its mission.

INSCOM has a unique structure that includes a series of relationships with the RC and a number of units that include both active and reserve Soldiers. RC integration within INSCOM starts at the top with the second highest position, the Deputy Commanding General, filled by a RC Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA). INSCOM’s MI Brigades (Theater) or (MIB(T)) are multi-component (multi-compo) with full time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Soldiers assigned as Deputy Brigade Commanders, Senior Intelligence Analysts, and Operations Officers. Part-time RC support is provided by Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers assigned in S1, S4, S6, Staff Judge Advocate, and Public Affairs Officer positions within the brigades.

INSCOM also has a Reserve Programs (RP) Directorate led by an O-6. The RP office manages over 200 RC Soldiers assigned to INSCOM and almost 300 Soldiers on long-term orders. These include AGR, TPU, and IMA Soldiers assigned to INSCOM’s headquarters, MIB(T)s, and functional commands. RC Soldiers on long-term orders, supporting all INSCOM Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) and HQ staff elements, include Soldiers from both the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG).

RC integration and support extends beyond assigned Soldiers and includes “operationally aligned” relationships with the USAR’s Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC). Active Component (AC) units within INSCOM and RC units within the MIRC are aligned both functionally and regionally. The relationships are mutually beneficial by providing INSCOM with much-needed intelligence support and providing the MIRC with operational intelligence experience and training. For example, the MIRC’s 368th MI BN continuously supports INSCOM’s 501st MIB(T) with Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) analysis. The figure below depicts the operationally aligned relationships between INSCOM and MIRC units.

**Mobilizations in Support of INSCOM**

The RC has been an invaluable enabler to INSCOM’s missions through mobilizations. It has succeeded in filling intelligence requirement gaps within INSCOM in all intelligence disciplines and across multiple theaters of operation. This has been the case despite the drawdown in forces and seemingly no corresponding drawdown of intelligence operations and requirements. In Fiscal Year 2015, the RC provided over 300 USAR and ARNG Soldiers to meet INSCOM requirements providing trained, equipped, and operationally ready multi-discipline intelligence force multipliers. This was accomplished by Active Duty Operational Support and Contingency Active Duty Operational Support orders (U.S. Code 12301) or Mobilization (U.S. Code 12302), funded and allocated by INSCOM and Department of the Army (DA) resources.

This equated to over $7 million dollars in RC support for the fiscal year. Support to INSCOM’s MIB(T)s served to enable them in their mission as Army Service Component Command intelligence anchor points and provide support to Combatant Commands in all theaters of operation.
Support to NGIC

The MIRC’s operationally aligned MI Groups (MIGs) (2100th MIG, 2200th MIG, 2300th MIG, and 2500th MIG) provide RC Soldiers to INSCOM’s MSCs and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). Soldiers fulfill operational and strategic intelligence requirements for various intelligence missions and programs. Analysts within the 2200th MIG support NGIC divisions by researching and analyzing information on foreign military equipment, foreign military forces, and regional developments. Analysts within the 2300th MIG provide NGIC with ongoing operational intelligence support to the Special Research Division, Middle East Division, C4ISR, and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Division. Analysts within the 2500th MIG provide NGIC with national strategic intelligence products and intelligence support.

RC Soldiers also support NGIC’s Reach Language Support Program (RLSP). The RLSP is designed to provide reach back language translation as a component of the Document Exploitation program for rapid exploitation and evacuation of the captured material. Soldiers assist with the translation of documents in numerous target languages (Arabic, Persian-Farsi, Korean, Chinese, French, German, Russian, and Spanish).

The RC also provides support to NGIC with Technical Intelligence (TECHINT). Over 250 RC Soldiers are assigned to the Army’s one and only TECHINT BN, the 203rd, whose mission is to provide near-real time intelligence derived from the exploitation of material found, captured, or acquired within a theater of operation. The 203rd establishes the Captured Material Exploitation Center (CMEC), which serves as the DoD directed infrastructure for the formation of the Joint CMEC. It performs duties associated with the Army’s Foreign Materiel Program mission; trains joint and component elements on TECHINT, and conducts emerging TECHINT missions in support of contingency operations. Support to NGIC is derived from the 203rd’s TECHINT collection, production, exploitation, chemical/medical analysis, mobility analysis, weapons/munitions, and warehouse teams and includes a unique set of MOSs such as 14A, 45K, 89D, 91K, 63 series.

NGIC also has over 20 other RC Soldiers providing full-time support as MOSs 35M HUMINT collectors, 35G Geospatial Intelligence Imagery Analysts, and 35P Cryptologic linguists.

Support to Contingency Operations

During FY 2015, INSCOM’s support to Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize and Operation Inherent Resolve included 28 Soldiers from the RC. Soldiers conducted reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition operations to combat insurgent operators of improvised explosive devices. RC Soldiers that supported the mission included OH-58A/C Scout Pilots, C-12 Pilots, and MOS 35G Soldiers.

Counterintelligence Support

During FY 2015, five USAR (TPU and IRR) and 14 National Guard (PA, RI, IN, TX, IL, GA, UT, and MA) Soldiers provided counterintelligence (CI) support to INSCOM’s pilot Army CI and HUMINT Command (ACHC), 66th MIB(T), 500th MIB(T), 470th MIB(T), and INSCOM HQ. These Soldiers were instrumental in determining INSCOM’s HUMINT and CI future force structure; providing CI special agent support at forward bases; providing support to Force Protection activities, and liaising with U.S. Agency and host nation law enforcement.

Support to Theater Operations

RC Soldiers have provided support to all six of INSCOM’s Theater Brigades. Soldiers have augmented border patrol missions for the 470th MIB(T) and SOUTHCOM; analytic reach back support for the 513th MIB(T) and CENTCOM; CI support at field offices for the 66th MIB(T) and EUCOM; administrative and operational functions for the newly formed 207th MIB(T) and U.S. Army Africa (AFRICOM); CI and plans functions for the 500th MIB(T) and PACOM; and long-term analysis and Weapons of Mass Destruction functions for 501st MIB(T) and U.S. Forces Korea.

Support to Unit Activations

RC Soldiers are providing support to the 207th MIB(T) in their initial stationing and stand up efforts. The RC provided personnel to fill a critical gap when the 207th was called upon to perform a mission despite a lack of required AC manning. They ensure continuity of staff processes and command and retention of institutional knowledge until Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the unit. Upon unit activation, these Soldiers will have played an instrumental role in setting the foundation for conducting intelligence collection and exploitation in support of U.S. Army Africa and AFRICOM.

Support to Unit GEOINT Mission

RC support to INSCOM’s 116th Aerial Exploitation Brigade ensures continuity of processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) process through the use of Geospatial...
Intelligence Imagery Analysts and Cryptologic Linguists. This unit was also called on to perform its PED mission despite minimal manning and not reaching FOC. The RC provided almost 40 Soldiers to support their mission and to assist in the operational and administrative tasks of unit activation. RC Soldiers provide support at the PED Center of Excellence (Fort Gordon), Hunter Army Airfield, and Hurlburt Army Airfield. Soldiers directly support DoD National Security taskings related to CENTCOM’s missions.

Another manner in which the RC supports INSCOM in its GEOINT mission is demonstrated through the relationship and support of the ARNG. The ARNG G2, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania National Guard, created a pilot program to support INSCOM’s Army GEOINT Battalion (AGB) requirements. Six Soldiers were placed on duty, trained by AGB, and are now supporting requirements at home-station utilizing locally available networks and resources. This proof of concept is expected to expand in years to come as Army GEOINT requirements continue to grow. This initiative will also allow for greater utilization of USAR and ARNG Soldiers in support of worldwide GEOINT requirements while providing key opportunities to refine technical skills and leverage years of operational experience.

**INSCOM’s Contract Linguist Intelligence Program Support Office**

INSCOM’s CLIPSO is manned and managed entirely by DA Civilians and reservists. The director is an O-6 USAR Soldier with over 20 Soldiers performing duties as operations staff and Contract Office Representatives on long-term orders worldwide. The CLIPSO program provides contract linguist support to Operations Inherent Resolve and Freedom’s Sentinel. CLIPSO also manages Global Intelligence Support Services.

**CAUSE TROPIC**

RC Soldiers provide critical support to a classified intelligence Task Force designed to identify critical vulnerabilities for the disclosure of classified information. INSCOM has the lead for the Task Force and has tasked RC Soldiers to help protect intelligence sources and methods to mitigate potential or actual damage to the Army mission and National Security. These Soldier’s tasks enable security and protection of Army capabilities. The task force is comprised of DA Civilians, AC, and RC Soldiers with an RC IMA Soldier as its deputy.

**Conclusion**

INSCOM Reserve Programs will continue to prioritize the timely integration of reserve support to INSCOM MSCs by integrating RC intelligence capabilities from both the USAR and the ARNG. As fiscal challenges continue, the RC will remain capable of providing a trained and ready force to support intelligence missions worldwide. This integration of RC Soldiers strongly demonstrates the key Army G2 concepts of “No MI Soldier at Rest” and “Intelligence Readiness Operational Capability” and keeps the RC’s MI force relevant and vital to the Army and the Intelligence Community.

---

ATP 2-91.7, “Intelligence Support to Defense Support of Civil Authorities” was published on 29 June 2015. ATP 2-91.7 provides Army doctrine for intelligence support to defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). It is a companion to ADRP 3-28, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities.” ATP 2-91.7 explains how military intelligence Soldiers adapt military intelligence skills and techniques to provide support to civil authorities during operations in the homeland. It also discusses some of the sensitivities, laws, regulations, and policies that govern providing military intelligence support to DSCA and collecting information and producing intelligence within the homeland. This manual describes the techniques intelligence staffs at all echelons use to support situation development and situational awareness for the commander when conducting DSCA. It describes the homeland security framework and the missions and functions of federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector organizations that make up that framework. The primary audience of ATP 2-91.7 is military intelligence Soldiers assigned to maneuver battalion and brigade intelligence staffs. However, this publication provides general information for MI personnel at all levels when supporting DSCA.

ATP 2-91.7 supersedes TC 2-91.7 dated 26 January 2011.

Soldiers can access this publication at [https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/ATP_1.html](https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/ATP_1.html).
Maximizing Reserve Component Intelligence Support  
by Colonel Steve G. Stevens, Army National Guard

Editor’s Note: This is an extract from Colonel Stevens USAWC Program Research Project, 2014 “Maximizing Reserve Component Intelligence Support: Progress, Problems, and Proposals.” The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction
Twenty years ago the Cold War had just ended, the Department of Defense (DOD) budget was being slashed, and troop levels were being drastically reduced. Amidst the cutbacks of the mid-1990s, a clarion call sounded to mitigate the reduction of the Active Component (AC), particularly in the field of intelligence, by increased reliance upon Reserve Component (RC) intelligence. In 1994 the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed development of a concrete way ahead for “Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements.” The resultant comprehensive plan initiated sweeping changes to improve RC intelligence in the areas of facilities, network access, funding, and utilization.

The last big drawdown of active forces after the Gulf War and the peace dividend following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s made it “imperative” to make greater operational use of the Reserve Military Intelligence Force and led to a major expansion in Reserve intelligence infrastructure. The RC already contains approximately 40 percent of total military intelligence force structure and comprises a significant amount of support to the AC. For example, “the Navy Reserve provides more than 50 percent of the intelligence the fleet uses on a daily basis.” All this RC structure and support is provided while consuming only five percent of the total Defense intelligence budget, with RC personnel costing only 80 to 95 percent of the cost of their AC counterparts.

In the two decades since this call for improved use of Reserve intelligence personnel during peacetime, the U.S. has made great strides in facilitating RC intelligence production. The following paragraphs highlight the major policy changes that made progress in Reserve Component intelligence training and support possible.

1994: A Watershed Year
A recent history of progress in RC intelligence support is best examined by dividing it into two periods: pre-1994 and post-1994. Prior to 1994, RC intelligence efforts historically focused almost exclusively on training during peacetime to be prepared for wartime functions, with real world intelligence production the exception rather than the rule. Actual operational intelligence missions were not a priority. Instances of full-time Reserve support were rare. As a prime example of such support, the Naval Security Group Reserve blazed the trail for RC support in the 1970s and 80s by turning training opportunities into mission contribution, showing “what part-time cryptologists could do if given the funds, equipment, and support.”

For the most part, RC operational mission support occurred only incidental to training conducted under a few formal programs. Examples include the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program, CAPSTONE/WARTRACE, and REDTRAIN. Under the IMA program, a small number of intelligence professionals in the Air Force, Army, and Navy Reserves were assigned to billets in AC units or Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). CAPSTONE, later WARTRACE, allowed RC Soldiers and units to “undertake operational intelligence missions as a part of their training” if approved through both the Department of the Army and their respective gaining command.

Another program called REDTRAIN was a “unique one-of-a-kind” Army initiative oriented primarily at the warfighting commands. REDTRAIN assigned RC intelligence personnel to tactical intelligence units and staffs to “sustain and improve the technical/analytical and foreign language skills required to carry out their combat intelligence missions successfully.”

In addition to part-time mission support and training opportunities, there were some instances that demonstrated good use of full-time RC intelligence production. One such effort that continues today is the National Guard Counterdrug Program. In 1990, Air and Army National Guardsmen began providing intelligence support to local, state, and federal law enforcement and DOD and Department of Homeland Security agencies. This program provides National Guard intelligence personnel opportunity to work full-time providing detection, monitoring, tracking, transcription, translation, interpretation, link analysis, financial analysis, and case construction in support of law enforcement or counterdrug/counter-narcoterrorism agencies. With the exception of this full-time Counterdrug support arrangement, the
The aforementioned programs were merely training alignments and opportunities. While they were all beneficial, they were neither sufficiently widespread nor comprehensive.

**Major Policy Initiatives Change RC MI Support**

**USERRA.** RC intelligence support benefited tremendously from a series of major policy initiatives beginning in 1994. The first such change was enactment of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Largely the result of experience with RC mobilizations for the Gulf War, this law sought to facilitate RC return to civilian employment after extended full-time duty. Theoretically, Reservists resume civilian employment without negative impact, “with the seniority, status, and rate of pay they would have attained if they had remained continuously employed.” The intent was to prevent discrimination for military service; however, a net effect was incentivizing increased voluntary full-time RC support to intelligence operations.

**JRIP.** Unquestionably, the single largest boon specifically addressing RC intelligence support also came in late 1994 when the DOD published guidance subtitled “Implementation Plan for Improving the Utilization of the Reserve Military Intelligence Force.” This watershed policy change led to the 1995 establishment of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), bringing with it funding for connectivity to secure networks at multiple reserve locations where RC members could both train for their wartime missions and provide real-world peacetime intelligence production. The SECDEF guidance also provided additional appropriations and a new funding mechanism to pay for additional RC personnel support efforts.

Part of JRIP’s mandate is to bring the intelligence production capability to the RC rather than require the Reserves to send their service members to the infrastructure located at a few central locations. With an initial proof-of-concept site at Fort Sheridan, Illinois and an additional feasibility study at the Utah National Guard Headquarters in Draper, Utah, the program ultimately expanded to its current 27 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs). Hosted primarily at RC Service locations, each site “provides an incredible opportunity” for RC military intelligence forces “to contribute worldwide intelligence support” to the Services, theater commanders, and Defense Agencies. The new connectivity dramatically improved both part-time and full-time RC intelligence requirements.

At the time the JRIC concept was viewed as “revolutionary,” and today the program that sponsors them is still recognized as an innovative “DOD success story.” The new connectivity dramatically improved both part-time and full-time RC intelligence support.

**FRA.** Another key action under the SECDEF plan for Reserve intelligence was supplemental funding for full-time RC support. The DOD provided “additional and significant funding for intelligence contributory support.” More impor-
Military Intelligence

The legal revision, or “1095 rule,” extended the length of time RC personnel could serve on active duty without counting against end strength to three consecutive years, or 1,095 cumulative days out of the previous 1,460 days. This extended tour length significantly expanded the pool of viable RC candidates willing to volunteer to perform intelligence support. This also opened the door for Reserve personnel to accept assignments requiring permanent change of station, rather than having to decline or require the supported organization to pay higher costs associated with per diem for temporary duty. Similarly, the ability to retain RC personnel in full-time status longer greatly facilitated increased subject matter expertise.

**FLPB.** In 2006, two major policy changes significantly improved the plight of RC intelligence professionals and reduced the disparity between AC and RC pay. First, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) transitioned to the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB). In becoming a bonus rather than “special pay,” FLPB eliminated the 1/30th prorating rule which had been a slap in the face disincentive for traditional RC linguists. Papers and even other Reservists serving on orders longer than 139 days, but be paid a lot less. Reserve linguists were being held accountable for maintaining the same proficiency levels as the AC, but received only prorated pay based on the number of days per month they were on orders. With the elimination of prorating, RC linguists who performed their two day drill duty in a particular month and qualified for FLPB began receiving the full monthly bonus amount. Language pay also dramatically increased. From humble beginnings when first approved in 1986 with a maximum of $100 per month, FLPP had increased to a maximum of $300 a month in 2000, and then jumped to as much as $1,000 per month for multiple languages under FLPB. In other words, FLPB became a true incentive.

**BAH.** A second significant AC and RC pay disparity—housing allowance—was also eliminated in 2006. This change reduced the length of time a Reservist needed to be on orders to qualify for the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) from 140 days to 30. Prior to this correction, the RC was paid a much lower BAH II rate for periods of active duty over 30 days up to 139. This meant that RC individuals could be on long-tour orders for months working side-by-side under the same conditions and incur the same costs as AC counterparts and even other Reservists serving on orders longer than 139 days, but be paid a lot less. It was “truly a significant change; one that was long overdue.” While this new parity did not benefit traditional RC members, it had a huge positive effect on the morale and pocketbooks of RC intelligence professionals accepting longer-term intelligence support opportunities.

**Conclusion**

Looking back on the progress of the last 20 years, RC intelligence support is in a much better place than it was two
decades ago. Over the past decade, in particular, all elements of the RC have made “a dynamic shift from a strategic reserve force to an operational force” and “have proven themselves in combat and peace time as relevant and integral” to the total force.28 Perhaps the Navy summed up this principle of support as a training mechanism best: “Units and personnel do not train to support the active force, they train by supporting the active force” (emphasis added).29

Endnotes
1. The terms Reserve Component, RC, Reserve(s), and Reservist as used here include all seven individual components of the U.S. Armed Forces: Air Force National Guard, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Navy Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. Lawrence Kapp and Barbara Salazar Torreon, Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 12 July 2013), 1.
2. Then Secretary of Defense William J. Perry directed that recommendations from the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s report on “Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements” published August 9, 1994, be developed into a sweeping, comprehensive implementation plan. This plan was completed on December 21, 1994, and formally endorsed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense two weeks later in early 1995.

The DOD later codified RC intelligence support established by these documents as policy in Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), DOD Directive 3305.7, February 29, 2000 (later updated as Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), DOD Instruction 3305.07, March 27, 2007) and Management and Administration of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), DOD Directive 3305.8, April 11, 2001. As of this writing, these two publications are currently being formally revised and combined. In 2013 the memorandum was actually cancelled and incorporated into a new DOD Instruction.


10. AR 11-30 Army WARTREE Program, 28 July 1995, 3. The Army CAPSTONE Program was established in 1979 to create planning and training associations between RC units and AC headquarters to better prepare for potential wartime mobilization and deployment. WARTREE replaced CAPSTONE in 1994; however, the ultimate purpose remained the same—to develop cohesive planning associations and to provide training opportunities.
16. Systems include Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), among others.
20. Intelligence overwatch helps providers develop or maintain their skills while serving as a “force multiplier for operationally deployed forces by enabling them to reach effectively to ‘virtual’ partners” to receive intelligence support, reducing numbers forward on the battlefield.


For an official description of overwatch, see FM 2-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 1995), 52.

21. Systems include Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), among others.

20. Intelligence overwatch helps providers develop or maintain their skills while serving as a “force multiplier for operationally deployed forces by enabling them to reach effectively to ‘virtual’ partners” to receive intelligence support, reducing numbers forward on the battlefield.


For an official description of overwatch, see FM 2-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 1995), 52.

21. Systems include Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), among others.

20. Intelligence overwatch helps providers develop or maintain their skills while serving as a “force multiplier for operationally deployed forces by enabling them to reach effectively to ‘virtual’ partners” to receive intelligence support, reducing numbers forward on the battlefield.


For an official description of overwatch, see FM 2-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 1995), 52.


AR 11-6 Army Foreign Language Program, 14 December 2007.


COL Stevens has served on active duty with the Utah National Guard since 1990, including 20 years with the Utah National Guard Counterdrug Task Force, and as a foreign language analyst and intelligence analyst supporting a variety of government agencies, as Training Officer and later as OIC Joint Language Training Center, and culminating as the State’s Counterdrug Coordinator. In 2002, he was part of the Task Force mobilized to provide security for three 2002 Winter Olympic venues. In 2003, he deployed during OIF in support of the Iraq Survey Group where he served as a Company Commander and Liaison Officer over the main effort for site exploitation teams.

He has served in a variety of assignments including in the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) as its Deputy Commander, S3, S2, Brigade Language Section Chief, and Commander, HHC. He has also served as Commander and S3 for the 142nd MI Battalion (Linguist); and Battalion Language Support Officer and Interrogation Section Leader, B Company, 141st MI Battalion (Linguist). He is a graduate of the MI Officer Basic Course, the MI Officer Advanced Course, the CombinedArms Services and Staff School, the Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College Distance Education Program. He holds a BA in Political Science from Brigham Young University, an MBA degree from the University of Utah, and a Master’s Degree in Strategic Studies from the Army War College. COL Stevens assumed duties as the Reserve Forces Director, National Security Agency/Central Security Service in July 2012.

**GREAT SKILL Program**

Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program

**Our Mission**

The GSP identifies, selects, trains, assigns, and retains personnel conducting sensitive and complex classified operations in one of five distinct disciplines for the Army, DOD, and National Agencies.

**Who are we looking for?**

Those best suited for this line of work do not fit the mold of the “average Soldier.” Best qualified applicants display a strong sense of individual responsibility, unquestionable character, good interpersonal skills, professional and personal maturity, and cognitive flexibility. Applicants must undergo a rigorous selection and assessment process that includes psychological examinations, personal interviews, a CI-scope polygraph and an extensive background investigation.

**Basic Prerequisites:**

- Active Duty Army.
- 25 years or older.
- Hold a TS/SCI clearance.

For a full list of prerequisites, please visit our website (SIPRNET http://gsd.dais.mi.army.mil) or contact an Accessions Manager at gs.recruiting@us.army.mil or call (301) 833-9561/9562/9563/9564.
Overview
In July 2013, Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3300.05 was published instructing all DOD entities including the Defense Intelligence Agency, COCOMs, the Services, the Army National Guard Bureau, and all five Reserve Services to fully integrate the reserve components into the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. (Including the Reserve Components Intelligence Enterprise maximizes contributions to intelligence force requirements.) Then Department of the Army G2, LTG Legere directed all U.S. Army Intelligence elements to implement this in a manner that leaves “No MI Soldier at Rest” resulting in “No Cold Starts” at the beginning of the next conflict. Active Army accomplishes this through Reachback and Overwatch support for theaters and deploying formations. The Army National Guard (ARNG) G2 has termed ARNG participation in this effort the Federated Intelligence Program (FIP).

Benefits
The FIP gives ARNG Soldiers an opportunity to provide real world intelligence support to commands. This is a great motivator for Soldiers who want to see a purpose for their intelligence training and real world results for their work. Participating in FIP allows them to work collaboratively with Soldiers from other units and other states. Many of these Soldiers have extensive intelligence experience which they share with less experienced Soldiers who participate in the program. This is a contrast with traditional training where small sections of MI Soldiers are often isolated from other MI Soldiers. The FIP creates an environment of learning and enhances readiness and the skills MI Soldiers will have when their units deploy.

Some reserve component MI Soldiers work for intelligence agencies full time. Connecting these Soldiers and their varying backgrounds and expertise in the FIP has resulted in great collaboration, cross-training, and contacts with other organizations. That collaboration may not have occurred or may have been less likely to occur without the FIP. Unlike collaboration during traditional training, the benefits of collaborating in the FIP can extend over years.

Annual Training (AT) periods spent working in the FIP allows for additional MI specific training that may not get the attention it deserves at home station or in a traditional AT. Maneuver units frequently overlook MI personnel in planning for brigade or battalion level exercises. This can be especially true for lower density disciplines such as Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and Geospatial Intelligence who often get minimal roles if they are included at all. A FIP AT focuses on intelligence skills and provides time for a deeper understanding and review of threats, intelligence systems, the Intelligence Community (IC), types of intelligence, intelligence oversight, and other relevant topics.

Process
Illinois Army National Guard (ILARNG) MI Soldiers are able to fulfill intelligence requirements of a COCOM or Agency during drill weekends whenever they are not required to be at drill by their parent unit. This usually equates to between 8 to 10 drills per year spent entirely on a FIP mission with the remainder used to fulfill mandatory training events such as medical reviews, weapons qualifications, PT tests, etc. Soldiers are usually assigned to a FIP mission for no more than 12 months at a time in order to share this opportunity with as many Soldiers as possible.

A full-time manager is brought on active duty operational support orders to cover the contributions of troops from several states. The Issue Manager will vett and distribute requirements from the COCOM/Agency to each of the states in their area according to the state’s availability during that month. Not every state will have a full-time Issue Manager in their state and may be working under the direction of another state that has that lead role. Each state will have a Mission Manager for each COCOM/Agency they support. This is usually the most senior member of the FIP team and will coordinate participation and validate the capability to meet those intelligence requirements that month. The Mission Manager then assigns tasks to fulfill the intelligence requirements for that month, and provides quality control over products before supplying them to the requesting COCOM/Agency.

ILARNG Partnerships
Presently the ILARNG is partnered with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) J2, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
**AFRICOM.** The ILARNG partnership with AFRICOM J2 began with a section of Soldiers from HHC 33rd BCT conducting AT in 2012. In 2013, ILARNG Soldiers began preparing to provide recurring support during drill weekends. This was ILARNG’s first FIP partnership and the AFRICOM FIP team was the first to encounter some of the challenges involved in FIP support. As solutions were developed, our troops dug into the mission set. ILARNG coordination with AFRICOM was mainly through the Minnesota ARNG that had a Soldier on full-time orders as the AFRICOM Issue Manager to support multiple states. Our troops have been focused primarily on counterterrorism products across various parts of the continent. The ILARNG AFRICOM Mission Manager has been working to expand the kinds of support that ILARNG can provide to the command.

**NGA.** In the fall of 2013 the Missouri ARNG had been working with NGA to establish a partnership wherein ARNG MI Soldiers could enter their facility, train on their systems, and provide support to their mission. ILARNG joined Missouri in this effort just as the program was set to launch and has been reaping amazing benefits ever since. NGA has been very supportive and enthusiastic in bringing our troops on board and has provided terrific instruction on various GEOINT topics. ILARNG Soldiers were divided into teams and assigned to different mission areas to maximize hands-on training opportunities. SSG Dale Kirkendoll of D Co, 766th BEB is the ILARNG Mission Manager for NGA. According to him:

> “Both teams from 33rd BCT are consistently hitting production marks and surpassing each goal they’re given. Striving to hit these goals has sharpened our GEOINT Soldiers’ skills as analysts. Every drill weekend further builds a network of support between NGA and the ILARNG that will provide cohesion and support to any mission we may encounter.”

SSG Kirkendoll’s troops remain excited about this mission even after a year on board, and none wanted to change out. These troops contributed 2,954 hours of support producing intelligence products at the national and strategic level. The ILARNG is looking to expand the number of troops involved for the upcoming year so that more Soldiers can take advantage of this outstanding opportunity.

**USTRANSCOM.** One of the most surprising partnerships to evolve out of the FIP is with USTRANSCOM. Their team is responsible for ensuring the integrity of DOD logistics. USTRANSCOM is expected to remain abreast of many complex topics, sometimes exceeding their organic analytic capacity. TRANSCOM implements full-time Issue Managers at Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) facilities throughout the nation that coordinate National Guard and Reserve support for these requirements. This coordination allows TRANSCOM leaders to delegate non-time sensitive requirements to JRIC personnel. This delegation allows TRANSCOM analysts to address more pressing issues, and often results in very detailed analysis of delegated topics due to the focus of several National Guard and Reserve Soldiers on a specific requirement. ILARNG Soldiers provided 752 hours of support for over a dozen issues between May 2014 and December 2014, all at no cost to USTRANSCOM.

USTRANSCOM’s relationship with the National Guard and Reserve IC is highly flexible, enabling USTRANSCOM to rapidly increase the number of supporting Soldiers in response to world events or changing mission requirements, still at no cost to USTRANSCOM.

The relationship with TRANSCOM is one of the few opportunities to engage certain MI Soldiers for distributed support and the FIP partnership has allowed the ILARNG to leverage a large portion of its MI Soldiers. The support they provide has added to four Joint Intelligence Bulletins distributed throughout the IC as well as other activities. Through hard work and dedication, these Soldiers have proven they are capable of operating at the same level as their active duty IC counterparts in an operational environment. Furthermore, these Soldiers have made themselves a force multiplier within their home units. Upon returning to their regular units, they now possess many of the unique skills required to establish and sustain specialized operations worldwide. The accomplishments of these Soldiers have been so noteworthy that they were nominated for DIA’s 2014 CI Analysis and Production Team Award. Their results set the groundwork for DOD to exploit new opportunities for many years to come.

**Challenges**

An area of potential improvement in the FIP would be to correlate partnerships with states’ regional alignment. Illinois has a strong relationship with Poland, our State Partnership Program nation. We hold joint training regularly both in Poland and in Illinois. Starting in fiscal year (FY) 2016, three of our Brigades will be oriented towards the U.S. European Command under the regionally aligned forces concept. Thus far, none of our partnerships are in our assigned geographic theater. Fortunately, the ARNG G2 has been working towards correcting this issue for Illinois and other states and a new 2016 partnership should be in place by the beginning of FY 2016.

Many MI Soldiers do not have access to SIPR and JWICS at their home station so travel to a SCIF or JRIC is necessary for Soldiers to have access to necessary systems. This forces units to have Soldiers conducting drill at multiple locations and can be a challenge for continuous command and con-
trol. Additionally, not all sites will be available on the same weekend as a unit’s normally scheduled drill. This means that Soldiers supporting FIP from certain locations may have to drill on different weekends and there may not be anyone from their unit available while they are at drill.

Decentralized intelligence operations such as FIP have inherent challenges because training schedules for the supporting units do not always align to the training schedules of the offsite mission managers. Additional challenges stem from transitions when units or individual Soldiers join the mission. State and unit level leadership can mitigate these challenges by supporting offset drill scheduling and providing access to the armory facilities and transportation assets when necessary. Working with neighboring units and states has been tremendously helpful as well. For example, ILARNG Soldiers have occasionally used Missouri ARNG facilities while supporting NGA. Wisconsin (WI) ARNG Soldiers utilize ILARNG facilities regularly while supporting USTRANSCOM, and both WIARNG and ILARNG use an Army Reserve JRIC every month. Only through integration and collaboration can we provide the best training opportunities for our Soldiers and the best possible support to intelligence requirements and ensure No MI Soldier at Rest.

CPT Kirschner is currently the ILARNG FIP Detachment OIC. His past assignments include Commander, B Co 33rd BSTB; Asst BCT S2, 33rd BCT; XO, B Co 33rd BSTB; Platoon Leader, B Co 33rd BSTB, and S2, 33rd BSTB. His education includes the MI Captains Career Course and the Armor Officer Basic Course. CPT Kirschner was deployed to Afghanistan 2009 and 2010.

MAJ Brian McGarry is currently the ILARNG G2. His past assignments include Reserve Forces Office Training Officer, U.S. Intelligence Center of Excellence; MI Readiness Assistance Team Chief, ARNG-G2; Current Intelligence Analyst, NGB-J2, and Watch Team Chief. His military education includes ILE; the Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officers Course; Army Cyberspace Operations Planners Course; Defense Support to Civil Authorities Course; the MI Captains Career Course, and the Armor Officer Basic Course. He holds an MS from the National Intelligence University in Strategic Intelligence. MAJ McGarry was deployed to Iraq in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.
When Sergeant Ken Sterner transferred from Active Duty to the Illinois Army National Guard, he told his Company Commander he planned to leave the Army once his service contract ended in the summer of 2015. Captain Craig Robbins, the Commanding Officer of D Company (MI), 766th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) of the 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT), spoke to SGT Sterner about the unit’s mission and related training opportunities. Five minutes later, SGT Sterner re-enlisted for another six years. SGT Sterner later explained why he had a sudden change of heart. “I’m a 35M Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Soldier who loves what I do. In my last unit, they didn’t have a mission for me. At D Co, everybody seemed to be highly motivated and engaged in their work,” SGT Sterner told his Commander.

According to Major Brian McGarry, G2 for the Illinois Army National Guard, MI training in the state has significantly improved over the past three years, particularly HUMINT training. In 2012, Soldiers of C Co, 341st MI Battalion (BN) (Linguists) in Chicago conducted the only HUMINT exercise in the state. By 2015, this exercise expanded to a series of exercises including Soldiers from multiple units across not just the Illinois Army National Guard (ARNG), but Wisconsin, Indiana, and Missouri ARNG Soldiers, a U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) MI BN, Special Forces, and participation from several federal agencies. SGT Sterner was one of the Soldiers who participated in the 2015 exercise. “As long as realistic training opportunities like this continue to be available, I don’t see myself leaving the Guard,” he said.

CPT Robbins, who spent five years with C Co, 341st MI BN as a Tactical Intelligence Officer and HUMINT Platoon Leader before taking Command of the 33rd’s MICO, now has several low-density military occupational specialties (MOSs) to train. Working with leaders at the Battalion, Brigade, and State level, CPT Robbins has created unique training opportunities for Soldiers who hold MOSs that range from Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operators to HUMINT, Signals Intelligence, and Imagery Intelligence Soldiers. Some of these opportunities, such as the Federated Intelligence Program (FIP), are significantly boosting morale, retention, and readiness in the MICO.

Through participation in the FIP, National Guard Soldiers support global operations and align with national intelligence priorities. They work with the Combatant Commands, Army Service Commands, Theatre Intelligence Brigades, and National intelligence agencies as part of their missions. Select Soldiers from D Company spend the majority of their drill weekends working with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in St. Louis, Missouri, supporting AFRICOM and TRANSCOM from the North Central Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center, or on assignment with units or agencies outside the U.S.

In 2014, the 33rd MICO was only in its first year of providing intelligence support at the national/strategic level and yet its Soldiers provided more than 1,840 hours of intelligence support to a single agency. These Soldiers must also complete an annual Army Physical Fitness Test, a Physical Health Assessment, Individual Weapons Qualification, and other events throughout the year. Intelligence Professionals in the National Guard have to find ways to balance these requirements with the demanding civilian lives they lead, balancing family life, school, and full-time careers, in addition to providing strategic intelligence that supports senior U.S. decision makers.

Like their counterparts in the USAR, National Guard Soldiers perform fifteen days of annual training (AT) each year. The complexity of the MI training environment, to in-
The UAS flight line at Wainwright Air Base in Alberta, Canada. ILARNG Soldiers from D Co, 766th BEB traveled north to participate in Operation Maple Resolve 2015, an international military readiness exercise.

The TUAS Platoon operates Shadow, which provides critical surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for the 33rd Infantry BCT. “It is the enablers within the MICO that distinguish the BCT from the divisional brigades of 10 years ago. The BCT is a highly adaptable, lethal force only if it exploits the capabilities of the MICO. Thus, it is essential for the Brigade to secure and support a variety of challenging and realistic training opportunities for the MICO,” said Colonel Henry Dixon, Commander of the 33rd Infantry BCT.

According to Platoon Leader Chief Warrant Officer Two Andrew Nicholson, the TUAS Platoon flies between 40 and 50 hours during a typical AT period. This year, the Platoon flew more than 150 aircraft hours and 350 crew hours while supporting Operation Maple Resolve. This is the largest military readiness exercise in Canada, and includes more than 6,000 Soldiers from the U.S., UK, and Australia, among others. These training opportunities become possible when leadership at all levels, from the Company through the Brigade and beyond, work together to enhance training and readiness for the force.

“I’ve been waiting many years to do something like this,” CW2 Nicholson said. “We’ve been providing UAS support to Friendly forces while the UAS Platoon from Utah’s 19th Special Forces Group provides the same capabilities to Notional Enemy forces. Our Soldiers are finally gaining experience working with international maneuver units. As part of this exercise, we’ve been able to work with Infantry, Armor, and other combat arms units. We now have the experience required to deploy overseas with very little additional training.”

Supported by Soldiers from the Wisconsin and Pennsylvania National Guard, this is the first time the UAS Platoon from Illinois conducted 24 hour sustained operations in support of major military maneuvers. “This is the best training exercise we’ve had, and it will definitely have a positive impact on retaining our Aviation Soldiers,” said CW2 Nicholson.

With combat deployments rapidly drawing down and budgets tightening across the Department of Defense, the MI Branch offers an abundance of exciting opportunities for those looking to join the Army National Guard. The MI career field will continue to grow in the years ahead, and these Soldiers will remain engaged in the fight while training here at home. Very few careers in the National Guard allow Soldiers to contribute to tactical, operational, and strategic missions on a regular basis; but, for the MI Soldiers of Illinois, nobody is at rest.

CPT Robbins is currently the Commander for D Co, 766th BEB. Previous assignments include Platoon Leader, C Co, 341st MI BN; Tactical Intelligence Officer, C Co, 341st MI BN, and Assistant S2, 1-133rd IN BN. His military education includes the MI Officers Basic Course, BCT S2 Course, OSIRA, and the Tactical EW Operations Course. He is currently completing the MI Captains Career Course. CPT Robbins deployed to Afghanistan in 2011.

LTC Masters is currently the Commander for the 766th BEB. His past assignments include Operations Officer, 40th MEB; S3 Operations Officer, 766th Engineer Battalion, and Commander, 135th Engineer Company. His military education includes ILE, the Engineer Captains Career Course, and the Engineer Officer Basic Course. LTC Masters deployed to Iraq in 2006 and 2007, to Kuwait in 2005, and Iraq in 1991.
The War on Terror significantly transformed the Army’s operational environment. Asymmetric warfare has become the new norm, and today’s Army constantly faces unique and rapidly evolving challenges. Success on the battlefield depends on the ability of Soldiers to communicate in native languages while working within local cultural norms. As a result, Army language professionals have become a key factor in accomplishing the mission. Many of the challenges we face today are further complicated by cultural misunderstandings. Commanders can overcome these challenges by incorporating language professionals who speak the native language and know the local culture. Army linguists have already been through extensive training that exposes them to local cultures, customs, and languages. The utilization of these Soldiers can serve as a force multiplier because they can easily change a foreign individual from friend to foe or vice versa based solely on how our Soldiers are perceived.

Linguists are a critical asset to successful military operations and the Department of the Army has even called them ‘a national treasure.’ The standard to be qualified as a linguist is set at the 2/2 level on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). For non-native speakers, maintaining a 2/2 proficiency on the DLPT may be difficult, and achieving a 3/3 proficiency proves even more challenging. For graduates of the Defense Language Institute (DLI), it can be a very difficult transition from actively studying language in a full-time status to returning to a civilian career or education and attempting to maintain a highly perishable skill set. It is the responsibility of the unit to provide resources to help them succeed. Illinois Army National Guard’s (ILARNG) Command Language Program focuses on this mission, and is rapidly innovating to meet the needs of future National Guard forces throughout the state. The following training plan was implemented in Illinois in January 2014 to provide structure to monthly language training. There are four components: current events, vocabulary quizzes, media, and excursions. In addition to this routine training, all linguists are recommended to attend at least one language refresher or immersion course.

1. **Current Events (1 hour)** - Articles from these categories should be covered during language training.
   - Politics/Government/Military
   - Accidents/Disasters
   - Weather
   - Culture:
     - Music and the Arts
     - Sport
     - Food
     - Holidays

   Each soldier must have a copy of the articles presented. Linguists are encouraged to use news reports in the target language that have audio and accompanying text so they are able listen to the report, answer questions verbally, and then have the chance to review the text and identify terminology or problematic grammar construction.

2. **Vocabulary Quizzes** - Relevant vocabulary and terminology, a minimum of ten terms related to the current events articles are identified and tested at the next language session. All vocabulary lists and quizzes are kept in the language binder.

3. **Media/Cultural Activities** - if more than one hour is allocated to the training session, the second and third hours of language training may include a film, television program, or other cultural activity in the target language. Vocabulary and current events should be incorporated into the training. Other audio resources may also be presented, such as podcasts, radio, books on tape, etc.

4. **Excursions** - Excursions provide linguists an opportunity for practical exercises outside of the classroom. Outings to restaurants, museums, or points of cultural or linguistic importance provide time to immerse oneself in the target language. The language leader submits a plan, which includes: itinerary, personnel, and contact information. Vocabulary and current events must still be incorporated into the training prior to departure from the classroom.

The priority of monthly language training is current events. This section aligns training with the DLPT criteria and improves literacy, pronunciation, and comprehension. Linguists must, at a minimum, be able to comprehend basic news and weather to contribute to the mission.

In addition to monthly training during drill, Illinois recently hosted its first mobile training team (MTT) in over a decade and is expanding MTT support for next year. MTTs are a cost-effective solution for training a group of Soldiers at home station as opposed to arranging travel for each Soldier to another state. This opportunity allows for coordination of training that best fits the schedules of our linguists.
while providing them cost effective interaction with a native educator.

One of the best methods used to enhance language proficiency is OCONUS immersion training. This is not always an option depending on the geopolitical environment of host countries. Immersions with a home-stay provide nearly round-the-clock training and practice. It forces linguists to spontaneously interact with various native speakers. They also gain the perspective of being on the other side of a language barrier. The only downside to this training is that it does involve slightly more risk and can be cost prohibitive for some units. To maximize the gain from an immersion, linguists should have at least a 2/2 proficiency. This allows them to improve exponentially because they already possess the foundation of spelling, grammar, and pronunciation before they arrive in the host country.

When immersion training is not an option, the refresher courses conducted across the U.S., often taught by DLI instructors, give military linguists the next best opportunity to sustain and enhance proficiency. These two to four week programs are critical for simply sustaining language qualified personnel.

The previous ILARNG State Command Language Program Manager (CLPM), Sergeant Stegeman, planned an immersion with Poland, Illinois’ partner in the State Partnership Program. This course focuses on advanced Polish translation and interpretation. We have already completed immersions to Santander, Spain; Montpellier, France; Riga, Latvia, and Taipei, Taiwan. Additionally, Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) opportunities is another avenue for Soldiers to enhance language skills. ILARNG sent linguists to Panama for the first time this year and has linguist ODTs currently scheduled for the next three years. These foreign immersions are a valuable resource for our linguists’ education and professional growth. The few Soldiers that participate in these OCONUS opportunities are then able to share their experiences and knowledge with the rest of the Soldiers in their language group and improve those troops’ capabilities as well.

To supplement the monthly training, immersions, and refresher courses, all linguists are recommended to register for training through the Joint Language University and Headstart to complete training modules. The CLPM disseminates an extensive list of language resources online and also collects resources requests on a regular basis. A new language laboratory with an updated library and functional classroom spaces has improved the atmosphere of language training and renewed interest in the library’s collection. The greatest challenge for the traditional drilling linguist is setting aside the time to independently study the target language on a regular basis. Language training one weekend per month can reinforce good study habits and provide access to resources, but ultimately it is the responsibility of the linguist to take advantage of the resources.

This language training plan has provided structure to training that was previously left up to the linguists and has improved overall language readiness. Continued command emphasis will continue to produce positive results, but a strong CLPM is essential to getting the most out of any state’s language program.

Our previous CLPM, Sergeant Elizabeth Stegeman, arranged and coordinated OCONUS immersions, CONUS based refresher training, and built language training plans for each of the state’s six primary languages. She worked extensively to coordinate varied training and to increase the state’s language readiness. Her claim to fame for most of our linguists will likely be her investigation and resolution to the majority of Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) issues in the state of Illinois. Her actions have resulted in language pay related issues seeing a sharp decrease and the SOP she devised now keeps FLPB actions on track and completed in a timely manner. SGT Stegeman has successfully tested in German, Russian, Polish and Ukrainian without attending DLI. She has also utilized her Russian proficiency to support exercises for federal agencies and 20th Special Forces Group. In December of 2014 Sergeant Stegeman completed her Masters Degree in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Illinois in Champaign. In March of 2015 SGT Stegeman was selected as the Army’s 2014 Language Professional of the Year and will represent our service in the next stage of the competition against the Marines, Navy, and Air Force.

Illinois is always seeking new linguists to integrate into the current force structure. There is a gap in identifying Soldiers
with the key languages listed on the newest language list (See ALARACT 236/2013). Most Soldiers do not realize they can be paid for successfully testing in a language that is listed regardless of billet. Soldiers can receive up to $1,000/month for testing in multiple languages such as Arabic, Tajik, Ukrainian, and many others. CLPMs must reach outside of the Military Intelligence Corps to make inroads with recruiters and commanders in order to educate them about the Army Language Program. Working with recruiters not only helps identify valuable Soldiers that may be coming into the ranks but also serves as another tool for recruiters to attract highly qualified Soldiers using the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus. The approved language list changes every few years so it is important that the CLPM keep state leadership and recruiters informed in order to achieve the best results for all.

SGT McLaughlin is currently the CLPM for the ILARNG. His past assignments include as a Crypto-Linguist, D Co, 766th BEB; Linguist, B Co, 33rd BSTB, and Anti-Armor Specialist, A Co, 1-178 IN BN. His military education includes the Warrior Leader Course; Persian-Farsi Basic PEP, and Crypto-Linguist (Persian-Farsi).

SGT Stegeman is currently an HCT Team Sergeant, C Co, 341st MI BN. Her past assignments include the CLPM for the ILARNG and a HUMINT Collector, C Co 341st MI BN. Her military education includes the Warrior Leader Course and Human Intelligence Collector AIT.

MAJ Brian McGarry is currently the ILARNG G2. His past assignments include Reserve Forces Office Training Officer, U.S. Intelligence Center of Excellence; MI Readiness Assistance Team Chief, ARNG-G2; Current Intelligence Analyst, NGB-J2, and Watch Team Chief. His military education includes ILE; the Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officers Course; Army Cyberspace Operations Planners Course; Defense Support to Civil Authorities Course; the MI Captains Career Course, and the Armor Officer Basic Course. He holds an MS from the National Intelligence University in Strategic Intelligence. MAJ McGarry was deployed to Iraq in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

Joint Service Reserves
by Major Brian McGarry

Traditional National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Navy Reserve units keep to themselves—one service, one command structure, one set of regulations. Each knows the other exists, but is otherwise oblivious to their purpose or command structure.

Most Reservists have little or no experience dealing with personnel outside their specific organization, a disservice to their professional growth as they become complacent with only knowing one way to refer to the restroom (read: latrine, head). Most service members are left reeling in culture shock from their first encounter with another branch. They are surrounded by people using unfamiliar, albeit distinctly military, jargon and wearing uniforms they’re not used to. They have no idea what the rank or appropriate form of address is (read: Petty Officers) or find themselves trying to figure out the correct term for rescheduling a drill date (read: split, RST, re-sched).

But these are all petty differences. After service members overcome the social anxiety of a Joint environment, they’ll find many parallels in training and missions. It behooves service members, particularly leaders, to open a dialog with the other services and find out how they can learn from each other. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is a prime example. The Army and Marine Corps take slightly different approaches to HUMINT (pardon the pun) training which have the potential to complement each other and facilitate professional growth by everyone involved. Strategic Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is often dominated by Navy and Air Force, creating tremendous training potential for Army and Marine Corps SIGINTers to improve their craft and broaden their skills.

Joint training can be easy to facilitate—find a unit that complements your unit’s skills and engage leadership to make a plan that works for everyone. It also helps to find a leader staunchly opposed to paperwork that, if left unchecked, can quickly overrun your efforts to do something outside the box. Give the service members a heads up with an introduction to ranks or branch-specific customs and courtesies (read: properly boarding a naval vessel) that they need to know.

Joint-service training is perhaps the most overlooked opportunity within the Reserve community to give service members a broadening experience. Treat it like any other Joint-unit training, and you’ll be happy with the improvements in mission readiness and service member morale.

MAJ McGarry is the G2 for the ILARNG.
Introduction

One of the greatest challenges facing reserve component MI professionals today is training development. As leaders, how can we provide relevant, engaging, and challenging training to Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Soldiers? One National Guard unit developed and executed an innovative training plan in Fiscal Year 2015 that may help to solve this problem for other units.

The Illinois Army National Guard incorporated four training exercises linked by a common notional operation based on current events in the real world into their 2015 training calendar. Soldiers received training in Military Source Operations, screening, report writing, key leader engagement, interrogation, and debriefing techniques. This article highlights some of the lessons learned throughout the year as these training events were conducted.

Key Aspects of Successful Training

Due to the extremely limited amount of available training time during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) drill weekends, it is imperative to minimize exercise setup, lead-in, and other duplication of effort. By developing a notional road to war used across all training events throughout the fiscal year, C Company, 341st MI Battalion (BN) was able to make the most of Soldiers’ time during IDT weekends. This strategy also helps to simplify the operation from the Soldiers’ perspective—they aren’t forced to re-familiarize themselves with the area of operations, key personalities, and other mission information each month. Rather, they can focus on the tasks being trained for maximum training value.

One of the most important lessons has been the incredible value added by including other units, agencies, and specialties to the training plan and exercise iterations. Tapping into the experience that resides in other agencies and specialties was highly beneficial to the Soldiers who were able to contrast and learn from diverse experiences and approaches. A great aspect of the reserve component is that many Soldiers have full time employment in fields that are beneficial to the unit mission, and can share that knowledge in appropriate venues. The ILARNG was able to tap into Soldiers’ experience with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, undercover police work, and other national agencies. Additionally, coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency and Special Forces provided subject matter expertise for certain blocks of instruction. These training events were not only highly beneficial to the Soldiers, but also exciting and effective since it approached the material from a different perspective.

Beyond using outside resources to enhance training, other units should be incorporated into the training event as well. This improves the realism of each exercise iteration and has been a consistent positive after action review (AAR) comment from Soldiers of every participating unit. For example, the March 2015 MSO exercise included ILARNG Soldiers from...
C Co, 341st MI BN; D Co, 766th BEB; HHC, 232nd CSSB, and HHC, 1-178 IN. Troops from outside the ILARNG came from D Co, 173rd BEB (WI ARNG); D Co, 776th BEB (IN ARNG); G2X, HHB, 35th ID (MO ARNG), and HHC, 378th MI BN (USAR). Working with unfamiliar faces greatly improves role player interaction with collectors and better replicates real world operations where Soldiers will not know everyone they will be working with.

Bringing different units together at the same location can be a challenge in the reserve component as usually there will not be more than one or two units stationed together for many miles, let alone MI assets. Funding travel, food, and lodging can be quite a challenge but is worth the work. Regional training is far more cost effective than sending large numbers of troops beyond driving distance and increases the number of times different units can get together to train.

Oftentimes Soldiers will happily pack into a small GSA vehicle for a long drive, eat MREs, and sleep on a cot on the drill floor for a good training opportunity. Present Soldiers with the opportunity and most will gladly go for it.

HUMINT training during FY 2015 was also enhanced by varying the training environment, adding realism and maintaining Soldiers’ interest. MI Soldiers took advantage of widely varying environments available within Illinois, from highly populated urban areas in the Chicago region to the tactical training area at Marseilles Training Center. This strategy best prepared Soldiers to deploy in support of contingency operations worldwide.

The final—and, arguably most important—takeaway from C Co’s training year was the importance of aggressively seeking opportunities in each month’s training schedule to integrate HUMINT training. “White space” exists in every training schedule. The key to successfully executing a training plan such as this is the ability to positively identify such periods and have a plan at the ready to capitalize on them.

For example, C Co leadership was able to accurately predict large amounts of downtime during the unit’s annual Periodic Health Assessment. While enduring the inevitable pauses that accompany large scale administrative events, role players were scripted so that collectors could practice debriefing skills to set the stage for the yearlong scenario. Other areas that proved successful were incorporating SHARP principles and scenarios into role player scripts. These topics are generally uncomfortable and difficult to navigate, thereby adding further complexity and challenge to encounters with sources while

As leaders, we owe it to our Military Intelligence Soldiers to provide challenging, engaging, and relevant training.
reinforcing an Army priority. When possible, these exchanges were conducted in Soldiers’ target languages. Warrior tasks and battle drills were incorporated into field interrogation training to similarly combine and train multiple skills during the same exercise iteration. Collectors would not simply occupy an interrogation facility and begin running approaches, that doesn’t maximize a training opportunity. Rather, Soldiers would have to gain intelligence from a source or detainee, use that to determine their next objective, tactically move to that location mounted or by foot (while reacting to any threat along the route), and locate their next subject for further action.

Designing the Training

For the National Guard these activities and plans must be created at least 12-18 months in advance to stay in line with Battalion and Brigade training planning timelines. It also means that most of the exercise design and development work needs to be completed by Soldiers in the participating units since in most states there is no higher MI headquarters element to do it for them. Beginning in 2014, the ILARNG assigned MI Soldiers to an Exercise Coordination Team to meet this demanding challenge.

The Exercise Coordination Team committed hundreds of man hours and personal time developing the necessary products for these exercise training events. The Soldiers were handpicked for their experience performing HUMINT operations overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for their high work ethic and motivation. These Soldiers created an overall training scenario based on potential real-world contingency operations and on likely scenarios where Illinois Soldiers and units could be involved. The team then prepared support materials including Road to War briefs, monthly INTSUMs, background social media products, print and video media, voice recordings in target languages, cell phone data for notional CELLEX, data injects, notional friendly orders, and more than 50 character scripts for use across the training scenario. Soldiers rotated through the team after every other exercise iteration to spread the burden and the knowledge required for future training.

These Soldiers played a critical role not only in coordination, but in the execution of each exercise iteration. The Soldiers involved served as members of the “White Cell” Higher Headquarters, delivering injects to the various HUMINT teams and the S2 fusion cell throughout each training event. They coordinated role players for use in the training, including participants serving as refugees, foreign military officers, civilian sources, members of foreign governments, and enemy conventional forces and insurgents. They then ensured the role players tasked with the scripts understood the training goals and methods in order to deliver the most benefit to HUMINT Soldiers involved in the exercise. They also ensured that AARs
were conducted and recorded for the improvement of future exercises, and that Soldiers received follow up information prior to each drill period for the continuity of the exercise. Team members also served as notional Higher Headquarters staff, receiving briefs from HUMINT teams and S2 fusion cells.

Illinois’ ambitious training plans would not have been possible without the dedicated efforts of this team of Soldiers. For their hard work, dedication, and excellent results, the ILARNG submitted the Exercise Coordination Team for DIA’s 2014 HUMINT Training and Education Award.

**Summary**

As leaders, we owe it to our Military Intelligence Soldiers to provide challenging, engaging, and relevant training. An outstanding training plan yields Soldiers ready to support the missions of their state and federal commands, anywhere on earth. Additionally, a challenging and well-executed training plan aids in unit retention. Since embracing these ambitious training plans, retention rates for MI Soldiers in both Illinois and Wisconsin have increased drastically. Soldiers desire and expect to be challenged, and it is our responsibility to ensure that expectation is met.

By taking the time to develop a coherent and relevant training plan that is portable across IDT weekends and then carefully inspecting our training schedules for opportunities to inject MOS training, coordinating with partner agencies and neighboring forces, and continuously seeking ways to improve upon our training, we can maintain a professional, highly-trained, and competent force of HUMINT professionals ready to support the Army’s mission.

1LT Hardin is currently a Platoon Leader for C Co 341st MI BN. His past assignments include Tactical Intelligence Officer, C Co, 341st MI BN and IT Specialist (25B). His military education includes the MI Officers Basic Course, Information Technology Specialist AIT, CEH, and Network+. 1LT Hardin deployed to Iraq in 2005, 2006, and 2008.

1LT Wachtveitl is currently the S2 for the 33rd MP BN. His past assignments include Platoon Leader, C Co, 341st MI BN and Tactical Intelligence Officer, C Co, 341st MI BN. He has completed the MI Officers Basic Course.

MAJ Brian McGarry is currently the ILARNG G2. His past assignments include Reserve Forces Office Training Officer, U.S. Intelligence Center of Excellence; MI Readiness Assistance Team Chief, ARNG-G2; Current Intelligence Analyst, NGB-I2, and Watch Team Chief. His military education includes ILE; the Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officers Course; Army Cyberspace Operations Planners Course; Defense Support to Civil Authorities Course; the MI Captains Career Course, and the Armor Officer Basic Course. He holds an MS from the National Intelligence University in Strategic Intelligence. MAJ McGarry was deployed to Iraq in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

---

**A Special Mission unit on Fort Bragg is looking for qualified 35F/X, 35G, 35M and 35Ls for potential assignments. Serving as a Special Operations Intelligence Sergeant is a unique and challenging assignment. This assignment requires an individual who is highly motivated, confident, intelligent, and capable of working without direct supervision. You will be provided the opportunity to work with many national agencies and state-of-the-art systems in order to execute a unique mission of highest importance. Soldiers assigned here have a great opportunity to seek advanced training, be it civilian or military, and also be offered additional pay and accelerated promotion rates for the increased responsibility we place upon our analysts. We are looking for the right Soldier to be a part of the Army's top intelligence innovators who desire the challenge of conducting analysis for strategically directed operations.**

Assignment prerequisites:

- Volunteer
- CMF 35F/X, 35G, 35M, 35L
- Minimum 22 years old
- Minimum GT Score of 110
- Rank of SGT - MSG
- Minimum of 4 years - Time In Service
- Must be able to pass an APFT – permanent profiles are considered on a case-by-case basis
- U.S. citizen
- Airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training
- UCMJ / Financial: No recurring adverse actions
- Security Clearance: Secret; eligible for upgrade to Top Secret

If you have any questions or are interested in applying please contact Jody at (910)643-0689/0649 or at army.sofsupport-recruiter@mail.mil.
Living the ARNG Culture of “No Cold Starts”

by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Church

Introduction
One of the first questions I was asked prior to assuming command of the Army National Guard’s (ARNG) 223rd Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN) Linguist (L) in April 2013 was: How can we maintain our operational relevancy and keep our intelligence acumen as the number of deployments began to scale back? While the number of deployments had decreased, the number and type of threats had not. In fact, they were becoming more asymmetrical, decentralized, and volatile on a level such as never before, consequently increasing Army intelligence requirements. Conventional threats still remain as well.

As long as the ARNG MI remains a key contributor to the Army intelligence enterprise, we knew it was essential to remain relevant within our respective intelligence skillsets. While intimidating, we reflected on the different resources available to the ARNG after 14 years of post 9-11 deployments and the ARNG MI enterprise having evolved into an expert force. Through the application of the Federated Intelligence Program (FIP), Panther Strike (PS), the Foundry Intelligence Program, and language immersion training, intelligence professionals within the California (CA) ARNG maintain intelligence readiness and relevancy, embracing the attitude of “No Cold Starts.”

The Federated Intelligence Program
The FIP is a training strategy adopted by the ARNG to sustain intelligence skills and expertise by providing real time mission support across the world during inactive duty training (IDT) and annual training (AT) periods. Guardsmen have the opportunity to produce intelligence products in support of a Combatant Command (CCMD), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), and defense agencies. The California ARNG MI community participates in the FIP through a partnership with the Joint Detachment (JDET) Minneapolis in support of the Northeast Asia Division (NEA-D) for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). Guardsmen from the 40th Infantry Division G2, 223rd MI BN, and the 250th MI BN are actively engaged each IDT and AT session in producing analytical products in the fields of cyber, country threat and intelligence briefs, and merchant vessel analysis.

For these Soldiers, attending drill has become more meaningful and filled with a greater sense of purpose as they are no longer confined to an armory performing perfunctory tasks. Instead, they stay connected to the intelligence enterprise through the various live networks at the Western Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center at Camp Parks and the CA ARNG’s own Joint Reserve Intelligence Center (JRIC) in Los Alamitos. These are the same systems, networks, and data sources they would have access to and intimately work with while being forward deployed.

According to the National Military Strategy, today’s operational environment demands interagency partnerships and the use of liaisons. The CA ARNG Soldiers are not only gaining operational relevancy through the FIP effort, but they are also acquiring an appreciation and comprehension of interagency collaboration, information sharing, and interdependency. In addition to the support provided to PACOM on IDT and AT sessions, intelligence Soldiers have the opportunity to foster and strengthen interagency relationships between the different organizations. The PACOM JIOC Commander recognized the partnership between the CA ARNG, JDET Minneapolis, and the PACOM JIOC when he visited the Los Alamitos JRIC and became acquainted with the solid support coming from the CA ARNG in support of the NEA-D.
The CA ARNG community considers it a win-win for all parties involved. Commands receive assistance with Army intelligence requirements, while the MI Soldiers are able to fine-tune their intelligence skills and learn interagency collaboration. The common theme shared below among these Guardsmen was excitement for what they were doing.

"Having the opportunity to actually be a part of a real-world mission during drill and working with experienced NCOs and officers has truly been a great learning experience. I will soon be able to share the skills learned from this mission with the rest of my unit."

"It’s a great opportunity to be able to provide support and contribute to a real-world mission. It gives us a sense of purpose and actual need. As Guardmen and women, serving only as M-Day Soldiers we don’t always get opportunities to perform the duties we were trained to do when not on active duty orders. It is an awesome experience and will benefit our intelligence careers."

"As a 35L, I’m learning a lot more on how important it is doing research, putting together and analyzing information, and producing a product, along with how important that information is to inform decision makers on a strategic level."

The 640th Interpreter Platoon under the 223rd MI BN (L) allowed its MOS 09L Interpreter/Translator Soldiers to follow this same model of developing intelligence products in support of a specific CCMD. Instead of providing analytical services, the 09L Soldiers provided Farsi and Arabic translation services in partnership with the National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC) at the Defense Intelligence Agency. When the deployments began to subside and the need for these native speakers as translators faded away, these Soldiers began to question their purpose during drill weekends. However, the partnership with NMEC gave them new purpose as National Guardsmen and they took pride in contributing to the larger intelligence enterprise. There was a complete turnaround in performance and attitude. Equipped with the SIPR network, their language ability, and their respective native dictionary, these translators went to work. The 09Ls were not only providing real products for the enterprise and gaining operational relevancy, but they were simultaneously sharpening their language ability in preparation for the Oral Proficiency Interview and the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT).

Exercise Panther Strike

Panther Strike is the premier MI collective training exercise planned and executed each year by the 300th MI Brigade (L) from the Utah National Guard at Camp Williams. The exercise receives tremendous backing from DA G2 with systems support, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) with mobile training team (MTT) trainers, and NGB G2 for Foundry funding. Each year a different battalion from the 300th MI BDE (L) receives the opportunity to serve as the host battalion and as the command and control element, exercising its battalion staff for a year leading up to the exercise and during the course of the exercise. California’s 223rd MI BN (L) had the privilege of serving as the host battalion for the 2014 exercise. The battalion staff exercising command and control coupled with its Soldiers participating in the actual exercise is another example in which ARNG intelligence Soldiers strive to maintain readiness and relevancy.

A FOB designed to simulate conditions in Afghanistan is used to host Panther Strike, an exercise designed to develop the skills of those in MI at Camp Williams, Utah. Panther Strike originated with the 260th MI BN (L) from the Florida Army National Guard in 2003 as a company level exercise for Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) training. Since then, the exercise has morphed into a more complex exercise. In 2005, the 260th MI BN (L) hosted the exercise at the battalion level and from then on, battalions within the 300th MI BDE (L) rotated in hosting responsibility. Prior to 2014, the 223rd MI BN (L) also hosted Panther Strike at Camp San Luis Obispo in California in 2010. Over the years, Panther Strike has really made a name for itself as it has evolved into a training exercise for a variety of the intelligence skills. It’s by far the most robust and organized intelligence exercise of which many participants have been a part. Panther Strike has even evolved into a Foundry recognized event.
The goal of the 300th MI BDE (L) is to eventually have Panther Strike serve as an equivalent MI warfighter exercise nested in a unit’s ARFORGEN cycle prior to a deployment. It would also like to stabilize funding for the exercise through the Program Objective Memorandum. Intelligence Soldiers have advanced their skills with the help of Panther Strike in preparation for deployments such as Kosovo Force, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Guantanamo Bay, and Operation Inherent Resolve. Some of the Soldiers have even applied their Panther Strike knowledge and lessons learned working as analysts in support of Cyber Command and Joint Task Force Counterdrug.

Panther Strike is designed to develop and enhance technical competence in CI, HUMINT, Signals Intelligence, All-Source Intelligence, and Geospatial Intelligence at the collective level. The first week is comprised of individual training for the different specialties, while the second week culminates with the collective exercise modeled under a realistic and challenging scenario reflective of a specific contemporary operating environment. The exercise is renowned for incorporating the most current tactics, techniques, and procedures used in a respective theater of operations to maximize Soldier familiarization with real world scenarios, system operability, cultural intricacies, operational methodologies, and interconnectivity and interdependency among the different intelligence skillsets.

A major effort with Panther Strike includes setting up the various intelligence systems and tying them into the exercise scenario. These systems include: Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), Deployable CI/HUMINT Portal; CI/HUMINT Automated Reporting and Collection System; Tactical CI Operations Portal; Near-Time Notional Gateway; Detainee Information Management System-Fusion; Source Management Database, and Intelligence Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer. Of particular note is the emphasis with the MI Soldier’s weapon system, the DCGS-A. In 2014, DA’s Intelligence Directorate dedicated over one million dollars for the application of DCGS-A into the exercise.

DCGS-A allowed the MI Soldiers to collect, process, and analyze the gamut of intelligence from various sources with the goal of providing product and predictive analysis to the respective commander. For many, this was the first time they utilized DCGS-A in an operational setting (outside of a deployment); while for others, it was the first time in a long time. Regardless of the system, Panther Strike offers intelligence professionals the rare opportunity to practice their skills on the actual systems while not being deployed.

As the TF Commander for Panther Strike 2014, it was amazing to witness the unity of effort and synergy established among approximately 750 personnel from approximately 34 different units to include the three different Army components and even coalition partners along with Field Service Representative (FSR) contract support. This symbiotic effort established in the training arena is one of those intangible benefits that serves as a faithful force multiplier on the battlefield. The current National Security Strategy avows “we are stronger when we mobilize collective action.” Due to this collective action, Guardsmen walked away from the two week exercise not only with practice in their intelligence specialty but also with a renewed appreciation of the different organizational cultures and mindsets of the Army components, the NATO partners, and the FSRS. In today’s ambiguous operational environment, sharing the burden is essential to mission accomplishment and this fundamental appreciation establishes the foundation for the different organizations to work together in the future.

Foundry Intelligence Training Program

Since intelligence skills are short-lived when they are not regularly exercised, the Foundry Intelligence Training Program is another valuable tool that the CA ARNG relies upon to help keep Intelligence Soldiers relevant in their respective skillsets. According to the Army Foundry Intelligence Training Program, the program builds upon institutional, unit, and individual training.

Foundry training can be conducted through INSCOM-approved MTTs, formal classroom setting, live environment training or immersion training, and unit level training. In the case of California, the Los Alamitos JRIC serves as the Foundry platform for All Source Intelligence and CI training. The instructors are able to help facilitate 100 and 200 level courses for intelligence training.
professionals, facilitate and host specialized MTTs, and train Soldiers on 300 level courses. They offer their services either to assist Soldiers in preparing for an upcoming deployment or to help them maintain their intelligence readiness for the next fight.

In one particular incident the instructors assisted in preparing a group of Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan by facilitating their participation in tactical over-watch. This concept placed the deploying team in contact with the unit they were going to replace in theater. Through the secure networks and communication amenities at the Los Alamitos JRIC, the group was able to initiate and sustain connection to the enterprise, allowing them to become familiar with and understand the cases they would be falling into prior to stepping foot on foreign soil. They were able to access and study HUMINT summaries, intelligence summaries, and CI estimates all from within the U.S. through secure network access. This familiarization not only provided them with what they could somewhat expect, both operationally and culturally, it also elevated their confidence and enhanced the operational continuity as the two units transitioned.

The Foundry instructors have also been instrumental in preparing MI Soldiers for deployment through Foundry-approved All Source and CI courses. Intelligence units coordinate with the respective instructor to establish course dates at the Los Alamitos JRIC during the pre-mobilization period. Units also take advantage of these Foundry courses during AT and throughout the training year, whatever is most conducive to their yearly training calendar. On a couple of occasions, the CI instructor set up the CI Collection Course and the CI Force Protection Course for CA Soldiers deploying to Kosovo and Afghanistan. The feedback (below) that came back at the conclusion of the courses was professionally edifying as it confirmed the power and impact behind the Foundry program.

"Re-honed my understanding of CI's role in Force Protection."

"Although I had a good working knowledge of the material, the terminology and brushing-up helped me better prepare myself for my real world mission."

"This course taught me new things and challenged the skills I already have vast experience with."

"I feel more confident in my abilities and have walked away with new knowledge and skills to continue to improve on."

"I needed a course like this to refresh my old skills."

"Recommend this course before deploying."

"Only problem is...I don’t receive enough of this type of training with my MI MOS."

"I feel a lot more confident in my abilities and skills from this course. It has given me new ideas, skillset, and knowledge to continue to grow."

"Even though the basic fundamentals are the same, they are perishable skills we don’t often have the opportunity to practice."

Language Immersion Training

Another tool ARNG intelligence Soldiers have, especially those who belong to a linguist battalion, is language immersion training. There are a variety of language grant programs in partnership with various universities to include the University of Montana, University of Kansas, University of Utah, and California State University Long Beach (CSULB). The CA ARNG takes full advantage of these programs with the help of the Army Language Program funding in order to enhance Soldiers' language proficiency and cultural appreciation.

The primary language program the CA ARNG participates in is the local CSULB Language Training Center (LTC) grant. The CSULB program is an intensive 16-day course consisting of ten hour days for the languages of French, Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese-Mandarin. The objective of the course is to increase proficiency of a “+” Interagency Language Roundtable level in one modality (reading, listening, or speaking). The target audience is usually 6-10 Soldiers who
are either Defense Language Institute graduates or indigenous speakers with a DLPT score of 1+/2 to 2+/2+ (1 skill levels require a waiver). Each course begins with initial testing to gauge the listening, reading, and speaking abilities of each participant. The class is then divided into two groups based on skill level - upper range and lower range - with a professor assigned to each group. The course begins with a hybrid of English and then as it progresses, English speaking is replaced by the target language. Students are comfortable with this learning progression model. Over the last two years, there has been a rise in the number of Soldiers participating in the CSULB program.

The CA ARNG has witnessed the favorable results of the CSULB language program firsthand. One particular Farsi speaker increased her Farsi DLPT scores from 2/2 to 2+/2+. Furthermore, the same Soldier took the Dari DLPT without direct Dari training but only having the CSULB Farsi training and scored a 2/2 on the first attempt. Another Soldier increased his Chinese-Mandarin score from 2/2 to a 2+/2+. On another example, a Soldier increased his French DLPT score from 2+/2+ to 3/3. This was a great feat for this particular Soldier because for the longest time he could not exceed 2+ in listening until he attended the CSULB language immersion training.

The CA ARNG also took advantage of the LTC program with the University of Utah in Salt Lake City. Recently, it had one distinguished Chinese-Mandarin speaker attend the three week course. This course does much more than just rehearse vocabulary, it consisted of language dialogue covering a variety of topics such as politics, international news, and scientific research to name a few, with the goal of bringing an appreciation to the language and the culture. With this specific course, one-on-one tutor sessions are also available.

LTC programs like these will become even more valuable for the intelligence community with the MOS 35M transitioning from “language capable” to a “language dependent” MOS. This new standard will require 35Ms be held to a 2/2 proficiency standard, so what better way is there than through the proven LTC program to sustain and enhance language ability?

**Conclusion**

American marketing executive and author Tom Hayes said it best: “Nothing limits you like not knowing your limitations.” With access to the FIP, Panther Strike, Foundry, and language immersion training, there are no longer limitations to keep ARNG intelligence Soldiers from specializing in operational relevancy and readiness. The CA ARNG intelligence Soldiers are making significant strides in embracing the concept of operational relevancy and internalizing the phenomenon of “No Cold Starts.” Sustaining MI proficiency and readiness is a costly and time-intensive business, but with the help of these tools, MI proficiency and readiness are achievable while not being forward deployed. As a result, ARNG intelligence Soldiers can remain globally engaged as they support regional aligned intelligence requirements.

Even though the resources available regionally to the Army MI force are decreasing while the intelligence requirements are increasing, the ARNG MI force can be optimized to assist with the increase in requirements. As such, the CA ARNG has proven the ARNG MI force is capable of maintaining its relevancy while not being deployed unlike some of the other warfighting functions. Through the application of the FIP, Panther Strike, Foundry, and language immersion training, we can sustain this expert force and operational capability while ARNG Soldiers attend home station IDT or AT, contributing to “No MI Soldier at rest.”
Endnotes


3. AR 350-20, Army Foundry Intelligence Training Program, 10 June 2010, 4.

4. Ibid.

Introduction
The 38th Infantry Division’s intelligence enterprise is an integrated network architecture of Soldiers, systems, sensors, information, and processes. This enables the G2 to provide support to targeting, support to subordinate and adjacent commands, and provide the commander situational understanding of the battlefield. The most important element of the intelligence enterprise is the people who make it work. Army intelligence analysts are the foundation of the enterprise, and Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) is their weapon system. Like any system, it requires focused training and dedication to be an expert. The 38th ID and the Indiana National Guard’s commitment to Military Intelligence digital master gunnery over the last decade provides the Division expert institutional knowledge and a robust intelligence architecture.

The road to Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 15.3 provided the G2 an opportunity to integrate digital systems into all facets of individual and collective training. In addition, after observing a warfighter exercise, the G2 and the intelligence staff recognized that not leveraging the entire DCGS-A enterprise placed division success at WFX 15.3 at risk. This led to the analysis and control element (ACE) integrating the Multifunction Workstation, Tactical Ground Station, GEOINT Workstation, and ACE BLK II system during the exercise.

The key outcome of the employment of the DCGS-A enterprise was a reduction in the sensor-to-shooter time lapse. The 38th ID’s employment of the DCGS-A intelligence systems during WFX 15.3 demonstrated an ability to provide a direct digital link between the sensor and shooter, greatly reducing the time between acquisition and effects on target, providing the division a decisive advantage on the battlefield.

Background
Over eight days in February 2015, the 38th ID “Cyclone,” executed combined arms maneuver with two infantry and one armored brigade combat teams (BCTs), one Canadian brigade, one each of fires, combat aviation, maneuver enhancement, engineer, and sustainment brigades. The division coordinated its operations with a host nation armored brigade, and received temporary OPCON of the Corps Reserve and one armored BCT in order to conduct an area defense for 24 hours. The Division advanced more than 240 miles during the eight-day exercise. Its operations defeated one enemy infantry and one enemy mechanized division conducting an area defense, defeated one enemy motorized division conducting a mobile defense, defeated one enemy armored division conducting an attack, defeated two brigades committed by the Operational Strategic Command in support of its defending divisions, penetrated two separate obstacle zones, and successfully conducted a division wet gap crossing. The Cyclone Division accomplished these tasks with the loss of one armored BCT’s worth of material and less than 10 percent of the division personnel strength.

Among the capabilities aptly demonstrated here was the ability to rapidly mass joint fires to destroy enemy fires and armored formations; the synchronization of division maneuver that resulted in the enemy fighting a division rather than four individual maneuver brigades at critical points in the operation; and the creation of understanding of the enemy in time and space relative to the operational and tactical tasks of the division.

Three primary techniques and procedures within the ACE enabled these capabilities. First, is the use of ABIs to decrease the sensor-shooter link. Second, is the creation of a situational development cell within the ACE. Third, is the incorporation of a robust unmanned aircraft system (UAS) processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capability within the ACE. The integration of DCGS-A Ace Block II enabled the success of these techniques. The ABI processed approximately 15 percent of the information received by the division and enabled approximately 40 percent of the division’s understanding of the enemy.

The key capability of ABI was near seamless interoperability with the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination

Winning Warfighter: The Intelligence Enterprise
by Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. East and Major Oliver G. Wells
The ACE nested its training within the G2’s vision statement for the intelligence enterprise:

**G2 Vision Statement**

The 38th DIV G2/ACE is the Premier Army DIV Intelligence Enterprise, fully capable of supporting decisive action via combined arms maneuver and wide area security as well as providing support to civil authorities.

G2 Training Focus: Intelligence Support to Combined Arm Maneuver ISO Warfighter FY 2014 and FY 2015.

Enabling Focus: Intelligence Support to Wide Area Security (AFRICOM mission) and Intelligence Support to Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DARM mission).

The G2 received support from the command staff and the headquarters battalion command to prioritize G2 training in order to reach the goal of 50 percent of inactive duty training (IDT) periods dedicated to individual and collective intelligence training. The G2 instituted a policy of maximum utilization of IDT periods, often extending the training day well past that of other sections, averaging a nine hour duty day for Soldiers and an eleven hour duty day for leaders. The G2 held all leaders accountable for planning and resourcing training that nested with the G2’s designated lines of effort as depicted in Figure 1.

The road to the warfighter exercise started in the summer of 2013 with the ACE conducting an intelligence focused, five-day, computer-assisted map exercise hosted for the division by the 101st Airborne Division’s maneuver training center. The five-day event re-oriented division intelligence Soldiers to intelligence in support of combined arms maneuver during decisive action after years of supporting wide area security missions and two years conducting a do-

The ACE situational development cell tracked the capability and capacity of the enemy. This allowed the G2 to describe the enemy in terms of its ability to perform a tactical task against friendly forces. The cell is comprised of analysts from the fusion, target development, and information collection cells. It is responsible for tracking the current enemy situation template and battlefield damage assessment and accomplished these tasks through the analysis of information provided by the PED team, ABII, and higher, lower, and adjacent units. Together this ensured the G2 was able to accurately provide situational understanding to the commander while continually assessing the current situation against the predicted enemy course of action.

The technical and tactical knowledge of its Soldiers enabled the success of the Division’s intelligence enterprise during WFX 15.3. The Division’s commitment to intelligence training greatly increased its capability during the time leading to the WFX. The training plan included the incorporation of digital systems during all phases of individual and collective exercises.
Since participating in a multi-intelligence training collective exercise in July - September 2015, the Division has had the necessary mission command systems to replicate most functions resident in the division and also provided subject matter expertise, trainers, lodging, and meals. The division resourced the event using annual training funds and several GSA vehicles.

Training Year 2014 IDTs focused on individual and section level tasks to provide the Soldiers an understanding of their roles and responsibilities during combined arms maneuver and to build institutional knowledge in the decisive action training environment. This year of training was significant as the G2 worked directly with the ACE to fully integrate the two components of the division intelligence enterprise. The ACE must have a good understanding of the expectations, preferences, and idiosyncrasies of the G2. Likewise, the G2 must understand the capabilities and limitations of the ACE. The G2’s role as senior intelligence advisor to the division staff and general officers makes it essential the G2 can articulate ACE capabilities and limitations.

In the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2014, the Division acted as the higher command for another National Guard division’s WFX. The Division command team locked the Division intelligence team in place based on their performance as the HICOM ACE. The G2, TAC deputy G2, deputy G2, ACE chief, Collection Manager, targeting officer in charge, and the combat operations information center intelligence OIC all attended this event. This allowed the G2 team to understand the digital architecture of the WFX exercise, as well as the unique operational environment of the warfighter combined arms maneuver simulation. The command again demonstrated its commitment to intelligence training when it used annual training and warfighter support resources to fund participation of more than 20 intelligence Soldiers in the exercise.

A key outcome for the ACE was a recognition that the operating tempo of combined arms maneuver was much higher than the G2 had planned. The G2 estimated that a reduction in available time to analyze and respond to threat forces was a factor of 10 less than in the wide area security and defense support to civil authority missions to which the Division was accustomed. The ACE has 2.5 hours in combined arms maneuver, where it had 24 hours in wide area security to analyze, understand, and react to threat actions. Realizing this early in the process allowed for a final adjustment of the training plan and enabled the sections to mentally prepare for the pace of operations.

Key leaders and Soldiers not involved in the HICOM event participated in a multi-intelligence training collective exercise hosted by the Indiana National Guard Intelligence Center using annual training funds. This five day Foundry support training provided the Soldiers a greater understanding of information flow within the ACE. Five days of training focused on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) culminating in a mission analysis brief to the G2 immediately followed. The division ACE demonstrated proficiency in graphically depicting the enemy in time and space, use of doctrine, and use of the primary weapon system of a division intelligence Soldier—DCGS-A.

The division conducted the military decision making process (MDMP) during the warfighter seminar. This training event stressed the ACE in a time-constrained environment as it conducted IPB using the DCGS-A MFWS and Command Post of the Future (CPOF). This validated the adjustments to training to account for increased tempo identified during the HICOM mission. The Division G2 and ACE achieved a nested understanding of the operational environment, enemy operations in time and space, and the planned friendly scheme of maneuver. The ACE demonstrated mastery of DCGS-A, and improved its capability to depict the operational environment and the enemy graphically in time and space. The command resourced more than 20 intelligence Soldiers to support MDMP using a combination of warfighter and additional annual training funds.

From July 2014 through January 2015 the ACE chief and G2 executed collective training together during IDT periods. During this time the G2 stressed digital proficiency, collective training, and integration of DCGS-A ACE BLOCK II with AFATDS, CPOF, and JADOCs to enable training and effective production in support of all division battle rhythm events. The key enabler of this training was the ability to establish the G2 network architecture and hardware at a location and leave it set up throughout the year’s training. Several times during the year, the division moved its division main and tactical command post causing the G2 to tear down and re-establish its network and hardware footprint.

However, the net time saved and availability of the established ACE for immediate or hip-pocket training opportunities during white space on battalion and company training schedules enabled many hundreds of Soldier hours of training conducted that were not planned. This allowed the G2 to reach its goal of leveraging 50 percent of IDT periods for intelligence training. G2 and ACE collective and individual training for WFX 15.3 did not end until change of mission on the final day of the exercise. Figure 2 shows the training conducted and availability of critical personnel and capability in support of Warfighter 15.3 and reflects the commitment of the state and division command and staff.

July - September 2015
Figure 2. Resources Committed to Training and Certification.

ACE BLOCK II Accreditation

The Division committed to deploying to WFX 15.3 with its DCGS-A ABII in July following its HICOM mission, after recognizing the need for the unique capability it provided. The G2 and the intelligence staff recognized that not leveraging ACE BLOCK II placed division success at WFX 15.3 at risk. Neither the G2 nor the ACE chief fully realized the difficulty they faced. The G2 appointed a project officer who was also the OIC of the Indiana Intelligence Center, had extensive experience in networking and Army digital systems, and was available full time to execute the tasks associated with ABII accreditation. A full-time MOS 350T Intelligence Systems Maintainer, special security officer (SSO), and DCGS-A trainer were part of his team.

While the team was primarily engaged in the management of the Intelligence Center and execution of its Foundry mission, it dedicated a significant portion of days to solving the many problems and overcoming the constant friction associated with fielding and accrediting the ABII components of the DCGS-A System. Figure 2 shows the critical personnel, the number of days they were available, and how many days they directly supported accreditation and condition setting for successful use of DCGS-A.

The process first required that the ABII system be updated and accredited by securing software upgrades and licenses outside of the normal fielding process. This required some skill in software integration, patching, and upgrading as well as knowledge of local area networks and information assurance.

Second, the Division undertook a search for applicable regulations, guides, handbooks, and examples to aid in the process with the project officer constantly coordinating with multiple stakeholders to produce the hundreds of pages of required standard operating procedures (SOPs) and separate documents for the single-source ABII, all-source ACE BLOCK II, and the cross-domain server. This part of the process took more than two and a half months to work through. A formal request to Department of the Army (DA) G2 for certification and appointment orders is required for the process to formally begin.

Table 1 shows the different products and the estimated time to complete the documents. PL2 systems include the all-source and single-source components of ABII but not the cross-domain server system. These times reflect no re-writes, system failures, or communication friction, and the availability of existing examples and experience in producing these type products.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>FY13 Fort Campbell MTC: Hosted CAMEX</th>
<th>FY13 UTAs</th>
<th>FY14 AT: WFX HICOM</th>
<th>FY14 AT: IN ARNG Intelligence Center Foundry Site: Hosted Multi-Int Training, Collective Exercise (MITCE)</th>
<th>FY14 AT: DATE IPB</th>
<th>FY14 WFX 15.3 Seminar</th>
<th>FY14 350T Available to support ABII Accreditation (Starting in August)</th>
<th>FY14 350F Available to manage ABII Accreditation (Starting in August)</th>
<th>FY14 SSO Available to support TSCF Accreditation (Starting in August)</th>
<th>FY14 Fort Hood Hosted ACE BLK II Train the Trainer</th>
<th>FY14 UTAs</th>
<th>FY15 Contractor Enabled ACE BLK II Training (single source and all source)</th>
<th>FY15 350T Intelligence Enterprise Integration</th>
<th>FY15 Contractor Support for ABII, AFATDS, and JADOCs Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#PAX</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#Days</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(Estimated 80 days of direct duty)</td>
<td>(Estimated 120 days of direct duty)*</td>
<td>(Estimated 20 days of direct duty)*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10 (Estimated 20 days of direct duty)*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Days</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>~60</td>
<td>~120</td>
<td>~40</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>~240</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVG</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>~50</td>
<td>~20</td>
<td>~20</td>
<td>~20</td>
<td>~20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>160 (Estimated 60 days of direct duty)*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Accreditation Products and Time.
a lack of clarity on what the rewrite must include delayed its completion. The completion of the long-form System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) may take more or less time than 200 hours and depends on availability of the necessary information, experience of the Soldier filling out the long-form SSAA, and availability of SMEs to guide the author. The table does not depict hours needed to assemble supporting documentation, and only provides the time to complete the long-form SSAA itself.

The hours listed for ACAS certification are the course’s listed credit hours. **If the person taking the training is unfamiliar with network scans, network vulnerability analysis and information assurance, the online certification takes longer.** Likewise, the table does not assign time to requesting, receiving approval, and download of required scanner software.

ACAS Certification and the construction of the ACAS scanner enabled the submission of the request for Interim Authority to Test (IATT) for each of the single-source and all-source components of the ABII. **If prior coordination occurs, approval of the request is rapid. Otherwise, the delay could last days or weeks.** Interim authorizations to test (IATTs) for each component allow the conduct of separate vulnerability scans. **Performing the actual scans may take days or a week.** The Division experienced extended delays and a requirement for extensive consultations with the DCGS-A field service representative in order to successfully complete the full set of scans and the collection of sufficient body of evidence to support a request for Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) or Authority to Operate (ATO). The table does not list these times as they are variable and largely dependent on the expertise of the scanner, the availability of a scanner, and the characteristic of the local area network for each of the single-source and all-source components. Minor resubmissions were required in order to receive an IATO. **DA G2 estimated the time to receive an ATO at several weeks.**

The 264 hours (or 33 working days) accounts only for completion of paperwork and under optimum conditions. The amount of time for ABII accreditation of 120 days includes the 33-plus days for paperwork and 87 days for coordinating with appropriate authorities, overcoming network and software friction, seeking approvals and signatures, rewrites and rescans, coordinating with the Division G2 for direct interventions with various organizations in First Army and the Department of the Army G2, executing necessary training and training oversight, and assisting in DSCG-A ABII integration into the Division Intelligence Enterprise prior to start of a warfighter exercise. **A 120 day timeline represents the best case timeline and possesses significant risk. Units should plan and resource more than 120 days for the accreditation process.**

The 35OT, 35OF, and SSO were available for 240 days because they were Title 32 active duty, technician, or contractor working at the Indianapolis Indiana Intelligence Center assigned M-Day to the 38th ID G2 section. However, their day-to-day duties and jobs restricted their availability. **The accreditation process takes at least six months and units who place its project officers and enabling personnel on orders achieve better results.**

An available 350T accomplished an additional 60 days of work assisting in establishing the ACAS scanner and local area networks, collecting information on hardware and software for documentation, and integration of DCGS-A ABII into the Division intelligence enterprise. Integration of hardware, connecting subordinates into the Division networks, and tying CPOF, JADOCS, and AFATDS into the division intelligence enterprise accounts for most of this work. **Authorities to operate ABII as a component of the intelligence enterprise possess significantly reduced value if the system does not interface with the Fires enterprise or the common operational picture.**

The G2 SSO established a TSCIF to house the entire ACE as well as the ABII at WFX 15.3 concurrent with the effort to accredit ABII. This caused second-order impacts to accessibility of the ACE by members of the intelligence and operations enterprises. However, planning and SSO days spent managing the access roster and conducting read-on mitigated this greatly. The close proximity of the DCGS-A ABII systems and operators with collection management, UAS feeds, imagery analysts exploiting UAS feeds, mission managers controlling UAS missions, and the target development team all enabled rapid acquisition and destruction of enemy fires systems. The digital links among DCGS-A ABII, AFATDS, and JADOCS enabled rapid processing of auto-generated fire missions.

**Conclusion**

The 38th ID’s intelligence enterprise greatly improved during the training prior to throughout the execution of WFX 15.3. The command’s support of intelligence training and commitment to mission command systems caused the success of the intelligence enterprise. While the entire DCGS-A enterprise demonstrated its ability to greatly increase intelligence support to targeting and provide situational understanding to the command, a robust training program is necessary to leverage this capability. **The command’s continued commitment to intelligence training using its primary weapon system, DCGS-A, is essential to ensure**
continued increases in the intelligence enterprise’s ability to provide timely, relevant, and fused intelligence products benefiting the entire division.

There are several critical lessons learned from this Division’s experience. First, units must properly resource the six-plus month accreditation process with a full-time project officer. Second, units must leverage every available moment to train on digital systems. This training must be scenario driven and focused on producing products required by the Division battle rhythm. Third, the G2 and ACE must train together enough to develop a nested understanding of the enemy forces, friendly forces, and the operational environment. The G2 and ACE must understand each other’s capabilities and limitations. Fourth, the G2 must fully integrate DCGS-A ABII into the intelligence and fires enterprise. The Fires and Aviation communities must trust ABII and its operators. This requires time and demonstrated capability. Finally, the command must commit to and resource the continuous and integrated nature of intelligence training. The command must recognize the importance of DCGS-A ABII as the primary weapon system for intelligence Soldiers.

LTC East was commissioned in 1998 and is a Signals Intelligence Officer. He is the ACoS G2 for the 38th ID. His previous assignments are S2 138th Fires Brigade; S2 2/138th Artillery Battalion; Commander, Kentucky MI Detachment 20th SFG(A), and assistant S2 63rd Aviation Brigade. LTC East holds a PhD and MA from the University of Kentucky and an MA from the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies.

MAJ Wells is an MI Officer in the Indiana Army National Guard. He enlisted in 2000 as an MOS 13F, Fire Support Specialist, and completed Officer Candidate School at the Alabama Military Academy. He is the S2 for the 76th IBCT. His previous assignments include ACE Chief, 38th ID; and Target Development Officer, 38th ID during OEF. MAJ Wells holds an MS in Technology and BA in Political Science, both from Purdue University.
Listing the websites in this article does not imply any endorsement by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, or any U.S. government agency, and the content on these websites does not express the views of the U.S. Army, the Defense of Department or any government agency.

Introduction

Reserve Component (RC) MI Analysts in a Troop Program Unit status generally conduct a two-day Battle Assembly each month in which they perform intelligence research and analysis, usually in an Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially over the last 10 to 12 years with the reduction of military and civilian staffs at combatant commands and national agencies, more and more “real-world” intelligence production at operational and strategic levels is being assigned to RC intelligence units. This strategic intelligence production is vital for Army components at combatant commands to accomplish the Army’s mission of “winning in a complex world.”

As TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, states “the U.S. requires ‘ready land forces’ capable of ‘protecting our nation and securing our vital interests against determined, elusive, and increasingly capable enemies.’ To defeat these enemies, U.S. land forces must “develop situational understanding through action” and “Army commanders develop an understanding of complex situations in depth, breadth, and context through the integration of intelligence and operations...”

RC MI analysts are called upon to contribute to this situational understanding through the real-world intelligence products they generate for joint and Army intelligence organizations during Battle Assembly weekends. However, the complex world is changing at an increasingly rapid pace, and significant political-military developments can occur in the 28 days between Battle Assemblies. Intelligence analysts must develop the capacity to maintain a “situational understanding” through unclassified news resources when they are away from the intelligence production facility.

Developing a Situational Understanding “Battle Rhythm”

From June 2012 until March 2013, I served as the Director for the European Command (EUCOM) J2 Joint Reserve Intelligence Support Element (JRISE), based at Fort Meade, Maryland. The JRISE consisted of U.S. Army, U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force MI detachments supporting the EUCOM J2 collection management, J2X, intelligence engagements, targeting, contingency planning, and cyber sections in Stuttgart, Germany. During my first meeting with Brigadier General John Bansemer, the Air Force general serving as EUCOM J2, he noted that a key challenge for reserve MI analysts was maintaining “situational awareness” of political-military development in conflict areas in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

BG Bansemer noted that analysts should “hit the ground running” on Saturday morning, and not have to spend several hours getting “up to speed” on military developments, especially when developing targeting packages and intelligence requirements in support of EUCOM contingency planning. Although he noted that in most cases it was difficult if not impossible for RC analysts to access classified intelligence reporting and intelligence products, he stressed that each analyst should allocate time to maintain “situational awareness” of military and political developments in the EUCOM AOR by accessing unclassified news resources.

To support this goal as the J2 JRISE Director, I prepared a list of websites that provide timely news and analysis of global political and military activity. As a civilian, I serve as an FBI intelligence analyst, and I had developed my own list of unclassified “open source” news resources and analytic resources for the intelligence analysts on my squad. I utilize these resources several times each month to identify political, military, and economic development worldwide which might impact foreign counterintelligence and cyber threats directed against civilian and military targets in New Jersey.

I used my FBI resource list as a baseline to develop an open source, monthly situational understanding “battle rhythm.” That is, a schedule of daily, weekly, and monthly information checks of these websites to maintain awareness of global military and political developments. This rest of this article will provide an overview of the type of websites I access and a description of their content, the actual “battle rhythm” I use to access the sites, and finally a list of the websites with links to each resource.
At the end of the article is a list of websites of news organizations, intelligence and defense related blogs, online journals and research institutions or “think tanks” with the hyperlink and a brief description. Most of the websites and their digital content are free, however, several of the news and journal websites charge fees for unlimited access.

**Website Overview**

The keystone website for maintaining awareness of global political-military developments is the Open Source Center (OSC). All MI analysts should have opensource.gov bookmarked on their favorites list. Formerly known as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), staffed by the CIA, OSC provides translations of political, military, and economic reports and translations of print and broadcast media from 210 countries and 73 languages. The OSC articles can be viewed by region, or by specific country and topic, which makes it an ideal resource for regionally aligned MI analysts.

OSC analysts also research and produce finished analytic pieces on significant political and cultural events, and publish “Master Narratives” on important countries. These are historically grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns. These insights can be used by analysts to better understand critical audience segments and key influencers, build analytic capabilities, and develop actionable messaging and counter-messaging strategies. The website also provides access to technical/scientific information in commercial databases such as Jane’s, IEEE, EBSCOHost, Lexis/Nexis, and access to regional and topical news/information sites including Stratfor and the Economist Intelligence Unit.

There are a number of newspaper, television, wire service, and magazine websites that provide up-to-date international geo-political news on a daily basis. They include The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, Bloomberg News, Reuters, the BBC World Service, and The Economist. The Economist, based in the United Kingdom, is a weekly international news and business publication. Despite its name, its content goes beyond economics and business, and offers reporting, commentary and analysis on world current affairs, business, finance, science and technology, culture, society, media, and the arts.

Research institutions, think tanks, and foreign policy blogs are great sources of in-depth, analytic articles that range from 3 to 4 page bulletins on current international events to multiple page reports or book-length publications that provide detailed research and analytic findings on significant trends or political-military developments. Some think tanks have existed for decades, such as RAND, established after World War II, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, while other are post-Cold War, such as the Center for a New American Security.

Another source for research and analysis of political-military topics are defense-related websites that host original analysis of defense issues, as well as content from other publications and research institutions. These sites include Defense One, War on the Rocks, and Real Clear Defense. Each of these sites disseminates a daily or weekly bulletin or update via email which contains links to three to five articles that the editors select as particularly relevant or timely.

Finally, there are several organizations funded by the U.S. government or foundations that collect, analyze, and publish data and finished analytic pieces on terrorism and other national security threat areas. Two important sites are the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point and The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The CTC produces in-depth research reports on terrorist ideology, terrorist strategy and structure, and emerging threat and publishes The Sentinel. The Sentinel is a monthly, independent publication that provides analysis of the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence. START is a university-based research center committed to the scientific study of the causes and human consequences of terrorism in the U.S. and around the world.

Using all of these news and analysis websites, I developed a “battle rhythm” of daily, weekly, and monthly review of website content to maintain situational awareness. Each morning, I scan the “World” and “United States” sections of The New York Times website. I pay for a digital subscription so that I can access all content. Next, I open my email inbox and scan the “Defense One Today,” “D Brief,” “War on the Rocks Daily Newsletter,” and “Foreign Policy Situation Report” for articles of interest. I scan the titles and read the articles related to my own threat prioritization. Each evening, I read “The Evening CSIS” email.

Weekly, I check my email box for the Foreign Policy “Editors Picks” and the “New on the Economist” emails, and read the International Project for Terrorism Weekly Update. I log into Opensource.gov and review the articles in my key country list and check War on the Rocks and the Foreign Policy National Security Channel and Best Defense Blog for articles of interest that may not have been included in the daily emails.

Every other week I read the Homeland Security Digital Library email “HSDL Critical Releases in Homeland Security”.

52
I also check the regional pages in the CSIS and RAND web-pages and the topical pages in the CNAS webpage. Monthly I review the table of contents of The Sentinel, on the CTC website, and scan the list of any new publications on the START homepage.

This “battle rhythm” allows me to efficiently maintain a “situational awareness” of the global conflict areas and threat actors I need to understand to be an effective intelligence analyst for the FBI and for the U.S. Army Reserve. Of course, each intelligence analyst can tailor the frequency of site reviews and number of news resources based on the sophistication and complexity of their intelligence analysis and production mission. I would suggest, however, that subscribing to the daily and weekly bulletins and newsletter disseminated by the defense and military news websites, usually for free, is critical in achieving continuous situational understanding. Good luck as you create your own individual “open source intelligence battle rhythm.”

**News Sources for Intelligence Analysts**

**News Websites**

**Open Source Center (Formerly FBIS).** The OSC, staffed by the Central Intelligence Agency, provides translations of political, military, and economic reports from 210 countries and 73 languages. The website also provides access to technical/scientific information in commercial databases like Jane’s, IEEE, EBSCOHost, Lexis/Nexis, ProQuest and access to regional and topical news/information sites including Stratfor and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). At [www.opensource.gov](http://opensource.gov).

**Foreign Policy.** Foreign Policy is an international source for global news, providing an evolving network of insights and analysis coupled with rapidly expanding original reporting. In 2012, Foreign Policy launched FP National Security, a “channel” covering global defense, intelligence, cyber and tech issues. At [http://nationalsecurity.foreignpolicy.com](http://nationalsecurity.foreignpolicy.com).


**The Economist.** The Economist newsmagazine is a weekly international news and business publication, which offers reporting, commentary and analysis on world current affairs, business, finance, science and technology, culture, society, media and the arts. At [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com).

**Defense/Military News Websites**

**War on the Rocks.** War on the Rocks is a platform for analysis, commentary, debate, and multimedia content on foreign policy and national security issues. It features articles and podcasts. Subscribe to the War on the Rocks Daily Newsletter on the right side of the main page: [http://warontherocks.com/](http://warontherocks.com/).


**RealClearDefense,** a sister site of RealClearPolitics, is a catch-all source for defense news and commentary. RealClearPolitics.com (RCP) is an independent political web site. Updated every morning and throughout the day, RCP culls and publishes highlights from commentary, news, polling data, and links to important resources from all points of the political compass and covering all the important issues of the day. At [http://www.realcleardefense.com](http://www.realcleardefense.com).

**Research Institutions/Think Tanks**

**Center for a New American Security (CNAS).** CNAS provides research, ideas, and analysis. CNAS is located in Washington, and was established in February 2007 by co-founders Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Flournoy. At [http://www.cnas.org](http://www.cnas.org).

**RAND Corporation.** The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit re-search and analysis institution. RAND focuses on issues such as health, education, national security, international affairs, law and business, the environment, and more. RAND is a nonpartisan organization. At [http://www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org).
Information on Terrorist Groups and Attacks

The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. The CTC serves as an important national resource that rigorously studies the terrorist threat and provides policy-relevant research while moving the boundaries of academic knowledge. The CTC produces in-depth research reports on terrorist ideology, terrorist strategy and structure, and emerging threat. The CTC also publishes The Sentinel which is a monthly, independent publication that leverages the Center’s global network of scholars and practitioners to understand and confront contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence. At http://www.ctc.usma.edu.

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). START is a university-based research center committed to the study of the causes and human consequences of terrorism in the U.S. and around the world. START is also maintains the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2011. Headquartered at the University of Maryland, START supports research efforts of social scientists at more than 50 academic and research institutions. At http://www.start.umd.edu/start.

The Investigative Project on Terrorism. The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) is a non-profit research group founded by Steven Emerson in 1995. It is a comprehensive data center focused on radical Islamic terrorist groups. For more than a decade, the IPT has investigated the operations, funding, activities, and front groups of Islamic terrorist and extremist groups in the U.S. and around the world. Click on the “subscribe” button on the upper right side of the main screen to receive the weekly update—an email with relevant news articles organized under the following topics:

- General security, policy.
- Air, rail, port, health, energy and communication security.
- Financing, money laundering, fraud, identity theft, civil litigation.
- Border security, immigration and customs.
- International.
- Comment/analysis.
At http://www.investigativeproject.org.

The Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL). HSDL is the nation’s premier collection of documents related to homeland security policy, strategy, and organizational management. The HSDL is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA, and the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security. HSDL’s mission is to strengthen national security of the U.S. by supporting federal, state, local, and tribal analysis, debate, and decision making needs. The HSDL is composed of homeland security related documents collected from a wide variety of sources. These include federal, state, tribal, and local government agencies, professional organizations, think tanks, academic institutions, and international governing bodies. Every two weeks, the HSDL disseminates “HSDL Critical Releases in Homeland Security” an email which contains links to a targeted collection of recently released documents of particular interest or potential importance.

Featured Topics: Hand selected lists featuring documents relevant to current issues in homeland security.

Critical Releases: A list compiled every two weeks highlighting recent resources of particular interest or potential importance.

News Digest Collection: Archives of periodic digests with a focus on homeland security topics.

I3P Cyber Infrastructure Collection: A specialized collection created by the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) focusing on the fields of infrastructure protection and cyber security. (Note: this collection was acquired in 2008 and is not actively updated.)

Policy and Strategy Section: Direct access to key U.S. policy documents, presidential directives, national strategy documents, major legislation, and executive orders.

HSDL Blog: On the Homefront, a synopsis of the most recent reports and issues in homeland security. The blog also includes a calendar of upcoming conferences and events as well as the ability to search across the best homeland security related blogs and bloggers.

Books and Journals: Pointers to commercial sources of homeland security related research.
At https://www.hsdl.org/.

COL Wulfhorst is a graduate of the Armor Officers Basic and Advanced Courses; the MI Officer Transition Course; Counterintelligence and Imagery Analysis Courses; the Signal Officers Advanced Course; the Combined Arms and Services Staff School; the Command and General Staff College, and the Advanced Joint Professional Military Education-II. He holds a BA in History and Russian from The Pennsylvania State University as well as a Master of Education degree in Human Services and Human Resource Administration from Boston University. He holds an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He has served in many active duty and reserve assignments, the latest as Director, JRlSE, supporting the EUCOM J2 prior to taking command of the 1st BDE (MI), 100th DIV (OS). As a civilian, he is a Supervisory Intelligence Analyst with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Newark NJ Field Office.
The 2014-2015 issues of MIPB can now be accessed on the outside of IKN (no CAC login required) at http://ikn.army.mil. Both regular and e-reader versions are available.

To access archived back issues, logon with your CAC and click on the MIPB icon under IKN Community Sites. Go to past issues to select the issue.

Speaking With Intelligence

Speaking With Intelligence (SWI) is a monthly, informal online talkshow presented by the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center enterprise. We bring exciting speakers from around the Intelligence Community to the warmth and comfort of your living room. We broadcast live on the last Thursday of each month at 2000 central time.

We’ve had a lot of exciting topics:
"I’ll take INTELINK for 20, Alex!"
"Marines talking SMAT: Techniques for Improving Analytic Tradecraft"
"Cheat, lie, and steal your way across the internet!... How ransomeeware profits organized crime."
"Google Glass: Game Changer or Just Goofy?"
"Social Media in Mexico: Not tú morna’s revolution."

To hear about future shows, nominate speakers, send us fan mail, or ask us a question please email from your .mil/.gov account: usarmy.usarc.mirc.list.speaking-with-intelligence-swi@mail.mil

July - September 2015 55
Introduction
A crucial component of the readiness of the U.S. military, Military Intelligence (MI) professionals are considered an essential resource for assuring victory on the battlefield as well as maintaining stability in homeland and peacekeeping operations. From George Washington advising, “As it is of great consequence to gain intelligence of the enemy’s intended operations, I cannot but recommend your attention to this subject, and that you will concert some measures... for establishing a channel of information,” to the recent advisement by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper in 2015 that “unpredictable instability is the new normal,” MI professionals must strive to maintain a state of continual operational readiness.1,2

Serving as an MI Professional within the Army National Guard (ARNG) or U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is a challenging assignment and requires a diligent and resourceful approach to maintaining both individual and unit readiness. This effort is further stretched when mandatory annual training requirements applicable to all military members are added to the training calendar. As well, these MI professionals in the ARNG and USAR generally serve as Citizen Soldiers, concurrently managing a separate career or the pursuit of an education outside of military service.

Therefore, whether the MI skill set the Citizen Soldier possesses relates to Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Intelligence Analysis, or other (which may also require sustained foreign language proficiency), the time that these Reservists have available is limited and must be managed in an efficient and resourceful manner. Validating the perishable skill sets MI professionals are required to maintain, Charles Innocenti’s warning certainly rings true today: “Despite the potential for the U.S. Army’s informational dominance and overwhelming firepower on the battlefield, success in battle is not guaranteed.”3 The authors’ intent here is to outline and discuss the cohesive training and leadership strategies that MI Leaders embody to accomplish mandatory training requirements, while in turn meeting MI training requirements for skill sets maintenance and operational continuity.

The informational dominance capability that Innocenti describes is as much a requirement within the ARNG and USAR as it is within the Active Army. This was validated by Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno in 2013, who explained the requirement for strategic balance necessary “to maintain an Army that can respond quickly, but also have the depth of response...from the Guard and Reserve.”4 This balance and depth of response holds ARNG and USAR commanders responsible for an elevated level of individual and unit readiness. Accurate blueprints conforming to the training environment realities of ARNG and USAR MI formations should be internally developed. These MI professionals will best incorporate methods and tactics (compounding) that challenge the organization to objectively meet training requirements and the commander’s intent. Suggested strategies in refining these blueprints are discussed below.

Strategy 1: Channel MI training appropriately to utilize the Army Intelligence Training Strategy and the Army Intelligence Core Competencies.

These two resources provide starting points for achieving success. Though adversaries may change, in MI training it is not necessary to re-invent the wheel. Changes in technologies may present a temporary challenge necessitating training and doctrine updates, but the Army Intelligence Training Strategy and the Army Intelligence Corps competencies collectively provide a concrete foundation to formulate successful MI training. Realizing the unique aspects of the Reserve Components, the Army Intelligence Training Strategy devotes several pages on available and dedicated resources for the ARNG and USAR. Leaders should ask themselves what portions of their MI training support the Army Intelligence Training Strategy, and how additional or enhanced training might further complement the strategy. The Army Intelligence Core Competencies are:

✦ *Intelligence Synchronization*. The capability to integrate information collection and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and efficiently support decision making.

✦ *Intelligence Operations*. Tasks undertaken by Military Intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements.

✦ *Intelligence Analysis*. The process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production (ADRP 2-0). The purpose of intelligence analysis is to de-
scribe the current—and attempt to proactively assess—threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations.\(^5\)

**Strategy 2: Teach and then maximize the benefits that Military Intelligence provides to the operation.**

Utilizing Lundvall’s Knowledge Taxology, Victor Ruiz provides guidance in four areas that provide value to the force from the MI Professional:

- What facts intelligence officers should know.
- How to apply intelligence skills.
- Who an intelligence officer should know.
- The understanding (or “why”) behind certain actions.\(^6\)

From the various Army schoolhouses that teach our MI Professionals skills, graduates return to their formations equipped with a basic understanding of how to operate their equipment, how to effectively gather intelligence from subjects, and the clues that determine a potential intelligence lead. Commanders need to capitalize on these fresh skills and reinforce the principles laid out by Ruiz. By teaching and reinforcing skills for Soldiers at all grades and skill levels, the MI Corps will develop cohesive, competent, and maintainable formations through engaging and rewarding MI MOS training.

Reinforcing this strategy, Travis Bradberry, provides an Optimal Performance model demonstrating the correlation between performance and stress.\(^7\)

Leaders must create a maximized balance between these two factors to achieve optimal performance. Applying stress and performance variables to the MI Professional within the ARNG and the USAR, commanders can see some parallels and potential outcomes. Prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks, many Reserve MI Professionals were not engaged in accelerated skill set maintenance and struggled to determine their relevancy within the Army’s MI Corps. Operational contributions outside a conventional battlefield were not considered and many suffered from the boredom threshold on Bradberry’s model. Now, in 2015, the political and fiscal realities oblige inclusion of ARNG and USAR MI Professionals and leaders in training, planning, execution, and operational success. One way to do this is to integrate Ruiz’s focus on the four areas of value to the force. Incorporating these focus areas while creating a greater level of participation and stress provides the individual Soldier and formation measures for improvement in performance and skill maintenance.

**Strategy 3: Identify clear and comprehensive goals associated with the selected MI training.**

Build your training to serve a purpose while integrating Army Regulation 350-1 mandatory training. As an MI Professional responsible for training Soldiers in the ARNG and USAR, ask yourself the following as you create a training strategy:

- What is the desired outcome?
- Determine the need. What training is missing to meet this outcome?
- How can leadership best adapt the schedule of training for the individual and the organization within the constraints of time?
- Is there training overlap? Can training be developed that meets multiple outcomes in unit readiness or annual training requirements?

As deployment cycles for an ARNG or USAR MI unit vary based on the nation’s operational tempo, training must focus on acquiring and maintaining a minimum level of readiness while then raising the level to meet specific milestones. This raise is reflected via measured outcomes developed by leaders who evaluate conducted training and assess accomplishments.

In most Army formations, whether Active or Reserve Component, training concepts and lesson plans are developed using a “Crawl-Walk-Run” delivery. Skill development requires application of this methodic process but must adapt based on the Component. Reserve MI formations may take several months of drill assemblies whereas an Active Component MI formation can deliver training and meet outcomes in a matter of days or weeks. While the actual training contact hours are similar, the calendar days to accomplish the outcomes are different. Army Training Circular (TC) 25-10 appropriately lays out planning strategies for the MI leadership to incorporate. “Lane Training” describes individual and specific tasks. When successfully completed by
an individual or group, this lane training accomplishes intent through practical exercise, providing trainers and leaders results on individual and group proficiency levels.

TC 25-10 lays out a realistic lane training time frame. “Normally, the entire crawl-walk-run process occurs within a short time frame of only a few hours or days for the Soldiers undergoing training, although this is determined by the tasks selected and the number of Soldiers to be trained. However, for lane training, the crawl-walk-run process can occur over a period of several weeks, months, or years (especially within the RC).” A conscious and deliberate balance between training output and accurate capture of MI skill set proficiency is necessary for an accurate assessment on where MI formation readiness (read: goals) stands.

**Strategy 4: Incorporate the Operational Environment (OE) framework and key conditions across the strategic environment into the training focus.**

The OE provides a platform to develop realistic and relevant training events. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 provides an Opposing Force Battle Book that highlights the use of OE in training:

“In training environments, the OE provides the framework to create conditions to replicate the complexity of the real world and thus provide realistic and relevant training. It provides a non-specific capabilities-based approach. If training consists of task, condition, and standard, then the OE is the condition(s), in which the Army can train mission essential tasks to the desired standard. If the training event is a mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) or a regionally aligned force (RAF), then the trainers will apply the OE of a specific theater resulting in an operational environment assessment (OEA) of that selected environment.”

This approach lends itself to efficiency of training, a goal for all commanders, but especially vital to the Army Reserve and National Guard Commander. Some units have taken the initiative to align themselves with other components, including elements deployed to a theater of operations. This creates a reach-back capability for the deployed element and a real world OE for the rear echelon elements providing them with focus. This approach highlights the cooperation necessary between components, branches, and specialties. It is clear in reviewing recent conflicts that commanders who rely solely on intelligence to paint an accurate picture of the OE may miss critical pieces of information. In today’s operating environment, where news and information are instantaneously available worldwide, every Soldier is a sensor. Commanders must employ multiple information related capabilities or IRCs, and work to incorporate the discoveries into their intelligence reports.

The training strategy for Army Intelligence includes the TRADOC approach to developing a force that is adaptive and agile, especially in terms of intelligence gathering and use. Commanders must design training events that incorporate leader development, training development, capabilities development, and concept development. Training staffs to work together and overcome the chimney or stovepipe approach to training is one such method. The commander and staff must develop training that forces individuals to cross lines of effort to accurately paint the intelligence picture. This will further the appreciation that staff sections have for the work in other sections. If the G3 understands intelligence, it will task accordingly, if the G4 understands intelligence, it will supply more readily. If the G2 understands the conflicting demands of the limited capabilities, it will develop plans to overcome resource constraints. The outcome produces efficient staff work and cross-functional cooperation.

TRADOC’s Command Operational Environments to 2028 discusses training and how the environment factors into decision making:

“The conditions of the strategic environment must be understood, captured, and factored into Army decision-making. Only then can realistic training, the correct mix of systems and capabilities, and the proper approaches to leader development and education be identified and implemented across TRADOC and the Army in general.”

The ability of a combat unit to employ intelligence resources to benefit its operations depends on the training that has occurred up to that point. It seems obvious, but in times of conflicting demands and the long list of AR 350-1 mandatory training requirements, this creates trouble for part time training cycles that the National Guard and Reserve experience. With only 48 Unit Training Activities adding up to 192 hours, there is no time to spare. However, by incorporating real world relationships, collaborative units’ relationships, and reach-back capability, the commander of a part-time unit can provide realistic and relevant training at each of their drill events, building on what has recently been accomplished.

**Strategy 5: Maximize training time to employ year-round Annual Training.**

A robust operational tempo that builds upon itself through Annual Training enables the commander to synchronize training with events that last notably longer than two weekend days. Creative resource management tools are available for commanders if they take the time to develop them. Providing actual missions for MI personnel to perform for their units down range can be helpful in making the training realistic and provides the platforms to perform in their area of expertise. Furthermore, the elements of expertise that may be less well developed in a unit have ample op-
portunity to cross train and gain that ever-valuable experience by aiding a deployed unit. In this type of arrangement it is vitally important to establish a cooperative and enduring relationship that is maintained even as personnel moves and deployments may affect operations. Units that fail to adequately cultivate cooperative relationships can inadvertently and unknowingly hinder the training opportunities of future MI Professionals in the organization.

An enduring relationship not only satisfies the operational requirements, but provides Reserve units the necessary education and experience to create a solid training model. Capturing challenges and successes in the after action review and including these lessons learned through trial and error allows success to be repeated and mistakes to be avoided in the future. Continuity requires a transitioning leader to pass along lessons learned and introduce current intelligence relationships to incoming leadership.

Fulfilling GEN Odierno’s mandate on the relevance of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve’s role in strategic balance, MI Professionals must be masters at their craft. A true master is the one who understands the required skill sets and teaches the next generation. Aside from mastering the MI skill set itself, suggestions for teaching the next generation include incorporating procedures in training and operational plans that reinforce concepts such as Military Intelligence Life Long Learning at (https://mi.ellc.learn.army.mil/) and for the ARNG specifically, ARNG Life Long Learning at https://guardu.ellc.learn.army.mil/ .

Current and future leaders should blueprint and then develop efficient and positive habits that bridge and withstand personnel changes within the organization. When an MI Professional incorporates a path of success for the next generation (a core concept in leadership), perishable MI skills and the administration and continuity for open-ended training cycles become an exciting and welcome task for MI professionals at all levels as they maintain readiness for the next critical mobilization in service to this great nation.

Endnotes

Background

In February 2009 the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 25th Infantry Division (ID) deployed for a 12 month rotation from Fort Richardson, Alaska, to eastern Afghanistan as part of Regional Command East, International Security Assistance Force. The BCT’s area of operations (AO) included the provinces of Khowst, Paktika, and Paktia, all of which bordered Pakistan. The brigade headquarters was at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno in Khowst Province. With the addition of a Military Police battalion, a National Guard Infantry battalion, an Aviation battalion, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and Agri-Business Development Teams, the BCT took on the designation of Task Force Yukon.

During its deployment the unit encountered a number of interesting intelligence challenges—leading up to and during the deployment—which might serve as lessons learned and best practices for other intelligence professionals. The purpose of this article is to capture and share these experiences, so that others may use them to improve unit SOPs and overall unit effectiveness. While some issues presented here are useful only to Counterinsurgency or Wide Area Security operations, many also have applicability to Combined Arms Maneuver missions. Challenges 7 through 12 are presented below. Challenges 1 through 6 were outlined in the April-June issue of MIPB.

Challenge #7–Linking Intelligence Collection to Operations.

Early into the deployment we received many queries from higher (CJTF) on how we were employing the aerial ISR assets they were providing our BCT. In addition to our CM submitting feedback via email to the CJTF CM after every mission flown, we developed a template for communicating how we were using the assets. We learned through experience that aerial ISR has three primary functions. It can be used to “support the unit’s friendly scheme of maneuver,” “support targeting,” or “support combat assessment.”

By using this simple three-part framework, S2s and CMs are able to quickly and clearly communicate to commanders, S3s, and higher CMs how aerial ISR assets are being employed. A unit’s friendly scheme of maneuver includes everything from traditional infantry style clearing operations (offensive operations), to resupply convoys (logistics operations), or even orbiting above a FOB looking for enemy mortar or rocket firing positions within range of the FOB (defensive operations). Second, aerial ISR can be used to support unit targeting efforts by locating enemy personnel, equipment, or facilities. And third, aerial ISR can be used to support combat assessments following friendly forces ground operations or air strikes.

Another important aspect of linking intelligence collection to operations is the use of the Collection Emphasis Message (CEM). The CEM is an extremely powerful tool for the S2 and CM, as it provides transparency on what the BCT’s SIGINT, HUMINT, and Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (TUAS) collection assets are doing. In simple terms, the CEM is a written document that lists the support relationships of assets (e.g., DS to 1-509th BN), their mission (task and purpose), the named area of interest they will collect against, the start and end times they will collect, and any special instructions for the asset. The Brigade CM Cell produces the CEM, then forwards it to the Brigade S3 Section for publication in the brigade’s daily Fragmentary Order (FRAGO). Its publication in the daily FRAGO signifies that the Brigade S3 has authority over the execution of the collection missions for these assets.

Units which can produce a daily CEM are operating at the PhD level; all units should strive for this. A good CEM lists all SIGINT (Prophet Collection Teams), HUMINT (HCTs) and Shadow TUAS missions to be conducted, typically dur-
 Challenge #8—“S2, You’re in charge of the Fusion Cell.”

Several months prior to the unit’s deployment, senior brigade and battalion personnel flew to eastern Afghanistan for the unit’s Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS). One of the biggest surprises was a “Fusion Cell” within the brigade headquarters. From lessons learned during OIF, Fusion Cells were created by SOF forces as command and control nodes to deconflict air and ground operations between SOF and conventional (GPF) units.¹ This particular Fusion Cell also served as the de facto brigade level targeting cell. It was led by an SOF Infantry captain, in charge of facilitating ISR support for SOF missions and deconflicting the execution of SOF missions within the BCT’s AO.

In addition to a handful of SOF intelligence analysts, both the BCT’s Cryptologic Support Team (CST) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Analyst also sat in the Fusion Cell. During the PDSS it was made clear that SOF was in charge of the Fusion Cell and that the only personnel support required from the BCT were the CST and NGA Analyst. However, upon arrival to Afghanistan, our BCT was notified that SOF personnel would be repositioning to a new location and in 30 days our BCT would be required to take complete ownership of the Fusion Cell. The Brigade Commander made a decision that the Brigade S2 would be responsible for managing the Fusion Cell upon the departure of the SOF personnel.

The immediate dilemma for the Brigade S2 was how to replace the SOF personnel, to include a leader and five intelligence analysts. Fortunately, the USARAK G2 at Fort Richardson was willing to let a senior 350F Warrant Officer immediately deploy to serve as leader of the Fusion Cell. This individual had extensive targeting experience from previous OIF deployments, as well as experience working in the SOF community. Once on the ground, she developed a relationship with the SOF units and the battalion S2s. She also participated in daily SOF operational updates, to ensure battlespace deconfliction. She was able to get three battalion S2s to commit to providing an MOS 35F analyst to the Fusion Cell for 180 day rotations. The 35Fs were required to develop target packets for whichever high value individuals (HVIs) their battalion S2 directed. Through this process, the 35Fs gained valuable targeting experience and the battalion S2s had someone embedded in the Fusion Cell focused wholly on developing target packets for HVIs operating in their battalion AO. In addition to the three 35Fs provided by the battalions, two more 35Fs were brought over from the Brigade S2 Section. Also, the Fires Battalion agreed to support the Fusion Cell with a Fires warrant officer to assist with targeting support and to deconflict fire missions. Lastly, SOF agreed to provide a senior NCO to serve as their Liaison Officer.

Now properly manned, the Fusion Cell was able to carry on its original mission of deconflicting air and ground SOF and GPF operations. Additionally, it served as the brigade level targeting cell, where analysts could take the time necessary (often weeks or months) to generate detailed target packets on mid- to low-level HVIs. Due to the relationships cultivated, the Fusion Cell was able to share target packets with SOF and vice versa. To action the mid-to-low level HVIs the BCT stood-up a Focused Targeting Force (FTF), a task organized platoon-size element specially trained to conduct HVI targeting. Commanded by an Infantry captain, the FTF consisted of a rifle platoon and multiple enablers, to include specially trained Afghan police, dog handlers, female Soldiers (for processing Afghan women), Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, and others.² There was also a Multifunction Team assigned to the FTF, which provided organic HUMINT and SIGINT collection, biometrics collection, and document and media collection. The FTF conducted missions almost daily, maneuvering by helicopter air assault or ground vehicle convoy to detain HVIs, destroy weapons caches, capture vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), or conduct reconnaissance.

 Challenge #9—Who will Train the Afghan Intel Soldiers?

Our BCT headquarters was aligned to support the 2nd Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps headquarters. The 2nd ANA Corps consisted of several brigades, each with several battalions. During the first month of the deployment the Corps established a training center on the same FOB as its Corps headquarters. Getting there required a 45 minute helicopter flight from our brigade headquarters. The Corps G2 asked if our BCT could provide someone to train the ANA soldiers working in the Brigade and battalion S2 sections, as there was no MI school for the ANA at that time and the
soldiers working in the S2 sections had never received any type of intelligence training. The Corps G2 wanted multiple course iterations taught throughout the year, with each course being four weeks in length. ANA brigade and battalion S2s would send one or two soldiers to each course, so that within one year the entire Corps could be trained in basic S2 section skills. Soldiers from the Corps G2 Section would also attend the training.

Our Brigade Commander had already made it clear that while our BCT’s role was not to train the ANA, we should also not forgo opportunities to improve their capabilities. U.S. forces would be leaving someday and it would then fall to the ANA to provide their own security. Realizing this was a tremendous opportunity to leave the ANA a more capable force than we found them, the Brigade S2 agreed to provide someone to conduct the training. It was decided to use the BCT’s only 350F All-Source Warrant Officer to conduct the training of the ANA soldiers. An IBCT had only one organic 350F on the MTOE at that time, so when he moved to another FOB to focus full-time on training the ANA his absence created a senior leader gap in the Brigade S2 Section. This was resolved by backfilling him with the 1LT who had been serving as the MI Company’s Executive Officer.

Our 350F designed, then taught six iterations of this “S2 Course” to the ANA. The course consisted of basic skills that ANA S2 sections needed, to include: map reading, battle tracking, intelligence reporting, terrain and weather analysis, target packet development, and how to coordinate with other staff sections. After the first course, the 350F was able to designate assistant instructors who could assist him. Due to the minimal education levels of many of the ANA soldiers, instructors had to demonstrate skill and patience when explaining concepts that were foreign to many of the students. Some had never used a map prior to the course and many were unfamiliar with how to operate a radio, but quickly learned how to use it to report information to higher. Overall, the S2 Course was a huge success, as it dramatically increased the professionalism of the S2 sections within the 2nd ANA Corps.

Challenge #10–For Want of a Battalion Level UAS. The geography of the BCT’s AO had one major restriction. The province of Khowst was bordered to the north and east by Pakistan and to the west and south by a rugged mountain chain, with peaks just under 10,000 feet, resulting in a situation where it was extremely difficult to fly Shadow UAS over the mountains. The Shadow Platoon of the BCT prior to ours conducted multiple flights over the mountains to determine the exact limitations. If our BCT stationed the Shadow launch and recovery site inside Khowst Province, then Shadow could not be flown over the mountains to support operations in the other two provinces of Paktika and Paktia. On the other hand, if it were stationed outside, it could not fly over the mountains to support operations inside Khowst Province.

Based on our pre-deployment analysis, it was decided to station Shadow at an airfield in Paktika Province, where it could support approximately two-thirds of the BCT’s AO. Fortunately, a major airfield existed at FOB Salerno inside Khowst Province, from where an OH-58 Kiowa troop could provide daily aerial reconnaissance support to ground operations conducted. While the manned OH-58s were used extensively, they were not an ideal solution to the requirements for long-duration aerial surveillance inside Khowst Province. For instance, their limited flight duration time prevented them from spending hours searching roads looking for IEDs ahead of Afghan National Police convoys or loitering undetected above the residence of a suspected HVI. Only a UAS has the abilities needed for long-duration aerial surveillance.

The BCT worked both long-term and short-term solutions for this dilemma. The long-term solution was to secure a second set of Shadow launch and recovery equipment and second Ground Control Station from the Shadow UAS Program Manager (PM), locate it at FOB Salerno inside Khowst Province, then split the four Shadow vehicles across the two locations. Two would be used to fly missions from inside Khowst province and two would continue to fly from the airfield in Paktika Province. The Brigade S2 and Shadow Platoon jointly worked this long-term solution. The Brigade S2 submitted a proposal to the FOB Salerno engineers for a construction project to build a Shadow capable runway, while the Shadow Platoon secured a commitment from the PM for the extra equipment and a proposed timeline for its arrival. However, it was projected that the BCT’s 12-month deployment would be over long before the runway was built and the extra equipment arrived.

The short-term solution was a battalion level UAS. This was the ideal solution to fill the gap until Shadow was operational inside Khowst Province. The Fires Battalion was the battlespace owner for all of Khowst Province and its S2 was willing to dedicate two personnel to operate a UAS. The Brigade S2 communicated the requirement to CJTF J2. The solution came in the form of the Silver Fox UAS. The Joint IED Defeat Office had contracted with the manufacturer to provide Silver Fox as part of its counter-IED mission, with the Air Force Research Laboratory serving as Silver Fox PM.

While not as easy to manage at the battalion level as a rotary wing UAS might have been, Silver Fox turned out to
be an excellent system. A 38-pound aircraft with a 10-foot wingspan and eight-hour flight duration, Silver Fox launched from a small rail and landed on its belly. It provided first-rate day and night stabilized FMV directly into the battalion Command Post (CP) and all units had communications with the CP. It excelled at providing counter-IED support to convoys, looking far ahead of the lead vehicle and often detecting personnel as they were either emplacing or arming (previously emplaced) IEDs within the convoy's path. Even when Coalition Forces were unable to arrive in time to apprehend the individual, Silver Fox still found the ambush location and the IED was easily neutralized by an Engineer Route Clearance Team.

Our BCT’s experience with Silver Fox proved the concept and worth of a battalion level UAS. It worked extremely well in Khowst Province, detecting IEDs and greatly increasing situational awareness of threat activity within the battalion’s AO. It demonstrated how a battalion could positively benefit from having its own organic UAS capability, and its success suggests that all Army maneuver battalions could benefit as well.

**Challenge #11–How to Regain Control of the Border from the Taliban.** During the deployment it became obvious that more emphasis needed to be placed on “securing the border.” This awareness grew as the enemy changed strategy and began to detonate increasing numbers of VBIEDs not only in our three provinces, but also in the Afghan capital. The most direct road from Pakistan to Kabul was the Gardez-Khowst road, which ran directly through our AO. While typical roadside IEDs consisted of 30 to 50 pounds of Home Made Explosive (HME), a VBIED carried hundreds and sometimes thousands of pounds of HME. Simultaneously to these increasing numbers of VBIED detonations taking place, our BCT’s efforts at improving Afghan Border Police (ABP) capabilities began to pay off. The Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) had the mission of assisting the ABP and worked hard to improve ABP facilities and provide professional training for all ABP personnel. As ABP capabilities and morale increased, they began to capture some VBIEDs attempting to cross into Afghanistan at border checkpoints. When this happened the driver would often flee back across the border to Pakistan before he could be detained by the ABP.

With the growing numbers of enemy VBIEDs crossing from Pakistan into Afghanistan and the increasing effectiveness of the ABP at capturing them, the brigade staff formed a working group to determine what more could be done to attack this issue. The Brigade S2 Section’s contribution was largely through Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) analysis. The two-person GEOINT Cell went to work pulling the latest imagery for the approximately 200 miles of border the BCT had with Pakistan, annotating every road and trail large enough for vehicular use. There were many enemy Route and Transit lines crisscrossing the border area, but we specifically targeted the ones large enough for vehicle traffic. The analysis was passed to the BSTB Commander and Brigade Engineer, who worked to get Afghan crews to close off as many of the roads as possible. The only roads allowed to remain open were those which had an Afghan international crossing station or ABP checkpoint. All other roads were physically blocked by construction crews.

This combination of both increasing the capability of the ABP and blocking all non-essential roads blunted the enemy’s strategy, and the ABP continued to get better at identifying VBIEDs and stopping them at the border. Nonetheless, while our joint U.S./Afghan efforts stopped many of the VBIEDs constructed inside Pakistan from crossing into Afghanistan, the enemy continued to adapt. Soon, they began moving larger amounts of HME across the border by foot to construct VBIEDs inside Afghanistan. Consequently, our targeting focus changed as we began to look for indicators of VBIED construction sites inside Khowst and other provinces.

**Challenge #12–Who’s in Charge of UGS?** The lack of a dedicated person within the BCT to manage unattended ground sensors (UGS) became a serious issue to the Brigade and battalion S2s. The BCT had received an MTT on UGS prior to its deployment, which was focused on how to conduct minor upkeep and properly emplace UGS. However, the Brigade S2 did not anticipate the need for a dedicated individual within the Brigade S2 Section to serve as the BCT’s overall UGS manager. Shortly after the RIP/TOA into Theater, our Brigade S2 Section began receiving emails from CJTF J2 asking for status updates on UGS systems. The 25 systems in our AO were issued to the previous BCT and all were at the battalion or company level, and spread across four battalions. It took months for the battalion S2s to even locate the systems, as many were tucked away in CONEXs and not listed on any hand receipt. The UGS Manager within the CJTF J2 Section wanted the BCT to employ as many of the systems as possible, but the battalion S2s stated that most were inoperable.

The CJTF UGS Manager tried hard to promote the use of UGS and wanted to push additional systems to the BCT. Unfortunately, the Brigade S2 Section had no personnel who could take on the additional duty of UGS Manager, and the CJTF J2 had no personnel who could physically come to the BCT’s AO to assist. Therefore, the Brigade S2 decided...
that the best solution was to start sending the inoperable systems back to CJTF J2. Had there been even just one field service representative assigned on a part-time basis (supporting multiple BCTs), then the UGS systems could have been maintained and employed much more effectively. The Brigade S2 NCOIC volunteered to evacuate the non-working UGS. Each trip took him out of the Brigade S2 Section for three or four days, as he had to fly by helicopter to a battalion headquarters, collect the systems, arrange air transportation to CJTF (Bagram), turn in the systems to CJTF J2, then arrange transportation back to the brigade headquarters. Through this process, by the end of the deployment the BCT had reduced its numbers to 12 operational UGS systems.

Units wanting to utilize UGS in an exercise or deployment should be prepared to designate personnel within the BCT to undergo training on how to maintain and employ them, as well as someone within the Brigade S2 Section to serve as overall UGS Manager. Be aware that some systems also have a Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) requirement, so a decision must also be made as to which organization will do the PED (BCT, Theater MI Brigade, ASCC G2, etc.), so that usable information can be disseminated to the unit.

**Endnotes**


LTC Jim Reed served as Brigade S2 for 4/25 IBCT during 2008-2010. He is currently the XO of the Training Development and Support Directorate at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Other assignments include G2 Operations Chief at ARSOUTH, BDE S2 for the 18th MP BDE, 11th ACR Assistant Regiment S2, and 96th CA BN S2 and HHC Commander.

MAJ Ken Wright served as Brigade Collection Manager for 4/25 IBCT during 2008-2010. He is currently the XO of TRADOC Capability Manager-Biometrics and Forensics at Fort Huachuca. Other assignments include Senior Intelligence Advisor to Saudi Arabia MoD and Battalion S2.

CW5 Erin O’Hara served as Fusion Cell Chief for 4/25 IBCT during 2009-2010. She is currently the Senior Technical Advisor, Requirements Determination Integration, CDI at Fort Huachuca. Other assignments include Senior Analyst at USARAK, Special Operations Intelligence LNO, Knowledge Manager for ARSOUTH G2, and Production Chief for CJTF-7 and V Corps.
I recently deployed to the National Training Center (NTC) as a brigade S2 to participate in the first 18 day Decisive Action rotation. Having recently left NTC as both a BN S2 trainer and scenario planner I thought I had it all covered, but as the rotation wore on I realized there were a lot of little things that needed to take place before I ever saw a unit in the box as a trainer. The following is a list of 15 things, in no particular order, that I identified as something I wish I had done before setting foot in the box.

1. **Test your MI systems well before you ship your equipment and give yourself time to fix the problems.**

   This was our biggest issue at NTC. Every one of our MI systems broke down at one point or another during the exercise. Most of these problems could have been prevented if good operator maintenance had been performed prior to shipping the equipment. The frequent loss of the use of systems like the Prophet and Tactical Ground Station hindered our ability to receive intelligence injects that could have led to a better understanding of the conventional enemy threat and help to build patterns of life for unconventional targets.

2. **Have a plan to jump your DCGS-A server and don’t bring your battalion servers.**

   Most of us who deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan are used to living on a FOB where the DCGS–A server was stored in a room and forgotten about until it either had a problem or it was time to redeploy. Little or no thought was put into how to maintain connections with the Tactical Entity Database while the Brigade Main was jumping to a new location. In the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) at NTC this became a big problem. Our Brigade Main jumped twice, both times our DCGS-A server was off the network for the better part of a day. This prevented the units that were linked to it from accessing the TED during that shut down. Initially our plan was to use the server in the ACT-E to fill the role until the main server could be brought on line but the maintenance issues made that a problem. Having a plan for how to provide uninterrupted coverage prior to arrival would have prevented the loss of coverage we experienced.

   Jumping a server at the battalion level is even harder. A battalion tactical operations center (TOC) would jump almost daily. This would have required the battalion S2 section to set up the server and then just as it was getting fully operational, tear it down for the next move. This would have required an MOS 35T to support each battalion every time it moved. We did not have the 35Ts to support that kind of work load. We solved this by not bringing battalion server stacks. Each battalion set up a BAL as a server and pointed that to the Brigade who in turn pointed to the Division server. We got a lot of push back from NTC for this but, after talking to the DCGS Tactical Engagement Team this is the solution they recommended.

3. **Have a good troops-to-task plan.**

   Troops-to-task planning has become a bit of a lost art. In the days of Iraq and Afghanistan most units didn’t worry about providing personnel for TOC security, or KP, or a laundry list of other tasks that take Soldiers away from their primary duty. In the DATE environment units have to secure themselves and sustain themselves. This requires personnel to be pulled away from their primary duty to perform these secondary but vital tasks. There were several times where I would walk into the Brigade Intelligence Support Element (BISE) and find it almost completely empty. This was due to our inability to forecast tasks and build a plan that maximized each soldier’s time.

   At NTC you have your Soldier’s complete attention, use all 24 hours of their day. After an 11 or 12 hour shift there is no MWR to go to or movies to watch back in their room. Many
Soldiers would spend some of their “off” time continuing to work. Use a couple of those left over hours to cover security requirements so you can fence those that are on shift. Don’t push them too hard however, or they will be no good to you on their shift.

4. Have a good power generation plan.

This is another issue that wasn’t an issue in the FOB environment. You have to understand the power requirements of your equipment and how much power you can self generate. It may not seem like an S2 section needs a lot of power but when you add in all the systems the MICO and terrain team bring with them your ability to sustain each is reduced quickly. Know who you can turn to when you need some extra power generation.

5. Identify early on who is in charge of the BISE.

The new ATP 2-19.4, Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Techniques, identifies the need for a BISE chief but does not identify who that should be. We started with the senior All Source Warrant Officer as the BISE chief. This did not work. Pulling him out of the process to be in charge of the entire operation took a senior analyst away from what he does best. It wasn’t until we moved the S2X, a 35D Captain, into the position of BISE Chief did the BISE really start to produce quality products.

6. Know who the right people are to jump with the TOC.

Before our Brigade Main would jump we would send forward what we called the X-Ray TOC (the Main was the Yankee TOC). This X-ray TOC was a small element designed to run the battle for about 24 hours until the rest of the Main could be brought back on line. Each section with a current operations (CUOPS) requirement would have a day and night shift person. These people have to be your strongest CUOPS people. If it doesn’t hurt having those people out of the fight while they are setting up, then you picked the wrong people. These are the people that you have to trust to answer the Brigade Commander’s questions while you are off line and on the move.

7. Shadow Mission Command from the Brigade Main.

This isn’t something that I forgot, but it was something I had to fight the observer-controller/trainers (OC/Ts) over. This is only an option if you have redundancies at your Launch and Recover Site (LRS). We had a Ground Control Station (GCS) and a Portable GCS (PGCS) at the LRS and a GCS at the Brigade Main. The OC/Ts recommended that all three be located at the LRS. This is not necessary. By having a GCS and a PGCS at the LRS you have the required redundant capabilities.

Having a GCS at the Brigade Main does several things. First, it increased our range. The LRS never moved during the rotation. From their location, however, they could only cover about half of the box. Having the GCS with the Main increased their range to cover the entire box. Secondly, having the mission commander on the TOC floor meant it was easier and quicker to re-task or refine their mission. Communications with the LRS were spotty at times which would have prevented us from dynamically tasking the Shadow during the mission. Further, having the GCS with the Main meant we didn’t have to rely on the One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) for the camera feed. We were able to hard wire the feed into one of the monitors on the TOC floor which provided a clearer picture and wasn’t susceptible to losing the feed as much as the OSRVT.

8. Have a products checklist.

We had done several field exercises prior to arriving at NTC where we created some great Military Decision Making Process products that were very detailed and provided the Commander with exactly what he wanted to see. Somewhere between those exercises and stepping foot on the ground at Fort Irwin that knowledge was lost. Our first set of products was not to the same standard as our last set of products we created at home station. This led to the creation of a checklist for what each product needed to include. After that it was as simple as following the list.

9. Know how to build graphics in all ABCS systems.

Yes, DCGS-A is supposed to feed the other ABCS systems but that won’t always work. This will require someone to manually create overlays in both the Command Post of the Future and Blue Force Tracking (BFT)/Joint Capabilities Release (JCR)/ForceXXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). These are time consuming for the skilled user and next to impossible for someone who is learning on the job. Get someone trained on how to use these non-MI systems so they can effectively transfer products from one to the other.

10. The proper role of the MICO commander.

What I thought he would be doing before the exercise and what I had him doing during the exercise were two completely different things. I had originally planned to use him in the BISE OIC role described above. I had seen it work in Iraq and thought it would work in this environment as well. After some strong coaching from some mentors of mine I changed his role. He ended up as the facilitator for brigade’s collection assets and assisted the Collection Manager in the planning for collection and then ensured the successful execution of that plan with regards to his assets. Moving and
sustaining three Human Intelligence teams, two low level voice intercept teams, a Prophet sensor, and ensuring the Shadow had what it needed is a full time job that requires commander level oversight.

11. Don’t forget COIN.

Just because there is a formation of T-80 Tanks to your front doesn’t mean you can hand wave away the improvised explosive device to your rear. Understanding the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) learned during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to combat an insurgency is still a requirement in a DATE rotation. Unfortunately, we did not train this during our home station train up, however, we did have a few people with deployment experience that stepped up. One of the most important TTPs we brought back was a High Value Individuals targeting cell. This team focused on personality based targeting for the Brigade’s Focused Targeting Force and the Ranger unit working with us.

12. Have a good weather team.

Many people think it’s always sunny at Fort Irwin so why is a good Staff Weather Officer important? During our first two battle periods the weather was bad enough that our Shadow was grounded for the entire fight. The loss of the Shadow would have been a significant issue for us had our weather team not predicted these weather events days in advance. This allowed us the time to change the collection requirements of the Cavalry Squadron and our Echelons above Brigade assets for these battle periods. This kept us from being in the dark on what the enemy was doing.

13. Have the CAV analyze terrain.

Using the cavalry squadron (CAV) to the fullest would not have been accomplished had we not tasked them with terrain analysis. Having the CAV analyze terrain does not mean they are responsible for creating the Brigade’s MCOO. What it meant to us was that the CAV would be tasked with determining the best routes for follow on forces as they moved forward to find the enemy. This provided us with a better, first hand understanding of the terrain and confirmed the best route for reserve forces if they were needed.


We did not properly apply this tool for intelligence operations until the very last battle period. As we confirmed enemy locations with our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection assets we created an overlay in the JCR and sent it to the Brigade and Battalion Commanders’ vehicles. The Battalion Commanders in turn sent that graphic down to the Company Commanders. This created an environment of shared understanding from Brigade down to company of the current enemy situation.

Another aspect of the system that was helpful was the chat function. Similar to Jabber chat, the chat function on JCR was critical to passing timely information to the command teams. Enemy assessments and battle damage assessment were sent via this system allowing the Command and O&I nets to stay free for Mission Command.

15. Don’t call the enemy courses of action (ECOAs) Most Likely and Most Dangerous.

While the doctrine writers might cry foul on this one we found it more effective to not use these terms when describing the ECOAs. Calling a COA the Most Likely caused us to have tunnel vision and focus the blue plan only on that one COA. After shifting to calling them COA1 and COA2 the focus spread, and we started to create plans that took all of the enemy actions into account. This coupled with understanding the enemy’s decision point tactic methodology allowed us to create ECOAs that were very successful in predicting what the enemy would do.

This is by no means an all encompassing list of things that if you follow you will be guaranteed to be successful at NTC. There are many other things that have to be done to make a rotation successful. These will, however, give you a good base for building toward your success. Good luck!

MAJ King is currently the Brigade S2 for 1/25 SBCT at Fort Wainwright Alaska. He previously served as the Light Task Force S2 O/CT (Airborne) and scenario planner at NTC, Fort Irwin. He has deployed three times in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as both an Infantry and MI officer, first as an Infantry Platoon Leader in 1st SBCT 25th ID, 2004-2005, then as an Intelligence advisor to an Iraqi Army Battalion as a part of a Military Transition Team in 2007-2008, and finally as the BDE AS2, Targeting Officer, and Surveillance Troop Commander in the 4th SBCT, 2nd ID in 2009-2010. MAJ King holds a BA in Sociology from the University of Washington and a Master’s Degree in Strategic Intelligence from American Military University.
Staff Sergeant Antonio Bonilla, U.S. Army

Antonio Bonilla entered the U.S. Army in 1980 as an MP (Military Police). In 1984, after graduating from the Defense Language Institute, he switched to Military Intelligence (MI). He attended and graduated from the Interrogator and Strategic Debriefer courses at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. After graduating, SSG Bonilla spent much of the rest of his career in Panama.

Assigned to the 470th MI Brigade in Corozal, Panama in 1985, SSG Bonilla worked real world missions and projects of national interest throughout Central America. He was selected as the “Pilot Debriefer” for a Central American Military Deserters and Refugees program. He individually screened and assessed more than 400 foreign nationals while working jointly with foreign, U.S. military, and national intelligence agencies. He also conducted intelligence seminars on interrogation techniques, document exploitation, report writing, and other topics for more than 250 Central American MI personnel.

While assigned to the Collection & Exploitation (C&E) Company, 746th MI Battalion, 470th MI Brigade, Bonilla was the NCOIC of a group of 23 officers and enlisted personnel of various intelligence disciplines that supported U.S. Army South (USARSO) and several national-level agencies with sensitive intelligence missions throughout region. As a result of Bonilla’s leadership ability, he was selected and served as First Sergeant of the C&E Company. His actions directly contributed to C Company, 746th MI Battalion being awarded the Director of Central Intelligence Human Intelligence Collector of the Year Award for Fiscal Year 1989.

Bonilla’s greatest contribution came in late 1989 during Operation JUST CAUSE, the operation to oust Panamanian strongman GEN Manuel Noriega. LTC Ben L. Elley, Commander of the 746th MI Battalion, chose Bonilla as his finest Panama expert to support the Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force South. MG Marc Cisneros, Commanding General, USARSO, then handpicked Bonilla to lead the effort to force the peaceful capitulation of the Panamanian Defense Forces. Spending days on the telephone talking to commanders of outlying military zones, SSG Bonilla used his powers of persuasion, knowledge of the enemy, and understanding of the Latin American culture to coerce enemy military zone commanders to serve their country by living to see its rebirth instead of dying needlessly.

SSG Bonilla then set about establishing a telephonic intelligence network that took spot reports of fugitive GEN Noriega’s location from Panamanian sources. This net-
work supplied information that was instrumental in flushing out GEN Noriega and also produced information leading to the discovery of the largest weapons cache found during the entire operation. SSG Bonilla's efforts in support of these operations undoubtedly saved hundreds of U.S. and Panamanian lives and spared numerous towns from destruction and collateral damage that would have occurred had the enemy forces chosen to fight. For these actions, SSG Bonilla received the Bronze Star.

After Operation JUST CAUSE, SSG Bonilla continued working in Panama with the Regional Liaison Office where he coordinated on a daily basis with high-level members of the new Panamanian Police Force and government officials.

SSG Bonilla left the Army in February 1990. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, and Good Conduct Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).

**Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, U.S. Army, (Retired)**

Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant through the Auburn University ROTC program in 1974, LTG Burgess began his career in a series of company-grade assignments of increasing responsibility in Armor and Military Intelligence (MI) units in Germany and at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Later, he held key staff and command positions, including Assistant Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Washington, DC, in 1990, and Battalion Commander, 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, from 1993 to 1994.

From 1995 to 1997, LTG Burgess commanded the 470th MI Brigade. During this period, he expanded the regional focus of the brigade throughout Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Korea. He also filled the role of acting Vice Director of Intelligence, and subsequently the Acting Director of Intelligence for U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). His superb leadership ensured a continuous flow of intelligence analysis in support of a year-long hostage crisis in Peru that ended with the safe withdrawal of U.S. hostages.

LTG Burgess next served as the Director of Intelligence (J2) for the Joint Special Operations Command from 1997 to 1999. His leadership was instrumental in supporting continuous global deployments, as well as major exercises and complex joint-service training events. Following this assignment, LTG Burgess reported as the J2, SOUTHCOM. Maintaining high-tempo operations throughout the Americas, to include Caribbean nations, LTG Burgess provided thought provoking, predictive intelligence for key SOUTHCOM missions, including countering transnational organized crime and drug operations and supporting peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief operations.

In 2003, LTG Burgess left SOUTHCOM to become the J2 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Assuming control of intelligence operations only months after U.S. and coalition forces invaded Iraq, he was at the forefront of providing time-dominant and insightful intelligence for all operational requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, transnational terrorism, and all developing global issues affecting U.S. interests abroad.

LTG Burgess reported to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2005. He served consecutively as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Customer Outcomes, Director of the Intelligence Staff, and Acting Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Under his leadership during this unprecedented period of change, the cornerstone Executive Order 12333 governing all intelligence activities was revised; the first-ever Joint Manning Document for military personnel assigned to organizations outside of the Department of Defense was established; critical Intelligence Community managerial operations were overhauled; and innovative human capital practices were pioneered.
From 2009 until his retirement in 2012, LTG Burgess served as the 17th Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He reinforced the organization’s ability to surge in support of contingency operations, improved the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, and was at the forefront of establishing the Defense Clandestine Service.

During his distinguished 38-year career as a U.S. Army officer, LTG Burgess was a driving force in the U.S. Intelligence Community, providing exceptional leadership and broad strategic vision that contributed to safeguarding national security interests. His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Defense Superior Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters), Joint Service Commendation Medal, U.S. Special Operations Command Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, NATO Medal-Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Parachutist Badge, Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge, and Army Staff Identification Badge.

Major General John DeFreitas III, U.S. Army, (Retired)

MG DeFreitas enlisted in 1973 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant through Officer Candidate School in 1975. Throughout his career, he served as the Senior Intelligence Officer at squadron and division, as well as at three different joint/combined commands. He was twice an MI battalion S3 and commanded at every echelon from platoon through brigade and major command. In 1994, he led the 519th MI Battalion into Haiti, where it conducted intelligence operations, including successful detention operations under the watchful eye of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In 1998, MG DeFreitas took command of the 504th MI Brigade, III Corps, Fort Hood. The Brigade was tasked to deploy Task Force Hunter to Macedonia in support of operations in the Balkans. Within one week of notification, 504th Soldiers re-deployed the unit’s assigned Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from a National Training Center rotation and deployed to Macedonia. Upon arrival in Macedonia, the 504th was mission ready and conducting flight operations within 24 hours. The Brigade’s successful operation in support of military contingencies overseas proved the value of the Hunter which, although scheduled for decommissioning, still flies today.

After a year as the J2, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, MG DeFreitas became the J2, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea in 2001. In less than 12 months, he fully integrated all U.S. and Republic of Korea collection systems to provide full visualization of the operational environment and intelligence support to mission command from any of six warfighting headquarters on the peninsula. This intelligence/operational visualization technology remains one of the most robust in the Department of Defense.

In July 2004, MG DeFreitas was assigned as C2/J2 Multi-National Force, Iraq. He quickly consolidated the supporting intelligence organization into a Joint Intelligence Operation Center (JIOC) and built the facility that housed intelligence operations for most of the war. He helped prepare the theater to receive the Joint Intelligence Operations Capability-Iraq (JIOC-I), a revolutionary concept of intelligence data storage and advanced search with which he had supported as a prototype—Project Morning Calm—while serving in Korea. JIOC-I was funded and ultimately deployed across the area of operations and in stateside units for “reach-back” intelligence operational support. JIOC-I capabilities later integrated into the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, the Army’s premier intelligence processing, exploitation, production and dissemination system.

MG DeFreitas’ next assignment was Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). During his command, MG DeFreitas con-
vinced the Army Staff to consolidate the Army’s five Aerial Exploitation Battalions (AEB) within INSCOM. By doing so, AEB flight crews could deploy worldwide for collection missions while the processing functions remained at a fixed location stateside. This concept allowed the continuation of operations in four theaters with no break in mission support. MG DeFreitas was also the driving force behind the design of the INSCOM Detention Training Facility at which all Army interrogators now train in accordance with published doctrine.

MG DeFreitas’ 36-year Army career culminated with his assignment as the Deputy Director of Analysis and Production at the National Security Agency. He retired on 30 September 2009.

MG DeFreitas’s military awards and badges include the Distinguished Service Medal (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with 6 Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Commendation Medal, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, and the Army Staff Identification Badge. He was also awarded the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal by the Director of National Intelligence.

Colonel James (Tommy) Faust, U.S. Army, (Retired); SES (Retired)

COL Tommy Faust was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in Military Intelligence (MI) through the ROTC program at the University of Georgia in 1976. He commanded Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 501st MI Group; the 332nd Army Security Agency Company, U.S. Army Field Station Korea at Camp Page, Republic of Korea; the 332nd MI Company (Electronic Warfare), 532nd MI Battalion; the 344th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade, and the 525th MI Brigade (Airborne). COL Faust served as S3, 519th MI Battalion; S3, Task Force 525 during Operation URGENT FURY to Grenada in 1983; and S2, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. In 1986, as an MI Proponency Action Officer in the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, he developed the exception to policy allowing Special Electronic Mission Aviators to hold both Aviation and MI Branch areas of concentration. He also served as one of the action officers during the 1 July 1987 activation of the MI Corps.

From 1990 to 1994, COL Faust served as Chief, J2 Operations Division, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, JSOC selected COL Faust to serve as J2 of the Joint Special Operations Scud Hunting Task Force in Western Iraq. Two years later, he led the intelligence assessment team and then served as Chief of Intelligence Operations during Operation GOTHIC SERPENT or “Task Force Ranger” to Somalia in 1993. His final military assignment was Director of the Policy, Operations and Integration Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT), where he created and implemented intelligence plans for the Army’s early efforts in the Global War on Terror.

COL Faust retired from active duty in 2002 and entered Civil Service. In 2005, he was selected for Senior Executive Service by the Department of Homeland Security and held positions as Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Integration in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief of Staff for the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. In 2007, COL Faust transitioned to the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service to serve as the Director, Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity. A year later, he became the Deputy G2 in the Office of the DCSINT. In this capacity, he oversaw Army intelligence planning, programming and budgeting; intelligence operations; intelligence studies, architectures, and Army civilian intelligence personnel programs.
COL Faust retired from Civil Service in October 2013 with more than 40 years of combined military and civilian service. Among his military and civilian awards are the Presidential Rank Award-Meritorious Executive, National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, Army Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), and Bronze Star. He earned the Ranger Tab and both U.S. and Korean Master Parachutist badges.

Major General Harold J. Greene, U.S. Army, (Deceased)

MG Greene received his commission as an Engineer Officer following his graduation from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in May 1980. Early in his career, he served as the S2 in the 588th Engineer Battalion, Fort Polk, Louisiana. The lessons he learned during his formative assignments shaped his understanding of the importance of timely and accurate intelligence and the critical need of operations and intelligence integration. More than 15 of his 34 years of service were devoted to improving intelligence for the commander. MG Greene impacted nearly every system in the Army’s tactical and operational intelligence force from July 1998 until his untimely death in Afghanistan in August 2014.

In July 1998, MG Greene was selected as the Product Manager for Aerial Common Sensor in the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors (IEW&S) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. He was responsible for life-cycle management of the Guardrail, Airborne Reconnaissance Low, and Aerial Common Sensor systems. Under MG Greene’s leadership, the long awaited Guardrail System 2 and its auxiliary/supporting ground systems were fielded. The system not only provided an open architecture that allowed greater interoperability between the various Guardrail systems, it also significantly improved the system’s ability to locate targets in the dense signal environment of the modern battlefield.

MG Greene’s next engagement with Army Intelligence came from June 2003 to February 2008 when he served in consecutive assignments as the Project Manager of Battle Command in the PEO for Command, Control, and Communication-Tactical and the Director of the Battle Command Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology). MG Greene brought intelligence systems, specifically the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), into overall battle command development for the first time. The end result was the integration of DCGS-A functionality into command and control systems throughout the tactical force and the timely dissemination of previously delayed relevant information to commanders at battalion level and below.

In February 2008, MG Greene assumed a General Officer-level position as a Colonel for the Director of Materiel, Force Development, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G8. Among his many responsibilities, MG Greene focused on the future of tactical airborne reconnaissance. MG Greene ensured that the concept of a mix of manned and unmanned aerial collection systems that were compatible and interoperable remained valid. As a result, instead of the complete dissolution of the program, the investigation continued to find the right platform and to give technologies a chance to mature.

MG Greene’s last assignments working with Intelligence, were as the PEO IEW&S, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, and then as the Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management (DASM), in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army. As the PEO, he made tremendous contributions to aerial and terrestrial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and the Army’s Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Program, as well as the continued development of the Guardrail Relay Facility architecture. As the DASM, he suc-
cessfully fielded several major systems including the Grey Eagle Unmanned Aerial System. More importantly, during major Congressional challenges to the DCGS-A program, MG Greene became the “face of Army Intelligence Acquisition” on Capitol Hill as he masterfully defended the criticality of the intelligence flagship system.

MG Greene’s awards include the Distinguished Service Medal (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters), Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Commendation Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Achievement Medal, and the Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff Identification Badge.

Staff Sergeant Dick S. Hamada, U.S. Army, (Deceased)

In early 1943, Dick Hamada was living in Hawaii when he answered the call for volunteers to join the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, a segregated unit made up of Japanese-Americans from throughout the U.S. He was sent to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for combat training. A few months later, Dr. Daniel Buchanan with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) visited the camp, seeking soldiers familiar with the Japanese language. Hamada was one of only a few enlisted Japanese-Americans chosen to conduct clandestine espionage, counterespionage, and intelligence missions for the OSS in the Pacific theater.

In late 1944, Hamada arrived in Burma for his first assignment behind enemy lines. His unit’s mission was to gather intelligence, conduct guerrilla warfare, and coordinate with other battalions to disrupt the enemy escape route to Thailand. Hamada’s responsibility was to interrogate captured prisoners and translate captured documents. As platoon leader, he also led squads of Kachin Rangers on scouting expeditions to harass the enemy and set up intelligence nets to identify and locate targets for the U.S. Army Air Forces.

In late February 1945, Hamada’s battalion tried to enter a small village in western Burma, but was met with strong opposition by Japanese forces. The panicked native warriors deserted by the hundreds. On the third night of battle, with only one-quarter of the battalion’s original strength remaining, the Japanese launched a strong attack on its western flank, which was guarded by Hamada and some newly assigned Chinese troops under his leadership. During the intense fighting, the Chinese troops began to falter and appeared ready to desert. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Hamada left his foxhole and crawled to each Chinese position to encourage them and bolster their defenses. He was not only constantly exposed to enemy fire but also faced the threat of being inadvertently fired upon by his own troops. His leadership and courage empowered the Chinese to fiercely defend their position and ultimately repel the Japanese, who withdrew and retreated. Hamada’s courageous and valiant effort saved his battalion not only from defeat but possible annihilation.

In another incident in August 1945, Hamada’s OSS team participated in Operation MAGPIE to rescue four survivors of the Doolittle Raiders and 600 other prisoners from a Japanese prison camp in Peiping (currently Beijing). The OSS team parachuted in and, upon landing, drew fire from snipers. Still, they were able to successfully extract the prisoners.

SSG Hamada was discharged from the Army following the war. His awards include the Good Conduct Medal as a member of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, Bronze Star Medal (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Soldier’s Medal, and the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded by GEN Dwight Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff. SSG Hamada also received a Presidential Unit Citation in 2000 for being a member of the Military Intelligence Service in World War II, a Special Breast Order from the President of the Republic of China Nationalist government for the rescue of the Doolittle Raiders, and the Congressional Gold Medal awarded in
November 2011 to Japanese-Americans who served in World War II with the Military Intelligence Service, 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Efforts are currently underway to have SSG Hamada’s Bronze Star upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross or Medal of Honor.

Chief Warrant Officer Five John A. Pineda, U.S. Army, Retired, (Deceased)

Mr. Pineda entered military service through the delayed entry program on 18 October 1971. After attending basic training, he was sent to Fort Huachuca to attend the Counterintelligence (CI) Special Agent Course and then to Fort Bliss to attend Vietnamese language training through the Defense Language Institute (DLI) Southwest. His first assignment was as a CI Special Agent for the 502nd MI Battalion stationed in Daegu, Korea. From 1975 to 1977, he was assigned to the 902nd MI Group Resident Office on Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. After attending German language training at DLI in Monterey, California, Mr. Pineda was assigned to the 165th MI Battalion Field Office in Germany. His next assignment was to the Systems Exploitation Detachment at Fort Meade, Maryland, from 1981 to 1984. Following graduation from the Warrant Officers Course, he was assigned to Detachment Alpha at Fort Meade until 1989. During this time, he provided valuable intelligence support to U.S. forces in Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada) and JUST CAUSE (Panama). During all Mr. Pineda’s Cold War-era assignments, he planned and executed sensitive intelligence operations to protect U.S. Army capabilities and operations and, in the process, contributed to the identification and conviction of several foreign espionage agents.

In 1990, Mr. Pineda transferred to the External Management Division, Defense Intelligence Agency, as a Defense Attaché recruiter. Then, during a four-year assignment to the Forward Support Office in Mannheim, Germany, he provided intelligence that supported operations in the Balkans. In 2000, he served as the Executive Officer for Detachment 448 at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, during which time he also supported operations at White Sands Missile Range. In 2002, Mr. Pineda moved back to Fort Meade to serve at the Army Field Support Center.

In 2006, following extensive recovery after an accident, Mr. Pineda returned to Fort Huachuca to lead the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Training Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JC0E) team developing the Advanced Source Operations Course (ASOC) Program of Instruction. The following year, after completing and instituting ASOC, he volunteered to deploy to Iraq as the Bilateral Agreement Program Manager under the C2X, Multi-National Forces-Iraq.

After returning from his deployment, Mr. Pineda retired from the Army. Then, as a new member of the MI Civilian Excepted Career Program, he was hired to serve as the Military Capabilities Detachment Chief for the U.S. Army Operations Activity. In 2010, Mr. Pineda was promoted to the rank of GG-15 and selected to serve as the Senior Intelligence Officer for the U.S. Army Operations Group (formerly the Army Operations Activity). On 26 April 2014, Mr. Pineda suffered a massive heart attack from which he did not recover.

CW5 Pineda’s real legacy was the mentorship he provided to multiple generations of MI professionals, many of whom continue to serve with distinction because of his selfless service and careful guidance. CW5 Pineda’s awards include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Joint Service Achievement Medal (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Superior Civilian Service Award, Department of Defense HUMINT Career Achievement Award, and induction into the HUMINT Hall of Fame, Class of Fiscal Year 2014.
Colonel Douglas Sheldon, U.S. Army, (Retired)

COL Doug Sheldon’s assignments over his 30-year career took him from Vietnam to Fort Bragg, the Pentagon and finally to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In each consecutive assignment, COL Sheldon left a lasting legacy for all generations of military professionals who followed him.

COL Sheldon was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Military Intelligence (MI) from the University of Iowa in 1966. During his first assignment, he advised an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) clan collection unit. His maturity, understanding of cultural dynamics, and rapport with his counterpart and other ARVN forces resulted in critical intelligence reporting on enemy operations in the central highlands. When he returned to Vietnam three years later for his second tour, he was assigned as advisor to the same team and counterpart. Using their already solid relationship, COL Sheldon convinced his counterpart to broaden collection operations into the tribal lands of the central highlands, thus tripling reporting on key enemy operations.

Returning from Vietnam in 1972, COL Sheldon was assigned as S2 for 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division. As only the second MI officer to be assigned below Division headquarters, he developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for tactical intelligence collection operations. Additionally, he developed and tested employment tactics and techniques for the Division’s unattended ground sensors—the first of their kind in the continental U.S.

In 1976, COL Sheldon became an Operations Staff Officer at U.S. Forces Command where he developed the intelligence force structure for the U.S.-based force to deploy in support of general war in Europe. He also was selected as the intelligence trusted agent in the formulation and assessment of a unit later to become known as Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, or Delta Force. Based on this experience, he was handpicked to be one of the initial members of the newly developed Joint Special Operations Command. As the Deputy J2 for Operations (CHOPS), COL Sheldon helped build the military’s most capable intelligence force and established the core of intelligence operations in this joint community.

COL Sheldon served as G2 of the 82nd Airborne Division from 1984 to 1985, and then as Commander of the 313th MI Battalion in the Division. In 1987, he was handpicked by LTG Sidney T. Weinstein, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, to help develop an intelligence structure for the emerging USSOCOM. COL Sheldon then served as the U.S. Southern Command Deputy J2 during Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada and the early days of the “War on Drugs” in South America. He followed that with an assignment as Commander of the Army’s Office of Military Support.

COL Sheldon spent the final three years of his military career as the J2, USSOCOM, followed by 15 years as a civilian in USSOCOM where he helped grow the intelligence structure in both billets and funding, thus greatly increasing the capability of Special Operation Forces to execute the most dangerous missions in the most austere environments.

Throughout his career, COL Sheldon’s ability to innovate, listen, and create a team of teams not only distinguished him as a leader in Military Intelligence but also within the Joint and Special Operations communities. COL Sheldon’s awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, the USSOCOM Outstanding Civilian Service Medal, and the Master Parachutist Badge. ⭐️
"Military Intelligence has played an important role in every conflict in which the United States has been involved. The MI Soldier has in the past, and will continue in the future to be the most important piece of MI history and of a larger U.S. Army history."

These are the overarching themes of the new MI Soldier Heritage Learning Center, which opened on 26 June 2015. MG Robert Ashley cut the ribbon during the 2015 MI Hall of Fame ceremonies, and continued a process that began nearly 20 years ago with the dedication ceremony of the Army Intelligence Museum on Fort Huachuca on 2 November 1995.

The MI Museum project began in earnest in June 2013 when all of Fort Huachuca’s museum facilities were transferred from U.S. Army Garrison’s Installation Management Command to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), under the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Because the Army’s museums are intended to provide training and education for Soldiers, particularly in the area of branch history, the realignment better supports that mission. The transfer included all of the fort’s museum facilities: the Fort Huachuca Museum, the Museum Annex, and the Army Intelligence Museum, as well as the museum staff.

While it required a temporary closure of all of its buildings at once, the museum transfer turned out to be a bonus for all of Fort Huachuca’s museum facilities. The museums were placed as a separate branch under the management of the Training Development and Support (TD&S) Directorate, Training Support Division. TRADOC and USAICoE committed funds to make much needed renovations and repairs to the Fort Huachuca Museum and Annex, both located on Old Post. These buildings were brought up to code for electrical and safety, as well as becoming far more accessible for visitors with disabilities with the installation of ramps and new restroom facilities. In addition, the site of the former MI Museum has been turned into a support center that will provide work space for the museum staff and storage for the museums’ collections and archival materials. Finally, the Army Intelligence Museum was relocated to make it more accessible to MI Soldiers in training.

After considering a number of options, the warehouse facility beside the MI Library that housed the Training Materials Support Branch (TMSB) was determined to be the best facility for a new MI Museum. In September 2014, TMSB moved to a newly refurbished bay on the south side of Nicholson Hall, and work commenced to turn a warehouse into a state-of-the-art museum and learning center.
After emptying the space completely, contractors constructed partitions and a functional classroom, polished and stained the concrete floor, and painted the ceiling black. New positional lighting, tracks for multi-media cabling, and sound baffles were installed. The space was ready for its new purpose—showcasing the history of MI and the U.S. Army while educating and inspiring MI Soldiers about their Corps’ history and heritage.

The new Learning Center features exhibits highlighting the contributions of Soldiers to the MI profession throughout our nation’s history, beginning with the Revolutionary War and continuing to the present and beyond. The exhibits are Soldier-focused, recounting the actions of Soldiers serving in intelligence fields. When Soldiers enter the museum, the first thing they notice is a giant photo wall of the faces of other MI Soldiers from the past and present. They will recognize that they are part of an organization much larger than themselves and their fellow Soldiers training with them at Fort Huachuca. The photo wall features an introductory video providing an overview of MI history, beginning with an exciting look at today’s modern, All-Source Intelligence capability and transitioning to a high-level, retrospective tour through history.

Directly opposite the Photo Wall, history comes alive in exhibit cases dedicated to the Army’s major combat operations. Exhibits feature iconic imagery from the time period, focused learning objectives, artifacts, interactive multi-media topics, and individual Soldier Stories. Themes of the individual exhibits explore how MI as a profession evolved through that era, showcasing the development of specific disciplines and capabilities over time. Using a selection panel to access exhibit videos, Soldiers are able to select from a number of short video vignettes that will highlight specific roles MI played within the larger Army picture.

A unique feature of the new MI Museum is the Soldier Story. Each exhibit will have a televised story about an intelligence Soldier—an intimate look at the people involved in specific MI events. For example, the Civil War exhibit highlights the intelligence contributions of the Bureau of Military Information at the Battle of Gettysburg. The Soldier Story will feature Private John Babcock, how he came to serve with this organization, and what he was able to achieve there. The hope is that the Army’s newest MI Soldiers will be inspired by these stories, understand how one MI Soldier really can make a difference, and be inspired to see the potential in themselves.
The MI Soldier Heritage Learning Center utilizes technology and interactive features, expanding beyond the one-dimensional feel of a traditional museum. In addition, despite the fact that MI history is technology-heavy and covers a wide spectrum of disciplines and multiple domains over 240 years, we are fortunate to be able to showcase a number of tangible pieces of our history. Two of the larger artifacts happen to come from Cold War era: an actual piece of the Berlin Wall, and a vehicle used by the Military Liaison Mission in East Germany. These macro-artifacts had to be positioned early in the design and layout process in order to ensure adequate spacing between exhibits and placement of other features. In order to illustrate some of the modern intelligence effort, National Guard units are loaning the museum used equipment as it is being decommissioned from overseas deployments.

Work continued on the MI Museum at an accelerated pace in preparation for the ribbon cutting ceremony in June and will feature full exhibits highlighting the Revolutionary War, American Civil War, World War I, and Vietnam. There are partial exhibits that showcase some of the accomplishments of the Cold War and capture the experiences of the Global War on Terrorism. Future exhibits planned include World War II, Korea, Desert Storm/Desert Shield, an expansion of the Cold War, and the MI Soldier in 2025. When funds become available, the museum staff stands ready to expand the museum to incorporate more Soldier Stories, video vignettes, and full exhibits.

The history of Army Intelligence is being written every day. Soldiers who train at USAICoE will graduate and move on to units in support of yet-unknown military operations and conflicts. Because of the MI Soldier Heritage Learning Center, each of them will have an opportunity to learn that he or she is part of an MI and Army tradition that is rich with history and ripe with potential. These new Soldiers will recognize the value of their role within the greater Army and within their own Corps and will continue to make their nation proud.
Sharing the Secret: The History of the Intelligence Corps 1940-2010
by Nick van der Bijl

Pen and Sword Military, 2013, 256 pages
ISBN: 1848844131

This book is about an organization within the British Army that has responsibility for collecting military information that will help the Army carry out its duties in those parts of the world where it has been sent. It is unique in the sense that it focuses on one organization, namely the Intelligence Corps of the British army. The sources used in the book are limited by national law but enough were found to produce a work that can make a contribution about an important organization. Some of the sources are declassified government documents and others are written accounts of individuals who participated in intelligence activities. The approach used by the author is basically a historical one beginning with recognition of the need for a military intelligence organization and continuing on into the twenty-first century with an allusion to the activities of the organization. The reader will find how the Intelligence Corps responded to the many new challenges over an expanded period of time.

The author is well qualified to write this book as he served with the Intelligence Corps and has written a number of other books concerning British military activities in areas such as the Falklands, Indonesia, and Northern Ireland.

Reading this book, it is interesting to compare what is noted about the British Intelligence Corps and military intelligence agencies associated with other countries. One similarity is that of a rather slow acceptance by some of the need for such an agency. Perhaps this occurred because many individuals did not realize the contributions that such an organization can provide to the army. Another similarity is that the Intelligence Corps has been divided into various specialties. This is understandable because the tasks assigned to intelligence agencies vary considerably. It is noted that linguists, photographic interpreters, and human intelligence resources all made valuable contributions. A third similarity is that the Intelligence Corps was using and found helpful individuals from various professional backgrounds. Of course, all intelligence agencies have the basic responsibility of gathering and analyzing information and getting it to the proper personnel who are the key decision makers in military strategy, government policy reactions, and the implementation of various security activities.

One would expect that the value of an intelligence organization would most likely occur and be evident during major operations experienced by the military such as occurred in England during World War II. This can certainly be said about the British Intelligence Corps during that time primarily because of the many challenges faced by the military which used its services. In addition, one would expect that its contributions during such a stressful time would be recognized to the extent that they could be used as a strong reason for the maintenance of the organization. However, such did not appear the case for the British Intelligence Corps. For example, the author notes that after the war one high ranking individual suggested that “it is possible that at some future date the intelligence corps will continue on a reserve or territorial army basis (172). In addition, the author suggests that promotion opportunities might have been limited for those interested in serving with the Intelligence Corps. Yet in spite of these views support for the Corps did evolve because of tension in Europe after World War II and the organization went on to make what appeared to be valuable contributions to the army in whatever major country its presence was found.

Perhaps we can learn much about the formation and role of an intelligence component associated with the army as a result of reading this book. For example, we learn such components do render a valuable service. However, their role is not always widely known and often there may be a lack of appreciation for their accomplishments. Perhaps it is true that we are more often to hear about a failure of an intelligence organization than hear about its many successes. Yet this should not deter us from supporting efforts to promote an intelligence organization within the military. What it should do is encourage us to work harder to make whatever contributions we can so that others will be more willing to provide needed resources to accomplish a valuable purpose.

Reviewed by William E. Kelly, Ph.D.
Auburn University
The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations
by Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom
Penguin Group, 2006, 240 pages

What does the rise of organizations based on the power of peer relationships mean for the U.S. Army? With the new millennium are rigid, hierarchical, command-driven structures at an end? Is initiative and leadership driven from the top or the bottom?

Although published nearly a decade ago, The Starfish and the Spider offers insight into the growing challenges facing leaders and subordinates in an increasingly ambiguous and shifting environment. Its 240 pages provide many thought-provoking ideas for the reader to ponder. The revolution of information sharing and instant connectivity, the transition from analog to digital, and the evolving power of the Internet—all within a generation—has led to fundamental changes in how we think and work. Centralized structures are stressed as access to information proliferates, fragmentation accelerates, and crowd sourcing enables everyone to participate. Like younger generations of workers, many organizations now face a fundamental shift in how work is accomplished with decentralized, flexible staffing, and driven by a sense of community that shares goals, responsibilities, and ownership. It is leadership by the many over the restricted direction of a few.

The authors distill numerous principles on what drives leaderless organizations and a few are noteworthy: intelligence in an open system is spread throughout; power and knowledge are distributed; members communicate directly to one another; and leadership trusts subordinates enough to encourage initiative. Serving a critical role in leaderless organizations are the catalysts, leaders who derive power not from command-and-control and rank. Instead, catalysts are peers who build trust, and employ emotional intelligence to be inspirational and collaborative. They thrive behind the scenes on ambiguity and chaos, and in the end, they are mission-oriented. They drive solutions from the ground up.

Leaderless management philosophies are embraced by an array of companies and organizations. Unlike militaries organized top-down where initiative is driven through the General Staff solution, the American way of war emphasizes innovation and initiative from the bottom, reflected by its deep training curriculum for junior soldiers and NCOs. America’s military history is rich with examples of small unit task forces carrying the battle forward with localized initiatives.

The selective adaptations of some leaderless principles are critical to the future of the U.S. Army, not only for efficiencies and harnessing the intellectual capital of its soldiers, but to understand our adversaries who increasingly embrace leaderless, dispersed organizational structures. Published two years after The Starfish and the Spider, Marc Sageman’s, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century accurately predicted the emergence of leaderless terrorist organizations. Hastened by the Arab Spring and the demise of authoritarian governments, many of our adversaries follow a model of leaderless jihad driven by social media—ISIS, al Nusra Front, and AQ’s affiliates. They are prolific and proving hard to contain. The centralized al-Qaeda organization now seems out of step with its contemporary terrorist counterparts.

Can the U.S. Army go the way of a modern leaderless Internet-driven organization? Likely not. But can it embrace aspects of the principles outlined in The Spider and the Starfish? Yes, it can. It already has. 🌟

Reviewed by Master Sergeant Peter Clemens (USAR, Retired)
Captain George J. Fust
2015 Recipient
LTG Sidney T. Weinstein Award
for Excellence in Military Intelligence

Captain Fust graduated from McKendree University’s ROTC program as a Distinguished Military Graduate with a degree in Political Science in 2008. Upon graduation, he was commissioned as an Armor officer. CPT Fust’s first assignment was as a training committee member at the National Leader Development Assessment Course, Fort Lewis, Washington. After completing the Armor Officer Basic Course, CPT Fust was assigned as Platoon Leader for 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, Fort Riley, Kansas. After the unit was deactivated, he served as Scout Platoon Leader and Troop Executive Officer for 4th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment. Following a deployment to the highly volatile Kandahar Province, Zhari District, Afghanistan, CPT Fust served briefly as the Squadron Operations Officer.

CPT Fust attended the Officer Transition Course and the MI Captains Career Course in 2012, graduating in the top third of his class. He then served as the Battalion Intelligence Officer for 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) (Airborne). In April 2014, he was selected to command the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) for the 173rd IBCT (A) in Vicenza, Italy.

As the MICO Commander, CPT Fust developed a culture of readiness and resiliency within his unit while executing simultaneous multinational operations in support of five named operations in six countries. His leadership resulted in multiple nations requesting his Company’s support in developing their own intelligence assets, thus strengthening alliances in the region at a critical time. His Unmanned Aircraft Systems element became the first ever to fly in Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia. To increase the effectiveness of the 173rd IBCT, he developed an air-land concept for the deployment of his Company’s organic systems and designed and validated expedient packages in support of Joint Forcible Entry and Airfield Seizure Operations. Many of his training methods were adopted by the Joint Multinational Readiness Center. In addition to his mission requirements, CPT Fust organized numerous public events to represent the Army Values to the local community.

CPT Fust is a graduate of the Airborne School, Infantry Mortar Leader Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Air Assault School, Combatives Level 1 and 2, Ranger School, Pathfinder School, and the Electronic Warfare Signals Intelligence Course. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, Army Commendation Medal (with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Army Achievement Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Army Superior Unit Award, National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with two service stars, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon, NATO Medal for the ISAF, and the Combat Action Badge. CPT Fust has also been awarded the German Armed Forces Proficiency Badge (Gold), the Norwegian Road Marching Badge, and the Parachutist Badge from Cameroon, Great Britain, and Greece. 🌟