Self-Development and Unit Training

**Operational**
- (INSOCOM, FORSCOM, ASCC, and Unit)
  - Training at home stations and major training centers
  - Live virtual constructive, & gaming environments
  - Operational Missions
  - Foundry Program

**Institutional**
- (TRADOC G2, USAICoE, ARNG G2, USAR)
  - Guidance and Leadership
  - Support to the Field
  - Initial Military Training
  - Professional Military Education
  - Functional Training

**Self-Development**
- Planned & Goal-oriented learning
- Reinforce & expand knowledge base
- Complement institutional and operational learning
- Reachback to institutional knowledge
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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

From The Editor
As a reminder, MIPB is now online at IKN on the open front page at https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webId=2248. You will find several of the most recent issues there as well. For earlier issues (2013 and earlier) please go to the MIPB site on IKN after you CAC in.

The following themes and suspenses are established for:

April-June 2015, Intelligence Challenges, deadline (closed).
July-September 2015, Focus on the Reserve and National Guard, deadline for submissions is 21 May 2015.
October-December 2015, Intel Support to Situational Awareness 2015 and Beyond, deadline for submissions is 2 September 2015.

Articles from the field will always be very important to the success of MIPB as a professional bulletin. Please continue to submit them. Even though the topic of your article may not coincide with an issue’s theme do not hesitate to send it to me. Most issues will contain theme articles as well as articles on other topics. Your thoughts and lessons learned (from the field) are invaluable.

Please call or email me with any questions regarding your article or upcoming issues.

Sterilla Smith
Editor
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Always Out Front

by Major General Robert P. Ashley
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

This issue’s theme is “Self-development and Unit Training.” Very few topics could be considered more important to the U.S. Army as we think about how we train leaders to deal with complexity and ambiguity in the current and future operational environment. A key component of that training is as simple as a self-development program. ADP 7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders, tells us that effective training and leader development form the cornerstone of operational success. But, before anyone can become a leader they have to take responsibility for their own education through an effective and aggressive self-development program. Leadership is a lifelong journey—each day you should ask yourself, “What have I done today to make myself a better leader?” There are lessons that can be gleaned from everything we do.

A key challenge we face in preparing Soldiers to deal with the complexity and ambiguity of the future is: How do we apply that self-development program to accelerate experiential learning? In Malcom Gladwell’s book, “Outliers,” he examines the premise that to become a subject matter expert or to master a task (a sport or musical instrument) one must invest approximately 10,000 hours. This is a staggering amount of time to devote to any task but it is essential if you are intent on learning through experience.

With regard to the complexity of today’s and tomorrow’s operational environments, our junior Soldiers will be called upon to make decisions that require an extensive amount of experiential learning. One way to accelerate the experiential learning process is by leveraging the body of knowledge residing in those who have years of experience in a given field of study or profession. There are many ways to provide the opportunity to learn from the experiences of others—we’d like to propose one such forum.

For the past year USAICoE has been developing a web-based program called the Intelligence Leader Development Resource (iLDR). The iLDR project is designed to facilitate
easy, open access to effective professional and self-development solutions. The site connects intelligence professionals with resources, leaders, peers, academia, and the private sector community on a variety of topics. The site is divided into three primary MI related topic pages: Leader Development, Intelligence Studies, and Geopolitics (this one led by the TRADOC Culture Center).

I would like to ask for your help to make iLDR successful. Please contribute to the site in order to build a cache of leader development resources to be shared and utilized across the force. If you have successfully completed a leadership position such as Company Commander or First Sergeant, please share your insights. Many of you find creative ways to deal with complex problems and your ingenuity should be shared with others. Please film a short video or write a paper and post it to the iLDR page. Make your influence reach beyond the unit to which you are assigned by sharing your ideas!

None of us can be successful on our own. I was fortunate enough to have been the CENTCOM J2 under one of the premier warfighters of our generation, General Jim Mattis. General Mattis was a tremendous student of history and throughout my tenure as the J2, he often took time to relate to his subordinate commanders and staff, the value of something as simple as reading history. When you think about the responsibility for your own self-development, General Mattis’ words and guidance could not ring more true:

_The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s experience) i.e., the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men._

Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.

I encourage all of you to avoid learning the hard way. Contribute to iLDR and make use of its resources to ensure that we can help each other be prepared for whatever situations we may face. The Army Operating Concept challenges us to win in a complex world where the future is not only unknown, but unknowable. One way we will win is to ensure that we build institutional knowledge in resources such as the iLDR. The iLDR Website is up and running at: [https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/iLDR](https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/iLDR).

“Always Out Front!”

Editor’s Note: Look for the article “ICoE’s Self-development Program: Intelligence Leader Development Resource” in the next issue of MIPB (April-June 2015) for more details regarding this program.
Team,

I kindly request your assistance in ensuring our Military Intelligence Noncommissioned Officers attend NCOES IAW ADP 7-0 para 2-21. As of now, we are doing a disservice to some of our NCOs by not ensuring they attend the proper Professional Military Education in their careers. I understand that many of our great NCOs are operationally engaged and it is difficult to pull them away from the mission. However, when the opportunity presents itself, we strongly encourage Leaders to sit down with NCOs to talk about the importance of hitting the milestones of NCOES. Also, NCOs must seek mentors to help them along this process. Without the proper level of NCOES, Soldiers will not properly progress through the ranks and may be asked to separate from the Army.

Leaders, ensure our MI professionals are vetted prior to their attendance at the NCOA on Fort Huachuca. I also request that they are physically and mentally ready to execute once they get on the ground.

物理上. NCOs should not be borderline passing the APFT or height/weight/body fat standards prior to reporting. Fort Huachuca is nearly 5,000 feet above sea level and there is a significant difference completing an APFT here versus an installation that is near sea level.

精神上. NCOs are coming here to learn more about their MOS and to add to their leadership abilities. They must be prepared to write research papers, give briefings, and participate within their small groups.

I encourage everyone to visit the NCO Academy page on IKN: https://ikn.army.mil/apps/IKNWMS/Default.aspx?webid=2326. This website will prepare Leaders and NCOs on NCOES expectations. Also, recommend Junior Soldiers review and prepare themselves for future NCOES attendance at Fort Huachuca. As leaders we have a responsibility to ensure our subordinates attend Professional Military Education at the right time in their careers. (This is paraphrased out of ADP 7-0, para 2-21). Constant deferments, in the end, will hurt our NCOs professionally.

Thank you for what you do every day for this great country and for the MI Corps. Please visit my website on IKN for the latest updates concerning the Force and our Corps.

Always Out Front!
The theme of this issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Self-development and Unit Training, is timely given the recent publication of AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World: 2020-2040. AR 350-1 establishes the roles and responsibilities of our Army and of each of us as professionals and leaders in training individuals and units. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 gives us our Army’s roadmap as to “...how future Army forces, as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational efforts, operate to accomplish campaign objectives and protect U.S. national interests.”

As I wrote in the last issue of MIPB, Army warrant officers, as combat leaders and technical experts, must be competent and confident practitioners of our Army doctrine. Expert knowledge and proficient application of leader and Intelligence Warfighting Function skills are the foundation to training Soldiers, building teams, and preparing units to accomplish the mission.

Our efforts at USAICoE move steadily forward towards implementation of the MI Branch Technical Training phases for both Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (WOILE) and Warrant Officer Senior Service Education (WOSSE). MI Commander and Senior Intelligence Officer responses to the leader surveys for these courses were invaluable to informing the process. Thank you, to all of the commanders and senior leaders for taking the time and giving thought to these surveys. The Critical Task Site Selection Boards for these two courses were a tremendous success; shaping the tasks for these courses to meet commanders’ needs. Thank you, to all the participants who attended and worked hard during the board.

We recently inaugurated our Quarterly Senior Military Intelligence Warrant Officer Forum via Defense Connect Online. There were well over 150 participants in this event. MG Ashley hosted the forum, demonstrating his commitment as Chief of Military Intelligence to the warrant officer cohort in our Branch. The presentations were guided by concerns and questions provided from the field. We will publish the date and time for the next quarterly forum as soon as that date/time is set. I invite commanders and senior intelligence leaders to participate in these online forums along with our MI warrant officers.

Thank you for your selfless service and tireless commitment to our Army and to our Nation. I also wish to thank your families for the sacrifices they make to support you.

Always Out Front!
This We’ll Defend!
Introduction

As the Army faces the challenges of the new operating concept “Win in a Complex World,” Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWfF) training will increasingly focus on how we fight our primary weapons system to support expeditionary operations, with light and lethal formations capable of deploying quickly. This new environment will be increasingly dominated by the proliferation of technology and rapid information exchange. Now, more than ever, intelligence Soldiers are realizing that attaining and maintaining proficiency in the use of key Mission Command systems is essential for success. The challenge is that individual Soldier skills have atrophied and leader knowledge has not kept pace to fully employ the Distributed Common Ground System–Army (DCGS-A).

We must teach and understand our weapons system from an operational employment perspective that focuses on interoperability and seamless intelligence in new operating environments. For the IWfF this means our ability to fight DCGS-A has never been more important. To that end, we, at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), have engaged in a deliberate effort with Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) in establishing a Tactical Engagement Team whose purpose is to enable intelligence Soldiers to fully employ their weapons system, DCGS-A, within the context of executing their core intelligence tasks. This IWfF training model will close the gap between ‘schoolhouse’ and unit collective training responsibilities to alleviate the lack of knowledge and confidence to operationally utilize DCGS-A.

The Tactical Engagement Team Concept

The Tactical Engagement Team concept incorporates a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) from across the Intelligence Corps that plans, coordinates, and executes training to specifically enable leaders and Soldiers to go beyond simply understanding functionality of the system tools.

The concept is operationally focused on the system of systems that makes DCGS-A a key enabler in the overarching umbrella of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). A team training event begins by focusing the Intelligence professional on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of employing DCGS-A tools that specifically support the Commander’s decision making cycle and processes.

Rather than focusing on basic “buttonology” or training with our junior Soldiers, the unit is engaged as a whole, from the Division Commander and his key staff through Battalion NCOs and junior analysts. To accomplish this goal, the Tactical Engagement concept is designed around the following principles:

- Train Intelligence leaders on how to employ the system.
- Train Intelligence leaders and Soldiers how DCGS-A enables Mission Command.
- Show Intelligence leaders how to establish the brigade combat team intelligence team on the network 24/7.
- Show Intelligence leaders and senior trainers “a way” to train the team to support the Commander.
- Tailor Tactical Engagement Training to the unit’s needs then organize, plan, and execute based on unit objectives.

Though each engagement is uniquely tailored and based on unit objectives, the Tactical Engagement Team concept focuses on a broader understanding of the system as it pertains to the unit’s mission and its place in the overall architecture.
Proof of Concept

In April of 2014, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager Sensor Processing (TCM–SP) determined there was a gap in understanding the employment and use of the system of systems that gives DCGS-A its true power. The system, not unlike other complex technology, requires upfront proficiency from an individual perspective, but also an understanding by leaders of how the system should be employed and what tools it brings to the intelligence community in support of planning for operations, executing current operations and preparing for future operations—essentially the intelligence cycle during combat operations.

The idea of Tactical Engagement Team was to teach intelligence professionals how to operationally tie in DCSG-A to the ABCS network and use its tools to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in support of the Commander’s military decision making process, a foundational requirement of battle command. Additionally, the team trains the importance of collaboration and near-real time sharing of intelligence with operational partners as staffs attain and maintain a common operational picture that provides the unit a holistic and common understanding of the situation.

Realizing the span of this problem set, Tactical Engagement Teams were scoped to focus initial efforts on the 11 active duty divisions, their intelligence, operations, and their communications teams (G2,G3, G6), and specifically the Senior Intelligence Officer of each formation. After initial concept development, TCM-SP proposed the idea to the Army’s Divisional G2s and asked for a unit to step forward and help provide a proof of concept training event.

With command emphasis/focus and history with DCGS-A, the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) G2, LTC Marc Spinuzzi, volunteered to provide the venue for the proof of concept with his entire Division IWfF.

LTC Spinuzzi describes the demonstration and impetus for contacting TCM-SP in April 2014:

“Our DCGS-A demonstration was not intended to “sugar coat” the system—we talked about what it does well and what it doesn’t do so well. The two biggest problems we discussed were training and the DCGS-A interface. While there are plenty of training opportunities available for DCGS-A, we had found that most of them focused on a narrow set of tools. There were several great tools in DCGS-A that simply weren’t being trained anywhere—tools like the Threat Characteristics Workcenter (TCW) and the ISR Synchronization Tool (IST).

The DCGS-A interface was also a common complaint. The system simply does not come across as “user friendly.” It isn’t intuitive, so Soldiers often struggle to find the tools they are looking for or to quickly make use of the ones they know. We thought we had a good solution to these problems. We needed to get our Soldiers to talk to someone who could listen to their thoughts and opinions and help adjust the training and the interface.”

TCM–SP saw an opportunity to implement the new vision of “unleashing the full potential of DCGS-A, one tactical formation at a time” to provide the resident knowledge to build confidence and competence in the system. Rather than simply respond by sending a few trainers as LTC Spinuzzi anticipated, TCM–SP requested a complete list of 1ID’s training objectives. They then put together a team of SMEs, drawn from not only TCM-SP but the entire DCGS-A enterprise for a multi-day event at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Over a 60-day period, the DCGS-A Tactical Engagement Team facilitated a series of collaborative and interactive planning sessions with the 1ID Chain of Command and LTC Spinuzzi’s intelligence teams. TCM-SP and 1ID staff linked each training event to training objectives and coordinated with numerous other organizations to provide SMEs for the team and support for the concept. The figure below depicts the glide path the two organizations followed to execution.

The foundational principle of Tactical Engagement Team centers around the unit and its identified shortfalls as it pertains to the ability to provide intelligence to the tactical commander while utilizing and fighting DCGS-A as its weapon system. The Tactical Engagement Team essentially tells leaders to look at their formations, honestly assess their capability, and determine where they need help. Tactical Engagement Team leadership then takes this information and assembles the SMEs from across the intelligence enterprise to teach, coach, and mentor those areas identified by the unit.
manders, S2s, and intelligence personnel from the outset. The event began with an introduction brief focused on educating commanders and staffs on DCGS-A capabilities. The assembled team of almost 30 SMEs was made up of individuals from the TCM-SP, Program Manager DCGS-A; USAICoE Noncommissioned Officer Academy; Training, Doctrine, and Support; New System Training and Integration Directorate, and the DA G2. SMEs from all over the country came together with one clear objective—build leader and Soldier confidence, understanding, and competence of how to successfully employ DCGS-A.

Soldiers and leaders of multiple intelligence military occupational specialties (MOSs) were trained in a myriad of system tools during a three-day event that focused on intelligence production and ABCS system interoperability. The tailored training is depicted below.

### The Tactical Engagement Team is designed to specifically meet the needs of the Division.

All events were planned in cooperation with 1ID; specifically tailored to focus on 1ID’s objectives.

- **Threat Characteristics Workcenter**
- **DCGS-A Architecture**
  - Data Architecture
    - Architecture from the analysis perspective of analysis
    - Architecture of systems interoperability
- **Employment of TGS across the BDE**
  - 3ST
  - 35G
  - Leader Overview
- **MFWS Best Practices**
  - User and Mid Level Leadership
  - Leader Overview
  - OMT MFWS Integration

- **IST Briefing, QT Search, Text Extraction, Link Diagram, Visual Entity Browser, Time Wheel**
- **ABCS Interoperability - Establishing “How” to move messages from DCGS-A to Mission Command**

  □ Additional Training Identified by Unit

**Tailored Training.**

Issues identified were corrected on the spot. Tactical Engagement Team members were able to make on the spot adjustments to the Intelligence Fusion Server (IFS) configuration. During the event they identified that the Division would benefit from a “fixed site” configuration rather than their current deployable set-up. This adjustment allowed users to have access to all data sources around the world rather than continuously changing to different areas of responsibility with specific data source sets. This minor change alleviated the burden of updating the end-point for the IFS for data mining and simplified their data management. The organic Field Service Engineers (FSEs) assigned to 1ID also gained direct lines of communication with key personnel from the team which enabled their ability to provide continued service once the event concluded. The figure below depicts the 1ID’s overall training objectives and how TCM-SP resourced each to meet their requirements.

**Collective Training Objectives.**

Soldiers and leaders alike were directly connected to experts for each facet of the system and were encouraged to use those connections to further educate themselves and train their Soldiers. Overall, the engagement laid to rest some of the false perceptions of DCGS-A and demonstrated it provides a robust capability that when understood, trained, and employed properly, and will satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements.
“Key to our success was establishing command emphasis with BDE Commanders to provide three, uninterrupted and focused days of training enabling the opportunity to connect our intelligence community across [Fort Riley, Kansas] and discuss trouble areas, TTPs and lessons learned in a near rankless environment. Senior intelligence leaders had a chance to pass on their lessons learned to junior intelligence Soldiers. Junior intelligence Soldiers provided candid bottom-up feedback. The majority of our After Action Report comments were requests for ‘more,’ which was a great sign.”

—LTC Spinuzzi

Capitalizing on the momentum, TCM-SP has begun the process of engaging other senior leaders across the Army in an effort to offer similar training. The DCGS-A Tactical Engagement Team is quickly becoming a “must have” for G2s that shows a tailored, deliberate approach to the system can and will instill confidence in DCGS-A at the unit level.

Command emphasis and participation in the preparation, planning, and execution are vital to the success of DCGS-A Tactical Engagement Team. As such, it is a command-driven event, ensuring staff participation and unit support. Commanders also gain a better understanding of how DCGS-A, and the supporting architecture can better enable mission command functions.

Throughout the combined planning process with TCM-SP, commanders, S2/G2s, and units drive the composition of the Tactical Engagement Team by identifying training requirements as well as gaps in knowledge and capabilities. As such, each Tactical Engagement Team is organized, planned, and executed based on unit specified objectives giving it a tailored feel. TCM-SP, in coordination with the unit, builds a unit specific training strategy that complements existing Program Manager functionality training associated with New Equipment Training and Doctrine, Tactics and Techniques (DTT). Also, post-DTT, collective training strategies are established and are nested with FORSCOM G2 and INSCOM. The entire concept is a series of building blocks using existing systems provided by senior intelligence leadership. It holistically looks like this:

- Program Manager provides functionality training when equipment is fielding.
- New Systems Training Division (ICoE) provides a 90-hour IPB focused training course to assigned analysts.
- INSCOM, through Foundry, provides DCGS-A Advance Production training to intelligence leaders.
- Tactical Engagement Team provides system of systems training, specifically focusing on operational employment and interoperability including focused training on tools or system components.
- Foundry sites provide sustainment training and offer internal collective training venues using IEWTPT.

- Training centers bring it all together by providing an environment that is truly ABCS centric.

Communicating Best Practices

The DCGS-A Tactical Engagement Team Concept facilitates the sharing of lessons learned, TTPs, and best practices throughout the Army. Each engagement provides a unique opportunity to collect and share Army-wide success stories on system employment, Combat Training Center best practices, regionally aligned force best practices, and TTPs for Decisive Action and counterinsurgency missions. Peer networking is another key benefit. Solid relationships facilitate continued sharing of ideas between formations long after the engagement is over.

As the Tactical Engagement Team continues to engage the force, the collective knowledge will be socialized across formations and documented for use by the entire force. The Tactical Engagement Team also provides leave behind products such as Brigade Training Plans, TTPs, tactical standard operating procedures (TAC SOPs), SOPs, and sample products to further enable unit success.

Tactical Engagement Endstates

The Tactical Engagement Team strategy seeks to address current DCGS-A challenges at both the strategic and tactical levels. The end state is tactical commanders who are confident in their S2’s ability to help them with battlefield visualization: See themselves, See the enemy, and See the terrain.

PROBLEM STATEMENT: Lack of command emphasis/understanding of DCGS-A hinders proper implementation and utilization of the DCGS-A as a system of systems.

TASK: TCM-SP Strategic Engagement Team provides an overview to commanders on DCGS-A Intelligence Enterprise system of systems network and capabilities, collective training strategies, and maintainer efficiencies for the employment of DCGS-A.

PURPOSE:
- Discuss commander’s production requirements.
- Define intelligence needs.
- Discuss communications architecture requirements.
- Develop awareness of training available to command.
- Discuss how to establish relationships with NEC and other key entities.
- Discuss training strategy.

Strategic Engagement Concept.

PROBLEM STATEMENT: Current DCGS-A system introduction, fielding and training does not build broad understanding within tactical level IWfF/MWF leaders on DCGS-A in the application and establishment of DCGS-A system of systems to provide intelligence support to training and operations.

PURPOSE:
- Establish relationships to enhance DCGS-A utilization, improvement and user feedback.
- Build unit leadership understanding of the DCGS-A system of systems and its capabilities.
- Educate commanders and leaders on DCGS-A contributing value to support training, operations to build command emphasis on intelligence training across the Army.
- Train multi-intelligence MOS skill sets to establish requisite knowledge base enabling the unit’s IWfF to maintain, sustain, and utilize DCGS-A.

END STATE: Establish overall confidence in DCGS-A system of systems. Build leadership understanding and skills that will allow for successful DCGS-A integration to divisions’ and BCTs’ training and intelligence support to operations while providing subject matter expertise to facilitate unit’s development of DCGS-A efficiencies, SOPs, and TTPs. Build and establish lines of communication that will enable collaboration.

Tactical Engagement Concept.
The unit’s intelligence professionals gain confidence, and improve their ability to complete MOS critical tasks using DCGS-A. They understand the “so what” of producing intelligence products, are able to interface with the Army’s ABCS architecture, and are confident and proficient at employing DCGS-A to its full potential in order to meet the commander’s requirements. Unit intelligence Soldiers also gain a basic understanding of system troubleshooting skills, thereby reducing the reliance on contract FSE support.

The unit’s intelligence leaders understand DCGS-A from a system of systems perspective and learn to ask the “right questions” pertaining to employment and intelligence product development. Additionally, they learn where to turn for assistance when required and how MOS 3ST MI Systems Maintainer/Integrators can assist with technical issues. Lastly, confident and competent in its use, they are able to fully leverage the potential the system was designed to provide a tactical commander.

DCGS-A Tactical Engagement Teams also assist the unit’s intelligence team by providing a start point on “how to” train the intelligence discipline as a team versus individual MOS skills acting independently. They learn that working in concert with the other warfighting functions provides a powerful tool for command decisions. Most importantly, through integrating DCGS-A training with the unit’s ABCS, the unit understands how to fight using DCGS-A to support Mission Command.

The Way Ahead
The graphic below is a snapshot of the way ahead. Units from across the Army are taking advantage of the Tactical Engagement Team concept.

Conclusion
The concept of Tactical Engagement Team has given the force needed help in an age of complex technical systems. It provides the bridge between institution and collective training responsibilities and helps unit leaders and Soldiers better understand what the system does and how it helps them support their commander’s decision making process.

DCGS-A by design is expeditionary and tailorable, it takes large amounts of data and provides structure to enable an analyst to clearly see through the fog of war. Tactical Engagement unleashes and puts the potential of the system in the hands of our Warfighters.

“TCM-SP brought in a world-class team of experts to address everything from DCGS-A best practices to Brigade-level training strategies. The Tactical Engagement was a resounding success.”

–LTC Spinuzzi

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COL William L. Edwards, U.S. Army, is the TRADOC Capability Manager for Sensor Processing. Prior to this position he executed duties as the TRADOC Capability Manager for Biometrics, Forensics and Machine Foreign Language Translation. Before being assigned to Fort Huachuca he attended the United States Naval War College, graduating in July 2013 with a Master of Arts degree in National Strategy and Policy. His most recent tactical assignment was as Commander, 3rd Brigade Troops Battalion, 4th Infantry Division during OIF and OND from 2009 through 2011. He holds an MS degree in Personnel Management/Administration from Central Michigan University. His military education includes the completion of the Armor Officer Basic Course, Military Intelligence Transition and Advanced Courses, Counterintelligence Course, Intelligence Combating Terrorism Course, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
The Foundation for System Success
System maturity and ease of use continue to make the Distributed Common Ground System–Army (DCGS-A) a collaborative intelligence fusion tool that is the Intelligence Warfighting Function’s (IWfF) operational link to support of mission command. A combination of proficiency in all training domains is required in order to grasp and properly employ DCGS-A in an operational environment. As leaders, we need to become system experts and take advantage of the potential DCGS-A gives our Army from a process, exploit, and disseminate perspective.

AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, affirms that “the Army’s training and leader development efforts support training in the three training domains: institutional, operational, and self-development with each training domain complementing the other.” Each domain has an important role in training and developing Soldiers to operationally employ DCGS-A in a myriad of environments. Because of this, it is prudent to discuss the three domains of training with regard to DCGS–A. Successful and thorough training is how we as an Intelligence Corps will have a profound impact on our Commander’s ability to achieve situational understanding and battlefield visualization in support the Army’s operating concept.

Institutional Training Domain
The institutional training domain is centered within the Army’s Centers of Excellence (CoEs). The CoEs provide initial training and subsequent functional and professional military education for Soldiers, military leaders, and Army civilians. The institutional training domain provides training support products, information, and materials needed by individuals as they solidify their foundational skill set to better execute operational training and self-development requirements levied in our formations across the force.2

The institutional training domain provides a foundation of doctrine and functional experience associated with excelling as an intelligence professional. Institutional training is the first step in a model that builds on itself to produce the level of expertise required by the profession and should not be considered the only step to DCGS-A knowledge and proficiency.

In many instances, the operational force assumes that MI Soldiers receive comprehensive training and instruction on the Portable Multi-Function Workstation and other DCGS-A tools. However, in reality Soldiers are introduced to the system and its tools with the expectation that the operational domain will build on the foundations of the institution. As is well known throughout the force, DCGS-A training can consist of an introduction to the system to comprehensive training and operational employment in austere environments that is simply not possible to replicate in the institutional environment.

As we learn more about our system and the intricacies associated with its employment, the Intelligence CoE continues to emphasize training DCGS-A as a weapons system. Calculated steps are being taken to review each course at ICoE to determine the necessary amount of emphasis on DCGS-A for each course and the functionality training associated with each military occupational specialty so that Soldiers leave the institution prepared to execute in an operational environment.

What is important about this training domain and how can you help our Soldiers and Leaders understand its role?
First, be involved and welcome the training opportunity. Be a productive participant in training and course feedback. Second, get involved in the Critical Task and Site Section Board (CTSSB) process. The CTSSB produces the Critical Task Lists, which affect our training base for a 2 to 3 year period. The CTSSB is the forum that shapes the institutional training base and your inject point to the system. The CTSSB process can be accessed by contacting the Training Development and Integration Division at Fort Huachuca (logon to IKN at https://ikn.army.mil for more information).

Operational Training Domain

The operational domain encompasses all training activities that individuals and organizations undertake at home station, at training centers, Intelligence Readiness Operational Capability activities, Foundry classes, and other locations (to include mobilization centers), and while operationally deployed. All training conducted in this domain must be unit readiness-centric to produce agile, adaptive units and leaders. The operational domain is where we as intelligence professionals integrate our IWfF into the organizations collective training. This domain may be the area where we have the largest room for improvement. We need to first ensure our equipment is properly set up and fully operational. The planning and coordination to get DCGS-A equipment on a network is something that can and must be done (one of the main requirements for DCGS-A equipment is that it is network ready). There are people who can help with this process if you or your unit needs assistance.

However, not having your equipment on a network should not be the reason for lack of training. This is often what is cited from Soldiers when asked about home station training programs—the equipment is in a CONEX or similar storage. While often not easy to do, units must devise a way to set up equipment outside of a garrison network and conduct training (think tactical MI network), until they are able to get it on the garrison network.

For those units with DCGS-A equipment on the garrison network, keep leaning forward! Conduct mission specific training based on your mission essential task list (METL). But more than merely conducting baseline training, ensure that the training is reinforced on an almost daily basis by conducting the mission on the system. Continued use and exploration of the tools available is easier than most of us think, and your unit will quickly gain an ability to use the system to complete mission requirements. What do you do with the additional time…analysis!

How can you improve training in this domain? Just as important as having the equipment operational, is to create a realistic training program tailored for your organization’s needs. Then get it approved by the leadership and lock it in on the training calendar. During unit training events you can still use the system to complete the mission as your organization’s capability in the system increases.

Other operational domain resources include the multiple Foundry courses, the availability of the DCGS-A Users forum on SIPRNet, and the DCGS-A Training Support Package materials. If your organization is still having problems, contact the TRADOC Capabilities Manager for Sensor Processing (TCM-SP) at Fort Huachuca as it is the User Representative (among other things) for you. One of the recent initiatives is their Tactical Engagement Team to aid units with any and all of their DCGS-A related concerns.
Self-Development Training Domain

The self-development training domain recognizes that service in the Army requires continuous, life-long learning and that structured training activities in Army schools and in operational units often will not meet everyone’s individual needs. Leaders help subordinates identify areas where self-development will improve performance in current assignments and prepare them for future ones. Leaders must incorporate time in training plans for self-development.4

To succeed, Soldiers must have a personal drive and willingness to use and explore the system. True mastery of DCGS-A is easier than most of us think. Make it a point to learn the system! As a result, your work will become easier and more efficient, subsequently allowing more time for analysis. The self-development domain does not require endless work during the night and weekends to be successful. Self-development training can be achieved on an individual basis during duty hours. Units can devote training time in addition to organizational activities to ensure individual Soldier self-development improves.

How can you help yourself with DCGS-A self-development? A realistic self-evaluation of you and your organization’s proficiency is a start. What is your need to understand the tools to complete the mission? How can you better yourself to aid in the overall effectiveness of the unit? How can you learn the system and tools better than anyone else in the unit? These are some of the areas in which to start your self-assessment. Understanding your level of DCGS-A skills and then developing master level proficiency with DCGS-A is not easy. However, if you become the “Go To Soldier” on DCGS-A at your unit, you will contribute immensely towards mission success.

Conclusion

Achieving proficiency of your organization’s METL by processing, exploiting, and disseminating intelligence using DCGS-A should be in the forefront of every MI leader’s mind. Providing proper emphasis on DCGS-A in all three training domains will enable Intelligence professionals to provide exceptional mission command intelligence. If you or your organization needs assistance, it is readily available. Lastly, understanding and incorporating training from all three training domains will aid you and your organization’s success in employing DCGS-A in an operational environment.

Endnotes
1. AR 350-1 Army Training and Leader Development, 19 August 2014, 2.
2. Army Intelligence Training Strategy, January 2014, 8
3. Ibid., 10.
4. Ibid., 14.

CW3 Brown is currently assigned to the Training Development and Integration Division at Fort Huachuca. He ensures effective integration of DCGS-A tools throughout courses at USAICoE. He also aids the TCM SP as a subject matter expert on All Source Analytics using DCGS-A. Mr. Brown previously integrated the use of MFWS at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and the Theater Intelligence Group (non-traditional analytical support role). During OEF, his team maintained the most analysts actively using the system tools in collaborative mode and maintained one of the largest DCGS-A analytic footprints in theater.


Here are some sample titles from the 2014 reading list.
The Role of Unit Analyst Certification Programs in Support of the U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015

by Major Craig T. Olson

“Probably the best adaptive capability we have in the U.S. military is the ability of Soldiers and young officers to adapt in battle. Special Forces on horseback in Afghanistan and Servicemembers in Iraq performing duties they have never been trained for—improvising to deal with bad situations—are case studies in bold, successful adaptation.”

Introduction

The ability to quickly adapt in stressful combat situations has been a trait of the American Soldier for centuries. The U.S. Army Learning Concept (ALC) for 2015 was created to further develop this inherent ability of the American Soldier. The ALC’s purpose is to describe an Army learning model that meets the All-Volunteer Army’s need to develop adaptive, thinking Soldiers and leaders capable of meeting the challenges of operational adaptability in an era of persistent conflict. The ALC states that “leaders at all levels must have opportunities to develop operational adaptability through critical thinking, willingness to accept prudent risk, and the ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation. They must be comfortable with ambiguity and quickly adapt to the dynamics of evolving operations over short and extended durations.”

MI “Schoolhouse” Fundamentals Instruction

For a new MI Soldier, the basic entry courses at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) offer the first step in the analyst’s learning continuum. While a perception may exist that newly-trained analysts fresh from the schoolhouse are competent in performing their critical tasks and have even gained competency in operating program-of-record systems, it is important for leaders to acknowledge that these new analysts are only trained in the basic fundamentals of intelligence analysis. They are not yet trained on the mission-specific tasks required to successfully support the unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL). Leaders must be familiar with the skill level tasks that are provided in the Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guides for each military occupational specialty (MOS) in order to appropriately form their training expectations (current STPs or Soldier Training Programs).
Developing the Soldier at the Unit

Over a relatively short period of time, the soldier is overloaded and less likely to retain information over a relatively short period of time. A new Soldier will experience training in a large number of courses, including Combat Readiness, Basic Rifle Marksmanship, and a variety of other courses and it is easy for a new Soldier to become overloaded and less likely to retain information over a relatively short period of time.

The training culminates in a four-day Situational Training Exercise (STX) in which the students perform in a Tactical Operations Center as part of a Fusion, Targeting and Operations Cell conducting 24-hour operations. During the STX, students are also taught skills, tactics, techniques and procedures to enable them to survive and succeed on the modern battlefield. These common “Warrior Tasks” include Land Navigation, First Aid, NBC and Weapons drills. Add to this the required training in combatives, basic rifle marksmanship, and the AR 350-1-mandated courses in subjects like SHARP, ASAP, Resiliency, suicide prevention, and dozens of other courses and it is easy for a new Soldier to become overloaded and less likely to retain information over a relatively short period of time.

Developing the Soldier at the Unit

Upon arrival to the new unit, the new analyst is quickly forced to build upon the fundamentals provided in the institutional training. The quality and effectiveness of the unit’s organizational development programs will now be essential to providing the new analyst with the experience and ability to perform more complex tasks, in more complex operational environments (OEs), and in support of more complex missions. Consider the following complexities that a new analyst faces in a new unit; complexities that are too nuanced to be completely covered in the institutional training:

- The analyst may be assigned to a separate brigade that conducts unique missions to which the analyst has never been exposed, such as a Military Police, Engineer, Field Artillery, Aviation, Maneuver Enhancement, Air Defense, or even Expeditionary Signal Brigade in which the analyst must learn to provide intelligence support to Police Intelligence Operations, obstacle intelligence, integrated air defense operations, force protection in the sustainment areas and along lines of communication, analysis of cyber security threats to friendly communications, etc.

- The analyst may be assigned to a unit that is tasked to conduct unfamiliar missions across the spectrum of Unified Land Operations (such as a Regionally Aligned Force mission; security cooperation activities; advise and assist missions through police advisory teams or military advisory teams; offense, defense, or stability missions in expeditionary warfare; humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions; and Defense Support to Civil Authorities among others).

- The analyst may operate in an unfamiliar region, in an unfamiliar OE, and conducting an unfamiliar mission set. (Will the next conflict be in Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Central Asia, East Asia, Africa, the Middle East, or Europe? Will we be conducting missions in a mega-city, across non-contiguous borders, in the cyber or space realm, in the desert or jungle? Will the analyst be answering the commander’s priority information requirements that include weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, natural disasters, scarce resources, transnational terrorism, criminal organizations, state-sponsored militias, mass migration, pandemics or other threats?)

- The analyst may operate in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment that adds complexity in conducting intelligence operations, intelligence synchronization, and leveraging the intelligence enterprise. Will the analyst be providing intelligence support in an expeditionary environment using organic intelligence equipment and architecture or will he be providing intelligence support to our forces from a fixed site? Will we be fighting unilaterally or working by, with, and through United Nations forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, or other allied states? Will we be working with host nation military or local authorities?

- The analyst must become familiar with a new commander who has particular intelligence requests and desires. Does the commander want to see intelligence reports in the “Doctrine” tab and on the Central Army Registry).

- The analyst may be assigned to any echelon, from a company intelligence support team to a battalion or MI company in a brigade combat team to an analytical cell in a Corps G2, Intelligence and Security Command, or combatant command.

Publications are available on Army Knowledge Online under the “Doctrine” tab and on the Central Army Registry.

Take, for example, the basic analytical training received by an MOS 35F10, All Source Analyst. The new 35F10 will receive 16 weeks and 3 days of MOS-specific training at Fort Huachuca. The analyst, who is typically new to the Army (although some Soldiers reclassify into the MOS), is taught the basic fundamentals of analysis. Over the course of training, students receive instruction and hands-on experience in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB); Research, Writing and Briefing Skills (over 120 hours dedicated to this task alone, which includes the basics of critical thinking and problem solving, communication, and engagement); Cultural Awareness; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Targeting; Automated Intelligence Systems; Intelligence Security; Map Reading and Military Symbology; Joint and Army Operations; Counterinsurgency, and Military History.

The analyst may be assigned to any echelon, from a company intelligence support team to a battalion or MI company in a brigade combat team to an analytical cell in a Corps G2, Intelligence and Security Command, or combatant command.
reported and disseminated in a certain manner, format, or priority (i.e., intelligence summaries put out verbally over Combat Net Radio or sent out digitally over an Army Battle Command System (ABCS)? Does the commander want to be briefed verbally, using a map on a tabletop or on a wall, using an ABCS or directly off of the Distributed Common Ground Station-Army or even using Powerpoint slides (and how much Powerpoint “bling” does the commander want to see)? What does the commander want to see in a target packet, in an IPB brief, on an enemy situation, event, and decision support template, on a modified combined obstacle overlay, etc.? Which analytical technique (PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time) for the OE, ASCOPE (area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) for civil considerations, CARVER (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability) or CARVERSHP (adding symbolism, historical significance, and political significance) for targeting analysis, or other techniques or combination of techniques) does the commander want to see used and how must the analysis be presented?

Faced with these nuances in successfully completing intelligence analysis tasks at the new unit, it is the unit’s organizational development programs and training that remain flexible and resourced to overcome the challenges and increase the education, training, and adaptability of the force. The institutional training provides the fundamentals, and the organizational training programs (along with self-development programs, which are equally important) fill in the gaps.

Commanders are responsible for unit readiness and leader development and the two are inextricably linked. ADP 7-01 states that “good training supports leader development and good leaders develop good training programs for their units and subordinates.” It is up to the leadership to create training programs that focus on the unit’s mission, operational environment, and complexities and nuances discussed above. Unit leadership at all levels must foster a learning environment that enables its Soldiers to progressively and systematically build on successful task performance, from simple to complex tasks, until proficiency in those tasks is reached.

The critical task training is derived from the unit’s METL. The unit’s METL represents the doctrinal framework of fundamental tasks for which the unit was designed (based on its table of organization and equipment (TOE) and table of distribution and allowances (TDA) mission). Proficiency in its METL enables the unit to adapt to unexpected situations and environments during mission execution. The MI-specific training within a unit must be nested with both critical tasks associated with each MOS and integrating those tasks to meet the intent of the unit’s METL. Leaders must provide a forgiving, disciplined, demanding, and challenging learning environment to accompany the critical task training.

Enabling Organizational Training through Unit Certification

During my time as the Deputy Theater Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Chief for the 532nd MI Battalion (Operations) in Camp Humphreys, Republic of Korea, we developed an Analyst Certification Program to train our analysts on the OE that is unique to Korea and on the critical tasks that are unique to the unit. The vast majority of our analysts came directly from Advanced Individual Training and they were largely unfamiliar with the intricacies involved in a conventional fight.

The certification program is a living document that is directly nested with the unit’s METL. The MOS-specific tasks required modification as the OE changed, as it often does in this region. Over time, however, the program provided a systematic method to continually develop junior and senior enlisted, warrant officers, and company grade officers serving in the theater ACE across all MOSs (to include the IEW Maintenance team, which is often left out of MI training programs). The battalion commander is ultimately responsible for the training programs and providing the climate in which learning can take place. The end state is to develop intelligence Soldiers and Officers who are self-aware, adaptive, competent, confident, and able to demonstrate and use their skills in 35-coded positions within the battalion and in future Army assignments. The program also served as a tool to increase camaraderie and team-building, as the colored lanyards that depicted advancement became a source of pride in one’s job and abilities.

Samples of the program on the next pages show the tasks used in the Analyst Certification Program. Analysts performed each task in accordance with the critical task list. Tasks were certified by the analyst’s chain of command and the ACE Chief and ACE Sergeant Major reviewed the checklists and competencies prior to advancing the analyst to the next level. Levels 1 thru 3 (Novice, Apprentice, and Journeyman) are requirements for all analysts, however each analyst is highly encouraged to reach level 4 (Master) for their own professional development. Completion of the program was annotated on all professional counseling and was also quantified on evaluation reports.
Sample All Source analyst Novice tasks include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Source Fusion Section: Analyst Training: <strong>Novice</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fusion On-The-Job Training (OJT) has four levels: Novice, Apprentice, Journeyman, and Master. Upon completion of one level you will move on to the next.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Novice**—Introduction to organization, mission, threat, supported forces, procedures, systems and applications. Mastery of specified knowledge and skill sets is guided by senior analysts, but the Novice analyst is responsible for research, study and practice of the specified knowledge and skill sets. 

**End-state:** Level One Analyst with basic knowledge of systems, core country problem sets, and briefing skills.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify North Korean Order of Battle down to Division level.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Set up Google Earth for daily Intelligence Briefing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operate intelligence systems (DCGS-A, MFWS, NEXT Gen).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Send S309 report utilizing ASAS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Maintain Ground Forces Activity Spreadsheet (GFAS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintain All Source Workstation.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Establish communications (both internal and to higher) via virtual chat rooms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perform communications support processor operations.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Maintain battle tracking and BDA on the Theater ACE map board during major exercise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Write an article for the daily Black Book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prepare and conduct the daily Battle Briefing to the Theater ACE Chief.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass the “Basic Intelligence Analyst (ASFS) Test” with a minimum score of 80%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**This should take approximately three months to complete. Completion of this level indicates the analyst has mastered a baseline set of knowledge and skills needed for further training, development, and job progression. The analyst is prepared to move on to the Apprentice level.**

Sample GEOINT Apprentice tasks include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GEOINT Analyst Training: <strong>Apprentice</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEOINT On-The-Job Training (OJT) has four levels: Novice, Apprentice, Journeyman, and Master. Upon completion of one level you will move on to the next.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Apprentice**—Increased knowledge and mastery of organization, mission, threat, supported forces, procedures, systems and applications. Mastery of specified knowledge and skill sets is guided by senior analysts, but the Apprentice analyst is responsible for research, study and practice of the specified knowledge and skill sets. 

**End-state:** Level Two Analyst with more in-depth knowledge of systems, core country problem sets, and ability to create and brief products.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Overview</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Correlate PIR to Current GEOINT exploitation requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support tipping, cueing, and intelligence fusion on a current operation or during a major exercise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Demonstrate knowledge of research tools by developing a research report that utilizes material from a minimum of five national agencies and/or databases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Perform updates to specific Microsoft Office applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Utilize Google Earth to create a morning update briefing slide.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Perform quality control on Imagery Derived Products (IDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perform quality control on Supplementary Phase Interpretation Reports (SUPIR) in the Imagery Exploitation Support System (IESS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create a new task in the Geospatial Intelligence Enterprise Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination System (GETS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create an RFI in GETS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart continued next page*
Sample Journeyman CI/HUMINT Analysis Response Cell (CHARC) analyst (the CHARC consists of the HUMINT Analyst Cell (HAC) and the CI Analyst Cell (CIAC)) include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Connect to chat rooms used by internal sections and by Joint GEOINT sections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Create three IDPs in Socet GXP under limited supervision with minimal discrepancies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Write three SUPIR reports in IESS under limited supervision with minimal discrepancies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Write three SUPIR reports in GETS with attached IDPs under limited supervision with minimal discrepancies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass the “Single Source IMINT MSG Transmittal for Exercises” test with a minimum score of 80%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This level should take approximately three months to complete. Completion of this level indicates the analyst has mastered a baseline set of knowledge and skills needed for further training, development, and job progression. The analyst is prepared to move on to the Journeyman level.

### CHARC: Analyst Training: **Journeyman**

CHARC On-The-Job Training (OJT) has four levels: Novice, Apprentice, Journeyman, and Master. Upon completion of one level you will move on to the next.

**Journeyman**—Advance to organization, mission, threat, supported forces, procedures, systems and applications. Mastery of specified knowledge and skill sets is guided by senior analysts, but the Journeyman analyst is responsible for research, study and practice of the specified knowledge and skill sets.

**End-state:** Level Three Analyst with more in-depth knowledge of systems and core country problem sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section Chief Initials</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct daily battle briefing to the Theater ACE Chief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Demonstrate in-depth knowledge of daily read files/current RFI requests/current events.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Manage CHARC Configuration Using System Manager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Configure team properties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manage CHARC user accounts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Edit System settings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perform CHARC database maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demonstrate advanced knowledge in daily use of HOTR, Query Tree, and M3 applications.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Create a Time Event chart using Analyst Notebook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create a Link Analysis chart using Analyst Notebook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manage the fusion of CI/HUMINT analysis and production and brief this product at the daily Battle Briefing to the Theater ACE Chief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Mentor a novice analyst on the proper use of PSI-JABBER, IWS, and ZIRCON Chat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• (HAC) Train Analyst to prepare a Source Directed Requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supervise fulfillment of a Request for Information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (HAC) Train Analyst to prepare an Intelligence Information Report Evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (CIAC) Create an Association Matrix using Analyst Notebook.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart continued next page*
Sample tasks for a Master All Source Analyst include:

**ASFS: Analyst Training: Master**

Fusion On-The-Job Training (OJT) has four levels: Novice, Apprentice, Journeyman, and Master. Upon completion of one level you will move on to the next level.

**Master**—Mastery of production process. Able to manage multiple analysts and production requirements. Efficiently coordinates assets. Able to correlate operational requirements with supporting intelligence priorities and products.

**End-state**: Level Four Analyst with ability to formulate written sound assessments, supervise and mentor subordinates on all tasks, and capable of providing supporting arguments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Overview</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Chief Initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervise the Collection Management and Dissemination Element.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Analyst Control Element (ACE) Operations.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare and conduct a VIP briefing on the ACE mission.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Chief Initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare an analytical briefing for the J2.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified Tasks</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Chief Initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perform Information Security Officer (ISSO) functions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Re-create and brief the schematics for the Theater ACE intelligence architecture.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Chief Initials</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in a theater-level exercise in a leadership role.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct an analytical briefing to the J2.</td>
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**Completion of this level indicates the analyst has mastered a baseline set of knowledge and skills needed to succeed in his/her job in this unit.**

**Conclusion**

As stated in the U.S. Army Learning Concept, learning is a lifelong process that never ends. The institution provides guidance along a Soldier’s career path, but it is up to the leadership in each unit and each individual to capitalize on their unique experiences and situations and, in turn, teach and mentor others along the path. Organizational training and development are critical enablers of the lifelong learning process, and unit training programs such as the Analyst Certification Program, are essential components to building adaptable and thinking Soldiers.

The triad of institutional training, organizational development, and self-development is not perfect or flexible at all times—it is up to all MI professionals to fill in the training gaps as we learn and to provide feedback to the appropriate USAI-CoE elements through answering training and doctrine surveys, reviewing and providing feedback to doctrinal products, participating on Critical Task/Site Selection Boards, etc. MI leaders must be familiar with the individual and unit critical task lists that delineate the institutional, organizational, and self-development-associated tasks (found on the Central Army Registry) and provide feedback to USAI-CoE directly from the field.

Leaders must also be familiar with the programs that support the unit’s METL training and development. FOUNDRY 2.0 programs are available around the globe under the FOUNDRY platform. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Training Brain Operations Center supports home station training and provides an online training repository to enable warfighting exercises across a variety of OEs. FOUNDRY provides individual training opportunities that build on institutional training and enhance a commander’s ability to execute team and collective mission-oriented training across nine FORSCOM Home Station training sites (and most recently through Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability concept that ex-
pands the FOUNDRY program to focus on mission support for readiness tasks). Units can also tap into the extensive suite of institutionally-provided support programs that are tailored to the training in specific units with specific missions, as further discussed in this publication.

Lastly, the unit must undergo continuous, intense training that is properly resourced and is focused on core skills in order to produce exceptionally capable, adaptive, and thinking analysts and analytical sections. The use of tools such as the Analyst Certification Program is essential in this process.

Endnotes


3. Ibid.14.

4. Ibid.10.

5. Ibid.1.

6. Army Doctrine Publication 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, August 2012, 3.

MAJ Craig T. Olson was the Deputy Theater ACE Chief and Battalion Executive Officer for the 532nd MI Battalion at Camp Humphreys, ROK, during the development of the Analyst Certification Program. He is currently serving as the Senior Military Advisor for Doctrine at the USAICoE at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
Introduction

Over the last decade, there has been a steady movement toward a more robust and integrated Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence training curriculum. In addition, functional intelligence certification programs have been introduced that apply to all military, civilian, and contractor intelligence professionals. For some disciplines, such as Defense Security Service and Collection Management, the certification programs are established. The All-Source Analysis Professional Certification program will be initiated in calendar year 2015. The intent for this workforce management effort is to standardize skills and build an interoperable workforce with the expertise to work across the organizational boundaries.¹

The timeline below highlights several of the key milestones along the way, including the October 2011 Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (USD(I)) memorandum making the professional development of intelligence professionals a priority. This included the development of core competencies, training standards, and nationally accredited certification programs for analysis, collection management, geospatial-intelligence, cryptology, counterintelligence, and HUMINT.² The USD(I) also supported the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004’s requirement for an integrated framework of joint training by championing a shared catalogue of all course offerings providing community-wide access to training opportunities.³

Certification History.

- March 2006 USD(I) details “Remodeling of Defense Intelligence” with Enhanced Professionalization and Sustainment Tenant
- January 2009 USD(I) signed policy establishing DoD-level Certification and Accreditation Programs
- November 2012 USD(I) signed policy establishing Collection Management Certification Program
- December 2004 IRTPA requires Integrated Education Framework
- September 2007 ODNI & USD(I) Select National Commission for Certifying Agencies to Accredit Certification Programs within the IC and DoD
- March 2011 USD(I) signed policy establishing Security Certification Program (SPEd)
- October 2011 USD(I) signed memo making Accreditation and Certification of Intelligence Professionals a priority
- July 2014 Draft DoDM 3305.03 DoD All-Source Analysis (ASA) Accreditation and Certification

How will this affect Army military and civilian intelligence professionals?

- Organizations will identify the positions that require certification. Current professionals identified as incumbents in those positions will not be required to meet the identified certification to retain their position.⁴
- New entrants into identified positions will have a specified amount of time (to be determined) to achieve certification by passing the certification exam accredited by the National Commission for Certifying Agencies.
- Certified intelligence professionals will maintain or renew their certification by earning professional development units each year.
Professional Certification for All-Source Analysis

Professional certification is intended to enhance analytic quality by enforcing common standards and best practices across the DoD and to integrate the intelligence enterprise through portable credentials. The proposed certification framework for All-Source Analysis (ASA) includes two certification levels and the potential for more:

- **“Fundamentals”** assesses understanding of critical core ASA concepts using a multiple choice exam. These core concepts represent the baseline for the profession regardless of agency or organization.
- **“Applications”** assesses ability to demonstrate the core ASA skills using a practical work-based assessment.

Once implemented, ASA professional vacancy announcements will state the requirements for certification. DoD components must require as a condition of employment for ASA professionals that the professional will obtain the appropriate certifications for the position they fill.\(^5\)

Certification Maintenance

Intelligence professionals will likely maintain their certification through a variety of professional development activities. Proposed ASA creditable activities include:

- **Academic study and education.** Intelligence-related undergraduate and graduate courses, training and education from accredited Agency or Component Schools (including the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence), and ASA-related training are included in this category.
- **Professional activities.** ASA-related presentations at professional gatherings such as symposiums and seminars are included in this category.
- **Professional experience.** Joint duty assignments, external assignments, ASA-related adjunct faculty instructor are included in this category.

Professional development opportunities have expanded exponentially over that last few years. The National Intelligence University is offering new academic degrees, expanded certificate programs, and new campuses. More universities are developing national security/intelligence studies programs, including partnering with the Intelligence Community (IC) to develop Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE). Established in 2005, the IC CAE Program helps meet the need for qualified intelligence professionals to carry out the nation’s security imperatives. For 2014, twenty-nine schools across the country instituted intelligence-focused curricula, including language study in several critical languages. In addition to undergraduate and graduate programs, IC CAEs host workshops such as the “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” analytic workshop held by the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies at the University of Mississippi in March 2014.\(^6\) The table below highlights some of the opportunities for professional development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency/Component Training</th>
<th>National Intelligence University</th>
<th>University Education Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Certifications</td>
<td>Accredited Degrees: BSI, MSSI, MSTI</td>
<td>Accredited Degrees and Certificate Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-residence Training (e.g., CIA-U, NGA College)</td>
<td>Certificate of Intelligence Studies in:</td>
<td>IC Centers of Academic Excellence located in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Certificate Programs (e.g., OPM, FEI, DAU)</td>
<td>• Africa: Strategic Intelligence Studies</td>
<td>• Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Agency Training</td>
<td>• China: Intelligence Concerns</td>
<td>• California</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Counterintelligence</td>
<td>• Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK)</td>
<td>• Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eurasia</td>
<td>• Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leadership and Management in the IC</td>
<td>• Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic Warning Analysis</td>
<td>• New Mexico</td>
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<td>• Pennsylvania</td>
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<td>• Texas</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Virginia</td>
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<td>• Washington</td>
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</table>

Professional Development.

Structured Training

The development of a structured training program to provide the baseline skills identified for the various programs through accredited schoolhouses, especially with reduced training resources, is daunting. The identification or development of these training programs is one challenge; providing access and availability is equally challenging. Consequently, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is building Enterprise Learning Centers (ELC) with satellite Enterprise Learning Sites (ELS) to create a global training footprint. ELC that are colocated with a Combatant Command are a partnership, as are ELS at locations...
where partners, (e.g., DIA, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)) all share training resources.

This network of ELC and ELS will increase regional relevance and bring the DoD closer to the IRTPA’s vision of an intelligence training enterprise while reducing reliance on mobile training teams and TDYs. The design utilizes a distributed learning model that includes virtual learning technologies to optimize developmental opportunities. Through various forms and scales, training leveraging unique capabilities, from regional expertise at the combatant commands to in-depth knowledge of the “INTs”, becomes available across the enterprise thus expanding those pockets of expertise.

DIA is also increasing the pool of certified instructors for core courses. As part of this effort, two NGIC instructors are obtaining accreditation to teach the Open Source Intelligence course. This six-month long process begins with the NGIC employees first observing the course and culminates with their successful instruction of the course under the supervision of a fully qualified instructor IAW Draft DoDM 3305.03. This expanded training cadre will allow more iterations of the core courses to be offered through the ELC/ELS networks. This effort will facilitate access to courses supporting both standardized skills and professional development.

**Future Requirements**

The USD(I)’s certification and enterprise-wide training programs will ensure the DoD’s intelligence professional baseline competencies are consistent between agencies and commands. Future educational requirements, such as those articulated below, will allow both the Army and the IC to meet the demands of an evolving 21st century environment.

- **Socio-cultural analysis.** The IRTPA highlighted the IC’s need for additional linguists in 2004; however, there is a growing need for socio-cultural analysis as well. Since 1946, the vast majority of armed conflicts were intrastate (see the figure below) and the number of intrastate conflicts with foreign involvement has exceeded the number of interstate conflicts, particularly in the last decade. This trend emphasizes the need for analysts trained in identifying the underlying causes of violent political instability and the conditions under which threat groups are born and flourish, friction points, and factors that make fragile states fail as well as the strategic geopolitical goals that cause regional (interstate) conflict. The blurring of borders and the increased pace of human interaction enabled by technology have changed the character of war, requiring analysis that underpins both military and “whole of government” responses.

- **Open source information.** Intelligence analysts need an extensive grounding in use of open source information including the growing field of information forensics. Open source information may provide key indicators of a new technology or system currently being developed, or provide insight into an adversary’s future interests. Analysts need to know how to determine whether an author is telling the truth, whether a publisher or web administrator is selective about what gets published, whether information is current, and so on before deciding if information is credible. Training in this area will provide analysts with the skills needed to verify information received, if possible, and recognize “circular reporting” as similar information is published and/or posted to various websites. The advent of big data applications and models like GDELT requires analytical training on the proper use of these tools depending on the intelligence question to be answered, skills on how to avoid being overwhelmed with irrelevant data, and knowledge on which databases or sources to consult.

- **Data science.** The process of analyzing large data sets containing a variety of data types to uncover hidden patterns, unknown trends, or other useful information offers new ways to glean information. Without a solid understanding of the hypothesis being tested and the data set being analyzed, unwarly analysts can misinterpret the results— in data dredging, where analysts are searching for patterns, 5 percent of the correlations are purely coincidental. There is
growing recognition for the field across academia, science, industry, and government leading numerous universities to develop certificate or degree programs to meet the demand.

Network analysis. Network analysis skills, including identity intelligence, developed over the last decade proved their value in an operational context. As applied to science and technology topics, network analysis will allow all-source analysts to not only identify linkages between people, but also government and civilian organizations/companies. When properly conducted, network analysis can reveal a plethora of information, to include (but not limited to): technical topics of common interest amongst researchers (government/military, academic, and or civilian), areas for potential technology transfer and proliferation, etc. Identity intelligence and the ability to know exactly who is seeking entry into the United States will remain a critical component of homeland security, but its applications have expanded to support other fields, such as scientific and technical intelligence. Ultimately, a threat capability comes down to the people designing, directing, facilitating, financing, and using the capability, which makes network analysis perhaps one of the best tools in our analytical tool kit. The 2004 IRTPA stated that it was the sense of Congress that “efforts to track terrorist financing must be paramount in United States counterterrorism efforts.”

Specialized Analytic Disciplines
The Army may need to identify specialized analytical disciplines within the broad category of All-Source Analysis. Two disciplines, identity intelligence and support to cyber, require specialized training and education. Identity intelligence is practiced at all levels, from tactical through strategic, with commensurate changes in the skills needed. As the U.S. Army and DoD build the Cyber Mission Forces, the specialized skills and knowledge needed to provide ASA support to cyber must be identified. In both of these disciplines, the education and training necessary to develop these skills are ideal candidates for joint intelligence training solutions so that common military and civilian training needs are addressed across all of the services.

Analytical Enterprise
The various intelligence professional certification programs are beginning to come on line and bring the community much closer to the USD(I)’s vision of a highly-skilled, mission-aligned, and diverse Defense Intelligence Enterprise. As the final form of the ASA certification program is codified, the Army has the opportunity to reenergize its civilian intelligence professional training program, leveraging the best joint intelligence training programs while closing workforce skill gaps. As the Army downsizes, we must ensure that Army is able to train and retain intelligence professionals with the ability to support the Army’s missions and enable strategic leaders to make decisions.

Endnotes
1. S. 2845 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Title I, Subtitle D, SEC 1041.
3. IRTPA, Title I, Subtitle D, SEC 1042.
4. DoDM 3305.03 DoD All-Source Analysis (ASA) Accreditation and Certification, Draft as of 10 July 2014 23.
5. DoDM 3305.03, 24.
7. IRTPA, Title I, Subtitle D, SEC 1041.
8. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 14/11/9) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia at www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University.
11. IRTPA, Title VII, Subtitle A, SEC 7118.

Sherrill L. Stramara is a Department of the Army Civilian and works as a chief analyst. She leads a modernization effort that focuses on training and tradecraft providing senior level oversight of all-source services. Prior to this assignment she served as a director providing all-source analysis of foreign basic and applied research and technologies of military interest, including cyber. Ms. Stramara is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and earned an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College.
Introduction

Following an exercise deployment or an overseas contingency mission such as Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, many Soldiers buy and proudly wear a T-shirt that commemorates their participation. It may even read, “Been There, Done That, Got the T-Shirt.” Additionally, Soldiers wear badges and tabs that quickly identify, and in some cases, announce their certifications in abilities and skills to others. When you see the Army parachutist badge with a star or star and wreath, it signifies that the individual is a jumpmaster, a graduate of a two-week course with a rigorous qualification test and with years of practical experience. Soldiers understand the value of demonstrating they have the skills to properly execute a required mission. Much like project managers, not all Soldiers can, or even want to, take the required courses or qualification exams.

To succeed, Army officers constantly seek knowledge that will make them better leaders, managers, and technicians. DA Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, as exemplified in the following excerpt, recommends Army engineers seek professional certifications, including Project Management Professional (PMP®).

“Engineer officers without an undergraduate engineering degree should seek to obtain a master’s degree in an engineering related discipline and professional certification relevant to the Engineer mission, such as Project Management Professional (PMP), Project Engineer, or Geographic Information Systems Professional. To add the best value possible to the Army and the nation, Engineer offi-

The Army also recognizes in DA Pamphlet 600-3 a shared goal with the Project Management Institute (PMI) and other industry certification granting entities—“lifelong learning.” Unfortunately, this section for engineers is the only place where the Army addresses industry certification.

Most military intelligence (MI) officers can benefit from an association with the PMI or another subject area industry association, and over the course of their careers, could attain certifications that are transferrable to the civilian sector. Four benefits to current MI officers include: understanding a systematic approach to managing projects; developing a network of like-minded professionals; enhancement of the skills required to coach and mentor junior leaders; and preparing for professional life after military service.

MI officers could benefit from an association of ASIS International and International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium, Inc. [(ISC)²®], who administer the Certified Protection Professional (CPP®) and Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP®), respectively. Further, the Defense Security Service recently developed the SPēD, Security Professional Education Development Program, initiative to professionalize the Department of Defense workforce. It provides for a “common set of competencies among security practitioners that promotes interoperability, facilitates professional development and training, and develops a workforce of certified security professionals.”

While this article champions MI officers attaining industry standard certifications, it is not limited to any specific certification. For the purpose of limiting the discussion, the article will focus on the PMP® certification.

Membership in PMI and learning its processes, tools, and techniques provides MI officers with an understanding of a
systematic approach to managing projects. Attendance at the Army’s Intermediate Level Education course and pursuing a graduate level education will not approach management issues in the same systematic and proven way that PMI does. The military services or universities often structure their education programs around sound academic principles, but PMI’s structured approach will provide another valuable instrument to the MI officer’s toolkit.

Second, becoming a part of a local chapter helps develop a network of like-minded project management professionals, and PMI facilitates its members sharing ideas, tools, best practices, and techniques. Much like the Association of the U. S. Army’s Army magazine, PMI’s PM Network® magazine provides a similar function. While scanning an issue of PM Network®, the reader might notice a citation for Edward De Bono’s book Six Thinking Hats, wherein De Bono separates thinking into six distinct modes, identified with six colored “thinking hats.” Use of these “hats” forms the basis for many of the evaluations conducted during the proposal process and can be used in the project management process, including identifying opportunities and constraints. Our MI officers could use this multi-hat review framework during the mission analysis phase of planning military operations, ensuring they look at the situation from different perspectives and points-of-view.

The Army’s “Red Teams” provide the enemy perspective, De Bono might suggest that his “black thinking hat,” or some combination of the six, provides a similar perspective. Following a successful attack in a computer assisted exercise (CAX), a British Army Brigadier noted in the after action review that American military forces do not plan for success. If the CAX group had used the thinking hats concept during the planning process (especially the “yellow hat”), they might have considered success scenarios and exploited the situation.

Third, having an organization and process accepted by a large population provides MI leaders with a codified body of knowledge they can use to coach and mentor junior leaders. Much like the field manuals; tactics, techniques and procedures; and standard operating procedures used by the military, the Project Management Body of Knowledge Guide (PMBOK®) identifies a subset of the project management body of knowledge generally recognized as good practice, and a common vocabulary within the project management profession for discussing, writing, and applying project management concepts. Military Intelligence leaders habitually take the knowledge— including briefing techniques and management tools—gained in intermediate and senior service colleges and integrate them into the units they lead. This effort allows them to share these skills with the officers they mentor, using contemporary problem sets.

Fourth, and finally, PMI membership and certification provide MI leaders with access to knowledge, a network of like-minded professionals, and recognized credentials for their life after military service. One of the hardest parts of transitioning from the military to the civilian workforce is adopting private sector jargon. The military already uses many project management tools and techniques, as a result of the integrated environment that has existed with the civilian education systems for many years. Critical path method, scatter charts, and Gantt charts are compatible with Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) and Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) and Cost Schedule Planning Control Specification (C/SPCS), which have historically been applied to both methodical and complex military operations.

The Veterans Administration (VA), through the GI Bill, provides education assistance to veterans. This assistance can, but does not always, support certifications such as PMI. PMI may be able to work with the Veterans Administration to ensure the VA and the GI Bills support the PMI certification process, including membership, instructional aids, exam costs and preparatory courses, such as PMP® Boot Camp classes for officers already familiar with the concepts of project management, but not necessarily the required PMP® processes and procedures or their names.

How can implementation be accomplished? PMI needs to partner with the training commands of the services. As an example, partnering with the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) allows PMI the ability to address the training life cycle of Army officers from the commissioning sources—Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), and the Officer Candidate School (OCS)—through its basic, career, intermediate, and senior service schools. Since ROTC units coexist with schools of business/project management programs at a significant number of universities, the partnership may be easier to establish and have a far reaching effect on the students.

Partnering with USMA allows PMI to work, not only with students, but also their instructors. USMA instructors consistently contribute to the evolutionary nature of their many disciplines, and could have the same impact on the project management body of knowledge. Using knowledge of the project management process and tracking their involvement in the process, we can prepare military project managers to complete their applications for Certified Associate in Project Management (CAPM®), and PMP®.
While it might actually be possible for officers to qualify for and certify as PMPs at their career courses (3-4 years in the Army), the majority should accomplish this before they attend the Intermediate Level Education (Command and General Staff College) courses. After attaining PMP certification, they could work toward the Program Management Professional (PgMP®) certification. Based on CAPM® qualifications, the noncommissioned officer corps could benefit from a partnership with PMI; again, TRADOC would be its primary partner if PMI sought a broad-based approach.

In summary, all MI officers can benefit from an association with organizations like PMI, ASIS International, (ISC)², SPēD, and their certification programs. Over the course of their careers, they could attain certifications that are transferrable to the civilian sector. Future MI leaders’ education will cross paths with the civilian sector; PMI membership and certification allows MI officers more opportunities to work with civilian practitioners and master their lexicon. Further, PMI certification parallels the military’s need to work with civilian practitioners and master their lexicon. A career in the military training programs will benefit tremendously from a partnership with PMI, and give retiring military officers a certification the civilian sector respects and rewards. We will be able to see our impact on the military, when we see them wearing their PMP® t-shirts …proudly stating: “Been there, done that, got the T-Shirt.”

Endnotes

1. Bob Mahler, “Special Forces Project Leadership,” presentation to Washington, D.C. chapter of PMI on 17 January 2012. Mr. Mahler is the Vice President of Marketing (volunteer position), Washington, D.C. Chapter of PMI. Additionally, he is a Principal at Strategic Leadership Services, LLC, a veteran-owned small business.

2. DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 03 December 2014, 125.


6. De Bono, 82-83. De Bono identifies six distinct directions in which the brain can be challenged and assigned them a color. The other five directions are: Information (White)—considering purely what information is available, what are the facts?; Emotions (Red)—intuitive or instinctive gut reactions or statements of emotional feeling (but not any justification); Discernment (Black)—logic applied to identifying reasons to be cautious and conservative; Optimistic response (Yellow)—logic applied to identifying benefits, seeking harmony; Creativity (Green)—statements of provocation and investigation, seeing where a thought goes; and the sixth (Blue) is meta thinking.

7. I base this comment on my personal experience during Tactical Commanders Course, which was a component of his pre-command course in November 1997.


10. PMP Boot Camps provide skills-based training developed to meet PMP goals, while developing and reinforcing real-world project management skills.

11. Project Management Institute Inc., PMP Credential Handbook (Revised August 2009). 7. PMP certification qualifications are: Minimum three years/36 months unique; non-overlapping professional project; management experience during which at least 4,500 hours were spent leading and directing project tasks.

COL Perkins is the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He served the last 20 years of a 30 year career as a Military Intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. Colonel Perkins retired following his assignment on the Multi-National Force-Iraq staff from 2006-2007. He is a graduate of Cameron University, holds graduate degrees in public administration and strategic studies, and is a 2001 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. Colonel Perkins earned his PMP® in 2010 and his CPP® in 2014.
Standardizing Mission Essential Task Lists

by Linda Klein

The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the formation of the Army Mission Essential Task List (METL) Review Board (AMRB) in 2007 to establish and maintain a Standardized METL for like-type HQDA designated Army brigade and higher echelon units. These METL were initially referred to as Core METL (CMETL), then Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) METL, and now Standardized METL as Army doctrine has evolved over the past eight years.

The Standardized METL established by the AMRB provides a list of core capabilities and tasks that a unit must execute to facilitate Decisive Action in any operating environment and supports that unit’s training readiness reporting.

The Standardized METL are developed, updated, and synchronized with:

- The strategic environment as defined by the Army Training Strategy.
- The unit’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).
- Changes in Army doctrine.

The AMRB is conducted annually, or as required per HQDA discretion, via SharePoint, Defense Connect Online, or video-teleconference at the direction of the G37/TR (Training Readiness) Director of Training on behalf of the DCS G-3/5/7.

The Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) and other U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Schools and CoEs develop and recommend draft or revised Standardized METL for Army units for which they are proponents. They then submit the METL to the applicable Army Command (ACOM), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), or Direct Reporting Unit (DRU) that serves as the higher headquarters training readiness command for that type of unit. After appropriate review and adjudication of the recommended METL between the CoE and ACOM/ASCC/DRU, a proposed Standardized METL is then submitted to AMRB voting and nonvoting members for consideration and approval recommendation at the formal AMRB voting session. The AMRB recommended Standardized METL for all units are then reviewed by the Homestation/Deployed Council of Colonels (H/D CoC) and the Training General Officer Steering Committee (TGOSc) prior to submission for final approval by the HQDA DCS G3/5/7.

Once approved, the Standardized METL serves as the basis for brigade echelon units to focus their collective unit training management, and provides the metrics for training readiness reporting in NetUSR in accordance with Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting.

HQDA does not require TRADOC proponent schools or CoEs to develop Standardized METL for Battalion and Company level units. The unit METL for these size organizations are the responsibility of the unit commander to develop, with face-to-face dialogue with the higher level commander, in support of their unit’s designed or directed mission.

ICoE develops and maintains, in coordination with the Intelligence and Security Command G3, the Standardized METL for the theater echelon Military Intelligence Brigade (MIB). ICoE, in conjunction with Forces Command G3, is currently in the process of Standardized METL development for the Corps-aligned Expeditionary-MIB due to begin activation in late fiscal year 2015.

Linda Klein is the Director of the Training Development and Integration Division (TDID) for USAICoE. She is a Signals Intelligence Analyst by trade and has over 30 years combined military and federal service.
Analytical Training: Improving the Abilities of the MI Force at the Unit Level

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey J. Fair

Introduction

Intelligence analysis is one of the most crucial skills our Military Intelligence (MI) professionals can develop, yet it is also challenging to teach and a difficult talent to cultivate. It is, however, central to the execution of all MI tasks. Quality analysis assists the commander with not only understanding the operational environment, but also with anticipating changes and shaping the battlefield to friendly advantage.

According to the Army Leader Development Strategy published in 2013, a major portion of leader development happens away from the schoolhouse while Soldiers are assigned to units. “The operational domain is where leaders undergo the bulk of their development. It encompasses all training and education in deployable units. It is where junior leaders achieve technical competence, mid-grade leaders further develop their ability to lead units and organizations, and senior leaders contribute to the development and implementation of national and geo-political strategy... After action reviews (AARs), coaching, counseling, sharing and mentoring are important parts of developing leaders.”

This concept is the same for the development of analysts, our current and future MI leaders. The leadership at Fort Huachuca is charged with the training of our analysts, but they are limited by time, force-wide training requirements, and the complexity of the subject matter. It is imperative for units to pick up where the institutional MI instruction ends and continue to develop our Soldiers’ analytical skills. This not only assists the individual Soldier, but it ultimately contributes to the effectiveness of MI organizations and success of supported commands.

MI units have several options for training analysts and further developing their analytical skills. Units, however, are limited in similar ways to the institutional organizations from which their analysts come. Although mission requirements will dominate the time available to a unit, other obligations from higher headquarters, the installation, or the Army will shorten available time for analytical training. In this respect, commanders must ensure analytical training is a priority and dedicate resources to that effort. In units that provide Soldiers to larger joint missions, commanders must communicate how this training benefits the supported organization and illustrate how time dedicated on this training is time well spent.

In order to address the time concerns and ultimately achieve training goals, units have three general options. First, organizations can develop formal training programs that focus on the analytical needs of the unit. Second, everyday product requirements can be used to teach, coach, and mentor junior analysts, honing their skills. Finally, analytical skill sets can be addressed during counseling and mentorship sessions, giving direction and providing feedback on analysis. All of these options can have an impact, but units can greatly improve analytical ability if they used a combination of these options. The balance between these three approaches will be determined by the unit mission, time available, and type of analytical development required.

Formal Unit Training Programs

When most people think about unit training programs, visions of Sergeant’s Time Training, lane training, and death by PowerPoint are common. Analytical training programs in MI units, however, will rarely take those forms. First, MI organizations in the field just do not have time to dedicate even a few hours to training each week. Second, supported organizations have demands that must be met, requiring at least a portion of a unit’s Soldiers to be present for mission-related duties. When analytical capability is a recognized shortfall, it is challenging to get these programs the needed momentum to keep them going for the long run, even when made a priority.
The best way to overcome some of the difficulties that competing mission-related requirements pose is to work with the supported organization. If unit commanders can form common views of training needs with their stakeholders, it will be more likely that an arrangement can be worked out that makes the best use of time, setting some time aside for training. As an example, a company that supports a joint organization needs to train Soldiers in both Soldier tasks as well as analytical tasks. Convincing the supported mission commander that trained Soldiers will have a positive impact on their organization will elevate training in priority and create dedicated time for training each week or several times a month. In this example, as in other circumstances, the first few training events are critical to continued time allocation by both organizations. Training momentum can only be generated and maintained by planning, resourcing, and executing a quality program that can create an immediate impact, as well as build on longer-term improvement.

Before a unit can build an effective analytical training program, leaders must assess the current state of Soldier skills and abilities. Although many of our junior leaders are just now being introduced to ADRP 7.0, it is a great idea to pull this resource off of the shelf and revisit a few chapters. This manual is not solely written for field training, many of the points made here will have invaluable impact on the design and building of a unit’s analytical training program. It is also important to keep key stakeholders involved in the design as well. If the organization that receives Soldier support believes it is benefiting from this training, it is much more likely to work with the unit in identifying enough time on the calendar for an effective program to flourish.

In design of a program, many questions should be asked before putting pen to paper. The structure of the training session should be constructed with the goal of being able to assess training and developmental needs:

- What current shortfalls can be identified?
- What needs to be trained to get Soldiers to the next level?
- How are Soldiers evaluated at the end of each training session?

These questions build a natural feedback process that can occur during training, allowing leaders to assess the progress of the group and that of individual Soldiers. Separate from the group AAR on the training itself, the feedback process can help leaders determine if additional one-on-one training is necessary to achieve developmental goals. This feedback, while stressed at Army leadership and training courses, if often forgotten in the field, leading to unit training that merely checks the block, rather than improving individual and group performance of mission-related duties.

Once the unit and supported organization (if applicable) have dedicated time on a recurring basis for a program and training needs are identified, leaders can determine the length of the program. This helps in how quickly sessions need to build on one another and how often practical exercises and other evaluation tools should be incorporated. Examples of program limitations could be large exercises, TDY, courses, or deployments. These are all natural breaks in a regular training program that are not conducive to picking up where the last session ended. For example, United States Forces Korea (USFK) holds two major exercises each year. MI units that support the USFK J2 can have a solid program that begins following one exercise and culminates prior to the next one, leaving a training program that is approximately six months long.

Lastly, subjects, classes, and instructors must be scheduled. Much like other training, it is imperative that leaders pre-inspect classes and discuss training material with guest instructors always. With demands on time MI units have, it is crucial to not waste a single training session because someone was not ready or went off topic. These events can have a devastating impact on program momentum, and could lose supported organization support if not avoided.

**Focused On the Job Training**

Everyone has encountered on the job training, or OJT. MI units are no different and the analytical positions that each of these units have require some amount of initial familiarization and indoctrination training. The difference between preparing a Soldier to do an assigned job and improving analytical skill through doing that job, however, is significant. Although initial train-up for a position is usually accomplished after Soldiers arrive to that position, they are being trained because they do not yet have the background in the subject matter to accomplish basic requirements. Focused OJT enhances Soldiers’ ability to do their job, but also focuses on their skills and analytical abilities in order to make them better intelligence professionals and contributors to the team.

Many leaders have experienced this type of training through the reworking of products ranging from memos to white papers to AR 15-6 findings. Asked by seniors to rework the product to make it better, the Soldier inevitably becomes better at that type of product and the thinking that goes into making it. For intelligence analysts this is an opportunity that comes frequently and only the availability of time or deadlines influence what products leaders choose to use as developmental opportunities. If time
permits, the interaction between Soldier and leader can, through discussion, improve not only the product, but also the Soldier’s ability to produce similar documents in the future. Topics routinely addressed in this type of training include analytical arguments, use of supporting intelligence, writing style, doctrinal vocabulary, coordination with others and other organizations, and many more.

The biggest benefit of OJT is that a leader can focus on individual Soldier needs. Unlike a formal unit training program, it does not have to apply to a group of Soldiers, only one. There is, however, an excellent opportunity to tie OJT to the formal training program. OJT can be used to reinforce lessons or address training needs assessed in the formal program. It takes a leader who is involved in the development of their Soldiers and who can either attend a portion of the formal training or receive back-briefs from the instructors on the assessed progress of Soldiers.

**Counseling and Career Development**

Although tied to OJT, Soldier counseling and career development will take a different approach to improving Soldier abilities. One again, however, this takes an invested leader who is willing to spend the extra time with subordinates in order to help improve analytical skills. The major difference is the time horizon involved. During OJT, leaders are using current intelligence products to build skills in real time, training Soldiers using everyday activities as learning venues. Counseling takes the long-term view, and focuses efforts of Soldiers on periods of months and not weeks. As OJT helps Soldiers to meet short-term training goals, counseling pushes them to see long-term career goals as a MI professional.

Counseling, when done well, addresses many different aspects of a Soldier’s conduct and future service. Focusing on analytical abilities may not be the priority for some performance counseling sessions, but it should be addressed when counseling MI Soldiers and leaders. It plays a part in the larger picture of schools, courses, and training that will ultimately be discussed in counseling sessions. Even when an informal mentoring discussion takes place, analytical ability is a critical component of the development of an MI Soldier into an MI leader. Leaving analysis out of the discussion for any 35 series Soldier or leader will not only affect outlook and priorities in the short run, but can influence the counseled Soldier in the long run, producing a future leader who does not view analysis as imperative in the leader development of his own Soldiers.

As with the training discussed previously, counseling takes time, but the additional time it takes to address analytical development will benefit the force in the future. Soldiers should understand how analysis is important and how courses and schools fit into the larger picture of analytical development. Sometimes it may be important to expose them to a few things they may not understand, advance forms of analysis that they will be taught at Fort Huachuca or in other venues, to illustrate that development is constant and that they may not have quite all of the answers now. The time leaders spend in counseling also empowers Soldiers to begin to look and seek out that career-long mentor that can help them through the long-term analytical development that our future leaders require.

**Conclusion**

Any way an organization chooses to approach the development of its analysts will take time and effort. Those endeavors, however, can reap enormous benefits in both individual performance and mission-related analysis. If combined in a fashion that suits the unit and supported organization these benefits can be even greater, and will have a long-term effect on the Army and future leaders carry with them successful models of development. Taking the time to train Soldiers, reinforce that training with OJT, and aid them in visualizing a way forward to be even better through counseling and mentorship will have a lasting positive impact on the entire MI community.

**Endnote**

1. Army Leader Development Strategy, Department of the Army, 2013, 11.

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Analysis as the Basis of Intelligence Curricula
by Chief Warrant Officer Four Doug Megenity

“Traditionally, analysts at all levels devote little attention to improving how they think. To penetrate the heart and soul of the problem of improving analysis, it is necessary to better understand, influence, and guide the mental processes of analysts themselves.”

–Richards Heuer
Psychology of Analysis

Introduction

The term “analysis” is a concept commonly presented in curricula throughout the Intelligence Community as a function to be completed rather than as an abstract idea which generates thought. It is generally referred to as something an analyst “does,” and much instruction is given to that end, but little curriculum time is given towards what analysis “is,” and little institutional time is typically given to an analyst in the field to learn its nuances. Analytical skills cannot be taught in a short amount of time, they must be learned on an individual basis through practice and experience. By emphasizing the function of analysis rather than its process, students with little practical application and no immersion in theory will have a long road ahead in understanding exactly what it is they need to do as an analyst.

To mitigate this, the emphasis in instruction should be placed on the idea of analysis process—that is, reasoning, research, and understanding—rather than just the function, with the idea that students will eventually apply what they learn in critical thinking techniques in their everyday jobs. However, this article is not intended to be an exploration or suggestion of how to “fix” Army institutional training. Rather, this article is an appeal for conversation about the process of teaching analysis in the Army in general.

Background

During a recent assignment of mine as an intelligence officer, my unit received a number of freshly graduated Soldier-analysts from Army training organizations. At the time, the organization to which I was assigned was re-engineering itself into a more productive, forward-thinking intelligence team, with the responsibility to provide both real-time intelligence information and mid- to long-term intelligence analysis products to its consumers. So, the influx of young, fresh minds into the mix was felt to be a boon, as prior to their arrival our manning in the intelligence analysis section had been rather sparse.

After their in-processing these new analysts were assigned to the various analysis teams within the section and put into “study mode” in order to learn the details of our particular mission set. Unfortunately, we soon came to realize that these analysts—again, fresh out of school—only vaguely knew what intelligence analysis entailed, and were better at punching information into their workstations and waiting for guidance on an answer than they were at conducting research on an intelligence question and coming up with an answer on their own. Very few of them could write well, and none of them could write a passable intelligence report. It took the better part of a year to separate the wheat from the chaff, determine the strengths and weaknesses of each analyst, and instill in them some of the discipline it takes to be a decent researcher, analyst, and reporter. They did not, by and large, have any history or discipline in the cognitive tools necessary to think critically about an intelligence problem.

It is unfair to expect a training organization to generate high quality analysts who are able to answer all of our intelligence needs immediately upon arrival to a unit, and teach it all within the doctrine and time constraints under which the school must operate. But these Soldiers arrived in such an analytically unprepared state that the question of whether or not the school is teaching appropriately useful skills to its students must be asked. There was no doubt that they could operate, at a very basic level, the program of record tools they might use in a tactical environment, but when presented with a analysis problem where they were required to think through to a reasoned conclusion, they were lost. That these Soldiers arrived in this condition speaks to the orientation of the training at the school, and raises the question of whether we want our intelligence Soldiers to be analysts, or simply equipment operators.

Technical or Cognitive Training?

Do we favor cognitive ability over technical ability, or vice versa? It is not a zero-sum question, but it’s hard to achieve both of them with measurable success in the small amount of time an analyst spends in school. Currently, the emphasis at Army Intelligence training organizations is on the technical, which makes for easier statistics tracking, but it is the cognitive which ultimately produces results. 45-year veteran CIA analyst Richards Heuer touched on this problem in his book, The Psychology of Analysis, when he wrote, “(m) ore training time should be devoted to the thinking and reasoning processes involved in making intelligence judgments, and to the tools of the trade that are available to alleviate or compensate for the known cognitive problems
encountered in analysis.”¹ However, current training curriculums generally emphasize the opposite, placing program of record toolsets at a higher priority than training in thinking, reasoning, and writing. If these current metrics-friendly methods of training are to change, then the way basic analyst training is viewed would need to change fundamentally, and the structure and intent of basic analyst training curriculums in general would need to be undertaken.

How to train new analysts is a question that has beguiled the Intelligence Community for decades, and will continue to do so far into the future. Unfortunately it really is a question without a ready answer. The reasons for this are twofold: first, Army Intelligence training organizations, motivated by policy, react immediately to the perceived needs of intelligence producers and consumers in the field (this could be called the tyranny of relevance).² This creates a constant state of confusion within the staff that creates the curriculum, which in turn generates an atmosphere of constant upheaval within the school as the curriculum constantly undergoes change. Secondly, and because of this need for relevance, the Intelligence Community has, by and large, lost the understanding of what a student of basic analysis essentially needs to learn in order to arrive at a unit and be reasonably useful.

These training organizations aren’t broken by any means; they serve well their purpose of generating intelligence Soldiers within the limits of their mandates. They are just given over to the idea of the “next great thing,” where new advances in technology or theory take center stage and enter curricula before they are fully understood or even developed. There is a problem, in the Army Intelligence community at least, of both leadership culture and curriculum overcrowding. If current teaching emphasis on function over process remains unchecked it will continue to give intelligence leaders a false sense of confidence in the abilities of their young analysts, and continue to produce analysts who are not ready for the rigors of critical thinking and deep analytic production.

When addressing these issues it might be appropriate to ask precisely what it is we expect from analysts fresh from school. In general, mid-grade and senior leaders expect these Soldiers to be competent program of record system operators, who have a fundamental grasp of tactical intelligence operations, general knowledge about the Intelligence Community, and who are able to give reasoned analysis with little unit training needed. Conversely, what the field typically receives is a novice program of record system operator who needs a lot of refresher training, with a general but uninformed view of tactical intelligence operations, no tangible understanding of the Intelligence Community, and very little capability in independent analytic process. This is not surprising since training organizations must produce “vetted” analysts in twelve to sixteen weeks, fulfilling the training needs not only of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, but other Department of Defense, and many Department of the Army non-intelligence related training objectives as well.

The problem of under-qualified analyst-Soldiers tends to gets overlooked in the fast-paced daily life of field units, and when Soldier integration into these units occurs they must simply make do with what they receive. Venues to solve this discrepancy of what the field wants and what they receive from the intelligence schools, such as the Critical Task Site Selection Board process, are positive steps towards identifying problem areas, but are generally short sighted. They are affected by the tyranny of relevance, making the immediate needs of the field paramount, and training that might be better suited to post-graduation training or on-the-job training venues are instead forced into already overcrowded curricula.

There are likely many reading this who would argue that Army Intelligence training schools are not the place for pie-in-the-sky analysis training, but rather should provide the training necessary, as an example, for an all-source analyst to function as an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) specialist within a brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC). There is merit to this argument—those are important skills—but providing training in IPB before the root skills of analysis are learned will ensure that the analyst arrives at his or her unit as an under-educated “map marker placement specialist” rather than a novice analyst. When the basics are neglected the end product suffers. So, when these unfortunately unprepared Soldiers arrive at a unit and must be retrained to do their job, it is not the training organization that bears the brunt of the resulting issues, but rather the unit. It is the basics that are urgently needed though and any curriculum about the basics of analysis must include introductions to the theoretical framework of these disciplines, a long reading list for students to consume prior to and over the course of the training, and lots and lots of writing, revising and resubmitting analyses.

Many current intelligence-related curriculums are a frenetic combination of systems training, operations training, doctrine training and introductions to analytic techniques. So much information is pressed into these sixteen to twenty-or-so-week courses, that no particular subject gets more than a few days attention (perhaps a week at most in some cases). Some core concepts are broken into chunks
and spread throughout the training as well in order to reinforce their importance. This kind of structuring works only if the students involved already have a firm grasp on the basic skill of analysis—reasoning and writing—upon which they will build other system or doctrinal skills. Other Army training institutions within the military which focus on fundamentals emphasize core skills and their mastery before moving on to more complex or other ancillary skills. We cannot expect a Soldier to manage a rifle qualification range before learning, understanding, and mastering rifle marksmanship. But in the analysis field, we do just that. We expect Soldiers arriving for training to already have the cognitive and analytic skills needed to fully, or at least very quickly, grasp the details of advanced analysis techniques, and then expect them to apply that analysis to database and systems analysis. It simply doesn’t work.

Perhaps then, curriculums should go “back to the basics.” For the purpose of this article “the basics” refers to the root skills of an analyst—the core competencies. For an all-source analyst, the basics are critical thinking, research, and writing. For a Signals Intelligence Analyst this is radio wave theory, antenna theory, radio net reconstruction, and report writing. For a Geospatial Intelligence Analyst this is image interpretation, order of battle knowledge, and report writing. For Human Intelligence Analysts this is interrogation, target development, and report writing. Program of record systems operations is a basic skill, but it is secondary to the core competency of analytic skill. This admittedly heretical view is based on the fact that these programs come and go. Over the course of Soldiers’ 20-year career, they might encounter three or four systems in succession that they must master either through on-the-job-training, or through mobile training teams (MTTs), all without the benefit of basic instruction at the Intelligence School. The basics of analysis really have not changed since Julius Caesar asked his lieutenants what was happening in Rome when deciding whether or not to cross the Rubicon, and these skills transcend any automated system or database a modern analyst may be required to use throughout a career.

The Basics of Analysis

So then, a corollary to this must be the question of what constitutes the basics of analysis? In short, an arguably good analyst knows how to do three things well: reasoning, research, and writing. Reasoning and research are the cornerstones of any attempt at analysis, and the cornerstone of research is the habit of reading. An analyst who does not read out of habit is simply uninformed. It is not enough to know where the databases, or libraries, or compendiums are located, or how to use the system that accesses them. Intelligence analysis at all levels is part political science, part history, and part sociology. It is only when analysts read and understands the literature about an issue and its ancillary influences that they can gain the basic understanding of that issue and have an informed opinion. This is why overemphasis in curriculum on database manipulation, systems operation, and process-driven analysis is not an effective way to teach basic analysis. The results those systems display as they access databases are irrelevant if the operator does not understand the nature of the problems against which they are working, and that will only lead to intelligence failure.

Given the right amount of study and understanding of a given intelligence problem, any analyst should be able to arrive at the moment of clarity associated with solving a problem, and write a lucid report about what he or she has discovered. This “ah ha!” moment is elusive but achievable by anyone willing and allowed to put in the time and effort to arrive there. But there is the rub—time and effort; these are two elements most often restricted to the modern analyst. It is hard to argue against the statement that there is often a sense of urgency associated with intelligence analysis that disallows long reflection on products, and the resulting hastened timeline disallows significant peer review and “analysis of the analysis” to be completed before publication. This urgency is often justified; a tactical commander does not have time for peer-review of his S2’s battle update—a product which arguably requires as much true critical thinking as the National Security Strategy. However in times of less tactical urgency, or even in the classroom, the habits of effective study, reflection and production are not typically emphasized. If these habits are not learned, encouraged and exercised, they cannot mature, and if they cannot mature, the quality of analytic product suffers from mediocrity.

Likewise, effective writing is perhaps the hardest skill any analyst will ever have to develop, but it is perhaps the most critical skill an analyst can have. There is only one way to get better at writing, and that is to write. Good reading habits will help with writing skills, but simply sitting and writing is the only true method of improvement. Any curriculum in analysis should require significant amounts of writing, with attention by the teaching staff given to grammar, composition and structure. Very few courses in the Intelligence Community truly emphasize this skill, and lack of writing skill certainly does not restrict a young analyst from graduating and moving on to their first assignment. This is not surprising though, since teaching effective writing is time consuming, requires experience, and is ridiculously frustrat-
ing from the teacher's point of view. But the argument remains that if you can't write well, you can't get your point across effectively, and you probably shouldn't be analyst.

As for the other skills they will need, well, the best way to learn TOC operations and intelligence battle rhythms is on-the-job-training, and this is where the field shares the burden with the Intelligence School. We give much lip-service to organizational training run by a unit's cadre of noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), so put that to the test. Let the school teach the basics, and leave the operational training to the NCOs (and warrant officers). Soldiers cannot arrive at any given unit as a plug-and-play asset. That is an unrealistic expectation, but they can arrive as an analyst with a fundamental grasp of analysis in their given discipline, and then learn operations along the way. Systems training, tactical training, and other more technical needs can be met through follow-on courses depending on the analyst's projected first assignment, but only once they are qualified as analysts. They will then have to cross-level into different, discipline-related skill sets over their career. This is admittedly a tough sell, but it worked in the past, and we owe it to ourselves and our customers to produce thinking, reasoning Soldier-analysts, not database managers.

Conclusion

Much of this may seem like a bridge too far for the Army Intelligence schools to accomplish in toto, and that may be so, but certain institutional changes could be made that would begin the process of transforming the mindset of the process from the current “jack of all trades” orientation to that of mastery of the basic arts of analysis. We can never train for all exigencies, but we can train a baseline that will prepare Soldiers for a wide array of analytic problems and then train them on systems and operations.

Army Intelligence schools should be in the business of producing baseline analysts for each discipline, and then reacting to field needs with post graduation add-on courses, or with MTTs to deal with emerging issues, program of record systems, and field operations. Had the Soldiers mentioned at the beginning of this article arrived with their analytic skills established, and a follow-on course in their program of record system under their belt, then time wasted in retraining could have been avoided, and integration could have occurred much more quickly.

There is no one solution to analyst training that will satisfy everybody. However, there must be a better way than that which we have now. Would be analysts need training in the basics of their craft before anything else. Produce a solid, thinking analyst, and everything else will follow.

Endnotes


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pattern analysis, grouping significant activity is not always helpful. In Afghanistan, overlays often showed improvised explosive device (IED) detonations for a given area of operations (AO). The takeaway was that IED activity occurred in the area but few details were provided apart from the kill zone. This frustrated commanders because it failed to provide the complete enemy picture needed for an informed decision regarding potential friendly action. A common excuse offered was the need for more intelligence, but this is the precise reason for studying tactics, it enables prediction of enemy action without observing the entire enemy system.

As part of a brigade S2 section in Afghanistan, we eventually developed products that showed a complete enemy concept of operations which linked lines of communication to support zones, battle zones, and disruption zones across Regional Command South. The support zones were based on activity associated with movement of lethal capacity into the AO and linked to associated villages, often areas with no significant activity observed. The battle zones were based on activity associated with enemy attacks to seize terrain or execute decisive engagements. The disruption zones were based on activity associated with suicide vest or vehicle borne IED activity, irregular tactics, and typically observed near combat outposts and government controlled areas. The zones were flexible and continuously updated. Overall activity was consistent and specific events usually occurred in specific zones. Graphically depicting this frame-
work allowed the commander to visualize how boundaries were exploited, when activity in a zone shifted, and where best to apply combat power at a time and place of the commander’s choosing.

This approach added science and geometry to enemy analysis. Friendly operations began to focus on enemy support zones, which disrupted enemy operations in other zones. The depiction of detailed tactics inside an operational framework of connected zones significantly improved the commander’s visualization and aided decision making.

**Predicting Enemy Action**

The art and science of tactics is also critical to predicting enemy action. The science of tactics is “the capabilities, techniques and procedures that can be measured or codified.” The science of tactics is a challenge for MI Professionals because it requires knowledge of procedural and physical constraints, typically gained through operational experience. For example, if an enemy is expected to conduct a breach against a tactical obstacle, what is the first step in a breach? The answer is to suppress, but that requires procedural knowledge. If asked where will the enemy breach? This is a physical constraint best determined by terrain analysis. The MI professional cannot state “when the enemy initiates the breach that will indicate the breach site,” but this is the reactive nature of waiting on intelligence to form a prediction.

The science of tactics affords a template which illustrates functional organization and the sequence of a standard tactical mission. The template is used to identify all options available to the enemy and ultimately choose which of the available options the enemy will select. Therefore, tactical operations and performance based drills must be executed or purposely observed by the MI professional to develop sufficient experience. Operational experience allows for the art of tactics, which is “the creative and flexible means of accomplishing a mission.”

Predicting enemy action incorporates the art of tactics by accounting for the variables of the mission at hand; however, the science of tactics is the key to visualizing the operational framework, sequence, and timing. A noticeable trend is that MI branch detail officers do not struggle as much with tactics and can often sketch battle drills, formations, and even a concept of operation without a reference document. This trend illustrates the value of firsthand tactical experience when trying to think like an enemy commander. Therefore, the MI professional must study and apply CAM tactics to gain proficiency and think like an enemy commander. This type of operational experience is essential to predicting enemy action without waiting for perfect information.

**Evolution to CAM**

The historical application of tactics is vital to winning in the future OE. To this end, current enemy tactics can be compared to the tactics of World War I. The German ‘Elastic Defense’ was a defense in depth which exemplified the attrition strategy of trench warfare. This style of warfare resulted in horrific casualties and stalemate along the western front from 1914-1917. The lessons of World War I gave rise to CAM. From 1927 to 1932, General George Marshall as the Infantry School Assistant Commandant led major reforms by changing from mass static formations to small units using maneuver tactics. Marshall also doubled the amount of tactics instruction and moved lectures into field settings to reinforce practical application.
led German CAM reforms, designed to restore offensive maneuver to warfare.9 CAM defeats static defenses by bypass of resistance and deep penetration.10 Objectives focus on disrupting the enemy rear where artillery and combined arms battalions target enemy command and control.11 The concept maximizes precision fires coordinated with armor and aircraft leading or accompanying assault infantry.12

The U.S. Army is designed for CAM but not for attrition warfare. As a result, the enemy has logically adopted tactics designed to neutralize maneuver tactics and employ an attrition strategy via the defense in depth. This tactic has been observed by Taliban in Zhari-Panjway in southern Afghanistan, by Islamic State in Fallujah in western Iraq, Hamas in southern Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The defense in depth incorporates complex terrain, operational (human) shielding to counter precision fires, obstacles and defensive fires. Defense in depth is designed to absorb penetration, wear down the attacking force, and then counter attack to retake lost ground.13

Combined Arms Battalions are the ideal force to attack the defense in depth; however, the frontal attack is not the ideal tactic.

By using an operational framework the MI professional identifies enemy tactical zones, provides options for maneuver, and recommends high value targets. CAM organization, tactics, and objectives are as valid today as a hundred years ago. Success requires effective intelligence built on knowledge of tactics and operational framework. This allows identification of enemy support zones and avoids frontal attack into enemy disruption zones. The MI professional must enable the commander to visualize the OE and execute mission command.

**Studying Tactics**

The study of tactics must be part self-development, part organizational, and part institutional education. The most important education method is self study. Mastery takes years to build; the key is consistent self development, as skills will diminish if not exercised. Tactical competency is the requirement for the MI Junior Soldier or junior officer. They must be familiar with the mission variables, terms and military symbols, and tactical concepts such as echelons and tasks. Tactical proficiency is the requirement for MI mid-grade noncommissioned officers and officers. They must demonstrate tactical competency as well as comprehend the operational variables, operational framework and combined arms maneuver. This is critical to visualizing enemy action and describing it to the commander with the required amount of detail. There is no single school, unit or doctrinal reference that can provide all the answers. Only personal application and correct repetition will enable proficiency. This is an individual pursuit that ultimately should lead to mastery.

Mastery is the requirement for MI senior leaders and is formed over many years, many repetitions in varied formations and OEs. Mastery cannot be instantly acquired, it is a lifelong process. MI senior leader must pursue mastery in order to properly develop the vast talent found in the IWfF.

The primary MI references are ATP 2.01-3 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace and FM 3-55 Information Collection, as they are the standard by which the operational force judges the IWfF. ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, ADRP 3-90 Offense and Defense, and FM 3-90-1 Offense and Defense Volume 1 provide a superb foundation for the art and science of tactics. Another venue for education is found at the unit level. MI leaders should conduct formal professional development and address tactics both in theory and in performance based tasks. All ranks must be involved in the study of tactics, as predicting enemy action is a fundamental skill. Finally, institutional education is helpful but overall just a small component when viewed in the context of a military career. The MI professional must embrace routine opportunities to explore tactics and the most important education method is self study.

**Conclusion**

The IWfF must properly visualize and describe the enemy in time and space to maintain its relevance to the operational force and enable the U.S. to win future wars. A critical area of study for the MI professional is the art and science of tactics. Proficiency in tactics is vital to the commander’s visualization, in predicting enemy action and must be included in all areas of MI professional development. There is no instant fix; the MI professional must start now and then continuously develop in order to be ready for the next challenge.

**Endnotes**

1. ADRP 3-90 Offense and Defense Volume 1, August 2012, 1-1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 1-17.
4. Ibid., 1-8.

“The Principles provided the basic tactical concepts for defense. The Principles of Field Construction provided specific regulations for construction of positions. Regulations specified techniques to apply to the new defense
regulations. The defense now consisted of three successive zones: the outpost zone, the battle zone, and the rearward zone. Although the regulation did recommend tactical dimensions, it emphasized adapting the defense to the specific terrain in order to accomplish the mission.”

6. Lupfer, 11. “Assuming his duties as first quartermaster general in August 1916, Ludendorff quickly visited the area of the Somme fighting (Rupprecht’s Army Group). He was convinced that the German Army must alter its defensive tactics or it would not be able to win the war, for the Allied artillery was wearing down the German forces.”


8. Pogue, 432.


10. Ibid., 35-36. “The essence of the German tactics was for the first echelon of assault units to bypass centers of resistance, seeking to penetrate into the enemy positions in columns or squad groups, down defiles or between outposts. Some skirmishers had to precede these dispersed columns, but skirmish lines and linear tactics were avoided. The local commander had authority to continue the advance through gaps in the enemy defenses without regard for events on his flanks. A second echelon, again equipped with light artillery and pioneers, was responsible for eliminating bypassed enemy positions. This system of decentralized “soft-spot” advances was second nature to the Germans because of their flexible defensive experience. At the battle of Caporetto in 1917, the young Erwin Rommel used such tactics to bypass forward defenses and capture an Italian infantry regiment with only a few German companies.”

11. Ibid., 36. “The final aspect of the German infiltration tactics was the effort to disorganize the enemy rear. The artillery began by destroying communications and command centers; the infantry also attacked such centers, as well as artillery positions.”

12. Ibid., 36-37. “Beginning on 15 July 1918, the British, French, and US launched a sustained series of attacks that combined all the Allied innovations made during the war. Infantry units used renewed mobility and firepower, plus tanks to precede them and suppress enemy strongpoints. Airpower provided limited ground-attack capability plus reconnaissance both before and during the battle. This air reconnaissance focused on antitank threats to the advancing forces. Artillery had become much more sophisticated and effective than in 1914. Most important of all, the different weapons and arms had learned to cooperate closely, at least in carefully planned set piece operations. Commanders could no longer rely on one or even two arms, but had to coordinate every available means to overcome the stalemate of the trenches.”

13. FM 3-90-1 Offense and Defense, March 2013, 7-6 to 7-7.

MAJ James F. Lawson is the Senior Intelligence Trainer at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), Fort Benning, Georgia. He served as a Division LNO to the 1st UK Division during OIF 1, a combat advisor during OIF 08-09 and as a Brigade S2 with the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade during OEF 12. He commanded the 406th MICO, 732nd MI BN, 500th MI Brigade and served as HQ Commandant for the 311th Signal Command. Major Lawson previously served as the G2 for the 311th Signal Command, U.S. Army Pacific. He holds a BA from Excelsior College, New York.
The One Army School System

by John Craig

Introduction

The One Army School System (OASS) was created in 2012 in an effort to promote and ensure equivalent training for Active Army (AA), U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) OPORD 12-001, One Army School System Implementation Plan, directed that all NCOES and MOS-T (reclassification) courses be made OASS compliant where practical so that AA reclassification mission Soldiers could attend Reserve Component (RC) MOS-T wherever a course exists.

The U.S. Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona further refined this within USAICoE Pamphlet 350-18-1, OASS Implementation and Support Plan, which outlines the application of OASS principles to intelligence training institutions across the three components in order to maximize efficiency and training effectiveness. Other USAICoE initiatives include:

✦ Developing OASS compliant courses: 35F10/30, 35M10/30, 35L20/30, 35G10/30, 35N30, 35P30, and MI SLC.
✦ Creating multi-component Tiger Teams to develop OASS programs of instruction (POIs).
✦ Facilitating monthly RC MI School telephone conferences with RC sites.
✦ Conducting RC MI Quarterly Training Reviews (QTR).
✦ Providing AA instructor augmentation at ARNG/USAR MI training sites.

Under OASS, and beginning in Fiscal Year 2015, TRADOC is recommending that AA Soldiers conducting inter-service MOS reclassification be directed to attend MOS-T training at the nearest USAR or ARNG training facility. Within MI, MOSs 35F10, 35M10, 35L20 fall into this category. AA NCOs may also attend the RC’s MI NCOES courses.

Reserve Component Training

The RC has three accredited MI training sites under authority of HQDA and TRADOC. These sites are located at Camp Williams, Utah (UTARNG), Camp Clay, Georgia (GAARNG), and Fort Huachuca, Arizona (USAR).

Reserve Component QTR

The RC QTRs provide an opportunity for the commanders of each RC training site to inform the Commanding General, USAICoE of their current mission status. The QTRs rotate between the various RC MI training sites and Fort Huachuca, permitting the RC Commanders to showcase their training institutions as well as allowing USAICoE leadership to observe training.

Quality Assurance

Every third year, TRADOC-mandated accreditation visits are conducted at the RC MI training sites by combined TRADOC and MI Proponent Quality Assurance (QA) teams. In between accreditation years, USAICoE’s QA Office conducts annual staff assistance visits to ensure consistency and compliance with TRADOC’s Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards accreditation standards.

John Craig received his commission through the Officer Candidate School and was assigned to MI Branch in which he served on active duty through 1972, primarily with the 500th MI Group. He consequently served in various Army Reserve line and staff assignments, ultimately overseeing all USAR and ARNG MOS training in the eastern half of Tennessee. He returned to active duty in 1984 and culminated his career at Fort Huachuca as an Assistant Chief of Staff at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School where he retired as a Colonel with 32 years of service. Currently, he is a training evaluator in the Quality Assurance Office, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
January - March 2015

Introduction
The U.S. Army must deploy and fight in a complex operational environment, in which change is constant and increasing at a rapid pace. General David Perkins, the Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), said in a recent interview, “Everybody’s got to change, including everything from concepts to training to weapons programs. A couple of weeks ago, we had a meeting with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, and they said: ‘look, this is not business as usual.’ A year ago, how many people thought we’d have thousands of soldiers en route to Africa to deal with Ebola?” Perkins asked.

The Army cannot predict who it will fight, where it will fight, and with what coalition it will fight. On 7 October 2014, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World was released. General Perkins said this new doctrine must equip the Army, physically and mentally, for threats that are “unknown and unknowable and always changing.”

Timely and effective intelligence collection and analysis will be critical factors that provide the situational awareness commanders need to win in this complex world. This intelligence will be collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated by highly trained and proficient military intelligence (MI) professionals in all three components of the Army. To train MI Soldiers as well as Soldiers in all military occupational specialties (MOS) in the reserve, National Guard, and active components in the skills they need to serve in today’s complex environment, the Army created the One Army School System (OASS).

Background
The OASS is comprised of Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) schools, designed to provide relevant and realistic institutional training. OASS is based on a centralized training load inclusive of course content, design, delivery, and quality assurance. In 2007, TRADOC conducted a feasibility study to nest all Army training under one command. The study recommended synchronization of the three Army component school systems to provide Soldiers the ability to attend the right class at the right time regardless of component.

Based on this study, the U.S. Army Reserve’s (USAR) 80th Division, an Institutional Training Division, transformed in 2008 to become the 80th Training Command (TC) (TASS), with responsibility for the entire Total Army School System (TASS) mission for the Army Reserve. It trains Army soldiers in the career military fields for combat support and combat service support through its three subordinate divisions: the 94th Training Division (Force Sustainment) at Fort Lee, Virginia, the 102nd Training Division (Maneuver Support) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the 100th Division (Operational Support) at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

The 1st BDE (MI), 100th Division (OS), is the TASS training brigade with the mission to conduct professional education and training in the following CMF 35 Series Military Occupational Skill Qualification (MOSQ) reclassification as well as NCOES: 35F Intelligence Analyst, 35G Geospatial Intelligence Imagery Analyst, 35M Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector, and 35L Counterintelligence (CI) Special Agent. As part of the 80th TC (TASS) reorganization, 1st BDE (MI) moved its brigade headquarters and its Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT) mission to Fort Huachuca in the Fall of 2014.

1st Brigade (MI) is part of the 100th Division, which was constituted during World War I as an infantry Division, and which saw action in western Europe during World War II. The division was reorganized in 1995 as one of several USAR “Institutional Training” Divisions. Under the change the division retained its Initial Entry Training (IET) mission but also acquired the MOSQ and NCOES training mission and force structure formerly associated with the U.S. Army Reserve Forces schools. One of these schools was the Sixth Reserve Forces Intelligence (RFI) School, based at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Beginning in 2006, the 100th Division (Institutional Training) transitioned to become the 100th Division (OS), and shifted its mission as part of the 80th TC (TASS) reorganization from IET to only providing MOS and NCO officer training for four army career fields. The 100th DIV (OS), in addition to 1st BDE (MI), consists of the 2nd BDE (Signal Corps), the 3rd BDE (Civil Affairs and Military Information Operations), and the 4th BDE (Health Services).
**Functionalizing the OASS**

With the transformation of the 80th TC (TASS) complete, the Army examined ways to create a functional “One Army School System.” Analysis revealed that the existing USAR TASS structure, where troop program unit (TPU) instructors are called upon to train the majority of the student load within statutory funding, was no longer capable, within the environment of Total Army Training System (TATS) courseware and the OASS, of producing the required wartime or peacetime ARPRINT output without continued mobilizations and contract instructor support. In addition, increased course length in both MOS-T and NCOES training due to increased qualitative standards and reduced instructor-to-student ratios (as low as one-to-one in certain MI courses), stretched the ability of TPU instructors.

In August 2009, HQDA tasked the U.S. Army Reserve Command in the “One Army School System (OASS) Implementation Guidance” to determine and document the total enduring institutional training TDA requirements and authorizations. In response to this tasking, the 80th TC published a Concept Plan reorganizing its subordinate divisions in support of the OASS. Under this reorganization plan, the 80th TC will be integrated directly with proponent school programs of instruction (POI) development, training development, and course development. Organizationally, each brigade in the 80th TC will reduce the number of subordinate battalions from five to three, and re-station the remaining battalions near ARPRINT training locations and near similar USAR MTOE units for recruiting and manning support.

**OASS MI Training**

1st BDE (MI) was selected to be the first brigade to move its Headquarters and training mission to its proponent school. As of November 2014, it has moved both its headquarters from Newport Naval Station, Rhode Island, and its MI training mission from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE). The new Brigade HQ is located in buildings formerly used by the units of the 11th Signal Brigade. All MI MOS and NCOES training has also moved from the Devens TASS Training Center to the USAICoE campus. Currently, MOSs 35F, 35M, and 35G training is being conducted in various buildings around Fort Huachuca.

Over the next several years, 1st BDE (MI) will deactivate two battalions, and move two battalions to Fort Meade, Maryland and Fort Gillem, Georgia. It will establish detachments at the USAR MI Readiness Command (MIRC) Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (ARISC) sites at Fort Devens; Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Sheridan, Illinois; Camp Bullis, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; and Camp Parks, California. It will also have detachments at Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. The detachments will be able to support collective training for AC and RC MI Soldiers, and maintain a Brigade “footprint” with operational MI units.
There are many benefits from integrating reserve component training into the active component schoolhouse and having the 1st BDE (MI) headquarters physically located on Fort Huachuca.

- First, more effective management of instructor resources. Both 111th MI BDE and 1st BDE (MI) instructors will be available to support both AC and RC training courses.

- Second, 1st BDE (MI) instructors and course managers will be able to more closely participate in USAICoE POI development and review, and course development. They will also be more closely integrated in courseware updates and POI changes based on upgrades to MI systems such as DCGS-A. This is critical to the successful creation of OASS compliant MI course materials.

- Third, 1st BDE (MI) instructors will have improved access to professional development training resources provided by the Staff and Faculty Development Branch, including the Foundational Instructional Techniques (FIT) course and the Advanced Instructional Methods Course (AIMC).

- Finally, 1st BDE (MI) instructors and staff will benefit from more efficient integration in the USAICoE instructor badge program and the Quality Assurance Office accreditation process.

RC students will benefit not just from training in state of the art intelligence training facilities, but from taking advantage of all Fort Huachuca has to offer, including the MI Museum, the recreation and athletic facilities, and morale, welfare and recreation programs not available at Fort Devens. Most importantly, RC MI students, through the Christopher T. Nason MI Library and its dedicated and helpful staff, will now have access to the world-class resources that will sharpen their lifelong learning skills and provide a wealth of professional development resources.

MI Soldiers interested in attending 1st BDE (MI) MOS-T and NCOES training course in the MOSs 35F, 35G, 35M and 35L career fields can enroll in these classes through ATTRS. To support their individual professional development learning objectives, MI Soldiers in all components should visit the 1st BDE (MI) “Professional Resource Portal” on the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN) at the following link: https://ikn.army.mil/apps/INKNWM/Default.aspx?webId=2442. The portal contains documents related to Intel 2020, Doctrine 2015, Mission Command, the Operational Environment, Creative and Critical Thinking, Analytic Tradecraft, Joint Doctrine, and recommend reading lists and guides to websites and online information sources.

With the move of the 1st BDE (MI), 100th DIV (OS), Headquarters and its ARPRINT training mission to the USAICoE and Fort Huachuca, the MI Corps is truly “Always Out Front” in creating a “One Army School System.”

Endnote


COL Wulfhorst is a graduate of the Armor Officers Basic and Advanced Courses; MI Officer Transition Course; CI and Imagery Analysis Courses; Signal Officers Advanced Course; Combined Arms and Services Staff School; Command and General Staff College; and the Advanced Joint Professional Military Education-II. He holds a BA in History and Russian from the Pennsylvania State University as well as a Master of Education degree in Human Services and Human Resource Administration from Boston University. He holds an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He has served in many active duty and reserve assignments, the latest as Director, Joint Reserve Intelligence Element, supporting the EUCOM J2, prior to taking command of the 1st BDE (MI), 100th DIV (OS). As a civilian, he is a Supervisory Intelligence Analyst with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Newark, New Jersey Field Office.
In full support of the One Army School System (OASS) mission, it was determined by HQDA and the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) that 1st BDE (MI) would relocate from its previous location in Fort Devens, Massachusetts to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The purpose of the move was to maximize the use of instructional assets and training resources by collocating the BDE’s Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT) mission (MOS-T 35F10/30, 35M10/30, 35L20/30, 35G10, and MI SLC) and the BDE Headquarters with the proponent schoolhouse. As of 16 October 2014, 1st BDE (MI) successfully reached an important milestone of moving its BDE Headquarters and all of its ARPRINT courses to Fort Huachuca. A formal ribbon cutting ceremony was conducted on 23 January 2014 to celebrate the successful completion of the move.

The benefits of sharing instructional assets and training resources are already being demonstrated in the execution of the ARPRINT courses in close vicinity with U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE). 1st BDE (MI) courses are being conducted in state of the art facilities provided by USAICoE, and the instructional staff is benefiting from the additional staff and faculty courses provided on site at Fort Huachuca. Sharing of instructional assets has already begun in an effort to ensure that appropriate instructor-to-student ratios are met in both Active Army and Reserve Component courses.

1st BDE (MI) is also implementing a Professionalization, Readiness, and Evaluation Program (PREP) for its instructors to enhance their overall professionalism and Army Learning Model (ALM) compliance and implementation. PREP teams are being established to mentor, train, and evaluate instructors at their home stations to ensure a high level of readiness for troop program unit instructors. Using the motto of “No MI Soldier at Rest,” instructors are participating in regular training and evaluation opportunities to hone and improve upon their instructional and MI skill sets.

As a result of the high level of readiness that the 1st BDE (MI) instructors are maintaining, two instructors recently took 1st and 2nd place at the 80th Training Command (TC) Instructor of the Year Competition at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Sergeant First Class Raymundo Soto, an All Source Intelligence Analyst senior instructor assigned to 6th MI Bn/95th Regiment, 1st Brigade, 100th Training Division, up against seven other competitors won the 80th TC (TASS) Instructor of the Year Competition. A 1st BDE (MI) Staff Sergeant Vincent Lai, an MI instructor assigned to 6th MI BN/98th Regiment, 1st BDE, 100th DIV took second place. SFC Soto will now compete at the USARC level with the goal of advancing to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command-level competition.

On the horizon for 1st BDE (MI) is conducting the pilots and implementation of the newest courses added to the OASS: 35G30 and 35N30 in Fiscal Year 2016. The addition of these courses to the ARPRINT mission will provide even greater opportunities for both AA and RC Soldiers to attend NCOES courses in their respective fields and be fully prepared to succeed in their operational missions.

LTC Green currently serves as the S3, 1st BDE (MI), 100th DIV (OS), 80th TC (TASS). She graduated from the MI Officer Basic and Captain’s Career Courses, and ILE. She has served in a variety of assignments and was deployed in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Joint Guardian.
Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) Military Intelligence (MI) officers have often faced the daunting task of actively continuing their professional military education while balancing their fulltime civilian professional life. This balance has required online courses and four weeks away from their civilian employers in addition to their routine unit functions and drills.

In order to increase the depth and knowledge of the reserve forces MI Captain, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAICoE) has redesigned the existing Reserve Component MI Captain’s Career Course (RC-MICCC) into the MI Captain’s Career Course Blended Education (MICCC-BE). The current RC-MICCC consists of two asynchronous distance learning phases and two resident phases of two weeks each.

Beginning with Training Year 2015 (TY 2015) Human Resources Command (HRC) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) will divide the current 2LT-CPT Intelligence Officer population into year groups based on date of rank to CPT. Senior Captains (tentatively more than four years Time in Grade (TIG) will be directed to complete the legacy RC-MICCC before the beginning of TY 2017. All MI officers with less than four years TIG will be directed to attend the new MICCC-BE. Beginning in TY 2017 the four phase RC-MICCC will be phased out and replaced with the five phase MICCC-BE.

One of the changes to the progression of students through the new MICCC-BE is that they must take each phase consecutively. The legacy RC-MICCC allows for students to take each phase in any order they wished (a student for example could complete phase distant learning phases one and three prior to attending the resident phase two). A student will have the ability to complete more than one MICCC-BE phase per TY if they are inclined.

The MICCC-BE will be a five phase course that efficiently blends asynchronous distance learning, synchronous distance learning and resident training of both common core subject matter and MI specific critical tasks. The MICCC-BE model has been approved by National Guard Bureau, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the Combined Arms Center. The MICCC-BE will be broken down into five phases:

| Phase 1: 75 hours of distributed learning (DL) common core material on Blackboard. |
| Phase 2: 75 hours of common core material which will be taught remotely from Fort Huachuca on Saturdays over six sessions on Defense Connect Online (DCO) and Blackboard. Phase two Officers will select a DCO cohort of their choosing based on their availability throughout the month. DCO session will be offered on Saturdays and Sundays. |
Phase 3, 4, and 5: Two week resident phases are conducted at Fort Huachuca and focus on intelligence support to the brigade through division, corps and joint operations and key development assignments as an intelligence staff officer at all echelons corps and below.

The MICCC-BE will produce better Army Reserve/National Guard MI officers, however the course will require more commitment from each student of their time and effort to complete. With the MICCC-BE, Soldiers will need to actively manage their course registration, progression, and ensure completion prior to becoming eligible for the Major’s Promotion Board.

MAJ Michael J. Wessling is the RC-MICCC Course Manager. He is currently assigned to the 304th MI Bn as an Army Reserve AGR.

MAJ Anthony Burmeister is the MICCC-BE Phase II Manager. He is currently assigned to HHC, USAICoE as a Title 10 Army National Guard AGR.

What is the UMI? Where is it? How do I use it?

The University of Military Intelligence (UMI) is a training portal of MI courses maintained by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona for use by authorized military (Active, Reserve, National Guard) and non-military (e.g., DOD civilian, Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government agencies) personnel. UMI provides many self-paced training courses, MOS training, and career development courses. In addition, the UMI contains a Virtual Campus that is available to users with an abundance of Army-wide resources and links related to MI: language training, cultural awareness, resident courses, MI Library, functional training, publications, and more.

UMI is undergoing improvement and expansion to become available for any approved MI courses (from any U.S. Army MI source) that are designed to be offered as Distributed Learning (dL) via the UMI technologically advanced online delivery platform(s).

UMI online registration is easy and approval of use normally takes only a day or two after a user request is submitted. Go to http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.army.mil, read and accept the standard U.S. Government Authorized Use/Security statement, and then follow the instructions to register or sign in. The UMI Web pages also provide feedback and question forms that can be submitted to obtain more information.

Use of the UMI requires:
- User registration (it’s free!).
- An active government email address (such as .mil or .gov).
- A sponsor (if user has no .mil or .gov email address) who can approve user’s access to training material.
- Verification by UMI of user’s government email address.
- Internet access. UMI courses require Internet Explorer 7 or previous browser and Adobe Reader, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Shockwave Player, Windows Media Player, and/or a recent version of MS Office.
When looking for the highest quality U.S. Army Military Intelligence (MI) MOS-T and NCOES training in the career management fields of 35M and 35F, look no further than 1st BN, 122nd Regional Training Institute located on Camp Clay in Marietta, Georgia. Established in 2009, 1st BN is dedicated to providing the most relevant and realistic MI training to its Soldiers. Stellar instruction, paired with the finest facilities available, has allowed 1st BN to become nationally recognized with the coveted rating of “Institute of Excellence” through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command accreditation process. The mission of 1st BN is to train and certify Soldiers as competent and adaptive MI professionals who are capable of leading and conducting intelligence functions across the full range of military operations.

The 1st BN is easily within driving distance of multiple installations located in the southeast. For those outside of driving distance, Camp Clay is easily accessible via air. The combination of an extremely convenient location along with its compliance with the One Army School System program makes 1st BN’s schoolhouse the ideal choice for all units with 35M and 35F MOS-T and NCOES needs.

As a Reserve Component schoolhouse, 1st BN implements longer training hours and a 6 day training schedule, which allows for all standards of training to be met in a shorter period of time. This means Soldiers spend less time away from their units while also saving training funds. This condensed schedule allows for the 35F30 and 35M30 Advanced Leadership courses to be conducted in 4 weeks, the 35F10 MOS-T course in 6 weeks, and the 35M10 MOS-T course in 11 weeks. In addition to being time efficient, all graduates of 1st BN courses qualify to receive college credit through a partnership with Cochise College, a fully accredited 2-year college located in Sierra Vista, Arizona.

Our classrooms provide approximately 90 student workstations with access to SIPR and the most current version of DCGS-A, which is implemented in all of our courses. Our primary facility also provides students with access to our local unclassified network that provides easy collaboration capability, a comprehensive MI library in our student break room, and access to high-speed commercial internet service to facilitate open source research and course homework.

Realistic and relevant training is the goal at 1st BN and can only be capitalized on when outside of the classroom. Students receive in-depth MOS training in our extensive Afghan village.

Highly skilled instructors are key to creating the highest quality education at 1st BN. All of the instructors have been hand selected based on their skills, deployment experience, NCO professionalism, language skills, and ability to instruct the material. Locally, instructors are sought out from units such as the 48th IBCT, 560th BFSB, 648th MEB, 78th TC, JFHQ-GA, 201st RSG, 122nd Regiment, and from interstate transfers from units outside of Georgia. Once an instructor is brought on at 1st BN there is a continual push to further sharpen MOS and instructor skills by attending follow-on courses to allow the most up-to-date information to be put out in the latest and most effective implementation methods in accordance with Army Learning Model.

Mission success is achieved through continuous communication with USAICoE to ensure all instructors have the most current information and standards to allow all students to receive the most cutting edge training that the MI community has to offer. In addition to these open lines of communication, the USAICoE Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) has assigned one of their own Senior Instructors,
to act as the Active Component NCOA Liaison Instructor to 1st BN to further comply with the One Army School System.

1st BN strives to reduce the inconvenience of leaving home for training, with not only superior instruction, but also with excellent living accommodations. The on-post student housing is near hotel quality with the bonus of a shared clothes washer and dryer in every two rooms. A newly renovated DFAC staffed with a friendly and well trained crew provides healthy and delicious meals three times per day.

The Camp Clay gym boasts a fully stocked weight room to include free weights, weight machines, Rouge power racks, TRX systems, and cardio and aerobic rooms. Camp Clay also offers a 400 meter, 8 lane rubberized track and a paved running trail.

To be the best you must never stop improving and 1st BN incorporates constant improvement into all it does. The state of the art facilities, the highly trained instructors versed in the latest and greatest teaching methods, and being the only MI schoolhouse east of the Rocky Mountains makes 1st BN an easy choice for all 35M and 35F needs.

For more information regarding courses and the 1st BN schoolhouse please refer to the ATRRS SH screen under school code 984.

A Special Mission unit on Fort Bragg is looking for qualified 35F/X, 35G, 35M and 35Ls for potential assignments. Serving as a Special Operations Intelligence Sergeant is a unique and challenging assignment. This assignment requires an individual who is highly motivated, confident, intelligent, and capable of working without direct supervision. You will be provided the opportunity to work with many national agencies and state-of-the-art systems in order to execute a unique mission of highest importance. Soldiers assigned here have a great opportunity to seek advanced training, be it civilian or military, and also be offered additional pay and accelerated promotion rates for the increased responsibility we place upon our analysts. We are looking for the right Soldier to be a part of the Army's top intelligence innovators who desire the challenge of conducting analysis for strategically directed operations.

Assignment prerequisites:
- Volunteer
- CMF 35F/X, 35G, 35M, 35L
- Minimum 22 years old
- Minimum GT Score of 110
- Rank of SGT – MSG
- Minimum of 4 years - Time In Service
- Must be able to pass an APFT – permanent profiles are considered on a case-by-case basis
- U.S. citizen
- Airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training
- UCMJ / Financial: No recurring adverse actions
- Security Clearance: Secret; eligible for upgrade to Top Secret

If you have any questions or are interested in applying please contact Jody at (910)643-0689/0649 or at army.sofsupport-recruiter@mail.mil.
The 640th Regional Training Institute (RTI) is located near Salt Lake City and the Salt Lake International Airport, making it an ideal military training installation. On its 24,000 acres of training area Camp Williams showcases rugged mountain vistas, reminiscent of the central Afghanistan region, along with two premier training resources: a Tactical Training Area Compound resembling a forward operating base and an Afghan Village. While the rough mountainous terrain alone has been sought out as a unique venue by numerous units, agencies, and special operations groups preparing for deployment to Afghanistan, the Afghan Village and Tactical Training Area Compound significantly contribute to the realism of the training environment.

In addition to being fully accredited through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the 640th RTI has also been awarded the prestigious rating of “Institute of Excellence.” In keeping with the One Army School System, it offers high quality, technically advanced resident and non-resident training for National Guard, Reserve, and Active Army Soldiers alike. With four separate training battalions, the 640th had a throughput of several thousand students in Fiscal Year 2013, elevating it to one of the highest throughputs of any RTI in the nation.

Current Mission
4th Battalion, 640th Regiment (RTI), is the Military Intelligence (MI) Training Battalion. It works in conjunction with the National Guard Bureau and the TRADOC proponent school, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) to provide MOS-T (35F10, 35L20, 35M10) reclassification and NCOES (35F30 ALC, 35M30 ALC, 35P30 ALC, 35CMF40 SLC) training for the ARNG, USAR, and Active Component.

The 640th RTI works closely with USAICoE to ensure that the training uses the most current programs of instruction available. In an effort to increase efficiency and equality of training between the Active Component and the Reserve Component (RC), the USAICoE Noncommissioned Officer Academy partnered with the National Guard in assigning a Senior USAICoE instructor to each MI training institution.

SME Cell
The 640th RTI is also home to the MI NGB Subject Matter Expert (SME) Cell that represents the RC interests with USAICoE and the Army Reserves. Each of the major proponents has an NGB sponsored SME cell to represent their interests and is the liaison between the Army National Guard (ARNG) Schoolhouses and their proponents. The SME cell provides oversight for the ARNG instruction, coordinates with the Army Reserves, and represents the ARNG at each Quarterly Training Reviews conducted by USAICoE.
Instructors

In addition to organic instructors at the 640th RTI, other members of our instruction team are derived from other Utah based units such as the 300th MI BDE, 19th Special Forces Group, 65th Fires BDE, and the 204th Maneuver Enhancement BDE. Each instructor is not only basic instructor certified, but also participates in the USAICoE sponsored Instructor Professional Development Program. In conjunction with the USAICoE program, the Battalion Command emphasizes instructor development through extensive professionalization courses aimed at enhancing instructional technique and competence.

From the introduction of the Army Learning Model 2015, 4th BN has led the way in the implementation and application of this student centric instructional technique. Instructors have not only completed advanced instructional courses, but several instructors are now able to facilitate such courses as Learner Centric Teaching Method (LCTM), Advanced Instructor Methodology (AIM), Systems Approach to Training (SAT), and Foundations of Instructional Techniques (FIT). Instructors are able to capitalize on their vast deployment experiences as teaching points in addition to utilizing student deployment experiences to make the training environment a rich learning experience. This student centric learning environment keeps with the Army Learning Model focus and ensures students are more involved in their own learning experience.

In an effort to maintain an instructor cadre both qualified and relevant in their MOS, the Battalion Command Language Program (CLP) was established in 2013 with a dedicated and localized CLP Manager. Through this program, instructors have been able to capitalize on locally hired tutors for individual language training. Additionally, many have taken advantage of the Language Enhancement Assessment Program (LEAP) which provides language immersion opportunities in target language countries.

Facilities

Its state-of-the-art training facilities enables students to take advantage of the newest teaching methodologies, the newest facilities will be completed December 2014 to include a new DFAC and IT training facility.

For the past three consecutive years, the 640th RTI has also hosted the annual 300th MI BDE Panther Strike exercise. Panther Strike is a multi-discipline exercise that incorporates human intelligence, signals intelligence, counterintelligence, and imagery intelligence, acting in a joint Warfighting and deployment-based scenario to prepare MI Soldiers for the types of real-world missions they will face in a deployed environment.

In response to an ever changing and complex operating environment, the 640th RTI remains at the forefront of military education by way of a highly professional corps of instructors utilizing innovative technologies and advanced infrastructure to produce adaptive U.S. Army Soldiers that are fully capable of meeting the evolving threat on the battlefield.

For more information regarding courses and the 640th schoolhouse please refer to the ATRRS SH screen under school code 956. 

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**Background**

During the spring of 2013 the MOS 35M10 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector Course conducted a study on the use of a learner-centric, self-paced study hall in lieu of an instructor-centered study hall. The purpose of the study was to compare the effectiveness of an alternative teaching method which incorporated self-paced, technology-delivered instruction to traditional instructor-led techniques. The goal was to close the gap between instructor-centered training and learner-centric facilitation to better align the 35M10 HUMINT Collector Course with the Army Learning Model (ALM) as described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015.

The self-paced study hall incorporated a learning theory based on the idea that an optimal learning environment for an adult requires learner involvement and ownership (Wlodkowski, 190-193). Students are likely to take ownership of the learning environment when they have a measure of control in the learning objective. This can be accomplished by allowing students the opportunity to select, to some degree, how and when they will achieve the learning objective and by controlling the pace of achieving the learning objective. Adults learn best when they are active participants in their learning objectives, which can be achieved by allowing learners to direct their own self-study time (Wlodkowski, 190-193). Adults need to be able to review learning objectives and seek information to assimilate into their prior learning to develop mastery of a skill.

Adults learn at different rates and in different styles and need the opportunity to self-assess and discover independently in order to efficiently achieve learning objectives. When adult learners see themselves as in control of their learning environment they tend to be intrinsically and positively motivated to seek information concerning a learning objective (Wlodkowski, 311). A self-directed learner sees himself/herself as in control of his own learning; and will therefore, make extra time to review lessons which he/she didn’t fully understand. He will also seek out answers using all available media to find the answer. Increasing control of the learning environment increases the value the learner assigns to the learning objectives. When adult learners value their learning, they are intrinsically motivated to achieve the learning objective (Du, Jianxia, Xun Ge, and Ke Zhang). Control of the learning environment and motivation to learn are mutually supportive.

Self-directed learners who have time to review material at their own pace spend more time on course-related material, develop a greater mastery of the course material, and have a greater satisfaction with their learning environment (Mqutshini). Adult learners today are accustomed to information being immediately available to support learning. Learners with access to self-paced, technology delivered in-
struction methods have a 30 percent decrease in the time it takes to learn with no decrease in effectiveness (TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, 15). Self-directed learners must have access to appropriate content and have time to review the content thoroughly.

**Learner-Centric vs. Instructor-Centric Training**

Traditionally in the MOS 35M10 Course, instructors assessed a learner’s areas of weakness then developed a learning plan for the learners during study halls. Study halls were divided into areas of weakness to focus learners. All learners attended an instructor-centered study hall, regardless of ability. Students completed the issued plan of action guided by an instructor and maintained a passive role in their learning. This method represents the didactic model of instruction wherein the learner is heavily dependent on the instructor for improvement.

The instructor has the responsibility to assess the learner to determine the learner’s weaknesses and which methods of instructional delivery will be most effective for the individual learner. With 20-30 students per class instructors can easily be over-tasked to assess each individual learner. The learner’s passive role allows for a shift of responsibility for learning to the instructor rather than placed on the learner. In order to place the responsibility for learning on students they must be able to self-assess and develop their own plan for improvement. Learners must also be allowed to direct the date, time, pace, and activity of learning and to develop a learning plan consistent with his or her personal learning style.

To compare the ability of the self-directed learner in contrast to the instructor-dependent learner, the 35M10 Course developed an online study hall for the interrogation module using the Blackboard Learning Platform. The interrogation block of instruction consists of platform instruction followed by seven practical exercises. Each of the practical exercises is a full interrogation which allows the learner to practice all of the performance measures of an interrogation in sequence as required on the Interrogation Performance Test (IPT). During the IPT the students are tested in their ability to perform all aspects of an interrogation and properly write an Intelligence Information Report. The students can pass the IPT but fail the Intelligence Information Report and vice versa. A failure in either section constitutes an overall failure of IPT.

The online study hall incorporated several instructional techniques to guide the learner through a self-directed method of study. The learners had access to all instruction and were able to review, at their own pace, all lesson plans and slide shows shown during the platform instruction. Each module of instruction in the online study hall was focused on a specific performance measure or a set of performance measures. The learners had an overview of the focus of each module so they could select the activities in which they would participate.

Students were required to write a journal entry after each practical exercise. In it, they were required to document their perception of their own previous performance and develop a plan of action for improvement. The instructors were able to read the journal entries and provide feedback to the learners either through the online study hall or in person during class. Instructors were also able to monitor each student’s use of the study hall and performance in each module. The students were allowed to develop plans for improvement completely independent of the online study hall. They were also allowed to decide when and where they would study and were not obligated to attend a formal study hall although they were allowed the option.

**Test Group Results**

One test group of 21 students participated in the online study which was compared to three control groups consisting of 20-24 students each. All groups had students of similar educational backgrounds and demographics. The online study hall was open only to the test group for three continuous weeks during the practical exercise phase of instruction. The test group performed at or above the control groups in all areas. The performance measures associated with questioning techniques and intelligence information collected showed the greatest improvement. The test group also showed a lower standard deviation rate than the control groups in map-tracking performance measures.

The lower standard deviation rate indicates the students’ scores were closer to the mean of the group. This allowed the instructors to focus the group as a whole to bring the average score up. The lower standard deviation rate is probably a result of the students being allowed to focus on their own areas of weakness as an individual as opposed to learning in a broad-based format. During instructor-led study halls, the instructors often focus on all performance measures in a topical area as opposed individual performance measures. Thus, a student who is passing the first three performance measures in map-tracking will be learning the same lesson as the student who is only passing the last three performance measures. Students who were able to select their areas of focus were able to target only those performance measures in which they needed assistance. Students also showed an increased performance in report
writing, a direct reflection of their improvement in questioning. A student who is able to collect more intelligence information has the ability to report that information with a higher degree of accuracy.

The test group had a smaller failure rate on the IPT than all three control groups. During the IPT, Control Group One had ten failures, Control Group Two had five failures, Control Group Three had four failures and the Test Group had two failures. After the re-test, Control Group One had two students academically relieved, Control Group Two had one student academically relieved, and Control Group Three group had one student recycle. The Test Group had no re-test failures.

Students in the test group reported a slightly higher level of satisfaction than students in the control groups as well as reporting a lower rate of confidence in questioning and a higher rate of confidence in report writing. It is notable that although the test group reported a lower level of confidence in questioning, they scored higher than the control groups in questioning. Online learners have a perception that they must work harder because they may have missed something that may have been taught in an instructor-led environment. They tend to spend more time on course-related study than their instructor-led counterparts (Mqutshini). The lower rate of confidence in questioning and report writing served as a motivator to engage with the online self-paced course content to increase performance.

Student comments from the test group focused on individual responsibility and confidence in the ability to achieve the learning objectives. Comments from the control groups focused on the need for individual attention from instructors, an instructor’s inability to deliver the learning content in the student’s desired learning method, inconsistency between instructors, and insistence that the student would ultimately fail the learning objective. Knowing that knowledge can be gained through study and practice and that effort is often a matter of will reduces learners’ feelings of helplessness. Understanding that reasonable, but not overwhelming, effort is necessary provides realistic hope for learners. When people can endorse what they are learning and see themselves as volitional and autonomous in their learning they tend to be intrinsically and positively motivated to learn (Wlodkowski, 190-193,311).

Students in the test group could study at their own pace and time. They were aware of their role and responsibilities in the learning process and had constant access to all of the course material rather than being dependent on an instructor to deliver learning content. Instructor comments concerning the self-paced study hall focused on the instructor’s increased ability to quickly identify students’ areas of weakness and provide immediate access to learning content. It reduced the amount of time the instructors spent reviewing the student performance reports and increased the quality and quantity of individual feedback to each student.

The students in the control groups demonstrated dependency on the instructor for learning. When we remember that instructors usually establish requirements, issue assignment, give tests, generally set standards for achievement, and often control the learning environment, students believe that instructors are more responsible for their achievement than they are (Wlodkowski, 190-193). Even when they are seeing their own successes, students will seek the approval of their instructor and seek the instructor’s direction for future learning.

Students in the control groups were relegated to learning when the instructor was available even though the instructors encouraged the students to study independently. Those in the control groups were given blocks of instruction and told to practice on their own with no further guidance or feedback as to whether or not their independent study was effective. It is also notable that all three control groups complained of inconsistency among instructors while the test group did not. Students must be able to self-assess against an established norm in order to modify their performance. The established norm is generally an example or a rubric with clearly defined performance measures. The nature of interrogation necessitates that feedback from instructors will vary to some degree between practical exercises depending on the situation presented in the practical exercise.

Although the rubric does not change, students can have difficulty seeing each variance in the practical exercise situation as independent of the established performance measures. The control group students were only able to self-assess against the norm established in the previous practical exercise, leading to a perception of inconsistency between instructors. In contrast, the test group students had access to the learning content provided during platform instruction and were able to self-assess against a consistent norm as opposed to their prior performance.

After the conclusion of the interrogation module, the test group entered the Source Operations Module where there was no opportunity for self-guided study hall. The test group attended mandatory study hall with the three control groups. When polled about the effectiveness of the online self-guided study in comparison to the instructor-led study hall, the students overwhelmingly preferred the self-paced alternative.
Conclusion

This study shows that given a self-paced alternative to instructor-led study hall, student performance could be at, or better than, the performance given an instructor-led study hall while providing a richer and more complex learning environment. The qualitative data suggests that students who were taught using self-directed learning methods asked for more independent learning while those taught to be dependent learners asked for more instructor-led learning.

The mandate for the Army is to create a learning environment that enables mastery of fundamental competencies through an appropriate mix of live and technology-enabled learning methods. Technology-enabled learning must be balanced with higher quality face-to-face learning experiences that employ learning strategies that foster critical thinking and problem solving skills needed for operational adaptability (TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, 15). This study shows the effectiveness of incorporating self-directed study as a supplement but not a replacement to face-to-face instruction. The online self-paced study hall as an alternative to instructor-led study hall complements the instructor’s efforts in the classroom while providing an opportunity for students to take responsibility for their own learning. It increases the effectiveness of the learning material while reducing the resources needed to carry out traditional methods of instruction.

References


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Experiences in Self-Development: Becoming a Better Leader at My Career Course Assignment

by Captain (P) Charles M. Van Otten

Having taught at the Military Intelligence (MI) Captains Career Course for only 5 months, I can already foresee that this assignment will greatly enhance in my growth as an MI officer and as a leader. In just a short period, I have learned many lessons about how to become a more effective leader, and I now understand that what I initially believed about this assignment was inaccurate. As an Army instructor, I am obligated to be a leader in a new, challenging environment driven by doctrine. Career Course students expect instructors to demonstrate mastery of the subject matter and outstanding leadership. While wholeheartedly applying myself to these tasks, I have learned many valuable lessons from peers, students, and personal reflection.

Although it was always clear that being an instructor at the Career Course would be a broadening assignment, I underestimated just how much it would challenge me. Heretofore, I served exclusively in tactical units. Therefore, my exposure to the Intelligence world has been somewhat limited in scope. As a result, I now find it necessary to apply myself to become fully conversant with the immense capabilities of the MI community. Although I often find myself spending five times more time to prepare a lesson than it takes to teach it, the extra attention I have to exert helps me to become far more proficient in doctrine.

In addition to having to develop an increased depth of knowledge of the information I am about teach, I soon found that I had a lot to learn about professional teaching methods. I assumed I would be able to use the pre-approved lesson plans and PowerPoint visual aids to deliver an effective lesson from which all the Career Course students would fully grasp, understand, and be able to apply the techniques, procedures, and concepts presented. It quickly became apparent that it is simply not enough to recite the lesson. In order to facilitate learning and achieve desired student outcomes, I find myself deeply delving into doctrine that I had previously believed I fully understood. I also find it very useful to consult and collaborate with senior Career Course instructors. In addition to studying doctrine, I have also had to learn and develop more engaging and effective teaching techniques.

The reality of teaching Captains at the Career Course as a Captain is that I must carefully walk the lines between my roles as a peer, instructor, and leader. This unclear authority creates a stark contrast to my previous positions as a Company Commander for an MI company and a Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The same methods I used as a company commander are not appropriate or effective as a Career Course instructor.

As an instructor, I have to remind myself that my primary mission is to create a learning environment where students remain fully engaged in becoming MI professionals. In short, in order to maintain student interest in course materials and respect for the instructional process, instructors cannot simply rely on the standard command approaches to leadership. I have already learned that it is necessary to employ a more collaborative approach in which I not only acknowledge the students’ points, but validate them as well. This motivates students to understand the teaching point and tends to mitigate their natural inclination to challenge me as a peer.

Even though instructors in the Career Course cannot simply rely on standard command and control techniques as they strive to enhance learning, it is nonetheless important to create a learning environment of mutual respect in which the roles of students and instructors are clearly defined. This environment of mutual respect will quickly collapse if instructors do not make a serious effort to set an appropriate example as a leader. Although not technically responsible for any Soldiers or officers, the fact that students look directly at instructors to set the example for excellence is a powerful motivator that should bring out the best in any leader.

It has long been held that it is important for individuals in positions of authority to participate in Physical Readiness Training (PRT) activities with their Soldiers. The act of showing up to conduct PRT on a daily basis, and actually performing rigorous PRT to standard with the students has paid off. Because I take PRT as seriously now as I did as a Company Commander, I am able to demonstrate that leaders should always hold themselves to the highest standards.

When I first received this assignment, I did not realize the amount of interaction with students that I would experience outside of the classroom environment. From PRT in the morning to walking the hallways, I am often approached by students; and a conversation that started with what they did the past weekend could end up covering topics such as
Command Supply Discipline, or techniques for handling a brief that is not going particularly well. These conversations will often start with a funny story about how I failed at one task or another, and I am amazed at how quickly I am able to turn it to a discussion that is professionally developing for both of us. It is in these conversations that I truly enjoy being an instructor. I believe these interactions allow me to influence the overall opinions of the students, and if handled correctly will have a far-reaching impact on that student’s career and the Army as a whole. These informal discussions are some of the most rewarding experiences I consistently experience as a Career Course instructor.

One thing that constantly surprises me is how much I learn from the students. The students in this course have professionally and personally walked many different paths. As I listen to their experiences and opinions, I am continuously expanding my knowledge about the Army. For example, I am able to refine my understanding about how to employ a Stryker Force from an officer that deployed as a Stryker Platoon Leader. That simple conversation has now grown into additional topics such as what Stryker Gunnery is actually like, or how to conduct training in a Stryker Unit. In the classroom environment, I am able to move these conversations past the typical answer that the student would usually provide when asked about Stryker capabilities (i.e., “It was hard” or “It was fun”).

Pushing past these typical “brush off” answers by challenging them to explain why it was hard or why it was fun provides an opportunity to teach by allowing students to discover what they already know. This technique also allows me to encourage other students to describe their experiences about how they executed gunnery, or how Stryker gunnery might differ from Bradley gunnery. These discovery discussions not only allow the students to learn from each other, and challenge each other’s points, but also offer me (as the instructor) a broader perspective outside of my personal skill set that will benefit students in future Career Course iterations.

One of the most difficult tasks instructors face is to make certain students are not falling behind in achieving learning objectives. My job as an instructor is to make certain that students become sufficiently prepared to perform as confident MI Captains. It is natural for instructors to focus on the students who are doing well. Moreover, it is also natural for students and instructors who come from similar backgrounds to find it easy to interact with each other. If a student is having difficulty understanding, or refuses to change her or his frame of mind in order to grasp a teaching point, I now find it necessary to change my approach, or spend more time engaging that student. It is important to make sure that such students do not feel ostracized or think that the instructor would rather be doing something else. These students need to see that instructors care and are doing their best to make sure that they are successful.

Accordingly, I create a contract with the students from the beginning. This involves laying out my expectations for them, as well as what they can expect from me. I inform the students that I will be there for them inside and outside the classroom. I will answer the phone and provide as much additional guidance as is required. This forces me to hold myself to a high level of personal accountability. Moreover, I continuously reinforce the ideal that there are no questions left unanswered. A simple text message or phone call can serve to remove student doubts and enhance clarity. The credibility that I gain by keeping faith with this contract on a daily basis forges a relationship with students that facilitate a higher level of learning.

As I consider all the many lessons I have learned and the many adjustments I have needed to make, I realize that while being an instructor might not be the most glamorous position, it is arguably one of the most important. If I am performing my job correctly, I will be able to positively affect a large group of officers. I now see that as an instructor one of my primary duties is to lead and set the example. To be successful, I have to show the students how right ought to look. Additionally, I must set a positive example, not just in the classroom but on the PRT field and in the hallways. How I wear my uniform and the language that I use needs to be beyond reproach because if not, any credibility that I might have, will be lost. I have to show understanding and accept completely different points of view in order to ensure that all students are learning, and that every student has the opportunity to succeed. So far, this job has been one of the most challenging, and one of the most rewarding jobs that I have ever had.

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We have all seen those inspirational posters, many hung in the halls of headquarters buildings—Believe, TEAMWORK, Conquer It. While I don’t specifically remember one which addresses personal growth and self development, I am sure there is one out there. However, as noted in the 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army Leader Development Task Force Report, only 35 percent of Army leaders believe their organizations makes time available for self development. This is a decrease from 41 percent in 2010. (Adamshick, 2013) Given the Army’s focus these past 12 years, this is not surprising.

However, as a country where our youth are falling further behind the international learning curve, we cannot afford to neglect the self-development and intellectual growth of our Soldiers. In 2012, the U.S. was repeatedly graded behind China, Hungary, Germany, Japan and Australia; falling 7th in graduation rate, 9th in mathematics and 7th in science. (Huffington Post, 2012) A survey conducted by the Harvard Kennedy School in 2012 also suggested that students in Portugal, Hong Kong, Germany, Poland Liechtenstein, Slovenia and Colombia are progressing at twice the rate as U.S. students. (Hanushek et al, 2012) As a subculture within America, are our Soldiers reflecting a similar rating when compared to those serving in other armies of the world?

Prior to the events of 9-11 and the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, an Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) report identified the need to direct more attention towards training and leader development. In 2003, Major Milford Beagle, Jr. utilized the ATLDP report to address his thesis question: Is the Army’s self-development model capable of contributing to the end-state of providing self-aware, adaptive and life-long learning leaders for the future force? Tying self-development to the processes of self-reflection, self-management, and self-determination, Beagle asserts that “training, education and leader development are all utilized in the Army as exchangeable terms,” leading to one overarching philosophy for all three. (Beagle 2003) He further asserts this form of self-development will be too narrow, relying on external observations and feedback, instead of personal or self assessment.

Beagle summarizes his work by offering several observations. He states, “…to be desirable and genuinely enjoyable, adults must view themselves as personally endorsing their own learning.” (Beagle 2003) As military leaders, we often associate personal investment as a motivator for success and this observation certainly fits the model of empowering our soldiers. Beagle also suggests the use of learning contracts, allowing for leaders to take part of the ownership in their subordinates’ learning process.

“Learning contracts are utilized to allow the learner to select, identify and organize personal and organizational learning objectives in ways closely aligned to their learning strategies, needs and style. Learning contracts prevent the learner from feeling that everything is being dictated in terms of learning objectives and how or when to accomplish them. The chief benefit of learning contracts is realized in the level of ownership given to the learner, level of individual self-assessment and management required to make the tool useful to the individual.”(Beagle 2003)

He effectively ties this approach to the 360° and multi-rater feedback, which helps identify professional strengths and weakness. Assessments from multiple perspectives aid in identifying areas of focus and self-development tools, such as learning contracts provide an avenue for growth and progress. This type of mentorship provides opportunities for feedback regarding the efforts and quality of learning. Additionally, understanding the subordinate’s developmental focus and level of knowledge in a specific subject will allow the leader to encourage self-development and personal growth, at a rate and in a direction which will encourage the Soldier to continue to invest his time.
You may be surprised to know, the Army has a self-development handbook. The introduction to this resource describes three types of self development:

- **Structured Self-Development.** Required learning that continues throughout your career and that is closely linked to and synchronized with classroom and on-the-job learning.
- **Guided Self-Development.** Recommended but optional learning that will help keep you prepared for changing technical, functional, and leadership responsibilities throughout your career.
- **Personal Self-Development.** Self-initiated learning where you define the objective, pace, and process.

The handbook is designed to assist soldiers with recognizing strengths and weaknesses and utilizing the self-assessment to direct personal development. It discusses techniques for measuring progress and making the most of learning opportunities. Scenarios and examples from the handbook provide an excellent opportunity for developing soldier training on this topic.

As the Army continues its shift towards Decisive Action training and a multi-dimensional threat environment, many intelligence professionals will identify needs for self-development. Additionally, given the average report card the American education system continues to receive, we will find ourselves with young soldiers and officers who have not been encouraged or challenged to accept the responsibility of self-development. These considerations should weigh heavily in unit and individual training plans, even more so in our Reserve and National Guard forces, who must invest personal time outside of their drill requirements.

Having previously served as a Senior Intelligence Technician and the Chief of a Brigade Intelligence Support Element, I can attest to the importance of mentoring intelligence professionals and encouraging self-development. One key component to success is identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the individual service members (of all ranks). This understanding should incorporate subordinate units, such as the MICO and MI battalions. Understanding which NCOs and officers in the unit have a solid understanding of key competencies will allow leaders to accurately direct the development of the soldiers. Subject matter experts, regardless of their assigned unit, can be invaluable in assisting supervisors in creating self-development plans and directing soldiers to the best recourses.

Beagle’s suggestion of learning contracts also translates well at the brigade level. Supervisors can assist the soldier in self-development, as part of the individual counseling process. Distance Learning and required reading can also be the foundations for a life-long learning process, encouraging soldiers to continue their civilian education. Soldier progress translates to successful NCO mentorship and instills a lead-by-example atmosphere which challenges those same NCOs to take ownership of their self development. The end result is a highly effective unit, measurable progress, and individual pride.

*Works Cited*


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Author’s Note: The Command History Office has an extensive historical document collection with some interesting items. Sometimes, however, those items come with little background and many questions. This week’s article covers one of those history mysteries. The following is a bare outline of an intelligence school that began operations in Europe in 1944. Much of this story is yet untold, particularly for the period in the late 1940s. If you can help fill in some details about the Intelligence School at Oberammergau, please contact the author at (520) 533-4113.

The dust of war in Europe had not even begun to settle, but the U.S. Army was already preparing for its next mission: the occupation and rebuilding of Germany. To ensure it had the right technical specialists on hand, the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA) established a number of schools, including those for quartermaster, military police, engineering, and ordnance, in France and Germany.

The Army also recognized the need for personnel who understood the language, culture, and political systems of the countries they would be rebuilding as well as countries that could pose a future threat. As early as November 1944, a European Theater Intelligence School was established near Dreux, France. The school provided instruction on German armed forces, the political organization of Nazi Germany, and basic intelligence activities. The school also sent mobile training teams throughout the European Theater of Operations (ETO) to orient troops on the society they would face as they entered Nazi Germany.

Similarly, in February 1945, a U.S. Army Liaison Officers School was established in Le Vesinet near Paris. Here, students received training in the political and military aspects of the Soviet Union to prepare them for assignments as liaison officers and intelligence specialists throughout the ETO.

In November 1945, the European Theater Intelligence School moved to the Hoetzendorf Kasern in Oberammergau, Germany. During the war, the Kasern had housed a German mountain signal battalion and later an experimental jet engine lab for the Messerschmitt Corporation. The U.S. Army’s 409th Infantry Regiment occupied the area in April 1945 and shortly thereafter the instructors for the Intelligence School moved in. Classes on denazification and the growing Soviet threat began in January 1946.

The school expanded in 1947 when Detachment R began a three-year immersion course in Russian language, culture, and politics to prepare Foreign Area Officers for diplomatic tours in the Soviet Union. Major Jane G. Brister, a Strategic Intelligence Officer, attended Russian language training at the school in the late 1950s. She remembered being one of only three women in a class of 30 students. Upon graduation, the students hoped for assignments as attachés or members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission. Brister was instead assigned to work in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, in the Pentagon compiling Soviet order of battle and intelligence summaries.

The Russian immersion course remained there until 1964 when Detachment R moved to Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The course subsequently became known as the U.S. Army Russian Institute and was later absorbed into the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

Back in Oberammergau, the Intelligence School went through additional changes when it was combined with the Military Police School in May 1948. The MP School had originally been established in France in 1945 but was later combined with the Constabulary School located in Sonthofen,
Germany. When the latter school closed, the European Command (EUCOM, successor to USFET) Provost Marshal and G2 agreed to move the MPs to the Hoetzendorf Kasern. The school was then redesignated the EUCOM Intelligence and Military Police School.

Signifying the changes in world-power relations, the Intelligence School recommended and developed a two-week course in staff planning and procedures for nuclear war. The first class was held in January 1953. Shortly thereafter, a Special Weapons Branch was created to oversee the class. By the end of 1956, the school had been renamed the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR, the Army component of EUCOM) Intelligence, Military Police and Special Weapons School.

Also in 1956, during festivities for the school’s 11th anniversary, the Hoetzendorf Kaserne was renamed Hawkins Barracks in honor of Lieutenant Colonel Jesse M. Hawkins. A 1933 graduate of West Point, Hawkins was serving as Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 2nd Armored Division, when he was killed in action in France on August 31, 1944. For gallantry in action, Hawkins received the Silver Star.

The Intelligence School’s 25-week course interspersed language instruction with detailed German and Soviet history, politics, and current conditions. Halfway through the course, students were introduced to combat intelligence topics, including map analysis, order of battle, intelligence sources, reporting, and interrogation.

Another course covered photo interpretation. One student, Bennett Young, remembered, “Class work was intense and we put in full days, but there was no homework and the instructors were well qualified officers who we all respected....The curriculum consisted of plotting and identifying targets on the ground and writing reports about the terrain.” Young returned in 1957 for an advanced photo interpretation course.

In 1960, the U.S. Army School Command, Europe, was activated, with headquarters at Oberammergau, to provide centralized control over the various schools. At this time, the quartermaster and signal schools at Lenggries and the engineering and ordnance schools at Murnau were all consolidated. The Intelligence School became the Intelligence Department of the U.S. Army School, Europe. Its mission was to provide “specialist courses in intelligence subjects peculiar to USAREUR and in specialties in which shortages of trained personnel exist [as well as] refresher training languages peculiar to USAREUR.” It is unknown when the last U.S. Army Intelligence course was taught at the school.

The Special Weapons Branch became the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Weapons Systems Department under the operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 1966. It continues to operate today as the NATO School Oberammergau.

DID YOU KNOW?

You can access historical MI related documents plus a lot of other valuable MI History information on IKN at the MI History website located at: https://ikn.army.mil/apps/mi_history/.

A dress parade at the Intelligence School in Oberammergau, Germany, ca. 1955.
Language learning in the 21st Century has improved drastically with the increased number of training tools and authentic material available the Internet. Gone are the days when a Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) graduate needed to carry dozens of books and hundreds of cassette tapes to each duty station in order to maintain the knowledge gained in language school. Now, with only a few clicks of a mouse, a linguist can access thousands of hours of language-learning material through DLIFLC or external sources—all at no cost to the individual. Although the onus must be on the individual to dedicate the time and energy into language study, supportive leadership with proper emphasis on language training and a well-run Command Language Program (CLP) can go a long way toward ensuring success on the next Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT).

Language skills can be thought of as similar to physical training; most service members would not neglect PT until just a month before a PT test, and linguists should not neglect language training until just before the annual DLPT. Language skills must be exercised regularly if a linguist hopes to maintain the proficiency gained during the basic course at DLIFLC. With assistance from the CLP Manager (CLPM), linguists can develop an Individual Language Training Plan (ILTP) that uses the following resources, available to any service member with access to a computer with Internet, in the most efficient way possible to sustain and enhance language proficiency throughout their career.

Global Language Online Support System (GLOSS)

GLOSS is DLIFLC’s online training system which provides individuals with learning tools for improving their foreign language skills. Each of the 40 available languages has reading and listening material ranging from Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) level 1 through level 4. The content is based on authentic material, and each item (article, TV report, radio broadcast, etc.) consists of four to six learning activities. Each activity is accompanied by thorough explanations and tutoring, almost as if an instructor is guiding the linguist through the lesson. Certificates for lesson completion are available, allowing a CLPM or leader to track a linguist’s progress against the ILTP.¹

Joint Language University (JLU)

JLU is a language training portal serving the US Government. By registering an account with a .mil or .gov email address, users have access to the most comprehensive language training resource available today. Accessible on the site are 17 different resources that encompass the whole gamut of the ILR scale. There are resources that cater to the casual or beginning language learner (Rosetta Stone, RAPPORT) and resources for the lifelong language learner (GLOSS, CL-150 Rapid Rote, SCOLA), which the linguist may access on a personally owned or government computers and networks. Some resources have downloadable apps for smartphones that allows linguists to flip through flashcards at any time and there are even software tools and content for instructors or program managers to create lessons and classes to facilitate home-station training. The sheer volume of content can seem daunting at first, but it is well worth the time for linguists to familiarize themselves with this site and take advantage of everything JLU has to offer.²

SCOLA

SCOLA is a non-profit educational organization that provides authentic foreign language resources in more than 175 languages, relying mostly on foreign TV broadcasts. Unique to SCOLA is the ability to download or stream TV programming from eight geographically designated channels, allowing a language learner to experience programming exactly as native speakers see it in their own countries. Additionally, many of the broadcasts are broken into “insta-classes,” where there will be a short video accompanied by a transcript, translation, vocabulary list, and questions. SCOLA is a subscription-based service, so the unit CLP must have an account to make use of the services.³

With so many resources available it has never been easier for a linguist to study a foreign language. The most important characteristic about language maintenance is that it cannot be neglected until just before the annual DLPT. Time must be budgeted, both on-and off-duty, for linguists to enhance their language proficiency daily or weekly at a minimum. One could easily complete a SCOLA “insta-class” or GLOSS lesson in one hour, so a linguist can sustain language
proficiency with minimal impact on mission requirements. A strong ILTP with regular training using the above-cited sources coupled with 150-hour refresher/sustainment training and proper command emphasis by dedicating time for language training on the unit training schedule will greatly enhance a linguist’s proficiency and help them achieve ILR level 3 and beyond in listening and reading.

References

SFC Huntley is currently the MOSs 09L and 35P Career Management NCO in the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence. He has served as a SIGINT Platoon Sergeant in Afghanistan and is a career linguist, graduating from the Korean and Chinese-Mandarin Basic Courses at DLIFLC.

The Office of the Chief, MI (OCMI) is the MI Corps Personnel Proponent office and executes the personnel life cycle management functions relative to DOTMLPF for MI and Functional Area 34, Strategic Intelligence. The USAICOE and Fort Huachuca Commanding General, as the MI Proponent, enlists the help of OCMI, to ensure the Army has the sufficient number of MI Officers, WOs, NCOs, and Enlisted Soldiers, with the correct occupational specialty, correct training, and are available for assignment at the right time.

Contact Information:
OCMI Director at (Comm) (520) 533-1728/1173
Training Development Update. The Training Development and Support (TDS) Directorate is currently working several important training related initiatives.

- The first initiative involves efforts supporting the development of national level certification programs for the areas of “Analytical,” Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), and Collection Management.
- The second initiative discussed here is the development of the Intelligence Architecture Training Support Package (TSP).
- The third initiative concerns efforts to improve leader training and education across the Army with regard to how leaders can better understand the Intelligence Enterprise and their role in directing, synchronizing, and exercising Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations.

National Level Analyst Certification. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) continues to shape the future of analytical certification requirements and national level certification standards across other intelligence areas. We are ensuring military occupational specialties/areas of concentration (MOS/AOC) critical tasks (individual tasks) remain our utmost priority in our training development and execution. These individual critical tasks are then compared with the national level certification requirements. MI Soldier proficiency in their MOS/AOC skills are paramount to the mission success of their units. We must ensure a proper emphasis on these skills, while at the same time considering those skills that exist as part of national-level certification programs. This is accomplished in part by participation in all stages of development of national-level certification programs, to ensure Army requirements shape these programs.

All Source Analyst Certification (ASA). In coordination with DA G2 and representatives from across the Intelligence Community, we remain heavily involved in the efforts by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to establish an ASA Certification Program for Soldiers and DA Civilians. The program will consist of an initial exam and an annual re-certification requirement. The initial exam will consist of two phases: Phase 1 will test knowledge of All Source “fundamentals” and Phase 2 will test knowledge of All Source “application.”

Soldiers and civilians from the TDS Directorate and Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence participated in an April 2014 DIA-led working group, developing draft ASA competencies and a certification blueprint. Following this, they took part in a pilot of the Phase 1 exam, along with other MI Soldiers and civilians from across the Army. Results are currently being validated by DIA and scores will be discussed in the future. Development of Phase 2 of the exam will start after Phase 1 is validated. Once the certification exam is complete, DIA will begin developing an ASA Certification Program Annex, which will spell out the components of the program. ICoE will then develop the draft Army annex, which will be staffed across the Army and ultimately approved by DA G2.

GEOINT Certification. In coordination with DA G2 and representatives from across the Intelligence Community, ICoE continues to support the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in its efforts to establish a GEOINT Certification Program. Representatives from ICoE, the Maneuver Support CoE (Fort Leonard Wood), the Army GEOINT Battalion, and others participated in the development of the GEOINT Performance Level (PL) 1 certification exam in early 2014. The U.S. Marine Corps has already mandated certification for all active duty Marine GEOINT personnel. NGA leads a bi-weekly GEOINT Professional Certification Working Group, developing and refining the PL 2 Certification exam.

Collection Management (CM) Certification. In coordination with DA G2, ICoE continues to support the development of an Army level annex for the Army’s CM Certification Program. ICoE representatives provided input to the DIA’s Essential Body of Knowledge (EBoK) in 2013. The EBoK is the basis from which the DIA’s CM certification exam was created. Where applicable, sections of the EBoK are now incorporated into the Information Collection Planners Course (ICPC, Q7 ASI) offered at Fort Huachuca. ICoE continues to provide information and feedback to DIA. ICoE drafted the Army-level CM Certification Program annex in August 2014. DA G2 is expected to begin staffing the annex across the Army during the September-October 2014 timeframe.

For more information on National Level Analyst Certification Programs contact the Chief of the Imagery and Analysis Branch at Comm (520) 538-1099.
Intelligence Architecture TSP. As the Army transitions from an “Army of Execution” to an “Army of Preparation,” units must be prepared to quickly deploy and establish their intelligence architectures in an immature and austere operational environment. We are learning from combat training centers (CTCs) that some units are experiencing difficulty in establishing their intelligence architecture, particularly in a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) scenario. Accordingly, MI personnel must build proficiency in quickly establishing an operational intelligence architecture.

In February, 2014, ICoE published MI Pub 2-01.2, Establishing the Intelligence Architecture, which outlines how units plan and execute intelligence architecture tasks. Its chapters cover planning, preparing, deploying, and redeploying the intelligence architecture. As a follow-on to the development of this publication, ICoE is in the final stages of development of an Intelligence Architecture TSP. Requested by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the TSP will be taught at FOUNDRY Training Sites across the Army. The target audience is Forces Command (FORSCOM) MI and Signal Soldiers. In the event units are unable to send personnel to this training at a FOUNDRY Training Site, they can use the TSP to conduct the training at their unit location. The TSP consists of eight modules, designed to be taught as a three-day course. The TSP is expected to be complete and available to FOUNDRY Training Sites across the Army in early 2015, with an initial pilot Intelligence Architecture Course to occur at Fort Bragg summer/fall 2015.

Module 8 (7.5 hrs.): Culminating Practical Exercise. Students each prepare a portion of a Division-level intelligence architecture briefing.

While the three-day course will familiarize personnel with the basics of planning and establishing their unit’s intelligence architecture, it will not make them experts. MI leaders must continue to reinforce the skills learned in the course with hands-on training, rehearsals, and exercises.

For more information on the Intelligence Architecture TSP contact the All Source Training Developer at Comm (520) 538-1159.

Intelligence Enterprise and ISR Leader Education Initiative.

In July 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the DA G2 to implement a program to improve leader education across the Army in the areas of understanding the Intelligence Enterprise and how to employ ISR. In turn, LTG Legere, DA G2, directed ICoE to develop a comprehensive strategy for educating and training senior combat arms division commanders on the national-to-tactical Intelligence Enterprise and their role in planning, directing, synchronizing, and exercising ISR operations. This initiative has expanded and now includes five Lines of Effort (LOEs) listed and expanded upon below.

- **LOE 1: Educate new division commanders.** Led by INSCOM, LOE 1 is a 2-day event dedicated to General Officer Pre-Command Course (PCC) training at Fort Gordon. In coordination with DA G3/5/7 and General Officer Management Office, INSCOM G3 schedules this training as each major general is identified to take command of a division. This event includes briefings from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2, the 513th MI BDE, the 116th MI BDE (Aerial Intelligence Brigade (AIB)), and the 706th MI Group. Commanders of Army CoEs are also encouraged to attend. INSCOM begins the event by briefing its mission, authorities, and organizational structure. The TRADOC G2 briefs global and Theater ISR capabilities and priorities. The 513th MI Brigade outlines how it functions as a TIB and intelligence “Anchor Point” in support of Regionally Aligned Forces and the Global Response Force. The 116th MI Brigade (AIB) briefs current capabilities of INSCOM’s aerial layer and its Distributed PED (DPED) capabilities. The 706th MI Group presents a capabilities briefing and demonstration involving its Joint and Theater support.

- **LOE 2: Educate new brigade combat team (BCT) and brigade engineer battalion (BEB) commanders.** ICoE provides a 3-hour Intelligence Warfighting Function overview briefing during Phase II of the Brigade Commander PCC at Fort Leavenworth, designed to
educate BCT commanders on the national-to-tactical Intelligence Enterprise and their role in directing, synchronizing, and exercising ISR operations at the operational and tactical levels. ICoE conducts a similar briefing for BEB Commander PCC (active duty) and Brigade Special Troops Battalion Commander PCC (National Guard), both at Fort Leonard Wood.

**LOE 3: Support to CTCs.** ICoE is working with CTCs to establish a baseline of intelligence knowledge within MI Trainers, to ensure they have critical intelligence related knowledge early in their CTC assignment. Collaboration is also underway to improve intelligence related briefings presented to units, such as those on the Staff Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process and Information Collection. ICoE began working with the Mission Command Training Program in FY 2014 and will expand to include other CTCs in FY 2015.

**LOE 4: Support to Army CoEs and Schools.** ICoE is coordinating with MI instructors at other CoEs to synchronize, where possible, intelligence training. ICoE intends to implement a Leader Development Program to certify these MI instructors in the latest MI doctrine and concepts, ensuring they possess a baseline of critical MI skills and knowledge. Additionally, ICoE is working with the Command and General Staff College to improve intelligence related training for MI officer students.

**LOE 5: Support to Home Station Training (HST).** The three objectives of this LOE are to identify gaps in intelligence-specific HST, work collaboratively within the Army to develop solutions to HST gaps, and to expose units to available specialized MI training opportunities. Currently ICoE is focused on partnering with TRADOC and FORSCOM to develop training guides for use at home station. FORSCOM will take lead for this LOE in FY 2015. In support of this LOE, the following three manuals are being developed:

- **MI Gunnery Manual.** Last published by ICoE in December 2010, this manual will be revised in FY 2015. Roughly modeled after Tank Gunnery Tables (crawl, walk, run methodology of training), MI Gunnery is a process for the BCT’s MI Company to attain individual, team, section, platoon, and company proficiency in individual and collective tasks necessary to accomplish the unit’s battlefield mission.

- **Collection Manager’s Guide.** This document will serve as a reference for Collection Managers and will be published in FY 2015. It will list current training opportunities available to Army CM cells at each echelon.

- **Intelligence Training Handbook.** This handbook will be published in FY 2015. In response to a critical need for MI Company commanders to have a document that addresses the intelligence-specific aspects of training management, this publication will help shape outcomes for unit training by identifying unique training opportunities, training-related best practices, and individual/collective tasks.

For more information contact the TDS Executive Officer, at Comm (520) 538-1159.
Introduction
Little did the U.S. know that the 9-11 attacks would usher in more than a decade of U.S. servicemen fighting a war on two fronts, Afghanistan and Iraq. While WWII vets may be nicknamed ‘The Greatest Generation,’ history may look back and refer to this ‘war on terror’ veteran group as ‘The Most Deployed’ generation. It is not uncommon to meet soldiers who have multiple deployments to both Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these soldiers have personal stories that end differently. However they all began similarly, something inspired them to join the military during a time of great patriotism, but also great uncertainty.

They all came from different hometowns and went to different assignment locations, but a common thread for some is that if they chose a Military Intelligence (MI) military occupational specialty (MOS), they all passed through Fort Huachuca. From a cultural perspective as a whole, how have the views of these students varied over the course of these conflicts? What was the average mindset at the beginning, middle, and now end of the war decade?

The War Years
The ‘war years’ (2001-2012) began with recruiters inundated with a patriotic wave of citizens wanting to ‘do something’ in the post 9-11 America. For many citizens the Gulf War and the Balkans were ancient history, they were all too young. But this was their chance, and they were not going to let it pass. When they arrived at training, both officer and enlisted were about to put their time and sweat where their oaths were. Little did anyone know that we were beginning the longest continuous phase of conflict in the history of the U.S., the 2004-2007 period being the bloodiest.

MI BOLC (LTs) and MICCC (CPTs) had no shortage of enthusiastic students; the desire to excel was high among all. Both lieutenants and captains knew they had a lot to learn. The U.S. had not transitioned from Cold War to counter-insurgency (COIN) for very long, and all realized that what they learned here might be the difference between life and death for them and their soldiers.

One of the early challenges was getting the ‘hearts and minds’ concepts accurately across to them. Among many there was the attitude to ‘take 9-11 to their backyard’ and ‘why should we care about feelings and cultures when they had not?’ The patriotic swell turned out to be a two-edged sword for culture training with many highly motivated officers, but a general disregard for cultural awareness. This only tended to worsen during the difficult years from 2004 through 2007.

Enlisted students, during this time period were similar to the officers. NCOs were trying to stay abreast of events and tactics as more and more units were deploying. Lower enlisted going through Initial Entry Training (IET) were focused. One interesting note is that the ramping up of sheer
through-put numbers made it a challenge for the instructors to maintain course standards. Many Soldiers wanted to be in the army, not necessarily in some of the more challenging MI MOSs. Teaching culture was not quite as difficult with lower enlisted, they were mainly grateful for whatever training would help them survive deployments, but the NCO Leadership students for the most part had a disdain similar to the officers.

The Post War Years

As we attempt to close these chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan, we are stuck with some serious issues. Budgeting, PTSD, the military drawdown, reallocating military assets at all levels, and refocusing training are but a few. The military tends to be very focused during times of crisis, which makes retooling that much more challenging once the crisis ends. We are also seeing a difference in the attitude of the Soldiers who are joining. 9-11 is now a full decade in the past and many more are joining due to post-recession financial hardship than full on patriotism.

Officer BOLC Students have to face the reality that, unlike the classes of their predecessors, they are not guaranteed an immediate deployment to receive the highly coveted combat patch. Head-to-head competition for promotion will be pretty much the same across the board. This would not be as much of an issue except that the majority of the Soldiers that they will be commanding are combat vets. From a cultural perspective it is easier to teach them during MI BOLC than previous groups, as cultural training has now reached down to the Leader Development and Assessment Course as Cadet Command’s capstone training event.

Also, MICCC students are now more likely to be first lieutenants than captains, with many deployments under their belt. Cultural instruction to them is more of facilitation, merely attempting to guide them into teaching each other based on their rich experiences—what worked and what did not for each of them.

For enlisted students at the entry level, through-put numbers have dropped off dramatically from the height of the war. This has caused a shift to a quality versus quantity scenario, where quality wins. As far as attitude, the majority of these Soldiers truly desire these MI MOSs, and this eases the challenge for cadre. Similar to MI BOLC, culture training has now reached down to the Basic training level, thus further easing the challenging of teaching culture during IET.

NCOs have the challenge of stiffer requirements as the military attempts to downsize post war. NCO Leadership students have a challenge similar to MICCC students, as Big Army transitions from war to this unknown land called peacetime. Cultural awareness training for them is similar to that of the MICCC, it is facilitation, merely attempting to guide them into teaching each other based on their rich experiences.

The Future (2015 and Beyond)

I joined the 1977 post-Vietnam army, where all my NCOs were trying to make the adjustment from COIN to the Cold War. I served in combat arms and transitioned as a Sergeant to MI. The majority of my career was spent pondering the Red Threat and a war in the Fulda Gap that never happened. It all came crumbling down just as the Gulf War spiked. I took the 15 year retirement plan in 1994 just as the Cold War was ending and the Middle East was heating up.

I see many similarities with the challenges facing Soldiers today. It appears that world events never seem to take a timeout. As we now attempt close out on CENTCOM; Mr. Putin is apparently longing for ‘the way we were’ in EUCOM as he heats things up in the former Soviet Bloc. Does this mean that we will be coming full circle to the apocalyptic scenarios that filled Hollywood scripts in the 1980s? One fact is certain, tomorrow’s Soldier will face an environment where there will be many potential threats. The MI school will have its virtual hands full (as always) preparing Soldiers for future threats. Viet Nam and the Cold War were practically devoid of cultural considerations. I believe that even if we revisit previous scenarios (Cold War), future Soldiers will employ cultural considerations in their contacts with other groups.

Vern Philyaw is a retired Strategic Debriefer who has served in PACOM, EUCOM, and a tour in Iraq. He is a DLI Hungarian linguist who also speaks German, Spanish, Korean, and some Arabic. He began his military career as a Field Artillery Target Acquisition Specialist/Linguist near the DMZ Korea in 1978. He now serves on the Cross Cultural Competency Team in the TRADOC Culture Center, Fort Huachuca as an Institutional Training Specialist.
Who are Your Best Analysts?

Every section, team, unit, formation, echelon, etc. has someone who is the top performer; the person to whom you assign the difficult tasks which require the best possible results. These top performers are simply the best at their craft. The Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) Lessons Learned (LL) Team seeks your help in identifying whom you consider to be your best intelligence analysts in an effort to help determine how they became the best. If you are pressed for time feel free to skip ahead to this column’s last paragraph to see how you can help us. I prefer you to continue reading the intervening paragraphs which provide background and further context to the issue we seek to address.

It is probably easy to know which sergeant you want to lead your unit’s physical training formations or the lieutenant to task with running the rifle qualification range when expecting VIP attendance. Identifying the superior performers of specific tasks is often directly linked to established measure of performance (MoP). Identifying the best battalion S2 or company commander within a particular brigade often involves both MoP and measures of effectiveness (MoE). MoE often involve more subjective assessments or conclusions than MoP. Is identifying the best performer in any field of endeavor simple to identify? What makes one the best at anything? We often combine both objective and subjective evaluation factors when seeking to identify or defending our choice for the best leader, company commander, first sergeant, teacher, sports figure, actor, etc.

What factors and characteristics do you apply to your personnel to identify your best analyst? Can you support your decision with objective evidence or is your assessment based on more subjective grounds? The LL Team not only seeks to know who is your best analyst; but more importantly, how did your analyst become the best?

ICoE’s Commanding General (CG) recently asked the ICoE LL Team to learn from MI professionals with whom we interact as to what makes the top performing analysts capable of superior performance. The context of the discussion in which the CG levied his requirement made it clear our focus was on enlisted Soldiers; but not specifically limited to those holding Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35F, All Source Intelligence Analyst. In author Malcolm Gladwell’s terms, the CG wants us to learn how your intelligence analyst ‘outliers’ achieved their performance superiority.

As we (the ICoE LL Team) began to develop our collection strategy we were immediately faced with a number of questions that could only be addressed or refined by those from whom we sought the answers. Wargaming our potential exchanges with interview subjects resulted in anticipated answers which led to more questions than answers. Our internal course of action analysis (wargaming) results combined with the lessons from our first few interactions with brigade combat team S2s and MI company commanders readily confirmed that providing an answer to the title question is not simple.

Who is your best analyst? Why is he or she the best? Do you consider your best DCGS-A operator to be your best analyst? What about the oft cited term critical thinking; do your best critical thinkers produce the best analytical products or results? Perhaps your best analyst is the specialist who readily provides prompt and accurate answers to questions others struggle to understand. One can see how the questions surrounding this requirement seem endless. We seek the answers to these questions in order to answer our Commander’s requirement and to form hypotheses for further investigation.

Many well-intentioned sources provided their immediate respective anecdotes to the LL Team prior to any LL collection of this topic. Offerings included the classic Nature versus Nurture discussion; individual training; off-duty self-development; professional reading; computer expertise; previous (civilian and military) experience; mentoring; and others such as playing various types of games: card, role-playing, strategy, brainteasers, etc. We do not discount these offerings as they contain insights into commonly held perceptions, or misperceptions. We may find these accurately indicate associated conditions which lead to superior performing analysts.
For those who recognize Malcolm Gladwell’s name, or know of his works, “Outliers: The Story of Success” associates extremely successful people with surrounding events or conditions. In Outliers Gladwell introduces the phenomena of 10,000 hours of task-related practice enabling success in performing the associated task. The most important lesson for our purposes that Gladwell imparts to us is the assertion that “success is not a random act, it arises out of a predictable and powerful set of circumstances and opportunities.” Successful people are not outliers due to happenstance, chance, or serendipity; success results from preparation and commitment. We seek to discover these tangible precursor activities your high-performing analysts experienced. Pure speculation presumes the answers we provide may lead to changes to the processes or methods used to recruit, assess, and produce future intelligence analysts.

We do not look only to Gladwell’s conclusions to help guide our effort. There are countless organizational improvement, self-development, and leadership related books, articles, webinars, etc. available for reference. In our limited research we’ve found a particularly useful resource to be “The Star Factor: Discover What Your Top Performers Do Differently” by William Seidman and Richard Grbavac. An LL Team collector extracted key elements of the authors’ approach to identifying the characteristics of high-performers to form questions he could pose to MI leaders to help identify their best analysts.

**How can You Help?**

You are our best source. Tell us who is your best intelligence analyst (regardless of rank, MOS, area of concentration, branch or duty position) and why you consider them to be so. Invite them to contact us chester.f.brown.civ@mail.mil or allow us to contact them to discuss what sets them apart from their peers and the factors which may have contributed to their success.

**Endnotes**

2. Ibid., 103.

Other Gladwell books include:
- The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference
- Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking
- What the Dog Saw: And Other Adventures.
The MG Oliver W. Dillard Award honors the most outstanding company-size military intelligence (MI) unit assigned to a BCT, each fiscal year. Although MG Dillard was an infantry officer during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, he was a decorated Battalion S2 in Korea and became FORSCOM’s first Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2) in 1973. Continuing his service as an infantry officer within a MI functional area, he promoted the use of intelligence Soldiers and units at the tactical level as the senior intelligence officer in U.S. Army Europe from 1975-1978. MG Dillard is a Thomas W. Knowlton Award for Intelligence Excellence recipient, a member of the Army’s Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame (2012), and Alabama Military Hall of Honor (2013), and symbolizes the promotion of esprit de corps and professionalism in military intelligence units throughout FORSCOM.

Colonel Anthony R. Hale, U.S. Forces Command Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, officially designated the 66th Military Intelligence Company, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas as the inaugural MG Oliver W. Dillard Award recipient for 2014. Under the leadership of Captain Eleanor Baldenweck and Sergeant First Class Centoria Young, the soldiers of the 66th MI Company demonstrated an exceptional commitment to maintaining high standards while serving both in CONUS and while deployed to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Further, the company’s commitment to excellence extended beyond its military mission to include their commitment to each other and the community. The 66th MI Company command team emphasized the Family Readiness Group as playing an integral role in maintaining steady communication between the command and unit families, and also sponsored the Salado Junior High School as part of the Fort Hood Adopt-a-School program.

The 66th MI Company sought out opportunities at every turn to support collective training throughout 3rd Calvary Regiment. Most notably, they played a key role in the Regiment’s multiple command post exercises as well as creating and refining Regimental S2 mission analysis and daily intelligence products. The company earned high praise from the Observer/Controller Trainers during their deployment to the National Training Center and was lauded for not only providing flawless UAS mission execution, but creating doctrinally perfect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance overlays.

The 66th MI Company deployed to OEF fully trained to provide intelligence support to the Regional Command East (RC-E) headquarters. By providing timely, actionable and fused intelligence support not only on a daily basis, but to over 40 combat named operations, they drove operations with intelligence and supported Afghan National Security Forces, Special Operations Forces, International Security Assistance Force and other governmental agencies. Colonel Cameron Cantlon, the 3rd CR commander, noted, “Without a doubt, the veterans of 66th MI Company make up the most outstanding Military Intelligence unit assigned to a Brigade Combat Team.”

The 66th Military Intelligence Company’s Brave Rifles Intelligence team serves as a role model for other U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army intelligence professionals. The company epitomizes esprit de corps and professionalism in MI and is the most outstanding company-size MI unit assigned to a BCT for 2014. ✨
The battle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 deeply affected three countries. France’s willingness to continue its colonial war in Indochina ended with this shocking defeat. For the surging Communist Vietnamese nationalists (Viet Minh), the battle reinforced their belief in victory. For the United States, a reluctant patron of the French, the war’s next phase began, creating a South Vietnamese client state to oppose the Communist drive to dominate Vietnam. A decade of U.S. combat operations ended in frustration by 1973, followed by the defeat of South Vietnam two years later.

Martin Windrow’s, *The Last Valley*, describes the complex story of France’s Vietnam defeat. In detail, he explains its increasingly difficult military situation as relative military power slides to the Viet Minh opponent. A small guerrilla army in 1945, with training, indoctrination, and Chinese supplied armaments, the Viet Minh grew to a conventional army, capable in the mountainous jungle of northern Vietnam, but wary of confronting French firepower in pitched battle. That is until Dien Bien Phu.

By 1952 France was searching for a way to achieve enough battlefield success to gain concessions for negotiations and preserve a French role in Indochina. They believed the “air-land-base” concept (fortified airheads deep in enemy territory), would enable them to disrupt enemy movements, logistics, and lines of communication, forcing the Viet Minh to attack on battlefields favorable to the French.

In late November 1953, to break up a Viet Minh invasion of neighboring Laos, the French established a redoubt at Dien Bien Phu, in the last valley of northwest Vietnam. Given the difficult terrain, air operations were essential—the redoubt was 200 miles from friendly lines. Inserting their strategic reserve of elite parachute and Foreign Legion units, the base was a series of fortified hilltops defending two airfields. The French made critical mistakes, ceding the high ground to the Viet Minh and believing the jungle would prevent their opponent from concentrating enough artillery to decide the battle. Within two months, the garrison was hemmed in, as the Viet Minh tightened the noose. The valley battlefield transformed to trench warfare, where 15,000 French Union soldiers engaged a Viet Minh enemy three times their size.

By mid-March, Viet Minh preparations ended with a fierce artillery bombardment. The French garrison was in deep trouble, the defensive strongpoints spaced too far apart to protect the airfields, while their artillery and airpower had difficulty attacking Viet Minh positions. Strongpoints fell one-by-one under relentless Viet Minh attack; the casualties on both sides were staggering. The end came on 7 May with the French surrender.

The loss of the garrison with many elite units, bankrupted an increasing precarious French-led military effort. Unable to use conscripts in this colonial war, nearly 80 percent of its forces were not French, but soldiers from the French Union—Vietnamese, North African, West African, and Foreign Legion. Too weak in numbers to win victory, it was nonetheless expected to counter relentless Viet Minh pressure. A greater catastrophe for the French was the loss of faith for their cause by many Vietnamese and high country tribes.

A captivating aspect of French operations was the prolific use of paratroopers. Before the era of helicopter mobility, the French employed paratroopers in dozens of operations as blocking forces, reinforcing trapped units, or conducting sudden attacks. In a desperate effort, paratroopers were still dropped into Dien Bien Phu in the last weeks of the battle, demonstrating their unmatched bravery.

*The Last Valley* is a fascinating read of a struggling military trying to achieve impossible demands. The author references many French language sources rarely read by English language audiences. For decades afterwards, a paper war between veterans erupted in France which left a detailed, yet conflicting account of the battle. Martin Windrow performs a magnificent effort reconciling these accounts into a well-written book on a difficult story. Bernard Fall’s 1966 book, *Hell in A Small Place*, was the best English language account of the battle for forty years. Now, *The Last Valley* is the new standard.

Reviewed by Master Sergeant Peter Clemens, USAR (Retired)
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The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) launched its Military Service Internship Program (MSIP) at its Springfield, Virginia Headquarters, on 2 September 2014. The program’s goal is to produce a cadre of advanced level GEOINT trained military personnel who can bring their experience and expertise gained during the internship back to their service.

“NGA’s new internship program will help the services deepen their expertise in GEOINT and help mature both the participants and the enterprise,” said Major General Mark R. Quantock, NGA’s Military Deputy.

The three year internship includes two years of on-the-job rotational assignments within the designated agency work centers such as the Analysis, Source, InnoVision, eXperience, Technology, Military Support directorates and the Office of Geospatial Management. In addition, participants will complete more than 1,000 hours of formal classroom training in GEOINT-related coursework.

The MSIP is a competitive program that includes noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and commissioned officers who have reached the mid-level of their careers (E5-E6 and O3-O4). Active duty Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps personnel are eligible to enroll in the internship if they meet program eligibility requirements and receive a formal endorsement by their respective service.

“This is what NGA is about—an agency where individuals are challenged to be creative, an agency where identifying solutions to GEOINT issues and resolving tough problems is a daily occurrence,” Quantock said.

The MSIP will not only support the agency’s vision of putting the power of GEOINT in the hands of its partners, the internship provides military members the opportunity to obtain advance proficiency in Geospatial-Intelligence.

NGA’s internship also provides participants with the opportunity to develop their knowledge and skills at an advanced level by working with current Geospatial and Imagery analysts on current operating systems and technology. During the program, participants will obtain their GEOINT Certification for Proficiency Levels I and II.

Located on the Fort Belvoir compound, NGA features state-of-the-art systems and training facilities that support the agency’s mission of providing timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security.

To date, NGA has enrolled three NCOs in the Enlisted GEOINT Career Advancement Program (GCAP), as well as a commissioned officer in the agency’s Junior Officer GEOINT Program (JOGP).

For more information about the Military Service Internship Program contact your military career manager or detailer or contact the NGA MSIP program manager at (571) 557-4246.