Thanks to the Knowledge Management (KM) Office here at Fort Huachuca and their comrades at Fort Leavenworth for the update to the January March 2008 KM MIPB issue. From 2008 to now, KM has matured to improve the sharing of information through various portals and collaborative tools. Colonel Sangvic’s *Always Out Front* column summarizes the in-depth articles on what’s new in KM for the Military Intelligence professional. I’m sure you’ll find something that will help improve your operations.

We have three articles from the field that address issues and events in our near future. Captain Purser discusses possible points of failure in the basic governance structure of the GIRoA which will undermine efforts for stability in that country and touches on what remaining forces during the transition to departure can do to mitigate this situation. Scott Montgomery and Brandon Middleton talk about the value of the CoIST during recent conflict and lessons learned. They then discuss how the CoIST concept is adapting to the challenges of supporting combat effectiveness in the face of the hybrid threat in a dynamically changing operational environment. USAICOE’s first recipient of the BG Strom Writing Program award, Captain Parrish discusses the importance of regionally aligned Army units to face the strategic challenges of our near future and beyond. Such units will develop an expertise in their geographic areas and will take the lead in that region’s security, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts as well as building relationships with coalition partners for long lasting partnerships.

From the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, we have a Doctrine Update. From CAC, as well, Greg Eddy gives us an update on the Mission Command Staff Trainer (MCST) which is a follow on to the Battle Command Staff Trainer (BCST). The MCST simulation software application enables units to conduct battle staff training with the Army Battle Command Systems with minimal setup, time and effort. Complete details of how to obtain this training are in the article.

In an effort to improve the relevance, accessibility, and distribution of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) we are conducting a survey. For those of you who participated in the 2010 survey, some of the questions will be familiar. This will take no more than 5 minutes out of your schedule, and this time, there is a section for free form comment. I urge you to take this short survey. We respect our readers’ feedback and want to make this publication as relevant and as accessible as we can. To take the survey, go to: [http://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/1190434/MIPB-Survey-March-13-2013](http://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/1190434/MIPB-Survey-March-13-2013).

Suspenses for MIPB are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Suspense Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>July September 2013</td>
<td>S: 30 April 2013</td>
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<td>October December 2013</td>
<td>S: 30 August 2013</td>
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<td>January-March 2014</td>
<td>S: 28 February 2014</td>
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Sterilla A. Smith
Editor
Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Intelligence (USAIoC) publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas, concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

By order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1306603

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
This issue of MIPB is devoted to Knowledge Management (KM). It has been 5 years since we last published an MIPB focused on KM and collaboration tools. I believe it is time to reinforce one of the most important functions we use to improve productivity, efficiency, information dissemination, and shared knowledge. This issue will highlight KM efforts at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) by showing how we are incorporating these efforts into our curriculum and introducing some of the tools that are being developed and currently exist to enable people, processes, and the sharing of knowledge. For Military Intelligence (MI) Professionals, KM is a critical part of our profession and one of the most important things we do today. How we gather data, apply it to a meaningful structure to get information, and then add personal context to produce actionable intelligence is what we do for a living.

Collection has never been our problem—the challenge has always been with processing, analysis, and sharing. The same is true with KM and the vast, and ever increasing, amount of information that is available today. If it is not actionable, it piles up in papers that are never read, databases and spreadsheets that no one uses, and archives and repositories that no one ever visits. The most valuable knowledge within an organization is that knowledge that enables action or the ability to take action—this is what makes knowledge so critical.

Websites have grown from static web pages only capable of uploading/downloading information to interactive Portals with applications and tools to automate and streamline processes. In her article “KM Tools for the MI Community: The Intelligence Knowledge Network,” Ms. Melissa Schreiner discusses KM tools in general and tools that are available through the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN).

IKN is a Portal that enables Intelligence Soldiers all over the world to communicate, collaborate, and investigate. It provides a standardized suite of mission-specific web services and tools to enable the exchange and sharing of knowledge across the USAICoE and the MI community. It hosts discussion forums, and serves as a single point of entry to access USAICoE, the Intelligence Community, and other Army websites. It also hosts a variety of public and private web applications that support directorates across USAICoE and the Intelligence Community worldwide with both NIPRNET and SIPRNET access.

IKN enables students to use these tools while in residence status, as well as providing Soldiers a “reach-back” capability to subject matter experts within USAICoE for follow-on KM and lifelong learning once they graduate. IKN is the knowledge network for MI Professionals. Since the last KM MIPB, IKN has gone through several facelifts and grown from less than 5,000 to 105,000 registered users. IKN has proven to be a valuable asset for not only USAICoE, but also the MI Community.

The world has changed and so has the way we use technology. If you don’t believe that, and have a teenager at home, ask them how many emails they have sent in the last week. I would be surprised if it is more than you can count on one hand. Email is a thing of the past. Younger generations and new Soldiers are all about social networking, texting, and instant messaging. Multi-tasking comes naturally to them and that is very evident in the way they train here at the USAICoE.

This is not just limited to the newest and youngest Soldiers. Ms. Rebecca Oliver’s article, “NCOA: Moving Forward with Knowledge Management” is an excellent example of how the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) is using KM as a key enabler to train our NCOs. Applications that streamline processes and social networking are key to this effort. The newly launched Intelligence Synchronization Network enables discussion groups and collaboration for any organization. NCOA Advanced and Senior Leadership Courses are leading the way in incorporating these capabilities into their instruction.

Highlighted in “A Tool for Collaboration: The Intelligence Synchronization Network,” Ms. Rhonda Hunter and Mr. Alan Chao gives a primer on its capabilities. Tom Kerr expands on this subject and provides (Continued on page 25)
Knowledge can be enormously costly, and is often scattered in widely uneven fragments, too small to be individually usable in decision making. The communication and coordination of these scattered fragments of knowledge is one of the basic problems – perhaps the basic problem – of any society.”

- Thomas Sowell

Knowledge Management Tools

Sharing institutional knowledge can be a significant challenge for many organizations. This is especially true in organizations that are of considerable size and transient, such as the military. In order to keep an organization moving along smoothly, it is essential to make sure that people in the organization have a place to store the knowledge that they have garnered, and for others to be able access it easily. How knowledge is passed within and outside of an organization is the organization’s knowledge flow. The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making is called Knowledge Management (KM).

Good knowledge flow, through and among the people in an organization, is critical to create shared understanding and increase collaboration and interaction within the organization itself, as well as with other organizations. Like a river, knowledge flows find their own way, but can also be guided, blocked, and diverted. Organizations have people who build the “river bed” for the future and those who guide the flow on a daily basis. As an organization changes, blocks and diversions may become necessary to maintain a working knowledge flow. Successful teamwork relies on a working knowledge flow to share knowledge, increase collaboration.

Within knowledge flows are KM tools that act as enablers in creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge. These tools can be either non-Information Technology (IT) or IT tools. Non-IT tools include, but are not limited to: after action review, brainstorming, collaborative physical workspace, peer assist, and information boards. IT tools can include document management systems, knowledge bases (Wikis, etc.), blogs, social network services, and collaborative virtual workspaces (portals, etc.) to name a few.

It is easy to put up a SharePoint site and start collaborating and sharing. However, if an organization is looking for a comprehensive solution to keep operations moving along smoothly, deciding which tool to use can be difficult. Organizations must consider how the tool will be integrated into their business process and the issues they trying to resolve. When deciding which tool would work best in your organization, there are a few things to consider:

- Does the tool do what I need it to do?
- Is the tool easy to use?
- Is training required to use the tool?
- Does the tool work with tools already in use?
- When do I use this tool, and when not?
- Is the tool available at the classification level needed?
- How much administrative control does the tool allow?

KM Portal: Intelligence Knowledge Network

The Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN) is a KM tool that is available to the Intelligence Community (IC) and is hosted by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) KM Office. It was first deployed in the summer of 2003 and was called the Intelligence Center Online Network (ICON). As this KM portal grew in members and applications, it became clear that it was a tool not only for the Intelligence Center, but for all MI Professionals. To reflect its support of a broader audience in 2009, the portal name was changed; and then in 2010, IKN was redesigned to better meet the users’ needs.
In the 10 years since it was initially established, the IKN portal has grown to a user base of over 105,000 registered users. It provides over 65 applications that range from common use and community level resources, to specialized, tailored web applications that automate manual processes for USAICoE and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. It also hosts a variety of public and private web applications that support directorates across the Intelligence Center and the IC worldwide with NIPRNET and SIPRNET access. IKN provides tools for students to use, as well as giving Soldiers a “reachback” capability to subject matter experts within USAICoE for follow-on KM and lifelong learning once they graduate.

Army Knowledge Online (AKO) hosts a very comprehensive document library, provides links to thousands of external web sources, and provides services such as instant messaging. IKN does not duplicate these AKO provided services. We complement AKO rather than compete by providing IC-specific content and dozens of specialized web applications to meet the mission-critical needs of a specific community.

With the redesign of the IKN portal, some unique features were added. Channels have been added to the front page of IKN; within these channels are links to sites and training information. All channels are listed under the Available Channels box found on the left side of the screen. These channels allow users to customize the look of their own page. After a channel has been dragged over to the main screen, it can be re-arranged, collapsed, expanded, and removed from the screen.

There are three permanent channels: IKN Community Sites, IC Sites, and Networking & Feeds. These channels cannot be removed, but can be re-arranged, collapsed, or expanded. One unique channel is the Favorites channel. Here the user can create links to applications within IKN or to outside websites. On the upper left side of the screen is a list of menus that gives the user access to Applications, Conference/CTSSBs, Course Registration, Resources, and Surveys. Simply move the cursor over one of these to expand it to access the tools within.

Although the look and feel of IKN has change over the years, the primary mission has not. IKN continues to ensure that the IC has the tools it needs to communicate effectively and get the information it needs to accomplish the mission. Following are some of the major IKN applications that have been developed and deployed in support of this mission:
## IKN Main Page

**Application:**
- IKN Portal.

**Number of Registered Users:**
- Over 105,000.

**Restrictions on Access:**
- Must have a CAC registered through AKO.

**Description:**
- IKN is a KM tool that enables Intelligence soldiers all over the world to communicate, collaborate, and investigate. It hosts discussion forums, serves as a single point of entry to get to USAICoE and other IC websites, and hosts a variety of public and private web applications that support the IC.

**Major Components:**
- See the remainder of this document to get an overview of the major web applications that comprise the IKN Portal.

## Daily Status Reporting System
**Application:** Daily Status Report (DSR).

**Restrictions on Access:** Restricted access/role based application.

**Description:**
DSR provides personnel the ability to manage their daily status reports via a web based application. The system tracks students, cadre, DA Civilians, and contractors and their duty status (Leave, TDY, Present for Duty, etc.) for each company and battalion and calculates a total headcount for the Brigade.

**Major Components:**
*Manage Personnel* module allows each company to update the status of their personnel and “roll-up” their numbers to higher headquarters. DSR rollup reports provide head counts at the battalion and brigade level.

**Impact Assessment:**
The DSR application saves the 111th MI Brigade an average of 4 hours a day per organization compared to the previous process of managing status reports using Microsoft Excel. The Brigade has also noticed a significant decrease in errors using this application. Now that this data is being tracked in a database, it can be analyzed and reported in real time using the USAICoE Commander’s Dashboard. This application has expanded to the NCO Academy with plans to include all of USAICoE by the end of this year.

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**Annual Training Management System**

**Application:** Annual Training Management System.

**Restrictions on Access:** Requires access to IKN-public content.

**Description:**
This system provides IKN users with a way to view and track annual compliance training. It will list all training that is due/overdue, not yet taken, and completed for an individual user. The system will send an email 30 days out when a user’s training is about to expire.

**Major Components:**
This system makes available training to include annual suicide prevention, intelligence oversight, acceptable use policy, warrior transition unit, web logging, OPSEC, and No FEAR Act modules. New annual training requirement modules can be added at any time.

**Impact Assessment:**
It provides a single place where USAICoE personnel can come to complete nearly all annual and recurring training. Only that training which is mandated to be completed at external DOD websites is not included. The interface lets users know what training required. It also provides a 30 day notification of upcoming training requirements.
**Department of the Army Civilian Training Tracker**

**Application:** DA Civilian Training Tracking System.

**Restrictions to Access:** Requires access to IKN-public content.

**Description:** This system provides USAIoCoE DA Civilians the ability to track their annual compliance and series required training in a single location. The application also allows the USAIoCoE Training Coordinator to pull reports and manage the series requirements for training.

**Major Components:**

- The *My Training* module gives each DA Civilian the ability to enter and track their completed training as well as see required training that needs to be completed.
- Reports provide information for the DA Civilian's supervisor and the Training Coordinator.

**Impact Assessment:**

The Tracker provides a mechanism for DA Civilians to monitor and review training requirements and assignments. Training managers can assign specific training by individual to create a custom training package for any DA Civilian under their purview. The system has a full reporting capability built in and the system is tied into the USAIoCoE Commander’s Dashboard so that USAIoCoE leadership can view the statistics for training in real time.

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**IKN Conference Administrator**

**Contact Us**

Knowledge Management Office  
Email: kmo@conus.army.mil  
Phone: 520.533.3941

---

**IKN Conference Administrator: Overview**

Welcome to the IKN Conference Administrator. This system is for you, the conference website administrator, to use for preparing and reviewing your conference websites.

The IKN Conference Administrator gives you the following customizable options:

- Select one of 228 website color schemes and 228 text colors

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Application:</strong></th>
<th>IKN Conference Administrator.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restrictions on Access:</strong></td>
<td>This is a restricted access system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description:</strong></td>
<td>The Conference Administrator allows designated personnel to create a new conference website for deployment to the IKN portal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Components:</strong></td>
<td>Users can select website color scheme, banner graphics, and menu items for top and left menu areas. Users build custom event registration forms and custom breakout session information areas. This application removes the IKN developers from the task to develop customized conference websites and puts the control in the hands of the conference action officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact Assessment:</strong></td>
<td>The Conference Administrator saved the IKN Portal web developers over 30 hours a month in developing and configuring conference websites for users. This system puts the control from inception to completion in the hands of the action officers assigned to host the conference. IKN has hosted over 100 conferences for MI organizations across the U.S.</td>
</tr>
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**IKN Document Management System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Application:</strong></th>
<th>Document Management System (DMS).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Requesting Organization:</strong></td>
<td>USAICoE KMO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description:</strong></td>
<td>The DMS is a controlled document repository. All documents that are published to the DMS are meta tagged for smart searching. Only privileged users can upload documents into the DMS. This control helps preserve document integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Components:</strong></td>
<td>The DMS allows users to either browse the document repository or perform a targeted search. The search capability allows users to filter by meta tags and use common advanced search criteria including natural, fuzzy logic, stemming, phonetic searching, and synonyms. It also includes a “Did you Mean?” prompt for spelling issues. The interface allows privileged users to create, rename, and delete folders. Privileged users can also upload, rename, and delete documents within their area of access. All users can subscribe to folders (for email updates) and can download files from the DMS to their desktops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact Assessment:</strong></td>
<td>The IKN DMS provides a full text search capability for MI documents in a 24/7/365 available web environment. It provides the capability to search or browse documents from anywhere in the world with a web connection. Documents are tagged to allow role based access to sensitive content.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IKN Website Management System

IKN Website Management System (WMS).

This is a restricted access system.

The IKN WMS allows organizational website administrators to prepare and review DRAFT versions of new website designs and publish changes to DRAFT and/or LIVE websites for their organization. The IKN WMS allows users to use the following customizing options:

- 228 website color schemes and 228 text colors.
- 11 banner designs or create-your-own custom banner.
- Include a top menu with the ability to set up menu items.
- Display your organization’s name above the left menu.
- Include a SHOUT BOX on the right side to manage user suggestions and questions and requests dedicated to the organization’s website.
- Enter preferred email contact address(es) to be used when users click on the Contact the Webmaster link on the organization website.

Website Management, Draft Management, Organization and User Management.

Prior to the deployment of the IKN WMS, IKN web developers spent hundreds of hours a year assisting organizations in the development and customization of their organizational websites. After deployment of the WMS, the IKN portal team spends only an average of about 20 hours a year assisting users with the development of websites. This has freed IKN developers to concentrate on the continuing development of new applications and updates to systems in IKN.

IKN Workgroups

January - March 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application:</th>
<th>IKN Workgroups.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Access:</td>
<td>This is a restricted access system. All users can see it, but access to folders is only given on a by name basis by folder owners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>IKN Workgroups is designed to be an online collaboration tool allowing small groups of users to upload and share documents in a controlled access environment. Workgroups give access to documents 24/7/365 from any location, including while TDY or deployed as long as the user has access to a web browser and Internet connectivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Components:</td>
<td>Workgroups contain the following major components: Create Folders, Rename Folders, Delete Folders, Subscribe to Folders, Manage Users and Permissions, Upload Documents, Delete Documents, Rename Documents, and Document Queuing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Assessment:</td>
<td>IKN Workgroups gave USAICoE and selected external organizations 24/7/365 access to collaborate on documents in a web environment. This was a significant step forward for organizations because the content is available outside of the USAICoE firewall while at home or TDY.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Information Technology Request System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application:</th>
<th>Information Technology Request System (ITR).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Access:</td>
<td>This is an open access system, however certain actions are restricted access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>The intent of this site is to provide a mechanism to create, submit, and manage IT requests to the USAICoE CIO/G6 office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Components:</td>
<td>The ITR system provides an IT request form for users with the Requestor role. It provides a workflow approval system for Approvers. It provides blogging, detailed status updates, and workflow assignment for IT support personnel and CIO/G6 Government leadership. It also provides a reporting and statistical analysis module for metrics gathering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Assessment:</td>
<td>The system is critical to the success of the USAICoE CIO/G6 organization. Prior to the ITR system, the CIO/G6 office was tracking incoming requests for service manually via email and spreadsheet. The ITR system allows reporting and statistical analysis as well as tracking and status update to submitters and approvers of critical ITRs.</td>
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MI Officer’s Student Management and Registration System

![MI Officer’s Student Management and Registration System](image)
NCOA Student Registration and Management System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application:</th>
<th>Officer Student Registration and Management System (SRMS).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Access:</td>
<td>Restricted system/role based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>The Officer SRMS is currently being utilized by the MICCC at the 304th MI Battalion. The application enables students to pre-register before arriving for class and provides the cadre and course managers the ability to manage all facets of the students time at the course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Components:</td>
<td>Pre-registration, course rosters, APFT scoring, height/weight scoring, academic scoring, reports (by individual and class).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Assessment:</td>
<td>The Officer SRMS provides a single database-driven application to handle dozens of processes that used to be managed individually via spreadsheet or email. It also significantly reduces the in-processing time for incoming students from 2 days down to under a day. The majority of in-processing activities can be handled in advance of student arrival using the SRMS. It is tied to ATRRS feeds in order to simplify and streamline the input of student records prior to class start.</td>
</tr>
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NCOA Student Registration and Management System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application:</th>
<th>NCOA Student Registration and Management System (SRMS).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Access:</td>
<td>Restricted system/role based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>The NCOA SRMS is very similar to the Officer SRMS. The application enables students to pre-register before arriving for class and provides the cadre and course managers the ability to manage all facets of the students time at the course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Components:</td>
<td>Pre-registration, course rosters, APFT scoring, height/weight scoring, academic scoring, reports (by individual and class).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Assessment:</td>
<td>The NCOA SRMS provides a single database-driven application to handle dozens of processes that used to be managed individually via spreadsheet or email. It also significantly reduces the in-processing time for incoming students from 2 days down to under a day. The majority of in-processing activities can be handled in advance of student arrival using the SRMS. It is tied to ATRRS feeds in order to simplify and streamline the input of student records prior to class start.</td>
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</table>
Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned

**Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned (OIL)**

**Application:** Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned (OIL).

**Restrictions on Access:** This is an open access system for issue submission, but it is a restricted access system for lessons learned management.

**Description:** The OIL system provides a public submission form that allows either anonymous or non-anonymous submission of observations. The system also has a restricted access management area for Lessons Learned organizational personnel to vet and manage submissions.

**Major Components:** The major components of the OIL system are: Observation Submission, User Administration, Lessons Learned Management, Approvals, Virtual Council of Colonels, and Search Interface.

**Impact Assessment:** Prior to the implementation of the OIL website, it was difficult for soldiers and other key personnel to know where to submit lessons learned and insights for improvements for the MI Community. This system provides a single input and management interface for all incoming MI feedback from the battlefield.

**Shout Box**

**Application:** Shout Box.

**Restrictions on Access:** This is a open access system.

**Description:** The IKN Shout Box allows all users to post questions to anyone in the MI Community. If questions aren’t answered by another IKN user within 72 hours of posting, the USAICoE KMO office tracks down the answer and answers the post. This section of IKN is one of the most successful tools in the portal. It’s meant to be an informal tool allowing users to post nearly any type of question to the MI Community.

**Major Components:** Create Message, Edit Message, Delete Message, Add Link, Add Email.

**Impact Assessment:** The Shout Box is one of the most used applications in IKN. It is nearly self sustaining in that shouts can be posted by any IKN user and can be responded to by any IKN user. 95 percent of shouts are answered by external users in the MI community. Only about 5 percent are answered directly by the IKN or KM office.

**TRADOC Requirements Analysis System Tracker**
**Application:** TRADOC Requirements Analysis System Tracker (TRAS Tracker).

**Requesting Organization:** USAICoE Training Development and Integration.

**Description:** The TRAS Tracker provides a web based application to upload and distribute training materials for approval. The system supports multiple types and levels of workflow approval including informal, concurrent staffing and formal, sequential approval.

**Major Components:** Upload Document Packages, Apply Staffing Templates, Online Approval, User and Role Management, Template Management, Document Repository, Approval Delegation.

**Impact Assessment:** The TRAS Tracker replaced an email based tracking system. With the email based system, documents had to be sent out as attachments to approvers. Changes had to be reviewed and manually incorporated into a master document. The system eliminated the dissemination of DRAFT documentation via email for approval, simplified and streamlined the change management process for documents, and created a traceable system that shows the outstanding and completed actions in real time.

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**Tasking System**

**Application:** Tasking System.

**Restrictions on Access:** This is an open access system for tasking review, but is restricted access for creating and responding to taskings.

**Description:** The USAICoE G3 office creates new taskings using this system and assigns the taskings to sub-organizations. Tasked organizations use the system to respond to the taskings. The system allows tracking and reporting and contains a comprehensive search and dashboard utility.

**Major Components:** Create Tasking, Manage Taskings, Tasking Dashboard.

**Impact Assessment:** Prior to the development and deployment of the USAICoE Tasking System, taskings were handled via email and spreadsheet. There was no central system to manage and track the status of taskings and there was no ability to tie them into a dashboard for statistical reporting and metrics collection.
### Virtual Footlocker

**Application:** Virtual Footlocker.

**Restrictions on Access:** This is an open access system for users to review, download, and create packages for future use. It is a restricted system for the management of training packages.

**Description:** The Virtual Footlocker is an application providing students, post-graduate students, and MI Professionals virtual access to current course materials in an electronic and searchable format for all Intelligence Center courses. The user has the ability to download these resources by course, in total or individually, and organize his/her virtual footlocker on a customizable IKN front page. This application provides access to resource materials anytime and reachback from any location.

**Major Components:** My Virtual Footlocker, Browse Student Packages, Package Manager, User Manager, and Search.

**Impact Assessment:** Prior to the deployment of the Virtual Footlocker, there was no way for students at Fort Huachuca to take critical training documentation with them to their operational units. The Virtual Footlocker allows students to reach back and get the latest versions of documentation that were used for training and are essential to mission success throughout their career. The MI Library and TMSB staff keeps the most up to date version of training documentation in the Virtual Footlocker so users don’t have to worry about superseded or outdated documentation.

If you are interested in using any of the IKN applications, please contact the Knowledge Management Office at usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.usaicoe-kmo@mail.mil or (520) 533-3841 or (520) 538-8837.

## Endnotes


2. FM 6-01.1 Knowledge Management Operations.

*Melissa A. Schreiner currently serves as the Knowledge Management Officer for the USAICoE, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. She retired after 20 years in MI and has been a DA Civilian since 2009.*
Since its inception on 1 March 2012, the Intelligence Synchronization Network (ISN) has been the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence’s (USAICoE) unclassified online collaboration site. ISN is a place where Military Intelligence (MI) professionals can rapidly connect and work together on projects and exchange ideas anytime and anywhere. Using ISN’s tool set allows users to establish business-style one-on-one and group connections and for engaging in collaboration efforts. In the past year we have seen broader MI Community use, as people look for effective and efficient means to collaborate in a resource constrained environment.

**The Platform**

ISN offers users the ability to use the latest Web 2.0 tools available behind CAC authentication. The ability to create blogs, discussion forums, upload and share documents, create quick and easy polls/surveys, and track projects enhances learning, improves business processes, and spurs innovation. The “social” aspect of ISN allows individual users to follow other users or groups and to expand their social and professional network. This allows individuals to connect with Soldiers, Army civilians, and defense contractors in their profession, and to keep up to date with the latest developments in their field.

**Setting Up Your Profile**
Setting up your profile is the first step to participating in the community. Start your experience by developing your individual profile on ISN at https://isn.ikn.army.mil (or click on ISN at the Networking and Feeds section at IKN after you ‘CAC in.’) Your profile establishes your presence on ISN, and it tells your peers and colleagues who you are and what you do. Provide as much information as possible in the biography and expertise fields to communicate your specialized skills. This allows others to more easily match up your skill sets with their needs.

Conversely, how will you find others with the knowledge and skills you need? ISN’s search tool is capable of searching for individuals and their associated skills. In the community-wide search box, the system will display possible results as you type in a search term. With predictive searching, ISN will return the most closely related names for you to browse. Click on the Browse menu and then select the People option, and then you can use the filter tool to narrow the results as to how they relate to you.

To edit your profile, login and click your name located in the upper right corner of the webpage. In the bottom right corner of your profile, go to the Actions list and click Edit profile and privacy. Once here, you can edit your profile to your liking. Required fields are starred (*).

**Explore the Community**

On the leftmost side of the page within the Browse Communities box are several links that enable you to explore the site. Simply click on Spaces, Projects, or Groups to reveal the content in each category. The Search option is also located here.

*Spaces.* Presently ISN has one Space: Ask ISN. It is hosted by the ISN staff and designed to keep the Warfighter informed and assist with any Requests for Information.

*Projects.* When there is a tight schedule for your mission or task, using a Project can help you stay organized and keep you on track. In ISN, creating a project encourages teams to plan and stay ahead with the use of a calendar. Checkpoints on the calendar allow the entire group to have visibility on what other team members are doing. Help prevent missed deadlines by setting up reminders to stay on track. Use the Project Calendar to see a list of checkpoints or tasks. Hover over a date to create or edit checkpoints or tasks.
Groups. Keep teamwork simple by using an ISN group. A Group is a virtual space for your organization or topic of interest. Create your own group based on work needs or interests. Restrict membership or let anyone join, it is up to you! Users can join groups that are of interest to them, and participate in the group by using the collaboration tools available. As of 22 January 2013, ISN has 86 active groups in use. These groups cover a variety of topics or organizations. If you do not see a group that interests you, feel free to create it.
As an example, the USAICoE Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) is extensively using Groups. NCOA instructors are leveraging the capabilities of ISN to make curriculum more engaging and interactive among students. ISN is enabling instructors to provide a learner-centric environment through the facilitation of questions, discussing topics, polling their classes, and receiving updates. Since each class group is restricted to only those students in the class, it provides a closed environment for students to interact openly.

In this case, the ability to set this restriction also prevents future students from seeing the past work of a prior class. Another advantage for the instructors is that it allows students to stay connected when away from the classroom, which keeps the learning cycle continuously moving. You will be pleasantly surprised at what your team can accomplish within a Group.

ISN provides three *What Matters* (WM) icons (to the right of the *Home* tab at the top), a customized, personal view of information and activity that is unified into three streams: *Activity*, *Communications*, and *Actions*. The WM icons prioritize what matters most to each user, based on who and what the user follows, participates in, and comments on. The WM *Activity* is ISN’s way of helping users keep up-to-date on the latest postings, questions, and content.

The user can also set filters to highlight the user’s followed activities of people, places, and content. WM *Communications* shows replies, direct mentions, messages, and shares—all in one place. WM *Actions* is a place where the user can manage all their awaiting workflow actions, such as document and friending approval notifications.

**Discussions**

To the far right of the screen is the *Discussions* area. ISN is the ideal place to engage in conversations, generate collaborations, and provide opportunities for exchange of ideas. Users can start discussions, ask questions, or introduce new ideas to the community. Discussions are a quick way to get an answer to a question or gather feedback on an idea from the community. Some social features of the discussion tool include the ability to *like* different responses, tag topics in the original posting, attach files to the posting, and respond directly to each comment.

Liking a post shows the community that others support what that user wrote. Tagging the post allows the ISN search engine to find content based on those keywords. Attaching a file allows others to access the file quickly and provide a visual aid to the discussion. The system will visually indent the responses made to each specific posting, creating a clear hierarchy that shows the context of each comment and its respective response. If someone replies to your question with useful information then you can mark the reply as *Helpful or Correct*. This allows others who have the same question to quickly see which replies are the most useful.
Here are some ways to use online discussions:

- Instructors can use the discussion forums to extend the reach of the classroom by posting a question or topic and asking students to respond to it. Since the forum contents are viewable to everyone with group access, students can respond to both the original question as well as build on or critique the comments of their peers. This leads to richer engagement among all in the class. Since the discussion is not limited by class time, there is more time to grow and develop. Finally, for those who are quiet in nature or prefer to have time to think about the issues, online discussion forums provide a good alternative to being put on the spot in a classroom.

- Discussion forums avoid long email trails and frees important content that can be trapped in email. For example, if someone new comes into an ongoing project, he/she will be unaware of the history of the project. Most of the time, current team members will forward a few emails that they deem important and have the new person read them. However, this presents a few obvious problems. What if they do not forward an important email because they simply forgot? Or what if somebody leaves the project and all of his or her emails are deleted? In this case, all of the information that was acquired is now lost.

  If team members, instead, posted messages to a discussion board, the content will still be available for all team members to see and read. If new people join the team, they would simply read the discussion boards to get the entire picture and history of the group. Current team members would not have to spend time digging through their inboxes to find important emails to forward to the new person. This saves time and effort for the entire team.

**Documents**

ISN provides its users a place to share and review office documents. This ability enables viewing, version control, collaboration, and editing. Because the document is open to the group, members can view it at their leisure. Version control shows the progress of the document over time. If the current version is incorrect, users can simply restore a previous version. For editing, the system will lock down the document to a single user to avoid the issue of teammates overwriting each other. The document stays in sync, as it never leaves ISN. For final approval before publishing, there is an option to select the approving official’s name in the system. ISN will then submit a request and notify them of the document’s status.

**Blogs**

A blending of the words “web” and “logs,” blogs provide an easy-to-update platform to push information out to your users and obtain feedback through comments. To create a blog or comment you simply create your material and post it. Most blogging systems, including ISN, display blog posts in a reverse chronological order, which enables the reader to see the most recent information first, and then backtrack to see previous developments of the subject. Posts can include text, graphics, links to other relevant websites, and any other associated media.

The primary difference between a blog and a regular static website is the ability to obtain user feedback. Because of this attribute, blogging is a social media tool. Other users can follow your blog so that they remain updated on your latest posts. Users can also comment on your posts, and leave valuable feedback and comments. To complete the feedback loop, the blogger can directly respond to the comments or create a brand new post if necessary. As you can see, blogs provide a great way for an organization to push information to the community at large and receive feedback from the community in an open and transparent manner.

**Polls**

Polls in ISN are another tool for collaboration. They empower users by allowing them to create simple surveys and gain immediate feedback. Users can create a poll in their groups, have members vote on their preferred choice, and leave comments for further discussion.
Invite Friends and Contact Us

Invite friends and colleagues using the Invite Friends Button from the homepage or from within a specific group, (in the Actions menu click Invite people to your group). Feel free to contact the ISN support team by clicking on the button in the lower left hand corner or visit Ask ISN Space. The ISN staff is prepared to help with any of your questions, suggestions, and comments.

References


Introduction

Knowledge management (KM) is a critical enabler for the Military Intelligence (MI) Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA). The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) KM architecture, known as the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN), provides the necessary information framework to support the NCOA’s training mission. IKN codification and personalization tools enable cadre, staff, and students to participate in communities of practice, tailored data-feeding reports, streamlined processes and procedures, and enhances the 21st century Soldier competencies in our student population. This article will highlight specific examples of KM use within the NCOA.

Student Registration Management System

The NCOA Student Registration Management System (SRMS) is an online database/management tool that synchronizes ATRRS student/class data with student confirmation of attendance. With this up-to-date data, validating student attendance and preparing class/platoon administrative documentation in advance of student arrival is simplified and done automatically through codification. After students sign-in for training, the Small Group Leader (SGL) updates data stored in the SRMS to reflect student performance throughout the course. The S1, S3, and course cadre use the SRMS to produce numerous administrative products including graduation reports, student alert rosters, class rosters, and the DA Form 1059, Academic Evaluation Report.

According to SFC Watts, a Senior Leader Course (SLC) SGL, the NCOA SRMS “allows us to in-process students more efficiently, get to the training faster, and significantly reduce errors in the reports that we publish. This system saves us time and allows us to focus on our mission: training senior NCOs.”

Workgroups

IKN’s Workgroups application on NIPRnet and SIPRnet is widely used by NCOA cadre, and students. NCOA personnel use it to share class related information and to make libraries of performance support products and references. These materials are available to students attending training at the NCOA or at their point-of-need afterwards. For example, the MOS 35M Human Intelligence Collector Advanced Leader Course (ALC) student workgroup folder on IKN NIPRnet contains report templates, doctrinal manuals, and references. 35M ALC students request access to this folder upon arrival and even maintain access to it after graduation. As doctrine and information changes, this workgroup folder is updated to reflect the newest information available.
The NCOA Training Management section also uses IKN Workgroups as a key enabler of its One Army School System strategy. IKN Workgroups simplifies the annual transfer of Active Component courseware to the Training Development Integration Division Reserve Component liaison for rapid distribution to Army Reserve and Army National Guard units tasked with the MI NCOES training mission.

**Intelligence Synchronization Network**

The Intelligence Synchronization Network (ISN) is quickly becoming a favorite tool of many NCOA courses because of its powerful ability to extend student learning beyond the classroom. According to SFC Whitcomb, MOS 35T MI Systems Maintainer/Integrator ALC Senior Instructor, “ISN is an integral part of their academic strategy.” 35T ALC SGLs use ISN to begin the process of building a sense of “class community” before students arrive by requesting students conduct online introductions and describe their expectations for ALC. During the 35T ALC, students use ISN to collaborate on assignments and projects, make recommendations and present opinions to each other, and reflect on their learning. ISN provides a ranking system that shows how active students are in the discussion group. This makes it very easy for the SGL to gauge a student’s participation visually.

Additionally, 35T SGLs rate the quality of student postings by clicking on “Like.” When students see that their post did not meet the SGL’s criteria for excellence (relevance and quality), and their post is not “Liked” by the instructor, they quickly adjust to improve the quality of their comments. SLC SGL SFC Barris uses ISN to “extend the classroom” when students wish to pursue an issue spawned by in-class discussion. When this occurs, SFC Barris assigns a student the responsibility to post the discussion question or topic in ISN, monitor student feedback, and bring the discussion back into the classroom for more face-to-face
discussion when time permits. According to SFC Barris, this strategy provides an outlet for students to query their classmates, receive feedback, and encourage more in-depth and critical reflection.

**Instructor Resources Website**

In the past year, NCOA launched the Instructor Resources website using IKN as the platform. The Instructor Resources website provides NCOA SGLs with a one-stop-shop for all NCOA training development products, standard operating procedures, and references and resources needed to create and execute student-centered training. In keeping with Army Learning Model 2015 characteristics of a learner-centric learning environment, the website also provides SGLs with strategies and recommendations for the inclusion of simulations and games, social media, and appropriate use of learning theory in the design of lesson plans and training. Instructors use the “Shout Box” as the communication vehicle to address issues and request additional information.

This website creates a strong NCOA “Community of Practice” by consolidating information our SGLs need to perform their mission and provides a vehicle for shared feedback. The Instructor Resources website is reducing the amount of time SGLs spend looking for specific information while increasing the quality of their training products.

**Conclusion**

The USAICoE KM framework supports the NCOA mission of providing training and education for the Army’s MI NCOs. ISN, Workgroups, SharePoint, and our NCOA SGL Resources Website enable personalization of content, collaboration, and promote “Communities of Practice” across our organization. Codification tools such as the SRMS automate tasks and replace manual processes. The Army’s MI ALC and SLC can use this saved time and reallocate it for more training.

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Rebecca Oliver has been a NCOA Training Specialist since 2007. Her background in educational technology, engineering human performance through instructional design, cognitive task analysis, and application of traditional and contemporary learning theory in military training and education has given her a broad base of knowledge from which to approach many topics. She especially enjoys mentoring and guiding NCOA cadre through the process of developing superior student-centered training, and is currently conducting research on the appropriate application of Alan Tough’s Self-Directed Learning Theory within the MI NCOA.
The Military Intelligence Space Army Professional Forum Today

Military Intelligence Space (MI Space), formerly Military Intelligence Net (MI Net), was created as part of the Knowledge Network Division (KND) and the Battle Command Knowledge Systems (BCKS) Professional Forums (now the Army Professional Forums (APF)). The MI Space forum is a community of practice (COP) that provides a collaborative environment for the Army and MI professionals. The MI Space forum focuses its contents and discussions on MI and the MI community. It is a great place to collaborate with other members of the MI community, share observations, best practices, insights, techniques, lessons learned, as well as sharing products (after action reviews, standard operating procedures (SOPs), handbooks, etc.).

The History of BCKS, CALL, and the APF

On September 7, 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army, the Honorable R. L. Brown and Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, issued an Army Knowledge Management (AKM) Guidance Memorandum announcing a new training vision for the Army:

“The Army must think faster than our enemies, and the way to do this is through shared knowledge. If we can think and respond faster than our adversaries, we can defeat them before they have a chance to react.”

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was charged with developing and distributing knowledge via a dynamic, global-knowledge network called the BCKS. Eight short years later, the Army has developed, refined, and implemented an Army wide KM Program that enhances the sharing of best practices and lessons learned. Soldiers can reach around the globe and find knowledge virtually in real time, empowering them with the ability to make more informed decisions based on the experiences of others that have been in similar situations.

BCKS was established with operational Global War on Terrorism funds under the Combined Arms Center and was charged with preparing the Army for the next patrol rather than the next war. With initial guidance, BCKS began to implement systems to achieve these goals. Their first initiatives included KM Forums, KM Training, KM Doctrine, multi-repository search engine, digital storytelling, and interactive video development. The organization was divided into four distinct divisions; Knowledge Technology Division, Knowledge Services Division, KND, and an Operations Cell.

The KND hosted the Army Professional Forums. These communities provided Soldiers throughout the Army a collaborative environment where knowledge could be shared across the globe in real time. KND housed the Army’s network of KM Advisors as well, a group of subject matter experts who provide KM expertise, skills, training, and solutions to Army units and organizations. They supported the commander as functional advisors. They also acted as field representatives of BCKS by providing assistance in COP management, SOP development, facilitation, and content management advice.

In September 2010, BCKS was disbanded and reorganized as the Army Operational KM proponent under TRADOC with responsibility for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities issues related to KM throughout the Army. MI Space and the rest of the APF were then integrated within the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The concept was to provide CALL with a more efficient and responsive organization to Soldiers around the world. The power of peer to peer learning provided by the forums would now be coupled with the thoroughly analyzed and captured knowledge of CALL. Linking to the Request for Information (RFI) System enriches and expands CALL’s extensive da-
tabase. This enables it to not only respond to the individual soldier, but to potentially provide that same information to the entire professional forums population, which now exceeds 270,000 members. In addition, forum members can now comment on the RFI to provide their own thoughts and insights, as well as assisting in narrowing the focus about what is more useful to our Soldiers.

**The Future of MI Space and the Army Professional Forums**

In late March 2013, the MI Space Forum and all APF will migrate from our current software to milSuite software. There are a couple of significant items to know on the software transition. One is that memberships won’t transfer. Everyone who is currently a member, and wishes to move, will have to go there and join. Members of MI Space and the APF are being urged to go on milSuite and establish an account now. This is particularly important for current discussions and documents to be attributed to the original contributor when the content is transferred. Another significant change on the new software is access will be Common Access Card (CAC) only.

**Editor’s Note:** UPDATE: To sign up for a milSuite account, go to https://www.milsuite.mil/. If you already have a milSuite account, you can join MI Space at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/join-apf/join-mi-space.

Once you have joined MI Space, you’ll be able to access the MI Space forum at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/military_intelligence_space_(mi_space). Please be advised that the entire milSuite community can only be accessed by CAC holders. The migration from the current software to the milSuite software will occur not later than 29 March 2013.

**ALWAYS OUT FRONT**

(Continued from page 2)

valuable insight to social networking in his article on “Social Networking: Tools for Collaboration.”

KM is recognized as a key enabler as we adjust our processes and training to meet new and improved technology. As a critical enabler, the Army launched KM training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to facilitate its use. Mr. Jim Claunche’s article on “Forging Army KM: The Army Operational Knowledge Management Qualification Course” is an informative article on the establishment of the Army Operational KM Proponent and the KM Qualification Course with an associated additional skill identifier. This course was created to qualify Soldiers and civilians for KM assignments in MTOE and TDA organizations across the Army.

Like technology, our organizations must also adapt to meet the changing times and requirements. What was once the Battle Command Knowledge Systems at Fort Leavenworth has reorganized under the Center for Army Lessons Learned and has been replaced by the Army Professional Forums. Mr. Lee Girard’s article on “MI Space: A Place for Intelligence Professionals” outlines this transition and the recent move to MilBook as part of the Army’s MilSuite.

MI Space is a forum for MI Professionals and provides a number of important topic areas and the opportunity for Soldiers worldwide to collaborate. MI Space can be accessed if you already have a milSuite account, you can join MI Space at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/join-apf/join-mi-space. Once you have joined MI Space, you’ll be able to access the MI Space forum here: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/apf/military_intelligence_space_(mi_space).

In a time of constrained resources, how can we more effectively save time, talent, and treasure? We must constantly look at outdated and under-used applications and processes. We must change from being knowledge hoarders to knowledge sharers and provide the proper applications and tools to make this transition successful. KM’s goal is to assist hierarchical and stove-piped organizations in becoming knowledge-centric organizations. An organization becomes knowledge centric when it can connect people to each other and deliver the right information-and only the right information-at the right time to enhance learning, innovation, effectiveness, and productivity. It provides the ability to make better and more informed decisions and take action. KM is critical in this way forward. Leverage our world-class KM capabilities to make your units better. Enjoy all the articles in this MIPB and take some time to explore IKN’s capabilities at https://ikn.army.mil and ISN at http://isn.ikn.army.mil!

**Always Out Front!**
Introduction

It may not be evident, but Knowledge Management has been a key component of Army operations since 1775, at least as defined by Army doctrine in FM 6-01.1.

Knowledge Management (KM) is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision-making.1

This definition describes an intentional process of collecting, analyzing, and transferring knowledge of the battlefield and combatant forces in order to make better strategic and tactical decisions. The concept of gathering and disseminating knowledge about the enemy was a key component of General George Washington’s command structure during the Revolutionary War and remains so today. What we now call KM is an essential part of Mission Command and a primary mission of the Army Operational KM Proponent (AOKMP).

Today’s Army has a better understanding of the people, processes, tools, and organization necessary to collect, analyze, and transfer knowledge—important underpinnings of Mission Command and decision making. Consequently, the army is developing the training necessary to make KM an integral part of staff and decision making processes—a major responsibility of the Army’s KM Proponent Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The AOKMP

In order to manage change within the Army, the Department of the Army (DA) established Force Modernization Proponents which are responsible for determining and integrating doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policies (DOTMLPF) requirements and actions. AR 5-22, The Army Force Modernization Proponent System-designates the Commander, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), as proponent for Army Operational KM, who has delegated responsibility to the AOKMP Office as a part of CAC’s Combat Developments Integration Directorate.2

In order to accomplish the training part of the proponent’s mission, AOKMP conducts three KM training courses: the Army KM Qualification Course, the KM Representative Course, and the Army KM Senior Leader Workshop.

The “Q” Course

The primary course conducted by AOKMP is the Army KM Qualification Course (the “Q” Course). This course is conducted five times a year at Fort Leavenworth. Each class is three weeks long, with 16 to 20 students per class.

The objective of this course is to qualify soldiers and civilians for KM assignments in MTOE and TDA organizations across the Army. Students who attend the course will be trained in the skills necessary to plan, integrate, and coordinate KM operations across the spectrum of military operations as well as the integration and management of Army Mission Command Systems in order to optimize situational understanding and effective collaboration. Students who complete this course are awarded the 1E Additional Skill Identifier (KM Professional), and will be fully qualified for KM assignments upon graduation.

The “Q” course trains Active Army, Reserve, and National Guard officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) throughout the Operating and Generating Forces. But is not just for soldiers, numerous DA civilians (DACs) have also graduated from the course in preparation for their KM duties.
To date, the AOKMP “Q” Course has graduated 152 students from across the Army, to include students from TRADOC, FORSCOM, and OCONUS staffs and from brigade through Corps/ASCC. In addition, one U. S. Navy (USN) officer attended the course.

### Enrolling in the Course

In general, students must enroll in the course (Course Number 9E/920-S1/ASI1E (MC-CT) through the Army Training Resources and Requirements System, though in some cases direct coordination with the proponent office is required. Limited training resources require a priority to deploying units, though the proponent makes a concerted effort to ensure a diverse mixture of students in each class, including officers, warrant officers, NCOs, DACs, and Active, USAR, and NG.

As currently configured, each organization must pay TDY for students. As budget lines are established, it is intended that students will attend the course TDY en route to their KM assignment. Five courses are currently scheduled for FY 2013:

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<tr>
<td>7-25 January 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 February - 15 March 2013</td>
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<td>29 April - 17 May 2013</td>
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<td>15 July - 1 August 2013</td>
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<td>9-27 September 2013</td>
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With the exception of the January 2013 course, all of these classes have seats available, though they are generally filled 30 to 60 days in advance.

### Attending the Course

Prior to attending the “Q Course” students should read and understand FM 6-01.1 and the KM-related sections of ADP 3-0 Operations, ADRP 3-0 Operations, ADP 6-0 Mission Command, and ADRP 6-0 Mission Command. Students will be sent administrative instructions which will provide information necessary for TDY at Fort Leavenworth.

In addition to conducting KM Assessments and developing a KM Strategy, the “Q” Course curriculum includes a variety of subjects based upon the KM components defined in FM 6-01.1:

- **Process:** KM Theory and Doctrine, KM Fundamentals, KM Processes.
- **People:** Collaborative Teaming, Staff Integration and Battle Rhythm, Virtual Communities.
- **Tools:** Knowledge Systems Integration; COP Management.
- **Organization:** KM Training Plans, Knowledge Mapping Fundamentals, Fundamentals of Content Management.

### When You Return to Your Unit

Graduates of the KM Qualification Course return to their organizations fully qualified to establish and develop KM programs. Capable of directly improving knowledge and decision making processes within their organization, “Q” Course graduates will enable their units to focus on the Army’s KM objective: getting the right information, in the right form, to the right person, at the right time, in the right place, in order to make decisions that translate into timely and effective actions.

### Endnotes

1. FM 6-01.1, Knowledge Management Operations, July 2012, 1.
2. AR 5-22, the Army Force Modernization Proponent System, RAR 25 March 2011, Table 2.

*Jim L. Claunchock is a Military Analyst with the AOKMP Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He retired with 28 years military service (U. S. Army and U. S. Army Reserve) as a Field Artillery Missile Officer.*
“Social Media” is a term used today to describe our increasingly connected interaction with information. “Regular” media information sources such as newspapers, television, radio, books, and magazines, while useful, can be thought of as limited one-way data pathways—you can read or listen, but there is little ability to comment or respond. However, social media now provides us with an interactive means to communicate, coordinate, and expand knowledge. These tools are leading us to ever greater capabilities for collaboration, innovation, and creativity.

According to Wikipedia, social media is the “means of interactions among people in which they create, share, and exchange information and ideas in virtual communities and networks.” The rise of these interactions has been dependent on the development of mobile and web-based technological advances to “create highly interactive platforms via which individuals and communities share, co-create, discuss, and modify user-generated content.” The different forms of these technologies include online magazines, Internet forums, “blogs” (weblogs, social blogs, microblogging), wikis, social networks, podcasting, photograph and video sharing, rating and collaboration sites. The key point is that all of these involve user interaction.

Familiar examples of social media sites include news blogging, social networking, sharing (photo and video), and wikis. Most people have probably heard of popular sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Wikipedia, although there are many other examples. If a website invites interaction/collaboration with itself and with other site visitors, then by definition it is a social media site.

Today, many Internet users avail themselves of knowledge contained in social media, even if they don’t actively engage in direct interaction available on a site. An example of this is the research that I conducted for this article. One of the many sites I visited is Wikipedia, which is “written collaboratively by largely anonymous Internet volunteers.” While information should be taken for what it is, since it is a “live” collaboration by many contributors, data is “continually created and updated...within minutes, rather than months or years.” Anyone with Internet access to the site can contribute/update, and there are currently over 4 million articles.

Another example of how we use social media involves my son, who is in the 7th grade. Thankfully, he has learned that when he is doing his homework and has a question on a problem (usually math that his parents can’t answer), he can find the answer online. On several sites that he utilizes, to include
YouTube, he can usually (and quickly) find video that has been uploaded of instructors demonstrating how to perform the task. This capability to leverage knowledge online is very popular with his parents.

In addition to research, social media can be used for group networking or collaboration. While social networking services are generally more focused on “individuals sharing messages in a more-or-less undirected way,” (again according to Wikipedia), social collaboration services “focus on the identification of groups and collaboration spaces in which messages are explicitly directed at the group and the group activity feed is seen the same way by everyone.” This group collaboration may have an explicit goal, can facilitate a brainstorming process, or may be intended for knowledge sharing or synchronization of effort.

The ability to create social networking groups of users that share common interests, affiliations, or goals (called Communities of Interest), leads to improved idea sharing, knowledge, and productivity. In the business world today, companies have developed “interactive communities that connect individuals based on shared business needs or experiences” with many also providing “specialized networking tools and applications” for productivity. While modern technologies certainly help with creativity, collaboration, and communication, a much earlier example of social networking is Benjamin Franklin’s Junto organization.

Formed in 1727 in Philadelphia, the Junto was a “club for mutual improvement” with a stated purpose to “debate questions of morals, politics, and natural philosophy, and to exchange knowledge of business affairs.” This group of twelve friends came from diverse occupations and backgrounds, but “all shared a spirit of inquiry and a desire to improve themselves, their community, and to help others.” Through the Junto’s weekly meetings, Franklin was able to use their discussions as a springboard for community action that included concepts such as volunteer firefighting clubs, improved community security, and a public hospital.

Today at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), Fort Huachuca, Arizona, there are two main social media sites for coordination, collaboration, and knowledge sharing. The first, the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN), hosts a large number of applications, unit/organization and community web pages, and information storage, retrieval, and sharing tools. Users from students to instructors and cadre to deployed soldiers can utilize tools for in-processing, training, tasking, and knowledge storing and sharing of documents and other media.

The second is the Intelligence Synchronization Network (ISN). This site is a fully “social” one due to its focus on collective sharing and group interaction. It has built in blogging and collaboration tools that are tailored for and by unique community groups of users. Groups range from single shared-interest topics, accessing, and organizing information and conversations to tightly focused groups working on specific issues and problems, to training courses collectively working on group homework assignments and mentored by instructors.

Social networking, online connectivity, and expanding two-way and collective collaboration tools are greatly improving our information sharing and knowledge growth. As tools, technology, and connections increase in the future, our use of these networks as both individuals and as groups will only increase. In nearly 300 years we have gone from Franklin’s small group of local friends physically sitting at a table to a virtual, real-time, and connected knowledge-growing and sharing society.

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Introduction
As Coalition Forces (CF) prepare to transition out of Afghanistan, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is faltering as a governing body. The weakened state of the Afghan government is primarily due to its failure in three specific areas:

♦ Over-complication and confusion of requirements for tashkil (government allotted civil service positions) vacancy fills.
♦ The inability of GIRoA to effectively inject its authority into traditional rule of law.
♦ Acceptance of a budgetary structure that bottle-necks funds at the national and provincial levels, and prevents almost all funds from reaching district levels where they are most needed.

GIRoA’s success as a legitimate administration hinges upon its ability to remedy these three governance issues. If it does not succeed in these areas, GIRoA will likely fail.

Filling Vacant District and Provincial Tashkil Positions
The low percentage of filled key line ministry positions (tashkils) throughout Afghanistan is a pressing issue that undermines the effectiveness of GIRoA. These vacancies, if left unmanned, will continue to disrupt the establishment of effective governance, development, and security in Afghanistan’s districts. The GIRoA hiring process is extremely complex and is one of the most misunderstood aspects of Afghan governance. On the whole, staffing tashkils at the district and provincial levels is a slow and laborious activity that, according to GIRoA doctrine, requires very specific conditions to be met. To officially nominate a GIRoA official:

♦ The requested positional salary must be included in the “operational” budget.
♦ An official vacancy notice must be posted.
♦ A hiring committee must form and approve the candidacy.
♦ The candidate must pass specific testing.
♦ The candidate must receive official nomination from the requisite higher level GIRoA official.
♦ If the candidate has not previously received position training, he or she must complete official training.

by Captain Jennifer L. Purser
These confusing requirements and extensive steps complicate selection of GIRoA officials and often fail to take into consideration the lack of capable human capital in many of Afghanistan’s more rural districts. Contributing to the confusion of a system already significantly bureaucratized, officials are often seemingly arbitrarily assigned without regard to their ability to perform the required tasks. As a result of this often misleading and convoluted system, GIRoA tashkil positions frequently remain unoccupied and these key line ministry vacancies continue to degrade good governance in most districts in Afghanistan. Furthermore, despite efforts of GIRoA transparency, appointment of officials is a highly political process that is determined more often along tribal ties and nepotism than it is based upon candidate quality.

In order to fully understand how GIRoA’s bureaucratic system promotes a weak governance structure, it is important to grasp the process by which officials are hired. A common misconception is that the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) organization is responsible for nomination and appointment of GIRoA officials. While IDLG does play a significant role, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) actually has overall responsibility for hiring officials. Furthermore, IARCSC is responsible for the verification of the integrity and efficiency of the hiring process.

The respective ministries and/or directorates provide qualifications for hiring, appointment approval, and subsequent training specific to the position being advertised, and is also responsible for completing the hiring of the official. The relationship between IARCSC and IDLG is co-dependent. IDLG provides its prioritized vacancies and employment requirements to the IARCSC, which then is responsible for testing and hiring candidates. The same process applies to the other line ministries and their subordinate provincial directorates, and extension agents at the district level.

The IARCSC catalogs positions into eight categories. Category one is a provincial governor (PGs). District governors (DGs) and deputy provincial governors (DPGs) constitute category two. Once nomination and testing is complete, candidates for positions in categories one and two must be approved by the President of Afghanistan.

Categories three and four are comprised of the line ministry positions as authorized by the provincial and district tashkils, such as a Provincial Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) representative, or District Ministry of Education (MoE) representative. After testing, these candidates are approved at the national line ministry level.

Positions in categories five and six are civil servants at provincial level, and seven and eight are civil servants at district level. Examples of positions five through eight include secretaries, drivers, and other subordinate provincial or district civil servant positions. These officials may be appointed by either the district or provincial governor, depending on whether the position is at the district or provincial level.

Compounding the appointment difficulties inherent in an already complex system, the IDLG Handbook does not clearly explain the various categories of officials, the particular positions assigned to each category, and their respective appointment/approval authorities.

As discussed, the public hiring process begins with advertising of specific vacancies. Once candidates are nominated, they are subject to written (70 points) and oral (30 points) exams; 50 points in any combination are required as a passing score for testing. Following testing, the candidate must achieve gaining agency approval, final approval authority, and then complete follow-on training. The Civil Service Appointments Board has the responsibility to assign an appointments committee to identify and appoint eligible employees in categories one and two level positions prior to Presidential approval. The appointments of PGs, PDGs, and DGs take a minimum of seven weeks, longer depending on the President’s attentiveness to the approval packet.
In a complete contradiction to the description of GIRoA published doctrine, PGs or the IDLG may request waivers to place unqualified district governors or other tashkki candidates in districts where the situation dictates a need for immediate leadership, for example, where security is deemed unsatisfactory. To caveat, these hiring specificities are by policy, and despite GIRoA’s insistence that this policy be followed, frequent anecdotal exceptions point to a lack of discipline in the selection and appointment of GIRoA officials. Recent examples include officials in districts of Zabul and Kandahar Provinces.

One district governor failed his IARCSC administered exams, yet was still appointed due to extenuating circumstances in the district related to security and development. Another district governor was appointed by the provincial governor even though IDLG had selected a different individual to replace the removed official. Furthermore, the new district governor had not been vetted through the prescribed district governor screening process. Such examples only serve to cement the perception of GIRoA’s hiring system as a heavily flawed and corrupted organization.

In this altogether defective and kleptocratic system, many district governors are quite corrupt, taking advantage of numerous ways to embezzle funds and monopolize power brokerage at any opportunity. District officials extort money by overcharging for taskeras (national identification cards), demanding bribe money from any contractors who are working in the district, extorting money from material suppliers, and stealing money from various nationally or non-governmental organization (NGO) funded programs (i.e., the National Solidarity Program).

In addition, although there is a burdensome bureaucratic process, many individuals are placed in positions of authority based solely on a patronage network. Even once hired, district officials often exhibit chronic absenteeism and demonstrate a complete lack of accountability with regards to job performance. Nevertheless, regardless of true functionality or efficiency, this process is Afghanistan’s government-implemented system to hire administrative officials. Until GIRoA takes the necessary steps towards simplifying and/or repairing the process, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) should support the IDLG approved doctrinal system as best as possible through improved understanding and mentorship of GIRoA officials.

### Rule of Law: Implementation of Traditional Dispute Resolution

The Taliban justice system is best defined as a loose confederation of village-level shadow court systems that compete with the rule of law capability within GIRoA. The Taliban’s embedded nature within Afghan society coupled with its inherent ability to violently enforce decisions has allowed the organization to establish itself as a chief dispute resolution arbitrator and de facto rule of law enforcer in rural Afghanistan. The Taliban has been able to establish itself as a grassroots power broker and chief shadow governing body in the country.

Without control over rule of law within Afghanistan, GIRoA will continue to be delegitimized by the Taliban. In order to encourage the population of Afghanistan to turn to the GIRoA legal system instead of Taliban shadow courts, GIRoA must place a focus on increasing the quantity and power of the legal civil dispute mediators, or huquqs. Of importance, in some areas of Afghanistan, huquqs act as the civil mediators themselves. In others, they serve a mere secretarial and administrative role for mediation completed by other entities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Position Example</th>
<th>Approval Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PG</td>
<td>IARCSC/IDLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DG/DPG</td>
<td>IARCSC/IDLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Provincial DAIL/MoE/MoPH</td>
<td>Central Ministry/IDLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>District DAIL/MoE/MoPH/Huquq</td>
<td>Central Ministry/IDLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Provincial Secretary</td>
<td>PG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Provincial Civil Servant</td>
<td>PG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>District Secretary</td>
<td>DG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>District Civil Servant</td>
<td>DG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Optimally, a huquq sits at the district center and hears disputes at the district and sub-district level, where Taliban justice has become most intensely manifested, and where a true need for civil arbitration exists. Judicial vacuums exist where civil disputes remain unresolved. This void allows Taliban operatives relatively unimpeded access to the Afghan population. Villagers who do attempt to utilize the formal GIRoA courts often find them to be absent, inaccessible, unreliable, and/or corrupted, therefore serving to delegitimize the only elements of GIRoA rule of law.

Numerous conflict resolution solutions are applicable depending on tribal affiliation, social and tribal status, political alignment, wealth, and manpower within villages, districts, and provinces. For most Afghans, reliance on local maliks (respected village leaders or elders) and jirgas (best comparable, in a Western sense, to community decision making bodies comprised of inter-village or inter-familial district elders) theoretically should serve as a fully functional conflict resolution mechanism. However, civilians can bring their disputes to a variety of local actors. Typically villagers may initiate their search for civil dispute resolution with their local malik. Next, if no solution is achieved with the malik, they may seek out mullahs, other elders, mirabs (village water representative), or other local powerbrokers, such as wealthy landowners. Absent huquq or Taliban enforcement, villagers may go so far as to inquire with the Afghan local police commander, district governor, or district chief of police, if applicable. Combating Taliban justice from an intelligence perspective is dependent upon an understanding of the dynamics of the Taliban, malik, jirga, and other GIRoA and non-GIRoA leaders. GIRoA must develop an accessible, fair, and just form of conflict resolution in order to establish itself as the ultimate authority in rural Afghanistan. Furthermore, GIRoA must understand how it can effectively disrupt the insurgent ability to dominate rule of law. As yet, it does not.

Conversely, the Taliban justice system offers structured, restorative justice comparable to a typical traditional justice forum. Disputes are resolved through consultations with persons appointed by the shadow government who hear the testimony and provide resolutions based on equity, customary law, and Sharia law. Decisions are enforced through the most widely understood method possible—violence. At the very least, the population understands that the winner of a dispute mediated by the Taliban will have the insurgent organization’s support in the case of the Afghan equivalent of an appeal.

For the Taliban, this ensures population loyalty, adherence to Sharia law, perception that the Taliban is community oriented—and most important, it counters GIRoA efforts. The villagers’ attraction to the Taliban is typically rooted in the absence of effective alternatives in most rural villages, rather than ideological affinity. Generally, if the Taliban is providing a rule of law service, then it is something the villagers need; therefore, ISAF or Afghan leadership can conclude that a GIRoA rule of law entity at the specific location is either absent or broken.

Where malik and/or jirga presence exists, and the locals respect and use both entities, then the Taliban does not have a strong mediation platform. On the other hand, where there is a malik, but no ability to form a jirga, there will likely be the need for Taliban mediation. Further, if there is a jirga from a neighboring village who is from the same sub-tribe as the target village, there is a high probability the village will utilize that jirga. However, the village will also utilize some version of Taliban judicial dispute resolution mechanism when there is a conflict between the two villages.

Finally, when no malik or no jirga is available, a strong opportunity for Taliban justice exists. This tribal dynamic must be uncovered and developed in the favor of the huquq (or equivalent GIRoA representative) as this environment has the potential to hinder GIRoA’s development through its inability to provide rule of law service to the people.

Despite a convoluted social dynamic between Afghan civil and political societies, the focus for GIRoA rule of law ought to be on increasing huquq capacity. For the Taliban justice system to be undermined, GIRoA must populate and empower huquqs within all districts. Though other leaders can serve as civil mediators the huquq, in theory, has an unbiased capacity to serve as a primary decisive point for civil disputes, thus decreasing Taliban justice and removing insurgent influence from the civil domain.

Afghans will seek any civil mediation entity they trust to make a just decision, and who has the legitimacy to enforce said decision. Thus, the increased
authority, capability, and effectiveness of a GIRoA-backed huquq will, in turn promote GIRoA effectiveness over the long term. Through better training and placement in needed districts, huquqs are able to carry out the duties of their position. This increased capacity to mediate disputes will result in less impetus for local Afghans to turn to Taliban justice while linking the people to GIRoA in a positive way.

Budget: Why Districts Don’t Get Funded

Afghanistan is a unitary state. A unitary state is a state governed as one single unit, which through its constitution the central government maintains supreme authority to wield all power. Any sub-administrative units may only exercise powers allocated by the central government. These power allocations may be altered or removed altogether by the central government. The respective governments of China and France are two examples of unitary state systems. By contrast, in a federal state (e.g., the U.S.), sub-national units (states and commonwealths) maintain a certain level of power and sovereignty that per constitution cannot be removed by the central government.

With all power vested in Kabul, administration and budget development in Afghanistan are oriented vertically and maintained at the top. Provinces are merely administrative units of the central government, not political units in their own right. This means national line ministries maintain funding lines for all line ministerial issues down to the provincial and district level. Accordingly, districts are administrative units of provinces; district governments are not budget units, and thus are solely dependent upon the mercy of their provincial directorates for resource allocations.

The provincial Ministry of Finance offices are responsible for revenue collection and treasury operations within the province. Essentially the Finance Ministry must ensure the prescribed movement of funds system is enforced. Funds are moved from national to provincial; then post budget expenditure, excess funds, and taxes are moved back up to Kabul. It disburses operational (salary) payments, and, less frequently, maintenance (project development) funds which are referred to collectively as operational and management (O&M) funds.

With few exceptions, the provincial governors have no formal expenditure authority over line directorates. Governors exercise influence, but not authority, over the planning, formulation, and execution of funding. National funds flow through the primary budgetary units to their subordinate units. Therefore there is no provincial budget, per se, and by extension, no district budget. Although district governors have zero spending authority over government funds, they must still act as the central government’s representative to manage the line ministers and be the face of GIRoA at the district level. As such, the district governor has direct influence over the local perception of GIRoA. The less capable the district governor, the lower the perception of GIRoA at the village and district levels.

Funds for government activities at the sub-national level are allocated through the relevant central line ministries to their provincial ministries. Needs are communicated upwards, from line departments to line ministries. Line ministries determine allocations by program and province, and districts may receive sub-allocations from the provincial directorates. However, resource levels are often discretionary and subject to funds availability—as well as corruption—at the national and provincial levels.

Direct funding of projects by non-Afghan channels has only served to further degrade the budget process and allowed district and provincial leadership increased opportunity to misappropriate funds. Unfortunately in recent years, as the CF have prepared to fully transition Afghanistan to GIRoA, easier access to monetary support from NGOs and the international community has only served to hinder provincial and district financial relationships with Kabul.

As a general observation, district governors tend to exaggerate their demands, while provincial O&M resources remain lacking, without much promise of increase in the near future. A productive “push-pull” system must be enacted from the center, down. Districts and provinces will undoubtedly continue to demand funds. It is up to Kabul’s Finance Ministry to implement the “push” portion of the mechanism in order to efficiently deliver funds outward to the provinces and districts where they are needed.

Conclusion

As ISAF begins its transition and departure from Afghanistan, it is essential for GIRoA to take the reins as the sole governing body in the nation.
Predominant foundations for ultimate failure will come with GIRoA’s continued lack of capacity to fill key line ministry positions, lack of capable rule of law entities at the district level, and persistent blockage of funds flowing to sub-national administrative units. With what limited time the CF have remaining in Afghanistan, ISAF’s responsibility to communicate the importance of these three governance pitfalls cannot be overstated. ISAF must focus on mentoring GIRoA leadership to develop realistic solutions to the lack of trained and capable leadership, the absence of competent rule of law entities, and the inability to provide basic services to citizens at the district level.

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Defining the Problem

Over the past 10 years the Army has learned a great deal about warfare; however, our nation’s enemies have also learned and adapted. They have observed our strengths and weaknesses while slowly planning to chip away at our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. So how will tomorrow’s enemy most likely challenge the U.S. military? One only has to look at TC 7-100, The Hybrid Threat, which defines this threat as a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve synergistic effects. One of the largest challenges facing the U.S. military is how to maintain combat effectiveness and relevancy in a dynamically changing operational environment. The enemy has increasingly turned to inexpensive weapons combined with off the shelf technology and ground level intelligence to counteract the U.S. military’s overwhelming firepower, precision targeting, and superior technology.

Re-examining the lessons of Iraq in 2003 we saw the Iraqi military, then regarded by some as the 4th largest in the world, annihilated by the U.S. in a push deep through Iraq. Soldiers initially encountered fierce resistance in small engagements from conventionally arrayed enemy forces. Weeks later there was a transition to an irregular enemy engaging our forces at all levels. We now know Iraqi Soldiers simply took off their uniforms, blended into the population, and were supported by caches of weapons.

The response of the U.S. forces was reflected by the actions of several commanders near Balad, Iraq in May of 2003. The leadership could easily handle conventional forces but could not see beyond the initial effect of their decisions. Examples of units bulldozing orchards that were used as points of origin for indirect fire against coalition positions were common at the time. The second and third order effects not taken into account were the destruction of livelihoods for Iraqi civilians, leading to families, clans, and tribes that had previously been supportive, turning against the U.S. military. Ultimately, the effects of the decisions made at the ground level in the beginning of the conflict helped turn a population that supported us into a country largely against us. The results of those decisions in the beginning finally led to the third order effect of 4,486 U.S. military killed and over 30,000 wounded.

How can we as a fighting force better understand the enemy, the human terrain, and ourselves? How do we bridge the gap to enable clear communication, information sharing, and intelligence dissemination from higher echelons to the Soldier on the ground? In early 2007 the Asymmetric Warfare Group identified the need to bridge this gap and “Every Soldier is a Sensor” (ES2) began to take root. The paradigm shift in thought that every Soldier on the battlefield could collect information, conduct analysis, and utilize intelligence, has had a dramatic effect on the U.S. military. This led to the creation of company intelligence...
support teams (CoISTs) allowing company commanders to utilize and create intelligence from the raw information gathered by their Soldiers.

Today, both the maneuver and intelligence communities are very familiar with CoIST and the valuable role it has played in the counterinsurgency (COIN) based fights of the past decade. The years spent to develop and refine the CoIST have provided the military with an effective ground level intelligence capability to match and defeat an irregular enemy. The question now is how do we continue to evolve the CoIST against the anticipated hybrid threat in the future?

The Challenge

Currently, the Army has ended operations in Iraq and is rapidly doing so in Afghanistan. Army planners and trainers are being proactive by looking toward the threats of the future. This has brought about a return to training focused on traditional force-on-force (or as ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, now defines it, combined arms maneuver operations), incorporating lessons learned from wide area security operations or stability operations. CoIST is arguably one of the best lessons learned and has the capability to influence the fight in both combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

ES2 began a shift in information and intelligence collection to the company level, the next shift will come as the Army increases the amount of resources and assets provided to the squad level. Future programs to enable this will result in exponential increases in information at the company level. The CoIST is ideally positioned to manage this information flow, to provide a level of intelligence not previously available to the commander, and enable informed and increasingly accurate decisions on the ground.

In the past commanders acted as their own operations and intelligence (O&I) section. However, as the amount of information increased, the demand on commanders increased. We must understand the reality of what a company commander faces today—missions; next year’s training calendar; UCMJ; Soldier morale; property book issues, etc. In addition to that, modern instant communications constantly enable the problems at home, sometimes thousands of miles away, to affect the morale of Soldiers on the battlefield. How much time do commanders have left to focus on intelligence? Yet, it is the same intelligence that drives operations on the battlefield.

“Today’s Soldiers have access to far more information than their counterparts of the generation that fought from Vietnam through Operation Desert Storm and can receive, assimilate, and share data at rates that were unimaginable two decades ago. The current capability to transmit real-time intelligence, targeting data, and situational updates carries with it the challenge of how to receive, process, and act upon information without succumbing to information overload.”

–Colonel Walter Piatt, Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, 2012

CoIST Lessons Learned

The Army has begun conducting Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotations at its combat training centers (CTCs). The lessons learned at all CTCs highlight that while we have become proficient at fighting in the COIN environment, experience and skills in other environments have diminished. The new generation of Soldiers in the Army has very little experience in traditional offensive and defensive roles. At the same time, we have systematically adjusted training to the current fight at the expense of traditional doctrine. What are the lessons learned from our DATE rotations?

✦ Effective CoISTs contact adjacent units on company frequencies. O&I nets are established and monitored by companies and battalions to facilitate information flow and flatten the FM network.
✦ CoISTs without knowledgeable commanders do not receive guidance or know-how to operate a CoIST effectively.
✦ CoISTs have an in-depth understanding of threat equipment and capabilities (identification, ranges, munitions load outs, echelon, etc.) and are able to determine high payoff targets, vulnerabilities, and strengths.
Effective CoISTs tactically understand the enemy and wargame courses of action (COAs) with the commander.

Many MOS 35F10 Intelligence Analysts were inexperienced in MI disciplines and did not know how to support maneuver units. Units expected analysts to be subject matter experts and were often disappointed with their capabilities. They often became RTOs and were not utilized in the CoIST.

Very little written work is done during movement. CoISTs must prepare before SP or during halts and think critically on-the-move.

CoISTs should oversee and ensure tactical site exploitation paperwork is correct for EPW/detainee operations and biometric enrollment.

CoISTs must know and help push out information operations and tactical questioning strategies to assist with understanding the common operational picture (COP). This assists with preparing the battlefield for the impending change from the combined arms maneuver environment to the wide area security environment.

Company Infantrymen (MOS 11B) are more familiar with terrain impacts to mission than 35Fs. This skill made them very valuable in a CoIST.

CoIST personnel need to be identified and locked into position 180 days out and trained prior to a company exercise or CTC rotations.

CoISTs understand graphic terms and symbols to assist with dissemination and understanding products from higher/adjacent units.

CoISTs have training and access to blue force trackers (BFT) to create, receive, and disseminate overlays to the frontline, higher, and adjacent units.

CoIST is not a system nor should it be dependent on any system.

Brigade combat teams (BCT) S2s need to be involved in the planning, execution, and management of CoIST training to ensure standardization across the brigade. The BCT S2 incorporates the CoIST as part of the overall individual warfighting functions.

Companies that equip and resource CoISTs properly and maintain personnel continuity within the COIST produce more actionable intelligence during their deployment than those with a high turnover rate.

Offensive Operations

Offensive operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to defeat the enemy in decisive engagements and rely on the tenets of surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity to produce the desired end state. Effective offensive operations capitalize on accurate and timely intelligence. During offensive operations, intelligence must provide the commander with the composition, disposition, limitations, employment, and anticipated enemy COAs in a manner timely enough to allow the commander to affect the enemy commander’s decision cycle. Intelligence in offensive operations mitigates the risk of surprise.

CoIST Products

- Situational Awareness
- Terrain Model/Map Board
  - Effects on Enemy/Friendly Forces
  - Routes
- Enemy capabilities/limitations
  - Enemy Threat Characteristics
  - Enemy Engagement Areas
  - OP/Support Zones
- Weapons
  - Effective Ranges/Types
  - BDA Assessments
- Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay
- Terrain model/sand table
- MLCOA/MDCOA
- Pre-brief/Debrief
- SALUTE/SALT
- Friendly/Enemy Forces
- HVI/HVT List
- BOLO List
- Images
- PIRs/SIRs/Indicators
- ISR Capabilities
  - RFC Form
  - ISR Matrix
- EPWs/TSE
- DA 4157 Chain of Custody
The CoISTs function in this is providing the commander with the most robust and detailed COP possible prior to the execution of offensive operations. This entails detailed and refined intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), as well as coordinated and synchronized collection. The CoIST focuses on identifying the composition, disposition, capabilities/limitations, and likely COAs of the threat. This analysis enables the commander to make informed decisions on focusing his combat power to seize the initiative, exploit weakness, and defeat the threat. The CoIST also focuses on identifying intelligence gaps and coordinating collection efforts to satisfy the company commander’s priority intelligence requirements. This intelligence is disseminated to battalion to broaden its operational picture, which drives follow-on operations.

**Defensive Operations**

The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat enemy attacks. Commanders defend to buy time, hold key terrain, fix an enemy force, or destroy enemy combat power. The defense allows forces to retain initiative by creating the conditions for an attack. Preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and flexibility characterize defensive operations. The responsibility of intelligence is to provide the commander with information on the enemy force location, movement, COAs, and capabilities to allow him to array his forces to defend and shape the battlefield. In addition, intelligence is also required to identify where and when the commander can counterattack the enemy main effort or exploit enemy weaknesses.

In the defense, the intelligence focus is identifying the attacking threat composition, capabilities and limitations, and COAs through IPB. The CoIST uses this analysis at the company level to advise the commander on employment of forces to best defeat an attack. The CoIST also advises the commander on employment of supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to collect on enemy size, location, and movement. In addition, it performs predictive analysis to determine the composition and COAs of reinforcing threat forces, and advise the commander on how and when to counter attack to exploit threat weaknesses and gain initiative.

**Support Operations**

Support operations use military forces to assist foreign or domestic civil authorities as they prepare for, or respond to crises, and relieve suffering outside of the scope of normal civil capabilities. Forces meet the immediate needs during a crisis for a limited time until civil authorities can perform these missions without assistance. Support operations are often conducted as stand-alone missions, but are often necessary as concurrent efforts to offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

Intelligence in support operations requires a more non-conventional and complex approach. Often, support operations are characterized by threats that do not resemble the typical paradigm of what we think of as an enemy, but will instead manifest as the effects of disease, hunger, or disaster on a civilian population. Contact and situational understanding of key organizations and figures within the area of operation becomes key as these factors hold the greatest impact on the actions of the supported population.
Pre-Deployment
- Country studies.
- Threat characteristics.
  - Composition.
  - Tactics.
  - Sustainment.
  - Communication.
  - Support.

Deployment–Combined Arms Maneuver
- Threat characteristics.
  - Disposition, composition, and strength.
  - Echelon identification.
  - Battle damage assessment (BDA).
- Understand IPB products.
- Targeting (Threat centric).
  - D3A.
  - F3EAD.
- Understand/Utilize Intelligence Synchronization Matrix.
- Terrain Analysis (Understand enemy usage and tactics).
- Oversee Biometrics/EPW Process.

Deployment–Wide Area Security
- Threat Analysis (Sustain current COIN CoIST training).
- Targeting/Network analysis (Population centric).
- Validate/Update databases for wide area surveillance and send to Battalion (SWEAT/ASCOPE/PMESII).
- Inform and influence campaigns, talking points, and tactical questioning guidance.

The CoIST continues to be a key asset in enabling the company to perform its mission in this type of operation. It tailors intelligence of the operational environment, threat composition, and effects on the population to the company commander’s intelligence requirements (IRs). The situational understanding attained through the CoIST’s analysis enables the commander to use forces in the most effective manner to achieve his intent. The CoIST also identifies indicators within the environment that feed the commander’s decision making process.

Definition of success
The success of a BCT depends on rapid situational understanding and accurate and timely reporting from the company level. The CoIST processes support this by analyzing reports from FM nets, BFT, and/or TIGR for the company commander and higher. To get there, leaders must understand the importance of selecting and retaining the right Soldiers to operate the CoIST. Soldiers must demonstrate common sense, an understanding of operations, and passion to help save lives. Leaders need to support them by establishing battle rhythms, standard operating procedures, and battle drills and then provide appropriate training and guidance. From there Soldiers will do what Soldiers do best, they will figure out ways to accomplish the mission.
Not many years ago, before the Army was dependent on computer systems and connectivity we used FM communications, runners, and managed information in laminated smartbooks that could be stored in a cargo pocket. Returning to these methods of field craft is key to the success of CoIST in combined arms maneuvers. The CoIST receives information about enemy disposition, composition, and strength from higher, and works with the commander to develop possible enemy COAs to support operations. Post operation the CoIST assists with BDA and EPW processing (pocket litter and document exploitation), then reports information up to the Battalion S2. The size of the CoIST is flexible based on operation requirements; team members can be disbursed through the platoons during combined arms maneuvers, then pulled together in the company command post during wide area security operations. Commanders need to prepare for this by training and exercising the CoIST as it flexes in the field. Failure to do this will result in a long learning curve and inefficient processing of information, preparation for threats, and ineffective information flow higher and laterally.

**Training**

Currently, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence Training Division/Training Development and Support Branch provides 8 hours of combined arms maneuver-focused distance learning training followed by 40 hours of Decisive Action instruction at home station, in addition to mentoring CoISTs going through the CTCs. Training aids and tools that fit in a cargo pocket for Soldiers to use during combined arms maneuver training and a more extensive handbook to be used during wide area security are also available.

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**What is the UMI? Where is it? How do I use it?**

The University of Military Intelligence (UMI) is a training portal of MI courses maintained by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca, Arizona for use by authorized military (Active, Reserve, National Guard) and non-military (e.g., DOD civilian, Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government agencies) personnel. UMI provides many self-paced training courses, MOS training, and career development courses. In addition, the UMI contains a Virtual Campus that is available to users with an abundance of Army-wide resources and links related to MI: language training, cultural awareness, resident courses, MI Library, functional training, publications, and more.

UMI online registration is easy and approval for use normally takes only a day or two after a user request is submitted. Go to http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.army.mil, read and accept the standard U.S. Government Authorized Use/Security statement, and then follow the instructions to register or sign in. The UMI Web pages also provide feedback and question forms that can be submitted to obtain more information.
Brigadier General Bud Strom Writing Program

The BG Bud Strom Writing Program is a voluntary program open to Army MI students attending a course sponsored by the USAICoE, as well as those Army MI students attending courses at the Reserve Component Training Sites. Participation is open to the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve.

The USAICoE established the BG Bud Strom Writing Program to:

✦ Raise the consciousness of MI students of the importance of good writing skills within their discipline.
✦ Foster the development of excellent writing skills in enlisted Soldiers and Officers, both Active and Reserve.

This Writing Program will recognize, on a quarterly basis, the outstanding writing skills of one student in each of the following categories:

(1) Category A: Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET) Army Soldiers, both Active and Reserve, attending USAICoE-sponsored training.

(2) Category B: All other Army students, both Active and Reserve, attending USAICoE-sponsored training or training at one of the Reserve Component training sites (to include MOS-T, OES, WOES, NCOES, and Functional Courses).

To participate, students must meet the following criteria:

(1) Be enrolled as a student in a USAICoE-sponsored course or in a MI course at a Reserve Component Training Site at the time of article submission. Although the participant must be a student at the time he/she submits an article to the review board, he/she does not have to be enrolled at the time the Board meets or at the time of recognition.

(2) Must be in good standing within the course at the time of article submission.

(3) Must not be under unfavorable personnel action or UCMJ.

The CG, USAICoE, or a designated representative, will present the quarterly BG Bud Strom Writing Program Award during regularly scheduled Military Affairs Committee (MAC) luncheons at Fort Huachuca in February, May, August, and November. The top scoring papers from both categories will be published in the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB).

Brigadier General Roy M. Strom (U.S. Army, Retired, Deceased)

BG Strom was commissioned as an Artillery 2LT in 1954. His first Intelligence assignment occurred in 1959, when, as a Captain, he served as an Intelligence Officer with the Columbus (Ohio) Field Office, 109th CI Corps Group. Thereafter, BG Strom remained in the Intelligence field with assignments as Officer-in-Charge of the Inchon Field Office, 502nd MI Battalion, Korea; Aide-de-Camp to the CG, Intelligence School, Fort Holabird; and Intelligence Officer to the Army’s Alternate Command Post, Operations Group, Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. He then commanded three different battalions: the 519th MI Battalion, 525th MI Group serving in combat operations in Vietnam; the 4th MI Battalion, 525th MI Group also conducting operations in Vietnam; and then the 18th MI Battalion, 66th MI Group, Munich, Germany.

He had subsequent assignments within the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Special Security Group, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In July 1978, Strom took command of the 500th MI Brigade, INSCOM, at Camp Zama, Japan. He was among the first brigade commanders to play an instrumental role in the creation of INSCOM. In July 1980, he was assigned as the Deputy Commandant, and then as the Commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca. Two years later, BG Strom returned to Washington, D.C. to become the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

His final assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson. It was during this tour that he and his staff developed a workable language maintenance program for both active and reserve forces to ensure the Army kept pace with its changing language requirements. In March 1985, he retired from active duty after 31 years of honorable service.

After retirement, “Bud” Strom continued to serve as an ambassador for Military Intelligence and the Army through numerous volunteer, educational, and philanthropic activities. BG Strom was inducted into the MI Hall of Fame in 2009. He passed away on 25 July 2012.
Introduction
As the Army advances into the 21st century, it faces looming challenges regarding its strategic imperatives to sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. The global economic downturn and over a decade of constant warfare have triggered the need to rebalance a force that has been transformed by counterinsurgency operations. There is also recognition that operating in the current tactical and strategic environment requires a force that is better equipped to partner with coalition and host nation allies. In order to fulfill the Army’s broadening range of missions, it must adopt innovative ways to maintain mission readiness in today’s dynamic global environment.

One of the ways the Army intends to accomplish this is to align a selection of brigades to specific regions of the world. This is an extraordinary decision for several reasons. A regionally aligned brigade will enhance the Army’s ability to build more effective foreign partnerships, fostering a culture of regional expertise that is elusive to a force constantly on the move. Regional alignment will also improve the working relationship and interoperability between its conventional forces and Special Operators as well as the rest of the supporting partners in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

In a 2009 speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, President Obama declared that military strength “will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry but by the languages they speak and the cultures they understand.” This sentiment reflects an evolving approach to military operations that is gaining traction across the Department of Defense (DOD). The traditional role of the U.S. Army Soldier is expanding to include frequent interaction and partnership with the broader international community. America’s bi-lateral and multi-lateral commitments across the globe are placing U.S Army Soldiers and civilians in roles as emissaries and representatives of state. This has certainly been the experience for many of our service members who have deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in the last ten years. In many ways these service members were entrusted with advancing the strategic aims of U.S. policy through participation in shuras and key leader engagements. Though involvement in these missions occurred during intensive counterinsurgency, the desired effect is no different than if they were applied in a peacetime environment.

Preparing for Regional Alignment
Developing relationships and forging effective alliances with our foreign counterparts may only be achievable through building and improving training and education programs. These programs will
provide the Army enhanced and sustained language skills and regional expertise as stipulated in the DOD’s 2011 Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities.\(^2\)

Without a more concerted effort to improve regional training and foster cultural appreciation, our Soldiers and civilians risk failing to make these critical connections. This could mar U.S. objectives in a number of ways including delays in incorporating training, reluctance to align with U.S. interests, and a loss of influence to a competing foreign interest more dedicated to investing the time required to cultivate regional relationships. This is not a scenario we can afford to gamble on due to the significant time involved in growing regional expertise. Our service members must be equipped with the tools to relate to an ally and win the trust of a society.

In response to this issue, the Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, has tapped a Brigade from the 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Division as the Army’s first regionally aligned brigade. The plan is for elements of the brigade to rotate to Africa in support of the AFRICOM mission by 2013. In a May 2012 Stars and Stripes article GEN Odierno explained that “as they go through a training process, then they become available for a period a time, nine to 12 months, and then they can use those forces to meet whatever requirements they might have. It might be rotational forces. It could be building partner capacity. It could be providing security assistance. It could be doing exercises."\(^3\)

In a more recent article published in the Army News Service, GEN Odierno stated that “by aligning unit headquarters and rotational units to combatant commands, and tailoring our combatant training centers and exercises to plan for their greatest contingencies, units will gain invaluable expertise and cultural awareness, and be prepared to meet the regional requirements more rapidly and effectively than ever before.”\(^4\)

**NGB’s State Partnership Program**

Regional alignment may sound like a radical departure from the Army’s current setup, but it has actually been in practice for over two decades. The policy of pairing our armed forces with participating militaries began over 20 years ago in Europe. The U.S. European Command established a program for partnership-capacity building in 1991 with former Soviet bloc countries in the Baltic rim. This policy was the predecessor to the Army’s current shift to regional alignment and it gave birth to the National Guard’s now 70-nation State Partnership Program or SPP.\(^5\) Since its inception the SPP has demonstrated that forming key relationships with allied nations can significantly contribute to the execution of the National Security Strategy.

In 1993 Alabama, California, and Michigan partnered with Romania, Ukraine, and Latvia. This was followed by partnerships with Kentucky, West Virginia, Louisiana, and Missouri, all aligning with South American countries. By 2000, Hawaii and Guam joined the program, partnering with the Philippines, and in 2003 New York and Utah began partnerships with South Africa and Morocco respectively to support AFRICOM’s mission.\(^6\)

These states are involved in a myriad of critical tasks to include sharing intelligence and training tactics. Soldiers assigned to these regions also get exposed to burden sharing through joint operations (patrolling, coordination, etc.) which became an everyday occurrence in Iraq leading up to Operation New Dawn. This is not only teaching a new generation of Army Soldiers skills in joint collaboration, but it is also helping U.S. Commanders in identifying training and capacity shortfalls.

Understanding limitations will better prepare the U.S. in the event that the military is drawn into a regional conflict. We will be better equipped to array or assist host nation forces knowing their strengths and weaknesses and more effectively advise having logged countless hours of coordinated joint operations in the region.

**Improving Interoperability**

This introduces another important benefit of regionally aligning brigades—the addition of improved interoperability between the Army and its American collaborative partners. Regional expertise will become organic to the aligned organization and these selected brigades will become centers of excellence for the application of this expertise as pertains to Army matters. This will not diminish the interaction between these key JIIM enablers. On the contrary, it will enrich the support that the Army receives and strengthen the support that the Army provides.

The Army will also be in a better position to enable a Combatant Command or Joint Task Force
by providing more accurate and timely intelligence and a quicker response force that comes equipped with the training and background of the supported region. The Army may also benefit from regional alignment by more effectively partnering with the Special Forces groups on overlapping missions. A regionally and culturally aware force may provide more options for solving specific regional problems. Regionally aligned brigades offer these solutions.

Regional alignment may also serve as an invaluable tool for predictive analysis. A unit charged with the responsibility of a specific region will operate more closely with that region’s military and governmental staff as well as its indigenous population. This sets two critical conditions for effective intelligence—placement and access. Though this is not a revolutionary concept as it is one of the principal aims of the Foreign Area Officer program, it will increase the Army’s ability to influence and affect. This will benefit not only the Army and the Military writ large, but the State Department and other vital components of the U.S. Government as well. It will also heighten America’s ability to evaluate predictors first-hand and prevent potential flashpoints through intervention.

Language and Culture Training

With a transition to regional alignment there will be added costs and added hardships from having to manage training and regional proficiency in all of its explicit and implied requirements. Though our conventional forces will become less dependent on interagency or multinational support, the increased independence brings with it its own potential issues. The established core competencies of a regionally aligned maneuver brigade would remain, but in addition it would inherit an increased language proficiency and maintenance requirement and that would almost certainly require the injection of defense dollars to fund the increased training. This could be defrayed by the host nation providing some of the training; but there is no doubt that in the age of shrinking budgets, this added burden will cause financial friction.

There will also be the need to re-examine the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for some of the regionally aligned brigades as their equipment may not be suitable for the region they are assigned. Key factors such as terrain and mobility corridors would all have to be considered prior to alignment should mobilization become necessary. Regional alignment provides time and space to make these adjustments in a timely and deliberate manner but this would further strain contested budgets and would make a quick return to pre-alignment MTOEs unlikely should the experiment fizzle.

There really is no quick adjustment to make the Army immediately effective in regional alignment. In order to raise a culturally sensitive force with regional expertise, the DOD must take the long view on growing this capability. Part of solution resides in our schools. As mentioned in the 2011 Language and Culture Summit White Paper, language classes could begin earlier in DOD sponsored schools. Rather than middle school becoming our children’s introduction to foreign language, we could ignite a passion for language in kindergarten and elementary curriculums. Exposure to foreign languages is already occurring in elementary schools across the nation, but including some of the target languages so important to our military may pay dividends over the long run.

There must also be a better management of high scorers on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT), DOD’s test to gauge language learning aptitude. It is almost never considered in career management. Of course a DLPT score runs a distant second when our military moves on the road to war, but as we draw down in Afghanistan now is the time to scrutinize DLPT scores as they can provide the DOD a starting point regarding which enlisted Soldiers and officers would make good candidates for transfer into the pipeline of regional alignment.

Benefits of Regional Knowledge, WW I

As a final thought, a brief mention of British Army Officer T.E. Lawrence may better highlight the benefits of regional alignment and demonstrate the concept in action. T.E. Lawrence is credited with uniting the Hashemite tribes in the Arabian Hejaz and leading a successful campaign against the Ottoman Turks during World War 1. Lawrence’s most acclaimed achievements were the capture of Aqaba in 1917 and the Battle of Tafilah in 1918.

What made him such a brilliant organizer was not his familiarity with military tactics, but rather his extensive background in the Middle East region and Arab culture. By the time he was posted to Cairo at the beginning of the war, Lawrence had been to the
Middle East on numerous occasions as a researcher and an archeologist. He was recruited by the British military to conduct archeological surveys of the Negev desert and was fluent or conversant in several languages to include Arabic. Because Lawrence was so well versed in the Arab region and its people, he was able to gain the trust of the Arab tribes. This is corroborated by comments made by General Sir Edmund Allenby, the British commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, saying of Lawrence after the war:

“I gave him a free hand. His cooperation was marked by the utmost loyalty, and I never had anything but praise for his work, which, indeed, was invaluable throughout the campaign. He was the mainspring of the Arab movement and knew their language, their manners and their mentality.”

Lawrence’s deep regional knowledge made the Arab revolt possible and severely hampered the Ottoman war effort. It is difficult to imagine that Lawrence would have been as successful uniting the Arabs and leading the campaign had he not brought with him the knowledge of Arab culture and familiarity of the region. He should serve as the torch bearer for what is possible with regional alignment. Though regional alignment will not turn all Army Soldiers and civilians into experts on the level that Lawrence was, some may achieve this level of expertise and many more will gain regional competency. This will undoubtedly benefit the Army and serve U.S. interests abroad.

Conclusion

The Army is facing a critical juncture in its history. After a decade of warfare that has strenuously tested the Army’s composition and structure, it is seeking ways to evolve. In order to remain the gold standard as the world’s premier ground fighting force, the Army must adapt to the global challenges that persist. The lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan are that in a globally interconnected world, Army Soldiers and civilians must be trained and equipped to operate within it. The Army’s strategy to confront these challenges is to assign brigades to specific regions of the world.

These units would be responsible for developing expertise in their supported region and would take the lead in missions involving that region’s security, stabilization, reconstruction, and coalition partner training and development. This will be a tremendous advantage for the Army and the broader Defense community because it will better enable Army Soldiers and civilians to form partnerships with their coalition allies. Regional alignment will also lead to improved interoperability with the Army’s Special Operations Forces and its affiliates within the JIIM community.

Endnotes

4. Ibid.
10 Ibid.

Other References


CPT Parrish is the first recipient of the BG Strom Writing Program award. He is currently serving as the commander of the Intelligence and Sustainment Company, HHBN, 1st Cavalry Division. He recently relinquished command of the HHC, 781st MI Battalion at Fort Meade after 19 months in command. Prior to that assignment he served as a Joint STG Detachment Commander in Iraq. He holds a BA in History from Arizona State University.
Introduction

The most frustrating moment for the J2 occurs when the operations summary contains more useful intelligence producing data than official intelligence reporting. The common excuse, that the counter-insurgency (COIN) environment moves too quickly and the real intelligence exists in the human terrain, acts like a soft landing for an unimaginative staff. The intelligence infrastructure stands idly by and watches it unfold in reporting as teams conduct discovery learning at every turn.

Granted, nothing replaces the intimate knowledge of village idiosyncrasies like boots-on-the-ground presence and weeks of political courtship. There always exists a gap in knowledge until the teams share a cup of tea with a village elder. But all too often, our Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams responsible for village stability operations (VSO) walked into unfamiliar areas with limited or worthless reporting guiding their operations. To a point, intelligence teams can better prepare the SOF operators for the inevitable expansion into unknown areas. Intelligence operations must find a way to get out ahead of the fight.

Our J2 team, at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), created a comprehensive intelligence support package that increased baseline knowledge for VSO future operations. This article outlines our tested methods, and shows how a developed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan serves as a conceptual playbook for intelligence support to any planned operation. With priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) accurately reflecting the commander’s decision points and focus, a sustainable and candid four dimensional multi-INT collection plan, and means for discovery of consumable intelligence products, this outlined method for intelligence support to VSO expansion proves that intelligence still drives some operational decisions in a COIN fight.

The Problem Set

Multiple articles, and even some YouTube videos, describe VSO quite accurately. Captain Rory Hanlin’s 2011 article in Small Wars Journal best describes the lines of effort (LOE), difficulties, and specific examples of a team’s actions.

“A quote floating through CJSOTF-A: “If you’ve seen one VSO, you’ve seen one VSO,” accurately reflects the amorphous nature of the operation. Each village stability platform (VSP) executes VSO to the specific situation of their area. The team leader in the VSP drives the local situational development and expansion timelines. From the intelligence perspective, it proves exceedingly difficult getting out ahead of the fight—facilitating intelligence driven operations—when the teams cannot effectively describe the problem, the timeline, or the requirements.
With all the complexities of VSO, as it relates to the environmental constraints and requirements, the teams generally require intelligence support to three basic operations—force protection, force projection, and VSO expansion. First, every VSP requires force protection related intelligence. They need to know what’s going on in their area. To that end, the teams, or the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) above them, proficiently submit collection requirements and subsequently produce accurate intelligence reporting. The requests often call for Communications Intelligence (COMINT), imagery, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Full Motion Video (FMV), and there are rarely enough assets for country-wide requirements. Regardless, the teams accurately identify and communicate the needs.

Second, each VSP conducts kinetic operations in nearby areas to improve local security and prepare for eventual expansion. Planning for this force projection begins several days prior to the operation. The teams and SOTFs retain responsibility for planning and executing those Concepts of Operation (CONOPs) while CJSOTF-A has a supporting role. Every executed CONOP receives FMV and/or COMINT support but the teams’ and SOTFs’ reliance on FMV as an operational overwatch and their generally casual avoidance of pre-op collection requirements unwittingly handicaps the insertion team. Force projection operations could be supported better but that’s a separate topic for battalion level collection management issues.

Finally, expansion to uncontrolled areas and inclusion of otherwise under-considered villages defines the true success of VSO. Expansion requires the most preparation and yet receives the least resources. The teams do not submit collection requirements for VSO expansion as they do not know when they will expand and often cannot define a specific geographic area. This unknown timeline, combined with units’ habitual reliance on the immediacy of FMV support, precludes forward thinking collection requirements. In all fairness to the teams and the SOTFs, it was difficult to ascertain who held this responsibility.

After much discussion, the CJSOTF broke down the level of responsibilities. Considering the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and the intimate operations at the VSP, a team generally will not consider operations beyond the next two weeks. The SOTF, then, must take into consideration VSP expansion but only as it relates to their area of operation (generally corresponding to the Regional Command areas.) With multiple VSPs, ongoing force protection collection, and dozens of supported CONOPs, the SOTF likely only considers intelligence operations for the next month with one eye on the VSO expansion horizon. As Figure 1 depicts, the teams maintained intimate situational understanding of their immediate area with focused knowledge of the village and local relationships. The SOTF maintains excellent situational understanding of the multiple VSPs.

Their depth of knowledge directly relates to their access to the teams. This allows the CJSOTF to maneuver assets to support future operations, free to rely on the intimate knowledge at the team level and SOTF analysis of the situations, and react to indications of issues spanning multiple SOTF areas of operation. This leaves the CJSOTF intelligence team available for future expansion and subsequent intelligence support to help improve the SOTFs’ and teams’ situational understanding when the needs arise. With a clear understanding of the opportunities available at the CJSOTF and the inherent obstacles for the SOTFs, our J2 team looked towards future VSO expansion.

**Defining the Requirement**

Before considering adjusting intelligence operations, we asked basic internal questions about the Commander’s priorities. Naturally, the Commander expounded his priorities daily, but the existing PIRs, while well written and doctrinally correct,
centered on enemy activity and subsequent effects. If the Commander’s decision points reflected the PIR, then the Commander would never make a decision based on economic, political, or tribal circumstances. Subsequently, we could hardly justify collecting against those issues or support his LOEs for that matter. Unfortunately, daily reporting and weekly roll ups accurately reflected the command’s PIR, which proved a great disservice to the unit.

To correct the shortfall, the CJSOTF-A staff revamped the Commander’s PIR for a more accurate reflection of the mission and decision points. Much as described in the 2009 article in Small Wars Journal by Guvendiren and Captain Downey, our staff linked the PIR to the LOE. In the end, the staff wrote five simple PIR and the Commander quickly approved the holistic LOE-based priorities for his problem set (See Figure 2). This afforded the newly focused staff a more comprehensive look at the intelligence support.

Instead of “this team will occupy this village on this date,” we more accurately received, “this team will probably go north into this valley but not until the current village is ready for the team to move on, and only if we think there is a need in that area.” With that general information fat fingered on a map, the intel team next determined a data starting point for the new focus area.

The analyst responsible for the first focus area led a group huddle with representatives from each section of the J2 designed to level the knowledge playing field. She took the fat fingered outline, firmed up the geographic boundaries, and spoke to every nuanced detail available, followed by a rundown of identified knowledge gaps. The sections followed, thinking aloud as they ran their pens over the map, identifying known capabilities, potential updates to the analyst’s points, and additional gaps. For example, the HUMINT section identified sources who historically reported on the focus area and determined which ones would most likely provide information we required. The Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) team identified ground capabilities that, once maneuvered into position, could best collect against that problem set.

We included reachback analysis support representatives from the Counter-IED Operations Intelligence Cell (COIC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). Following the meeting, each section translated the intel gaps into specific intelligence collection requirements complete with essential elements of information, justifications, and special instructions.

The ISR team compiled the intelligence collection requirements and developed a three phase sustainable collection plan (See Figure 3). The first phase (Baseline) required the initial collection surge, spread out over the first 30 days, and was designed to fill the gaps and create a knowledge foundation. Most importantly the first phase, by design, avoided wasting assets’ time and effort with duplicative collection against already known information. It was, by no means an ISR soak, but rather a surgical collection plan.

The second phase (Sustainment) relied on spot collections by specific assets across the spectrum of intelligence capabilities. This phase drew on appropriate periodicity to maintain necessary sus-
tainment of the knowledge baseline and continue answering newly discovered intelligence gaps. This phase started approximately 30 days into the ISR plan and could last indefinitely as it did not rely on constant ISR coverage. Niche capabilities, often overlooked by virtue of their very specific and often highly classified assets, featured prominently in this part of the plan.

The third phase (Execution) represented the potential worst case requirements supporting a team’s expansion into a highly contested area. As the situation continued to develop, and as new information continued to confirm and deny our thoughts, the final phase adjusted accordingly. The overall collection plan’s requirements look like a reverse bell curve, which directly mirrored the influx of information as well.

The J2 knowledge management team developed a plan that prevented overwhelming the SOTF and teams with the anticipated deluge of information. We sought an alternative to an endless volume of semi-pertinent data. The plan required making all the data readily available (discoverable) while keeping the amount of data manageable given the OPTEMPO (consumable). A random word in the dictionary, for example, is discoverable, but the dictionary itself is not consumable—an analyst will never read the entire dictionary. Instead of 15 images of a village showing the construction of a farmhouse from beginning to end, the database would show the first image and last image and describe briefly the events in between each. We also found a means for displaying the information internally.

The J2 knowledge manager created a portal site dedicated to the focus area with an index page identifying the intelligence gaps as well as the structure of the data found in the portal, including naming conventions and latest date time group of the intelligence. Analysts consolidated duplicate files and deleted unnecessary data points. As per the standard, the original reports were posted directly to the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), which facilitated discovery via the common analytic tools. How our portal site differed from the raw data in CIDNE is that we captured the gist of the raw data in a tailored consumable fashion. With the plan in place for the collection, analysis, and back-end discoverability, the next step required actual collection, and that required outside approval.

**Selling the ISR Plan**

The focus area collection plan, augmented by the few organic collection capabilities required national, theater, and corps level assets. The pieces fit together loosely in the collection management realm and herding the ISR cats requires a centralized office. Only the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) can fit the pieces together for all of Afghanistan, but they will not prioritize collection for an unnamed operation. The IJC collection management process is an outdated method, relying too heavily on the individual task in support of D-Day operations vice the purpose of a dynamic collection plan. As Captain Jaylan Haley put it, the IJC operates on “impractical and constricive tasking procedures rooted in doctrine and inflexible theater guidelines that detract from the gains in hardware.” As a fact of the situation and despite being an ISAF Command priority, VSO was not a named operation and would receive prioritized allocation.

Fearing our phased non-kinetic collection requirements taken individually would go uncollected, the J2 ISR team briefed the plan in its entirety to the IJC Collection Managers (CMs). The briefing flowed from the operational macro view of CJSTF-A’s mission to the tactical micro view of a VSP, followed by the comprehensive collection plan as it related to the phases of VSO expansion and meeting the

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Figure 3. Simplified version of the phased collection plan. Original classified collection plan identified daily and hourly requirements.
lines of operation-based PIR. Linking the purpose of the collection plan to the individual requirements proved highly productive and informative. The IJC CMs recognized the overall long term phased collection plan as both sustainable and feasible.

Staggering the execution of each focus area helped disperse the requirements for niche capabilities and allayed the IJC CMs’ concerns about overtaxing the assets. This staggering method also provided flexibility in the collection timeline. Instead of demanding a specific asset at a specific time, the plan called for a specific capability within a period window. Moreover, our ISR team’s proficient grasp of collection management created a mutual trust with the IJC ISR planners. Over the next few days, our two teams worked hand-in-hand towards a theater-wide effort supporting the original purpose of the focus area collection without disrupting the IJC priority collection plan for ongoing named operations. At the successful conclusion, CJSOTF-A walked away with a phased collection plan mirroring the original requirements.

With the collection plan in place, propagating the effort to the processing and exploitation analysis teams ensured tailored support. For every collect, there exists a Service Member or civilian designing their analysis of the captured data. Sometimes, these exploitation cells operate in a vacuum, unaware of the original purpose of the collect, conducting their analysis based off the short cryptic paragraph in the collection requirement. Clarifying the requirements through a simple phone call to the Air Force DGS-2 analysts in California, for example, or over dinner with the Afghanistan Regional Operations Cryptologic Center, helped not only ensure increased attention to detail but also ingratiated our analysts to the many analysts supporting our effort from around the globe. The mutual trust amongst the services proved essential to the overall successful supporting relationship.

Other stateside agencies, namely the COIC, DIA, and NGIC, provided additional all source support as well. Including forward representatives in the initial phases of the focus area development increased the sense of teamwork, improved fused analysis, and decreased the pushback regarding our requests for information. The improved effort put forth by the reachback community directly reflected the amount of effort the CJSOTF put towards sharing our purpose with the larger intelligence community.

Getting Out Ahead of the Fight

Three weeks into the first phase of the original focus area, the J2 team updated the SOTF and CJSOTF Commanders. The information enabled clearer situational understanding as the SOTF Commander immediately turned to his S2 and S3, directing increased attention to certain topics, movement of organic assets to support the VSP SOF team’s expansion, and asking additional questions to help center the sustainment phase collection. Finally, the intel team operated out ahead of the fight.

The focus area collection plan required several adjustments to long-held standard operating procedures, but the effort proved highly lucrative. Recreating the method does not require access to special operations capabilities. The assets and method for allocation and prioritization exist in the conventional realm and can easily support any operation in the planning or conceptual phases. The following efforts allowed our team to focus efforts and paved the way for intelligence to help drive operations:

1. **Developed PIR that accurately reflect the Commander’s decision points and priorities.** The enemy is only one factor on this battlefield.

2. **Freed up analytic man hours.** On our team we fought against and discontinued daily reads that regurgitated reporting already displayed by our subordinate units. Our argument contended, “What value are we to the organization if the only audience is the Commander and his staff?” We were dangerously close to being a self-licking ice cream cone. Instead, we consolidated the subordinate units’ reports and added analysis only as it related to country-wide issues. Removing these types of roll-ups freed up over 45 analytic man hours per day.

3. **Defined the focus area geographically.** It took more than one try to get the operations cell or a Commander to outline operational areas.

4. **Determined our current base of knowledge.** We let one or two analysts deep dive into that area, pulling every resource data base they could to determine what was already known as well as what they wanted to know.

5. **Pooled our gaps.** We brought in the whole team to discuss what we collectively did and did not know. We included reachback representatives as well as the Public Affairs Office, Information Operations team, Linguist Manager, and Deputy J3 in our initial discussions.
6. Developed our collection plan. We turned our intelligence gaps into collection requirements complete with all the essential elements of information and special instructions. We took the requirements and built a three phase collection plan consisting of a baseline phase (designed to meet the initial intelligence gaps), a sustainment phase (designed to maintain situational awareness while continuing to build situational understanding) and an execution phase (designed to ramp up last minute collection to support the operation).

7. Designed our marketing campaign. We identified our audience and developed a briefing that displayed, from macro to micro, how the operation worked. Most importantly, we presented the collection plan as Phase 0 or I in the overall scheme of maneuver, linking requirements to specific operation maneuvers.

8. Sold the plan. Every stakeholder, support organization, and decision maker needed to know how the collection plan set the stage for the successful completion of the mission. For example, “If we don’t get hyper spectral collection at point X NLT D-5 to deny activity, we have to commit forces to that area, which pulls from the main effort.” With this method, we showed how the operation’s execution hinged on certain intelligence functions. This increased non-unit ownership and cooperation throughout the community. We cannot underestimate the sense of duty inherently present in the people associated with the mission. Knowing how they fit in the larger picture makes people very focused on mission success. Putting a face to our requirements ensured their successful accomplishment.

9. Planned the wave of information. We had no illusions that the amount of data coming in would overwhelm the number of analysts available; therefore, we planned ahead for parsing the raw data, storing the reports, and displaying the pertinent intelligence products. For us, it was all about making the data discoverable as well as consumable. Too much data can actually reverse the desired effect.

10. Maintained the momentum. These collection plans took weeks to months to truly mature. We could not lose the momentum by waiting for the 100 percent perfect answer before briefing the status. Standing before the man and telling him, “We thought we knew this...now we know this...we’re still waiting to confirm this... if you let us maneuver ground assets to here, we can figure it out.” Maneuver commanders tend to operate on a 24 hour cycle. If they asked for it on Monday, they expect it no later than Tuesday. Developing the intelligence support for operations can take time. Keeping the command and staff informed of the progress kept our plan in motion.

11. Following up. We did not allow OPTEMPO to excuse our team from writing a quick sentence or paragraph explaining how a collection, report, or even administrative support made the mission a success. I designated Sunday afternoons (when deployed) as our time to write at least two organizations that I felt had made a difference for us recently. I know each product is supposed to receive feedback but that’s not feasible when analysts pursue 700 pages of products on a daily basis. We set a realistic goal to provide honest feedback to the people supporting the mission.

Conclusion
The CJSTOF-A J2 team developed a method to get out ahead of a highly ambiguous COIN fight. The teams argued, broke through the quagmire of long standing traditions, and accomplished something that is expected of intelligence teams everywhere. A senior member on our team remarked, “I’ve been lectured on it, I’ve read about it, and I’ve memorized the steps; but I’ve never actually seen the intelligence cycle in practice until now.”

Endnotes
2. JP 1-02 describes PIR as a priority for intelligence support that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment.
3. JP 5-0 describes a LOE as multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose-cause and effect-to focus effort towards establishing operational and strategic conditions.

MAJ John M. Ives served as the Director of Intelligence, J2, CJSTOF-A in 2011 and 2012. He currently serves as an Executive Officer to the ADCS G2.
Doctrine Update, 1-13

The United States Combined Arms Center publishes the Doctrine Update periodically to highlight recent and upcoming changes to doctrine and provide information related to doctrine use. This Doctrine Update provides information on the overall Doctrine 2015 strategy. To maximize the understanding of the Doctrine 2015 strategy and the timelines of significant publications, disseminate this update to the lowest level. The proponent of Doctrine Update is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil or by mail to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (Doctrine Update, 4-12), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 2337. POCs for this update are Mr. Clinton J. Ancker III at clinton.j.anker2.civ@mail.mil and LTC Augustus Dawson at augustus.r.dawson.mil@mail.mil.

Army Publication Directorate Notifications

To stay current on what the Army publication directorate (APD) has published, subscribe to APD’s weekly update at: http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp. This update lists all authenticated Army publications published in the last week.

Development Status of Army Doctrine Reference Publications

Listed below are the 15 Army doctrine reference publications (ADRPs) and their development status as of 30 September 2012:

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<tr>
<th>ADRP 1</th>
<th>The Army Profession</th>
<th>FD Development</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRP 1-02</td>
<td>Operational Terms and Military Symbols</td>
<td>Published</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP 2-0</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP 3-0</td>
<td>Unified Land Operations</td>
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<td>ADRP 3-05</td>
<td>Special Operations</td>
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<td>Stability</td>
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<td>ADRP 3-09</td>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>Published</td>
</tr>
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<td>ADRP 3-28</td>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</td>
<td>DRAG Development</td>
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<td>ADRP 3-37</td>
<td>Protection</td>
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<td>ADRP 3-90</td>
<td>Offense and Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP 5-0</td>
<td>The Operations Process</td>
<td>Published</td>
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<td>ADRP 6-22</td>
<td>Army Leadership</td>
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<td>ADRP 4-0</td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP 7-0</td>
<td>Training Units and Developing Leaders</td>
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Development Status of Field Manuals

Field manuals (FMs) discuss doctrinal tactics and procedures—the how to execute operations. Listed below are the Doctrine 2015 FMs and their development status as of 18 December 2012:

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<tr>
<th>FM 1-0</th>
<th>Human Resources Support</th>
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<td>FM 1-04</td>
<td>Legal Support to the Operational Army</td>
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<td>FM 3-01</td>
<td>Air and Missile Defense Operations</td>
<td>Initial Draft Staffing</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM 3-04</td>
<td>Aviation Operations</td>
<td>Initial draft development</td>
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<td>FM 3-05</td>
<td>Army Special Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM 3-11*</td>
<td>CBRN Operations</td>
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<td>FM 3-13</td>
<td>Inform and Influence Activities</td>
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<td>FM 3-14</td>
<td>Army Space Operations</td>
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<td>FM 3-16</td>
<td>Multinational Operations</td>
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<td>FM 3-22</td>
<td>Army Support to Security Cooperation</td>
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<td>FM 3-24</td>
<td>Counteringinsurgency</td>
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<td>FM 3-27</td>
<td>Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense Operations</td>
<td>Initial draft development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-34</td>
<td>Engineer Operations</td>
<td>Final draft development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-38</td>
<td>Cyber Electromagnetic Activities</td>
<td>Final draft development</td>
</tr>
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<td>FM 3-39</td>
<td>Military Police Operations</td>
<td>Signature draft development</td>
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<td>FM 3-50</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
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<td>FM 3-52</td>
<td>Airspace Control</td>
<td>Awaiting publication</td>
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<td>FM 3-53</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
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<td>FM 3-55</td>
<td>Information Collection</td>
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<td>FM 3-57</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>Public Affairs Operations</td>
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<td>FM 3-63</td>
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<td>Maneuver Enhancement Brigade</td>
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<td>FM 3-90 Volume 1</td>
<td>Offense and Defense</td>
<td>Awaiting publication</td>
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<td>FM 3-90 Volume 2</td>
<td>Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks</td>
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<td>FM 3-94</td>
<td>Division, Corps, and Theater Army Operations</td>
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<td>FM 3-98</td>
<td>Reconnaissance and Security Organizations</td>
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<td>FM 3-99</td>
<td>Airborne and Air Assault Operations</td>
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<td>FM 4-01</td>
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<td>FM 5-02</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
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<td>Commander and Staff Organization and Operations</td>
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<td>FM 6-99</td>
<td>Report and Message Format</td>
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<td>FM 7-15</td>
<td>Army Universal Task List</td>
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<td>FM 7-22</td>
<td>Army Physical Readiness Training</td>
<td>Published</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM 27-10</td>
<td>The Law of Land Warfare</td>
<td>Published</td>
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* FM 2-22.3, FM 3-11, and FM 27-10 will not comply with Doctrine 2015 standards.

Other Recently Published Publications

Recently published FMs and ATPs include:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>FM 1-05</td>
<td>Religious Support</td>
<td>9 November 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-36*</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
<td>5 October 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-22</td>
<td>Army Physical Readiness Training</td>
<td>26 October 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP 1-02.1</td>
<td>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</td>
<td>20 September 2012</td>
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</table>
Changes in Field Manuals
The Doctrine 2015 strategy constrains the number of FMs to 49 publications. The 49 FMs will cover tactics and procedures. Operational techniques-based FMs will become ATPs, training-based FMs will become training circulars, technical FMs will become technical manuals, and all others will be rescinded.

Significant Doctrine Being Prepared at the Combined Arms Center
FM 3-90 Volume I Offense and Defense and FM 3-90 Volume II Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Operations FM 3-90 Volume I and FM 3-90 Volume II provide tactics and procedures for implementing the offensive and defensive doctrinal fundamentals established in ADP 3-90 and ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense. They are Doctrine 2015 compliant. The tactics discussed in these two manuals are only examples of ways to conduct specific offensive or defensive tasks. Collectively they provide part of the tool set that commanders employ in accordance with existing tactical situations. The primary target audience for FM 3-90 Volume I and FM 3-90 Volume II is those officers and noncommissioned officers serving in maneuver battalions, brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and on division and corps staffs. Secondary target audiences include officers and noncommissioned officers in the Army’s professional development courses and schools and cadets in pre-commissioning programs. Revision of ADRP 1-02 Operational Terms and Military Symbols ADRP 1-02 is going through a major revision to include all the symbols that remain in FM 1-02. With the publication of the next edition of ADRP 1-02, FM 1-02 will be rescinded. In addition to the FM 1-02 symbols, ADRP 1-02 will add all the Military Standard 2525 Revision C land symbols. Changes to the drawing instructions and tables will add clarity and provide more examples.

Army Dictionary
The Army dictionary is now available as part of the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) web portal at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=207. The Army dictionary website provides easy access to all terminology and acronyms found in approved doctrinal manuals (ADPs, ADRPs, FMs, ATPs, and ATTPs), and military symbols. The site is common access card enabled, and JDEIS must grant permission to gain access to the Army dictionary. The search engine allows you to do a normal or advance search. Normal searches only require typing a word in the provided blank space and selecting the box corresponding to searching within terms, acronyms, or symbols and then clicking the search button. Advance searches provide more selective searches tailored to the needs of the user. User options include refining the search by type (match phrase, match any word, match all word, begins with, ends with, contains), definitions, approved by (Army, Army/Marine Corps, DOD), source, and warfighting function. Users can also manually search through an alphabetical listing of terms, acronyms, and symbols.

Terminology Update
Table 1 lists significant new terms since Doctrine Update 4-12. A complete list of new, revised, and rescinded terms can be found at https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-25269.

Did You Know? (From Joint Doctrine Update)
Kinetic: Joint doctrine does not characterize joint operations as kinetic and non-kinetic. Per JP 3-09: “Fires create lethal or non-lethal effects” and one of the principles of fire support is to “consider using all available lethal and nonlethal attack means.”
dictionary word “kinetic” is a scientific term commonly used to describe the energy associated with motion. Further the term “nonkinetic” is not a dictionary word and is meaningless and useless in military jargon, since the alternative to kinetic energy is “potential energy.”

Knowledge management: The term “knowledge management” is not defined nor discussed in joint doctrine as a joint construct. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, addresses “knowledge sharing” and “information management (IM).” IM also is defined in JP 3-0 and discussed in detail in Appendix D, “Information Management,” of JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and FM 6-02.85, MCRP 3-40.2A, NTTP 3 13.1.16, AFTTP(I) 3-2.22, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management.

International organization (IO): An obsolete term; use “intergovernmental organization (IGO)” per JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

Regular warfare: A meaningless term (as opposed to irregular warfare). Use “traditional war” or “traditional warfare” per JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

Complex contingency operations: An obsolete term; use “crisis response and limited contingency operations” per JP 3-0.

Private voluntary organization (PVO): An obsolete term; use “nongovernmental organization (NGO)” per JP 3-08.

General Purpose Forces vs. Conventional Forces: “General purpose forces (GPF)” is a budget category (FYDP MDAP 2), not a type of force, per Department of Defense Issuance (DODI) 7045.7, Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and DODI 7045.7-H, Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure. GPF excludes the Guard and Reserve, USTRANSCOM, C2, intelligence, and space forces. Use “conventional forces (CF)” to describe nonnuclear forces not designated as special operations forces as defined in JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

Misused Army Terms
The following terms are still being routinely misused. Some are current terms that are misused; some are terms that have been rescinded.

Zone and Sector: While still used in some specialized cases (zone reconnaissance, sector of fire) neither term should be used to define the space within which a unit operations. Units operate in an area of operations, not in sectors or zones. This is a relic of “attack in zone” and “defend in sector”, both of which were removed from doctrine, as they simply designated areas of operation.

Decisive Action: Correctly used, decisive action is the simultaneous combination of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities. It is NOT a descriptor to level of conflict. Decisive action is not a synonym for large scale combat operations - ALL Army operations are decisive action. If you need to define a specific type of operation, use the list in Table 1-1, ADRP 3-0. Also, decisive action should not be used as an adjective unless you really need to distinguish those operations that are combinations of offense, defense, and stability or DSCA tasks for those that used to be conducted in only one dimension.

Airspace control: This term replaces Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) and Airspace Command and Control (AC2).

ISR: The Army has retained the acronym ISR as it is used in joint doctrine. However, the Army executes ISR through information collection (see FM 3-55).

When discussing the collection of information to support operations the term is information collection or a specific collection discipline, such as reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations, etc.

Adversary vs. Enemy: This is still widely misused, to include its misuse in joint doctrine. To be correct, any force that we are actually conducting operations against is an enemy. An adversary, by definition, is a force that we may conduct operations against. But once we start those operations, that force is an enemy. If you want to include both enemies and adversaries, use threat. If you want to include other than people and organizations, such as chemicals, weather, etc., that negatively impact on operations, use hazards.
Day three of the Maneuver Readiness Exercise in the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Command Post (CP): The Battle Captain remains focused on the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) in front of him as battalion events continue to populate his “BCT Events” effort from simulated subordinate battalions. The Fire Support Cell shouts out, “Acquisition! AO Mustangs!” based on the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) display, which immediately causes the brigade staff to execute its indirect fire battle drill. In the White Cell room, a Mission Command Staff Trainer (MCST) operator checks his Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) and sends another event to the BCT Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) box which, again, stimulates staff reaction. As the exercise continues, MCST continues to inject MSEL events causing the BCT staff to react in a coordinated fashion and execute battle drills.

Introduction
The creation of complicated and often costly simulation programs and special applications normally accompany the introduction of various sophisticated digital Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). These simulations programs and special applications produce situations/events in units’ ABCS boxes which, in turn, stimulate ABCS operators/staff reaction. Examples of current simulation programs which support unit ABCS training exercises are the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) and the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulations (JCATS). Though programs like these support unit ABCS individual and collective task refresher and sustainment training, they have a tendency to cause high overhead in internal and external personnel support, extensive lead time for training coordination, cost and equipment.

History
As a result of unit requests for ABCS simulation assistance, the National Simulation Center originally developed a low-overhead software application, known as the Battle Command Staff Trainer (BCST) (now called the Mission Command Staff Trainer (MCST)). The Product Director Common Software, under direction of Program Manager Strategic Mission Command (PM SMC), has the responsibility to continue development, fielding, and training of the MCST. TRADOC Capability Manager Mission Command (TCM MC) is responsible for MCST requirements generation and oversight.

What MCST Is and Is Not
MCST is a window based software training program that operates on standard personal computer systems with Microsoft Windows XP. This program is applicable to both Active and Reserve Component units, Mission Training Complexes (MTC) and Mission Command Centers of Excellence (MC COE). This software application, however, is not a substitute for ABCS or a replacement for CBS, JCATS, or other constructive training simulations. These systems were born of necessity and serve a very useful purpose for larger-scale training exercises.

Uses
MCST enables units to conduct battle staff training with the ABCS using internal resources with minimal setup, time and effort. MCST facilitates individual and collective staff refresher and sustainment training for staff sections or entire staffs, from battalion through ASCC levels. Significant training opportunities afforded by MCST include: maintain and improve highly perishable ABCS skills; train new staff personnel; apply staff coordination/battle drills; battle rhythm development, and train-up for exercises/events.

This software provides an ability to stimulate battle staff reactions to friendly and enemy force events. MCST can be configured to communicate with the training unit’s Warfighting Functions systems and inject friendly/enemy situational awareness data to those systems. It can tailor friendly force structure, roles, names and icons to the unit that is being trained. Actions from the MSEL may be scheduled to occur at specific exercise times or
manually inserted during the exercise to initiate a staff reaction. MCST must only be used on training networks, never on real-world operational networks. The risk of mixed MCST simulated and real-world operational events is too great.

**How Units Receive MCST**

Army units/organizations receive MCST new equipment training through coordination with the PM SMC MCST representative at their Unit Set Fielding Conference or Unit Equipment Reset Conference. Additionally, MCST software and associated training documentation can be downloaded through the MCST AKO download site at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/10244567.* The MCST computer program, pre-loaded scenarios, and a reference disk are included in the training package and are utilized by the NET teams during initial training.

**New Equipment Training (NET)**

Units/organizations should have their allocated ABCS equipment and complete ABCS NET before receiving MCST NET. During the MCST NET process, personnel from S3/G3 and S6/G6 sections receive instruction how to connect the MCST into the ABCS network, operator training and exercise scenario training. MTC and MC COE’s can receive MCST NET after training dates are established with the PM SMC MCST representative. A tiered support system provides assistance to units that encounter MCST issues. The support system contact information is located in the documentation on the MCST AKO download site.

**Summary**

Providing tremendous potential for Army battle staffs, MCST provides: a flexible training medium to maintain operator proficiency on their respective ABCS box; flexible training employment; low unit overhead in terms of exercise support personnel, training resources and cost. MCST stimulates the ABCS with situational awareness data and tactical messages that add realism to collective staff training.

Questions and comments may be directed to: Mr. Wallace Matteson, wallace.e.matteson.ctr@mail.mil, (913) 684-4597 or Mr. Gregory Eddy, gregory.j.eddy.ctr@mail.mil, (913) 684-4611, TCM MC, ATTN: Systems Branch (MCST), 806 Harrison Drive, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2326. Once units receive MCST software, familiarize their units with it and use it, send suggested improvements and recommendations for new features to the individuals listed in this paragraph.

*Meanwhile, back in the White Cell room, the MCST operator checks his MSEL, and initiates an event that stimulates the DCGS-A box, as the brigade staff continues to execute their staff coordination and battle drills...*

*AKO users will request access to this site from the MCST POCs.*
January - March 2013

Indigenous Peoples: Reshaping the International Security Environment
by Guntram F. A. Werther, PhD and Mohammed Yasin Khosti

Introduction
In the future, nation states to include the U.S., will find themselves in complex, multi-border insurgency situations where the insurgents will simply claim to be indigenous peoples in order to gain legitimate and internationally recognized rights to political and economic control of their traditional lands and resources. They will avail themselves at the court of world opinion as one way to advance their claims, while simultaneously using other levers of power. Who learns to effectively deal with ‘indigenous peoples’ globally will have an advantage over governments that do not. The suggestion for the intelligence community and leaders is to understand this issue to advance their goals, whether these are strategic or tactical, national, or global.

A unanimous 2007 United Nations (UN) General Assembly vote on the rights of indigenous peoples, combined with increasing global political, economic, legal, and social changes centered on this issue, shows that the nation-state dominated international system which arose during the late 19th to early 20th century is changing at foundational levels, and thereby is reshaping the conflict legitimacy environment in which national security organizations find themselves.1 This brief essay introduces core elements of this still emerging global change to intelligence and collaborating national security practitioners.2

Until a League of Nations, and thereafter a UN consensus, assumed all sovereign international legitimacy to states it was common to accept the sovereignty of non-state actors–bands, tribes, confederations, and native kingdoms–and to make war, peace, and form diplomatic relations with them as if they were legitimate governments. Trade relations, natural resources and land rights were typically negotiated with them in this way.

Historically judged as equal peoples3 in international law and practice, then progressively as less equal,4 until finally they were not seen not as sovereign peoples at all,5 the conduct of international affairs changed with each iteration of their decline in status, and is now evolving with each iteration of their increase in status.

Technical equality is back with the U.N. vote, although the capacity of indigenous peoples to practice equality as equal peoples is still in development.6 For example, ExxonMobil recently bypassed the Iraqi government and signed oil deals directly with the Kurds. Dealing with indigenous peoples worldwide is a normal part of their business practice.7 This behavior, and its legal justification, is growing. With the expansion of more direct business dealings with indigenous peoples into the broader Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, intelligence practitioners can predict one aspect of a complex emerging future. With indigenous peoples’ governments negotiating with state governments and each other, an even more complex future emerges. As an example, few today remember that the U.S. had formal diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Hawaii, with various tribal confederacies and tribal nations, and that internationally this arrangement persisted as legally and politically viable for centuries.8

Modern international law developed largely from the political-legal crisis engendered when Columbus discovered (this has a technical meaning) the native peoples of the Americas. After consultation, the Pope, the Spanish, and other European courts initially upheld the standard of equal status for all peoples, which limited Europeans to only those relationships that indigenous peoples agreed to.9 Obviously law and practice changed over time until by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, state power was largely unchallenged. A legal, political, and economic pushback began around 1950.10

What Happened and Why it Matters to Intelligence Professionals
The 2007 UN General Assembly vote heralded a return to indigenous peoples status post-Columbus, but in a far more complex, political, economic, legal, and societal operating environment in which indig-
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The vote unanimously agreed to accord ‘indigenous’ peoples (undefined) worldwide expanded political, social, economic (indeed, self-determination) ‘rights’, especially over natural resources ownership and political-economic developments on their traditional lands. Already, this has changed domestic law in many developing nations, cancelled billions of dollars in resource development and other projects, and reshaped conflict styles.

More importantly for the intelligence community, the international expansion of law and of political-economic practice around this issue creates precedents from which to validate the legitimacy of any nascent indigenous peoples organizations that challenge their states. With every additional country that grants recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights, a template for achieving enhanced within-state power is developed, a legal precedent is created for trans national courts to follow, and the path for subsequent enhancement of political, economic, and social rights is enabled.

Second, many insurgent groups find themselves with a newly eased path to legitimacy—simply claim ‘indigenous’ status—thereby reshaping self-determination relationships, whether peacefully or violently, with the government of their national state. For example, if the Tuareg are indigenous peoples, the Tuareg claim for enhanced control of their traditional lands and resources within Mali and elsewhere is valid. Is this not also true of Berber in Algeria, or Bedouin in Israel?

But the UN General Assembly said much more by “Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples...”–the original peoples’ ‘rights’ position at the 15th to 17th century genesis of international law. A renewed equal peoples affirmation logically challenges the very foundation of the 20th century post League of Nations assertion that each modern nation state, as a distinct ‘peoples’ (now with UN membership), is the sole ‘sovereign’ entity within the international system.

Placing indigenous status into an equal peoples-to-peoples equivalency logically removes this sole sovereign authority from the state. Naturally, the UN tried to limit this effect in practice by narrowly defining (read non-equally) rights of indigenous peoples in states. Despite that unresolved tension, the equality declaration has already made any claim ‘indigenous peoples’ a more significant international actor via an enhanced potential to control globally desired land and natural resources.

In places like Africa (with 2,000 ethno-linguistic groups south of the Sahara), the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania, where ‘indigenous’ rights have historically rarely been accorded, it takes little insight to understand that counterterrorism, state and regional stability, and development agendas are on a collision course. Conflicts are often started, then fueled, by globalization-induced resource competition among major and rising powers such as the U.S., the European Union, China, India, Russia, Brazil, etc. Understanding the future dynamics of this issue holistically within developing countries such as Afghanistan is also critical to predicting the future of new insurgency, ‘terrorism’ development, and to understanding emerging global and country-specific systemic arrangements and their various change dynamics.

The UN vote implies one hoped-for future by defining sharp limits of how ‘equal’ indigenous peoples really are. One limit, for example, is that indigenous peoples’ rights cannot lead to the breakup of existing states. Past experience of the dynamics around indigenous-state conflict in developed countries, however, suggests the emergence of far less limited or state-defined outcomes. Consider, for example, the Greenlanders are increasingly self-governing in Denmark and speak of autonomy. Indigenous peoples in Canada (Nanavut) changed the country’s Constitution, and like the five hundred plus First Nations (Indian tribes) in the U.S., are increasingly able to block agendas with which they do not agree.

Applying that degree of expanding self-determination precedent to sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East/North Africa, or to Asia, where change will likely occur partly through the use of Western lawyers and legal precedents, yields a far less state controlled prediction. Or, alternatively, apply precedents from the developed world’s ongoing legitimate fracturing of states based on the demands of embedded ‘peoples’ that are not framed as indigenous –Scots, Basque, Flemish, or Catalan. Along either path, the simpler 20th century world of a few sole-sovereign states competing internationally is changing to include many complexly blended forms.

**Myth of the Nation-State**

The 20th century assertion that nation-states are composed of single peoples (Danish, Spanish,
Canadian, Afghan, Iraqi, etc.) has never worked well, nor even existed. It produced the 20th century image of a ‘modern’ world composed of ‘sovereign’ states, each housing one unique peoples. Most were entangled in endless legal and often physical conflicts with their internal non-state peoples, from which much international law–written by states, one must add–emerged. Through these conflicts many new states formed from devolving states and dissolving empires: once 50, now 200, and counting. More significantly, within many states, especially if control over territory was always more a claim than fact, iterative conceptual and practical compromises about power were made. Especially whenever there was something tangible to fight over, ‘modern’ states discovered that alternative claims to land, resources, self-determination, even sovereignty, did not disappear upon the state’s mere claim to sole legitimate control (e.g., the Durand line, Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Karen, Berber).

What happened in 2007 is that a body of international law and political practice, with mirroring varieties of domestic law and practice, has now come almost full-circle. The original 15th century Western position affirming the equal status of all peoples affirmed, “Indians and other people who may be later discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property...should the contrary happen, it shall be null and of no effect.” Remember; Columbus was on a mere trade mission. European ‘discovery’ of other peoples was originally only about forming trade claims against other Europeans, and did not legally permit political or resources control of peoples discovered.

The international jurist Samuel von Wolff’s 18th century assessment that nations “are equal by nature; no nation has a privilege or precedence over others...” is again the legal position of the 2007 UN vote text.

**Intelligence and National Security Implications**

Categories matter. Within the context of the UN declaration, perhaps the main intelligence and national security point to consider that already many policy entrepreneurs have trained, advised, and otherwise supported peoples who did not formerly claim “indigenous peoples” status to make that claim. The indigenous peoples claim is now advanced for the Oromo in Ethiopia, for Berber, Tuareg, Kurds, Chaldeans, Chechen, Ingush, and for several Afghan, Pakistani, Baluchi, and Bangladeshi tribal peoples, among an expanding list. More to the point, developed world experience on this issue is that whenever a defined benefit exists, groups will strategically become indigenous peoples to get that benefit. Therefore, expect more claims of this kind.

Country-level change dynamics are complex and contextually shaped, but put simply, expect demographically numerous, and politically-militarily capable groups to seek indigenous peoples status to either create and/or bolster partial or total autonomy claims that are often backed by force. The Tuareg, Dinka, Nuer, and Kurds are recent examples. In Bolivia, numerically dominant indigenous forces took over the state, and then altered the constitution to grant expanded social and political rights, including expanded land and resources control, to indigenous peoples’ on their traditional lands.

Smaller groups can and do effectively halt multi-billion dollar resource control projects and other central government agendas, but use mostly legal mechanisms. There are patterns as to how their expansion into administrative, political, and economic power tend to develop. Understanding how indigenous peoples claims arise and evolve in their differing contexts permits ‘smart’ intelligence levers to arise. These strategic and tactical conflict management options are the topic of another essay.

**Potential Effect of Expanded Indigenous Claims in Afghanistan on U.S. Security Plans**

The official indigenous peoples of Afghanistan are a collection of many ethnic groups (e.g., Tajik, Urzbek, Hazara, Pashtun, and Turkman). Within these groups there are many different tribes. Each tribe can almost certainly now legitimately claim indigenous peoples status, and thereby claim expanded control over traditional land and resources, with rights to local self-government. Depending on where each tribe resides within the country, the financial and strategic potential of such land and natural resources claims will vary, but protecting and reserving rights for regional, especially cross-border, tribal peoples is already problematic. Neighboring
countries, with their related indigenous claimants, eye natural resources. Exxon, and other firms, have already bypassed central governments to sign resource agreements with Kurds in Iraq, and deal directly with indigenous peoples in the developed world. What if this precedent expands to relatively ungoverned Afghanistan, as it likely will?

Many countries have invested heavily in Afghanistan’s infrastructure, security, education, and economic development, including business, agriculture, mining, and in reestablishing and stabilizing the national government’s interests across Afghanistan. At the same time, when it comes to Afghan natural resources, there are many “investors” from outside wishing to develop them. As the 2007 UN vote affirmed indigenous peoples in Afghanistan their claims to ownership of traditional lands, mines, etc., who protects that indigenous ownership? Non-governmental organizations and lawyers are already facilitating these indigenous claims. That reality, if and when it matures, will legally and strategically alter the U.S. position in the country and region, and indeed worldwide.

Afghanistan’s natural resources can offer the Afghans, as one people, improvement in economic standards and lifestyle. With the help of friendly nations, Afghanistan can become independent of foreign aid just by developing its natural resources for national and international use. This is important to the national security of Afghanistan as a state. If it can rise above the poverty level and emerge from the “third-world” nation status, then terrorists groups that rely on bribery and corruption will be less able to operate among financially comfortably and secure Afghans. Alternatively, expanding substate indigenous peoples’ claims can shatter that reality, alter it partially, or the claims and rights of Afghanistan’s indigenous peoples can be preemptively incorporated into a more stable Afghan framework that is consistent with the UN declaration, a consideration for U.S., Afghan leadership and strategic and operational consideration. Good intelligence practices change with consideration of indigenous peoples’ equality status as an emerging element in international affairs.

Endnotes


2. A detailed treatment of this complex topic can be obtained by contacting the authors.

3. To be a peoples, rather than a people, has technical and usage meaning in international law and practice. Tribal people, ethnic people are cultural designators; but the same groups as seen peoples can form self-determining governments. Usage is often sloppy in discussions. The UN vote, however, refers to indigenous peoples being equal to all other peoples.


6. In practice, this is not often the case, but the potential is there.

7. Werther, Personal knowledge from ExxonMobil consulting practice.


10. Ibid., Werther, 1992.


19. This was not only the broadly affirmed legal position (See Vittoria and others quoted herein) but the moral one. The Pope, in *Bull Sublimus Deus* (1537), quoted in Werther, 1992, 9.


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Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (5th ed.)
by Mark M. Lowenthal
Sage/CQ Press, 2012, 364 pages

This book first came to my attention when I was seeking a textbook to use in my Intelligence Methods course at Ohio State University. There are not many books to choose from that address the standard textbook criteria one expects in a college course. I have focused on this content in military contexts but teaching it to civilian undergraduates, in a large state university, requires attention to the general curriculum dimensions one finds in such a university setting. The book has worked well in this regard, and it has relevance for the Army intelligence community in that it is appropriate for usage in the military intelligence classroom as well.

Lowenthal covers a significant amount of broad information in the book and this provides helpful orientation for the student who is new to the intelligence community. He begins with a definition for intelligence, primarily contrasting it with information, and correlates this with the evolution of the U.S. intelligence community. It should be noted Lowenthal focuses on the U.S. intelligence community but the linkage with global intelligence concerns is inherent.

He offers a macro-level understanding for variables that compose the intelligence process and proceeds to address collection and analysis as primary illustrations of such variables. The role of Counterintelligence and covert action are stressed within this discussion. The preeminent importance of the policy maker as ultimate consumer of processed intelligence is given due consideration. As such, the relevance of oversight and accountability is acknowledged and ethical issues are highlighted along with factors associated with intelligence reform.

The intelligence agenda is recognized in relation to nation-state contexts and also with transnational issues. Foreign intelligence services (primarily Britain, China, France, Israel, and Russia) are described in a single chapter but, again, many of the concepts presented in the book are recognized as relevant in universal scenarios.

The book covers a wide range of components, variables and dynamics that compose the intelligence community but it fails to identify common themes that could help nurture student conceptual understanding. Such thematic emphasis would be a significant benefit for this book. Lowenthal demystifies the intelligence world into readily understandable parts and acknowledges aspects that are, by definition, abstract (such as political concerns).

More attention to ramifications associated with new communication technologies would benefit this book insofar as so many aspects of life have been impacted by such technologies. The reader will most likely recognize this void in that such technologies can be used to enhance collection and analysis, in general, and other areas that involve more specific detail. They can be applied to offensive and defensive measures.

The key terms at the end of most chapters are helpful in guiding students but too much emphasis is on seemingly tangential intelligence slang/jargon that does not strongly correlate with central themes in specific chapters. The charts, tables, and graphs help the reader visualize content. Similarly, the ACRONYM listing/definitions are a helpful reference and the suggested readings at the end of the chapters provide guidance for the reader who wants to develop a more thorough understanding.

I suggest the book for usage in the education and training of Soldiers being groomed for careers in the Army intelligence community. As such, it has more relevance for the former (education) than the latter (training). It provides helpful details but also focuses on the relevance of context within scenarios often addressed by military intelligence professionals and the larger intelligence community within which they interact.

Reviewed by Jim Schnell, PhD, Lead Social Scientist, Army Culture and Foreign Language Directorate, Fort Eustis, Virginia
The Spy Within: Larry Chin and China’s Penetration of the CIA
by Tod Hoffman
Steerforth Press, 2008, 309 pages
ISBN-10: 1586421484

The essence of this book is an account of a foreign born individual who became a naturalized American citizen and worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an analyst and translator for thirty years and passed classified information to the Chinese. The passing of the classified information led to a charge of espionage. The individual was Mr. Lu Tau-Chin who satisfied the necessary background checks including a polygraph exam and who also received favorable evaluations while he was employed with the CIA. Although Chin received money for his betrayal he supposedly had another reason for his duplicity. He wanted to improve relations between the U.S. and China.

The author suggests that in 1971 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became interested in possible Chinese intelligence activity in the U.S. when representatives of that country started to take part in United Nations (UN) activities in New York City. It was presumed that among the Chinese diplomats some representation of intelligence activities would take place. This presumption is not new about the presence of foreign government representatives in the U.S., but it is an important aspect to recognize and react to when it takes place. Although this presumption relates to all representatives of foreign governments in this country, it is especially important when the country is in an adversarial relation to the U.S.

Interestingly, the author notes some interesting characteristics of Chinese intelligence activities. For example, the Chinese seem to take the long term approach in gathering information, believing that it is not easy to obtain vital information quickly. They also prefer to recruit large numbers of agents who provide small bits of information, unlike the U.S. which could be satisfied with the recruitment of a small number of agents providing a large amount of information. A lesson we learn from this book is that dealing with the Chinese in terms of intelligence activities requires an understanding that their way of conducting espionage differs somewhat from other countries. Yet, this does not mean that they are less effective in attaining their goals.

This investigation of possible espionage activity involving a foreign born individual began when it was alleged that a Chinese official passed on information to the CIA. This information suggested that a mole had penetrated their organization and was passing on information to the Chinese government. The CIA then requested the help of the FBI in tracking down this individual and it turned out to be Larry Wu-Tai Chin who was arrested and tried for espionage. At his trial, the prosecution made some obvious points: Chin had access to classified information, passed some of it unlawfully, and noted that such information could be beneficial to a foreign power. However, the defense suggested that what was passed on to China could easily have been obtained from public sources and was not viewed as detrimental to this country. Nevertheless, the jury seemed to agree with the prosecution and found Chin guilty. He could have received a long sentence for espionage but committed suicide in jail soon after the trial.

Chin’s actions reinforced a number of important points that we should know about foreign intelligence activities. First, assume that foreign governments will attempt to spy on us in various ways including the use of developing helpful sources of information within our intelligence agencies. Second, we should continually monitor and look for possible ways that such countries will attempt to do this since new approaches usually come about. Third, it is advantageous to constantly monitor our internal security agencies for possible moles within them. This implies increasing the number of times that employees are subjected to polygraph exams and background checks as opposed to just using them for the initial hiring process. Fourth, develop as many sources from other countries for providing information to us about who within our intelligence organizations is leaking unauthorized information. Of course, this means penetrating foreign intelligence agencies with the intent of securing this type of information. These are not the only suggestions that can help the U.S. protect its vital secrets but certainly they should be considered for its safety.

William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University
The author has an impressive background in government work involving intelligence analysis serving for about twenty-eight years. Hence, he is certainly qualified to share his views about a very important topic. The gist of his book concerns the relationship between the making of foreign policy and the intelligence community. He has relied on a number of scholarly works and government documents to make his suggestions and conclusions in this book. There is also a strong reliance on his personal observations and analytical conclusions to justify his views about the relationship between intelligence activity and policy formation.

Basically, Mr. Pillar defends the intelligence community from what he considers wrong accusations. For example, some of his major findings are that most prewar intelligence analysis on Iraq was good; the intelligence community did in fact identify the threat from Al-Qaida; most intelligence failures have had no effect on U.S. policy; and interestingly, policy has shaped intelligence on occasion rather than the other way around. The author also believes that the intelligence community has shown an internal willingness to change and to adapt as needed which may be a surprise to some.

Although critics of the intelligent community often cite a need for reform in these areas, the author also generally believes that it is not intelligence that is wrong, but that our political leaders who make important foreign policy decisions are influenced more by other factors. These factors could be a presidential neurosis, a need to demonstrate a particular characteristic such as being strong, or an acceptance of a particular theory such as the “domino theory” of communism as was cited by American political leaders to justify initiating a policy to send troops into combat. The latter reason is cited in reference to President Johnson’s policy of continuing the war in Vietnam.

The author also suggests that intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction was sold to the general public as a reason for engaging Hussein in a war, but that the real reason was a perception that Hussein’s presence constituted a threat to American interests in that area. Perhaps the author is correct as one looks back at the fact that weapons of mass destruction were not found to any large extent as suggested by the American government. Hence, it becomes clear that the author is suggesting that the image of a country or of a particular leader could be an important motivator for American military action rather than the information provided by the intelligence community.

An interesting aspect of this book is the author’s commentary concerning reforms within intelligence agencies as are suggested and so often advocated by those who are motivated by intelligence failures which have occurred in our past and may take place in the future. Yet, the view presented in this work is that the reforms are not necessarily always needed, often have little major effect when they do take place, and in fact are often made within the community by its own personnel. Nevertheless, he does have his own suggestions for improving the agencies which seem beneficial. For example, he advocates less politicization of the intelligence community which means that we should not allow political considerations to influence the objectivity of information emanating from the community. Doing so would have the benefit of safeguarding the integrity of the intelligence community’s own work for use by policy makers.

The author also suggests that we must realize that we expect too much from intelligence agencies. We cannot expect them to always provide complete and accurate information in a real world. There will also be some uncertainty when making policy decisions even if they are based on intelligence information for a number of reasons, one being that not all information needed is always available.

Another suggestion cited by the author is to change the relationship between the intelligence community and Congress. Specifically he is advocating that Congress make more substantive requests for information from intelligence agencies. Perhaps there is value in this suggestion because then it would be more aware of intel-
ligence activities, and the intelligence community itself would also have more of an opportunity to justify its activities. Such a situation might also have the added advantage of suggesting to the general public that more valuable scrutiny of intelligence agencies is taking place.

A latter chapter of this book reemphasizes an important characteristic of intelligence activity; namely, the uncertainty that is bound to be present when considering information obtained by such means. It is suggested that policy makers realize this, that they also do not let its presence counter the attempts by the intelligence community to search for the truth, and consider it to be basic characteristic of the real world of policy making. To put it more succinctly, the author notes: “No matter what reforms are enacted, substantial and unavoidable uncertainty will forever characterize the making of foreign and security policy.” (P.12)

The book should be of interest to a wide variety of professionals. Intelligence analysts will benefit because the book really does explain why and why not information influences policy decision making. It is also valuable to political scientists who are quite interested in the process involved in the making of important policies by our government. Students of history—especially those who like to study the post war international situation in terms of important conflicts involving the U.S. will also find the book beneficial because of references to many events of that period.

Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University

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