FROM THE EDITOR

In this issue you will find an update to the July-September 2009 and April-June 2010 MIPB articles on Army doctrine (and particularly MI doctrine) restructure. This update describes the ways MI doctrine will meet the intent of Army Doctrine 2015 as well as updating the available and projected publications. Look for another update in the October-December 2012 issue on this fluid and dynamic topic.

We have several articles which are in the lessons learned arena. From RC-East Afghanistan, three articles discuss the development and operations of the Regional Information Fusion Center from network targeting to the incorporation of a Human Terrain Analysis Team. Two articles speak to operations in the drawdown in Iraq. One summarizes principles of operational assessments and relates how a Joint Interrogation and Detention Center in Iraq used qualitative and quantitative assessments to improve operations and apply them to adapt and maintain efficient operations during the drawdown. The second focuses on the intelligence support to sustainment operations during the final push of personnel and equipment out of Iraq in 2011. Back to Afghanistan, another article relates the issues and eventual success story of a partnership between Romanian and U.S. intelligence personnel. Rounding out the topic of lessons learned is a summary of CIA functions and its relationship with the DoD.

From USAICoE, the Learning Innovation Office gives us a look at its digital training investment to support the Army Learning Model 2015 and the launch of its new learning management system.

Throughout 2012, the MI community (USAICoE, INSCOM, DA G2, and FORSCOM) will be commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the MI Branch and the 25th anniversary of the MI Corps. Activities are planned to educate as well as build professional interest in the history and heritage of Army Intelligence starting with the American Revolution through experiences and events throughout the year. In keeping with this, we are pleased to include in this issue an expanded biography of MG (R) Oliver Dillard, an inductee into this year’s Hall of Fame. MG Dillard’s career spanned 36 years, beginning as a drafted enlisted soldier in a segregated Army during World War II to retiring as a major general in an all-volunteer Army in the Eighties.

Look for the July September 2012 50th anniversary commemorative issue published in collaboration with Lori Tagg, USAICoE Command Historian and Michael Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian, (coming in September.)

Suspenses for next year’s MIPB are:

- January March 2013: Special Issue
- April June 2013: S: 30 January 2013
- July September 2013: S: 30 April 2013
- October December 2013: S: 30 August 2013

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Intel 2020: A Strategic Path for Army Intelligence

Until recently, the Army’s Military Intelligence (MI) senior leadership was focused on training Soldiers to meet the requirements of an Army engaged in over a decade of continuous conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. As these conflicts ebb, the Army has shifted its focus to defining the strategic landscape of 2020, and then staffing, training and equipping a force ready to operate in what we believe that operational environment will look like. This is a difficult task, because a generation of Soldiers and leaders has been almost exclusively focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. Army intelligence and the intelligence community face the daunting challenge of transitioning to meet a wide range of potential threats of increasing complexity, while still supporting current operations.

The most recent Defense Planning Guidance calls for renewed emphasis on strategic priorities. These priorities include: shaping the operational environment by framing perceptions and influencing the behavior of both multinational partners and adversaries, setting conditions for decisive operations, defeating enemy capabilities, and establishing conditions for stability. This guidance, published by the President and Secretary of Defense in January 2012, cautions that if we overemphasize the application of lessons learned from ten years of stability operations, we run the risk of preparing for the last war rather than for operations in a new strategic landscape. It specifically directs that the future force not be sized or resourced to conduct prolonged stability operations. We must, therefore, take global lessons learned (preparation for regional operations, the importance of foundational architecture, etc.) and apply those lessons to the Defense Priorities. These lessons have mandated both a geographic and phasing refocus, with a more balanced approach to “prevent, shape, and win.”

Army 2020 is a strategy for the future, developed through the lens of this Defense Planning Guidance and influenced by looming reductions in Army end strength and declining military budgets. Army 2020 describes the future operational environment that the Army must prepare for and prevail in. The strategy is to maintain a high level of operational adaptability in order to accomplish a wide range of missions, while retaining the ability to focus more narrowly on projecting power to deter and defeat aggression once a specific threat emerges.

The active, early, and persistent engagement of our total Army MI team is essential to the success of this wide lens–narrow focus strategy. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Lieutenant General Mary Legere, identified five complementary priorities required to link the intelligence warfighting function with the stated goals for the Army of 2020:

- Build the best possible multidisciplined MI force to enable decisive action in current and future contingencies.
- Sustain and expand MI support to Theater/Army commanders in order to provide the agility, responsiveness, regional depth, and expertise necessary for decisive employment.
- Provide a trained and ready MI force—the force structure, capabilities, and equipment needed to accomplish all assigned tasks.
- Keep our MI force ready and always in the fight—no “cold starts” and no “MI Soldier at rest.”
- Provide advanced intelligence solutions for today’s and tomorrow’s fight.¹

Guided by this strategic vision, the Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) at Fort Huachuca is developing the necessary force structure as part of Army Intelligence 2020, or simply Intel 2020. Intel 2020 describes the Army’s strategic-to-tactical intelligence enterprise and identifies and describes the force structure strategy needed to enhance our global and regional intelligence readiness to support the Army of 2020 and beyond. The Intel 2020 force structure strategy will encompass three major initiatives: echelons corps and below (ECB); the aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (aerial-ISR) layer; and echelons above corps (EAC).
The success of Intel 2020 force design depends on three key linchpins:

- It must be an “all compo” (Regular Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard) solution to ensure no “cold starts.”
- It must be connected and seamless from theater to squad to leverage the data, intelligence, technology, and expertise available within the intelligence enterprise.
- It must provide for the continuous training required to sustain and improve increasingly complex low-density, highly technical, and highly perishable MI skills.

ECB

As we build force designs for the ECB initiative, we must be sure to retain the best from lessons learned and capabilities developed in response to operational requirements while also assessing the future operational environment. Technical additions and innovations—such as full-motion video, document and media exploitation, aerial and ground-based precision geo-location, biometrics and other advanced capabilities—will provide tactical commanders with the tools they need for situational awareness, force protection, and decentralized operations.

New concepts, such as multi-functional teams (MfTs) and continued refinements to one of our core competencies such as advanced analytics, will help create a flexible multi-disciplined intelligence force prepared for both current and future contingencies. Widely dispersed operations are enabled by skilled analysts at echelons down to company level, with unprecedented access to sensor data, fusion tools, and the ability to collaborate with other analysts throughout the intelligence community. The starting point for Intel 2020 sustains and builds on these in order to provide the agility, responsiveness, and expertise for decisive employment.

However, designing MI support at ECB is not as simple as sustaining our current MI structure, TTPs, and equipment. Key precepts of Army 2020 have fundamentally changed the basic brigade combat team (BCT) designs by adding an additional maneuver battalion to the armor and infantry BCTs and limiting the size of all BCTs. This “cap” has limited our ability to grow organic MI-enabler capacity within the BCT, and we are considering how we can best support the newly designed BCTs with the requisite capabilities that have proven effective over the last ten years. The “cap” also limits our ability to increase the MI-enabler capacity required to support the additional maneuver battalion. To meet this challenge, we have developed modular capabilities (e.g., MfTs; processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) platoons; etc.) and built sufficient capacity and flexibility in our MI formations to task organize to meet mission requirements.

Future MI force designs envision closing the BCT’s enabler gap by pooling the required MI capabilities and capacities and providing them to the BCTs during the force generation process. Future force designs also envision tailoring BCTs for specific mission sets. Designs must address previously identified MI mission command gaps at corps and division, reinforce BCTs, and provide a mitigation strategy for closing the force-wide gap in training and readiness for highly technical low-density military intelligence occupational specialties.

Finally, we owe it to our MI professionals to ensure we propose force designs that consider the professional and intellectual development of our Soldiers and leaders and provide them with a deliberate career progression. We must continually grow and challenge our MI professionals to keep their skills sharp and ensure they are engaged.

Aerial-ISR

The second initiative in restructuring the MI force under Intel 2020 is revising the aerial-ISR layer to streamline the ability to provide tailored aerial-ISR packages for global response across all echelons from the joint force down to the deployed maneuver battalion. Lessons learned have shown us we must have a mission command element to manage the safety, sustainment, standardization, modernization, and capability-based rotations of our high-demand/low-density aerial-ISR special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) and crews. Additionally, we have learned through the successes of our aerial exploitation battalions (AEBs) and Task Force ODIN how to provide needed aerial-ISR support to commanders. Success comes from using a combination of forward-deployed capabilities and reach operations to maximize the effectiveness and responsiveness of the SEMA platforms and sensors and associated MI personnel. These lessons will be institutionalized in future AEB designs.

New designs will create a distributed PED environment in which PED capabilities will be virtually consolidated and physically located in areas for optimal utilization and leveraging of resources. Aerial-ISR designs will

(Continued on page 13)
Introduction

As a result of the past decade of conflict, there have been a number of changes to both Army and Joint doctrine in the approach to planning and executing operations. Perhaps the greatest doctrinal shift in the past few years has been the emphasis on two related concepts: mission command and the Army design methodology. This shift is a response to a number of factors, including the emergence of hybrid threats, the emphasis on unified action full spectrum operations in simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities, and the impact of the information environment. This article will discuss these two concepts and the implications for Military Intelligence (MI) professionals. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations, provides the context for these changes:

Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as unified action. Army leaders must integrate their actions and operations within this larger framework, collaborating with entities outside their direct control... Effective unified action requires Army leaders who can understand, influence, and cooperate with unified action partners. The Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within the Army, and it cannot operate effectively without their support. Likewise, government agencies outside the Department of Defense possess knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success. The active co-

Mission Command

Mission command is the first response to the requirement to “create a shared understanding and purpose” to integrate “actions within unified action” to synchronize operations. This represents a shift away from “battle command” to mission command. This is more than merely a change in terminology, and represents a change in the approach to the art and science of command. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 provides the following definition:

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. Exercised by Army commanders, it blends the art of command and the science of control while integrating the warfighting functions to conduct the tasks of decisive action.

Although mission command is commander-led, the concepts and principles apply to all leaders—at all levels. Mission command requires an environment characterized by mutual trust and the encouragement of collaboration and dialogue at all echelons—a necessary approach to achieve success in today’s operational environment:

Mission command emphasizes the critical contributions of leaders at every echelon. It establishes a mindset among Army leaders that the best understanding comes from a synthesis of information and an understanding from all echelons and unified action partners—bottom-up input is as important as top-down guidance. Mission command emphasizes the importance of creating shared un-
derstanding and purpose. It highlights how commanders—through disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent—transition among offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks and vary the level of control to account for changes in an operational environment.\(^3\)

Mission command is not only a function performed by commanders, but is also described as a “warfighting function” (replacing the command and control warfighting function.) It is, therefore, both a philosophy of command as well as a warfighting function. Commanders—the central figure in mission command—have three different tasks:

- Drive the operations process through activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.
- Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with joint, interagency, and multinational partners.
- Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations.\(^4\)

All three of these tasks in mission command are interrelated; the commander must “drive the operations process” by using the methodology of “understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.” During this process, commanders must develop teams within organizations, as well as strengthening existing relationships with unified action partners. Providing consistent messages to diverse audiences is required for effective planning and executing of operations. Staffs assist commanders with “understanding situations, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress” as well as keeping “units and organizations outside the headquarters informed throughout the conduct of operations.”\(^5\)

ADRП 5-0, The Operations Process, provides a schematic that describes how commanders drive the operations process in mission command. Note that the actions are focused on the task of “understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.” An overview of this process is displayed in the figure below.\(^6\)

ADRП 6-0 provides the following description of mission command:

**Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess throughout operations. Commanders continuously develop, test, and update their understanding throughout the conduct of operations.** They actively collaborate with other commanders, the staff, and unified action partners, to create a shared understanding. As commanders begin to develop an understanding of the operational environment, they start visualizing the operation’s end state and potential solutions to solve problems. After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates. This description facilitates shared understanding of the situation, mission, and intent. Based on this understanding, commanders make decisions and direct action throughout the operations process. Commanders use the operations process to lead Soldiers and forces by providing direction and guidance. Commanders assess operations continuously to better understand current conditions and determine how operations are progressing. Commanders incorporate the assessments of the staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners into their personal assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment, commanders modify plans and orders to better accomplish the mission. If their assessment reveals a significant variance from their original commander’s visualization, commanders reframe the problem and develop a new operational approach.”\(^7\)
There are some themes that are emphasized in mission command that relate directly to Army design methodology: the central role of the commander; understanding the operational environment; visualizing the end state and operational approach; describing the visualization for a shared understanding; collaboration and dialogue; and framing and reframing. Let’s now look at Army design methodology as the second concept.

**Army Design Methodology**

The Army design methodology is defined by ADP 5-0 as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them.” Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1 states that “design permeates the operations process” to “assist commanders and staff with the conceptual aspects of command.” ADRP 5-0 provides a description of the activities of the Army design methodology:

> Army design methodology entails framing an operational environment, framing a problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. Army design methodology results in an improved understanding of the operational environment, a problem statement, initial commander’s intent, and an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning. Based on their understanding and learning gained during Army design methodology, commanders issue planning guidance, to include an operational approach, to guide more detailed planning using the MDMP.

The Army design methodology is the second response to the requirement to “create a shared understanding and purpose” to integrate “actions within unified action” to synchronize operations and develop “a methodology that expands beyond the military decisionmaking process” that focuses on “understanding the operational environment” and understanding “the problem to be solved.” Army design methodology is primarily conceptual, whereas the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) is detail oriented:

Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning desired future conditions, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. Planning consists of two separate but interrelated components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. Successful planning requires the integration of both these components. Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning: the Army design methodology, the military decisionmaking process, and troop leading procedures. Commanders determine how much of each methodology to use based on the scope of the problem, their familiarity with it, and the time available.

Army design methodology, as the conceptual component of planning, is a methodology to help commanders think through handling problems, and to engage the staff, subordinates, and higher level commanders using collaboration and dialogue to enable a commander’s understanding and visualization of a situation. It is defined in ADRP 3-0, using much of the conceptual language of mission command of understanding, visualizing, and describing. Formal planning processes, such as MDMP or the Joint Operation Planning Process, provide a complementary and iterative methodology to provide specificity to planning.

The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The Army design methodology is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about unfamiliar problems. To produce executable plans, commanders integrate it with the detailed planning typically associated with the military decisionmaking process. Commanders who use the Army design methodology may gain a greater understanding of their operational environments and the problems and visualize an appropriate operational approach. With this greater understanding, commanders can provide a clear commander’s intent and concept of operations—both required by mission command. Such clarity enables subordinate units and commanders to take initiative. The Army design methodology is iterative and collaborative. As the operations process unfolds, the commander, staff, subordinates, and other partners continue to learn and collaborate to improve their shared understanding. An improved understanding may lead to modifications to their operational approach or an entirely new approach altogether.

Army design methodology focuses on three basic questions that must be answered to produce an actionable design concept that can guide detailed planning:

- What is the context in which design will be applied? (Framing the operational environment.)
- What problem is the design intended to solve? (Framing the problem.)
What broad, general approach will solve the problem? (Developing operational approaches.)

The first two questions relate directly to framing—framing the operational environment and framing the problem. Framing provides the “focus” for planning—to decide exactly what will be analyzed, and by necessity, what may not be analyzed. Just as a ‘timeframe’ looks at just a certain span of time, framing is like a camera lens that only shows a certain view—there is more around the frame, but the focus is only within the frame. When you don’t limit your planning frame, you have too much information to analyze; when you overly limit and focus the frame, there is the danger of missing important details. Too much information can result in ‘paralysis by analysis’ whereas too little information can lead planners to solve the wrong problem because they can’t see the real issue at hand. For this reason, it is essential to constantly review framing and to be willing to reframe as needed—including framing the operational environment and framing the problem. ADRP 5-0 gives the following description of framing:

**Framing is the act of building mental models to help individuals understand situations and respond to events. Framing involves selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of an operational environment and a problem by establishing context. How individuals or groups frame a problem will influence potential solutions... The Army design methodology involves deliberately framing an operational environment and problem through dialogue and critical and creative thinking by a group. The group considers the perspective and world views of others to understand the situation fully. This contextual understanding of an operational environment serves as a frame of reference for developing solutions to solve problems. Framing facilitates constructing hypotheses, or modeling, that focuses on the part of an operational environment or problem under consideration.**

Commanders and staff use different approaches when framing the operational environment and framing the problem. For framing the operational environment, the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time, or PMESII-PT) are used; for framing the problem, the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations, or METT-TC) start to come into play.

Developing the operational approach builds on the commander’s understanding of the problem and the environment. The general sequence is that commanders first understand the conditions that make up the current situation; based on this understanding, commanders gain a greater understanding of the problem (the competitive issue with an opponent) and visualize conditions that represent the desired end state. After envisioning the conditions that make up the desired end state, commanders then conceptualize an operational approach of how to change current conditions to the desired future conditions, as shown below.

**The concept of ‘collaboration and dialogue’ is strongly emphasized in Army design methodology. Having an organization that encourages collaboration and dialogue is necessary to build a learning organization. ADRP 5-0 describes the process of collaboration and dialogue:**

**Throughout the operations process, commanders encourage continuous collaboration and dialogue among the staff and with unified action partners. Collaboration and dialogue aids in developing shared understanding throughout the force and with unified action partners. Collaboration is two or more people or organizations working together toward common goals by sharing knowledge and building consensus. Dialogue is a way to collaborate that involves the candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and that encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement. Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners actively collaborate and dialogue, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and make decisions.**

**Implications for MI Professionals**

Full implementation of the mission command and the Army design methodology requires a
change in mindset, with attendant challenges and opportunities. There are a number of implications for MI professionals today from this shift in the approach to operations.

✦ **Know the playbook.** The descriptions of mission command and the Army design methodology are not exhaustive, but instead are a broad brush effort to explain the concepts. It is critical to understand the concepts and tools used for mission command and the Army design methodology. It isn’t necessary—or desirable—to follow doctrine slavishly. It is necessary to understand the doctrine and to reflect on the enduring principles and concepts, and then to use judgment in the application of those principles and concepts based on the situation.

✦ **Play on the team.** Mission command and the Army design methodology encourage free-flowing discussions with the emphasis on collaboration and dialogue—which represents an opportunity to be an active participant throughout the operations process. They are intended to ‘harvest the corporate intellect’ of the entire team, including the commander, staff, superiors, and subordinates. Don’t just ‘stay in your lane,’ but also understand that the commander is still in charge.

✦ **Play your position.** While mission command and the Army design methodology are ‘team sports,’ MI professionals have key roles to play. Understanding the operational environment and conducting PMESII-PT analysis are core missions, do them well.

✦ **Build a team.** The concept of collaboration and dialogue goes beyond the discussions within the staff; draw on others who have expertise for their insight. This is particularly relevant when conducting stability or civil support missions, there are many stakeholders who can assist... engage them.

✦ **Maintain the big picture.** Framing is critical, but it has inherent weaknesses—are you looking at the right issues? Have things changed that require a reframe? Always be attuned to the bigger picture to ensure you aren’t focused in the wrong area or working on the wrong problem.

**Summary**

Today, complex problems exist at all levels of war—and commanders and staffs at all levels have to synthesize intuition and ‘informed vision and creativity,’ with cognitive analytical approaches. The complementary concepts of **Mission command** and the **Army design methodology** provide the approaches needed to address these complex problems.

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**Endnotes**

1. ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011, paragraphs 11 and 12.
2. ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012, paragraph 2-45.
3. ADRP 3-0, paragraph 2-47.
4. ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012, paragraph 1-16.
6. ADRP 5-0, figure 1-2.
7. ADRP 6-0, paragraph 3-6.
9. ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, 14 September 2011, paragraph 1-15.
10. ADRP 5-0, paragraph 2-30.
11. ADRP 3-0, paragraph 1-51.
12. ADRP 3-0, paragraph 1-53.
13. ADRP 5-0, paragraphs 2-30 to 2-32.
14. ADRP 5-0, paragraphs 2-25 to 2-26.
15. ADRP 5-0, figure 1-3.
16. ADRP 5-0, paragraph 1-43.

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Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz, the famed early 19th century military theorist, introduced the concepts of fog and friction that are still firmly rooted in the modern military lexicon. Both refer to the element of uncertainty in war. Fog exists because no person can see everything, and the enemy will not oblige us by standing still or sending a copy of his battle plan. Friction exists because we cannot control everything perfectly. Somebody will make a wrong turn, the weather will not cooperate, and someone will spill coffee on the critical computer system. Try as we might, we cannot eliminate fog and friction, not even with the best that modern technology has to offer.

Martin van Creveld, one of the few military historians to tackle a direct examination of command and control in the history of war, accepts the premise that uncertainty will always be with us, but he argues that commanders have the power to decide where the burden of that uncertainty will lay. In his book, Command in War, Creveld argues that the best option for commanders, based on a survey of several millennia of military history, is to accept the burden of uncertainty at a higher level of command in order to allow subordinates the freedom to operate at lower levels based on their own initiative.

The ability to make decisions should be resident at the point of action, which is generally at a low echelon of command, so that unexpected threats or opportunities can be dealt with or exploited. The commander may not be able to see and control everything, but if he accepts the risk and trains appropriately then his organization’s efficiency and effectiveness will increase tremendously. This, in short, is what mission command should accomplish.

Mission Command Philosophy– ADP 6-0

The Army released Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command in May 2012. It will serve as our first step toward understanding what mission command means. The authors of ADP 6-0 define the mission command philosophy as the “exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” The authors also lay out six principles of mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust; create shared understanding; provide a clear commander’s intent; exercise disciplined initiative; use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.
Without going any further we can distill some of the central features of the mission command paradigm. First, mission command is commander-centric. Staffs play a critical role, but they support only what the commander leads. The commander must visualize, direct, build teams, and empower subordinates. Subordinate leaders also play critical roles. They must understand the higher commander’s intent, be capable of exercising disciplined initiative, and manage risk in a prudent manner because “higher” cannot and should not be involved in every decision or action. The use of mission orders is also very important. Commanders must give no more orders than are absolutely necessary and must strive to ensure that those orders are rigorous, succinct, and clear.

**Mission Command—Historical Examples**

ADP 6–0 may be a new publication, but the concept of mission command is not new and is certainly not an American invention. Mission command’s historical pedigree reaches far back to early warfare; the Prussian/German military tradition implemented mission command in its arguably most potent, organized and visible form. An acceptance of some disobedience driven by positive individual initiative was long a part of the Prussian military tradition, but formal mission command began to flourish during the liberalizing reforms conducted after Napoleon’s decisive defeat of the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806. It was not until the mid-19th century that mission command became enshrined as a central tenet by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, however.

Although a prolific and thorough planner, Moltke’s views on war were rooted in a central belief that too much exigency existed in combat to rely totally on a heavily centralized control structure predicated on the use of detailed orders. He therefore recommended that commanders should be “assigned general missions, related to fundamental, clearly understood objectives, and then instructed to accomplish those missions by carrying the fight aggressively to the enemy.” One can imagine the importance of decentralization in an age where thousands of men maneuvered in grand battles without the benefit of advanced communications equipment.

Modern radios and computers have increased our ability to exercise control on the battlefield, but decentralization remains critical. Radios may increase control, but engagements have devolved to smaller affairs, forces are more dispersed, and a commander cannot be everywhere, even with the benefit of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below communications and drones. In fact, commanders should not try to be everywhere because it sets a poor precedent and robs subordinates of critical initiative in opportune or dangerous moments. Moltke’s post-Franco-Prussian War advice still applies: “a favorable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient.”

Mission command, known in the German tradition as auftragstaktik, became especially useful during World War I. The German army in 1914 was the most decentralized in Europe; battalion and company commanders were free to train however they saw fit. One British observer noted in the late 1880s that “the Captain is practically unfettered by regulations, and no one has a right to interfere with what he thinks fit to do, unless such action is directly contrary to the spirit of existing regulations or manifestly would give but insufficient results.” This tradition continued on in German practice and regulation through World War I. We should note that the only major constraint on a commander was any action “directly contrary to the spirit of existing regulations,” not the letter of the regulation.

In line with auftragstaktik, the German army developed special assault units, or stormtroopers, as early as mid-1915 in an effort to overcome the bloody positional war of attrition in Europe. The innovation spread and, by the end of the war, battalions and below were forming their own ad hoc assault units in addition to the official formations. These units, led by young officers and outstanding noncommissioned officers, were employed in very small, well-armed, well-trained groups. They were generally employed against limited objectives and often instructed to bypass strong points, especially late in the war in order to penetrate deeply, infiltrate, and disrupt the enemy. Initiative at the lowest level was a key component to success.
These units yielded success on the battlefield by facilitating the achievement of limited objectives, and their tactics were eventually copied by British, French, and American units. In order to be successful, even the most junior member of an assault team had to know his mission and end state. For example, one particularly enterprising assault trooper captured near a British brigade headquarters during the Spring Offensive of 1918 revealed during interrogations that his orders were simply: “so weiter, so besser,” translated loosely as “the further, the better.”6 Many of us would be hard pressed to develop such a succinct and direct mission statement.

Auftragstaktik was also a key component in the early German blitzkrieg operations of World War II though its implementation was best observed at the tactical levels because Nazi tyranny tended to suffocate auftragstaktik at the operational and strategic levels. One outstanding example is Erwin Rommel and his 7th Panzer Division’s push at Avesnes during the German invasion of France in 1940. The division earned the nickname “the ghost division” because Rommel, who understood the higher command’s intent (he had a “ticket” to the northern coast of France), exploited a perceived weakness in the French fortified defensive line and attacked, remaining out of radio contact and practically unaccounted for during most of the advance, despite instructions from higher to wait and begin a deliberate attack early the next day.

The attack succeeded in breaking through the formidable defenses, due in large part to the element of surprise, and Rommel exploited the gap by pushing far into the Allied rear areas.7 Because Rommel understood his commander’s intent (he had a “ticket” to the northern coast of France), he was able to disregard the letter of an order and exploit an opportunity that higher commanders and staffs could not have seen. He had to act boldly. Historians suspect that he intentionally disabled his command’s radios during the attack so that higher commanders could not recall his division, but he had the latitude to do so under auftragstaktik and crashed through two defensive lines where he took more than 3,500 prisoners for the loss of only 40 killed in action.8

While the Germans were perhaps the best known practitioners of mission command and likely came the closest to its total implementation, plenty of other non-Teutonic examples of mission command in action exist. Just to demonstrate that mission command has a wider applicability than tactical ground engagements, I will briefly highlight Horatio Nelson’s successful implementation of mission command in his fleet during the Napoleonic Wars. Nelson wrote in 1799 that “the circumstances of this war so often vary, that an Officer has almost every moment to consider—What would my superiors direct, did they know what is passing under my nose?”9 He understood mission command, but more importantly, he developed a mission command culture in his organization.

The move to decentralization in the British navy was necessary as early as the first decades of the 18th century at the operational and strategic levels because fleets simply could not be controlled around the world. Decentralization at the tactical level also flourished in some commands for a short period of time in the mid-18th century, though its use tapered off in later decades because many officers began to adhere to a more scientific approach that seemed to promise almost total control in battle through the use of new methods of communication and drill.

Nelson recognized that such control in the heat of battle was impossible; a commander could not see everything, he could not direct everything, and communication was very difficult in the smoke and chaos of an engagement even with the best technology. His solution, using Creveld’s terminology, was to accept the burden of uncertainty and allow his subordinate commanders maximum latitude once fighting began. Notably, Nelson “abandoned” control of his subordinates in combat, but he did not abandon doctrine. As one author has phrased it, Nelson’s bravery was in entrusting “his professional fate to his subordinates.”10 Training, trust, and a well-articulated, widely understood mission and intent statement were the keys to his successful decentralization. Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 resulted in large part from his use of mission command. He instructed his subordinate commanders on his general plan and intent for the coming battle, but ultimately allowed those same subordinates the freedom to act as they saw fit within his intent once battle began.

**Developing the Mission Command Culture**

One common thread through each of these stories is the simple fact that mission command must be a
culture, not just a process. This is likely where we in the U.S. Army will struggle with its implementation because our army has historically opted for central-ized, detailed planning, and weighted control over command.11 In World War II, Patton and those few others like him were the exceptions to an otherwise mediocre American combat officer pool. Managerial tendencies drove operations in Vietnam, and U.S. strategy focused on statistics and firepower, which in turn demanded centralized control. Some basic implementation of mission command seemed ready to emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s in con-\textit{cert with the development of the AirLand Battle doctrine}. There, individual initiative would be a nec-e\textit{ssary ingredient for success considering the increased emphasis on maneuver needed in order to counter perceived Soviet quantitative superiority in a theoretical European conflict.}12

Still, mission command culture did not take root as evidenced by the U.S. Army’s tendency to con-\textit{tinuously increase the sizes of staffs at every level, its development of a zero-defect mentality, and the trend of making operations orders and accompanying slides ever more complex and detailed}. Most his-torians agree that even in the first Gulf War, possibly the epitome of AirLand Battle in action, the U.S. did not practice mission command.13 Huge staffs controlled highly choreographed operations from far in the rear and denied combat commanders in the field the opportunity to aggressively exploit opportunities that could have resulted in the capture and destruc-tion of Iraq’s Republican Guard.14

We have more than tradition agitating against the successful implementation of a mission command culture. We must also overcome a blame and litiga-tion culture in which mistakes or problems im-mediately trigger heavy-handed responses that tend to increase burdens on lower commands and cen-tralize control at higher echelons. Our personnel and training systems must find ways to reward and encourage thinkers and leaders capable of exer-cising disciplined initiative. Some concerned about the possibility of implementing mission command argue that only small elite units filled with highly moti-vated and very competent leaders and soldiers are capable of wholly implementing mission command because capable and driven subordinates are just as important as willing commanders. In short, can we practice what we preach?

Grounds for hope do exist. Mission command’s fairly unambiguous introduction through ADP 6-0 gives leaders across the Army a common lexicon and concept. The crucible of a decade of war provides an outstanding opportunity at every level to exam-\textit{ine what is actually important in our organizations and what processes, systems, and requirements contribute positively toward the accomplishment of our ultimate mission, which is to fight and win our nation’s wars}. Many junior leaders have also ex-perienced decentralized operations during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and may call on those expe-riences later in their careers when they are able to collectively exercise more influence in our Army.

More immediate than such big picture hypotheses is the fact that leaders at every level throughout a brigade are capable of implementing some of the te-nets of mission command. We can engage the future by changing the culture around our own foxholes. These suggestions may seem simple, but they will be difficult to fully implement. First, focus on what each of us can change—ourselves. Examine your ac-tions, do you clearly articulate an intent and end-state to your subordinates or do you just tell them “what right looks like?”

When you write your next operations order, take a moment to think about what really needs to be conveyed and delete the rest. Do your subordinates understand your vision and their own left and right limits? Are those left and right limits as wide as ethically, legally, and practically possible? Next, fo-cus on your subordinates. For mission command to work, your subordinates must possess enough training, competence, understanding, and confidence to act independently and function effectively on their own. Your subordinates need your trust and respect.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Do not jettison doctrine, but do not let it con-strain you either. We can borrow a concept from the German military culture—doctrine is a guide or a rule of thumb that can be broken when necessary to pursue a mission, as Rommel did at Avesnes, so long as our actions are morally and legally correct and in support of our higher command’s intent and endstate. More than anything, though, we must re-member that mission command is a culture, not a process. It must permeate everything that we do as an organization. We would do well to remember the stormtrooper’s orders: “so weiter, so besser.”
Endnotes

1. ADP 6-0: Mission Command, May 2012, 1.

2. Ibid., 2.


4. Ibid.


8. Ibid., 273.


10. Ibid., 699.

11. For an excellent analysis of this phenomenon, see Jorg Muth’s Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II. Where German cadets and junior officers were empowered, treasured, mentored, and taught, U.S. cadets and junior officers were belittled, hazed, and provided no practical realistic training prior to combat. As a result, U.S. officers tended toward control and made mediocre combat commanders. U.S. military education also focused, and still does frequently, on “book solutions” and the application of templates, not the encouragement of free thought. The U.S. military attempted to import many Prussian/German processes but totally failed to inculcate the underlying culture necessary for mission command.


13. Ibid., 660-3.

14. Ibid.

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tie into the combat aviation brigades (CABs) and BCTs through the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) enterprise. These linkages will allow for ubiquitous access to all data and PED capabilities across the network and the intelligence enterprise. Our intent is to provide the most effective aerial-ISR layer that the Army can afford and identify where future investments could be made if additional resources become available.

EAC

The third segment of the Intel 2020 force design strategy is reviewing MI support at the theater echelon. This echelon of MI support is the critical enabler that anchors the Army to the COCOM and the larger intelligence enterprise. This anchor provides the foundation that ensures access to data, networks, technologies, training, and expertise from the extended cryptologic, all-source, geospatial, and human intelligence enterprises to support Army missions at all echelons. Additionally, because a significant percentage of the MI force conducts operations daily, both at national centers and in support of the seven geographical combatant commanders, it is critical that we ensure MI is providing adequate support. At the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, and in line with the Army 2020 design, a critical component of the future EAC MI design is addressing the USARNORTH and USAFRICOM MI enabler support gaps.

Foundry and IROC

This last point reflects one of MI’s greatest challenges, but one that has a proven solution in the program known as Foundry. In 2004, the Army Chief of Staff directed the Army G2 to implement the Foundry program in response to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom intelligence training and readiness shortfalls. The intent of Foundry was to ensure all deploying intelligence personnel had the opportunity for live target training and technical immersion prior to deployment. The program has since been heralded by combat arms commanders as the single most significant contributor to Army intelligence readiness in the last decade. Because of its demonstrated success, Foundry has been institutionalized as an approach to sustaining and improving technical readiness in our MI tactical formations.

However, intelligence readiness does not stop at training, even with the robust capabilities provided by Foundry. Intelligence Soldiers and their supported commanders must remain continuously engaged in analyzing potential threats. The dynamic threats of the future require continuous engagement and situational understanding in support of the Army’s global contingency missions. Prior to deployment, MI units and Soldiers need

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Introduction

In the past ten years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the military to adapt in order to respond to an environment of persistent conflict, primarily focused in a counterinsurgency environment. With the completion of the withdrawal of forces in Iraq and the reduction of forces in Afghanistan, the next ten years will, no doubt, be just as dynamic as the last ten years.

Several trends are evolving, and will continue to accelerate in the short term. These include:

- The requirement for readiness to address challenges across the entire range of military operations (from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns).
- A focus on unified land operations and decisive action (the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities).
- Increased interaction with coalition, joint, interagency, and intergovernmental partners.
- Increased joint interdependence for critical functions.

At the same time, there will likely be a reduction of the overall end-strength in all the military forces as well as an imperative to reduce costs wherever possible.

Simultaneously, the operational environment in the future will be “characterized by several persistent trends: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the rise of modern competitor states; violent extremism; regional instability; transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources.”

These, coupled with “important trends such as globalization, urbanization, and failed or failing states” can have a direct impact on unified land operations. Threats to our nation in the future will likely include hybrid threats, or the “diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.”

What we have learned in the past ten years is that there are several enduring factors that we must retain in order to address these challenges in the future. Flexibility and innovation, coupled with creativity and adaptation, have been essential qualities for success in the past and will continue to be critical in the future. Our strongest asset has been and will remain our Soldiers. As always, “today’s operational environment requires Soldiers whose character and competence represent the foundation of a values-based trained and ready Army.”

This is particularly true for Military Intelligence (MI) Professionals. Our strongest asset is the intellectual capital of our Soldiers. To address the challenges and opportunities of the future, we must focus on the continued development and empowerment of our people. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen noted, our
forces are the best in the world—and, most notably, our intelligence capabilities:

“Today’s U.S. Armed Forces are, I believe, the most capable in our Nation’s history, and these capabilities provide important strategic advantages with respect to nearly any situation or potential adversary. U.S. forces can conduct operations on a scale that very few others can approach. Their ability to project and sustain military power over global distances is unmatched. U.S. joint intelligence capabilities, a key factor in the success of practically any kind of military operation, are the best in the world.”

—Admiral M. G. Mullen, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, January 2009

To retain the strategic advantage as the “best in the world” in intelligence, there are a few areas that I would like to highlight that require additional focus in the coming years.

**Potential Focus Areas**

**Return to the “Band of Excellence.”** For years, we have been stretched thin in our resources, especially the ‘high demand, low density’ capabilities. As a result, we have focused on the ARFORGEN cycle that has been characterized by the ‘patch chart’ of units preparing for deployment. To prepare for deployments, we have been ready ‘just in time’ with an increasing reliance on the ‘directed mission essential task list (METL)’ to prepare for missions. The transition to the ‘full spectrum METL’ that integrated core and directed METLs was short-lived. With hopefully fewer deployments in the future, we need to return to the “band of excellence” mind set that encourages units and Soldiers to maintain a level of readiness at all times rather than just to prepare for the next mission.

The “band of excellence” mind set focuses on critical tasks—not just urgent tasks or the tasks of the immediate future. As a result, Soldier and units cannot focus on every task, but are forced to do an analysis of the core tasks that apply in most situations. This will also require a focus on standards—with an acknowledgement that tasks and standards should remain constant, whereas conditions will always vary.

**Collaborate, Collaborate, Collaborate.** Without question, we are much better at collaborating with all of the ‘players on the team,’ including members of the combined arms team, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and coalition partners. Even so, it is critical that we continue to develop a team mentality for intelligence. Working with other governmental agencies and coalition partners has come a long way in the past ten years, and we must continue these close collaborations. This is true at all levels of command. Our junior Soldiers should routinely work with outside agencies to develop a working knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of all available assets.

Fully understanding the operational environment “typically will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, U.S. Government departments and agencies, and non-governmental centers that possess relevant expertise.” This collaboration with other agencies and resources should take place continuously, and should be a part of the daily routing of intelligence experts.

**Speak a Common Language.** Our Joint and Army doctrine is excellent, but our corporate fluency in the doctrine is lacking. Doctrine provides a common frame of reference and the fundamentals of how the Army and Joint Force conduct operations.

Army doctrine is a body of thought on how Army forces operate as an integral part of a joint force. Army leaders who employ forces in operations under the guidance suggested by the doctrine are its primary audience. Doctrine acts as a guide to action rather than a set of fixed rules. Capstone doctrine establishes the Army’s view of the nature of operations, the fundamentals by which Army forces conduct operations, and the methods by which commanders exercise mission command... Doctrine is also a statement of how the Army intends to fight. In this sense, doctrine often describes an idealized situation and then contrasts the ideal with the reality Army leaders can expect. Doctrine provides a means of conceptualizing campaigns and operations, as well as a detailed understanding of conditions, frictions, and uncertainties that make achieving the ideal difficult. Doctrine also helps potential partners understand how the Army will operate. It establishes a common frame of reference and a common cultural perspective to solving military problems, including useful intellectual tools.

For example, there is a difference between Intelligence (ADRP 2-0) and Joint Intelligence (JP 2-0); there are doctrinal definitions that discern be-
tween the two concepts. When possible, we should be speaking the same language. Of course, when working with the joint community, we should be familiar with joint doctrine and, when working with those outside our “doctrinal fold,” we should be sure to define our terms so that we have a common language.

**Become a Life Long Learner.** Never stop learning. I am amazed when I ask Soldiers about the last book they read, or what their interests are outside the workplace. To prepare for all the challenges of the future, it is great to have amassed knowledge of the world we live in, but you will never master all that you may need to know about a particular culture, region, or language. Cultivating a habit of curiosity and inquiry on a wide variety of subjects will develop the skills to innovate and adapt when necessary.

There are a number of great reading lists that are available, and many of these lists are not solely ‘military books,’ but include a variety of subjects. Take one on, develop the habit of reading on a regular basis.⁸

Reading isn’t the only approach, writing is also a critical skill, especially for MI Professionals. Put down your thoughts in writing, and share them, develop your writing skills to develop your ability to reason.

**Summary**

To prepare for the challenges of tomorrow, we must focus our efforts on the intellectual capital of our Soldiers in MI. These areas of focus include:

✦ **Return to the “Band of Excellence.”** Having a mind set of a high state of readiness and preparedness at all times.

✦ **Collaborate, Collaborate, Collaborate.** Maintaining a team mentality in all that we do.

✦ **Speak a Common Language.** Being grounded in our doctrine.

✦ **Become a Life Long Learner.** Fostering intellectual curiosity and inquiry by reading and writing.

The Army’s experience illustrates that the U.S. cannot accurately predict the nature, location, or duration of the next conflict. The operational environment remains extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and actors. It is unforgiving of leaders who are overly dependent on technology or are who incapable of acting independently amid uncertainty and complexity.⁹

**Endnotes**

2. ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012, para 1-3.
3. ADRP 3-0, para 1-13.
4. ADRP 3-0, para 1-48.
7. ADP 3-0, 10 October 2011, paras 4–5.

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Every month a new brigade combat team rotates through the National Training Center (NTC) and with each new rotation the Observer Controller Trainers (O/CTs) spend three weeks with their respective counterparts in an attempt to prepare them for impending deployment. Most of the S2s that rotate through NTC are very junior captains who find themselves in their first job since graduating from the MI Captain’s Career Course and, in the case of those that were branched detailed, in their first job as an MI officer. These junior captains are under a lot of pressure to provide commanders with the necessary intelligence to understand the enemy, make good decisions, and enable the success of subordinate units.

Almost every S2 coming through the NTC faces similar challenges which arise regardless of rotational design, Operation Enduring Freedom, or full spectrum operations. The two biggest challenges are section organization and the S2’s role during a major operation. The solutions to these challenges are not covered in any field manual but can be resolved with a little foresight and planning. Overcoming these challenges will vastly improve the S2 section’s ability to produce accurate and timely intelligence for the commander.

### Battalion S2 Section Organization

The initial keys to a successful battalion (BN) S2 section are efficient functional design and standard operating procedures (SOP) development. Having an understanding of who is responsible for what in the section is the foundation on which a successful section is built. FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, defines an SOP as “a set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.” The intent of an SOP is to prevent work overlap or missed tasks because of a lack of understanding about duties and responsibilities within the section. BN S2 sections are broken down into current operations (CUOPS), plans, and collection management.

Coming from the garrison environment, where there is no requirement to man a CUOPS, most S2 sections do not have a designated team. A CUOPS section should be manned by up to two junior analysts per shift depending on the number of soldiers assigned to the section. Commonly, one of these soldiers is the junior sergeant of the section, whose job it is to supervise the CUOPS. The role of these two soldiers in the tactical operations center (TOC) (and the intelligence section as a whole) is very important and can make or break the BN S2 team. The S2 CUOPS section should be expected to perform the following tasks:

- **Tracking significant activity (SIGACT).** S2 CUOPS sections should be responsible for entering SIGACTs into the requisite databases (i.e., Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGR), Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), and sometimes the Command Post of the Future (CPOF)).

- **Controlling information collection (IC) assets.** The S2 CUOPS soldier in the TOC can assist both the collection manager (CM) and Battle Captain by interfacing with operators of the IC
platforms under BN control. This interface includes confirming enemy situational templates (SITTEMPs) during named operations, as well as dynamically re-tasking assets upon the Battle Captain direction.

- **Producing intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and graphic INTSUMs (GRINTSUMs).** Because S2 CUOPS is very familiar with the day’s SIGACTs, it should produce the unit’s INTSUMs and/or GRINTSUMs. These products, however, must be approved by the S2 officer in charge (OIC) before publication.

- **Pattern and trend analysis.** Because S2 CUOPS tracks SIGACTs, its personnel are often the first to identify the trends and patterns created by enemy forces (or in some cases friendly forces).

- **Providing the current enemy situation for the Battle Captain.** The S2 CUOPS section is the first place the Battle Captain should look for up-to-date enemy information. Additionally, S2 CUOPS should brief the enemy situation as part of the TOC shift changes.

The items are not an all inclusive list. Some CUOPS sections are expected to brief their Battalion Commander, XO, or S3 on a regular basis as well. The CUOPS tasks provided here do, however, illustrate the importance of the duty position, an importance that can be over looked when assigning soldiers to this task.

The Plans section is where the S2 OIC spends the majority of his time. The S2, senior analyst, and (depending on the section’s strength) any other soldiers not part of the S2 CUOPS are responsible for a majority of the analysis and products produced by the section. The plan’s section provides all the inputs for various targeting steps including Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, enemy assessments, and target packet development. S2 Plans section members generate the Intelligence portion of the Military Decision Making Process with products such as SITTEMPs and enemy courses of action. It portrays the enemy forces during staff war gaming and is where the commander should get the information he needs regarding the enemy to make effective decisions.

Collection Management is arguably the hardest job in the section. The CM needs to be able to effectively execute the following:

- **Collection planning.** The most important skill that a CM can possess is the ability to create a collection plan. Creating a collection plan is more than just building a slide with a map and a chart depicting when an asset is flying. A good collection plan is the end product of a lot of background work that incorporates the priority intelligence requirements, essential elements of information, indicators, and specific information requirements that are being collected on in each named area of interest. Once the plan is complete and approved by the S3, the CM needs to pass the plan on to the S2 CUOPS for execution. Since S2 CUOPS will likely be monitoring collection feeds, the CM needs to ensure that the soldiers on duty have a good understanding of the indicators they need to be looking for, how to talk to the asset, and how to re-task it if necessary.

- **Understanding the “big picture.”** The CM needs to understand both what the BN is currently doing and what they are planning to do in the future. This will allow the CM to anticipate requirements and more effectively request assets for future operations as well as anticipate where assets may be needed in support of current operations.

- **Maintain a good working relationship with the S3 section.** Good relations between the S2 and S3 form the foundation for sound collection. No collection plan can be executed until it is approved by the S3 and published in an order. The CM needs to have an understanding of what patrols the companies plan to execute so he can provide them with collection requirements. Additionally, if the CM wants a company to execute a specific collection task that is not already in the collection plan that was published in a FRAGO he will need the S3’s approval to task that company.

- **Good working relationship with the brigade (BDE) CM.** Good relations between the BN CM and BDE CM are vital to the success of the BN CM. The BDE CM is the keeper of the assets controlled by BDE and is responsible for requesting echelons above brigade assets. A good BN CM needs to be able to plead his case for why he should get an asset over another BN. This is done at the CM Synch meeting. This meet-
ing is the most important event in a CM’s day. It should be reflected on the BDE and BN battle rhythm and every effort should be made to protect the CM from other requirements during that time period.

- **Understanding the assets.** The CM needs to know the capabilities of every asset flying within not only their BN battle space but the entire BDE area of operations (AO) and sometimes even the division AO. This will allow the CM to more effectively ask for re-taskings. It will also ensure that the CM has an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the assets at his disposal and is using those allocated to him as effectively as possible.

- **Maintain a fighting spirit.** Collection Management is highly competitive business. Every BN will want to have control of every asset and in most environments there are not enough assets available to meet the demand. This means that the BN CM needs to be able to fight tooth and nail for his BN to ensure it has the collection capabilities they need.

Most S2 sections “pin the CM rose” on the Assistant S2 (AS2) who is more often than not the least experienced person in the section, having just graduated from the Officer Basic Course. While the AS2 is normally chosen because of the lack of a more qualified individual this person needs to be identified as early as possible and sent to as many CM related courses as possible prior to deployment.

**TOC Feng Shui**

Once the duties of everyone in the section have been determined adequate workspace must be provided in order to execute their tasks. Creating good TOC feng shui can help the section be more effective. Feng shui is defined as “the Chinese art or practice of positioning objects, especially graves, buildings, and furniture, based on a belief in patterns of yin and yang and the flow of chi that have positive and negative effects.” A well thought out plan of where each soldier in the section will work can significantly increase the efficiency of the section. With only the garrison environment as a guide most S2s will want to keep them all located together in the TOC. This set up will not work. The S2 OIC will be drawn into the current fight so often that he will become ineffective at providing the required inputs to the planning process. Working in the TOC will become distracting and take valuable time away from more important planning tasks. The S2 CUOPS needs to have a space on the TOC floor, preferably near the middle of the room close to the Fires cell and/or the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).

This location allows the section to effectively coordinate with the Fires cell if a collection asset identifies a target, and with the JTAC when one of their non-standard collection assets potentially identifies a target. Being located in the center of the room also allows the section to have better situational understanding of the current location of Blue Forces. By not allocating the S2 CUOPS the proper work space they can become forgotten. The section will not be the integral part of current operations that they need to be and will provide little to no intelligence support to the Battle Captain. The Plans section and the CM must be located off the TOC floor and near the S3 Plans section. This facilitates the free flow of information between the S2 and S3 sections which is vital to the success of the unit.

**TAC vs. TOC**

FM 1-02 defines a TAC as “The forward echelon of a headquarters. The tactical command post consists of representatives from G2/S2 and G2/S3, fire support, tactical air control party, air defense artillery, engineers, and combat service support liaison (G1/S1, G4/S4) elements. It is located well forward on the battlefield so that the commander has a command post near subordinate commanders and can directly influence operations.” At NTC a TAC is often employed as a part of a BN named operation that requires the BN commander to exercise C2 from a location far forward of the TOC. A BN TAC is, at a minimum, manned by the S3, the Fire Support Officer, and the S2.

Some S2s are reluctant to be a part of the TAC because they feel they are more connected to the intelligence picture at their desk in the BN headquarters. While the S2 in the TOC may have a SIPRNET connection to BDE intelligence assets, it does not beat being on the ground with the BN commander and S3. This location gives the S2 a better understanding of the flow of the fight and the ability to more effective track battle reports of enemy activities. The S2 can accomplish this with a One Station Remote Video Terminal, a radio (an Operations and Intelligence net is a must) and/or an FBCB2/BFT
(both the radio and BFT is preferred), and support from the S2 CUOPS section in the TOC.

This support from the rear should include the following:

- **Collection asset coordination.** By nature the TAC is an austere environment with very few digital systems. The S2 will need to rely on the CUOPS section to provide feedback and coordination of the collection assets supporting the operation. While the S2 will be able to view the full motion video feed from the asset he will more than likely not be able to communicate with the operator.

- **Provide situational updates.** The BN TOC may receive updated enemy situation reports from BDE during the operation that the TAC may not receive. These reports need to be passed to the S2 in as timely a manner as possible.

- **Provide Assessments.** The BN TOC should have the same picture of the fight that the TAC has. The S2 section left behind needs to assist the S2 in providing their assessment of the battle. They can do this through tracking battle damage reports and monitoring the collection feed. They need to combine this information with any reports from any of the INTs that may be collecting in support of the operation and provide an assessment to the S2.

**SOP Development**

Now that all of the duty positions and the responsibilities associated with each have been identified, the S2 needs to put this information into an SOP. Duties should be broken down by duty title, not soldier name. This ensures that the SOP does not need to be changed every time a soldier leaves the unit or soldiers change position within the section. In addition to the descriptions of duty positions a good SOP will include the required formats for each type of product that the section creates. This should include the INTSUM/GRINTSUM, collection matrix, patrol debriefs formats, and any products required of the company intelligence support teams. Examples of these can be found in TC 2-50.5, The Intelligence Officer’s Handbook. Creating an SOP will prevent the soldiers in the section from sitting around waiting for tasks to be handed out as they will have an understanding of what is required of them before they arrive.

**Forethought, Planning, and Predicting Requirements**

Every intelligence officer in the Army is trained and expected to predict what the enemy force their unit is up against will do. Most of the task organization and functionality challenges that S2 sections encounter during an NTC rotation can be identified, addressed, and potentially corrected prior to arrival to NTC. Consequently, an S2 can apply some of the training he has received in predictive analysis to look at his section and predict the requirements that will be placed upon him and his team. Once these requirements are identified, through a little forethought and planning, the S2 can determine how best to meet those requirements prior to arriving at NTC or to wherever they are deploying. Some adjustments to that initial plan may have to be made but arriving with an initial plan will save a lot of time that can better be spent providing the Commander with the information he needs to make informed decisions.

CPT King is currently the Light Task Force S2 O/CT (Airborne) at NTC, Fort Irwin, California. He has deployed three times in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as both an Infantry and MI officer, first as an Infantry Platoon Leader in 1st SBCT 25th ID, 2004-2005, then as an Intelligence advisor to an Iraqi Army Battalion as a part of a Military Transition Team in 2007-2008, and finally as the BDE AS2, Targeting Officer, and Surveillance Troop Commander in the 4th SBCT, 2nd ID in 2009-2010. CPT King holds a BA in Sociology from the University of Washington and a Masters Degree in Strategic Intelligence from American Military University.
Introduction

Since the fielding of the Raven Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (T-UAV), uses for the platform have increased at a rate comparable to the amount of hard landings they perform. The Army fielded the first Raven “A” systems in 2005. The current fielded “B” models were supplied to deploying units in 2006. There are approximately 1,400 B systems in use across the Army, primarily distributed to brigade combat teams (BCTs). Select military police, engineer, and field artillery units have received the Raven systems as well.¹

The primary role of the tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (T-UAV), as defined by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, is to provide the ground maneuver commander’s with day/night, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition to answer priority intelligence requirements. “The TUAV provides the commander with a number of benefits to include: enhanced enemy situational awareness (SA), a target acquisition capability, battle damage assessment, and enhanced battle management capabilities (friendly situation and battlefield visualization). This combination contributes to the commander’s dominant SA allowing him to maneuver to points of positional advantage with speed and precision in order to conduct decisive operations.”²

During a 2010-2011 deployment to southeast Baghdad, 1-7 Field Artillery (1-7 FA) (then Task Force 1-7) began combat operations with its Ravens remaining in their shipping containers. After a period of rising enemy activity and increased mission tempo, less-orthodox uses for the Raven were investigated and tested in order to aid the soldier out on patrol. Despite the fact it was not initially designed for urban operations, the Raven T-UAV has been successfully adapted to the changing battle-field environment, passing a test for lasting Army programs.

The primary mission given to 1-7 FA was to advise, train, and assist the 1st Iraqi Federal Police Division, in a congruent area of operations (AO) with 1-7 FA, in policing and counterterrorism operations. Although this mission was not out of the ordinary as 1-7 FA had conducted similar missions during its previous deployment, the land owning requirement was. Upon transfer of authority from the previous unit 1-7 FA assumed control over a section of Baghdad that had just two years prior been controlled by a brigade-sized element with nearly ten times the number of combat soldiers. The area of Baghdad that 1-7 FA assumed control over

A Soldier from Alpha Battery, 1-7 FA provides security while his section conducts link-up operations with a team from the 1st Iraqi Federal Police Division.
took almost 6 hours to cross-navigate. This section of the historic city held approximately 300,000 Iraqis, greater than the population of Newark, New Jersey. The AO straddled a Sunni–Shia sectarian divide. The Battalion’s Headquarters was situated within a densely-packed, moderate income Shia neighborhood.

When the Battalion began utilizing the Raven system, its primary mission was to provide overwatch for dismounted combat patrols. When the forward operating base (FOB) entered a period of increased indirect fire, the Raven’s mission promptly shifted to counter the rocket, mortar, and improvised rocket assisted mortar (IRAM) threat. Over the course of 1-7 FA’s eight month tour within southeast Baghdad, the Battalion sustained over 100 rounds of mortar and rocket fire. During the first few months of the deployment there was infrequent employment of mortar fire. At the 90 day mark the enemy’s operations tempo increased. During the initial indirect fire attacks, the enemy engaged FOB Loyalty near the maximum firing range of the weapon system used. Though the enemy mortar and rocket teams demonstrated a level of training with their attacks they could not account for one important facet of effective indirect fire—meteorological conditions.

At a closer range, meteorological factors such as wind speed and humidity minimally affect the trajectory of a mortar/rocket. However, at increased ranges (to especially include the maximum effective range) the atmosphere plays a larger role in a round’s lack of accuracy. At the point of impact, the mortar and rocket groupings were well off target and after multiple iterations of the enemy’s trial-by-fire, the damage to the civilian infrastructure began to add up. The collateral damage caused by the indirect fire attacks forced the enemy to re-think its attack strategies.

After a significant number of indirect fire attacks of varied increased and decreased distances the enemy found the optimal firing distance. Firing from extended distances, the landing points primarily fell outside of the FOB’s organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purview forcing a reliance on dwindling echelons above brigade assets and combat patrols. The distance combined with our lack of control over the assets, forced a lengthy sensor-to-shooter ratio. This ratio is defined through the time it takes a sensor platform, either an infantryman on the ground, a forward observer over a target, or intelligence personnel watching a UAV feed, to relay pertinent information regarding enemy location to a Soldier with a weapon system, enabling him to engage.

A Soldier on patrol has a lower ratio, as he can engage directly. A Soldier monitoring a UAV feed typically has a higher ratio, as he is required to relay the information and maneuver other soldiers onto the target. When the enemy indirect fire teams brought their firing points within a closer range, the FOB’s organic assets became increasingly available to provide early warning. Additionally, this decreased the amount of space that the ISR platform had to cover. Though not improving the sensor-to-shooter ratio, it did enhance the opportunity for a platform to observe the enemy action.

The shift of enemy indirect fire attacks to a closer range enabled the Battalion to incorporate the Raven into the fight. After a trial and error process, 1-7 FA determined that the best use of the Raven system was during daylight hours. Though the system was issued with a high-resolution infrared camera (IR) for night use, the likelihood of an accident and surrounding hostile neighborhoods in which the recovery would occur, increased the risks in its use. The benefits of its use at night did not outweigh the risks. During the warmer months, the Raven systems were typically utilized during the morning and late afternoon hours. These are the times of day when the insolation, the measure of solar radiation energy were lowest. In an urban environment the amount of solar radiation reflecting off of the uneven surface types causes micro-climates,
or pockets of varying wind speeds and temperature. Though these differentials have little effect on large platforms, the small Raven is affected by increased levels of insolation. It will gain/drop altitude, change direction, and drain the system’s on-board battery life as the Raven adjusts in response.

**Limitations of T-UAVs Within the Urban Environment**

The use of the Raven system within an urban environment will continue to be a tough sell to commanders. Its inexpensive parts that allow for mass-distribution at the tactical level limit its capacities in both weight and range. Each Raven costs about $35,000. The total system costs around $250,000. 1-7 FA made the decision to fly the Raven without its IR camera. This significantly lowered the overall costs to replace and for forced recovery. The system’s light-weight frame is extremely susceptible to varying wind conditions and temperature fluctuations within the urban environment. Its cost, though not nearly as expensive as the larger Shadow at the BCT level, makes it a sensitive item on the owning commander’s property records.

The most basic mission of this system is to watch for enemy forces. It is inherent that the UAV will be conducting missions within areas that hold various levels of a declining security state. Any downed platform would force either U.S. forces to recover it, or to conduct a lengthy investigation of its loss. During the near six months of frequent use within southeast Baghdad, 1-7 FA was fortunate to not lose any Raven systems. There were multiple close calls. But the unit never had to attempt a recovery. Our sister units deployed throughout Baghdad, were not as fortunate. Of the instances of downed Ravens throughout our parent Brigade during the deployment, the decision was made to send forces out to recover the platforms. Fortunately, none of the recovery missions were engaged by enemy forces.

One of the primary tasks for Raven while still under development was to conduct target acquisition within an ISR capacity. Within the conventional force-on-force operations the Raven platform is hardly recognizable, especially over the drone of the opposing force’s idling engines and diesel generators. However, within urban counterinsurgency operations, the noise of the Raven’s motor hindered the platform’s ability to conduct the covert reconnaissance that is required for personality-based pattern development. The low flight levels required of the operator to maintain a communication lock with the system generated noticeable noise above the loiter area. Multiple missions to provide early warning of enemy activity during peak windows did not prove successful. The weed whacker-like sound of the propeller limited our ability to approach and loiter above target areas without alerting everything but the most remiss enemy.

**Best Practices of T-UAVs Within the Urban Environment**

Despite the system’s inability to conduct covert surveillance within the urban environment it was able to present a show of force through its reconnaissance missions around the FOB. Our application of the system primarily kept its flight path along the main routes and auxiliary streets adjacent to the FOB. The current intelligence and enemy threat streams determined what the primary mission (i.e., counter-rocket, counter-mortar, and counter-IRAM) and specific set of information requirements each sortie would answer. In that the system was flown locally by 1-7 FA soldiers, the Battalion was able to connect operators with the Battalion’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The order to launch the QRF did not come directly from the Raven operators, but rather from the Battalion Tactical Operations Center.

Though the intermediary slowed the reaction process of the QRF, the additional screening element allowed for the Battalion to track the event and correspondingly decide if more or different forces were needed to support. It provided the QRF soldiers additional time to stage their vehicles and weapon systems. This rapid notification process cut minutes off of the reaction time to any event observed by...
Brigade or higher ISR assets. Additionally, 1-7 FA would conduct mounted observation posts with the QRF in conjunction with Raven missions. Though typically done only during peak threat windows this allowed for QRF to near real-time response to any observed event within the Raven’s area of surveillance. Through this practice, the sensor-to-shooter ratio was the lowest when operating the Raven T-UAV system.

During a period of increased enemy activity the 1-7 FA’s main effort shifted to force protection (FP) of the FOB with most Soldier’s participating in defense operations. After the enemy threat decreased within the area, the Raven was incorporated into the FP plan. It was used for area reconnaissance during the peak windows of enemy activity, which had strong Soldier presence in the prior days and weeks. With the audible presence of the Raven, FP operations were able to scale back on the number of Soldiers utilized while still having a noticeable U.S. Force presence. The scale-back of Soldiers during the Raven flights enabled more refit time for patrols in between operations. It enabled the addition of an extra combat patrol during a randomized, off-peak time to defeat enemy analysis of our increasingly predictable mission windows.

The Raven T-UAV system may not have been designed for use within the urban environment. However, due to its adaptability and Soldier ingenuity, new roles for the Raven have been adopted in nearly every theater of conflict, across a full-spectrum of mission characteristics as seen by the Army today. The T-UAV platform is one of the best combat operations tools a tactical commander can leverage to gain crucial insight into the battlefield space he owns. Its fielding ability and ease of use fosters the small-unit methodology while reducing the need for participation of parent units. The Raven T-UAV and its predecessors will take the Army’s small unit operations into a new era of ISR support in future conflicts.

Guiding a Raven T-UAS towards the landing area following a route reconnaissance in support of a dismounted patrol.

Endnotes


Captain Krause currently serves as the assistant S2 for 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Previously, he has served as the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment S2; 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, Counter-improvised Explosive Device OIC; 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment S2; 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment Battlefield Intelligence Command and Control Officer, and the 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, SIGINT Platoon Leader. He has deployed twice to Baghdad, Iraq, once in support of Operation New Dawn 10-11, and once in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 08-09. He earned a BS in Environmental Science from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
Introduction

Afghanistan was recently declared a major non-NATO ally country, which affords it special privileges for training, equipment, and surveillance capabilities. As that status matures and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continue to transition to the lead in the fight against insurgent forces and instability, are Coalition Forces (CF) prepared to share intelligence with Afghan counterparts to enable them to succeed?

There are many hurdles to overcome and a great deal of creativity required for intelligence sharing to become a reality. In the War on Terrorism, the CF conduct complex operations involving 86 nations and rely heavily upon technology and time sensitive information management. In a country with very little infrastructure, it is difficult to impose automation on a force where the literacy rate is less than 30 percent. Transferring data from one system to another is not as simple as translating it from English to Dari or Pashtu.

If intelligence truly drives operations, then the intelligence community must continually seek means to support an asymmetrical fight. Observing how the Afghans develop intelligence and seeking creative means to support their operations is vital to Afghans owning the security. At least until 2014, and most likely beyond, the CF will be in a supporting role, collecting and managing the data, often through Afghan National Army (ANA) eyes and reporting systems.

“The ability for the ANSF to develop and manage their intelligence program is a critical step in the right direction,” said Captain Joe Lee of the California Guard’s 578th Engineer Battalion, who served as the ANA partnership coordinator for Task Force (TF) Mad Dog (2011-2012) in Afghanistan. “The Afghan National Army does not have a robust intelligence management program that consistently provides intelligence products to their [subordinate] elements. Many of the missions that the route clearance [companies] conduct are without pertinent intelligence like enemy threat analysis of the area of operations (AO).”

Currently, the strength of the ANSF is in its execution of missions. Deliberate planning and troop leading procedures are in need of further development during combined operations, where missions of ANSF elements must be synchronized with those of the CF to ensure success. In the short term, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) can mine data from its systems, develop the analysis in a high-tech forum, and develop products which can
only be disclosed with partner ANSF elements in a limited and restricted manner. There is too much investment and historical data to simply forgo the systems already in place, but can they be leveraged and sustained by the ANA?

**Intel Support to Route Clearance Operations**

Through a Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO), the 578th Engineer Battalion was able to “DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG” intelligence summaries and products in support of Engineer COYs (Afghan equivalent to Company), Afghan Route Clearance COYs (RCCs), and CF Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). Once approved, these products were sent to the ETTs, who discussed effects and threats with their Afghan counterparts in support of mission analysis and planning. The 558th Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) assisted in sanitizing route clearance weekly updates for display to ANSF at the request of First Lieutenant Alexander Jansen, Cobra ETT Mentor, 42nd Clearance Company. This was extremely well received by the ANA RCC and its mentor team in Ghazni Province. The EHCC product allows the mentor to share improvised explosive device (IED) activity and enemy techniques to better prepare the RCC for counter-IED missions. Both products were achieved by working closely with the FDO or representative and gaining approval before the product publication.

“We were more than happy to support the 578th request for Intel products that could be displayed to their ANSF partners,” explained Captain Julie Miller, EHCC Intel Officer, Combined Joint TF Paladin. “Information is power, and partnership operations are only increasing. Although we can’t disclose exact details of some friendly forces’ tactics, techniques, and procedures, we can certainly provide situational awareness for ANSF mounted patrols that leave the wire and face a similar enemy threat as their CF counterparts. Everyone likes reading about themselves, so we try to keep the highlighted IED events focused on ANSF units with details about what they did correctly and what they can improve in their training.”

Many of the battle space owners currently publish intelligence information at an appropriate level to share with their Afghan partners which are labelled with the caveat of “DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG.” This caveat simply means that it can be shown, but not forwarded electronically or physically given to the Afghans. Counter-IED working groups at the maneuver brigade and division levels are making great progress in developing partner warfighting skills by reviewing intelligence during monthly sessions. Provincial operations coordination cells also host weekly Intel fusion meetings attended by Afghan intelligence teams such as the National Directorate of Security, Afghan Uniform Police Intelligence Chief, ANA Counterterrorism Chief and CF Intel representatives. While not much in the form of actionable intelligence results from these gatherings, there is an increasing awareness and development of this ANSF critical warfighting function.

**Information Sharing, Information Flow**

In a culture, where information is power and that power can significantly change a person’s social and professional standing, there is little sharing of information. Part of this is due to the fear of being wrong, and as a result, unsubstantiated reporting is often exaggerated and rarely predictive. As these relationships mature and the ANSF elements see the value of sharing intelligence to different users, it should become less of ‘reporting of the news’ and more predictive analysis.

“The ANSF and ANA in particular face many challenges, but illiteracy, a lack of integrated networks and systems, and a cultural reluctance to share information or posit hypotheses most greatly inhibit their ability to build a professional, intelligence warfighting function, which is critical to validating awareness and supporting effective decision making across the full spectrum of operations,” stated Lieutenant Colonel Richard McCauley, Brigade Intelligence Officer, Joint TF Empire.

Communications are essential as the CF moves through “Inteqal” (Dari and Pashtu for Transition) and intelligence professionals must continue to seek means to share intelligence with Afghan partners. “Writing for release” means developing products specifically for disclosure to the ANSF by carefully excluding information which might indicate or reveal sources and collection methods. They need the facts and estimates to conduct the operation, and training should continue until they can perform these functions without assistance. The CF must actively seek reports releasable as “DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG” so partnered units and mentors can present that information for integrated, truly com-
combined operations and mission success. If there is Intel that is classified as releasable to CF and there is a clear benefit to current operations, then it can be sanitized in accordance with applicable policies and procedures and shared with the Afghans once it has been approved by a FDO.

“Information sharing with Afghanistan to further their capabilities relies on our capability to disclose intelligence in a timely manner and enable Afghan government agencies in establishing a system to receive, secure, and handle their own classified information,” stated Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Reynolds, FDO, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan. “In the current foreign disclosure posture, we have to balance the protection of our own intelligence collection with teaching and enabling the Afghans, while maintaining strict policy and procedures, keeping the end state of fully capable ANSF, without compromise of our own capabilities. This requires leaders across ISAF to develop products that are shareable and teachable to our Afghan partners. We have to shift from a process of disclosing to the Afghans to enabling them to operate on the information they develop and gather...a new paradigm must unfold.”

Information flow cannot be a one way street. In the short term, if the CF are handling the data administration, they must seek means to capture the intelligence from the ANSF patrols. Currently, reporting comes through a liaison officer. Much of that reporting is sparse at best, providing a date time group, ANSF unit designation, IED found or struck, and possibly a battle damage assessment. In the counter-IED fight there is too much data that is lost through this reporting scheme. Across the Afghan Theater of Operations there has been an increase of the IED switch types categorized as “Unknown”. That is information not being captured about the enemy’s capability to target patrols. In efforts to mitigate this data loss TF 4-1, 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, in Paktika Province is fielding an IED five line report for the ANSF patrols in their area of operations. This is critical in closing the gap on the unknowns from IED strikes and finds as the ANSF mission percentage increases.

Capturing that data is a matter of training and conditioning the patrols on what to report. The CF go through the same type of conditioning with patrols by standardizing the report formats and enforcing the reporting standards. Everyone benefits from higher quality information logged for data mining trends. Great efforts continue to be made to improve literacy in the ANSF and one would expect that as they increase, the ANSF will be able to leverage automation to efficiently receive, store, and warehouse intelligence data from patrols to support information requirements.

There is currently no plan to integrate ANSF onto shared systems and networks despite its change in status. Instead, what is happening (with limited success), is that a report is typed into an ANSF word processing system and two copies are printed. One is submitted to higher and the other filed at unit level. The Afghan Soldier then returns to the computer to delete the original document in order to save space on the computer. Despite advances in techniques and skills, without information systems and networks to share and support analysis, there is no progressive continuity from which to assess and validate information and trends or perform meaningful predictive analysis for mission planning and decision making.

As the CF maintain and analyze the data in the short term, they continue to mentor the Afghans
to make use of it for deliberate mission planning. Using the ETTs as the conduit for sharing the intelligence is effective now, but is not a sustainable long term solution. If the Route Clearance COY, Engineer COY, or maneuver unit is the end user of intelligence, how can they ensure they will continue to receive the information and intelligence necessary to support plans?

**Conclusion**

As the CF transitions into a supporting role, critical gaps are exposed such as the accuracy and quality checks on reporting from the relevant ANSF element into mission planning. Allowing the ANA patrol or platoon leader access to the Kandak Intel section for pre-mission intelligence summaries is a key first step to ensure they are mission focused and understanding the AO and concept of the operation.

The Intelligence Community can begin to address some of these gaps now by:

- Actively seeking to classify intelligence for “DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG” aka “Writing for Release.”
- Having products reviewed and approved by FDO/FD Representative.
- Developing low-tech or no-tech means for the ETTs to share the “DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG” intelligence products.
- Managing the data mining, warehousing, and reporting of intelligence.
- Working with ETTs and Operations Coordination Centers-Provincial to develop standards for ANSF patrol reporting and handling to close the gap on “Unknowns.”
- Supporting the intelligence functions for ANSF’s deliberate mission planning versus optimistic-style planning.
- Shifting from a process of disclosing to the Afghans to enabling them to operate on the information they develop and gather.
- Defining a credible merge path that provides the ANSF a sustainable network and information systems to support information analysis and requirements since currently there are less than a handful of Afghans authorized limited access on the Afghan Mission Network.

The way ahead is to seek, define, and implement the means for the ANSF to function independently by managing its own intelligence systems through receipt and dissemination of standardized reports and providing predictive analysis for its down trace units and decision makers.

**Endnote**


*CPT Couture and PFC Quigg were stationed at FOB Sharana, Afghanistan in 2011-2012 with the 578th Engineer Battalion, TF Mad Dog Intelligence Section. The mission focused on three lines of effort: Partnership Effects, Construction Effects, and Route Clearance Effects throughout Paktika, Paktia, Khowst, and Ghazni Provinces.*

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Introduction

Shrinking national budgets are not only a specter haunting the U.S. intelligence community (IC) but one looming over those of its alliance and coalition partners as well. War weariness over Afghanistan, nagging public skepticism over governments’ good stewardship of public funds, and persistent allegations of intelligence entities infringing on civil liberties further fuel public demands in the antechambers and parliamentary halls across Europe and Asia to reduce spending on national security programs. Hardly, a NATO member state’s military has escaped unscathed. Even Germany, the financial cornerstone of Europe, has trimmed defense spending in its recent budget. All NATO member-states now face the challenge of doing more with less.

In times of austere national budgets, there is no better time than the present to capitalize on the untapped opportunities available through increased multinational intelligence collaboration, especially among the military intelligence (MI) communities of NATO allies and other reliable coalition partners. Aside from collective defense and demonstrating broad-based international political resolve, the value of an alliance is burden-sharing. NATO’s experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and other recent endeavors have shown the value of multinational operations, leveraging coalition’s best assets for a common objective, in a form of Ricardian comparative advantage, a theoretical kernel at the heart of NATO’s Smart Defense.

Although they have clearly and successfully leveraged one another’s operational forces, NATO member-states have not yet realized the fruits of multinational intelligence collaboration. Smart Defense requires Smart Intelligence. No nation has, of yet, realized the full potential of multinational intelligence collaboration. Efficient and effective coalition intelligence collaboration requires a legitimate, responsive, flat, coalition-wide network rapidly and reliably linking collectors to analysts and analysts to decisionmakers.

Smart Intelligence Supporting Smart Defense

Undoubtedly, Lieutenant General Flynn’s approach to “fixing intelligence” catapulted intelligence collaboration within NATO light years ahead of its experiences in previous contingency environments such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Most notably, through the International Security Assistance Force, NATO has made significant progress, especially in turning the (Afghan) Mission Network into
a coalition-wide knowledge management environment, one supporting both the coalition warfighter as well as informing coalition decision makers. The encouraging news then is that a coalition wide-network exists, at least in a rudimentary form. But it is only formally sanctioned in a single theatre of operation. If all proceeds as hoped, the Mission Network will be a baseline network for coalition endeavors in future contingency environments. The truly innovative could perhaps even envision a similar network to enable peace-time collaboration.

That said, while it can likely support Smart Defense, the Mission Network is not yet supported by Smart Intelligence. Each coalition partner maintains several types of data-rich collection platforms, which though valuable to the coalition warfighter, often remain stovepiped, or worse, “clogged up” in national channels. Anecdotes abound of information collected in a theatre of operation being transmitted to a national capital remote from the battlefield and then retransmitted back to theatre several hours, even several days later. Or worse, in at least one case, information collected at a brigade level and transmitted to a division headquarters was removed from the coalition network, placed onto a national network and then classified as national secret, a series of actions which made the information unavailable to other members of the coalition, including those who collected it in the first place.

Smart Intelligence in support of Smart Defense requires better. In coalition contingency environments, national stovepipes, if required, must meld seamlessly and push information fluidly into a mission network where consumers are coordinating and conducting vital operations. Smart Intelligence requires linking the collection platforms into the operational network, essentially flattening the network even further and thereby increasing responsiveness. Responsiveness and “flatness,” are mutually supportive. Increasing “flatness” will ultimately improve responsiveness of the intelligence cycle in support of Smart Defense and coalition operations.

**Smart Intelligence**

There are generally two schools of thought on how to flatten the coalition IC network. The first advocates fielding a coalition network of coalition workstations to all users and mandate that all operators rely only on that network. Such an option underutilizes national collection platforms and counters the benefits of Smart Defense. A variant would be fielding coalition collection platforms as capable as the best national collection platforms. This is an option which at best is a straw man and is realistically a pipedream, if for no other reason that it countermands national ICs prerogatives and obligation to protect sources and methods. Further, creating capable coalition collection platforms in all the intelligence disciplines would be resource prohibitive in the current budget environment.

The second school of thought is to link national collection platforms through a trusted interface to the coalition network, the so-called “Future Mission Network.” In this scenario, national teams deploy with their national workstations and pipe through a trusted interface into the coalition network. That interface must be bi-directional, pushing from national systems to the coalition network and pulling from the coalition network to the national networks. This alleviates the collection burden on alliance partners, leveraging the best collection platforms, and, in the process, increasing the legitimacy of the network itself. In the concept of Smart Defense, this seems the more cost effective option. And it is in this direction the knowledge managers are putting their efforts.

A third option, a hybrid of the other two, is also possible, but requires the same prescriptions as that proposed for the second school of thought. The hybrid option also either increases the number of workstations on a user’s desk or puts a coalition workstation in a remote corner of the office close to the coffee machine.

Creating a system to support Smart Intelligence requires improved technology but, more critically, political will and leadership commitment. A non-negotiable precondition for linking the stovepipes into the mission network is ensuring coalition partners are confident in the network’s security. Specifically, at a minimum, the system must meet or exceed the requirements of confidentiality, availability, integrity and accountability of the data as outlined in the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Special Bulletin 800-14, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems. Second, the members of the coalition IC must be confident the means of providing a responsive flat link into the mission network does not compromise or endanger the basis of their
profession: sources and methods of national collection platforms. There is little doubt among coalition partners in the value of the intelligence they gather. What remains in question is whether a technical solution, be it hardware or software, exists which can ensure nothing seeps through the interface which would compromise a sensitive source or undermine a critical national collection capability.

Third, all coalition partners must consider the solution legitimate. In other words, all coalition partners must view coalition intelligence as a common enterprise and accept the technical solution as the “solution” to information sharing across the coalition IC. Some may argue NATO has an intelligence sharing network in place. In fact, it does. There are at least three such systems, which vie at any given moment for the honor of being NATO’s intelligence network backbone. NATO must mandate a solution and that solution, along with the accompanying regulations and doctrine must be approved through the appropriate military and political bodies.

On a more practical level, in any given theatre of operations, the smaller coalition partners must have confidence the coalition partners, who have the larger intelligence collection footprint, deem it as critical to push actionable intelligence to the coalition as it is to their national consumers. Likewise, those with the larger national footprint must be confident in others’ unerring commitment to the mission and its security, and in their ability to share the burden of meeting the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. In Smart Intelligence, there can be no free riders and no bullies.

Most importantly, the solution must be collector friendly insofar as it is either readily accessible to the collector or links the national collector transparently to the coalition interface (not forcing a person to type and re-type the same information on two separate computer systems.) Toward that end, the technical solution should leverage existing nationally fielded networks and the workstations predominantly used by each coalition partner’s IC. Finally, the technical solution must provide a reliable, responsive and rapid feedback loop from decision-maker to the analysts and collectors.

The technical solution may be the easy endeavor. Far more challenging may be adopting and adapting national policies to realize the benefits of Smart Intelligence. Each coalition member must examine its national caveats on intelligence collection and information sharing as they relate to their involvement in contingency environments. National caveats hinder burden sharing, constrict information sharing, and undermine others’ confidence in the competency and/or commitment of coalition partners’ ICs to mission accomplishment. In some cases, some coalition partners must first breakdown stovepipes to intelligence sharing between members of their own national IC.

Next is the task of developing the directives and doctrine necessary to support Smart Intelligence. NATO’s experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc. have generated treasure troves of lessons learned and best practices upon which to base NATO doctrine in support of Smart Defense. While collection, like counterintelligence, will always be a national prerogative, other matters are not. From reporting formats to collection management and intelligence fusion methods to coalition intelligence staff operations, NATO, its member-states, and its coalition partners must benchmark the successes and identify areas of improvement.

Further, like soldiers, intelligence teams fight as they are trained. Once drafted, NATO and its member-state MI communities have the obligation to integrate NATO doctrine into national military training doctrine, at least so member-state military members arrive competent to collaborate and confident in their nation’s commitment to the coalition intelligence enterprise. Too frequently, individuals have arrived in NATO contingency environments, only seeing NATO doctrine and formats for the first time as they disembark from the aircraft. If fighting in coalition is a direction which NATO’s member-states consider a likely course of action for the foreseeable future, then drafting, promulgating, and training common doctrine is not just an option, it is an imperative for Smart Intelligence to support Smart Defense.

Finally, Smart Intelligence requires examining which technologies and methods NATO member-states can share with each other to improve alliance, even coalition, intelligence collaboration. Where laser range finders and thermal imaging devices have given U.S. infantry teams a combat overmatch, so too have certain technologies (e.g., those used in document and material exploitation), increased the combat effectiveness of U.S. collection efforts.
Those with the better technology have both the advantage but must also bear a larger burden. In a coalition theatre of operation, where insurgents and other adversaries exploit even the slightest chink in the armor, the question is whether and how to promulgate the intelligence combat multipliers more broadly to alleviate the burden on the more technologically gifted coalition partners.

**Conclusion**

Many of the basic technologies and concepts for Smart Intelligence already exist. It is only a matter of sifting through the chaff to identify the best practices, draft the doctrine, and build the consensus necessary to implement the change. And, unlike the Cold War, the post-Cold War years have given NATO and its member-states an array of opportunities both in-depth knowledge of current threats and proficiency in applying the advanced technologies needed to analyze those threats and predict their actions. At the same time, commanders need robust intelligence during mission command training and realistic exercises that integrate the challenges their intelligence warfighting function will face during actual operations.

To meet these requirements, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has partnered with FORSCOM to develop the Intelligence Readiness Operations Capability (IROC). It is the final enabler needed to ensure “no cold starts” and “no MI Soldier at rest.” IROC is a set of capabilities, including infrastructure, management, architecture, software, and equipment that enable MI Soldiers and units in all components to—

- Conduct home-station familiarization with expeditionary target sets.
- Provide early intelligence support to mission command.
- Conduct intelligence overwatch of deployed operations.
- Conduct intelligence reach operations in support of Army operational requirements.

**Conclusion**

The specifics of the Intel 2020 design and implementation are wedded to ongoing Army 2020 discussions and future decisions. Force size limits and key decisions regarding ECB organizations, as well as a review of national, joint, and Army intelligence requirements and the aerial-ISR Layer, will impact our future designs. An equally important part of Intel 2020 is the establishment of the foundation layer (LandISRNet) and the adjustment of current Army programs to support MfTs, intelligence reach, and overwatch operations. To that end, INSCOM, in conjunction with ICoE, has initiated data calls and analysis of required capabilities at theater and national levels. We are working with Army Service Component Commands first, and then plan to look at joint and defense intelligence gaps and requirements.

Ultimately, the goal of Intel 2020 is to ensure that every MI Soldier is fully trained, equipped, and engaged in the fight against a complex, agile, and adaptive enemy, whether deployed or at home (via intelligence reach). Thoughtful investments in force structure, technologies and training will ensure that the Army intelligence warfighting function remains capable of supporting decisive action across the globe. Our future force structure capabilities and MI skill sets will allow both commanders and warfighters access to the intelligence and technology necessary to answer critical questions and to ensure success in complex future operational environments. As part of the corps of intelligence professionals building this future, each of you can look forward to being better prepared for deployment, better trained in functional and regional expertise, and better linked to the greater intelligence community.

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**Always Out Front!**
A Review of Intelligence Oversight Failure: NSA Programs that Affected Americans

by Major Dave Owen

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. Government.

Introduction

After World War II, the National Security Agency (NSA) established and directed three programs that deliberately targeted American citizens’ private communications. Despite ethical and legal concerns, these programs continued through the early 1970s. This intelligence oversight failure, once it was identified, resulted in a thorough U.S. Senate investigation. Out of this investigation came the 1976 document “NSA Surveillance Affecting Americans,” which led to legal restrictions on the agency and robust intelligence oversight processes to ensure that it continued to adhere to these restrictions. This article will summarize the programs that led to this situation, review the legal decisions that affected these programs, and discuss the impact that is still felt within the NSA today.

Background

The NSA rose after World War II in order to centralize and manage U.S. cryptologic efforts. Prior to and throughout the war, these efforts were mostly spread among the military services, and were poorly coordinated, controlled, and understood. In fact, the success of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was largely due to this confusing cryptologic situation, as the U.S. had clear warnings through Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) but failed to act. In 1949, the Department of Defense (DoD) attempted to remedy this situation by creating the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this agency combined the separate efforts underway in each service. However, the AFSA was ineffective, as continued inter-service rivalries, coupled with poor coordination basically maintained the situation of divided, independent cryptologic efforts. Additionally, as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, AFSA was not responsive to the SIGINT needs of elements outside of DoD, such as the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

President Truman created NSA in 1952 to remedy this situation. He issued a classified memorandum to do this, and followed it up with National Security Council Intelligence Directive 9. This classified directive explicitly stated that the NSA would be the “executive agent” for foreign communications intelligence for the entire government. However, this directive did not establish any limitations within the foreign SIGINT mission. Even as late as the 1970s, according to the NSA’s general counsel, “no existing statutes control, limit, or define the signals intelligence activities of the NSA.” Since foreign intelligence can be derived from American citizens’ private communications, and since domestic issues can affect foreign policy (requiring ‘foreign intelligence’ support for these domestic issues), this situation resulted in minimal control of NSA activities. Additionally, since both the memorandum and directive which led to its creation were classified, the NSA was generally unknown to the public.

As a result, the agency existed in an environment of unquestioned SIGINT authority, minimal intelligence oversight, and no statutory limitations. This environment was exacerbated by a marked appreciation for SIGINT capabilities, especially due to the “demonstrated wartime value of breaking enemy codes, particularly of the Japanese.” These factors resulted in a situation which could easily have led to the NSA exploiting American citizens’ private communications. However, one additional factor made this possibility a certainty, and also shaped the SIGINT culture so that exploiting American citizens’ communications seemed to be a normal part of operations: Project SHAMROCK.

Project SHAMROCK (1945 to 1975)

Project SHAMROCK began in August 1945, shortly before the end of World War II and over seven years prior to the establishment of the NSA. This time frame is important to note when considering the
culture of the SIGINT enterprise. By the time NSA was established, Project SHAMROCK was a long-standing, well-accepted program.

Project SHAMROCK originally started as an effort to improve wartime intelligence activities and was continued after the war due to its intelligence value. It consisted of access to telegraph communications that transited networks owned by several U.S. companies which then provided daily microfilm copies of all traffic. Though this traffic included foreign communications, it also included a vast amount of communications from or to American citizens.

The companies involved in Project SHAMROCK questioned the legality of these activities, especially in peacetime. In fact, they only agreed to support it “provided they received the personal assurance of the Attorney General of the U.S.” Additionally, representatives of the companies met with the Secretary of Defense in 1947 to discuss their continued participation. The Secretary of Defense assured them that Project SHAMROCK was “in the highest interests of national security” and that both the Attorney General and the President approved. The companies again brought up this issue in 1949, with similar results. However, though the companies did fear that Project SHAMROCK was illegal, they “never sought assurances that the NSA was limiting its use to the messages of the foreign targets.”

At its peak, Project SHAMROCK collected approximately 150,000 messages per month. NSA generated reports based on this collection to customers including the DoD, the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Secret Service, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (a precursor of the Drug Enforcement Administration). The inclusion of the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is especially noteworthy, as their mission included mostly domestic targets.

The Director of the NSA terminated Project SHAMROCK in 1975 amongst increasing Congressional concerns that this collection was in violation of the Fourth Amendment which guards against unreasonable searches and seizures unless authorized by a warrant. A previous Supreme Court decision (Katz v. the United States, 1967) identified private communications as protected by Fourth Amendment rights. However, even as late as 1976, the NSA continued to claim that “the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the NSA’s interception of Americans’ international communications for foreign intelligence purposes.”

Though Project SHAMROCK undoubtedly collected and analyzed American citizens’ private communications on a large scale, this effort still focused on foreign intelligence. The project was created as an effort to improve the foreign communications intelligence mission, and that purpose continued to be the primary reason for its existence.

Project SHAMROCK was just one of three major programs that infringed on Americans’ privacy. The other two programs more directly pursued the private communications of American citizens. The first of these two remaining programs was Project MINARET.

**Project MINARET (1960 to 1973)**

Project MINARET was essentially the NSA’s watch list. It used existing SIGINT accesses (to include information from Project SHAMROCK), and searched for terms, names, and references associated with certain American citizens.

Though Project MINARET officially started in 1969, the watch list itself existed at least as early as 1960. Originally, this list had nothing to do with American citizens. According to the 1975 testimony of a senior NSA official, “the term ‘watch list’ had to do with a list of names of people, places or events that a customer would ask us to have our analysts keep in mind as they scan large volumes of material.” However, starting in 1967, the NSA started adding selectors associated with American citizens to the watch list, establishing a ‘civil disturbance’ watch list. This was due to requests from the White House, the FBI, and the Attorney General. These requests included:

- “Indications that foreign governments... are controlling or attempting to control or influence the activities of U.S. ‘peace’ groups and ‘Black Power’ organizations.”
- “Determining whether or not there is evidence of any foreign action to develop or control these anti-Vietnam and other domestic demonstrations.”
- “Identities of individuals and organizations in the U.S. in contact with agents of foreign governments.”
The Secret Service also requested support through the ‘civil disturbance’ watch list program, submitting “names of individuals and organizations active in the antiwar and civil rights movements.” Finally, the CIA asked for “The activities of U.S. individuals involved in either civil disorders, radical student or youth activities, racial militant activities, radical antiwar activities, draft evasion/deserter support activities ... where such individuals have some foreign connection.”

After receiving these requests, the Director of the NSA sent a cable to the Director of Central Intelligence and every member of the U.S. Intelligence Board. In this cable the Director informed them that the NSA was “concentrating additional and continuing effort to obtain SIGINT” in support of these requests. Though there is no record that the U.S. Intelligence Board took any action in response to this message, the Board also did not validate these collection requirements. The lack of a response resulted in the continuation of the ‘civil disturbance’ watch list program.

NSA realized that the ‘civil disturbance’ watch list was significantly different from their other intelligence missions. First, it dealt with sensitive subjects to include protection of the President, terrorism, and civil disturbances. Second, the SIGINT sources could easily be compromised if information about this program was released. Finally, the sensitive nature of the subject material was on the edge of what the NSA considered legally permissible. One NSA official called it “unprecedented,” while another said it was “different from the normal mission of the NSA.”

Because of the sensitivity of this program, NSA decided to implement additional safeguards. When intercepts were used where one of the communicants was an American citizen, the resulting serialized product was only disseminated to a limited, by-name distribution. When both communicants were American citizens, the NSA removed itself as the source, the report was labeled “For Background Use Only,” it was not serialized, and it was not filed with other SIGINT reports. The Deputy Director of NSA, commenting on these safeguards, said that this was done so that “there would not be any record of this material held in other places within the Agency.”

In 1969, due to the growth of the ‘civil disturbance’ watch list and concerns over the security controls, NSA established Project MINARET. This project contained the entire program, and increased the security requirements. Prior to Project MINARET, only intercepts where both communicants were American citizens were held to the tighter security practices detailed in the preceding paragraph. With the establishment of Project MINARET, all communications “to, from, or mentioning U.S. citizens” were held to this higher security standard.

After the NSA established Project MINARET, the FBI sent the agency two memoranda in an effort to ensure that this activity continued. In these the Director of the FBI stated “this Bureau has a continuing interest in receiving intelligence information obtained under MINARET...There are both white and black racial extremists in the U.S. advocating and participating in illegal and violent activities for the purpose of destroying our present form of government. Because of this goal, such racial extremists are natural allies of foreign enemies of the U.S.” This demonstrates the continued effort to classify the Project MINARET activity as foreign intelligence, which would enable its continued existence.

Project MINARET continued until 1973, when it was terminated by the Director of the NSA. Throughout its course, this program targeted a cumulative total of approximately 1,200 American citizens. Targeted individuals included “members of radical political groups, to celebrities, to ordinary citizens involved in protests against their Government.”

Though Project MINARET clearly targeted the private communications of American citizens, it did this through existing collection efforts that were originally established to pursue foreign intelligence information.

There is one more NSA program that affected American citizens. In addition to targeting, exploiting, and reporting on the private communications of American citizens, this program also established new collection sources solely to improve access to the private communications of American citizens: the Drug Watch Lists.

**Drug Watch Lists (1970 to 1973)**

In 1970, the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs sent a memorandum to the...
Director of the NSA requesting “any and all communications intelligence information which reflects illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs.” The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs made this request primarily due to the 1967 Supreme Court decision ‘Katz v. the United States.’ Because of this decision, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs believed that it did not have the legal authority to collect this information for law enforcement purposes. However, they also believed that the NSA could collect this information for foreign intelligence purposes, and then share it with them.

The NSA responded to this request by establishing the ‘Drug Watch’ Lists. These watch lists consisted of individuals and organizations with a history of illegal drug activities. Unfortunately, many of the individuals on these lists were American citizens, and in order to target their private communications the NSA established new collection accesses for that specific purpose.

The CIA joined the Drug Watch Lists effort in 1972, believing that it may have a role separate from the law enforcement perspective (or perhaps believing that the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was attempting to intrude on a foreign intelligence area). However, after participating in the program for three months, the CIA decided that this effort solely supported a law enforcement function (vice a foreign intelligence purpose) and they ended their participation. Because of this, NSA conducted its own review and came to the same conclusion, ending the program in 1973. To date, this program represents the only occasion where NSA established new collection accesses for the purpose of targeting American citizens.

Legal Considerations: ‘Katz v. the United States’ (1967)

One of the most significant cases that impacted NSA’s programs is ‘Katz v. the United States.’ In this case, Charles Katz used a public phone booth to relay gambling wagers. This action is illegal according to the Wire Act. The FBI, targeting Katz in their investigation, used an electronic listening device attached to the outside of the phone booth. Based on the evidence from this device, Katz was convicted of violating the Wire Act. However, he appealed his conviction, claiming the listening device violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Katz believed the listening device constituted an ‘unreasonable search and seizure’. He argued that because the FBI did not have a warrant, the recordings should not be admissible in court. The FBI argued that since there was no physical intrusion into the phone booth, this was not an ‘unreasonable search and seizure.’ Additionally, the FBI argued that previous Supreme Court cases ruled along similar lines:

- In ‘Olmstead v. the United States’ (1928), the Supreme Court ruled that phone conversations obtained by warrantless wiretaps were legal. In this case, Chief Justice Taft commented “The (Fourth) Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing, and that only.”

- In ‘Goldman vs. the United States’ (1942), the Supreme Court ruled that conversations were not protected under the Federal Communications Act (1934) when the means of intercept was not through the phone system. The Federal Communications Act protected American citizens against warrantless wiretaps, but in ‘Goldman vs. the United States’ the Supreme Court ruled that the communications were only protected “throughout the course of its transmission.”

Based on these arguments, the Court of Appeals ruled for the FBI. However, the Supreme Court decided to conduct a judicial review. In this review, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals decision, and ruled in favor of Katz. Justice Harlan summarized the ruling by stating “an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy...An invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.”

The Supreme Court decision in ‘Katz v. the United States’ established a new legal precedent for the Fourth Amendment. This precedent defined “unreasonable searches and seizures” as applying to any situation where a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Though this decision clearly could apply to Project SHAMROCK, this program was well established by that point. Additionally, it
was unclear if this ruling even affected the ‘foreign intelligence mission,’ or if it just applied to law enforcement collection.

**Legal Considerations: ‘The Keith Case’ (1972)**

Another noteworthy legal decision is ‘United States v. United States District Court.’ This case, better known as ‘The Keith Case,’ was named after the presiding judge for the U.S. District Court, Judge Damon Keith. In this case, the U.S. charged three individuals with ‘conspiracy to destroy government property.’ Additionally, one of these individuals was also charged with bombing a CIA office.27

In the ‘Keith Case,’ much of the evidence came from warrantless wiretaps. However, the Attorney General argued that these wiretaps did not fall under the authority of the Federal Communications Act. The Attorney General argued that the wiretaps were authorized under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (1968), which allows warrantless wiretaps when there is a “clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.”28

After reviewing the arguments, Judge Keith did not concur with the Attorney General’s request to keep the sources confidential, and ordered the U.S. to disclose all sources and intercepts. Following this ruling, the U.S. appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court. However, the Sixth Circuit Court concurred with Judge Keith’s original decision. The Attorney General appealed yet again to the Court of Appeals. At this point the Supreme Court decided to hear the case.

The Supreme Court debated the case for almost four months before they ruled in favor of the lower courts. When explaining their decision, Justice Powell stated “The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power...For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.”29

This ruling reinforced that wiretaps and other means of intruding upon a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ can only be conducted with a warrant. However, just like the ruling in ‘Katz v. the United States,’ it was unclear if the ‘Keith Case’ ruling just applied to law enforcement collection, or if it also affected the ‘foreign intelligence mission.’

**The Church Committee (1975 to 1976)**

The U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, better known as the ‘Church Committee’ investigated the NSA’s programs that affected American citizens. This thorough investigation resulted in the report “National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans.” In this report the Senate Select Committee argued that the lack of a statutory charter or other significant control mechanism constituted an unacceptable risk to American citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.30

The Committee viewed the NSA situation through the lens of ‘The Keith Case,’ and their perspective is best summed up by Justice Powell: “History abundantly documents the tendency of Government—however benevolent and benign its motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies...The danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic security’.”31 Because of this perspective, the Church Committee seemed genuinely surprised by much of the testimony, even though most of the programs they investigated had been in place for over a decade.

The Church Committee reviewed thousands of pages of statements and testimony, and presented a coherent, thorough view of the programs that affected American citizens. In order to be as persuasive as possible, the Committee did not include any differing perspectives which would have made this report less impacting. It was careful to avoid any reference to noteworthy intelligence that resulted from these programs, and only provided details that supported its arguments.

The report was undeniably effective. It clearly demonstrated the negative results that can come from an unrestrained SIGINT agency, even when the individuals within this agency have good intentions. Additionally, this report led to legal restrictions on the NSA’s foreign intelligence authorities, as well as robust intelligence oversight processes to ensure that NSA continued to adhere to these legal restrictions. The most notable of these results was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

**Legal Considerations: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978)**

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act formally defined the rules and procedures required for phys-


ical and electronic surveillance in support of the foreign intelligence mission. Prior to this act, this mission was largely unregulated with minimal oversight. Even though there were many developments in the rules required for law enforcement purposes, it was not clear if these developments also affected the foreign intelligence mission. Additionally, since this mission was out of sight of the public eye, it did not receive the same scrutiny.

The act limited the scope of the NSA’s foreign intelligence mission, and also implemented strict, warrant-based procedures that all U.S. agencies had to follow for foreign intelligence issues. As well, it implemented thorough and mandatory intelligence oversight processes. These processes ensured that U.S. government agencies would conduct their foreign intelligence missions while protecting American citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.32

**The Lasting Impact on the NSA**

The current intelligence oversight processes are a testament to the impact of the Church Committee, and are a lasting legacy of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. In addition to mandatory annual intelligence oversight training and quarterly intelligence oversight reports, there is a requirement to identify and quickly report possible intelligence oversight violations. These processes have formed and continuously reinforce an NSA culture that is extremely adverse to any issue that may be construed as collecting on American citizens. Though this culture has shifted slightly over the last decade, most NSA employees are, at best, uncomfortable around these issues. Though the NSA culture will slowly shift, especially as new global technologies continue to blur the communications environment, NSA employees will continue to be exceptionally aware of their intelligence oversight responsibilities.

**Summary**

Due to the background of the NSA and the lack of statutes that controlled, limited, or defined its SIGINT activities for 30 years, the agency existed in an environment of unquestioned SIGINT authority with minimal intelligence oversight. This situation led to several programs that directly affected American citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. Though several associated Supreme Court decisions affected similar law enforcement situations, NSA continued to operate these programs under the cover of its undefined foreign intelligence mission. This led to the Church Committee investigation, and eventually to the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As a result, NSA now includes robust, mandatory intelligence oversight processes as part of its regular operations. These processes have created and continuously reinforce a culture that is extremely adverse to any issue that may be construed as collecting on American citizens. NSA will continue to operate with this culture for the foreseeable future as it pursues its legitimate foreign intelligence mission.

**Endnotes**


4. Ibid., 3, 97-112.

5. Disposition of Roy Banner, NSA General Counsel, 4 February 1976.

6. Ibid., 1.

7. Ibid., 1.

8. Ibid., 1.


10. Ibid., 1.

11. Ibid., 5.

12. Ibid., 1.

13. Ibid., 1.

14. Testimony of General William Yarborough, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 10 September 1975.


17. Ibid., 1.


19. Testimony of Benson Buffham, Deputy Director, NSA, to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 12 September 1975.

20. Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to Director, NSA, 3 June 1970, 6 November 1970.

21. Ibid., 1.
22. Memorandum from John Ingersoll to Noel Gaynor, 10 April 1970.


26. Ibid., 23.


29. Ibid., 27.

30. Ibid., 1.

31. Ibid., 27.


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From A Seed

In early 2009, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) initiated foundational and institutional change fostering a newly redesigned and transformed program called the Learning Technology Directorate (now the Learning Innovation Office). The organization was initially staffed with five positions and was challenged with not only standing up the operation but doing so under continuous refinement of intent, purpose, and mission. These challenges created an atmosphere of chaos and instability as the young organization was finding its foundation while defining roles and relations amongst external organizations and its own participants. The organization was also responsible for certain codified artifacts to include a quarterly newsletter, representation in the USAICoE training guidance, and research and development initiatives. Institutional features such as these helped early on in legitimizing the mission and work.

In Fall 2009, a strategic plan was drawn up and officially endorsed by the USAICoE Commanding General. This document provided the guidance and bridged intent and mission to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s shift in training delivery, and developing a culture change focused on training and education.

The basis for this was Instructional Systems Design (ISD). The overarching framework for Learning Technology’s organization processes is the Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation (ADDIE) ISD model. More than just a reference, it is a philosophical underpinning that reinforces all functions throughout all business operations, publications, and artifacts. Figure 1 represents the organization’s four stage approach to building products and supplying services. This graphic was used in all materials and briefings the organization uses for public relations and marketing and is an icon that marks this culture as unique.

Resources Sought

The Learning Technology Directorate set about building and filling the personnel structure in order to facilitate this training development and developed a strong suite of high standards, education, and experience requirements which provided the best possible employees. This somewhat arduous undertaking of staffing while “starting up” this fledgling organization proved to be a challenge for the Director. The selection and filling of positions was slow, adhering to a strict standard and requirements instead of accepting any willing applicant. This process presented challenges for some of the early staff engaged in accommodating the growth and design phase of defining organizational roles in addition to accomplishing assigned work. But later this proved a wise methodology.
At the time of this study (Spring, 2011), the culture of the organization was still unstable. While new members were being added, the culture endured a chaotic transition during a physical move and reconsolidation into one facility. This transition took approximately 60 days (January and February) before the dust settled and the directorate was mostly operational. March was a settling in month at which time operations and relocation to a new facility were finally completed. At the time of this research (March and April), business operations of day-to-day work settled into a semi-routine. Personalities had a chance to exhibit all the essences of Bruce Tuchman’s forming, storming, norming, and performing model of group development. As the project and knowledge manager during this time I estimated that we were between norming and performing phases.³

**The Human Dimension**

The population of the Learning Technology Directorate cultural demographic is made up of contractors, soldiers, and Department of the Army civilians. Figure 2 highlights the organization’s three functional areas supported by soldiers and leadership. Functional capacities identified are:

- **Outsourced.** Facilitates contractual work outside of the organization.
- **Development Team.** Consists of creative and technical divisions.
- **Instructional Design Team.** Facilitates all instructional design development.
- **Subject Matter Experts.** Soldiers assigned to guide and provide insight from the Army doctrinal perspective.
- **Leadership.** Provided operational and strategic vision, guidance, and operational management.

One challenge to the work culture coming together was the mix of prior service and civilian employees. The preponderance of personnel had a military background and there was a real knowledge gap for those who were pure civilians who had no prior experience with military or Army. The learning curve
was extremely steep and sustained for those few who had no point of reference for the Army culture, jargon, or institutional understanding.

Digging In

The discussion to this point is based upon my experience, observations, and perspective during my tenure in the Learning Technology Directorate for 11 months. The following discussion is based upon three instruments that were chosen to serve multiple purposes in this organizational analysis. This analysis will provide the leadership and members of the organization a representation and historical perspective of its travels so far. This foundational understanding and comprehension may lead and assist in the future operation and development of the organization.

Measurements

The KM Dynamic. The first area of research is the Knowledge Management (KM) aspect. This perspective reflects the abilities of a culture to share, generate, and archive knowledge which may ultimately serve to benefit the institutional wisdom and innovation. I utilized two independent tools to assist in this KM assessment—the KM Assessment Tool (KMAT) and the High Level of KM Self-Assessment (Table 1). The KMAT was individually filled out by two selected personnel and was also completed in a group of five personnel.

The KMAT is an assessment instrument measuring KM strengths and identifying potential gaps existing in the organizational culture. The focus is to capture organization specific KM components. The results in Figure 3 display the Learning Technology’s organization as represented by the five separate sections. The highest assessed section was KM culture at 30 percent, embodying organizational climate, openness, learning, flexibility, innovation, and knowledge sharing. The lowest scored section, KM Measurement (21 percent), reflected the organization’s ability to measure how knowledge was managed, innovations of linking knowledge, and resource allocation to increase its knowledge base.

The Leadership section embodied central strategic planning, comprehension and understanding, training and education, social learning, and the social network. The KM process section highlights systemic processes related to knowledge gaps, non-traditional research and idea harvesting, best practices and lessons learned, capturing tacit knowledge, and engaging in a knowledge sharing community of practice. KM technology involves technology connectivity, enterprise and institutional wisdom, technology utilization, human centered, empowered and self-guided, and integration.

The second KM instrument delivers an assessment that captures 10 assessed functional areas relating to the organizations’ KM capacities providing current and future perspectives. This product was provided to primary staff and leadership of Learning Technology (five personnel) who answered from group consensus and dialogue. This result provides a management only perspective of the current standing and a future (aspiration) estimate of the KM functions. The focus areas are clarified in Table 1 and were utilized to provide the current, plus a realistic forecast of where the organization could be a year from this assessment.

The High Level KM analysis process created a certain amount of interchange and contemplation centered on Learning Technology’s KM function and how they were then doing or not doing business. This energetic group process and assessment not only allowed for the assessment but provided a level of comprehension and understanding of the topic to the participants. One individual pulled me
and could be instituted without outside resources. These five lowest scoring areas provide the basis and focus on which KM specific change and innovation would be based.

**The Individual Dynamic.**

The third research instrument utilized was the Lewis model and Cultureactive web-based tool. This assessment (Figure 5) focuses on the individual’s perspective in an ancestral depth, thus providing a holistic relation to interpersonal communication and understanding. This was administered on an individual, self-paced, internet delivered method.

Overall it provides a succinct and exceptional resource aid and organizational understanding while identifying particularities of our culture holistically. Gaining an understanding of our culture provides the organization a greater effectiveness in its delivery of service and operations by enabling communications and interpersonal relations.

Figure 5 displays the individual scores of those who participated. There is high level of relationship in the captured beliefs and values. The legend details the major elements of the color relation and placement relating to hereditary origins and can be further explained at the Cultureactive website.
Analysis implies that the interpersonal relations amongst those represented would exist in a high correlation of shared beliefs and perceptions providing for a more harmonizing work environment as seen in Figure 6.1 (the four areas of work, bureaucracy and regulation, expressing disagreement, and the future and the past). The majority of results align in a similar response depicting an element of this culture that I would predict to be crucial to operations. A peculiar result to note is on expressing disagreement. What is the implication? I think this could very well result in an inhibited or locked work flow with a more resistant culture.
Figure 6.1. Results of Cultureactive survey by specific values and beliefs.

Figure 6.2 provides a heuristic view of effective principles related to the type of work done by the organization and the type of people matched to the mission. These facets depict a humorous, risk taking, and independent constituent which supports a strong mature position and strata of character. This is directly related to the level of forward thinking and self-directed characteristics needed to not only operate efficiently, but flourish in this environment.

Figure 6.2. Results of Cultureactive survey by specific values and beliefs.
Conclusion

The utility and ease of implementation of the tools used in this research provided a solid approach to cultural understanding which assisted in identifying strengths, gaps, and issues. As a newly transformed Army organization this report may serve well to be placed into the strategic guidance and further developed to provide a guide and management tool to assist the leadership in navigating as it plots the course. This type of reflection provides depth and understanding that over time allows better attuned operation and facilitates organizational learning to stay flexible and adaptable. Organizational strength is gained in understanding all elements of its own environment and existence, thus ultimately empowering it to adapt to any environment.

Endnotes

4. This tool has been adapted by Bob Dalton, BCKS KMNet Facilitator, from the KMAT developed by the American Productivity and Quality Center and Arthur Andersen to help military organizations self-assess where their strengths and opportunities lie in managing knowledge.
5. Knoco Ltd at http://www.knoco.co.uk/.
6. FM 6-01.1, August 2008.
Libya’s Convulsions:  
Middle Eastern Views on Western Action in Libya

by Sharon Curcio

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Prologue: After his scale was seized by a government administrator, a young Tunisian grocer who used that scale to scratch out a marginal living as a vegetable vendor immolated himself before a local government office and the woman who had taken his scale. This grocer’s powerful gesture became a call to action across the Middle East. Tunisians who witnessed this horrific event exploded in sympathetic protest, and went to the streets and became vocal to bring about political change. Technology-enabled youth had no difficulty connecting or meeting to stoke dissension and soon the currents of this wave struck Egypt, Bahrain, and Libya. Power brokers in four Middle Eastern countries faced public confrontation in many town squares. Yet only in Libya did armed opposition to the government coalesce.

Introduction

While authoritarian and unaccountable governments have prevailed in the Middle East since WW II (and prior), the unrest of the young unemployed and face-offs with current despotic governments is viewed by academics as the correcting of the “democratic deficit” in the Arab world. An early political sociologist, Martin Lipset, posited an increased demand for democratic rule in the broader context of “development success” in North Africa given that these countries have surpassed the rest of the continent in substantial health and education gain in the last ten to forty years.

Add technology, computer-fused mobile phones capable of posting directly to the web and thus “broadcasting,” and now everyone with an Internet capable camera or videocam is a photo journalist who can bring visibility to a political uprising or single act of violence. New techno toys with large broadband access extend the reach of abused masses inside a dictatorship to the outside world in seconds, and fortunately a worldwide audience stands ready, 24/7.

Why Armed Resistance in Libya?

Libya has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, even more than Nigeria, at an estimated 46.4 billion barrels as of January 2011 according to Oil and Gas Journal. So why are Libya’s people, who have one of the higher standards of living in Africa, taking to the streets? When Gaddafi took power 42 years ago, his socialist theory promulgated “jamihiriya” or “the state of the masses,” indicating a society ruled by the masses. In reality it was a power concentrated government controlled by a non-elected ruler–Gaddafi. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group attempted an Islamic insurrection that did not seem to garner popular support in the early 1990s, and the group’s leaders were jailed. Some escaped Gaddafi’s reach and others, finally freed from prison, left Libya. Gaddafi’s characterization of his citizens as a mass speaks volumes about his treatment of them.
Kiren Chaudhry has remarked that the astronomical rise in oil revenues accrued by those who are the State means that these states “need not concern themselves systematically with their own populations at all.”4 With regard to Libya, Dirk Vandewalle explained that Gaddafi came onto the Libyan stage at a time where “both statebuilding and national integration were in their infancy when oil revenues started to accrue.”5 These dynamics favored “complete state management of social, economic, and political relations.”6 Timing can be worth billions. According to Omar ai-Shehabi of the Gulf Centre for Policy, the formula for most “rentier” states is to have a welfare population marginalized on political and economic fronts and have an imported expatriate workforce with no rights. This is a recipe for dictatorial success which Gaddafi appears to have followed, if not coined.

While Gaddafi’s suppressive measures tightened across four decades, in 1997 he created the Law of Collective Punishment which states that entire families, towns or districts can be punished for the wrongdoing of an individual. Further, Gaddafi nationalized all private property so that absolute obedi
cence was required for any Libyan to have his or her needs met by the regime.7

Here in Libya is a crime to even try to say something to get even one vote against our Dictator and it has been the case for over 40 years! The so called traitors of our country (I call them the people that had the brains and intelligence to see when our totally fake and false Libyan State TV broadcasts to us only tons of Garbage News and No Real News) not only were they killed but they were hanged for decades in very public places where people can see them die very slowly and send the rest of the local population a clear message that if you even say anything against our Dictator you will be next to be hanged in a Public Execution.8

As other members of the Arab League looked on, Gaddafi took measures against his population that exceeded what his peers were willing to do against their populations. While the Arab League did not interfere with Gaddafi for decades, it perhaps viewed his encroachment on his native population as his rightful mandate. In such a collectivized society, Libyans have no independent institutions, and certain
tly no individual rights. By actively suppressing development of independent institutions or bureaucracies in Libya for transportation infrastructure (roads and bridges), health maintenance (water delivery, sanitation, and sewer systems), or medical care (equipped clinics and healthcare providers), Libyans lingered in a time warp of medieval serfdom.

Gaddafi’s “jamihiriya” is simply late twentieth century or early twenty-first century serfdom: people tied to the land but deriving no economic benefit from their birthplace. The rentier classes of oil-rich countries are not only excluded from the wealth of their native country but tend to become more disenfranchised in their native land over time. The vehicle for suppression of a native group is force. Gaddafi took power by force and is inclined to resort to it to retain power. To deny Libyans the opportunity to develop all aspects of the society from roads and power lines to court houses and clinics ensures serfdom. Faceless masses are easier to kill than diligent people who derive identity from contributions to many sectors of a shared national economy. Having been denied more than the average Saudi or Egyptian, the Libyans have more to avenge and greater motivation to take up arms against the stranglehold of the Gaddafis.

Professor Mark Levine, a professor at University of California, Irvine and a visiting researcher at Lund University in Sweden phrases the differences in the North African uprisings differently:

But Libya did not begin as an armed insurrection. Protests began as a response to the arrest in Benghazi of Fathi Terbil, a well-known human rights activist in Benghazi. In Tunisia and Egypt the ruling systems were bigger than the rulers themselves...Ben Ali and Mubarak could be sacrificed in order to preserve the system, or more precisely the power and wealth of elites whom it was constructed to benefit. Yet in Libya the system has long centered around Gaddafi and his family. There is no larger political order that could successfully push him out to preserve itself...In Egypt, the main activists running the streets - had spent years building personal relationships that served them well once the mass protests erupted. Although activists have done a remarkable job in building them quickly in Libya, the situation at the start of the revolt was, as Fathi Terbil explained in an interview on al-Arabiya, “as if we had just been born today. We were a group of rebels who barely knew one another.”9
Voices from Libya (Twitter, 5 April 2011)

“They responded with weapons, killings, and bullets.”

A man and a woman describe the strange feeling of praying for the pilot who’s bombing your country, why so few Tripoli residents are willing to speak publicly against Gaddafi, and the unlikely prospect of tribal war should the regime fall.

“This country is devoid of the fundamental institutions”

A man describes the services, common in almost all developed nations, that Libyans have lacked during Gaddafi’s rule: basic medicines such as the flu vaccine, centralized sewage networks, and postal addresses, among others. “What’s coming (after Gaddafi) will always be better,” says the man with the opposition flag.

Praying for a foreign pilot who is dropping bombs on your own soil is not an experience that every human has. Yet this is what Libyans faced from their current leader. To make matters worse, Gaddafi hired Tajiks, Ghanians, Serbs, and Algerians as part of his mercenary force. Is a postal address or a sewer line worth going to war over? Yes, if it comes to signify one’s identity or the health of one’s family and can separate a person from a faceless mass.

The UN Vote for the No-Fly Zone Over Libya

The UN vote was plus ten, minus five for the Libyan no-fly zone. Five governments abstained from the vote: Russia, China, India, Brazil, and Germany. The abstaining members were surprised at the scale of the intervention that occurred in Libya; the Security Council left its implementation to any and all. It “authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements.” Officially the Security Council authorized a “no-fly zone” and the tightening of sanctions against “the Gaddafi regime and its supporters.” Resolution 1973 called for “all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi.” At the same time, it expressly “excluded a foreign occupation force of any form” or in “any part of Libyan territory.”

The Merkel administration in Germany was criticized for its stance. Germany’s Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle then stated that Germany would take part in a European Union humanitarian mis-
sion (to Libya) should such an operation come to pass. “Then of course we wouldn’t shirk our responsibility,” said Westerwelle. In April, Sweden announced a sizeable donation for humanitarian aid to Libya. If reports are correct, and even after its vote, China bought (directly or indirectly) the first shipment of oil from the Libyan rebels.

While the UN Security Council can justify an action, it hands off all executonal responsibility to NATO. Thus NATO cobbles together an intervention approach with different partners who must combine, in very brief time periods, different parts of the military operation. The results are not always smooth as Libyan rebels found to their surprise that no-fly zone regulation applied to their flights as well.

Libyan Opinions of NATO

Al Jazeera’s Laurence Lee, reported from Benghazi that Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga, the vice chairman of the Libyan National Provisional Council, continued to insist that NATO do more. “He has certainly strengthened his language, and he (Ghoga) even went on to call NATO a ‘burden,’ which is an extraordinary thing to say under the current circumstances.” Libyan rebels blamed NATO for “friendly fire” actions (three major incidents as of 8 April 2011) which were killing their comrades. “Either NATO does its work properly or we will ask the Security Council to suspend its work,” said Abdel Fattah Younes, head of the rebel forces, speaking at a news conference in Benghazi in the rebel-held east. Younes said NATO’s inaction allowed forces loyal to Gaddafi to advance, allowing them to kill the people of the rebel-held city of Misrata. By 11 April, Mustafah Abdulrahman, a Libyan rebel force spokesman, indicated that NATO’s targeting had become much more effective.

Communication between the rebel forces and NATO elicited concern. NATO claimed that it did not know the rebels had assets such as tanks, armored vehicles, and rocket launchers nor what the rebels’ plan for placement of these assets was. The rebels said that their direction of movement should have indicated that they were not Gaddafi forces. NATO’s support of the Libyan rebel forces was not an error free process.

While Libyan rebels received recognition and resources from Qatar and were able to make an oil sale for much needed revenue, Gaddafi forces struck east.
Libyan oil fields and interrupted the electrical supply which enables oil pumping. The rebel force was quite vulnerable to pro-Gaddafi actions which impaired their ability to finance their struggle. Ghoga said groups of armored vehicles had attacked the oil fields of Messla and Sarir. He said that the extent of damage remained unclear, but the rebels could no longer sustain the 100,000 barrels a day they had been producing. Just two years ago Libya produced 1.65 million barrels of oil per day.

**The Arab League Overturns Decades of Solidarity**

Iraqi journalist, Hamid Alkifaey, met Ali Muhsin Hamid, an Arab League (AL) representative attending a British Labour Party conference in 2003. Hamid’s comments to Mr. Alkifaey revealed the real nature of the AL. He stated that “The League represents Arab regimes and therefore it cannot stand against any of them.” He emphasized that “protecting Arab peoples from their governments was not one of the tasks of the AL.”

Mr. Alkifaey observed that the AL’s unprecedented request for UN intervention in 2011 to protect Libyans from their leader may signal a new direction in the AL’s mission. It implies “a qualitative transformation in this pan-AL established in the middle of the forties to serve Arab regimes, rather than Arab people.” The foreign ministers of the six Arab Gulf states met in the Saudi capital Riyadh to discuss the ongoing crisis in Libya. They said that the existing Libyan regime is illegitimate and therefore it cannot stand against any of them. The foreign ministers also urged the AL to take the necessary measures to stop the bloodshed in Libya.

While current history regarding the AL appears more positive than its past, does it mitigate the fact that an elite group of self-appointed power brokers function solely to protect each other’s regimes even if terrible human rights abuses occur? Clearly, every member of this club had a very sovereign attitude: extract wealth from a region, eliminate all challenges to that wealth extraction, and use a heavy hand on all who did not agree with the power broker’s actions. Population control and demands from the population are the ‘burdensome’ aspects of dictatorial rule, so the fewer restive society members, the better, and if violence works to get rid of the rabble-rousers, let loose the cannons.

On the 22 February 2011, Libya’s representative to the AL, AI-Huni, resigned. On the 24 February, the AL suspended Libyan participation. As of 24 February 2011, 1,000 people were reported dead from Libyan state force. By 13 March 2011 the AL supported the no-fly zone over Libya. But if the AL brokers have finally broken ranks with Gaddafi, this too follows the course of power preservation. His violent actions against his own populace aroused international outrage; such widely held opinion cannot be reversed. In truth, world opinion changes slowly and simply tends to subside, not reverse. The AL cannot risk appearing to be so insulated that they are unaware of the visibility of his actions. It had no choice but to distance itself from him. If revolt by the lower classes is one step in the democratic process most Westerners are familiar with, then we already know the next scenes in this particular playbook.

**Gulf State Views of the Libyan Crisis**

According to editorialist Daoud Kattab, the Gulf States have no citizens working in Libya and were the first to denounce Gaddafi’s violence against dissenters. He further postulates that the Gulf States moved the AL to side against Gaddafi in this conflict. The Gulf News, a United Arab Emirates online news provider, reported that Gaddafi forces have used sexual assault as a weapon of war and that his snipers have targeted children in hospital wards in Misrata. The UN children’s agency, UNICEF said it had “reliable and consistent reports” that snipers had hit children in the city. The Gulf News also said that the International Crescent Red Cross would enter Misrata by boat to investigate the claim relating to children.

Hospitals in Misrata documented about 250 deaths over the past month, most of them civilians, as government troops fight for control of the last big rebel stronghold in the west of Libya. “We’ve heard disturbing accounts of shelling and shooting at a clinic and in populated areas, killing civilians where no battle was raging,” Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch, said. Under international law, warring factions are not allowed to target civilians or carry out assaults that do not discriminate between civilians and combatants. The watchdog organization said it spoke to two doctors and 17 evacuees, including 35-year-old Jamal Muhammad Suaib, who lost three family members in an attack by government soldiers. “My wife was holding my son,” he was quoted as saying.
The European Union

Composed of twenty-seven member states, the European Union (EU) represents one-half billion people and accounts for 28 percent of the global economy. The EU belongs to, and hence works through policies achieved with the UN, the World Trade Organization, G8, and G20. France adopted a political position that opposed Gaddafi staying in power while Germany declined to support the Libyan no-fly zone.

Given the diverse opinions about Libya from the members of the EU, Middle Eastern news organizations, reporters, and commentators have chosen to be country specific. France’s actions have received more (adverse) commentary from Middle Eastern press and bloggers than Germany’s. After being pressed on the needs for medical assistance and food in Libya, the EU stood ready to come in behind the UN to provide humanitarian assistance. As with any crises and the dislocation of population that ensues from political uprisings in North Africa, certain governments within the EU (Italy and Greece) began discussion on ways to route the expected flood of emigres.

Lawrence Gonzi, the Maltese prime minister, told Abdel Ati ai-Obeidi, Libya’s acting foreign minister, that Gaddafi and his family must relinquish power. “The prime minister reiterated the Maltese government’s position that the resolutions of the UN must be respected, that the Gaddafi government must step down, that Colonel Gaddafi and his family should leave, and there should be an immediate ceasefire and a process to enable the Libyan people to make its democratic choices.” Malta stayed out of the UN-mandated military actions against Tripoli but sent humanitarian aid to Misrata on trawlers.

The African Union

While the African Union (AU) has fifty-three member countries, five countries–Mali, South Africa, Mauritania, Congo, and Uganda–formed the core of an ad hoc high level committee of the AU Peace and Security Council. Members of this AU Commission included commission chief Jean Ping, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (Mauritania), Dennis Sassou Nguesso (Congo), Amadou Toumani Toure (Mali), Jacob Zuma (South Africa) and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and was tasked to negotiate a ceasefire between the Libyan rebels and Colonel Gaddafi. The group was permitted to fly into Tripoli to meet with him. (Incidentally, Libya is one of the five top funders of the AU whose budget exceeded $250,000,000 in 2010.)

Both the EU and NATO have encouraged the AU to make contact with Gaddafi and with the National
Transitional Council (NTC) to bring some resolution to the Libyan situation and perhaps negotiate a successful settlement. “(The EU) backs the AU’s diplomatic efforts to bring a peaceful end to the conflict in Libya,” said a spokesman for Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief, on 10 April 2011.16

A spokeswoman for NATO stated that “We take note of reports of an AU ceasefire proposal. Since the start of the Libyan crisis, NATO has been in constant touch with the AU and other regional and international organizations. We have always made it clear that there could be no purely military solution to this crisis. We welcome all contributions to the broad international effort aimed at stopping the violence against the civilian population in Libya.”17

Al Jazeera’s Laurence Lee reported from Eastern Libya that the rebels wanted to know what the real agenda of the AU was. Was the AU going to genuinely attempt to resolve this conflict or were the AU leaders, who have close ties to Gaddafi, in Tripoli to shore up the legitimacy of Gaddafi’s rule?18

Even though the AU had resolved against an external intervention and called for a political resolution to the Libyan conflict, the three African governments in the UN Security Council-South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon-voted in favor of the UN resolution concerning Libya. Jean Ping, the AU Commission’s chief announced intentions to work with European and NATO officials regarding the situation in Libya. Jacob Zuma of South Africa headed the ad hoc committee to visit Gaddafi. Many of the AU leaders are friends with him and Gaddafi often refers to himself as “King of Africa” given his record of providing economic assistance to many AU countries. The AU called for a ceasefire and referred to the situation in Libya as an internal African problem. Teodoro Obiang Nguema, President of Equatorial Guinea, opined that the conflict in Libya didn’t merit foreign interference.

Gaddafi accepted the AU’s “roadmap,” which included a ceasefire as one of its five points, but Gaddafi-watchers indicated that he acted with similar cordiality on 25 February 2011. “His acceptance was a courtesy. It did not mean he was committed to the ceasefire. It did not guarantee he was going to act on it.”

Libya’s NTC held that it would reject any deal that left any member of the Gaddafi family in power. The NTC also specified that for a ceasefire to work, Gaddafi must send his soldiers back to their barracks, permit civil expression (assembly and speech, etc.) and permit the unhindered delivery of foreign assistance.

Uganda’s Stance on the Libyan Crisis

Yoweri K. Museveni, President of Uganda, recently wrote an editorial that becomes an extensive list of the positive and negative aspects of Gaddafi and his rule. Ugandan journalist, Daniel Kalinaki, states that “President Museveni attempts to offer a solution by calling for the AU to take a lead role in saving Gaddafi from Libyans and Libyans from Gaddafi.”19

Museveni has quite a complex relationship with Gaddafi. He mentions that Gaddafi called for a “United States of Africa”—an idea that was deeply opposed by many of his Africa cohorts. Gaddafi charted his own way in international politics, meddled in the internal affairs of many African nations under the guise of shared cultures, and did not distance himself from terrorist activities sufficiently. But Museveni also credits him for raising the oil prices from $.40 a barrel in 1969 to the price
seen today by helping to form the first oil cartel in 1973. Therefore Museveni sees Gaddafi as a reality-changing player of the twentieth century who is central to the rise of unforeseen levels of oil-derived wealth and power in Africa and in the Middle East.20

In his book, What is Africa’s Problem?, Museveni admits to the fact that many African leaders stay in power too long—a core weakness of African leadership. Even if this is the case with Gaddafi, it has long been the case with his predecessors and his peers. Not much is likely to change in the behavior of the African power-elect (or non-elect as the case may be) any time soon. With manipulation and/or brutality many African leaders overstay their welcome in government.21

Museveni’s opinion further holds that “responsibility government should also be an elected one by the people at periodic intervals.” This certainly does not describe Libya in the last four decades. He also argues for Libya’s autonomy in determining what happens to it: “It should be for the leaders of the resistance in that country to decide their strategy, not for foreigners.” While Museveni moves against foreign intervention (UN, EU, or NATO) in Libya, notwithstanding the Libyans themselves are calling upon the international community for resources to continue the TNC’s opposition of Gaddafi.

Perhaps Kalinaki said it best when he said that the UN comes in and takes over (in Africa) because the AU fails to adequately respond to crises in Africa. He cites the AU’s demand for peacekeepers in Somalia. Uganda and Burundi’s peacekeepers were then sent to Somalia—but the U.S. and Libya picked up the tab for that operation. Kalinaki says that as long as African leaders can’t put their money where their mouths are and instead rely on Western resources, then African interests will be subordinate to Western interests. He proposes that African countries democratize to regain an ability to preserve their self-interest(s). But democracies require that a populace and its leadership act collectively to abide by the law. At this time the riches to be grabbed by leaders in Africa outweigh the benefits of abiding by the law. Oil wealth, mineral wealth, and commodity wealth are corrupting influences on the African democratic process but there are no ready solutions to combat this.22

**Libyans Leave Libya**

Al Jazeera’s Anita McNaught reported from Tripoli on 11 April 2011 that:

Some 100,000 Libyans have crossed into neighbouring countries since fighting erupted between rebels and Gaddafi’s forces nearly two months ago. Migration officials say much of that border traffic is routine and goes both ways.

However, hundreds of women and children in the past week fled to Tunisia by taking back roads through the Libyan desert, trying to avoid Gaddafi’s men.

East of Libya, instant communities of exiles have sprung up in the Egyptian port city of Alexandria and the coastal resort of Mersa Matrouh, where thousands have received aid and some 500 Libyan families found temporary refuge in vacant holiday apartments.

The exiles spend their days watching TV, hungry for news from home, and worrying. “Our psychological state has paralysed us,” said Nasser Abdel Rahim, a chemical engineer and father of eight. “We really can’t do anything.”

**Iran**

Iran’s Ahmadinejad told the UN on 4 April 2011 to stop intervention in Libya. The Twitter posts have carried little from the Iranian government on Libya.

**Epilogue: The Libyan rebels succeeded with international help.** So many weapons poured into the country that a $1,000 USD Kalashnikov fell to $500 by the end of the hostilities there. While funds were released to the TNC for re-building the country, Libya literally had to emerge from four decades of absolute stasis and had neither civil institutions nor infrastructure. Libya had to create itself as a modern nation on multiple fronts all at once. With economic functioning a top priority, organizing and funding Libyan security forces (police and army) was slow, and tragically insufficient to fend off anti-Western violence on a continent teeming with Islamist extremists. Is Libya in disarray? Yes, but not badly. Factions exist opposed to the new government but one of the last protests (mid-November 2012) had only one hundred people in attendance. Areas of the country with strong ties to the last regime have yet to be repaired but placement at the bottom of the “to do” list is unsurprising. Libya’s in its fragility currently exudes more stability than many of its African neighbors.

**Endnotes**


2. Kimenyi.


6. Ibid.


8. Twitter, Aljazeera. 11 April 2011.


22. Kalinaki.


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**The Warfighter Research Portal provides Intelligence Knowledge Network users content discovery solutions in a repository of current authenticated Army doctrine, approved Army operating and functional concepts, and other official publications. Log on to the IKN website at https://ikn.army.mil and follow the path below to try this beta content discovery site.**
More than 6,000 cadets from 14 regiments across the U.S., Puerto Rico, Great Britain, and Slovakia increased their cultural awareness (CA) skills during the Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) at Warrior Forge 2012. The mission of LDAC is to train U.S. Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) cadets to Army standards, to develop leadership, and to evaluate officer potential through a tiered training structure using light infantry tactics as the instructional medium.

Warrior Forge uses the fictional country of Atropia from the Common Training Scenario as the backdrop for culture training at LDAC. Joint Base Lewis-McChord hosts this important milestone for cadets, with approximately 250 cadets rotating through on a daily basis. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Negin (UC Berkeley), CA Committee Chief, integrated CA in three primary training areas: Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Ethical Decision Making, and Cordon and Knock.

Gathering tables, chairs, lamps, pictures, costumes and all the things that make a home, Master Sergeant Ronnie Lary (University of Northern Iowa) supervised the creation of six workstations (two for each area) which ensured a view into Atropian village life and culture. Instruction was facilitated by either a ROTC Professor of Military Science, Assistant Professor Military Science, or a Senior Military Science Instructor.

All were assisted by newly-commissioned second lieutenants and U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Soldiers ranging in rank from specialist through major. These individuals were selected from across the country for their unique education, deployment, and CA backgrounds. MSG Lary emphasized, “The CA Committee did an outstanding job. A big take away is that when we understand ourselves, it really helps us to understand others better—no matter where we are.”

Atropia is a blend of traditional and modern; urban and rural; secular and non-secular views, and high and low context communication styles.
Cadets must assess these cultural parameters as well as other cultural factors. Spanish is the native language of Atropia, but many of the elders speak Russian because of the Soviet influence during the Cold War. The majority of the country is Shi’a Muslim, but is generally not as conservative as neighboring Ariana. Cadets are introduced to cultural influences, PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time) and ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people), and events) expand these frameworks during interactive instruction prior to a practical exercise (PE). Cadets consider these influences and specific nuances of the Atropian people in order to effectively facilitate, interact, and meet the objectives of each PE. The instruction and PEs at each station allow cadets to modify or adapt their behaviors in a new culture.

During the train-up week prior to “go,” the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) trained six senior cadre on culture-general skills and region-specific information. Culture-general skills focused on self-awareness, perspective-taking, cross-cultural communication, and critical thinking. Region-specific information focused on the unique culture of Atropia. Second lieutenants received similar instruction while acting as junior cadre, facilitators and role-players at each station. Videos were available to cadre to review their instructional methods and role-playing. 2LT Halicki (Canisius College, Buffalo, New York), who is branching Military Intelligence, role-played as a member of the Atropian Defense Force. As a junior cadre and role-player he shared, “This has been really beneficial. The training gives the cadets a chance to practice skills that they can use anywhere. It has also been powerful for us to work together with NCOs.”

At the KLE workstations cadets needed to consider, “What does it take to build trust?” while also learning how to work with an interpreter. For the Ethical Decision Making portion, cadets assessed the cultural considerations of the U.S. Army, Atropia, and their own culture. The regiments also applied all skills during several search operations in the villages. Cadet Luis Gonzalez (Trojan Battalion, CSU, Dominguez Hills), a graduate student in education, commented that, “Even though there are many cadets, facilitators ensured participation by all of us.” He added that this CA training “is excellent. I am learning a lot and it is definitely not boring here in Atropia.”

Many leaders observed the CA training throughout the rotations, including Major General Jefforey Smith, Commanding General, U.S. Army Cadet Command and Colonel Peggy Combs, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Cadet Command. Both commented on how pleased they were with the training and the interactive PEs.

TCC cadre provided cultural guidance and advice during the beginning of training in June and followed-up during the final training rotations in July. The TCC was available during the entire training via phone or email to address questions, comments, or concerns. The TCC plans to continue its support for Warrior Forge 2013.

John Bird, TCC Director, highlights the importance of the enduring relationship between the TCC and Cadet Command, “Forging our Officer Corps and a deep bench of future strategic leaders is a key focus for the TRADOC Culture Center. Our culture training and education learning outcomes will serve as critical enablers yielding leaders with key attributes such as character, presence, and integrity. We are proud of our ongoing relationship with Cadet Command and look forward to our collective efforts building cultural competency in our Officer Corps.”

Kate Smith is a culture trainer, facilitator, and developer for the TCC. She is currently a member of the Professional Military Education Team and specializes in culture-general and negotiation training. Ms. Smith is a former U.S. Air Force linguist with expertise in the former Warsaw Pact nations. She is also a licensed professional counselor.
Doctrine Update, 4-12

The United States Combined Arms Center’s publishes the Doctrine Update periodically to highlight recent and upcoming changes to doctrine and provide information related to doctrine use. This Doctrine Update provides information on the overall Doctrine 2015 Strategy. It builds upon initial guidance contained in the Doctrine Update, 3-12, maximizes the understanding of the Doctrine 2015 strategy, and provides timelines of significant publications. Disseminate this update to the lowest levels. The proponent of Doctrine Update is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil or by mail to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (Doctrine Update, 4-12), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337. POCs for this update are Mr. Clinton J. Ancker III at clinton.j.ancker2.civ@mail.mil and LTC Ave Ruiz at averill.ruiz.mil@mail.mil.

Doctrine Comprehensive Guide (Doctrine Knowledge Map)

The Combined Arms Center is developing version 1.0 of an intuitive, standalone tool called the US Army Doctrine Comprehensive Guide to educate Army leaders and Soldiers about emerging doctrine. The guide introduces the structure of Army doctrine and details the doctrinal publications that focus on specific warfighting functions. Version 1.0 includes current Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) and current Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRPs), as well as all unrestricted doctrine publications. Restricted doctrine publications are also available for CAC cardholders through the Army Publishing Directorate’s Web site using embedded links in the Comprehensive Guide.

Army Publication Directorate Notifications


Note on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

The term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (and its acronym, ISR) was rescinded in 2010 based on guidance from the TRADOC commander. It was replaced in Army usage by the term information collection. Subsequent to that decision, the Army leadership decided that the Army must retain the term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as used in joint terminology. To resolve the retention, ADP 2-0 and ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, inserted the following paragraph:

The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through the operations and intelligence processes (with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise) and information collection. Consistent with joint doctrine, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function (JP 2-01).

To be clear, the Army will use information collection as the term for the process by which the Army collects information. Information collection replaces ISR synchronization and ISR integration. Much as the Army acknowledges the joint term of unified action and executes it through unified land operations, the Army also acknowledges the joint term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and executes it through “the operations process, to include the intelligence process, information collection, intelligence analysis, and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise.”
A collaborative effort to fundamentally redesign institutional training is underway and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is playing a critical role. The Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is giving USAICoE his nod of approval for its implementation of the Army Learning Model (ALM). While visiting Fort Huachuca on 11 September 2012, GEN Robert Cone received briefings from several USAICoE organizations including the Learning Innovation Office (LIO).

MG Gregg Potter, Commanding General of USAICoE and Fort Huachuca, discussed the school’s transformation to facilitated, peer-based learning. “It is our intent to design and develop relevant formal and informal distributed learning content that captures the imagination of the new generation of warfighters and builds upon their operational experiences,” Potter said. “Delivery is also key. Content must be easily discoverable, accessible, playable and trackable.”

Cone told Intelligence Center leadership he is impressed with the school’s curriculum which is not only technology-rich and platform agnostic, but also instructionally-sound. “We need to capture best practices such as these, pull them into TRADOC headquarters, and propagate them to our schools and centers, ensuring commonality and sharing,” he said.

Potter agreed, adding the way ahead for ALM is through standardization “To effectively and efficiently train the Army of 2020 as a superior fighting force, we must build around a base capability and then resource it across TRADOC,” he said. “This will require leveraging existing resources and identifying new ones.”

COL Jeffrey Jennings, Deputy Commander for Training, USAICoE, elaborated that institutionalizing the capability makes sense, especially in an era of declining resources where TRADOC schools are being asked to do more with less. “We all would be best served in establishing a central repository to harmonize intelligence requirements and three-letter agencies,” Jennings said.

According to Potter, the initiative will require a degree of governance and oversight to be successful. “It will call for establishing, for lack of a better term, a configuration and control board not only for the course being developed, but for other courses and CoEs,” he said.

LTG David Halverson, Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff of TRADOC, visited USAICoE on 24 September 2012 and shared his thoughts on how the initiative should be structured with regard to manpower. “From a matrix perspective, we should design this with a blending of green suits, Department of the Army civilians and in-house contract support,” Halverson said. “The blending will be important.”
In recent years, the Army has relied on outside contract companies to develop interactive multimedia instruction, gaming, and distributed learning. Jennings stated leveraging an in-house capability and working within a community of interest allows the government to be more efficient. “We are all better served if we work together for common solutions vice every different group contracting separately,” he said. “Developing requirements that work for multiple users works well within the intelligence community.”

“Contract companies will build the greatest training tool in the world,” he said. “The only catch—you must use their proprietary software and pay associated licensing fees, which aren’t cheap.” Jennings added that maintaining and updating course material developed by outside contractors presents its own set of challenges. “It’s not always feasible to return to the same contractor who developed the first iteration so a new contract must be established for a new developer,” he said. “The new developer typically builds to a slightly different standard, resulting in a completely different product that does not fit well with products already built. This approach adds costs to IMI development in the out years.”

LIO offers USAICoE an in-house capability to develop, maintain, and update courseware in a cost effective and efficient manner. It plays a key role in the school’s implementation of ALM. “The LIO is the pulse, if you will, for transforming the center and school to a learner-centric institution through different learning strategies,” Leanne Rutherford, LIO’s Director, said.

LIO’s core competency is instructional design, the systematic process that combines educational theory and training development to accomplish a desired learning outcome. She explained that instructional designers are organic to LIO and distinctly different from training developers. With academic backgrounds in educational theory and real-world experience in the application of instructional design methods and technology solutions, instructional designers are considered experts in learning. “Conversely, training developers are content experts with extensive military backgrounds,” Rutherford said. “Although this type of experience is valuable, it alone is not sufficient to revolutionize education and training of Soldiers.”

Jennings stated the training committees’ propensity to accept instructional designers varies widely. “It’s a big culture shift for those in the Army,” Jennings said. “The transformation requires near constant engagement. Each time a new command team arrives, we must re-engage.”

While Jennings supports the role of instructional designers, he also acknowledges the significance of training developers. “Instructional designers and training developers share a symbiotic relationship,” Jennings said. “Architects (instructional designers) create structural and procedural planning documents derived from in-depth analysis and the foreman and builders (training developers) develop materials to support the plans.”

During their respective briefings, Cone and Halverson met LIO instructional designers and developers and viewed the Collection Asset Management Simulator (CAMS), the organization’s latest product release.
CAMS is an Afghanistan-based simulation that consists of two products, Operation Kanjhar Strike and Operation Kanjhar Storm. Requested by the Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course B block of instruction, Operation Kanjhar Strike is 2-dimensional IMI that teaches high intensity conflict. Development is underway on Operation Kanjhar Storm. The 3-dimensional game focuses on counterinsurgency operations for MICCC’s D block.

TRADOC leadership also viewed a demonstration of the Intelligence Combat Training Center’s Information Collection (IC) Guide. LIO developed the IC Guide as an interactive encyclopedia for student use during training. The product’s editor feature allows course managers to update information for each of its 27 assets, resulting in a fully customizable product. Editable content includes asset information, compare features, products, filters, contact information and external links.

Rutherford said other courses and organizations have already recognized the value and potential of the IC Guide. “The functionality of this product has wide-reaching implications, not just locally at the schoolhouse, but throughout the Army,” she said.

In addition, LIO briefed TRADOC leadership on the Prophet Spiral power on/off process and troubleshooting simulation. The fully interactive, flash-based, 3D, self-paced training material allows students to repeatedly practice the process. The purpose of the simulation is to reduce troubleshooting equipment maintenance costs and mitigate the lack of equipment for troubleshooting Prophet hardware faults.

Following the demonstrations, Jennings explained that products placed on the network require a certificate of networthiness (CoN), which is an onerous process. “As we move forward into ALM, acquiring a CoN is a huge challenge. The process can take 6-8 months and the certification must be updated every year.” To hasten the process, USAICOE has assigned two individuals to the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command to manage the school’s CoNs.

Another challenge for USAICOE is accessing training at the point-of-demand, a primary component of the lifelong learning continuum. “The University of Military Intelligence is one way we are meeting this requirement,” Rutherford said. “The dilemma—TRADOC does not currently offer training on SIPR (secure internet protocol router) and JWICS (joint worldwide intelligence communications system).” In its quest for a relatively low cost learning management system, USAICOE identified Moodle, which was free. TRADOC recently granted the school an exemption to run the new LMS on all three domains.

For more information on USAICOE’s implementation of ALM, contact Ms. Rutherford at (520)538-2663 or leanne.r.rutherford.civ@mail.mil.

What is the UMI? Where is it? How do I use it?

The University of Military Intelligence (UMI) is a training portal of MI courses maintained by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca, Arizona for use by authorized military (Active, Reserve, National Guard) and non-military (e.g., DOD civilian, Department of Homeland Security, other U.S. Government agencies) personnel. UMI provides many self-paced training courses, MOS training, and career development courses. In addition, the UMI contains a Virtual Campus that is available to users with an abundance of Army-wide resources and links related to MI: language training, cultural awareness, resident courses, MI Library, functional training, publications, and more.

UMI online registration is easy and approval for use normally takes only a day or two after a user request is submitted. Go to http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.army.mil, read and accept the standard U.S. Government Authorized Use/Security statement, and then follow the instructions to register or sign in. The UMI Web pages also provide feedback and question forms that can be submitted to obtain more information.
A partnership with the intelligence community is moving the Learning Innovation Office (LIO) one step closer to self-sustainment. The new venture calls for LIO to become the capability to develop interactive multimedia instruction (IMI), games, and distributed learning (dL) for support agencies in the intelligence community.

Leanne Rutherford, LIO Director, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), Fort Huachuca, Arizona, stated she is excited about establishing a business enterprise with the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO IEW&S), Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland. “We’ve been looking for a vehicle to sustain LIO long term and make it an enduring capability,” Rutherford said. “This partnership has the potential to put us exactly where we want to be in future years.”

The business relationship was initiated on April 26 when Rutherford met with Stephen Kreider to discuss leveraging LIO for development. Kreider is deputy program executive officer for IEW&S. “During our meeting, it was determined DCGS-A (Distributed Common Ground System-Army) should be the proof of concept to develop intelligence products,” she said. “The SIPR (Secure Internet Protocol Router) cloud ultimately influenced Mr. Kreider’s decision to choose DCGS-A as the inaugural project for the concept.”

DCGS-A is the Army’s premier intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enterprise for tasking of sensors; analysis, processing and exploitation of data; and dissemination of intelligence across all echelons. Rutherford explained that monies are allocated to several intelligence organizations for DCGS-A, but only a few share their individual efforts at the enterprise level. “One of the consequences of this failure to communicate is a huge duplication of efforts,” she said.

Under the new initiative, LIO will function as the synchronizer between six disparate organizations that require intelligence training products geared to the 21st century Soldier, as prescribed in the Army Learning Model. In addition to PEO IEW&S, the organizations include industry, program managers, Department of the Army G2, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. “When it comes to IMI, gaming or dL, the intent is that LIO will be the center point for consistency, standardization, reduction and duplication,” Rutherford said. The partnership will likely equate to a big cost savings for the Army. “It will offer the Army a vehicle to fund projects in a more fiscally sound manner.”

According to Rutherford, the DCGS-A project will entail a hybrid approach. She anticipates LIO’s project management team will be heavily involved in the preparation and planning by providing timelines and deliverables based on requirements. “Our assessment is that in October or November, we’ll move into full development with potential support from our industry partners for the cloud SIPR,” Rutherford said.

LIO will work with industry partners (contract companies) to develop final products. TRADOC Capability Manager for Sensor Processing Colonel Ed Riehle stated he is pleased with the joint venture. “One of our gaps in the DCGS-A program is training,” Riehle said. “PEO and LIO’s efforts are creating an interactive multimedia instruction environment that will help close this gap by providing Soldiers a creative approach to optimizing our system.”

Rutherford elaborated it is a massive collaborative project for not only the 111th MI Brigade or USAICoE, but also for all organizations who use DCGS-A. “It’s our weapon system in many cases,” she said. During discussions, Kreider suggested Rutherford visit APG to brief his PEOs and PMs across the Army. “The visit will provide us with an opportunity to further showcase LIO’s capabilities and encourage more groups to leverage our organization for future projects.”

With the expansion in its customer base, LIO is already preparing for potential obstacles. Rutherford stated the only major challenge she foresees on the DCGS-A project is determining the actual requirements with realistic timelines for development.

For more information on the project, contact LIO Project Manager Michelle Austin at (520) 533-7140 or michelle.l.austin20.ctr@mail.mil.

Ms. Albrecht is the Senior Technical Editor and Writer for the Learning Innovation Office, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
The topic of military persuasion is complex and difficult to define. At first glance, this book’s title may cause readers to think it is a study that investigates the field of Psychological Operations or Military Psychology. Rather, political scientist, Stephen Cimbala, uses the term military persuasion more generally and describes it as a form of knowledge strategy. Through the course of nine chapters he investigates how military persuasion acted as a deterrent in preventing past wars and how it may be used as a deterrent or force multiplying tool in future conflicts. Cimbala’s stated goal with the book is to demonstrate the need for new strategic thinking in the Information Age which, like military persuasion, unfortunately is ambiguous and shape-shifting.

Although it was published in 2002 and much of the work may seem anachronistic, Cimbala’s efforts are potentially useful for intelligence professionals, particularly those working at strategic planning levels. In a larger sense, the author frames the topic of military persuasion as key to successful crisis management. In order to prevent or resolve conflicts, the most critical component is achieving some kind of mutual understanding between opponents which, on the face of it, is glaringly obvious.

In the context of case studies presented in the book however, achieving such understanding is not a common occurrence in world politics. For example, the eventual resolution of the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union was contingent (in very general terms) on a shared understanding of each other’s capabilities and intentions. How opposing sides utilized appropriate and successful persuasion as a deterrent to conflict thus depended on accurate reading or understanding of opponents.

In order to provide background, Cimbala uses chapters one through three to outline his concept of persuasion, and the Cold War historically frames the majority of his work. These first three chapters also review a number of relevant books on the topic of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. He differentiates these terms by describing deterrence as steps that prevent action by an opponent. Coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, causes an opponent to reverse or change a course of action once initiated.

In chapters four through six, the author demonstrates how the Cuban Missile Crisis (chapter 4) and tensions in 1983 in particular (chapter 6), demonstrated ruptures in shared understanding of intentions between the U.S. and Soviet Union. As a result of these political showdowns, both powers learned to read each others’ intentions to a greater extent despite a great deal of distrust and conflicts that convulsed the politics of the United States (Viet Nam) and the Soviet Union (Afghanistan).

The historical framing of mutual understanding and mutually assured destruction is an important element of the author’s work. Unfortunately, he bypasses the Viet Nam and Soviet-Afghanistan conflicts; that they are not discussed even briefly is surprising because both conflicts, along with other Cold-War era proxy wars, arguably impacted the use of persuasion in the Cold War. Despite this, Cimbala continues to emphasize crisis management in past conflicts, largely in terms of deterrence through nuclear arms. The key to successful
crisis management during the Cold War regarding nuclear war, the author seemingly contends, was a reliance on clear-eyed perspective of intentions. Cimbala provides numerous case studies to support his perspective, but the thesis often gets lost in the mix of case studies and overly detailed reliance on quantitative figures of, for example, nuclear strike capabilities.

Unfortunately, the book attempts to cover too much. This is demonstrated by one chapter on Clausewitz’s concept of Friction and its bearing on nuclear deterrence (chapter 7), which is then followed with a much too short chapter on small wars and counterinsurgency. Transitioning between these major topics is too wide a gulf to bridge in this book’s case. Considering the publication date of 2002 and the proximity to 9/11, it appears that world events possibly skewed Cimbala’s thesis and writing completed prior to that world-changing event. A lengthy introduction and concluding chapter that detail the problems of failed intelligence analysis also indicate that Cimbala and his publisher may have driven on with outdated arguments. In the realm of writing on current events, this is not an uncommon occurrence. Then again, it is certainly no fault to seek answers for the type of paradigm shift that 9/11 represents.

Despite these criticisms, the author investigates warfare in the Information Age at various points in the book and does so in a meritorious way. In those brief sections, he cites several key scholars who have significantly contributed to this evolving field of study, notably, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Dorthy Denning. Unfortunately, Cimbala’s writing style also trips up a number of his more useful points on interesting topics. For example, in his chapter on cyberwar (chapter 9), readers are confronted with overly dense writing. One example includes: “Preemption for want of information on account of cyberdistortion intended by the other side as intimidation is a possible path to war in an age of information complexity.” (221). Unfortunately, too many examples of this kind of confusing writing exist throughout the book.

On a positive note, there are many useful larger lessons to be gained from *Military Persuasion in War and Policy*. When read in context of debates surrounding Iran and nuclear capabilities, and the possibility of proliferation, Cimbala’s efforts are worthwhile. The book is also a reminder of how political, religious, and social factors remain inextricably linked to military capabilities, particularly in the contemporary environment where both state and non-state actors must be accounted for and understood. These obligations being recognized, Intelligence officers will find more timely writing on the subject of persuasion in the works of others, particularly John Arquilla and Doug Borer’s *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice.*

Reviewed by Nate Moir
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The 2012 MI Hall of Fame Inductees (from the left) CW5 (R) Richard L. Swares, Jr; CSM Todd S. Holiday; COL (R) Joseph M. Blair III; BG (R) James “Spider” Marks; MG Gregg C. Potter; MG (R) Oliver W. Dillard; COL (R) John G. Lackey III; COL (R) James V. Slavin; and Harold DeClay (great-great grandson of Inductee SGT William Alchesay). Not pictured: PFC Parker F. Dunn.

MG Potter looks at new display case in PFC Dunn Barracks, dedicated 14 September 2012.

CPT Gilbert Juarez receives the 2012 LTG Sidney T. Weinstein award from Ms. Halee Weinstein (daughter of LTG Weinstein). The Weinstein Award is given to a company grade officer for excellence in Military Intelligence.

Dedication of the PFC Parker F. Dunn Barracks in Weinstein Village. PFC Dunn was a WWI Medal of Honor Recipient for actions under fire while serving in an intelligence section.

Photos by: John O’Brien, MVI and SGT Kalie Jones, USAICoE Command Group
Headquarters, Department of the Army.
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