Cultural Awareness
FROM THE EDITOR

We, at the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC), are proud of this special issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* featuring articles from the cutting edge in the field of applied military anthropology. Contributors to this issue include the culture centers from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as TCC trainers and course developers, as well as others within the community.

This issue signals the strategic graduation from our beginnings in the post 9/11 realization of the critical importance of cultural awareness to the success of the American warfighter upon an ever-shifting, asymmetrical, unconventional human terrain, to the pressing need for greater refinement and sophistication of our cross-cultural competencies in dealing with foreign friends and potential foes alike. Cross Cultural Competency (3C) is a vital set of skills that serves to systematically empower all American war-fighters, not only to think and act more effectively in cross-cultural environments, but to provide a wider range of options in dealing with others in the field than those choices we call “kinetic.”

The basic skill sets underlying cross-cultural competence are the abilities to effectively communicate across cultures; to build cooperative relationships with individuals and groups; and to effectively manage conflict with a minimum of force in situations where cultural differences play a major role. Key to this 3C skill set is the capacity to suspend our own cultural biases and subjective points of view in order to observe, analyze, and respond more effectively to the realities of any foreign operational environment (OE) in its many complex, subtle nuances.

Reaching across all branches and sectors of the U.S. and foreign militaries and governments, 3C provides a unifying “green-layer” force for collective integration and a common operational objective for a constructive, tactical-to-strategic shift in our shared global future. Mastering the supreme art of war with this alternative skill, the war-fighter will remain on the cutting edge of freedom and democratic development in the international arena well into a global future.

Michael A. Rodriguez, TCC
Associate Editor

In an effort to catch up, the October December 2009 issue is now the July September 2010 issue. All articles that were scheduled for the October December 2009 issue will now be in the July September 2010 issue. In addition to these articles readers will find a complete MI Doctrine Update to include future publications. As Editor, I apologize for any inconvenience to both the writers and readers of MIPB. If you have any questions regarding this please send an email to MIPB@conus.army.mil.

Sterilla A. Smith
Editor
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By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
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Secretary of the Army

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General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

1007003
This issue of MIPB focuses on cultural education and the challenges we are currently facing throughout the world. The modern operational environment is increasingly complex and demands its Soldiers are trained in skill sets we have not generally emphasized in the past for the general force. For this reason, the way in which we train continues to evolve and improve in meaningful ways. In tandem with this effort, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Culture Center (TCC) will hold its 4th annual Culture Summit from 19-21 April 2009 at the Hilton El Conquistador in Tucson, Arizona.

The theme for this year’s summit is “Shaping the Environment by using Cross-Cultural Competency.” This conference will bring together various culture practitioners from every branch of our nation’s military services and foreign military partners, as well as university academics and scholars, among many others. We encourage every participant to use this opportunity to discuss the evolution of culture training and its impact on the way in which we apply culture to current and emerging threats. In past years, the Culture Summit has proven to be a vital educational and professional experience for participants, allowing them to expand networking contacts and resources in the field of cross-cultural competency. We hope that you extract useful lessons from the panel discussions and gain a new understanding of their implementation in current operations.

This special issue of MIPB contains articles from experts of various educational and professional backgrounds. Experts from the TCC’s regional teams as well as academics from a wide variety of fields discuss current cultural issues and trends; while representatives from every branch of service provide an important perspective in lessons learned downrange. Culture centers from each service will also provide key insight to the history, current roles and impact of military cultural education, as well as what lies ahead. The Military Intelligence community plays a critical role in achieving and maintaining cross-cultural competency and we are delighted to share the wide breadth of knowledge that is contained within this issue. I sincerely hope that you find this issue thought provoking and that you will discuss it with your colleagues during the conference.

This summit comes at a time when the U.S. military faces complex and rapidly changing operational environments. Each Soldier must attain cross-cultural competence to adapt and perform the full spectrum of operations the Army demands in today’s Overseas Contingency Operations. As we move into areas that have never seen a U.S. presence, or even operate in areas that are familiar to us, each Soldier must be cognizant of cultural issues to engage the local population effectively. Without knowing the cultural complexities of a community, we are simply unable to provide stability and proper support to the civilian and military sectors. We have placed a large burden on the modern U.S. Soldier to provide a variety of services, and we are confident that effective training and the proper maintenance of skills and knowledge will prove invaluable in achieving the highest standards of excellence.

Culture training within the Army is evolving in new and exciting ways as the force adapts to ever-changing operational environments and mission requirements. The TCC is always looking for new ways to improve its current operations, from generating products for culture education to training our force’s trainers to ensure our Soldiers receive only the best in educational resources and instruction. While we have already evolved as a force so much in the last decade in terms of operational integration, we certainly (Continued on page 4)
In 1952, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164 definitions of “culture” in *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. However, the word “culture” is most commonly used in three basic senses:

- Excellence of taste in the fine arts and humanities, also known as high culture.
- An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social learning.
- The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution, organization, or group.

In the War on Terror, the important definition that concerns our Soldiers on the ground the most is the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices of an institution or group of people. Cultural awareness is the foundation of communication, involving the ability to stand back from ourselves and become aware of other cultural values, beliefs, and perceptions. *Why do they do things that way? How do they see the world? Why do they react in that particular way?* These are questions our Soldiers on the ground need to continuously ask themselves because being culturally aware can affect a mission in so many ways.

A lack of cultural awareness of the environment in which our Soldiers operate can cause a mission to fail, get other Soldiers and innocent civilians killed, or even cause an influx of more improvised explosive device attacks on U.S. Service members. Take, for example, the incidents in Abu Ghraib. The lack of cultural awareness and respect resulted in an increase of the insurgency in Iraq, which caused many Soldiers to lose their lives. On the other hand, having cultural awareness and respect can help a Soldier survive in the strenuous environment of combat. Understanding “who they are and what they care about” can help in mission planning, building better rapport with the people in the area of operations, and improve decision-making. Sun Tzu once said that “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have drastically improved over the past nine years. Everyday Soldiers are learning that misinterpretations occur primarily when we lack awareness of our own behavioral rules and project them on others. In the absence of better knowledge we tend to assume, instead of finding out what a behavior means to the person involved.

With cultural awareness classes implemented throughout much of the students’ initial training here at Fort Huachuca, they are sent out much more able to help win the hearts and minds of people in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and other places where our forces operate. One of the biggest advancements within the U.S. military has been the expansion of cultural awareness. Every military branch, except the U.S. Army has an official cultural awareness center for their branch of service. Currently, our branch has the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) which we hope will become the U.S. Army’s Culture Center, the mission of which is to provide the U.S. Army with mission-focused culture education and training, especially to those preparing for deployment.

The Center’s training is not just limited to Iraq or Afghanistan, the TCC also provides expert training on countries within Asia and Africa as well. The curriculum hits on many aspects of cultural awareness to
have a long way to go. Educational summits and exchanges between military services, governmental agencies and our foreign military partners are necessary to ensure cooperation at every level.

Always Out Front!

include Influences on Culture, Social Organization, Political Structures, Cross-Cultural Communications, Rapport Building, Cross-Cultural Negotiations, Extremism, and Working with Interpreters, building an excellent foundation of cultural awareness for our Soldiers. One of the greatest things about the TCC is that the training provided by the Center is not only held in Fort Huachuca and Sierra Vista, Arizona, but can be exported in the form of mobile training teams to units that are preparing for deployment.

This year, the TCC is hosting the TRADOC Summit IV in Tucson, Arizona. The topics for the summit will include Cultural Utilization in the Operational Environment, the Importance of Culture in the Operational Environment, the Role of Non-State Actors in the Operational Environment, and Diplomacy and Foreign Experience, as well as other subjects of interest to the field. Leaders attending this summit will leave more aware of cross-cultural competency skills, and relevant and applicable lessons learned, as well as a network of culture contacts.

In summary, being aware of our cultural dynamics is difficult, cultural consideration of our actions is generally not something we do consciously. From birth we learn to see and do things at an unconscious level. Our experiences, our values, and our cultural background lead us to see and do things in a certain way. Sometimes we have to step outside of our cultural boundaries in order to realize the impact that our culture has on our behavior. It is very helpful to gather feedback from foreign colleagues on our behavior to get more clarity on our cultural traits. The U.S. Army is excelling in that every day through the TCC. It is helping to enhance positive perceptions to minimize adverse reactions to combat operations, allowing us build rapport and prevent misunderstandings that detract from mission accomplishment. Thank you, TRADOC Culture Center for helping to shape our Soldiers for today and the future.

Always out Front!

Army Strong!
In January 1980, as he arrived in Tehran to negotiate the release of American hostages, Kurt Waldheim said, “I have come as a mediator to work out a compromise.” However, when translated into Farsi it sounded like “I have come as a meddler to get you to compromise your standards.”

As the quote from Kurt Waldheim, an experienced and controversial diplomat, indicates, culture and language faux pas are not only the domain of the U.S. military. Becoming culturally and linguistically competent have been perennial challenges for every Army. Given the significant challenges the U.S. is facing in Afghanistan and other combat theaters, the Army requirements to acquire cultural and language proficiency are increasing. My first experience with cultural training began 25 years ago as a second lieutenant assigned to the 9th Infantry Division as a battalion S2. The Army selected my battalion, 3-60th IN, to deploy to Egypt to serve on the Southern tip of the Sinai, under the authority of the Multi-national Forces and Observers (MFO). The MFO and the Sinai mission were a direct result of President Carter’s Camp David Accords.

As an excited 2LT, I began in earnest to prepare my battalion with cultural training and other standard intelligence products. Our S2 shop developed historical documents and training packets, provided classified counterterrorism packets, and detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield products. Additionally we developed a
cultural analysis with emphasis on cultural sensitivity, including the “dos” and “don’ts” of Arab culture. We presented our culture classes to every company and staff section within the battalion. However, there was a very small cadre of officers in my battalion who were very hostile to Arabs and often used disparaging racial epithets around Soldiers.

These attitudes often rubbed off on some of our Soldiers and our command climate suffered as a result. This environment remained as we deployed to the Sinai, and not surprisingly at times these negative attitudes spilled over into our operational and tactical mission. Hostility to Arabs unnecessarily created some bad feelings and fostered among some Soldiers an incorrect and exaggerated perception of the security threat. On a few occasions, these negative attitudes caused some conflict with the Arab workers on our base. My efforts and those efforts of others to counter these attitudes and comments were not always successful. Obviously this damaged the mission effectiveness of our battalion and served as an example of what not to do when executing U.S. overseas’ missions.

The Army has expended significant resources to educate our personnel to be cross-culturally competent. In the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC), we have developed detailed training and products to help educate the Army and units on culture—in essence, using cultural competency as a combat multiplier. We address the role and importance of religion, tribe, clan, and other factors that Soldiers and leaders must be conversant with to empower them to maximize mission accomplishment. As Major General John Custer said in his introductory column, “the modern operational environment (OE) is increasingly complex and demands its Soldiers are trained in skill sets we have not generally emphasized in the past for the general force.” No one should underestimate the importance of cultural competency in the day to day operations, no matter how proficient or informed we consider ourselves. The central focus of the TCC is to enable soldiers to be culturally competent and avoid unnecessary cultural snafus.

Even though I had significant cultural experience operating in the Islamic arena and generally conversant in basic Arab cultural protocol, I have not always demonstrated this experience. From June 2005 to June 2006 I was a member of Seminar 20 at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. During most of the school year the students wore civilian clothes, usually suits and ties for the men. Often during our Seminar discussions we would exchange casual and joking compliments on the best dressed for the day. One very cold Pennsylvania winter day I complimented one of my Arab classmates on his nice leather jacket. As soon as I paid the compliment, I realized I had made a major cultural faux pas—my casual compliment required my classmate, based on Arab cultural protocol, to give me his leather jacket.

I remember the expression on his face—despite my humble pleas to the contrary, he felt duty bound to give me the jacket, even though I sensed he did not want to. He took the jacket off and gave it to me. I was totally embarrassed. I did not want or need the jacket, plus it was three sizes too big. Nonetheless, I took it so as not to make the situation worse. After class was over, I put the jacket on the hanger outside of classroom hoping that one day he would eventually take it, without me seeing him take it back. Fortunately, my mitigation strategy worked, and a few weeks later I discovered my Arab classmate had retrieved the leather jacket. This was a hard lesson learned, but with no operational impact to the Army. This was a small mistake but during deployments, we may not always be so lucky. In an OE, unintentional mistakes like this could have irreversible effects on operational missions.

There are also positive aspects to culture and paying attention to our surroundings. During my 2002 deployment to Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Daniel McNeil, the Combined Joint Task Force 180 Commander, asked us during one of our daily intelligence and operations updates about some observations he made during his travels throughout the country. We later learned that ethnic groups’ placements were a key to understanding his observations. LTG McNeil noticed during his travels throughout Afghanistan that in one province everyone he saw dressed nicely, had nice cars, rarely publically displayed weapons, and there appeared to be a greater sense of public harmony. In another province, he noticed most cars were old and run down, there appeared to be
a greater display of public tension, and almost everyone carried a weapon. His question was why the difference between the two provinces.

After a couple of days of research, we developed an assessment. First, the province with nice cars and no public weapons displays had the same ethnic group—thus they trusted each other and did not feel a need to carry weapons. The other key characteristic was that this province had a major drug line of communication running through it; the drug money enabled the locals to buy nice cars. The other province had multiple ethnic groups who did not trust each other; therefore the major public weapons display indicated a general lack of distrust and tension. The other significant factor that explained the paucity of nice cars was lack of any major drug lines of operations or other significant revenue streams. LTG McNeil's observations for the intelligence directorate were very insightful and helped our CJ2 team to provide better analyses. However, it would have been more helpful for us to have greater knowledge of the cultural and tribal composition and tensions before we deployed. Possessing this nuanced understanding of the cultural and economic differences would have enabled deploying units to be more cognizant of the challenges they would face and better inform their tactical strategies. Today, the Army has greater resources and capabilities to prepare and train soldiers.

The Army is expending considerable resources and efforts to make each Soldier and every deploying unit more linguistically and culturally proficient. It is leveraging every resource at its disposal to facilitate these efforts. However, the Army is not the only institution facing serious cultural challenges in tough OEs. There are numerous organizations collaborating with the Army that have significant practical experience in areas, which it is, or will, operate in to execute the nation’s missions. Obviously, the Army is focusing most of its cultural and linguistic efforts in the non-Western world, given our long and challenging activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our experiences conducting most of our conflicts the last 50 years outside the West. Consequently, the theme for the TRADOC Culture Summit IV in Tucson, Arizona in April 2010 is “Shaping the Environment by using Cross-Cultural Competency.” The TCC organized the focus of the conference on areas that we anticipate the Army will confront in the foreseeable future. Some of the key topics for Culture Summit IV are:

- Cultural Utilization in the OE.
- Prioritization in the OE.
- Social Organization in the OE.
- The Cost of Operating in a Foreign Environment.
- Gender Issues in the OE.
- Role of External Organizations in the OE.
- Business and Negotiations in the non-Western World.
- NGOs in the OE.
- Media in the OE.
- Diplomacy and the Foreign Experience.
- Developing Ambassadorship.
- Illicit Trafficking in the OE.
- Culture and the Suicide Bomber in the OE.
- Training to Internalize Competency.

We believe these topics will provide invaluable insight and lessons learned that will enable all participants to improve their cultural proficiency. Cultural and linguistic competency is a critical requirement for every Soldier and unit to accomplish the nation’s missions. There is no perfect program or training aid that will completely prepare Soldiers or prevent mistakes. However, there are many resources at our disposal to ensure greater success. The TCC and other TRADOC institutions stand ready to assist.

Endnote
1. From Ray T. Clifford, PhD, Associate Dean, College of Humanities, and Director, Center for Language Studies, Brigham Young University.

Colonel Reeves was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in Military Intelligence upon graduation from the College of William and Mary in Virginia in May 1984 with a Government Major and an Economics Minor. He began his career as an MI 35D/B officer and transferred to Strategic Intelligence Officer (FA 34) in 2001. He served in a variety of command and staff positions throughout the world at the tactical to strategic levels. Colonel Reeves has deployed five times: Sinai, Egypt (MFO S2 1985-86), Kuwait (Squadron S2 1991), Bosnia (IO OIC 1997), Kuwait (CJTF J2 Forward 2001), and Afghanistan (Deputy J2 2002). He may be contacted at harold.reeves@conus.army.mil.
Introduction
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) is located about 75 miles south of Tucson, Arizona and is part of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca. I have wanted to put this history in writing for several years now as there are varying stories about how, when, and where this all happened. Truth is, I was there and a part of all of it. Additionally, a number of people helped with input to this article and I want to make sure they receive due credit.

NOTE: Mr. Steve McFarland, Mr. Steve Wilson, Mr. Jim Bray, and Mr. Bruce Wood are the major contributors to this article.

2002: The Beginning
It all started in November 2002 as the result of a visit by then Colonel John Custer and team to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We were directed to stand up a course of instruction to provide training to interrogators and analysts who were assigned or were going to be assigned duties at Guantanamo Bay.

2003: First Efforts in Training Development
The Pilot Course was conducted in January 2003 and included the mandated 16 hours of Culture Training (most of the 16 hours delivered by guest speakers.) A quantum leap in culture training occurred under the direction of the then 111th MI Brigade Commander, Colonel Michael Flynn. Doctor George VanOtten (Dean, 111th MI Brigade), Mr. Steve McFarland, Mr. Steve Wilson, and Sergeant First Class James Bray began work on a distance learning product, “Strategic Geography of the Middle East”. This product was completed and went on the street in May 2003.

In October 2003, we hired our first contractors to support the culture training effort. Five contract instructor/writer/developers were hired to support the mission to develop 48 hours of training in Islamic culture. Members of the “House Development Team” as it was known then were also used as subject matter experts in support of our effort to develop two additional culture products—Cultural Anthropology of Afghanistan and Iraq.

2004–2005: Culture Center Designation, Expanded Training
In January 2004 the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Commander, then Lieutenant General Wallace, was briefed on culture training at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC). LTG Wallace requested an information paper from the Intelligence Center on the way ahead for culture training and forwarded that paper to the Army Chief of Staff.
This led to the Culture Center being designated as the TRADOC Culture Center in November 2005. By the end of 2004 we had expanded and culture training mobile training teams (MTTs) were common place. Part of the team was also providing training to the MI Captains Career Course (MICCC). We trained 14,000 plus Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines by the end of December 2004.

By January 2005 the culture training materials were refined into 126 hours of Training Support Packages (TSPs), emphasizing Iraq and Afghanistan, but including country studies for the Middle East. The train the trainer (TTT) and MTT activity continued parallel with course development. A pivotal event in 2005 was the CAC conference at Fort Huachuca in July, the results of which included direction to develop during calendar year 2006 a 39 hour Professional Military Education (PME) package, due in January, and a modular training package of unspecified hours for 2007 due in July 2005.

The first major expansion of the Cultural Awareness Team mission occurred in November. Sixteen developers and instructors were authorized, recognizing the growing demand for culture training. A new appreciation for the influence of culture training on contemporary missions was signaled by a new requirement for the first non-Middle East/Afghanistan TSP—the Horn of Africa (HOA).

2006-2007: The First Culture Summit, Expanded Training

The 2006 Interim TSP was published in January, with continuing development for the Final 2007 TSP and the new HOA TSP. In April, the 2007 PME TSP was released to all TRADOC schools and all Department of Defense (DOD) agencies for staffing in anticipation of the publication of the final 2007 PME package. In June 2006 the final (2007) version was approved and published, providing uniform modular training for all 38 TRADOC schools. The complete PME TSP was made available on disk to any military and civilian agencies upon request and was entered into the Army’s Automated Systems Approach to Training.

With the publication of the 2007 TSP, TCC accomplished its primary task to provide Soldiers with cultural training from Initial Military Training through the MICCC, and began to gain recognition by sister services. In February, the TCC Development Team relocated from Fort Huachuca to adjacent Sierra Vista, while the MTT (primarily FORSCOM training) and the Institutional Team (organic to 111th MI Brigade) remained on post. An event which would substantially change the national exposure of the TCC was the decision to initiate preliminary planning for a Culture Summit. With formal planning under way by June, invitations were sent in November to about 135 organizations and individuals representing the military, civil, academic, and private sectors.

2007 was notable for the first Culture Summit which took place from 27 to 29 March in Sierra Vista. The basic purpose of the meeting was to bring together “parties involved in curriculum development and training of Cultural Awareness Program of Instruction (operational, tactical, and academic) for the United States Armed Forces.” Panels, distinguished speakers, and discussion groups were formed around the theme, “Building an Enduring Capability.” The success of the endeavor was so apparent that USAIC immediately authorized planning for a follow on Culture Summit for the next spring. In addition to continuation of development and training, TCC assumed the lead for Culture Summit II, slated for 25 to 27 March 2008, under the theme “Culture Education and Training: Building Global Competence.”

Approval of the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy integrated the TCC into a broader planning context, a process begun the previous year. The primary result was placing TCC conceptual emphasis on Cross-Cultural Competence (3C), a model applicable to all future Army development and training. The TCC Culture Education and Training Curriculum had developed TSPs with more than 300 hours of material (covering regions such as the Trans-Sahara, West Africa, and China) which might be required to support of a variety of missions on a global basis in addition to the 39 hour Core Curriculum.

At the same time there was a shift in training requests from mostly TTT and MTT to largely “specialty missions” (training requested by commands for specific areas of expertise such as Counterintelligence, Information Operations, Behavioral Science Consultants, Criminal Investigation, the Chaplaincy, etc.)

Growing awareness of TCC capability was reflected in 2008 by new partnership connections with British, French, and German military culture training establishments as well as across DOD. In August the TCC Website was activated, further integrating TCC materials into the community of interest. The growing interest in effects of culture on military mission was reflected in the wide and diverse civil, military, and academic attendance at Culture Summit II. In September 2008, TRADOC approved the TCC Concept Plan, designed to ensure institutionalization of TCC and its mission and to incorporate both civil service and Army positions to augment the contractors already employed.

Using an expanded list of invitees, TCC led the charge for Culture Summit III, “Culture Education and Training: A Global Enterprise” which was planned for 24 and 25 March 2009 at Fort Huachuca. The focus reflected an increasing sophistication within the community and was organized around utilizing lessons learned and applying the 3C model to improve relevance to military training and education reflected an increasing sophistication within the community of interest.

By 2009 the TCC contract staff had expanded to 24 personnel, selected to establish a combination of experience and talent of a more global perspective. The core mission “to provide the U.S. Army with mission-focused culture education and training, as well as training for sister services, and other DOD organizations, and government agencies,” was met in part by mid-calendar year 2009; providing training to more than 70,430 individuals—primarily Soldiers—since its inception. The Core Curriculum consisted of seven TSPs, with materials for 18 countries published and 14 more in development. Specialty courses continued, including country-specific expertise for the U.S. Military Academy Culture Understanding and Language Program. Culture Summit III, “Cultural Education and Training: A Global Enterprise” was a continuing success, and planning for Culture Summit IV was initiated.

Mr. Smith has been in the Intelligence business for more than 50 years. He was first sworn into the U.S. Army on 1 July 1959. He is a retired Command Sergeant Major, having served in that position at both the battalion and brigade level. Mr. Smith served as the First Sergeant of five different units. Additionally, he completed four combat tours in Southeast Asia. Mr. Smith is a graduate of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and holds a BS in Business Management and an MS in Education Technology. His civilian experience includes that of test writer, instructor, and evaluator. He has served as Chief of Functional Training, and Chief of the Training Division, and is now the Deputy Director of Training, Development and Support at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He may be contacted at (520) 538-7303/DSN 8789-7303 or francis.smith2@conus.army.mil.

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31,809
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Pre-Deployment Training
Intelligence Center
Train the Trainer

TCC leads the way in culture education and training.
DOCTRINE UPDATE: CULTURAL AWARENESS

by Steve Isola

Introduction
The Directorate of Doctrine, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) recognizes the importance of cultural awareness. We are currently working to improve the doctrinal articulation of cultural considerations and cultural awareness within intelligence operations and also across the broader scope of combined arms doctrine. The vast majority of our doctrinal publications contain a discussion of the complexity of the operational environment (OE) and civil considerations which are closely related to cultural considerations and cultural awareness. The rest of this article (and most Army doctrinal publications) will usually refer to civil considerations but really apply to the overlap of describing a complex OE and adequately grappling with the many different aspects of culture. In partnership and collaboration with the TRADOC Culture Center we will build upon this solid base in order to improve doctrine in the future.

Recognition of the importance of accounting for cultural considerations within intelligence operations and staff planning is not new. For example FM 34-7 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations (May 1993), and FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (July 1994), are full of examples that account for culture and other civil considerations. However, the considerations were mixed among discussions of intelligence, civil military operations, and civil affairs tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and were usually specific just to stability operations.

We have worked closely with the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) at Fort Leavenworth and other proponents to better describe and provide TTP on civil considerations. The fundamentals of civil considerations rest in discussions of the nature of the OE, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and intelligence analysis across a body of combined arms and intelligence doctrine.

FM 3-0 Operations (June 2001) started the doctrinal emphasis within operations on civil considerations and culture. This edition of the Operations FM added a new factor for aiding visualization. The manual changed METT-T to METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations). “Civil considerations relate to civilian populations, culture, organizations, and leaders within the AO. Commanders consider the natural environment, to include cultural sites, in all operations directly or indirectly affecting civilian populations. Commanders include civilian political, economic, and information matters as well as more immediate civilian activities and attitudes.”

Based on the FM 3-0 paradigm shift and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan we saw a need to better capture the importance of civil considerations within intelligence operations. FM 2-0 Intelligence (May 2004) added significant portions covering civil considerations and culture. Subsequently, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (December 2006) further expanded upon and delved deeper into the impacts and effects of culture and civil considerations. “Intelligence in COIN is about people. U.S. forces must understand the people of the host nation, the insurgents, and the host nation government. Commanders and planners require insight into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests and decision-making processes of individuals and groups. These requirements are the basis for collection and analytical efforts.”

Fundamentals of Civil Considerations
FM 3-0 Operations (February 2008) codified the current major doctrinal frameworks for civil considerations. This manual expressly added civil considerations as an integral part of the definition of the intel-
ligence warfighting function. Additionally, under the discussion of the OE, FM 3-0 provided the primary doctrinal mechanisms to capture cultural considerations. These tools are the operational and mission variables:

- The operational variables “… are those broad aspects of the environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations.” The memory aid for the operational variables is PMESII-PT which stands for: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. The operational variables allow for a more generic but also a broader and more holistic look at the OE.

- The mission variables “… are those aspects of the operational environment that directly affect a mission.” “Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army tactical leaders narrow their focus to six mission variables.” The memory aid for the mission variables as mentioned previously is METT-TC. Civil considerations are the dominate factors that address the different aspects of culture. Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations in terms of the categories expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

Also, within FM 3-0 the discussion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in Chapter 7 begins, “Knowledge of the operational environment is the precursor to all effective action, whether in the information or physical domain. Knowledge about the operational environment requires aggressive and continuous surveillance and reconnaissance to acquire information.” It is not accidental that ‘civil considerations’ is mentioned 27 times in FM 3-0.

Other notable doctrinal successes in addressing civil considerations include:

- FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency and FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency. Between these two manuals there is a chapter on intelligence in insurgency; a chapter on the OE in COIN; an appendix on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), and an appendix on Social Network Analysis and Other Analytical Tools.

- Significant portions in FM 3-06 Urban Operations; FM 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, and FM 3-07 Stability Operations.

Additionally, USAICoE has made significant improvements in the scope and level of detail of our intelligence doctrine mostly (but not entirely) within our analysis-centric doctrine. We have meticulously collected lessons learned and exploited them in order to fully describe analysis in the current OE. Our most notable successes in addressing civil considerations include:

- FM 2-0 Intelligence (the Army should authenticate this publication soon.) Civil considerations and cultural awareness were added to Chapter 1. We also added a new continuing activity as part of the intelligence process called Generate Intelligence Knowledge which specifically addresses the collection and analysis necessary to address the operational variables/civil considerations in support of the military decision making process.

- TC 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis (July 2009).

- FM 2-01.3 IPB (October 2009).

- FMI 2-01.301 Specific TTP and Applications for IPB (April 2009).

- FM 2-91.4 Intelligence Support to Urban Operations (March 2008).

Other MI doctrinal publications that address civil considerations include:

- FM 2-19.4 Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations (November 2008).

- FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations (September 2006).

- FM 2-91.6, Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection (October 2007). Covers patrol, convoy, and small team reporting that are critical to the collection of civil considerations.

- FMI 2-01, ISR Synchronization (November 2008).
TC 2-91.701, Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter-IED Operations (March 2007). There is a fair amount of overlap between the analysis of the OE and a holistic analysis in support of Counter-IED operations.

The Future

A large number of doctrinal projects are currently underway and we will continue to improve the quality and relevance of our intelligence doctrine. The most significant doctrinal products under development that will address cultural considerations (in respect to the topic) include:

- FM 2-01.3 IPB.
- ATTP 2-01.31 Specific IPB TTP.
- TC 2-22.1 All-Source.
- TC 2-22.2 Counterintelligence.
- ATTP 2-33.41 Analytical TTP.
- TC 2-91.1 Intelligence Support to Stability Mission.
- ATTP 2-91.3 Intelligence Support to Urban Operations.
- ATTP 2-91.4 Intelligence Support to Counter-IED Operations.
- TC 2-91.603 Company Intelligence Support Team.

As evidenced in the recent white paper, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* by Major General Flynn (U.S. Army), Captain Matt Pottinger (USMC), and Paul D. Batchelor (DIA) and also in recent discussions we have had with Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) personnel we believe that there are still doctrinal issues left to tackle. The Army seems to have captured most of the individual components of collecting civil considerations information and producing intelligence that captures all of the critical aspects of culture and the OE, but Army doctrine seems to lack an adequate overarching framework.

For example, we believe that doctrine and TTP are not necessarily optimized for carefully synchronized and integrated collection and analysis of civil considerations across intelligence, the Human Terrain System, State Department and other non-Department of Defense participants, nongovernmental organizations/private voluntary organizations, military attaches, civil affairs, host nation liaison, Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance (patrols, traffic control, etc.), and the corresponding staff operations at the various tactical levels. We plan to broach this issue with CADD, the Special Warfare Center, and other doctrinal proponents to attempt to further define the perceived issue and talk about potential solutions.

In an attempt to move forward on this topic area we welcome all input. Please feel free to contact our action officer for cultural awareness, Mr. Steve Isola at (520) 533-5705 or steven.isola@conus.army.mil.

*Steve Isola is a team lead assigned to the Writing Branch, Directorate of Doctrine at USAICoE.*
Overview

The 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” discusses the effects of globalization and the importance of joining with like-minded nations to build trust through collective security efforts focusing on common threats and mutual interests to protect our global oceanic transit and trade lanes. Understanding of foreign peoples, their cultures, customs and languages is a direct force multiplier that enables service members to sustain our long standing alliances and forge new relationships with emerging partners. For Sailors, the Navy achieves this understanding through training in language, regional expertise, and culture. The vast majority of this training is provided by or coordinated through the Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (CLREC), a directorate within the Center for Information Dominance in Pensacola, Florida.

CLREC was established in October 2007 and responds to direct tasking from OPNAV N13 Navy Senior Language Authority for the execution of the Navy Total Force (NTF) Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) Training Program. The NTF LREC program provides Foreign Culture and Foreign Language skills training to Sailors preparing for overseas assignments and deployments. The program also provides for the professional development and for the sustainment and enhancement of foreign language skills of the Navy’s Foreign Area Officers. Additionally, CLREC manages the execution of the Navy Intelligence Foreign Language Program (NIFLP), a second program sponsored under the NAVAL NETWAR/FORCEnet ENTERPRISE. In addition to funding training to sustain and improve foreign language and technical skills among Navy intelligence community personnel (Cryptologic Technicians Interpretive, Intelligence Specialists, Information Warfare and Intelligence Officers), the NIFLP supports Navy training management activities at the Center for Information Dominance Detachment located at the Defense Language Institute, (DLI) Monterey, California.

CLREC accomplishes its mission with a staff of five Regional Desk Officers aligned to the Unified Command Plan’s five main geographic regions of the world (Americas/Caribbean, Africa, Europe, South West Asia/Middle East, and East Asia/Pacific Rim). Three contractors serve as research analysts who collect information on foreign cultures and related subjects and consolidate this information into reports and presentations. This work is the foundational material for Navy cultural awareness training products. CLREC is responsible for managing student quotas in formal language training courses at the DLI and advises the Commanding Officer of the
Center for Information Dominance on professional language training and on matters pertaining to the career professional development, training and education continuum for the Navy’s professional language workforce.

**Past, Present, and Future**

Before CLREC’s establishment, the Navy had no single organization responsible for planning and management of the Fleet’s pre-deployment cultural awareness and language familiarization training. A small team of subject matter experts in the area of adult learning and specialized training in foreign language designed the Navy’s LREC program from the ground up. Faced with the challenges listed above, this team established the program to work with Fleet customers and stakeholders to refine requirements and provide the right cultural and language training, when and where needed throughout the enterprise.

CLREC operates with four primary objectives:

- Provide overall management of the language and culture training programs.
- Identify, compile and consolidate extant cultural and language training solutions.
- Research and develop training solutions meeting unique Navy needs (where no extant training solution was available).
- Coordinate, schedule, and deliver appropriate training solutions.

In cooperation with resource sponsors, customers, and other stakeholders, CLREC determined that language skill, cultural understanding, and regional knowledge were three distinct but related disciplines, each requiring separate training approaches. It was further determined that within each of these disciplines, the level of knowledge and skill required varied according to the work goals, sub-tasks of the work and working conditions.

To ensure their efforts would satisfy the needs of the Fleet and Force, CLREC established processes for vetting and protocols for developing training products uniquely tailored to different Navy customers. CLREC established collaborative relationships with other government agencies (to include other services’ culture centers), industry and academia to implement best training practices. Where possible, CLREC made use of technology to present and distribute training.

Leveraging widely available technologies, software applications and communications media to meet the Navy’s growing demand for cultural awareness training, CLREC has developed rudimentary cross-cultural competency training, culture-specific training and other specialized training materials. General
cross-cultural competency training is the foundation for any pre-deployment training and precedes any training pertaining to a specific foreign culture. Specific foreign culture training is normally satisfied using a CLREC-developed training product, the Operational Cultural Awareness Training brief (OCAT). The OCAT is a presentation in Microsoft PowerPoint or Adobe Captivate format summarizing information about a nation and its peoples. Each OCAT consistently addresses eight topics: geography, history, peoples and ethnic groups, languages, religious influences, society and norms, behavior and etiquette, and a cultural summary. The OCAT familiarizes the Sailor with the culture they will be encountering. It identifies social norms, commonly encountered gestures, behaviors, etiquette and cultural taboos.

The overall intent is to mitigate the effects of culture shock by preparing Sailors for what will be a new and, possibly, an extremely different environment. CLREC has developed 159 OCATs to date and has begun to transition these locally developed cultural training materials to electronic courseware for deployment on Navy e-Learning. The intent is to make cultural learning more widely accessible, more engaging, and more easily tracked.

Since its inception in October 2007, CLREC has delivered training solutions to tens of thousands of Sailors ranging from E1 to O8 as they prepared for deployments and assignments worldwide. In fiscal years 2008 to 2009, CLREC doubled the number of personnel trained (approximately 10,000 in 2009) and tripled the number of personnel supported with training products (approximately 75,000 in 2009). Language and Cultural Training focused on virtually every region of the world from war-torn Afghanistan and Iraq to the Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Africa, Europe, South America, and the Far East. Sailors engaged in diverse missions, ranging from humanitarian assistance to civil affairs to combat directly benefited from training provided.

Conclusion
The Navy’s global mission and, subsequently, its demand for cultural and foreign language training shows no sign of slowing. The future will almost certainly require more robust general, cross-cultural skills training and more formal culture-specific and language-specific training delivered both in the classroom and through e-Learning. The Navy’s Center for LREC will continue to meet the dynamic needs of the Fleet and continue to collaborate with its other-service counterpart culture centers to ensure the best possible training is afforded to the Navy Total Force and throughout the Department of Defense.

Christopher Wise serves as the Director of the CLREC. He is the principal advisor to the Commanding Officer, Center for Information Dominance on programs and policies pertaining to training foreign languages and cultures. Mr. Wise retired from the U.S. Navy in 2007 after 22 years, 11 years as a Cryptologic Technician (Interpretive) and 11 years as a Cryptologic Officer. During his Navy service, he held a variety of staff positions managing technical training programs and operational positions leading and performing airborne and shore-based signals and electronic intelligence collection and analysis missions. Mr. Wise was awarded a Graduate Certificate in Information and Telecommunications Systems from Johns Hopkins University, and holds a BA from the University of the State of New York, Regents College and Diplomas with Honors from the Basic and Extended Russian Courses at the DLI.
Arming Marines with Cultural Knowledge: The 7th Warfighting Function

by Barbara G.B. Ferguson

What’s Wrong with this Picture?*

Introduction

If you don’t know what’s wrong in the photo above, then you need the training available from CAOCL, the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning.

CAOCL is the U.S. Marine Corps’ Center of Excellence for operational culture and language familiarization. Since its inception in 2005, its stated mission has been to train Marines to think critically about culture so that it becomes embedded inside the planning process to help prepare deploying Marines to be regionally focused, globally prepared, and culturally competent in complex operating environments. The center, located inside a nondescript complex of trailers on Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, is a vibrant research center that employs military and civilian analysts who are subject matter experts in various international cultures and languages. It is there that CAOCL develops resources and training programs to help Marines make tactically sound, informed decisions on the battlefield based on a better understanding of the complexities of different cultures, traditions, religions and languages.

“Our job is to make sure that Marines are best prepared to deal with war in foreign lands. Our specific niche is culture, with an understanding of the foreign languages that are involved,” retired Marine Colonel George Dallas, director of CAOCL, recently told reporters. Dallas is pushing for the adoption of operational culture as the “7th Warfighting function.”

“Think of it as the same level as planning fires, maneuver, logistics or intel. Just like you would be planning fires in support of maneuver, this would be planning culture in support of a scheme, maneuver or operation. We’re writing doctrine, we’re writing an overarching Marine Corps strategy on culture and language and regional studies, and we have built a Training and Readiness manual for culture and language that sets accepted standards across the Marine Corps.”

Gen. James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, is an ardent supporter of CAOCL and his recent endorsement of it brought the center’s work into the national spotlight. Gen. Conway characterizes CAOCL training as “extremely important,” saying:

“The more you understand that culture, the more effective warrior you’re going to be in a counter-insurgency environment. When you have the support and the confidence of the local population, very positive things follow,” he recently told reporters at the National Press Club.

He explained that this triad of regional understanding, cross-cultural competence, and language...
familiarization is a force enabler and crucial in preserving U.S. national security. “You will gain intelligence. You will gain support. They will point out to you IEDs. They will make it tough, as best they can, for the bad guys to come in and start to take root in that society,” General Conway said. “So you’ve got to understand that culture. We’re stressing it.

General Conway understands the difficulty of acquiring a new language skill set, but said even a few words serve as effective ice-breakers: “It helps if you speak with them, although you’re never going to learn the language as well as they knows it. It’s a difficult language, but just that you’re trying, starts to get you points,” said the Commandant.

Dallas says it is now a Marine priority to institutionalize culture and language. “If you take the Commandant’s “Vision and Strategy 2025” and “Long War” concepts, the idea of what the warfighting function is, culture and language fit right into that.” Indeed, throughout the history of the U.S., the one American uniform service that has consistently worked with local populations is the U.S. Marine Corps. And they are often the first to interact with civilians in the country where they have deployed.

The ratio of deployed Marines to the local population is frequently small. So Marines must interact with the local population—and they have to rely on their knowledge of operational culture—which is a force multiplier—to guarantee mission success. It is this knowledge of culture that has an immediate impact on operations and success, whether it’s Afghanistan, Pakistan, or any other region in the world.

Currently, it is the counterinsurgency (COIN) environments in Afghanistan and Iraq that have presented the U.S. military with an unprecedented set of challenges: Marines are required to simultaneously fight a war and build a nation, while having to deal with the indigenous population. In order for Marines, and U.S. troops, to effectively operate in any region—it is the knowledge of operational culture that will help them understand the balance of power and the relationships between formal and informal leadership there—between the government officials and the mullahs and tribal leaders.

By being able to comprehend the social and economic structures in the region, Marines and other coalition forces can help rebalance the distribution of power and authority. In Afghanistan, for example, better power distribution would give locals the ability to better resist the Taliban insurgency. So, while cultural “knowledge” or “understanding” improves immediate cultural effectiveness, CAOCL also can provide Marines with knowledge, through training, to plan for cultural issues throughout each step of their mission, instead of merely responding to the latest insurgent action or problem with the local population.

As they now wage war against an entrenched insurgency in one of the world’s most difficult physical environments, Marines have found that one of their greatest challenges is learning to operate among a vastly different human terrain, amongst people with age-old traditions and a set of values much different from Americans. Through its training, CAOCL can help Marines be prepared for likely cultural challenges that can help them avert both immediate and potential long-term crises.

New Missions for the New Millennium

Despite the uniqueness of the Iraqi and Afghan theaters of operations the challenges they present—and the need for friendly forces to understand the local culture and language—are not historically unique. From ancient Greece to the Latin American ‘Banana Wars,’ to Vietnam to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our overseas military adventures have required our armed forces to be adept at
navigating the complex cultural terrains occupied by both our defense partners and the enemy.

Cultural analysis now has become viewed as a key function that impacts all areas of operations. To ensure that cultural factors are included in all aspects of planning for the deployed U.S. Armed Forces, CAOCL believes that each operational planning team should require that culture be a key aspect of planning for a civil affairs or equivalent cell that crosses the spectrum of war fighting functions.

It is unfortunate that many Marines still view culture as something that causes them to react, rather than a factor for which they can plan and prepare.

By incorporating culture knowledge into their planning, Marines can anticipate potential response from the local population, and thus, will not be caught off guard by otherwise unexpected second and third order cultural effects.

Training the Full Continuum

As the Marine Corps’ lead organization for developing, providing, and coordinating operational language training and education for the General Purpose Force (GPF), CAOCL supports learning across the entire training and education continuum. Bottom line: CAOCL training can help individual Marines and their units navigate culturally complex operational environments. In order to achieve this, CAOCL takes a two-pronged approach to language training and education: Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program, and the Pre-deployment Training Program.

The focus on practical application in operational settings is the common thread running through all CAOCL language training. The overall goals and objectives of CAOCL’s programs are identical, although each language instruction approach may have a slightly different focus along the training and education continuum (see Figure 1).

Tools used to facilitate CAOCL language training and education span the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities) process, and are a mix of “on-staff” language instruction, specialized distributed learning software, and language learning resource centers. CAOCL also works in partnership with the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and others to deliver its brand operational language to the GPF. To ensure operational relevancy, CAOCL consistently reassesses and validates its language programs and associated tools, making adjustments as required.

Adjusting CAOCL’s Focus to New Operations

As U.S. decision makers evaluate America’s mission in Afghanistan, they are unanimous in the view that success depends largely on “arming American warriors with cultural knowledge.” It has now become widely understood that one cannot succeed on the ground unless “armed with knowledge.” This belief in the importance of operational culture knowledge was reinforced last August by General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, who said in his assessment that after eight years in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), “must redefine the nature of the fight” and “...and change our operational culture.”

“The more you understand that culture, the more effective warrior you’re going to be in a counter-insurgency environment.”

General James Conway (CAOCL photo)
He said ISAF does not understand Afghan culture, and that this “makes the problem harder.” ISAF “is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperience in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare... The intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate.” He added that there is a need to “change the operations culture to connect with the people. ....We must interact more closely with the population and focus on operations that bring stability, while shielding them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion.” To succeed, General McChrystal said ISAF must take a new approach, which is to “change the operational culture of ISAF to focus on protecting the Afghan people, understanding their environment, and building relationships with them.”

**CAOCL Offers New Solutions**

In response to General McChrystal’s requirements, CAOCL has created a new pre-deployment program tailored to the Afghan theater of operations. This training equips each deploying Marine with the specific regional knowledge and understanding needed to navigate and influence the Afghan operating environment.

For success on the ground, Gen. McChrystal is adamant that “all ISAF personnel must show respect for local cultures and customs and demonstrate intellectual curiosity about the people of Afghanistan. “ISAF must alter its operational culture to focus on building personal relationships with its Afghan partners and the protected population. Strong personal relationships forged between security forces and local populations will be a key to success,” he said.

CAOCL’s staff is available to brief deploying forces, no matter what region of the world they travel to, and follow up this training with a variety of training materials and computer-based products. The operational support offered by CAOCL, includes dispatching subject matter experts (SMEs) to the operating forces. These CAOCL Heritage SMEs help a Commander and his staff try to understand the cultural terrain of their battle space.

Importantly, CAOCL training is available to help all ranks of Marines deal with operational culture. A good example of this was recently noted by a Marine lance corporal from Company B, 6ESB, 4th MLG in his Instructor Rating Form: “The class being taught by someone who has lived the culture was much more exciting and enlightening than someone who has not. I’m now confident that I’m going forward in-country with a real understanding of what to expect regarding their culture.”

**CAOCL provides:**

- **Mobile Training Teams (MTTs):** These are CAOCL personnel available to deliver classes and briefings at a home station or while forces are underway:
  - Operational Culture Classes
  - Operational Culture Briefs
  - Operational Language Classes

- **Self-Study Culture and Language Resources:** In order to provide an assortment of additional opportunities to Marines for operational culture and language self-study, CAOCL is currently providing access to a number of distributed learning computer-based products.
  - The CL-150 Technology Matrix for Critical Languages: Designed to support learning of all languages determined by USG organizations to be of national security interest. CL-150’s suite consists of software programs that provide a blend of cultural training, regional understanding, and language familiarization for specific countries around the world. These programs can be downloaded to your computer or viewed on the web.
  - Rosetta Stone: All active duty and reserve Marines are able to access the Rosetta Stone Language Learning Software via MarineNet at www.marinenet.usmc.mil. Rosetta Stone provides 150
hours of self-paced computer-based language familiarization in numerous languages.

- Tactical Language Training System (TLTS) currently provides language and culture training via four modules: Tactical Iraqi, Tactical Pashto, Tactical Dari, and Tactical Sub-Saharan Africa French. These modules are high-end, interactive, video simulations using computerized characters, or ‘avatars’, in a variety of tactical scenarios.

**Language Learning Resource Centers (LLRCs):** In an effort to meet home station training requirements, CAOCL is establishing Language Learning Resource Centers (LLRC) at all eight major Marine Corps bases to facilitate culture and language training for all Marines. The LLRCs are computer labs equipped with culture and language study materials/software.

**CAOCL Liaison Officers (LNOs):** CAOCL LNOs are to assist Marine forces in accessing resources, scheduling briefings, and fulfilling culture and language requirements.

**Final Thoughts**

CAOCL’s director hopes that military leaders will seek to integrate operational culture into their battle plans. He envisions a dedicated CAOCL Center of Excellence, a go-to source for all things related to Marine Corps culture and language doctrine. Until then, Dallas said his team would continue to reinforce the importance of cultural understanding as a lifesaving tool and provide the training tools Marines need to succeed on the front lines. More than ever before, he said, in today’s ever-evolving battlefield, winning hearts and minds in much more than a catch phrase. It’s the difference between creating an enemy or an ally.

*Pointing at an individual, as in this photo, is considered belittling and insulting, which is why the young Afghan soldier looks uncomfortable. Additionally, wearing sunglasses is considered intimidating. Marines should never point their fingers at a foreign national and should remove sunglasses when speaking with them.*

Barbara G.B. Ferguson is a full-time reporter who has covered the Middle East for over 20 years. Embedded with the USMC during OIF 1 (Marine Wing Support Group 37, 3D Marine Aircraft Wing, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force) she now works part-time as a Strategic Communication advisor to CAOCL, where she also teaches on Islam, the Media, and Middle Eastern Culture.

For more information on CAOCL, log on to: www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl.
An Air Force Need, an Air Force Response

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force—with its unmatched agility and global reach—has become truly expeditionary. Airmen now routinely find themselves deployed on short notice to distant parts of the world, operating in circumstances of great cultural complexity. They establish working relationships with coalition partners, host-nation civil societies, non-governmental organizations, and other U.S. government agencies as well as many other actors, often encountering new situations in rapid succession with little advance warning or time to prepare. The U.S. now requires Airmen of all ranks and occupational specialties who are prepared to communicate, build relations, and solve complex problems across cultures on short notice.

Based on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, Air Force leaders clearly recognized the sobering implications of these new demands. Like their sister service counterparts, Airmen lacked the full range of capabilities now being demanded. Further, these capabilities could not be quickly or cheaply produced, requiring deliberate, sophisticated and long-term force development programs. To address the emerging new mandates, the Air Force Chief of Staff turned in early 2006 to Air University, providing “seed money” of new personnel, billets and funding. In March of 2006, Air University created a Culture and Language Center to serve as the pivot for development of new “cross-cultural” capabilities in the Air Force. This effort would be anchored in Air Force Professional Military Education (PME).

Initially, the senior Air Force leadership focused primarily on foreign language learning in PME. However, the leadership quickly concluded that the ability to leverage “culture” was much more useful than a singular focus on language skills. A broader emphasis on culture would provide a substantially greater return on the investment of Air Force time.
and money. The Chief of Staff subsequently mandated an approach that would empower Airmen with the generalizable knowledge, skills and attitudes that could be applied for mission success in any environment—‘in other words, a “culture-general” approach.

While the new Air Force approach emphasized generalizable cultural education, Airmen also required better preparation for operations in specific locations. A tailored combination of cultural, regional and (in some cases) foreign language learning was particularly needed. In late 2007, the Air Force added Expeditionary Skills Training (EST) to the portfolio of the new Culture and Language Center. At that point, the center became the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC)—a “one-stop shop” for development of Airmen’s cross-cultural capabilities throughout the service. The Air Force looked to the new organization to play a critical role in equipping Airmen to operate in the culturally diverse environments of the 21st century.

When it became AFCLC in 2007, the new organization was directed to pursue four key mission areas:

✦ Define, implement, and synchronize cultural, regional, and foreign language education for officers, enlisted and civilian personnel via Air University residential and distance learning.
✦ Coordinate, support, and validate training in support of expeditionary operations, exercises, exchange programs and overseas permanent changes of station.
✦ Support Headquarters, Air Force, in developing culture/region/language-related policy, plans and programs.
✦ Conduct, commission, and direct relevant research.

“Aim Before You Fire”

When the Culture and Language Center was activated in 2006, it reached out quickly to find the world’s leading scholars of militarily-relevant “culture,” along with Air Force PME faculty and practitioners, initiating consultations and workshops. It also commissioned research to define both the domain of knowledge and the best practices for making it relevant to Airmen.

Early investment in research proved very useful, gathering data from all over the world. The new center was able to evaluate the nascent “culture” development programs in other services and compare them to ongoing efforts in academe, other government agencies, the corporate world as well as the military services of allied nations. This allowed identification and comparison of reasonable outcomes, recognition of skills required for those outcomes, and visibility into the “state of the art” for teaching and assessing cross-cultural capabilities. All of these shaped the emerging Air Force program.

By 2006, the other services had begun to emphasize “culture” development in which knowledge of local regional detail played a key role. These approaches simply could not meet Air Force needs. Available research strongly suggested that attitude, motivation, and emotions played a larger part in determining intercultural success than mere factual knowledge. Further, memorized local detail could not be generalized beyond a specific environment. Even worse, if incorrectly transferred, memorization of local detail could easily lead to faulty conclusions when service personnel misapplied it to new circumstances.

Ultimately, the Air Force was able to identify a clear path to the desired outcome, a capacity the Air Force defined as Cross-Cultural Competence (3C): the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively act, to achieve the desired effect in a culturally complex environment—without necessarily having prior exposure to a particular group, region or language. In this model of performance, “culture” is less the task or the standard than the condition. Three basic skill sets operationalize the competence: the ability to communicate effectively across cultural boundaries, the ability to build cooperative relations with individuals and groups in culturally complex circumstances, and the ability to manage conflict in which cultural differences play a role.
In the Air Force formula, an individual becomes cross-culturally competent when s/he can do these things to accomplish the mission in the course of those normal duties appropriate to that person’s rank, specialty and assignment. For this reason, a cross-culturally competent junior enlisted member will exhibit a different mix and degree of the skills than a cross-culturally competent senior field grade officer. Cross-cultural competence is by no means a fixed state. For any individual, it is inevitably a “work in progress”—a life-long learning process that synthesizes education, training and personal experience with increasing sophistication and maturity.

**Developing 3C in the Air Force**

**Policy.** Air Staff responsibility for oversight of force development falls to the Director, Force Development (within the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel) who also holds the position of Air Force Senior Language Authority (SLA). Since 2006, three visionary individuals have held the position: Brigadier General (now Lieutenant General) Robert “Dice” Allardice, Mr. Joseph M. McDade, Jr, and Mr. Daniel R. Sitterly. Each of these has been personally committed to the development of Airman 3C. Each has also taken a personal interest in the Culture and Language Center, playing a key role in defining its function, providing necessary resources, and calling upon the Center’s expertise for advice on policy-related issues.

During his tenure (2006-2009) Joseph McDade also created two important advisory bodies: the Air Force Culture, Region and Language Executive Steering Committee and the Air Force Language Action Panel. The SLA chaired the former; the head of the U.S. Air Force Academy Department of Foreign Languages chaired the latter. Both were designed to bring leaders, stakeholders and subject matter experts together for consultations on policy issues relating to culture, region and language force development. The AFCLC has been a key actor in both.

**Education.** When the Air Force made the decision to anchor development of 3C in PME, an immediate question was how best to “jump start” that process. The Air Force was particularly fortunate to have two visionary leaders in its educational establishment—Lieutenant General Stephen R. Lorenz, Air University Commander, and Dr. Bruce Murphy, his Chief Academic Officer, two individuals who have oversight over virtually all Air Force PME. Fortuitously, Air University would come up for reaffirmation of its academic accreditation in 2009. A key feature in this process would be a required Quality Enhancement Plan (QEP) whereby the university would select an issue affecting the entire school and develop a plan to show enhanced student learning over a five year period. In 2007, Murphy and his deans recommended and Lorenz selected a faculty proposal on “cross-culturally competent Airmen” as the focus of the Plan. The Board of Visitors endorsed this decision, which was submitted to the school’s accrediting body.

This decision committed Air University to a substantial enhancement of 3C instruction across the entire Air Force continuum of education. It was a courageous act since it gambled Air University’s accreditation on the ability to demonstrate significant, measurable progress in developing cross-cultural competence within five years—something no other institution of like size had ever done. Lorenz thus earned a right to the title of “godfather of 3C” in the Air Force. He subsequently was awarded his fourth star and given command of the Air Force Education and Training Command, where his strong personal commitment Airman 3C was still evident. His successor as Commander of Air University, Lieutenant General Allen G. Peck, followed his example overseeing a significant expansion of 3C-related instruction and noteworthy increases in the capabilities of the Culture and Language Center.

To develop and implement the QEP, the AFCLC hired two brilliant scholars, first Dr. Kerry Fosher (now employed by USMC) and then Dr. Brian Selmeski, a former Army Intelligence Officer. Selmeski, arguably the world’s foremost scholar of military cross-cultural competence, finalized the plan and presented it to the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools in early 2009. The accrediting body was stunned by its boldness, enthusiastically endorsing it as “compelling,” “state of the art,” “pioneering” and “truly transformative.” By late 2009, Selmeski was overseeing an escalating program of curriculum and faculty development at Air University to fulfill the plan’s demands. He also chaired a department within the Culture and Language Center charged with defining the domain of 3C and weaving it into Air Force education and across the entire continuum of learning.
Training. In the Air Force model of 3C development, the basic skills in cross-cultural knowledge, attitudes and skills are built in PME programs. However, they are further enhanced, maintained and then honed for application in particular locations through EST. This approach was significantly facilitated in 2007, when the Air Force initiated a thorough reform of EST. The intention was to assure all Airmen obtained the right training at the right time in preparation for deployment. In the new approach, the training was divided into a series of tiers, ranging from foundational development in accession training, through proficiency maintenance in anticipation of assignment, to learning oriented at specific expeditionary duty assignments. The training program as a whole would be overseen by a general officer-level Expeditionary Skills Review Group supported by action officers in an Expeditionary Skills Working Group.

The reorganization of Air Force EST occurred just as the AFCLC came together. In 2008, the Center hired a gifted and aggressive retired Air Force officer with long experience in Air Force education, Mr. Hank Finn, to direct its EST portfolio. Finn quickly pushed the Center into the midst of the ongoing service-wide reorganization, obtaining a seat on the Expeditionary Skills Working Group and carving out significant space for 3C training in each of the training tiers, successfully convincing the Air Force training leadership that cross-cultural competence was critical to warfighting. By 2009, his directorate was rapidly creating the instructional content for each of the tiers, developing handbooks for deploying Airmen and pursuing advanced technological applications to web-based 3C training, based on the same approach used in Air Force education.

Foreign Language. Like each of the other services, the Air Force maintains small communities of regional and language professionals. The Air Force also has long debated the merits of developing significant numbers of language-capable Airmen in the general purpose forces, acknowledging that future requirements are difficult to predict, language-learning and maintenance are resource-intensive, and the skills themselves are highly perishable. Nonetheless, starting in 2006, the Air Force committed itself to ambitious programs to develop significantly greater foreign language capabilities within the general purpose forces.

An initial indication was a vastly increased emphasis on foreign language in officer accessions—ROTC and the U.S. Air Force Academy. Language learning in Air Force PME also commenced in 2006 with new programs at Air University. By 2009, this language instruction had grown to include seven languages offered in the resident courses of the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College. This resident course instruction was provided by mobile training teams from the Defense Language Institute’s Foreign Language Center, while students in other Air University schools were provided Rosetta Stone language learning software.

The Air University programs are overseen by Mr. Jay Warwick, director of a Language Center embedded within the AFCLC. Warwick, a retired Air Force intelligence officer and Russian linguist, is building both long-term and “just in time” language learning programs as part of an integrated plan to equip Airmen with the right language skills at the right time for mission accomplishment.

In 2009, the Air Force took the next step and activated its Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP). In this new program, general purpose Airmen are selected for life-long participation in language learning. Some 400 officers a year will be recruited into the program, generally at the accessions point. The objective is to achieve a steady-state inventory of approximately 3,300 officers spread across 26 strategic languages. Participants receive an initial language immersion experience followed by annual or biannual language immersion “booster shots” throughout their careers. They will also test annually and participate in regular learning activities with an on-line language cohort. Participants are expected to achieve and maintain an ILR 2 level language capability. When the officer program is fully implemented, LEAP will be extended to general purpose force enlisted Airmen. This entire program is managed by the AFCLC.

Negotiations. “Negotiations” offer a key set of conceptual tools for cross-cultural conflict management. From its inception, the AFCLC included an embedded Air Force Negotiations Center of Excellent (NCE), responsible for developing and delivering both education and training in the art of cross-cultural negotiations. Founded in 2006 and directed by Dr. Stef Eisen, the NCE has integrated cross-cultural negotiations coursework and instruction
throughout the Air Force PME, continuing education and expeditionary training within the Air Force EST program. AFCLC’s negotiations education and training expertise is frequently requested by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government agencies.

Growing the Center

The Center’s initial growth was agonizingly slow. By the end of 2006, it still consisted of three individuals, each of whom was also serving as full-time faculty at the Air War College. However, the year 2008 inaugurated a period of rapid growth. The Center grew from about ten members in early 2008 to almost forty by late 2009. By that point it also had become significantly diverse, employing a combination of active duty Air Force, Air Reserve Component (ARC), government civilian employees, and contractors.

The reserve component members—Air Reserve and Air Guard, officers and enlisted—offered an essential lifeline to the growing Center, which could not have accomplished its mandated mission without them. They arrived early in the history of the Center, bringing both expertise and experience. In 2009 it appeared that the ARC contingent within the Center had stabilized at about eight members.

Like its counterparts in the other services, one significant challenge faced by the Center was recruitment of qualified scholar/practitioners with expertise in militarily-relevant cross-cultural competence. The founding nucleus of the new Culture and Language Center at Air University in 2006 was a social anthropologist—Dr. Dan Henk. A former Army Foreign Area Officer and Defense Attaché, Henk had used his anthropological education effectively in overseas military assignments. He now sought to apply that experience to the cross-cultural needs of Airmen, initiating an intensive effort to recruit other scholars with related skills. It took two years and four failed searches before he could add a second cultural scholar and another year and three more failed searches for the third. But these efforts eventually paid off. By late 2009 the Center had succeeded in recruiting eight behavioral scientists with doctoral degrees and was advertising for a ninth. Their combined capabilities were unmatched in any other PME institution, and these scholars were providing the essential critical mass of expertise for the Center’s education and training missions.

Other Notable Center Activities/ Accomplishments

Policy Support. From the outset of its activation as an Air Force-wide institution in 2007, the Center was charged with assisting the Air Staff in the formulation of plans, policies and programs relating to 3C development. In this role it has functioned as an extension of the staff of the Air Force SLA—the official responsible for oversight of Air Force culture/region/language (CRL) develop-

Air Force Culture and Language Center

![Diagram of the Air Force Culture and Language Center structure]

- **Director**: Dr. Dan Henk
- **3C Department**: Oversight of all cross-cultural education and USAF research coordination.
- **EST Directorate**: Oversight of all USAF deployment training in CRL to ensure requirements are met.
- **Language Center**: Oversight of language education and training for USAF general purpose forces.
- **Negotiation Center**: Support CSAF goals of enabling Airmen to negotiate across cultures.

Dr. Brian Selmeski  Mr. Haak Finn  Mr. Jay Warwick  Dr. Stef Eisen
ment. Center personnel frequently represent the Air Force in service-wide, DOD and inter-governmental consultations and conferences concerned with CRL issues, and routinely coordinate on policy and program documents. The Center made a noteworthy contribution to the creation of the Air Force strategy for Airmen CRL development—the *Culture, Region and Language Flight Plan* signed by the Air Force Chief of Staff in May 2009. The Flight Plan articulated an unambiguous Air Force commitment to CRL development, planted it firmly on a foundation of 3C, and highlighted the role of the Center. Center personnel authored the original draft and took an active part in its staffing and refinement.

**A Standard 3C Training Package.** In order to meet service training demands for 3C development, the Center has developed a standardized approach that can be extensively tailored for the unique requirements of particular consumers, and can be scoped in length from about 4 hours to a week or more.

✦ This approach starts with an introduction to the general domains and characteristics of culture that Airmen must know and do to succeed in culturally complex environments.

✦ The learning then flows into a more focused look at cross-cultural communications, stressing what Airmen must know and do in order to achieve effective two-way communications across cultural boundaries.

✦ From there, it focuses on cross-cultural relations, stressing the things Airmen must know and do to build and maintain productive, collaborative working relationships with individuals and groups in circumstances of cultural diversity.

✦ Finally, the learning turns to the management of cross-cultural conflict, enabling Airmen to identify kinds and sources of conflict, and offering mechanisms for avoiding, attenuating or resolving it. Among the “tool kits” offered in this block are those of formal negotiations.

Options within this standard package also include “culture-specific” modules on particular people-groups, countries, regions or areas of operation. And they can include language instruction, aimed especially at courtesy and survival communications.

**Air Force Education.** Assisted by subject matter experts in the Center, modules, courses and electives on various aspects of 3C are being infused into curricula across all of Air Force officer and enlisted PME and in the accessions schools. The Center has developed a more comprehensive and complete educational package with its Introduction to Culture course, initially offered to enlisted Airmen through the Community College of the Air Force. This 45-hour, facilitated on-line course provides an educational grounding in the basic domains and characteristics of culture and makes these relevant to the experiences and requirements of Airmen. The course treats topics such as:

✦ Self and social identity.
✦ Race, ethnicity, and cultural identity.
✦ American and military culture.
✦ Culture shock.
✦ Language and intercultural communication.
✦ Cross-cultural conflict management.
✦ Religion and cultural heritage.
✦ Kinship, marriage and gender.
✦ Livelihood and economic exchange.
✦ Political systems.
✦ Cultural/intercultural dimensions of sports.
✦ Globalization, modernization and ethnic resurgence.

The course was first piloted with fifty Airmen in early 2009 and was a substantial success. By the time it was offered again in late 2009, another 400 Airmen had volunteered for the course, and the next iteration had over 1,000 Airmen waiting in line to take it. Ultimately, this course may be offered to some 15,000 Airmen each year. Versions of the course can be tailored for Airmen of all ranks. A follow-on course will delve more deeply into cross-cultural communication.

**Assessment.** One of the most important yet difficult aspects of “culture” education and training is the assessment of its effectiveness. While the U.S. military has a well-developed methodology for measuring the efficacy of most of its learning, militarily relevant cross-cultural competence is a new domain not yet subjected to the research required to develop robust assessment methodologies. Existing instruments, though important to ongoing Air Force education and training, are still limited in scope and relatively primitive.
Assessment capabilities are particularly important to answer two related questions: How effective are Airmen at obtaining the influence required for mission success? What kind of education or training is required to produce the cross-cultural competence necessary for obtaining that influence? Put another way, assessment will always be aimed at finding the education, training and experience that best delivers the required capability. Answers to these questions require an inventory of assessment instruments and methodologies.

The Air Force is committed to developing such assessment instruments and methodologies, and the Center is at the heart of that effort. In 2009 it hired a highly capable Industrial/Organizational Psychologist from the corporate world to oversee that development, and has committed hundreds of thousands of dollars per year over the next five years to the required research. By 2014, the Center expects to have an extremely sophisticated capability to assess both Airman cross-cultural competence and the efficacy of its education and training programs.

**Information Technology.** The scale of the responsibility to provide education to over 50,000 Airman a year, and training to over 500,000, mandates the effective use of Information Technology. The AFCLC is engaged in multiple initiatives that leverage information technology to deliver culture, region and language learning. These include both avatar based and live actor simulations. They include the use of Blackboard technology for culture-related distance learning. And they include the official Air Force Culture, Region and Language (AFCRL) website at www.culture.af.edu, maintained on behalf of the Air Staff by the Culture and Language Center. Most of the Center’s products will ultimately be accessible on the AFCRL website.

**A Bottom Line**

The Air Force is embarked on a deliberate, sophisticated and long-term program to develop Airmen capable of communicating across cultural barriers, building relations and solving cross-cultural problems anywhere in the world on short notice. The AFCLC plays a central role in this coherent Air Force vision of culturally, regionally and linguistically competent Airmen, exerting positive influence in support of Air Force expeditionary operations and institutional requirements.
Introduction

Africa is a vast continent, the second largest, after Asia. It is four times the size of the U.S. excluding Alaska. It is the cradle of human civilization. A diverse continent, Africa has more than fifty countries with a population of over 700 million people who speak over 1,000 languages. Ecological and cultural environments vary from one region to another. As an old continent, Africa is one of the richest in culture and customs, and its contributions to world civilization are impressive. Africans regard culture as essential to their lives and future development. From the African perspective, culture embodies their philosophy, worldview, behavior, patterns of customs and religion.

This article is intended to capture the comprehensiveness of African culture, incorporating such important aspects as religion, worldview, and myths. The uses and definition of “culture” vary, reflecting its association with civilization and social status, its restriction to attitude and behavior, its globalization, and the debates surrounding issues of tradition, modernity, and post-modernity. I have chosen a comprehensive meaning of culture while not ignoring the alternative uses of the term.

Worldviews

The Sahara runs from east to west across the widest part of Africa, a vast desert dividing the continent into two main regions. North Africa consists of the Mediterranean coast from Morocco to Egypt and includes the Valley of the Nile River as far south as Ethiopia. With strong ties to the Mediterranean and Arab worlds, North Africans felt the influence of Christianity by the second century, and in the seventh century, much of the area came under the influence of Islam.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the region inhabited by black Africans. Before the modern era, they had relatively little contact with the rest of the world. Islam entered Sub-Saharan Africa very slowly, compared with its dissemination across North Africa, and Christian missionaries were not very active there until the 1800s. Since then, the spread of Islam and Christianity has weakened the indigenous religions, myths, and legends of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the traditional beliefs have not disappeared. In some places, they have blended with new religions from other cultures, so that an African Muslim might combine Islam with the traditional practice of ancestor worship as an African Christian might also do in Christianity. This is called religious syncretism.

Myths and legends developed over thousands of years in Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the influences on their development were the mass migrations that took place from time to time.

About 7,000 years ago, the ancestors of the Hottentots and the Bushmen began moving from the Sahara toward southern Africa. Five thousand years later, people who spoke Bantu languages began spreading out from Cameroon, on Africa’s west coast, until they eventually inhabited much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Such migrations caused myths and legends to spread from group to group and led to a mixing of myths and legends. The migrations also gave rise to new stories about events in the history of those peoples. For instance, as Bantu groups settled in new homelands, they developed legends to explain the origins of their ruling families and the structure of their societies.

Peoples in Africa did not use written language until modern times. Instead, they possessed rich and complex oral traditions, passing myths, legends, and history from generation to generation in spoken form. In some cultures, professional storytellers, called “griots,” preserved the oral tradition. Written accounts of African mythology began to appear in the early 19th century, and contemporary scholars work hard to record the
Religion and Myths

Religion is inseparable from virtually every aspect of African life and is important in the determination of all branches of everyday life. Religion commands a central place in the organization of social, political, and cultural life and regulates the relationship between people and their physical and spiritual environment. Many different forms of religion exist in Africa and tolerance of religious differences is very high. Although people take their own faith very seriously, they also allow others to do the same, regardless of which god they hold highest. Personal and public displays of religion are frequent. People even preach on public buses in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and many of the passengers join in to what quickly becomes a call-and-response prayer session. Atheists are very rare and one who professes no faith in a higher being is looked at with great skepticism.

Africa is home to more than 50 countries and the majority of them recognize both Islamic and Christian religious celebrations. Muslims throughout the continent observe the Muslim month of fasting, Ramadan, but the feast at the end of Ramadan, Eid-el-Fitr, as well as feast of sacrifice Eid-el-Adha, are recognized as national holidays, as are the Christian celebrations of Christmas and Easter. During these times most businesses are closed and few people perform their regular work. The various traditional religious events also attract great interest regardless of faith. Islamic, Christian, and traditional religious holidays and festivals are social occasions when family and friends come together and celebrate.

Traditional Beliefs

The three main African belief systems include supernatural beings who influence human life. Some of these beings are powerful deities. Others are lesser spirits, such as the spirits of ancestors.

Most African traditional religions have multiple gods, often grouped together in family relationships. Nearly every culture recognizes a supreme god, an all-powerful creator who is usually associated with the sky. Various West African peoples refer to the highest god as Amma or Olorun, while some East Africans use the name Mulungu. Africans who have adopted Christianity or Islam sometimes identify the supreme deity of those faiths with the supreme deity of traditional African religion and mythology. In most African religions, the supreme god is a distant being no longer involved in day-to-day human life. African people rarely call on this deity. Instead, they address lesser gods, many of whom have distinct functions. The Yoruba people of Nigeria, for example, worship a storm god, Shango, who controls thunder and lightning. The number of gods and goddesses varies from culture to culture. The Buganda of eastern Central African Republic have one of the largest pantheons, with 20 or more deities. Many cultures regard the earth, sun, and moon as gods. In the Congo River region, the most densely wooded part of Africa, the forest itself is regarded as a deity or as a mysterious other world where spirits have their homes.

A young boy feeds chicken to sacred crocodiles in Bazoulé, Burkina Faso.

Spirits are invisible beings with powers for good or evil. Spirits are less impressive, less powerful, and less like humans than the gods, who often have weaknesses and emotions. Many spirits are associated with physical features such as mountains, rivers, wells, trees, and springs. Nations, peoples, and even small communities may honor local spirits unknown outside their borders. All humans, animals, and plants have spirits, as do elements such as water and fire. Some spirits are helpful, others harmful. People may worship spirits and may also try to control them through magical means, usually with the aid of a skilled practitioner, sometimes called the medicine man or woman and the witch doctor who leads rituals. People thought to have evil spirits are considered dangerous witches. Occult powers are also used to obtain protection or to gain an advantage in modern competitive arenas. In Burkina Faso for instance, these powers are widely known.
as Wak. Unlike what is often assumed or claimed about beliefs in occult powers, it is suggested that Wak acts as a complement to and not as the condition of an individual's talent or success.

A few years ago a Burkinabè newspaper published an interview with Sayouba Zongo, one of the country's greatest bicycle racing champions. Halfway through the conversation the journalist asked, “Do you believe in Wak?” “No, I don’t believe in it. At one point in my career I fell victim to a series of problems. I kept coming off my bicycle. I was constantly getting punctures. People told me to see this person or that person who might be able to help. But I never did. All I did was work harder and take care of my bicycle.” (Le Pays, 29 April 1992). To the uninitiated, Wak might appear to be a new technique or a new approach to bicycle racing. Yet most Burkinabè people would readily tell you that Wak consists of the manipulation of ritual objects by experts in esoteric knowledge.

A year later the same newspaper ran a retrospective on African sport that included a description of incidents in a soccer match between the Elephants of Côte d'Ivoire and the Tigers of the Central African Republic in the 1973 African Nations Cup (Le Pays, 30 April 1993). After getting off the airplane, the Tigers refused the accommodation offered by their hosts and chose to walk to the houses of compatriots residing in Abidjan. According to the article, a few minutes before starting time the Central Africans engaged in a few fetishistic demonstrations that excited the crowd. At halftime the Tigers refused to return to their locker room and remained instead on the field for fear that their hosts would engage in mystical doings in their absence. A Tiger player got involved in an incident with a ball boy, which ended up in a general brawl involving the police and the crowd. When the disruption eventually subsided the Tigers had left the field for good.

In his description of these incidents, the journalist reported the “fetishist practices” as an integral part of the competition, but not without some critical aloofness. Many Burkinabe “intellectuals” publicly decried the popularity of occult powers in African sport as a relic of rejected traditions in modern African society. Unaffected by criticism, a great number of practitioners of Wak like to present themselves as defenders of African traditions yet not opposed to “L’ Evolution,” a term widely used to mean “socio-economic change.” Resort to occult powers is widespread in Burkina Faso, as in many other African countries, particularly in national competitive arenas such as sport and school, and in the more exclusive political arenas. People from all walks of life (villagers, poor urban citizens, the financial and political elite and of different religious backgrounds) have appealed to experts in esoteric knowledge, making some of them rich and famous.

What (for lack of a better term) scholars call occult powers are known as maraboutage in French-speaking Africa. Specialists in the occult are indiscriminately called marabouts or sorcerers but also Wak-man in Burkina Faso, and the objects they manufacture are variously known as amulets, gris-gris, charms, or seben (“writing” in Dioula, the trade language of this part of West Africa) which consist of verses of the Qur’an sealed in leather pouches. The indiscriminate and widespread use of these objects reveals the integration of local Muslim and Christian religious traditions in everyday life.

Funeral rites and customs in Lobi region South West Burkina Faso.

Many Africans believe that human spirits exist after death. According to some groups, these spirits live underground in a world much like that of the living, but upside down. The spirits sleep during the day and come out at night. Other groups place the realm of the dead in the sky. The San of southern Africa say that the dead become stars. Many African groups believe that the spirits of dead ancestors remain near their living descendants to help and protect them, as long as these relatives perform certain ceremonies and pay them due respect. Believing that the spirits of a chief and other important characters offer strong protection, the Zulu hold special ceremonies to bring them into the community. In some
cultures, it is said that the soul of a dead grandfather, father, or uncle can be reborn in a new baby boy. Another common belief is that dead souls, particularly those of old men, may return as snakes, which many Africans regard with respect or some other sentiment such as fear, trepidation, awe.

Ancestor cults play a leading role in the mythologies of some peoples, especially in East and South Africa. The honored dead, whether of the immediate family, the larger clan or kinship group, the community, or the entire culture, become objects of worship and subjects of tales and legends. An example occurs among the Songhai of Mali, who live along the Niger River. They honor Zoa, a wise and protective ancestor who long ago made his son chief. Many groups trace their origins, or the origins of all humans, to first ancestors. The Buganda say that the first ancestor was Kintu, who came from the land of the gods and married Nambe, daughter of the king of heaven. The Dinkas of the Sudan speak of Garang and Abuk, the first man and woman, whom God created as tiny clay figures in a pot.

The line between legend and history is often blurred. Some mythic ancestors began as real-life personages whose deeds were exaggerated over time, while others are purely fictional. The Yoruba storm god, Shango, for example, may originally have been a mighty warrior king. The Shilluk, who live along the Nile in the Sudan, trace their ancestry to Nyikang, their first king. Later kings were thought to have been Nyikang reborn into new bodies, and the well-being of the nation depended on their health and vigor. The first king of the Zulu was supposed to have been a son of the supreme god. Many African peoples traditionally regarded their rulers as divine or semi-divine. Other legends involve culture heroes who performed great feats or embodied important values. The Mandingo people built a large empire in Mali. Their griots recited tales of kings and heroes. Soundiata Keita, a story of magic, warfare, kingship, and fate, is known over large portions of West Africa. Between the 1500s and the 1800s, millions of Africans were brought to the Americas as slaves. Their myths and legends helped shape the black cultures that developed in the Caribbean islands and the U.S. The Caribbean religion known as vodu or voodoo, for example, involves the worship of the vodu, West African gods. Enslaved blacks also told traditional stories about the spider Kaku Anansi and the con artist hare. Anansi came to be called Anancy, and the hare became Brer (Brother) Rabbit, the character who appears in the Uncle Remus animal fables that were collected by Joel Chandler Harris in the late 1800s.

Conclusion

There are many factors that influence and shape a culture. For example, people must adapt to their physical terrain, if they hope to survive. This will influence their cultural norms. History and religion shape values and beliefs and, by extension, behaviors and norms. Understanding these factors raises awareness and acceptance of other cultures. By fully understanding how geography, history, religion, and economics affect the people, we can ensure that we have a full understanding of the culture, exponentially increasing the chances of a successful mission. In his book, A Black Theology of Liberation, the African American theologian, James H. Cone, writes: “Theology is not universal language about God. Rather, it is human speech informed by historical and theological traditions and written for particular times and places. Theology is contextual language that is defined by the human situation that gives birth to it.” The same thing can be said about culture, African Culture.

Sources


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Introduction
What might one solitary anthropologist lost in the wilderness of a far-flung and diverse humanity bring to the critical understanding of a single community or ethno cultural grouping of people, much less to an entire nation or a region, that the many people of the region, nation and ethno cultural groupings themselves do not have? Why should the learning of a relative stranger, with only a year or so worth of experience in a field setting, provide a level of expertise or understanding that the community of culture bearers themselves may lack. In other words, why even do cross-cultural anthropology if the methods are invalid or suspect or the results problematic and questionable?

I’ve asked myself these questions for many years now. A pat answer would be to assert that the anthropologist brings to the field a framework of understanding, and a kind of critical objective parallax, that the native culture bearer, the subject of the anthropologist’s investigations, does not have. Culture bearers know the culture of which they are a part in a subjective and largely implicit sense, while there is little about the cross-cultural experience that the anthropologist usually finds subjectively understandable or bearable. The anthropologist takes from the field a sense of critical and hopefully objective parallax, gained both from the process of subjective transformation the anthropologist undergoes in the field, and from the process of systematic objectification through hopefully a well designed research methodology (protocols, surveys, journals, records) as well as from previous training.

But I cannot even now say that this is a complete or sufficient answer to this problem. I suspect that even though there may be multiple versions or interpretation of the same, especially complex human cultural phenomenon in the world, there is usually an objective common ground, a substantive basis, upon which most if not all anthropologists, working with a common grouping of people, can come to some kind of agreement. If they all elicit kin terms, hopefully in a non-leading manner, they will all be able to develop a componental model of a kinship system that is more or less the same in all cases.

I have been involved in one aspect or another of “Asian” studies for over a quarter century now. For purposes of this article and the themes of this publication, I will confine myself to a somewhat more restrictive definition of Asia to include all those non-English speaking lands and peoples that wash onto the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as those nations that are immediately adjacent to these lands and peoples, but which are for the most part land-locked.

Common Themes
We can ask, “Are there possibly common themes, elements, symbolisms, patterns of behavior or belief, that might be called characteristic and prototypical of a sense of Asian civilization and that might be encountered upon almost any shore that we land our ethnographic boats in the Indian and Pacific Oceans?” I might venture the following insights: Prototypical Asian nations are in general very long settled and many effectively constitute what can be thought of as autochthonous cultural traditions and civilizations. As a consequence, they tend in general to have cultural traditions that are often very old and very deeply rooted in the geographical regions in which they developed.

In spite of all the varieties of religion, language, customs, kinship structure, etc., Asian societies in general tend to be lineage based, family oriented, and tend to be focused upon a core set of values that can be said to emphasize the group over the individual, to emphasize the sense of duty and responsibility over the question of freedom and rights, and to be concerned with common problems of reciprocity in face-to-face relations. Traditionally, they tended to be formal, shame-
based cultures, and to have a preoccupation with social hierarchy and socially defined status identity over the problem of equality and individually oriented egoism. It is not clear that democratic institutions ever really developed and took hold in traditional Asia as they have done in the West, having become part of the Western tradition of civilization that is now extending itself to Asia.

Asian religions have had a profound impact on many of the major populations of Asia, and these religious philosophies, in the main stemming from a South Asian Hindu-Buddhist tradition, and from an East Asian Confucian-Taoist tradition, share certain distinctively “Eastern” characteristics that are not typically found among the Western circum-Mediterranean religious philosophical traditions. To summarize a few basic points distinguishing these Asian religious philosophies:

1. By and large these Eastern religious philosophies tend to be practical philosophies that do not dichotomize mind and body or the problem of knowing and doing. Often, enlightenment in a particular religious orientation entails not only a vow of living, active devotion, but an embodiment of experience that comes in practice and demonstration in the world.

2. They are primarily a philosophy of individual salvation involving meditation, devotion, respect, and salvation from a cycle of suffering that stems from attachment to worldly things.

3. They are secondarily socio-political philosophies that often provide direct practical instruction as to how one should live in order to get along with others in the world such as respect for one’s parents, or filial piety, and submission to duty and tradition as a sign of respect.

4. The world of the individual and the state and the universe of the supernatural and spiritual come to comprise largely parallel planes such that the workings of one reflect and represent symbolically the happenings upon other levels of experience, inference and projection. As a consequence too, it becomes possible in such a framework for events upon one plane to be construed by Asians as being affected by actions upon a parallel plane.

5. These religions tend to be symbolically open, tolerant, syncretistic and even synthetic of alternative symbologies of thought, and hence they tend to encourage an orientation that is non-dogmatic and synthesizing of differences and contradictions. As a result, the boundaries between these religious traditions are often as not permeable and overlapping, and one may find many blends and possibilities between them.

6. Peoples of Asia have largely developed symbolisms and ritual practices that serve to mediate the boundaries between self, or personhood, state and the supernatural or spiritual cosmos, and these symbolisms have by-and-large come to take on distinctive patterns or forms that can be said to be typically “Asian.”

There is a clear great/small traditional orientation among most Asians such that there occurs a dialectic between local and broader regional traditions, and by-and-large the local traditions have fused or integrated with the larger regional patterns, particularly in the areas of religion where syncretism and synthesis between local, largely animistic traditions involving shamanism, magic and incantation, combined with more formal religious traditions involving priests, sacred texts and prayer. Asian religions have thus in general a “blended” continuum with multiple layers and multiple foci of orientations, at the base of which, in everyday life, we may find a preoccupation with the practical, the mechanical, the spiritual, the magical and the supernatural as this is invested in the concrete and the natural world.

There is a resulting sense of relativity of orientation and values in the cultural patterning of Asian civilization, a kind of psychological (attitudinal and behavioral) and cultural (shared relational patterns) relativity of orientation that has several interesting consequences, from either an anthropological or a Western point of view. We might say that much of Asian behavior is situationally dependent and situationally defined, and that social controls are not so much internalized as individual controls are externalized within common Asian social settings.

In Asian societies, the boundary between self and others in everyday life is not always as clearly marked or well defined as it may be in Western societies, and sense of ego may be more socio-centric in orientation than individualistic or “ego-centric.” This implies, among other things, that Asians prefer indirection in interpersonal relations over direction, face-to-face networking over long distance relations.
with relative strangers, and rapport building that aims at achieving and maintaining a sense of harmony or social balance that implies that there is a established order of relations that must be maintained between sense of self, social sense of state, and a larger sense of the symbolic universe.

**The Cross-Cultural Consequences of Chinese Communism**

The Great Wall has long been a living metaphor for the Chinese state. It is a unifying symbol of national identity and cultural solidarity, and as a grand monument to a glorious Chinese past, it remains time immemorial a supranational symbol for the endurance and long-lived strength of Chinese civilization. As a dominant, living Chinese metaphor, the symbol of the Great Wall stretches throughout China, interconnecting its cities, villages and countryside in the hearts and minds of the Chinese, and its myriad, countless individual pieces are mortared together by the shared blood, sweat and tears of the Chinese people.

Beyond the Great Wall lies a world of possible trouble and turmoil. The Great Wall was erected to partition the world between barbarian and civilized, between the state of heaven and the wild, uncivilized sea of humanity beyond. The Great Wall has served as a barrier between these worlds, such that one outside cannot see into the inner workings behind, nor can those confined within the Great Wall see clearly beyond its elevated horizon. The Great Wall has become a master symbol of Chinese national unity and solidarity, a political symbol of the endurance and domestic integrity of Chinese Civilization time immemorial.

Modern China, being a Communist nation state, is the direct inheritor of this symbology and the tradition to which it refers, and as such in the hearts and minds of the Chinese people the People’s Republic of China holds the Mandate of Heaven and Earth. With but little dissension, in spite of often deep frustration, the Chinese people hold the Chinese state as symbolically isomorphic with the sense of Chinese self and a grandly extended, if somewhat disrupted, sense of the Chinese Cosmos.

The Great Wall, as indestructible as it is weathered, has in contemporary times come to stand for something more than Grand China. It has come to stand for the inherent ambiguity and ambivalence of what it means to be traditional Chinese in a modern world, for the relativity and duplicity of values and views that have come to represent the Chinese collective state of mind. Furthermore, it has become in the modern era a symbol of a wall of invisibility, for a form of multiple level internal security and secrecy of state and domestic affairs behind which things can be kept hidden from the World.

But the Great Wall is only the tip of a huge Chinese iceberg that is mostly hidden below the surface of a turbulent ocean of a common humanity. Few received anthropological models and frameworks fit well an understanding of the epiphenomenal complexities of the patterning of modern development across the board, or even of the general situation or the local diversities of single nation states such as China. There exist many levels of human realities that remain beyond the official purview of received or recorded history.

The Chinese world has long been one of contradiction transcended as part of normal, everyday affairs, and where relatively broad limits of tolerance for individual behavior and response belies extremely strict limits of intolerance of symbolic social alternation, from shared belief and collective representation. A broad range of natural human variation of any large population is encompassed within the Chinese state by the internalization of a strongly socio-centric ego, and by the symbolic isomorphism of identity between the primary sense of Chinese family and the secondary sense of Chinese state.

Chinese worldview has traditionally been one of the symbolic synthesis and syncretization of diverse and often contradictory elements adapted to purposes consonant with the practical ends of success and survival of the Chinese world, and thus the for-
eign becomes integrated with the native and autochthonous tradition of Chinese civilization. The symbolic reinterpretation of Western values of democracy and human rights, and even the implicit, though systematic, revision of western legal codes relating to copyright, patents and proprietary information, all serve Chinese interests in meeting the challenges of modern development, albeit Chinese style. Indeed, the genius of Chinese civilization has always been this almost limitless and boundless capacity for the systematic integration and assimilation of non-Chinese symbols and designs into the symbolic Universe of the Celestial State.

The synthesizing capacity of the Chinese in the reconciliation of contradiction has been noted by different scholars, and it speaks to the almost boundless and infinitely practical capacity of the symbolic human universe that is called Chinese to obviate marginalizing and relativizing alternate realities through processes of compartmentalization of conflicting interests and the mutual accommodation of alternative realities. It goes back to a shared cultural capacity for the rationalization of self-serving behavior when individual self-identity is isomorphic with the individual’s status-role identity vis-à-vis the state, and in which the state, a symbolic and behavioral extension of one’s family, comes to take on the naturalized legitimacy of a primary institution.

China appears to be a nation that can routinely manage contradiction without these contradictions becoming critical to the management of the Chinese system, and this serves as a testament to the exceptional synthesizing capacity of Chinese culture to balance extremes, and manage opposing forces in a largely constructive and nondestructive manner.

Why is this so? Free and unrestricted research in China, especially on a scale that might serve to answer such a question, would not be permitted, and the data necessary for coming to such a conclusion either may not exist, be erroneous or be kept secret or unavailable by the Communist state.

As a case in point, very few high level state secrets leak out of China. Indeed, a great deal of information that is made public and world available in most other places, remains essentially out of reach within the Chinese state. Accurate statistical data on contemporary China is difficult if not impossible to come by, if it exists at all, and this surfeit of realistic information is doubly compounded by deliberate distortion and misinformation to conceal the realities of everyday China behind a stolid, monolithic façade. On the other hand, China has been the regular and practiced recipient of high level state secrets from the West, and has been the recipient of a great deal of information and knowledge that would be considered of a privileged or proprietary nature. The Chinese people are almost universally and monolithically stolid about keeping secrets, while they are simultaneously very gracious in helping themselves to the secrets of others. The extent of copyright, patent, trade-secret, and security leakage from the West to China has been remarkable and remarkably absurd, as Western nations continue to trust and entrust Chinese with a naïve notion that this trust will not be just reciprocal, but of the same kind.

My own limited research in the central Chinese province of Henan bears the following general conclusions:

- Communist influence had a profound and to some extent disruptive effect upon the traditional institution of Chinese patrilineal kinship and family structure, down to the level of the primary family and nuclear relationships between parents and children.
- Many of the traditional cultural values of Confucianism transferred partially and ambivalently into the Communist Party organization and administrative organization of the society at the level of secondary corporate institutions.
- The pattern of face and reciprocal obligation networking that is so focal in the elaboration of everyday Chinese society in all areas and sectors of the complex Chinese social world represents a carry-over and adaptation of a traditional pattern rooted in the patrilineal kinship organization of Chinese society, centered on the socio-religious values of the Conflation of the Three teachings, into a modern, communist state.

One consequence of these factors appears to be an entrenchment in Chinese culture of a value system that interprets individual human rights as subject to justification of a state mandate. In other words, the Western version of human rights and the sense of individual freedom that this doctrine of rights implies is equivalent to a form of social license or ir-
responsibility of social action that runs against the larger interests of the state. Filial duty and obligation to the Nation of China preempts and outweighs individual concerns of freedom and choice, which if exercised, leads to a marginalization of the individual from normal society and a stereotypical labeling of the individual as abnormal. The primary concern of the Chinese state is the central location and control of the individual Chinese within that state. From this standpoint, therefore, there are three outcomes:

1. The Chinese see the doctrine of human rights as primarily a Western construct, probably of capitalistic origins and therefore inherently suspect of its social motivations, and as a threat to the basic communist doctrine of the modern Chinese state.

2. The Chinese legal system is largely a non-rights legal system of codifications that primarily supports the interests of the state at the expense of protecting the interests of the individual.

3. China is unlikely to reform its legal system or its single party political system of its own accord, or to reform some of the social consequences of this non-rights based system, which is widespread corruption through the hyper-developed system of face and arbitrary manipulation of the law in the service of private interests.

Cultural Relativity and Sino-centrism

Nothing happens in China that does not begin or end in Beijing. In dealing with things Chinese we face the dilemma of dealing with few verifiable factual realities and only superficial generalities that ultimately prove to be as vague of detail as they are broad of brushstroke. The reformed communist government of the brave new China has deliberately set about fostering an image of itself in the world that is relatively benign, open, friendly, and ready and willing to do business. It has also sought to downplay those aspects of its own authority that create controversy and distrust abroad, such as a poor human rights track record and heavy handed policies in the treatment of dissent or in the negotiation of interests conflictual to the state or its representatives. Information that is regularly produced by and about China cannot be fully trusted or relied upon for presenting realistic estimates of the Chinese state, embodying vast and complex human realities, and the surfeit of realistic information is compounded by the deliberate misinformation that is produced from both within and without that seek to paint pictures of China either larger, or smaller, than real life.

To a great extent, Western media has accepted and played uncritically upon the image of the New China as Western oriented and pro-business, a kind of born again communist capitalism, further building a myth of Modern China as an open, progressive cosmopolitan society. Therefore, the popular view of China worldwide is somewhat at odds with the informed insider view of a state still very much totalitarian, uni-party and top-down in almost paranoid control of not only what its people do, but what they know and how they think about the larger world or about the world within China.

If we are to reconcile these contrasting points of view—the received and popular notion of the emerging economic giant on the prowl for political leverage and economic advantage in the larger world, and the more informed and critical view of that significant proportion of humanity called Chinese, then we must seek the symbols and designs by which the Chinese people upon different levels have come to adapt and respond to changes in their world and to reconstruct their traditional civilization albeit in a modern guise and in a modernized idiom of what it means to be Chinese in a larger world. We must furthermore seek to look beyond the veil of the myth of modern China to find the complex human realities that rage and flow turbulently just beneath its apparently calm and conformist surface.

The modern Chinese government’s greatest concern is not the threat of foreign invasion, nor Western economic imperialism, nor Islamic terrorism, nor nuclear war with the U.S. Its greatest strategic concern has always been and will always remain, and, as its population continues to surge and swell with expectations of economic and social improvement of their existence, will increasingly become, the adequate containment and control of its own spirited people, which is both its greatest resource and its greatest liability. The capacity for virtually complete communist control rests upon the shoulders of the people themselves, upon their implicit consent and constraint achieved indirectly.
through the manipulation of collective representations and the ordering of the social world to the exclusion of alternative behavioral possibilities.

The capacity for the Chinese government to mold public opinion and to mobilize the Chinese people against officially sanctioned scapegoats and enemies of the state serves to maintain the Chinese population in a constant state of active distraction and implicit, obedient consent if not actual contentment with their position or situation in relation to the state.

Part and parcel to the making of the modern Chinese state has been a huge bureaucratized and highly secretive apparatus of information control and misinformation designed to keep the worldview of the average Chinese citizen strictly pro-Communist and thus basically anti-western (anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian). From China Net to China Daily, from e-mail filtering to server monitoring, from domestic foreign affairs officers to foreign emigrant spies and patent thieves, China has a huge investment in keeping the Chinese safely in the fold of the emerging Chinese official worldview.

The Chinese government does not recognize or acknowledge the concept of human rights, and these are broadly reinterpreted as human liberties that are the basis of individualistic irresponsibility. Social responsibility takes clear precedence over individual rights in the Chinese imagination, and the concept of a person’s rights coming before the interests of the state is considered criminally absurd. Taking China to task therefore on numerous human rights violations is a concept seen as foreign and non-Chinese, and therefore is rejected.

This way of thinking feeds relativistic and often self-serving systems of ideological rationalization by Chinese people that serve in turn to justify any range of what might be considered otherwise to be deviant behavior resulting in the infringement or violation of the rights of others or in the abridgment even of the powers of the state, or, vice versa, the abridgment of the powers of people by the empowerment of the state.

Conclusion

The anthropological long view of the current state of China is one in which about one quarter of the current human population shares a common national culture and heritage and a common structural identity in the world, but for whom there exists little composite or collective factual information that is reliable or even valid, and thus this quarter of the human population exists perpetually upon the twilight margins of human history.

It is not an uncommon mistake in dealing with the Chinese upon whatever level to superimpose our own ethnocentric frames of reference, often unconsciously, with the expectation that the Chinese fully comprehends and participates in the same system of reference. The Chinese, being traditionally synthesizing and accommodating, rarely make the same kind of critical error of judgment, and more often than not seeks to gain and take advantage of the unevenness of relationship created by the inability to navigate the parallax of different frameworks of cultural reference.

The cultural relativity of values is real, and it is frequently used to justify the things we do, but if we are to seek higher level answers to our moral dilemmas, then we must learn to transcend our cultural ethnocentrism and to adopt points of view that are relatively non-relative in orientation and panhuman in scope.

Chinese tend to adopt a relativistic and pragmatic versus rational and idealistic attitudes and ethos in relation to the world. This relativism in general is self-serving in the sense that it allows easy rationalization of behavior to fit circumstances. It reinforces a very conservative, very sino-centric worldview that implies identification of the individual with the Chinese state and justification of behavior of both the state and the individual in typically Chinese terms. In Chinese worldview, there are few if any absolutely inviolable laws or rules, short of filial piety and respect for the state that a well-placed bottle of Chinese wine won’t abrogate.

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The Subjugation of Afghan Women as Depicted in Their Own Words

by Fevziye B. Johnson, TRADOC Culture Center

“I shall speak about women’s writing: about what it will do. Woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women to writing, from which they have been driven away as violently as from their bides: for the same reasons, by the same law, with the same fatal goal. Woman must put herself into the text—as into the world and into history—by her own movement…”

Introduction

Restriction of women’s essential rights and of each aspect of life for women in Afghanistan is a universally admitted fact. This article explains and analyzes reasons behind the subjugation and suffering of Afghan women as depicted in their own contemporary writing. Publication of Afghan women’s limited writing in recent years inside and outside of the country is a significant contribution for analyzing the literary heritage of female writers in a male-dominated area. Critical analysis of women’s writing is a fundamental tool to see the gender segregation in a patriarchal society through women’s words, experience, and observation. These writings reflect the voices and concerns of a largely neglected population group in Afghanistan.

As Cixous argues, “Woman must put herself into the text—as into the world and into history—by her own movement.” Women of the last decades in Afghanistan broke with their imposed cultural norms and “put themselves in the text”, and now it is a time to provide social and literary criticism and interpretation of Afghan women’s writing to bring alive their words and meaning.

Role of Women in Afghan Society

As Hafizullah Emadi notes, “Afghanistan is a mosaic of various ethnic and linguistic communities. Despite their cultural and linguistic differences, their attitude toward women, to a large extent, is similar. The perception of women’s role in society is largely determined by a combination of tribal cultural norms and religious precepts as understood by men. Although some tribes treat women with some respect and impose fewer restrictions on them, this does not negate the fact that patriarchy and its prevailing culture and traditions dictate moral codes of conduct for women.”

Afghanistan’s political and social structure is based on ethnic and tribal norms and values. In the course of history any attempt to bring reform was crushed by tribal leaders and warlords. Social and tribal norms, combined with different interpretations and implementations of Islamic law, consider women physically and mentally inferior to men. These imposed values and norms require women, among many other things, to be quiet. Silence is a virtue, as noted in the autobiography of Sulima and Hala. Describing the house of one of her grandfathers in the eastern part of Afghanistan, a house-
hold in which stories of women remained unheard, Sulima notes,

“The atmosphere in his household was a tense, simmering pot of conflict. The four wives squabbled incessantly. Of course, they could not be very loud in their arguments. Women were expected to maintain a peaceful atmosphere in the house, and to remain inconspicuous. When the men were out, the wives allowed themselves the luxury of screaming, cursing, and raging, but when the men were present, they fought with silent hisses, glares, muted laments, and pursed lips…”

Noting her grandfather’s attitude toward his wives, Sulima writes,

“Although Aghajan respected Guljan, who was his oldest wife, very much and always spoke to her, as well as to his third wife, politely and affectionately, he spent most of his time with his fourth wife, who was the youngest. And it seems that he was intimate almost exclusively with his second wife. This was bizarre because otherwise, he never spoke to her at all. In fact, he treated his second wife almost with contempt by day. But he visited her residence in the qalah (castle) almost every night—and far more frequently than he visited his other wives. I found this out when I was an adult, and it bolstered my impression of my grandfather as a strange, mysterious, and difficult man.”

Women have almost the same destiny in most parts of Afghanistan, and while they were hostages in their home, they never had any rights of possessing even their own bodies. As Dupree notes, in some parts of Afghanistan women are treated like “livestock.”

Juan Cole’s assessment of Afghan society supports the statements of anthropologists Louis Dupree and Nazif Shahrani on the complexity of Afghan society, which always acted against any rights for women: “Early reformist measures taken by Amir Amanullah in the 1920s, such as improving the position of women, contributed to a popular backlash against that monarch. The country was thrown into long-term upheaval by the 1978 Marxist coup and the Soviet invasion and occupation from 1979 to 1989, during which, again, the question of women in the public sphere was broached in a major way. A conservative approach to women was taken up by the Islamic guerilla movement and implemented during the period of warlord infighting between 1992 and 1996.”

Later on Cole notes that during the time of the Taliban 90 percent of women and 60 percent of men in Afghanistan were illiterate. In fact this rate of illiteracy is a big factor in the shortage of women’s literature and writing in Afghanistan. However, the extreme methods of women’s punishment and demonstrations of power by the Taliban regime were in fact the birth of women’s serious outcry for help. As Kamran Talattof writes on the situation of Iranian female writers after the Islamic revolution in Iran, “Ironically the Islamization of the country caused the emergence of unprecedented literary works by women.”

In Afghanistan, where women never had the privileges of Iranian women or their literacy rate, writing, which for decades was heavily dominated by male power, with women having only limited access to education and literacy, became the tool to break the silence and let the world know about women’s agony in this country.

Each change in the ruling system of Afghanistan brought a new wave of discrimination against women in this country and marginalized women’s activities even further. Even before the arrival of the Taliban in 1996 and their extremist interpretation of Islam and Sharia, gender issues in Afghanistan were a major focus of the government. Women were deprived of the most essential rights of education and employment, and were locked up at home. Ellis cites Abbas Faiz on her work about Afghan women: “On August 27, 1993, the Supreme Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan issued a ruling on the veil and other matters concerning women’s behavior. Using
as its justification the argument that men are too excited by women and therefore tempted away from the Islamic wary of life, the ruling listed a number of restrictions on women’s freedom and mobility. It declared that women should be completely covered. They should not be perfumed, wear clothes similar to men’s, wear makeup, or have Western-style hair. They should be educated only at home by fathers, brothers or other close relatives, and they should only learn the basics of Islam, not worldly subjects. It ruled that girls should not be taught to write, because they would only use that skill to write love letters to strange men.”

Emadi notes, “Since the majority of women are illiterate and their access to legal institutions is extremely limited, they are at a disadvantage to fight injustices, discrimination, and physical abuse by men through legal means. One of the few options open to them to express their outrage and anger over societal and male oppression is through singing songs and behaving in a manner that subtly reflects their defiance of the social rules.” Later on he notes that “Women express their anger and frustration not only in private but sometimes also at public social gatherings such as weddings and cultural festivities by singing songs, performing dances, and playing music that satirizes social and cultural traditions that oppress women.” It must be clarified that all these social gatherings where women sing and dance are private for women only, and men have not been present there.

**Taliban Dominance, 1996-2001**

During the Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001 no social gatherings were permitted except the execution and punishment scenes in the soccer stadiums or town centers where people were forced to attend and celebrate the killing and cutting of the victim’s body as it is described by Ellis: “... The soccer stadium in Kabul is turned into an execution chamber every Friday afternoon. Crowds are forced into the bleachers to watch people being whipped, having their arms and legs cut off, or executed. Women are stoned to death for adultery, and homosexuals are killed by having a wall collapsed on them.” Ellis notes further, “Many of the punishments are focused on women.”

Zoya’s narrative provides one of the best examples of further elaboration on Foucault’s notion of bodily punishment:

“She is a victim of a mine, the result of a failed attempt to kill her.”

Zoya describes the horrific scene of torture and killing in Kabul Stadium in detail and says that she could not watch any more.

Subordination of women to traditional norms and beliefs, and Taliban’s religious principles stopped the minimal progress which had been started in the situation of women. The strong old conservative laws surfaced in the already-conventionalist society of Afghanistan, and women were subjected to a variety of harassments and deprivations. Women lost their limited freedom and were brutally forced to obey the laws and values of the religious government. New religious rules and regulations of the Taliban for Afghan society, and in particular for women, were not compatible with any universal human rights principals. U.S. Secretary of State Albright characterized the Taliban’s treatment of women and girls as “despicable” during a visit to a refugee camp in Pakistan, and announced the strong opposition of the U.S. to Taliban human rights violations. Education, having a career, working out-
side the home, and even shopping were banned for women. Schools were closed, libraries were burned, and media and publication, except Taliban's own propaganda, were forbidden for the public. Homes were searched to find women who were providing education for girls in hiding. Those who were caught were severely punished by the Taliban police.

Hala is a young girl who wants to educate little girls and boys and, despite the Taliban's strict order against education, creates a home school for children and tries to teach them some basics. But unfortunately the Taliban find out about her activities. They come to her home and interrogate her, and she denies their accusations, but the next day they show up again. As Hala notes in her autobiography:

“... Today they didn't knock. They pushed against the door and stormed through the house. Two of them grabbed my hair and pulled me down the stairs and into the courtyard. “You lied to us!” said one of the men.

“What are you talking about?” I barely recognized my voice. He pulled my hair harder and the other man slapped me. “We know who you are. You come from a family of infidels. Your sister was a Communist. Now she's a Christian. You are a Christian, too. Lying and heresy run in your blood.” The other man slapped me again, shouting about Christianity and teaching English, a language of the corrupt West.

I do not remember the rest. I remember the pain. I remember the blows. I remember the feeling of fists against my cheek, of hair being wrenched from my scalp. The sound of a woman crying, the sound of children shrieking. The sound of men shouting, “Children, go home! If we ever catch any one of you in this house again, we will burn down the house with you in it.”

The next thing I knew, I was being pulled to my feet by my hair. “You deserve to die,” one of the men said. “And we will come back for you.” The other added, “We will make an example of you...”\textsuperscript{19}

The Taliban were the absolute power against women. Too much power was given to them by the system, as Foucault argues in \textit{Discipline and Punish} about Europe in the 1670s. The Taliban were there to terrorize society, and in particular women, like Europe at the time of the Inquisition, like the medieval period in which no human rights charter existed: “There was too much power in the lower jurisdictions, which could—aided by the ignorance and poverty of those convicted—ignore appeal procedure and carry out arbitrary sentences without adequate supervision; there was too much power on the side of the prosecution, which possessed almost unlimited means of pursuing its investigations, while the accused opposed it virtually unarmed. This led judges to be sometimes over-severe and sometimes, by way of reaction, too lenient; there was too much power in the hands of the judges who were able to content themselves with futile evidence, providing it was 'legal' evidence, and who were allowed too great a freedom in the choice of penalty..."\textsuperscript{20}

The Taliban exercised their unlimited power in Afghanistan by torturing, killing, terrorizing, and shutting all windows of education and knowledge for the people, and in particular for women. The above excerpt from Hala's autobiography is only one example among many tragic events which happened to women in Afghanistan.

\textbf{‘Gender Apartheid’}

Cheryl Benard, in \textit{Veiled Courage} states, “When the Taliban began meticulously removing everything female from public view, and instituting a system for strictly separating the sexes, the outside world devised a technical term to describe this new order: 'Gender Apartheid.' This term was very apt, because it immediately made clear that this separation was occurring by force; that it was political and not a cultural or natural separation and that it had negative and discriminatory consequences."\textsuperscript{21} In fact, implementation of these policies kept women as segregated as possible and brought them nothing but suffering and humiliation.

In the traditionally male-dominated field of writing, female writing and publication, which already faced resistance from previous elements of the society, totally disappeared inside the country. Afghan women who were overpowered by the system started their publication abroad. Even lack of interest by the publishers and readers did not discourage them, and they started to write for the world to hear. In fact the passive power of Afghan women, which was their limitless endurance and silence against the brutality of the regime, started to turn into a positive power which is the power of writing. However, inside the country, female writers, poets and political activists are still not able to fight against the traditional standards and values of their society.
As Helene Cixous notes, “Men have committed the greatest crime against women. Insidiously, violently, they have led them (women) to hate women, to be their own enemies, to mobilize their immense strength against themselves, to be the executants of their virile needs...” In fact this is the main factor noted in Sulima, Hala, and Zoya’s autobiographical accounts. These women document the social and tribal structure of the country, associated with religious interpretation of women’s rights, as the reason behind women being distanced along racial and ethnolinguistic lines and hostile to each other, rather to having solidarity as women.

The imposed oppression creates intense fear of opposition by the political authorities, religious leaders, tribal leaders, husbands, and the general public, as well as fear of persecution by the family for violation of the code of honor and dignity; all this stops free association and cooperation of women of various ethnic backgrounds. The chaotic social and political situation of Afghanistan, religious tolerance for unfair household structures such as polygamy, the role of in laws in persecuting the bride, favoritism of a father, husband, and even a grandfather towards one or two female members of a family, push women to became hostile to their own gender and impose unfair oppression on each other.

However, in general terms, women in Afghanistan, regardless of their ethnic and tribal affiliation, paid the price of these harsh religious and tribal laws and regulations by dramatic suffering, both mentally and physically. The authority of the Taliban and their government over women went beyond perception and rationality, and the legal system of the government forced women either fully to obey the laws of men, or to die. This is truly the ‘Gender Apartheid’ described by Cheryl Benard.

Memoirs of Three Afghan Women

Robyn R. Warhol believes that “In literary terms, ‘reading’ can mean two distinct things; the first meaning centers on texts, the second on receivers of texts. First, a reading is an interpretation, one critic’s version of what a piece of writing has to say. A ‘feminist reading,’ in this usage, would be an interpretation of a text assuming gender’s centrality to what the text means...” Thus the following writings invite the reader to exercise their own judgment and comprehension of the text. According to Judith Fetterley, “Literature is political.” Indeed, all the political, social, and economic chaos in Afghanistan are the main reason for women’s suffering, and their writings which echo those realities, are political.

Behind The Burqa: Our Life In Afghanistan And How We Escaped To Freedom by “Sulima” and “Hala,” as told to Batya Swift Yasgur

This book is the autobiography of two sisters, with the pseudonyms of Sulima and Hala, and is narrated to the co-writer of the book. Its chronological narration, with very intimate stories of the family and various members of the households, brings many unknown facts about the Islamic, tribal and ethnic structure of Afghanistan to light. While Sulima, the oldest sister, tells of the silent suffering of her family members in the 1970s, Hala, who is sixteen years younger, shares with the reader her first-hand experience with the Mujahidin and later with the Taliban.

Sulima’s awareness of women’s subordination and unquestioning obedience started when she was a little girl:

“Even when I was quite young, I found Madarjan’s (dear mother’s) approach to be unsatisfying, yet I
found her gentle presence to be comforting. To my frustration, Madarjan did not offer concrete answers to the questions that troubled me, especially those that concerned the obviously inequitable treatment of women. Why did women have to ask men for permission to leave the house? Because that’s what’s right. Why did women do all the laundry? Because that’s the job of women. It has always been that way. Why do women have to listen to men? The Qur’an says so. Even though we were not very religious Muslims, invoking the Qur’an always ended a question-and-answer process. The Final Authority had been cited…”25

Sulima cannot understand the change in her father’s attitude. He makes a short official trip to Saudi Arabia and comes back a different man. He asks everyone to cover their heads inside the house, even little Sulima. She is not used to it, and one day during dinner her scarf slips off her head onto her neck. The father cannot stand this; he comes towards her and grabs her scarf and, in her fear and confusion, wants to fix it for her,

“...but my scarf is getting tighter. Tighter. I can’t breathe! He’s pulling me toward him. From far away, I hear his voice, ‘When I was young I said, if I ever have a daughter when I marry, I will make her cover her hair. And if her scarf falls off her neck, I will tie it so hard that she will choke to death.’ Suddenly, he lets go. I stumble backward...‘don’t ever let me catch you with your head uncovered again.’”26

This incident, and many others that she observes, gives her a different consciousness about her gender:

“... That is how I became a woman’s rights activist at the age of ten. Of course, I didn’t call myself a ‘women’s rights activist.’ I had never heard such a term in my life. Nor did I have some other phrase that I applied to myself. I didn’t conceptualize what I was doing. I simply acted…”27

Sulima, Hala, Zoya, and many other educated women in Afghanistan were becoming aware that something unjust was going on, but this awareness was not strong enough to make them fight for their rights, and to get united as a one body and one voice.

**Zoya’s Story: An Afghan Woman’s Struggle For Freedom**

This is the memoir narrated as an autobiographical account of a young Afghan girl who endured the terror of war and experienced the sad reality of being female in Afghanistan while she was still only a little girl. She brings to life the unbelievable stories of subjugation of women in her country. Zoya provides the reader with insightful awareness of Afghan culture and the silent suffering of women. One of the main figures in her autobiographical account is her grandmother, to whom she is very close. This grandmother shares with her stories of her private life from the time she was still married to a man that Zoya had never met.

“When grandmother told me that he would beat her, I asked her why. I though she must have done something wrong and been punished, just the way a child would be beaten for making a mistake. Grandmother shook her head. ‘It was different. Your grandfather was heartless. He would arrive at the house with a dozen friends, and he would order me to prepare lunch immediately. And it must be a big meal, with fine dishes. Once I said to him, ‘I am too tired. I am your servant, but even servants are human. I haven’t got the strength to do what you ask. And we don’t have enough plates for everyone.’ I said it in front of his friends, and he went to fetch his boots, big boots that he used for walking through the snow, and he beat me with them. That was the first time he beat me in front of his friends…”28

Zoya tells the reader about her conversation with her grandmother, how helpless she was in having no protection from anyone in the family, and how embarrassing it could have been for the family if she had run away. Grandmother tells her that she must never tolerate what she had gone through, and admits that it was a mistake to put up with that situation. She encourages her to get education, and never to be shy of expressing her opinions in front of men. This conversation reflects the awareness of Afghan women of their situation, but also shows how norms and cultural values oppress their identity and frighten them from standing for themselves.

Most of the latest writing of Afghan women is concentrated on their difficult life under the Taliban. However, writers provide insight about the lives of their mothers and grandmothers as well, their seclusion and social mistreatment even prior to the arrival of the Taliban.

Female writers of Afghanistan are recovering from a long time of stagnation and trying to find their identity through literature. This awakening is obvious in Zoya’s writing:

“It was during this journey that I truly came to understand what the burqa meant. As I stole glanc-
es at the women sitting around me, I realized that I no longer thought them backward, which I had as a child. These women were forced to wear the burqa. Otherwise they faced lashings, or beatings with chains. The Taliban required them to hide their identities as women, to make them feel so ashamed of their sex that they were afraid to show one inch of their bodies. The Taliban did not know the meaning of love; women for them were only a sexual instrument.”

Conclusion

Afghanistan is still in a state of war. Fear is still keeping little girls and women from going to school or obtaining education.

“The famous Tajik poet, Gul Rukhsar Safiyova, has said: “If you educate a man, you educate one person; if you educate a woman, you educate the entire nation.”

As long as the veil remains an imposed “virtue” on women, and their talents remain invisible just like their faces and bodies, the Afghan people will continue to be deprived of the intellectual and creative fruits of this entire segment of their population. It is too soon to believe changes will happen and women’s freedom will be bestowed upon them by some invisible power. Female writers in Afghanistan either have to publish their work outside their country or to keep it hidden from the public. Literary historians and critics will face serious obstacles in their work related to female writing in Afghanistan. It is not enough to call the subjugation of women in this country as “despicable” or “gender apartheid”; women will have to struggle and fight to get their rights and access to education and authorship. I think any input in this field; will be a useful contribution to honor the efforts of those who are engaged in this struggle against oppressive gender policies, now and in the future.

Endnotes

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6. Sulima and Hala, 5.
7. Ibid.
8. Louis Dupree, 125.
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15. Ibid.
16. Ellis, 54, 63, 64.
24. Ibid., 564.
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27. Ibid., 20.

Fevziye Bahar Johnson was born in Afghanistan, and completed her undergraduate studies at Kabul University and the University of Istanbul, Turkey. In 1985 she moved to Munich, Germany, to accept a position as a senior editor and broadcaster for the Tajiki and Afghan-language services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In 1995 she relocated to Seattle, Washington where she earned an MA from the University of Washington in Middle East/Near East Languages and Civilizations, and continued studies for a PhD in the same field. In 2002, she accepted a position as Assistant Professor at DLI in Monterey, California, and in September 2008 she joined the TCC. She is an experienced journalist and instructor, and has numerous publications in English, Farsi, Dari, and Turkish.
LATIN AMERICA
Imagine you are on leave time and are attempting to cross an international border in the Andean Region. The border official is scrutinizing your U.S. passport for its validity. You have an important meeting that you must be on time for, and you must negotiate with the official to get across the border as quickly as possible. This will involve significant skills in cross-cultural rapport building and an understanding of the local culture.

In order to get another person’s confidence, we must build trust with them; gaining trust is the cornerstone to building rapport. According to FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, rapport is “Confidence which leads to a willingness to cooperate”. This definition implies the importance of trust when attempting to build rapport. Depending upon your cultural background, the elements that go into building trust may vary. In American culture it may be maintaining eye contact to demonstrate sincerity, where as in Japanese culture it may be averting one’s eyes as to recognize the other’s position within society. To build rapport across cultures, we have to recognize and understand the intricacies of the other culture. When we attempt to build trust with someone from a different culture, we need to recognize the rules they play by, their cultural norms and customs which, if not recognized, will limit rapport-building.

To effectively operate in our own society, we grant trust everyday in big and small ways. In American culture, a simple handshake or the signing of a document is a symbol of trust. When we go to the bank, we trust that they put our money correctly in the account and do not spend it themselves. When we drive down the highway, we trust the oncoming traffic not to come in our lane. If we didn’t have this trust, we would be too nervous to get behind the wheel. Although we take these things for granted in our culture, people from other cultures may have different systems which they follow that they take for granted. To begin building rapport, you must understand their system in which they build trust.

Overall, to build rapport in the Andean region, earning trust takes time. While people in this region tend to be very friendly and hospitable, relationships tend to take time to solidify. According to Conflict Specialist Dr. Mitchell R. Hammer, in his guide to Intercultural Conflict Styles, in looking at the Andean region as a whole the majority of the population reflects an indirect style. An indirect style means that most conflict and communication will demonstrate elements of ambiguity and vagueness. Often subtleties and nuances reveal deep meanings that are intended to be understood without the explicit words being said. This implication can cause difficulties both with cross-cultural communication as well as with intercultural rapport building. It is important to be aware that in the U.S., the value is placed on being direct, forthright and clear. In the Andean region, they can find their neighbors to the North pushy, blunt, and sometimes lacking in a certain level of sensitivity and awareness. In addition, like in the U.S., the inhabitants of the Andean region tend to be more emotionally restrained and reserved. Arguments or disagreements are not won or lost by high levels of emotion, but instead through logical, low emotion persuasion (Hammer, 2003). By keeping these overall differences in mind, we can better facilitate cross-cultural communication.

In the sections that follow, we will take a very brief look at each specific country within the Andean re-
If we attempt to build rapport with someone from northern Andean culture, we must know the groundwork of their social terrain to properly guide our correct conduct in order to build trust. A brief cultural background and the examination of some elements of the countries of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru will be provided in order to serve as a reference for reasons to act in certain ways to build rapport within that culture.

Colombia. A national culture of Colombia is difficult to define due to marked class, caste, ethnic, and regional differences. Although remnants of Spanish colonization are apparent in Colombian language, culture, and religion, ethnic and regional groups remain stratified and independent (Lewis, 2006). Despite the fact that 90 percent of Colombians are Catholic and Spanish is the national language (CIA Word Factbook, 2009), linguistic variations and religious practices will depend on the region, depending on if you are in a rural or urban environment and the ethnic groups with which you are dealing. Additionally, Colombians base their class system according to physical appearance, regional heritage, and socioeconomic status (Every Culture, 2009). The color of skin is a social indicator in Colombia, as in much of the Andean region, and usually defines an individual’s class. The Spanish colonization in the 16th Century began to embed these disparities in colonial Colombian society. As time passed, Colombians of European descent took their place at the top of the economic echelon exploiting and enslaving the indigenous and importing African slaves (Every Culture, 2009). Since the beginning of Spanish colonialization, white Colombians have retained the greatest access to resources and have held the highest social esteem. Inclusion of other races and ethnicities into the middle and high classes are dependent upon an individual’s regional heritage and social, economic, and political status.

Fifty-eight percent of Colombians are mestizo (CIA Word Factbook, 2009), with mestizo being defined as a mix of European and indigenous ancestry. Mestizos, along with Colombian mulattos (a mix of African and European ancestry), have the opportunity to ascend to a higher class, but this mobility heavily depends on the individual’s “whiteness” and level of inclusion from white elites (Every Culture, 2009). The Spanish also imported slaves from Africa to mine precious metals on the Pacific coast. The Afro-Colombian population is the smallest minority group and has the least social esteem in society.

Depending on if you are in a rural or urban environment, gender roles will vary. Generally, people in rural settings adhere to more defined gender roles: women are expected to rear children and be caretakers of the household, while men are the disciplinarians and may work outside the house (Every Culture, 2009). However, economic stresses in these areas may force women out of the house and into the fields to work. In urban settings, it is becoming more common for women to go out in the professional workforce.

Colombia is a diverse country with unique differences within the regions. In religious practices Colombians in the countryside have combined African and 16th Century Spanish practices to Catholicism, and each village may have a patron saint which is believed to be more accessible than God (Every Culture, 2009). You will also find linguistic and cultural differences in the coastal regions versus the interior. The coastal residents have a more rapid style of speech, while people from the interior speak more grammatically correct and deliberately (Every Culture, 2009).

The effects of past events have an effect on the values, beliefs, behaviors and norms of a culture, and history is a reference point into understanding why it is shaped that way. Additionally, history provides you with a framework that will enable you to treat others with a genuine empathy that will enhance rapport-building and build a more solid relationship.

Venezuela. Venezuela is the third largest supplier of oil to the U.S., behind Saudi Arabia and Canada (Global Security, 2006). Oil reserves provide it with much wealth, but the question of who benefits from this wealth has been a historic problem for the social stratum of the country. Oil production is owned and government run, and corrupt political leaders in the past have squandered the wealth from Venezuela’s petroleum, which created a division between the economic classes as well as increased frustration and disillusionment of the poor towards Venezuelan politics and government. This unrest led to two coups against the Venezuelan government in 1992 by current pro-Socialist President Hugo Chavez. After serving two years in jail, Chavez

A coup in 2002 against the largely Chavez run government briefly removed Chavez from power. The coup was in response to Chavez’s firing of the president of the government run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, and replacing him with a former Communist Party militant. A subsequent general strike by the Venezuelan public, who were opposed to Chavez’s policies and actions, lasted two months (December 2002 – February 2003). This strike affected Venezuela’s oil production and distribution, and sent Venezuela into an economic downward spiral.

All of these events pushed Venezuela into a more divided social and economic diaspora – the poor against the rich. Currently, Chavez and his administration are famous for their pro-socialist policies and support of the poor class. Chavez is a close friend of Cuba’s dictator, Fidel Castro (Global Security, 2006). Despite opposition to the Chavez administration both in the United States and in Venezuela, in 2009 a constitutional amendment was passed allowing for the Venezuelan president to serve unlimited consecutive terms.

Although these events might disfavor social cohesion within Venezuela, the country remains fairly patriotic and optimistic. When attempting to build rapport with a Venezuelan, be sympathetic of their turbulent history and provide optimism for the future of their country (Lewis, 2006). Remember that Venezuelans are strongly nationalistic, and be cautious talking about the flaws of the nation. Also, be aware that the color red is strongly associated with the Chavez regime, so in order to best build rapport it is recommended to avoid using the color red wherever possible.

**Ecuador.** Two of the most striking features of Ecuadorian society are the highland-coastal cultural divide and the socioeconomic class divide. The cultural division between the highland, or sierra, region and the coastal areas reaches into politics, economics, and cultural values and beliefs. This rivalry starting from the time of independence continues until the present day. It frequently plays a pivotal role in Ecuadorian politics. Governments parceled out important political offices and the region of origin was a critical factor in an individual’s political career (Hanratty, 1989). These economic, political, and cultural divisions have led to an intense rivalry between the regions. The highland region hosts the capital city of Quito as well as a large and influential indigenous population. This region tends to be politically and economically conservative in both the rural and urban areas.

In Quito, the primary industry is business, politics and banking. In rural areas, the primary industry is agriculture, including subsistence farming.

Within Ecuador, the indigenous groups represent twenty-five percent of the overall population of Ecuador, with almost all living in the highlands region. Those from the sierra, or mountainous region, are more reserved and conservative in comparison with those from the coast, who tend to be more liberal due to the historic influences of international trade and large scale export agriculture.

The largest and most populous city in Ecuador is Guayaquil, which is also the nation’s primary port. Due to the past use of slaves on the plantations in the coastal region, it also has a significant Afro-Ecuadorian population.

Large disparities between rich and poor are also a fact of life in Ecuador. Due to Ecuador’s large debt, the government has difficulty in funding high levels of social spending that might improve the quality of life. Examples of such disparities include: growth stunting from chronic malnutrition that affects twenty-six percent of children under five years old and rates that are significantly worse for indigenous children (UNICEF, 2009). Both the
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian populations are fairly marginalized and according to UNICEF, are more likely to grow up in poverty with little access to formal education. As in other countries of Latin America, frequently socio-economic classes are racially and/or ethnically defined. When building relationships with Ecuadorians, it is important to keep in mind the distinctions and the rivalry between the highland areas and the coastal region and the disparity between the wealthy and the poor.

**Peru.** Perhaps the most important characteristic of Peruvian history is the limited influence colonization had in the more inaccessible regions of the country. The indigenous people of highland Peru and in the Amazon region have been relatively secluded from foreign influence for geographical reasons, and cultures in these areas have been preserved. Peru has the third largest indigenous population of any Latin American country after Bolivia and Guatemala (Gill, 2007). The indigenous, or Amerindian, population mainly resides in the interior highlands and Amazon regions, where they have had less exposure to European ethnicities. In the coastal region intermixing among various ethnicities has been more common.

The origins of some contemporary issues in Peru regarding national identity are the result of this schism. For five centuries the indigenous population has been persecuted and discriminated against by white elites and mestizos, who today comprise fifty percent of the country’s population (Gill, 2007, p. 43). Although this division is a current issue for Peru, you will still find a strong sense of national identity that is held together by common cultural characteristics such as religion, language, food and music (Every Culture, 2009).

The three most common languages of Peru are Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara. The Quechua and Aymara languages were enforced by the Incan Empire and are now languages of the indigenous inhabitants of highland Peru. Spanish was later introduced and enforced by the Spanish Crown with its colonization of the coastal region. Additionally, indigenous peoples of the Amazon region have their own languages apart from these main ones. Peruvians identify with these histories as part of their cultural makeup, and language is a source of identity for them. Therefore, building rapport will depend on which ethnicity you are dealing with and the history with which they build their identity.

**Bolivia.** Despite Bolivia’s mineral and energy wealth, it is one of the poorest and least developed countries in Latin America with an average annual income per person in 2008 of a mere $4,500 per year, ranking Bolivia 147th out of 229 countries in the world. Over sixty percent of the population is under the poverty line, with most of those being of indigenous descent. Currently, large segments of the population lack access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation, especially in the rural areas. Over fifty-five percent of the population considers themselves indigenous, including the current President, Evo Morales (CIA, 2009). Evo Morales, a long-time coca leaf grower, is the first indigenous president of Bolivia; he is of Aymara descent. He has strong ties to both the coca growers as well as to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Like Chavez’s nationalism programs, President Morales is not only against the U.S.-backed coca eradication programs, but he has also sought some form of national control over Bolivia’s huge gas reserves - the second largest in the region. He has also sought to nationalize all of the other natural resource industries, in addition to attempting to redistribute the wealth (BBC, 2005).

In January 2009, Bolivia underwent further radical changes, when President Morales’ project for a new constitution that aimed to give greater rights to the indigenous majority population won, despite strong opposition from the upper class and the resource-rich eastern provinces. In spite of Bolivia’s many natural resources, one of the main agricultural crops is coca. Bolivia is one of the world’s largest producers of coca, the raw material for cocaine. A crop eradication program, which benefits the smooth flow of conditional U.S. aid, has incensed many of Bolivia’s poorest farmers for whom coca is often the only source of income, as well as President Evo Morales, (BBC, Country Profile: Bolivia, 2009). He pledged to raise taxes on foreign mining firms and redistribute one-fifth of Bolivia’s land to peasant farmers (BBC, Country Profile: Bolivia, 2009). While acceptance and socio-economic status of the indigenous cultures in Bolivia have not traditionally been the norm, Bolivia, as a country, is striving to change this practice of separation. While many of Morales’ methods are unconventional in the global
context, remember that you cannot judge a culture on your own terms, and cultural relativity is the cornerstone of the discipline of Anthropology. In recognizing this you will provide yourself with alternative viewpoints held by the local culture, and let yourself see the world in another’s eyes which will enhance building rapport.

Conclusion

If we take a look at the border situation from the beginning of the article, how can you apply some of the provided cultural and historical information in order to quickly build rapport and get yourself out of this situation? To build trust, you must be aware of the official’s ethnicity, religion, gender, class and political views. If you are a woman and the official is a man, you might honor them by paying attention to gender roles within the culture. Additionally, the border official’s ethnicity will be important to remain cognizant. If he/she is of darker skin and you lighter, and ethnic and socio-economic separation in the country is an issue, you should treat him/her as an equal in order to best gain trust. Due to the indirect style of communication and of conflict, know that at times in much of this region, vagueness and ambiguity define communication.

It is generally recommended to stay away from openly expressed political opinion in a foreign culture, especially if you are in a politically conservative country. Therefore, do not present any bias against their political system for this will definitely limit rapport-building. Lastly, be sure to display empathy in the situation, maintain attentiveness, watch your body language, avoid open anger, and remember the importance that personal relationships play in these countries. The effects of past events have an effect on the values, beliefs, behaviors and norms of a culture, and looking at the culture as a whole, you will be able to navigate within these cultures more fluidly and more effectively.

Works Cited


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Introduction

Wars are generally fought on two fronts: the military front and the civilian front, or the public relations front, the latter being the far more difficult of the two campaigns to win. Defeating the enemy from a military perspective is indeed only half the battle, and in essence, the simpler of the two missions assigned to today’s modern military. The military knows what is needed to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, but to win the public relations war the military needs to pay serious attention and learn about other cultures.

Even if victory is reached on the battlefield, before one can declare “Mission Accomplished,” one must also be able to win the peace, not just the war. That, however, is only possible if those on the front lines as well as the leadership directing the troops on those front lines understand, and to some degree, appreciate the culture of their opponent as different, and at times, strange as it might be compared to their own.

Lebanon, October 1983

Lesson one in foreign/military affairs: Being different does not mean being inferior, nor superior. Do not think for one moment that yours is a better culture because others do things differently than you do. And at the same time, neither are they any better than you. Keep in mind that “different” is just what that word signifies, different. Make an effort to understand the other cultures and you will be one step ahead of your enemy—and possibly closer to victory. As Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese author of ancient military strategies wrote in his still very influential book on military stratagem, The Art of War, “The first step in defeating your enemy is getting to know him.” This phrase was repeated in Mao’s Red Book on Military Strategies in the 1960s.

As today’s Soldiers and Marines find themselves deployed in lands where not only are other languages spoken, but where the culture is diametrically different from the environment back home, embedding translators with the troops will no longer suffice. Today, it has become imperative to deploy people who understand not just the words, but also what is behind those words, those spoken as well as the unspoken ones. At the same time it is important to understand hand gestures, body language, intonations and how words and phrases are used to mean different things to different people. The difference can impact the lives of those who find themselves on the front lines.

When the Marines were deployed in Lebanon in 1982-83 as part of the U.S. Multinational (peacekeeping) Force, this correspondent often accompanied squads on four and five-hour foot patrols through Beirut’s southern suburbs, an area where Hezbollah had its stronghold. On one such occasion and upon returning to base, the unit was debriefed by G2 personnel who asked what the mood was like in this huge slum area inhabited by Shiites Moslems.

“The natives were friendly,” said one Marine.

“Yeah, they smiled and waved,” echoed another.

After allowing the Marines to leave the debriefing tent, this correspondent told the intel boys that they would benefit greatly if they were to have Arabic speakers accompany the troops. “Yes, the ‘natives,’ as you call them seemed friendly. Yes, they did wave and smile. But it was what they said that was not so neighborly. What they were saying in Arabic was what they wanted to do to your mothers and sisters, given half a chance.”

A few months later, on October 23, 1983, the Marines suffered their biggest loss of men in any single battle since Iwo Jima. In typical Inside Beltway
politics the blame for what went wrong in Beirut was passed down the line and fell on the shoulders of Colonel Timothy Geraghty, the commander of the Marine Amphibious Unit in Beirut. But Geraghty was not to blame, as his hands were tied by politicians in Washington who were completely ignorant of the deadly quagmire that was Lebanon. The Marines just paid the price.

Motivations Driving Conflicts

Quite often scholars of conflict resolution will refer to a sundry list of theories as they try to explain the reasons and motivations that drive conflicts. Conflict resolutionists, or as they are at times called, conflict interveners, will put forward any number of reasons why a particular conflict has erupted along with ideas on how to resolve the said conflict. Furthermore, they will theorize on the causes and roots of the conflict which will be assigned to any of the following theories and sub-theories: sociocultural dissimilarity, cognitive imbalance, threats of political imbalance, authoritarian and/or totalitarian rule by one minority over others, system polarity (usually amounting to one minority vying for power as a means of self-defense).

Among the plethora of theories dealing with the issues relating to the causes of conflict and the role (or not) of culture in conflict is John Burton’s needs theory. Indeed, one may argue that all other theories can be indexed under the needs theory. Example: the need to satisfy any urge or emotion can be written down as emerging from the “needs theory.” In that respect all other theories become derivatives of the needs theory. The need to hate, etc.,

As Tarja Vayrynen writes in her critique of Burton: “Human needs are a central concept in the language of Stoicism, classical tragedy, Augustinian Christianity, Enlightenment discourse, and Marxism. However, Abraham Maslow, has his own version of his needs theory; one which is widely used in social science, including safety needs, belongingness needs, etc. Maslow believes that when physiological needs are satisfied, higher needs emerge and this leads to conflict.”

And yet another theorist on needs, Paul Sites, stipulates that needs are essential in becoming a human being. “People will fight and die to protect values related to needs gratification.” This is an important quote worth repeating: “People will fight and die to protect values...”

Defeating the Taliban

This sentence sheds much light on the reasons why the U.S. and its NATO allies have been incapable in defeating the Taliban, despite the immense imbalance of power between the two forces. The U.S. has the best-equipped military force in the world and the most sophisticated weaponry on the planet along with the most thoroughly trained professional Soldiers, Marines, and Special Forces than any other country in the world. Yet, the U.S. and its NATO allies, who also rank at the top of the list of well formed militaries, continue to face a real challenge in defeating the Taliban, a rag-tag coalition of poorly organized warring militias that have no structured military command or sophisticated weapons, and have absolutely no recourse to air power. As former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told this reporter during an interview in Washington in September 2009, “The Taliban fighter wear sandals, carried an AK-47 and survives on an onion and a piece of bread a day. You Americans, on the other hand, are over supplied.”

What gives the Taliban their strength—perhaps their inner strength as well, is that they are not just fighting to defend their land against foreign intervention, they are fighting to preserve their culture and their way of life. Does one not see here specters of Vietnam? Substitute the onion for a bowl of rice and you have the Vietcong.

Because as surely as there were an assortment of groups simply opposed to American military presence in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam war, another similarity with that conflict is the presence of foreign fighters among the Taliban who simply wish to fight the U.S.’s intervention in Western Asia.

Sean Bryne and Cynthia L. Irvin point out that “…People may actively engage in conflict to precipitate social change.” But in the case of the Taliban, they are fighting to prevent social change in order to preserve their way of life; in other words, maintain and preserve their culture.

This is why understanding the cultures of countries where troops are engaged is paramount to the overall success of the mission. At the same time it is also just as important to make our culture understood by others. It is also of paramount importance to relay directly to the people of the countries where the U.S. is engaged militarily that Washington has more interest that simply selling Coca Cola, Microsoft,
and Nike to the developing world. Contrary to popular belief, U.S. troops have no desire to remain in foreign lands.

**Public Diplomacy**

This is where comprehensive public relations campaigns are needed to inform other cultures the U.S. comes into contact with that it is not out to change their cultures, even if it is out to change their political system. But before any of that can materialize, we must first understand their culture.

Going to war today necessitates recruiting warriors of words to fight a public relations campaign that is almost as important as the military phase of the war. Here are two examples of just how important public diplomacy is when it comes to war.

When Russia and the Republic of Georgia went to war in the summer of 2008 over the break-away republic of South Ossetia, the presidents of both countries dedicated several hours a day of their precious time to grant interviews to the international media, knowing full well the impact a positive public relations campaign would have on the overall effect of the war. Teams of Western public relations specialists were hired because both sides realized they needed to speak to the rest of the world in a language that would be understood. And, they were wise enough to understand the cultural gap between their own culture and those needing to be convinced, that people who not only spoke the language their campaign was targeting, but also understood the nuances and gestures. It is at this point that public relations become public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy, according to the definition given by the USC Center on Reporting and Public Diplomacy is the way a country (or multi-lateral organization such as the United Nations) communicates with citizens in other societies (read here cross-cultural communications.) The premise for effective public diplomacy is that dialogue rather than a sales pitch is often central to achieving the goals of foreign policy. Public diplomacy, in order to be effective must be a two-way street. The Center states that film, television, music, sports, video games and other social/cultural activities are enormously important avenues for otherwise diverse citizens to understand each other and integral to international cultural understanding.

One of the most successful initiatives in history which embodies the principles of effective public diplomacy was the creation in the 1950s of the European Coal and Steel Community, which later became the European Economic Community and eventually evolved into its current phase, the European Union (EU).

The initial purpose of the EU when it was first created after World War II was to tie the people of Europe together in such a way that war would become impossible. The road map was relatively simple: tie the economies of the different European countries together in such a way that war between the former foes would become unimaginable. The challenge lay in the hurdles of combining all the different cultures, languages and religions of the old continent. How does one go about bringing together as diverse cultures as the British, French, Germans, Italians and Greeks? And if that was not difficult enough, throw in the Irish, the Scandinavians, and parts of the former Eastern Block.

**Conclusion**

The answer was in ascertaining that the media and the public opinion were part of the drive that would explain the differences, yet stress upon the commonality of the different communities and cultures that make up the EU today. Its strength is indeed its wide cultural diversity, as is to perhaps an even greater degree the differences of cultures one finds in the U.S. Understanding cultural differences will in the final analysis lead to quicker resolutions of conflicts and will facilitate the transition to peace.

**Endnotes**


**Other References:**


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Corruption and Intelligence Policy

In an intelligence agency, information typically falls into four general categories: information that can be shared; information that cannot be shared by law; information that cannot be shared by policy, and information that is not shared because the agency chooses to withhold it. There are myriad reasons why agencies elect to withhold information in a joint intelligence venture, including: inter-agency rivalries and jealousies; political differences between intelligence executives; misunderstandings of law and policy; potential for future bargaining leverage; inadequate or non-aligned technology, and lack of formal reciprocity agreements, among others. However, field research by this author has revealed that the most frequently cited and heavily weighted reason among European and U.S. intelligence executives in deciding to withhold information from their counterparts is the perception of corruption.

Where cooperation in information-sharing is formalized by a pact, such as The Europol Convention, intelligence executives may opt to ignore legislated sharing parameters in order to safeguard proprietary information. In a multilateral or joint intelligence effort against terrorism, reluctance to share information based on the perception of corruption could fatally hobble the combined effort. Mary Noel Pepys writes, “The perception of corruption is as insidious, just as important to overcome, as corruption itself, as they both have the effect of undermining the public’s trust ...” Whenever an intelligence executive violates a formal agreement, whether internal or external to the agency’s host government, and if the purpose of the breach is to safeguard information, then almost certainly the perception of corruption is at the root of the executive’s decision-making process.

In fairness to the intelligence executives interviewed for this study, none of them used the term corruption discussing security concerns regarding information, but rather more often employ the industry term leakage of proprietary information, whether deliberate or unintentional. Once proprietary information has left control of the originating agency, the perceived risk of an unauthorized release escalates relative to the importance of the information. The reason for this is apparent: information valuable to the originating agency will be perceived by the sender as equally or more valuable to the recipient, essentially consigning the worth of the information to the second agency and discounting the worth to itself (the information having been shared).

The concept behind this perception is simple: an intelligence executive will view information and in-
telligence generated by his agency as more valuable than that received from any other agency. The commonly held perception is that because the originator’s intelligence will out-value the intelligence of the recipient, by its origins alone, shared information will be an attractive nuisance for theft. Intelligence executives perceive shared information as an attractive nuisance to any corrupt intelligence official who might care to profit by trading with a hostile entity.

Although hostile entities surely place value on guarded/protected information, values placed on government intelligence by hostile entities are not necessarily coequal with government valuations. For example, carefully guarded information such as bank records—which are useful in tracing the movement of illicit funds—may be valuable in tracking terrorist cells; however, the same information is doubtless of little value to terrorists who are certainly well aware of their own cash flow. Nevertheless, what doubtless is of greater interest to hostiles is to utilize government information to learn who or what is being targeted or perhaps to develop a better understanding of how far along the government is in an inquiry. And so, as a counterintelligence measure, the intelligence executive must anticipate the risk of information leakage valuable to hostiles and mitigate that threat. Often the result is sanitizing information or stovepiping it altogether. Other countermeasures include screening intelligence employees and taking technological steps to mitigate the risk of information leakage to hostiles.

One method of sanitizing information is to strip it of its source references. Another sanitizing method is to strip information of name or ownership references and a third is to remove quantitative references such as numerical amounts, sequences, etc. The bank records example above illustrates the benefit of sanitization of name or ownership information before sharing, because corrupt officials will perceive this information as attractive for theft. This is not because officials would benefit directly from the information, but instead because hostiles may benefit by acquiring name and ownership information through a corrupt official.

This typifies information deliberately withheld in joint intelligence, i.e., naming names in an open inquiry. Additionally, it is rare that an agency will allow unfettered access to open case information, specifically because revealing the contents of a current inquiry or operation may divulge names. Because open case information is potentially far more valuable to the hostiles than to a recipient agency in a sharing agreement, it is information highly valued to all sides and frequently stovepiped.

This is important in understanding the depth of policy coordination between and among agencies engaged in information-sharing. Succinctly put, intelligence agency executives coordinating decentralized policies by definition must have authority and control over the negotiated policies. Therefore, the presence of withheld information with perceived corruption as a variable in information-sharing is direct evidence that intelligence executives must have independent control in manipulating the depth of coordination between agencies. The revelation that the perception of corruption is integral in the executive decision making process (regarding whether or not to share), and consequently instrumental in agency cooperation and policy coordination, suggests that corruption in intelligence should be examined further.

Informal Cooperation and Corruption

One alternative to utilizing established regimes of cooperation in information-sharing is utilization of informal cooperation to acquire information. Whether the means are legitimate or not—and they could be either—informal cooperation has been a longstanding institution. Ostensibly, informal information-sharing between agencies is most often used to expedite the collection process, cut red tape, or for non-official purposes. However, in a setting wherein sensible discretion is a hallmark of good practice, it should not be surprising when one intelligence official asks another to share information and advance a common cause, but violate policy or domestic law in the process. When an illegal act is suborned through informal cooperation and consequently a law is violated in information-sharing, it is generally understood among the players that the illegal transaction likely will never be made public; hence, agents may employ illegal means to acquire information as it is well understood they likely may do so with impunity.

Not all corrupt acts in intelligence are law violations to further cooperation in a common cause, just as not all informal cooperation is illicit. To thwart unauthorized flow of information, intelligence exec-
utives take steps to control information flow from the agency, including establishment of a review process as an internal requirement to access-guarded information. Frequently, this is all that is necessary to stem the flow of unauthorized information leakage or, minimally, to send a message to agents engaged in informal coordination that sharing guarded information is officially discouraged. Still, most intelligence executives concede that some guarded information passes illicitly between agencies and, although perceived by the public as a corrupt practice, little will come of it as it frequently benefits all players (i.e., beyond the intelligence industry), arguably, including the general public.

However, informal interagency cooperation in information-sharing can foment corrupt practices. Although the players’ motives are most often benign and the end product is often beneficial, what of those acts that are indeed corrupt? According to Richard Ward and Robert McCormack, “[Corrupt] activities can be generally classified into four categories:

- Acts which are common throughout the whole [agency] and are generally accepted.
- Acts which are less common than those of the first category but which are generally overlooked.
- Acts which are common to particular units... and which are accepted or overlooked by unit members.
- Acts which are not common, which involve a few individuals, and which would be reported if discovered.”

Any of the above acts described by Ward and McCormack can apply to informal cooperation in information-sharing. The first illustrates how one agent might contact another with an information request outside of normal channels to expedite its receipt. Whereas, this request is not necessarily unlawful, it may be perceived as corrupt if it violates internal policy (which it almost certainly would). However, requests as these may be so common that acquiescing to them within certain agency cultures may also be common. In the experience of this author while in government service, when contacted by agencies with requests for information, official channels were often foregone in favor of whatever was the most expedient method of information delivery. However, exceptions to secure practice such as these were accounted for in standard operating procedures and so remained within the domain of formal cooperation under tactical intelligence guidelines.

The second corrupt act described by Ward and McCormack may be illustrated as a so-called “favor” request for information from one agency to another agency that is infrequent, but requires a policy or law violation to comply. When one agency makes a request of another to violate its standards of practice, the request is usually not secret; therefore, the agency that complies with an illicit interagency request does so at its own peril. Nonetheless, compliance with such requests is not uncommon. A typical example would be of an agency that could not locate an individual of interest and would resort to protected telephone, banking or tax records held by another agency to learn (e.g.) a suspect’s place of residence or employment. The source of this information likely would never come to light at trial.

The third corrupt act can be viewed as particularly insidious if found within an intelligence agency, as doubtless the opportunities for bribes, payoffs and blackmail abound in the information collection field and institutionally could manifest itself in a bureaucratic kleptocracy. Additionally, information could be bought and sold by analysts who sit at the command center of information flow every day. Whereas, occasions as these are rare, they certainly are not unprecedented in the United States or Europe.

And finally, the fourth corrupt act as described by Ward and McCormack suggests that the culture of the agency or its agents is not out of the ordinary, but rather the corrupt acts of a few are an anomaly to the whole. This would be illustrated by a blackmailer, information thief or bribe taker who acts alone or with few accomplices in secret and whose acts once discovered would not be tolerated.

Cooperation, Discretion, and Suborning Corruption

With the above descriptions it is demonstrated how the ethical culture within an agency may play a part in whether or not corrupt practices will be tolerated. The culture of discretion is embedded in government at many levels, and the breadth by which discretion is measured is often a reflection of agency culture. In writing about police discretion, specifically, K. C. Davis stated that it is exercised “whenever the effective limits of his power leave him free to make a choice among courses of action or inaction.” In this
context discretion means to sidestep often-complex laws regulating information safeguards, and distribute to another agency information it is not legally authorized to acquire independently. However, it is difficult to conclude that the exercise of legal discretion in information-sharing is always a corrupt practice. Exercising discretion in circumventing a formal system with informal cooperation to acquire information more rapidly and with a lesser chance of error is a common option. Many participants in this author’s research have noted the legal requirements in sharing information are cumbersome, which slows delivery of guarded information often beyond its usefulness; however, only very few have suggested that laws protecting information are unjust.

Leakage through informal cooperation is often quite explainable: one party who stands to benefit (by whatever means) suborns another to violate the law or policy to provide high-value information. It is important to note that usually no consideration or promise of a consideration passed between parties, and neither is made a **quid pro quo** offer.

Because the practice of officially encouraging informal coordination is a well-established institution in the fabric of multi-agency cooperation, doubtless executives view it as either helpful or benign. As the practice flourishes, the agencies themselves are beneficiaries. But informal coordination also serves as a source of leakage when an agent funnels away guarded information, whether knowingly or not engaging in a corrupt act. The hinge pin apparently does not lie in whether or not an agent is corrupt or engages in corrupt practices, but where exactly the request itself may fall (or not) into the ability of the recipient to exercise discretion. If the costs are low, if the potential gains are high, the opportunities for informal coordination escalate. In this fashion, informal coordination has flourished for decades.

There is no doubt that from time to time the line is crossed in information-sharing and practices traverse from murky shadows into dark corruption in its official dealings with other agencies. Indeed, either the public or government may say “the ends justify the means;” but if successful ends require the means of government to be unlawful, then who is corrupt?

**Optimizing Formal Cooperation to Minimize Corruption**

The previous sections bring to light a global practice in government that promotes informal cooperation among agencies to build regimes where formal cooperation may be inadequate. It is important to recall that not all informal cooperation is illicit, and that most informal cooperation regards lawfully traded information rather than suborned corruption. But the previous sections illuminate one of the greatest institutional maladies of informal cooperation—the loss of regulation—since, once the informal cooperation spigot is open, it is often difficult to close as regulation has fallen from control of the intelligence executive. For generations, professional conventions of mutual interest and purpose have served as a breeding ground for informal cooperation opportunities, with exchange of business cards among the myriad participants serving a high purpose. If no working arrangement exists between two agencies, an informal contact gleaned through a business card exchange is an avenue by which preliminary communication to establish informal cooperation can be made.

Intelligence executives each articulate inter-agency policies governing share/no share regulations within regimes. One dividend of an ineffective or insufficient formal regime (i.e., in which policy coordination has not or cannot successfully advance information-sharing) is informal cooperation that potentially yields corrupt practices. In other words, when formal channels are insufficient in information-sharing, informal channels are a viable alternative, even when considered an undesirable option by intelligence executives. Therefore, the formal cooperation decision-making process should be examined closely as a matter of counter-corruption. It is reasonable to expect that if a cooperative regime facilitates greater sharing capabilities, perhaps the motivation to defect to informal cooperation (and potentially corrupt practices) would diminish. In this context it becomes important to understand how a regime of cooperation best operates.

Robert Axelrod noted that a cooperative arrangement is identifiable as a simple Prisoner’s Dilemma, writing: “Fortunately, the very simplicity of the framework makes it possible to avoid many restrictive assumptions that would otherwise limit the analysis:

- “The payoffs of the players need not be compatible at all.
- The payoffs certainly do not have to be symmetric...One does not have to assume, for example, that the reward for mutual cooperation, or any
of the other three payoff parameters, have the same magnitude for both players.

- The payoffs of a player do not have to be measured on an absolute scale. They need only be measured relative to each other.
- Cooperation need not be considered desirable from the viewpoint of the rest of the world...In fact, most forms of corruption are welcome instances of cooperation for the participants but are unwelcome to everyone else.

For the purposes of this work, we must assume that when cooperation is achieved in a formal cooperative regime, an iterative game begins in information-sharing. In the game Agency A requests information from Agency B. Agency A values the information but has no knowledge of the information’s value to Agency B (as is usually the case). Agency B values the information but has no knowledge of the information’s value to Agency A. In this game, the bargaining parties are on an equal footing. As Axelrod indicated, a typical Prisoner’s Dilemma game is the product, with Agency A valuing its information at 2 and Agency B also valuing its information at 2, since for ease of the game we shall assume the information is what it is, a small piece in a large puzzle and nothing more. Shared information loses proprietary value and is reduced by 1. Non-cooperation is valued at 0, and giving away information and getting nothing in return is valued at -1 for either player. Minimally, Agency B benefits by establishing a link with Agency A and learning Agency A’s information, yielding 2 – 1 = 1. Agency B has information that Agency A wants, and so if Agency B cooperates (and shares), its information is reduced in value, yielding 2 – 1 = 1.

In a one-shot game, as might be the case in informal coordination, it is important to note that Nash Equilibrium is found where neither party cooperates. Axelrod observed, “two egoists playing the game once will both choose their dominant choice, defection, and each will get less if they had cooperated.” However, in a repeating game as would be found in a cooperative and coordinated relationship, Pareto Optimal Equilibrium is found at cooperate, cooperate (i.e., share, share). And so, in a repeated game the cumulative benefit quickly outweighs the payoff of a single defection. The advantage of cooperation over either non-cooperation (i.e., both players do not cooperate) or what Axelrod calls the sucker’s payoff (i.e., defect, cooperate for either player), becomes clear once a cumulative benefit is realized. Non-cooperation repeated over a number of games will yield a benefit of zero, no matter what greater strategy may be in play. The remaining alternative in a repeating game is that players exchange turns exploiting one another. According to Axelrod, “This assumption means that at an even chance of exploitation and being exploited is not as good an outcome for a player as mutual cooperation.” And so, in a repeating game cooperation between players is the Pareto Optimal Equilibrium, yielding maximum benefit.

Axelrod also suggests that cooperation evolves in three stages: first, cooperation must be based on reciprocity; second, a strategy based on reciprocity can thrive where other strategies are tried; and third, a strategy of reciprocity, once established, can survive in an environment of competing strategies. In non-zero-sum games the nature of other strategies with which the player’s strategy interacts must be considered. And so, the history of interaction between strategies must be taken into account.

To develop an appropriate response within the Prisoner’s Dilemma framework, Axelrod conducted a computer tournament for theorists in psychology, economics, political science, mathematics and sociology in an attempt to discover the best strategy to play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The winner was a strategy called **TIT FOR TAT**. To begin with, as would two agencies, the players agree to cooperate. Thereafter, the player with the TIT FOR TAT strategy chooses to do whatever the other player chose in the previous move. The strategy elicits the most cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game when compared with others in Axelrod’s competition. Regarding the nature of the strategy (mentioned above), the property of nice distinguishes TIT FOR TAT from other strategies and simply means that the player who utilizes this approach in a Prisoner’s Dilemma is never first to defect.

According to Axelrod, a strategy is collectively stable if no other strategy can invade it. Presuming for a moment that a number of players are involved in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and all are using TIT FOR TAT as a strategy (including the property of nice), there is no incentive to defect. However, if one player is not likely to be in the game much longer, it may be better to defect and optimize a sucker’s pay-
off (i.e., not cooperate, cooperate). This strategy is only workable when the game is not collectively stable because the weaker player cannot ensure reciprocity. A practical example is found in World War I trench warfare in which the French traded two shots from the trenches to every one unprovoked German shot, and the French never fired first. As long as the battlefield was collectively stable, either no shots were fired or if the Germans shot once, the French would fire back twice. 17

Donald Chisholm noted that, “When the norm of reciprocity is thoroughly internalized by members of an organizational system, it provides benefits beyond the actual changes in informal relationships by reducing the level on conflict in the system.” 18 Whereas, this is illustrated well in the French–German scenario with a stabilizing strategy developed in the midst of conflict, in information-sharing the strategy offered by Chisholm illustrates how a culture of sharing must replace the culture of stovepiping to achieve a stable environment in cooperation.

It is worth noting that the French–German strategy was not the result of negotiation within the common definition. Instead, cooperation evolved. And regardless of generals’ prodding to do otherwise, while the battlefield was stable the strategy held fast. Axelrod noted, “This is a case of cooperation emerging despite great antagonism between the players.” 19 In time, the strategy changed when the “raid” was introduced into warfare practice, and the so-called “live-and-let-live” system perished. Nonetheless, the system proved that antagonists could cooperate and reach a stable environment.

Conclusion

In the end, a rather unsettling conclusion is apparent that flies in the longstanding traditions of information sharing. If one agent offers to share with another agent one time, the one-shot game applies; therefore, the equilibrium endgame is to not share (!) even when counter-intuitive and there may be an apparent benefit. A formal arrangement involving reciprocity (in a repeating game) appears to be the better solution (at least in a game theoretic sense), in which both players would benefit over time and multiple plays (sharing, in other words). In this case, sharing is controlled, informal sharing that could amount to corruption would be avoided, and the likelihood of leakage to hostiles diminishes.

Endnotes


9. A typical informal exchange might begin with an agent from another jurisdiction offering, “I have information about an auto theft ring working in your venue. What do you have for me in mine?” More often than not, there was something worthwhile to trade.

10. In the author’s experience, I have sent many an agent off to a convention with the admonition to “bring lots of business cards.” The practice is global.


12. Ibid., 8.

13. Ibid., 10.


15. Ibid., 10.


19. Axelrod, 74.
As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don’t know
We don’t know.

—Donald Rumsfeld, February 2002

Subsequent to 11 September 2001, an increasingly popular topic has emerged as a thread in military thought, consisting of variations on the theme of the role of culture in operations. One line is an overt concern expressed by some military leaders that tactical implementation of national defense objectives in Operations Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) have encountered cultural parameters for which training and doctrine were conspicuous by their absence. Often identified in the literature is systemic failure to understand and appreciate the effects of culture on operational planning, resulting in unintended consequences—specifically in OIF and OEF, where operations inadvertently provoked the multiplication of violent adversaries. Some military thinkers have gone beyond present operations and extrapolated the contemporary salience of cultural awareness to hypothetical future operations subsumed under the rubrics “irregular” or “asymmetric” warfare, even the “Long War.”

Part of the response to adverse unintended consequences has included seeking out cultural expertise from a variety of sources, particularly drawn from fields specializing in professional expertise about alien—i.e., non-Western cultures. Outside of some special forces, the Army apparently lacked an organizational template for training cultural awareness or knowledge and skills on the scale required to affect the cultural paradigm of the relatively large numbers of personnel deployed. Cross-cultural competence is by definition a variable individual characteristic, not a collective skill. Since 2001, however, there have been diverse efforts to include cultural considerations in operations, usually predicated on the efficacy of cultural training under several names. The success or failure of the current endeavors is
yet to be determined. That said, history may provide a guide. Lack of preparedness may be laid directly on faulty organizational memory, with organizational memory defined as “the collective ability to store, recall, and retrieve information for reconstructing past experiences for present purposes. Organizational memory is imperfect, being affected over time by attrition of the organization’s membership and by environmental pressures affecting institutional attention. A useful theoretical construct describing organizational memory is the **meme**, a unit of cultural information that propagates from one mind to another, a cultural analog to the biological gene. Untransmitted memes become extinct. The organization has then reached Mr. Rumsfeld’s conundrum: it then does not know what it does not know.

Exactly which conceptualization of the term ‘culture’ is intended in contemporary military literature is often unclear. The fact is that operationalization of the concept ‘culture’ is sufficiently problematical that “many anthropologists have argued that the term (which has gained increasing popularity outside anthropology [original emphasis]) should no longer be used by anthropologists.” American cultural anthropologists have utilized the theoretical concept of culture for 120-odd years, since its introduction as a holistic concept meant to encompass everything that is “acquired by [M]an as a member of society.” From the wide methodological net cast by American anthropology came the ‘four-field approach’ to the study of Man, a core curriculum including courses in archaeology, cultural anthropology, anthropological linguistics, and physical anthropology. Thus, in North America the granting of degrees in anthropology implied possession of a body of knowledge of “[M]an as a member of society” and in the comparative study of culture.

Contemporary anthropology has since fragmented into a myriad of academic niches, including a bit termed ‘military anthropology.’ Like ‘culture,’ there is some ambiguity in what is intended by military anthropology, it may intend either the anthropological study of military culture or the military applications of anthropological culture. Thus far, Army efforts to institutionalize general cultural training have been tentative, frequently involving personal services contracts for expertise of consultants; contracting for transportable culture awareness training (e.g., the TRADOC Culture Center); assigning culture training to uniformed instructors (local commands); providing academic electives (U.S. Army War College); electives and immersion programs (U.S. Military Academy), or providing reading lists, some of which overlap with other services.

One result of the recent re-discovery of culture is the addition to the many facets of contemporary anthropology a casual use of the term military anthropology. To the extent that the silent hand of the market reflects reality, military anthropology has become at least a term of art. A single-site result of an Internet search for “Military Anthropology Jobs” produced the following advertisements for positions, including among their education qualifications a degree in anthropology:

**Leadership Analyst:**
- Social Sciences/Human Dimension Analyst
- JIEDDO-COIC Directed Studies Team
- Physical Anthropologist/Project Manager
- Undergraduate Coop Program Open Source
- Defense/Intelligence/Geopolitical
- Liaison Officer, Senior Program Officer

**Cultural Anthropologist:**
- Social or cultural Anthropologist
- Asymmetrical Warfare Analyst
- Information Operations Planner
- Social Scientist-PPL
- Red Team Analyst/Linguist
- Culture Advisor(s)
- Social Cultural analysts
- Socio-Cultural Intel Analyst

Perhaps the most prominent contemporary example of military anthropology in the sense of an applied anthropology is the “proof of prototype” Human Terrain System (HTS) of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which both recruits anthropologists as Human Terrain Team (HTT) social scientists and trains the teams in anthropological concepts and methods. The HTS mission “is to provide commanders in the field with relevant socio-cultural understanding necessary to meet their operational requirements.” HTTs do not conduct military intelligence opera-
tions nor provide kinetic targeting—an important matter to which we return below.

A role for anthropologists in military operations is, despite the appearance of the term military anthropology, not new—only fallen out of organizational memory. Why this should be so is a matter for conjecture. Hershel Holiday cites a former Army Vice Chief of Staff’s suggestion that after Viet Nam “the Army purged everything that has to do with irregular warfare or insurgency,” which would include implied cultural considerations. Whatever the causes, the contribution of anthropology to operational planning disappeared after the early fifties, with the notable exception of Special Forces, and only recently re-appeared in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

The history of anthropology as ‘hand maiden’ to colonialism is oft recited, but rarely appreciated are the contributions of U.S. anthropology and its notion(s) of culture during a time of total war, from 1941 to 1945, as well as its subsequent role in military governments for several years thereafter in Japan and Micronesia.13,14

One estimate is that by 1947 “one half of all professional anthropologists worked fulltime in some war-related governmental capacity, while another quarter worked on a part-time basis...in contributing to national defense.... These anthropologists used their skills to fill hundreds of positions in governmental agencies ranging from the Office of War Information to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and they engaged in activities ranging from bureaucratic drudgery...to the cloak and dagger adventures of secret agents....” The cross-cultural perspective of anthropologists was particularly suited to OSS operations and the Office of War Information.16,17

Important to the contemporary operating environment is the caveat that “[w]hile almost every prominent living U.S. anthropologist (including Ruth Benedict, Gregory Bateson, Clyde Kluckhohn and Margaret Mead) contributed to the World War II war effort, they seldom did so under the false pretext of fieldwork.” The contribution of anthropology may have been most substantial in the Pacific Theater, of which the anthropologist Ruth Benedict observed that the Japanese “were the most alien people the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle....” A concept from this era relevant to current operations is the “culture at a distance” method advocated by Gregory Bateson and Margret Mead for “analyzing societies which are inaccessible to direct observation.” At slightly closer range in contrast to classic ethnographic fieldwork, are “windshield ethnography” and “rapid ethnography.” The Rapid Ethnographic Assessment Procedure taught at HTS for unstructured, opportunistic interviews is a close methodological cousin.

The opportunity for creating the intimacy necessary to thoroughly analyze culture and language requires extended time in the field, work sometimes defining an entire career. A relevant example is the 20-years’ work of Louis and Nancy Dupree in Afghanistan, resulting in a substantial anthropological treatment in the four-field mode, Afghanistan. There are two practical elements which are necessary considerations when anthropological methods are applied to essentially battlefield (‘insurgency’) environments: The degree to which the subject culture is alien, and the degree to which the subject culture is accessible. Consequently, the implication for military operations is that most analysis of culture derived from anthropology is inherently “culture at a distance” combined with the synchronicity of the “ethnographic present,” which is essentially a historical method. Furthermore, while anthropology may inform operations, anthropologists may not be expected to compromise professional ethical norms by collecting actionable military intelligence: “In research, anthropologists’ paramount responsibility is to those [whom] they study.” Therefore, military anthropology cannot be presumed to constitute a subspecies of military intelligence.

When the cognitive template of military culture is overlain on anthropological notions of culture, the incongruence is immediately apparent. The logical fallacy is this: Where (alien) culture is an unknown, attempting to convert it to an (actionable) known involves disparate epistemologies—technically, virtue vs. propositional theories of knowledge, for example. That is, the two templates postulate differing criteria of what constitutes justified knowledge. Moreover, the kinds of knowledge claimed are complicated by purpose. When HTS says that its mission is to provide “cultural understanding” to a commander, the implicit claim is knowledge of an
intangible (culture) relying on the normative properties of the agent (anthropologist). Moreover, there are “levels” of cultural knowledge in warfare\(^{26}\) that further affect claims to truth.

Cultural intelligence remains a chimera. It may be hoped that a combination of the nascent field of military anthropology and the institutionalization of cultural education and training will eventually provide the Army with practical ways of avoiding unintended consequences in areas of conflict. The alternative is, in the classic words of Charles E. Lindblom, “the science of muddling through.”\(^{27}\)

**Endnotes**


2. For example, http://www.longwarjournal.org/.


Introduction

The human terrain, the social terrain of culture and shared human motivation, intention, and social expectation, is not fixed in time or place but is like a vast deep sea that is ever-shifting, turbulent, and moody. To know its dynamic, hidden topography is to reach beneath the social and psychological waves of the surface, to fathom and chart the common bottom and the connecting shoreline.

Military anthropology in its broadest sense is the anthropological study of the military realities of the human world, particularly of the contemporary and emerging world, with the aim of humanizing military applications to problem solving, particularly as these relate to cross-cultural conflict and to the larger project of promoting human development in the world by means of inter-cultural mediation involving the minimization and eventual elimination of organized mass violence.

Human knowledge is by definition organized. The basic organization of this knowledge is symbolic. This is the qualitative difference between knowledge and raw data, with information somewhere between. Knowledge is symbolically meaningful, because it ties to a larger, organized framework of understanding, that we call a paradigm or worldview.

Human knowledge becomes collectively and conventionally organized into different frameworks of understanding, and many of these frameworks are taxonomically and hierarchically arranged. The organization of knowledge is often implicit to our understanding in terms of classification and connotation. The larger patterning of human knowledge and its associated, non-random behavioral outcomes, at least from an anthropological perspective, is called “cultural” and the study and analysis of this patterning of knowledge and its outcomes in the world, when tied to empirical investigation, constitutes the empirical basis of the science of cultural anthropology.

The Cultural Construction of Human Reality

Human reality, with our large, cerebral brains, is somewhat paradoxical in the sense that human beings are ultimately arbitrary and not, by and large, controlled directly by genetic instruction or instinct. This is referred to as our “World Openness” as compared to the “Closed World” hypothesis for most species of animals. Even so, human beings cannot help but to see and construe the world in a manner that is entirely symbolic (i.e., cultural), and inescapably so.

Hence, we cannot escape the box of our cultural organization of reality, what is referred to as the anthropological construction of reality, nor its
consequences for most of what we do. We find, in-
variably, human children to be natural sponges
of innate cultural acquisition, their brains wir-
ing rapidly for dealing with cultural information
that creates knowledge and understanding, or
what can be called “cultural awareness.” To de-
prive a child of cultural enrichment is to produce
not an animal or a human, but a half-being, a so-
cial oddity.

But culture can be broken down in other ways. If
we were perchance to have direct contact with ex-
traterrestrial alien intelligence, presumably supe-
rior to our own at least in terms of technological
sophistication, then the likely outcome would be a
revolutionary breakdown of advanced human civili-
zation as we know it. Similarly, when an advanced
Western Civilization makes contact with and inter-
acts with less developed civilizations grounded in a
different cultural model and paradigm, we almost in-
variably see a pattern of response that can be called
overall a process of deculturation and collective de-
symbolization. Radical change can stimulate almost
spontaneously a range of various possible reactions
to such changes—revitalization, revolution, syncre-
tism, or the rise of extremist cults or millennarian
or nativistic movements.

Paradoxically, the science of culture is founded
upon the principle of the parallax of cross-cultural
contact, on the premise of differentials and sense of
displacement or dislocation in the complex accul-
turation experience, whatever form this may take. It
is also rooted in the hypothesis that there exist pat-
terns of cultural sharing evident in human behavior
that can be counted, systematically analyzed, and
compared. To summarize a few key elements of this
contact:

- The face-to-face interview situation is the pri-
  mary mechanism of inter-cultural mediation and
  reinterpretation.
- All cross-cultural interviews involve latent con-
  flict arising from cultural parallax and back-
  ground symbolic-behavioral differentials.
- All situations of cross-cultural contact in-
  volve some degree and kind of discrepant real-
  ities, subjectively experienced and objectively
  expressed.
- The sequence of all cross-cultural interviews is
  one of symbolic frame disruption, frame reeval-
  uation and frame rehabilitation or repair.

**Symbolic Transformation and Transculturation**

Symbolic transformation refers to the fundamen-
tal process by which an individual becomes “hu-
manized” as a sentient, adaptive, productive human
being in the world. Symbolic transformation is the
inevitable outcome of the human evolution of cul-
tural dependency as the central mediating struc-
tures for human adaptive functioning in the world.
We can look at this in another way. Basic drives and
motivations, the drive to power, become channelled
and shaped by means of increasingly differentiated
and sophisticated ego-defense mechanisms and de-
velopment of a socialized, enculturated ego-identity
that is more or less consonant with one’s larger so-
cial world.

It was in her *Patterns of Culture* that Ruth Benedict
formulated what have since been received as the
basic statements of the cultural relativist posi-
tion, a corner-stone of cross-cultural methodology.
Different cultural patterns or configurations have
been founded upon sanctioning and reinforcing of
particular personality configurations.

When human cultural systems come into con-
tact and collision, the resulting parallax of differen-
tial symbolic-behavioral realities of culture becomes
an inevitable, unavoidable, and intrinsic part of the
contact. Cultural relativity marks the difference be-
tween self and other at the interface of contact, and
defines the sum of differences between two different
human cultural systems interacting with one an-
other, upon many different levels of meaning and
interaction simultaneously.

This brings to bear a second critical concept hav-
ing to do with the process of transculturation that
underlies all other patterns of cultural contact and
development. It is the basis for cultural diffusion
and the development of trans-cultural civilization.
Transculturation can be defined succinctly as the
process of face-to-face transference of culture from
one individual to another and, by systematic ex-
tension, from one group to another. In general, we
might make the following points about the process
of transculturation:

- It is a basic, dyadic exchange or inter-change
  between two or more people.
- It always two-way, though rarely equal or evenly
  reciprocal.
It involves the intersubjective conversational apparatus between people that results in the frame reinterpretation/reevaluation and rehabilitation as a consequence of the symbolic marginalization of human experience in cross-cultural relationship.

It works to daily alter and adapt symbolic, behavioral and cultural models upon individual (psychological) and social levels, through regular reinterpretation and modification of cultural symbolisms, behaviorally and linguistically expressed.

In highly differentiated societies, in which there is specialization of status-role identity in structurally extended, secondary corporate institutional settings, tactical transculturation in the form of persuasion, networking, reciprocity, status-manipulation, information control can have decisive consequences for many people and across entire classes and categories of people, and can have effective outcomes in the development of cultural patterning.

**Definitions of Deep Culture in Cross-Cultural Research**

All science is ultimately about the systematic exploration of the unknown, and the discovery of new knowledge. The science of anthropology is no different in this grand goal, however elusive and complex its central object of study, the human reality of culture, however different and difficult to quantify may be its methodologies, and however much and many people may wish to disclaim its scientific legitimacy.

There have been many definitions of human culture. Each definition reflects, at least implicitly, a certain theoretical or methodological orientation, sometimes both, that in the larger scheme of philosophy and theory may be said to constitute a bias, an interpretation, or an evaluation.

Granted, we will probably never have, probably can never have, a physics of culture, or even a biology of culture (however much some may have tried in these ways). What is consistently ignored in these approaches is the role of social transmission in the shaping of culture and hence is the failure to consider the determinative influence of emergent properties of cultural systems.

Whatever our definitions of culture may or not be, the realities of culture present themselves in our world in many ways that are complex and often intractable. There remain certain recurring and enduring features of culture, wherever it may be encountered, that can be said to be common, if not universal, to all peoples. Some of these features are:

- Mostly symbolically organized and patterned.
- Mostly tacit and transparent to the culture bearer.
- Mostly compulsive and often coercive for the culture bearer.
- Functionally adaptive or maladaptive for the culture bearer, depending upon the prevailing circumstances of the situation.
- Transmitted and socially shared between people, largely through processes of transculturation, inter-personal and face to-face, but also acculturational through processes of mass distribution and communication.
- At least partially integrated to the extent that it is symbolically defined and expressive and institutionally organized in corporate social groupings with structures defined by rules, customs, sanctions, common knowledge and constraints.
- Is multi-level and multi-faceted, comprised by many things, material and non-material, behavioral and attitudinal, institutional and ritual, social and psychological.
- Stratifies upon multiple levels of its articulation and expression, and the stratification of culture leads to complex systems of organization and development.
- Conventionally defined and sanctioned by a tradition.
- Is a human construction that is reproduced with each passing generation, and modified systematically with each generation of its reproduction.
- Cultural boundaries are fuzzy and overlapping; hence, complex, fluid, dynamic and ever shifting.

If we are to seek what is common to all cultures in our anthropological science of cultural reality, however far from a precise physics or genetics we may remain, in order that we might anticipate if not quite predict the consequences of human action and behavior in relation to cultural contexts and causes, then we must seek out those patterns of human behavior that appear to become the consequence of cultural patterning however and wher-
ever this may be found. Common cultural patterns occurring across ethnocultural groupings include:

- The psychological internalization and behavioral subjectification of social constructs shaping attitudes and behavior in expectable and patterned ways.
- The requirement of symbolic transformation of human experience that usually ties the individual to a large sense of self in the social world.
- The basic sense of discrepancy that is the consequence of this symbolic transformation.
- The evidence of compensatory behavior that represents the individual’s compulsion to ameliorate this sense of discrepancy.
- The social outcomes that derive from this compensatory behavior, namely in terms of the social relational behavior of the individual in the group.
- The patterning of the group that serves to reinforce the behavior of the individual.
- The function of persuasion and reciprocity in interpersonal and group relations that tends to reinforce specific cultural orientations and patterns within a larger cultural continuum of the stream of human development.

How do these principles translate methodologically into effective fieldwork, into fishing for deep culture, beneath the surface beyond which we cannot really see? The answer lies in the systematic process of symbolic profiling of an individual and a group, by making explicit what is otherwise only tacit and implicit, and in thus exposing what is hidden, often deliberately, from public view.

Whatever is explicitly marked or known as culture, is always complemented dialectically in behavior and inference by what remains tacit only and usually out of direct awareness or at least direct acknowledgment. Furthermore, in the cross-cultural exchange, there is always the proclivity, the predisposition, the preference, to present to the outside observer a version of oneself and one’s culture that is idealized in some form, that invariably entails foregrounding what one considers good, positive, powerful, and back-grounding what one considers undesirable, suspicious, ambiguous or aberrant in some way.

It becomes one of the central jobs of the cross-cultural observer, within ethnographic contexts that involve some measure of direct, face-to-face contact and participant-observation, to be able to develop and test theories about the back-grounded and subsurface world of the informant, about hidden or deep cultural realities, given primarily only what is presented and fore-grounded or what is obvious and apparently self-evident to the culture bearer or informant.

**Human Conflict and Cross-Cultural Schismogenesis**

Conflict is human aggression and social violence that arises in competition between people, either as individuals or as social groupings. For social groups, this competition is usually socio-structurally defined and while it almost always has dimensions that run the gamut of the social structural spectrum (i.e., economic, religious, social and political), it can be argued that anthropologically all human competition leading to violent conflict has fundamental political motivations which, if understood sufficiently within ethnographic context, can take on predictable patterns of action with expectable outcomes.

Schismogenesis is a term coined by Gregory Bateson in the 1930s to refer to the tendency for contraposed ethnocultural groupings, separated by social boundaries, to mutually escalate and deliberately exaggerate cultural patterns or traits that serve to clearly mark the differences or boundaries between the groups. In 1967, he identified two forms of schismogenesis–competitive or symmetrical schismogenesis between categorical equals (niche-competition, rivalry) and complementary or asymmetrical schismogenesis between categorical inequals (dominance and submission.) Group ethos can be tied to ritual-symbolic forms that either serves to amplify and stimulate the schismogenic relationship, as a human cybernetic system, or to dampen and inhibit the patterning, as a boundary reinforcing mechanism. Bateson defines both forms and points out that either pattern, when carried to their logical extreme, becomes self-destructive for both parties.

There occurs in all societies, a series or set of secondary social-symbolic institutions that are corporate in nature and structure. These social institutions are larger in life than the existential boundaries of any single member of the institution, and they serve a critical function in the reproduction and production of a society’s culture, often in contradistinction to other competing organizations.
and societies, and these institutions tend to cohere together functionally (more or less) to produce an ordered field of relational possibilities and reciprocal expectations by which behavior is defined and evaluated for its social significance.

Whatever the functions and status-role identities of members of these corporate institutions we find similar patterns occurring with expectable outcomes, in all such secondary social institutions, and the game that is played is the zero-sum game of survivor, either as individuals or as coalitions or conspiracies.

- Structural position is socially managed through status manipulation of one’s own and other’s identity within a differential and hierarchically defined field of relationships.
- Forums occur, formally and informally, within which social identity and attitudes are managed interpersonally and within which there occurs competition for status identity.
- Conspiracies tend to develop over time through which in-groups can successfully out competing out-group members through interference competition, which is often reinforced through labeling and policies of social and structural discrimination.
- Authority is symbolically marked, structurally sanctioned and ritually constrained, and authority defines structural differentials of power and access to resources within such institutional settings.
- With the location of authority, the power to punish and reward, in such institutional settings, we have the collision and interaction of patterns of social authoritarianism on one hand and psychological authoritarianism upon the other.
- Authority, authoritarianism, cultural orientation and different patterns and practices of social-symbolic persuasion interact in such settings to establish, construct and maintain social realities and to revise and alter these realities in a manner that primarily suits those in power.
- Status, power, authority and influence are rarely set in stone in such institutional settings, and are socially negotiable to a degree. It is paramount to the long term flexibility and adaptability of such social frameworks that relative latitude be arbitrarily granted, even to the point of bending or breaking basic rules or taboos, to make human exceptions.

These considerations allow us to contextualize in definite behavioral settings, settings that are completely amenable to ethnographic description, what is most predictable and expectable of human social behavior, once the roles, statuses, identities and functions of the institutional framework is defined and comprehended.

Within such settings, we can invoke Erving Goffman’s symbolic transactionalism in the presentation of self within institutionally defined contexts, and we can see that the challenge of secondary socialization for the individual most often involves sufficient if incomplete compartmentalization of ego-identity between public and private domains of symbolic behavior, such that people must always try to present their best sides while trying always to hide their worst sides.

We must understand some of the ramifications of this process of compartmentalization in the presentation of self. First, in relation to reference group theory and the concept of relative deprivation (Merton 1957, Stouffer, 1949), we must distinguish between what can be called primary reference others, those significant others, usually in-group members of a higher rank within the institutional hierarchy. This is compared to what I have called counter-reference others, which would be those who are for one reason or another marginal within the institutional framework, or socially outside of the framework altogether, but in relation to whom one’s framework have critical reference or adaptive significance.

Once the process begins within an institutional setting, the game players having more or less staked out their relative positions in the playing field, it is very difficult to get people to change their positions or to alter the attitudes and behavioral train of response that comes from people committing themselves to particular positions vis-à-vis one another. Once labels and roles are defined, people usually become stubbornly steadfast in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, of proving their own constructions, however erroneous they may really be, or destructive they may become of social relationships. Once the constructions achieve a kind of received structural status within implicitly sanctioned social forums, there is a runaway affect in which a kind of lowest common denominator of group psychology takes over and predetermines the outcomes.
What might then be the consequences of such a flawed cross-cultural situation? We might expect, for instance, that the interviewee, the counter-reference other, will upon some level not be naïve or completely misled as to the true intent of the interview, and failing to gain trust in the interview situation, the interview will serve to reinforce those hidden cultural identities and realities that may have been occluded by the interview rather than disclosed.

It behooves us to analyze the total institutional situations in which we find ourselves, and to distinguish those who constitute our possible significant reference others from those who are structurally our counter-reference others. It would not matter if this were an academic anthropologist interviewing a native informant for her/his dissertation research, or a military representative interviewing the same native informant for the purposes of developing a better picture of the local human terrain. The ethical implications are intrinsically identical, and the potential outcomes more or less similar, except that in the latter case there is always the greater risk of the outbreak of conflict and violence.

**Ethical Dilemmas of Applied Cross-Cultural Research**

There is no cultural anthropologist who has not experienced some sense of ethical ambivalence or moral dissonance over social dilemmas encountered in fieldwork settings. These dilemmas arise unexpectedly and unpredictably and usually involve complications that admit no obvious or facile solution, rationalization or scientific explanation. Indeed, the kinds of ethical dilemmas that normally arise in fieldwork situations, especially in high tension, highly significant settings, admit of no final solution. We must choose in a manner that is almost always at least half-blind, half-ignorant, unknowing and unseeing of the outcomes or possible unintended consequences of our actions.

The dilemmas of fieldwork only compound if the fieldwork is of an applied form of human engineering, directly or indirectly, under the aegis of some larger program, toward one dimension or another of human development. Applied anthropologists must daily deal with unexpected dilemmas that crop up in the articulation of their research and development programs, largely as an unintended consequence of their involvement and possible “interference” in the field, whatever their best intentions.

And what cultural anthropology conducted in ethnographic fieldwork is not on some level disinterested inquiry in service of science, if not the state (or academia, or one’s own ego or one’s professional career)? If we are to do our jobs as anthropologists and if we are to do them well, then at some point we must turn the friends and family we make in the field into our informants, and we must divulge to the world in some kind of public manner, in a text, in a forum, upon some level of interpretation, the things and perhaps secrets they have confided and divulged, usually in trust, to us. And have we thus broken their trust, especially if no other payment but in kind and kindness was made, or in which there was some at least implicit mutual understanding, no matter how uneven, or defined by status difference or inter-social distance, of the true nature and reality of the interview(s) and the recordings and the purposes to which they might be put?

Of course, it is not necessarily the ethical dilemmas of the researcher, the interviewer, that are of most concern, but the ethical dilemmas of the interviewee, as a consequence of the interview. If this knowledge can be used, in some unknown manner, by some third party, government interest, to hurt that person or that person’s family, should the interviewer be to blame? Even if neither the interviewer nor the interviewee had full understanding, could have full knowledge, of the possible indirect outcomes of the interview, is this enough to make it wrong to do the research and conduct the interview? And once published to the world, the results of any such research cannot be called back or controlled. How else should our science of human reality be conducted?

And if we do not get explicit informant consent, or somehow directly compensate every interviewee, are we necessarily wrong? Most explicit informed consent in the field works against the fact of the interview in the first place, as it usually creates distrust up front. Most informants are more than happy to freely given information without explicit informed consent that they little understand anyway, than with it. Voluntary consent is part of the voluntary nature of the interview, implicit to that interview setting and the relationship it establishes. Therefore, no anthropologist expecting to get done with significant fieldwork can afford to implement a blanket policy of explicit written consent.
Perhaps there are no final answers to these kinds of dilemmas, nor should there be, as any such answer would be the wrong one for its dogmatism and ideological self-righteousness. Anthropology exists in the world, as a part of a world beyond the Academy, ideally open to possibilities not meant to be precluded by ideological commitments or arbitrary paradigms one way or another. In this sense, if in no other, it remains a science of disinterested inquiry, not for any particular party or person or state, but for all humankind.

With but one critical difference, the situation of the military anthropologist and of anthropological research in the field of human conflict is precisely analogous to the situation of the leading physicists who were employed by the U.S. government to design and build the first nuclear bomb. This is especially so to the degree that we are willing to seriously talk about and consider a genuine science of cross-cultural research. We today do not discount their theoretical work in physics because of their applied work on the bomb. If they hadn’t done it, some other group of scientists, working for some other government far less benign and less well intentioned, would have soon done so.

This analogy is important, because precedent helps to guide our moral-ethical standards and choices of conduct in the world. I mentioned one critical difference in the analogy between the two cases, and this is the fact that while physicists were working with elements and atoms, anthropologists in the field work with living, breathing, thinking people. In terms of the interview, the warrant of confidentiality and anonymity, the implied mutual consent, the open-source disposition of information and knowledge, the anthropologist in the field must maintain a strict set of professional standards, whether this occurs in a situation of human conflict and insecurity or in a time of peace and stability.

**Symbolic Profiling as Cross-Cultural Intelligence**

Ethnographers in the field frequently gather critical intelligence unbeknownst to themselves until after the fact of the discovery. Sometimes this intelligence may have direct consequences for the people with whom one is dealing, for better or worse. This is almost inevitably a part of any effective ethnographic fieldwork.

The possibility of human intelligence in ethnographic fieldwork emerges from the capacity to systematically triangulate between convergent forms of circumstantial evidence that emerges from the fieldwork experience over time. This possibility extends from the developmental nature of the cross-cultural contact in the fieldwork situation, and the fact that human reality always presents itself cross-culturally in the form of an ice-berg, with the significant understanding always hidden from view, either deliberately so or implicit to the behavior of the informant but beyond the informant’s own understanding, or both.

We may present a model below of the general anthropological/ethnographic situation in the field to which first-hand intelligence is typically attached, elicited and extracted from data.

![Paradigm for Ethnographic/Anthropological Intelligence](image)

In this model, it is clear that the information presented to the anthropologist in Quadrant I is usually as obfuscating and misleading as it is trivial. But usually in the behavioral performance and responses of the informant, access can be gained to the information of Quadrant III by various means, by cross-referencing between different informants or the same informant across interviews, and contextualizing information, by comparison between verbal and observational information. Elicitation frames and techniques exist that can systematically excoriate this knowledge without the informant being typically aware of this excoriation.

It is the information of Quadrant II that is usually of the greatest value—what the informant knows but...
refuses to tell. It is possible to get at this knowledge by means of information tunneling, or mining, by which we move systematically from Quadrant III to Quadrant IV through a combination of systematic symbolic framing elicitation techniques, combined with systematic cross-referencing and contextualization of the knowledge gained.

We may not ever gain direct knowledge within Quadrant II, but we may be able to formulate “informed” guesses, or hypothesis about this knowledge, and to test our hypothesis out through further research in the realms of knowledge in which we do have more or less direct access. In other words, we can make educated inferences about Quadrant I, and we can refer back to knowledge gained in the other Quadrants to evaluate the likelihood of our hypothesis being correct.

Because all knowledge, to be knowledge, is inherently organized and non-random, the majority of this pattern of non-random organization is ordered by relational rules that lend themselves to explicit definition and to confirmatory elicitation in terms of agreement or disagreement with an informant’s understandings of the social and behavioral consequences of such knowledge. The results of this non-random, semi-deterministic organization are loose symbolic models that, in the calculus of cultural articulation, take on a propositional form and direction in terms of the rationalization and motivation of behavior. In other words, sentence or question frame grids can be developed that systematically exhaust the range of possibilities of a relational nature and allow us to construct propositional models of this knowledge that are then fully amenable, if well designed, to computer-based knowledge systems (i.e., ethnographic expert systems).

**Constructing Cross-Cultural Frames of Reference/Inference**

To get back to the original proposition of this essay, that of the challenge of anthropological applications to human intelligence. We must consider the methodologies that may allow us to get to significant, but normally hidden social knowledge by means of second-hand and indirect sources. We must also consider techniques that allow us to analyze and interpret these forms of circumstantial knowledge in a manner that, again, would allow us to make systematic inferences about hypotheses we may develop regarding what remains unknown, and what we might like to learn, about a social organization, an institution, a group of people, or even just a single person.

Any kind of cultural artifact, design, setting, however back-grounded, contains information that may be critical as clues to a larger but unknown pattern of the organization of knowledge. Much of cross-cultural anthropology has been devoted to a kind of systematic comparative research that would involve the discovery of hidden relationships or associations between epiphenomenal patterns of culture and human behavior that might be interpreted as having some degree of etic causal interdependency. The Human Relations Area files have been deployed extensively in this manner, and some interesting associations have been thus discovered. A similar kind of systems-based methodology was proposed and developed by the seminal archaeologist Louis Binford, and attempts were systematically made to excoriate hidden patterns of relationship between areas of archaeological information.

We can find in modern nation states around the world complex social identities and dimensionalities of ethnocultural orientation. We might find in one nation Muslim and non-Muslim women who share
more in common upon more levels of their being with one another, than with their own husbands. We might find teenagers of modern nation states the world around who perhaps bear the heaviest burden of modernization and westernization, without the psychological capacity to deal with these influences, sharing more in common with one another in terms of a common plight and social situation, than with their parents who do not seem to understand or with the authorities of their respective states who seem to care even less and understand almost nothing.

Traditional forms of cross-cultural research, namely ethnographic participant observation, while still at the core of anthropological research methods, are by themselves alone no longer sufficient to cope with the larger, more extended and complex social realities that characterize most people in the world today.

These challenges have presented themselves to me in many different forms in the course of my own scholarship and research in various ethnological and ethnographic contexts. And from the beginning of such anthropological studies I have sought to systematically define encompassing frames of reference that would adequately deal with the increasing complexities of contemporary human cultural realities, and that would provide common frameworks for comparisons and evaluation of evidence, such as the diagram “Structural Dimensions of Analysis” presented above.

By such means, we might construct a common frame of reference by which to organize our anthropological understanding of culture in a manner that may assist us in the basic problem of cultural awareness in the military field, that of understanding the patterns of violence and conflict that may arise in the human mediated world.

**Bibliography**


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Introduction

There are literally hundreds of articles, papers, and books that have been written to explain culture and why it is so important to become proficient or competent in all facets of it. Various authors have taken the approach to tell audiences that cultural competence takes on specific and general functions and must include language at sequential levels of learning. Some have presented instruments that measure competence, while others have listed a series of do and don’ts that are expected to be recognized and applied while living, working, or visiting a new or particular area. While each of these writings has made significant contributions to the ways people can seek to become culturally competent, we have taken another way to view culture by metaphorically comparing American Culture to DNA.

Every individual has his or her own unique DNA, the basic building block for cellular development in all forms of life. In other words, DNA represents the nucleus of identity. Our approach is to show that in today’s global system, knowledge and understanding of ‘American DNA’ is as critical to understanding, analyzing, interpreting, and predicting behaviors of people from different cultures as genetic DNA is to cellular development. Further, we propose that understanding one’s cultural DNA is a critical enabler for developing the individual war fighter and for mission success.

Historical Background and Overview

“History is to the nation as memory is to the individual.”

–American historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.

Historically, America is a nation of immigrants. Other than American Indians or Alaskan Natives (some will argue that they too migrated to this land thousands of years ago), American Culture is multifaceted and shares so many dimensions that we often forget how different Americans really are. Like biological DNA, Americans are as different in their own cultural DNA identity as they are in unique cellular patterns.

When we are identified as ‘American’ by people from other countries, we tend to acknowledge that the person making that particular identity statement is correct. Most people from other countries know a great deal about American history, the U.S. economy, and our political issues. They are aware of American foreign policy because it impacts people around the globe; likewise, most are able to separate the policies and behavior of the U.S. government from the values and beliefs of individual Americans. While it’s certainly true that their sources of information, especially movies and television, often distort their understanding of the U.S., they still know more about our country than most Americans know about any other country beyond their own (Weaver, xi).
An example of cultural learning is the way Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida hires cast members at Epcot. Disney uses international exchange students to work in Epcot as cultural representatives for the park’s country village scenes. These cast members take on the roles as subject matter experts, sharing ideas about the culture of their home country. These young (normally college level) people are surveyed prior to coming to the U.S. and asked to describe Americans. The comments normally received include stereotypes about being loud, pushy, disrespectful, rich, obnoxious, rude, flashy, overbearing, mean, and others. After working at Disney for a year to eighteen months, the same survey is administered as these cast members are preparing to return to their homeland and the results are much more positive as they indicate such words as fun-loving, honest, helpful, warm, caring, humble, religious, protecting, charitable, and loving to describe Americans. The cast members are asked where their comments originated and most respond with: “This is the way we have seen Americans portrayed on television and media in our home country, so it is the most prevalent way to identify or describe Americans.”

Others (non-Americans) do see us as different as we view each other, or as we see others that are not American. Some would argue that culture is not depicted in this scenario. We believe that these ideas (or stereotypes) from the cast members are in fact culture or cultural components that are frequently noted by non-Americans from around the world. The components listed or described are not a ‘total’ composite, but they can be included in any list that tends to build cultural identities.

Likewise, if we are in the presence of other Americans that are inclusive of our particular group, we quickly accept how easy it is to identify an American. However, if we are in the presence of Americans who differ from our particular group, we might not welcome the identity that others ascribe to us. Within the U.S., Americans are as different culturally as they are different in understanding their own culture and/or the culture of others.

What is ‘Cultural DNA’?

We argue that to understand another culture we must first understand differences between Americans, as well as the basic ‘DNA makeup’ of who we are within American culture, individually and collectively. Just as biological DNA patterns differ, cultural DNA is comparatively (metaphorically) different. The many facets of our American Culture such as values, family, religious beliefs, behaviors, norms, thought patterns, attitudes about what is good or bad, right or wrong, in-group, out-group, social status, and many others can be patterned to show cultural DNA differences. A poignant example of American diversity (from my dissertation research) comes from a Jewish immigrant writer/historian in the early-mid-twentieth century, Oscar Handlin. His words (paraphrased) still resonate with me to this day: ‘Once I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America, but then I discovered that the immigrants were American history’ (Bonvillain, 1999).

‘For me, there was only one place to go if I couldn’t live in my own country: America. It is a country of immigrants. There is such tolerance for the foreign and unfamiliar. America continues to amaze me.’ —Milose Forman

So what is our ‘cultural DNA’? We are not born with a set of pre-programmed American cultural characteristics, (e.g., Mom, apple pie, and the American Flag), rather we acquire our primary culture very informally growing up in a particular family and within a particular society. Whether we are Hawaiian or Floridian, Alaskan, Texan, or Californian, Southern or Northern, farmer or preacher, rich or poor, European or African, we are all culturally different (McGuire, 1999 and 2003). Unlike biological DNA, where terms such as cells, chromosomes, nuclei, etc., are part of the common terminology, we might look at cultural DNA as metaphorically similar. As we look through a biological microscope for differences in DNA (with the microscope being the lens) we can say that the American Cultural lens is not so clearly or scientifically defined. Consequently, we use phrases such as “we’re all Americans” or “Americans are all the same” as if everyone clearly agrees with or understands the meaning of being an American.

We have identified biological DNA as being cells, chromosomes, etc. We propose that cultural DNA would be the differences in American Cultural Identity Groups, considering such things as ideas about family; food (and the way we eat); religious beliefs (or not); how we treat each other within that particular culture (hierarchical rules of etiquette);
concepts of time; how people are expected to behave based on gender, and other facets that tend to label our in-group culture as the primary ethnocentric group. American Culture is as multi-faceted as people elect to see and define it through their individual cultural lenses. This separation of American Groups is not always seen or discussed (or even accepted) in educational sessions unless the session is focused on equality or diversity.

Cultures (to include the American Culture) are learned and evolve over time, as people tend to take on the values, beliefs, interests, behaviors, norms, mental models and information of family and community that classifies or qualifies a particular culture. Extended further, U.S. Military cultures tend to complicate ethnic U.S. cultures by adding additional complexity to individuals “self cultural identity,” for example, Army Culture might be viewed as ‘completely different’ when compared to Navy Culture, etc. It’s clear that culture is extremely complex. We unconsciously bring to any situation our own mental background, the accumulation of our life experience in the society we grew up in. Everything we have been taught or picked up from the media, in turn, shapes our opinion. We struggle to understand how anyone could possibly think differently; some even label those who do as stupid, reactionary or trouble-makers, yet we need to fully understand why people think as they do.

According to Spiral Dynamics, human nature is not fixed and it changes as our life conditions change. When our circumstances change, we have the innate capacity to develop more complex thinking to handle new problems, and we change our psychology and rules for living to adapt to the new conditions. But the old ways of thinking do not disappear, we carry them within us and call on them when necessary.

Cultural DNA is like a container within which our values and beliefs form and fit, and which attracts and repels others, containing behavioral instructions that are passed from one generation to the next. It is a bio-psycho-social-spiritual code that underlies every aspect of our lifestyle and culture and holds it together. Every form of cultural expression is a manifestation of it—our forms of government, architecture, language, religious expression, moral views, creative arts, amusements, sports and sense of identity (Wilke, 2005).

Fifty years ago Clare W. Graves, professor of psychology at Union College, New York, was so frustrated by all the conflicting theories that he resolved to get to the root of what differentiates people, why they perceive the world so differently, and why their reactions to physical, emotional and social challenges are so dissimilar. Decades of research followed, in many countries and at all levels of society. The result was Spiral Dynamics, a revolutionary theoretical model of the development of consciousness and human value systems. Understanding the progressive stages through which individuals, organizations, and cultures evolve provides a key to resolving major conflicts and global problems, so many of which stem from clashes between different ways of thinking.

Dimensions of American Cultural DNA

So let’s take a look at some of the dimensions of American cultural DNA based on the above comments. To do this, we will look at the various groups of Americans portrayed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the U.S. Census Bureau that have grouped (or sorted) us in what we have determined to be ‘Hyphenated-American Groups’ (not all social scientists agree that using the term hyphenated is appropriate). The U.S. Military uses this same method to demographically depict differences with respect to racial and ethnic identity. The groups labeled by OMB, OPM, and the Census Bureau are: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, White, Hispanic or Latino (White), and Hispanic or Latino Not White. The groups identified as Hispanic are grouped under Black or White American, but have multifaceted cultures within each of the many subgroups of Hispanic Americans.
The groups listed below are not to be considered all inclusive, as Americans tend to develop ethnic identities that are not necessarily attached to any particular group. The identity groups below do provide brief descriptions about each group:

- **American Indian or Alaska Native.** Cultural DNA would include such things as a belief in the Circle of Life; extended family; the concept of the Great Spirit (a form of spirituality or belief in a greater being); ideas about roles for men and women; gatherers versus hunters; environmental ideas about taking care of the land (being kind to Mother Nature); original owners (or managers) of this vast land. These are but a few things to consider when comparing this group to others.

- **Asian (or Asian American).** Recognizing the belief that being educated and respectful of elders is the center of their being when talking about cultural DNA. The older a particular person is within the group, the more respect they might have in given situations in the culture. This can be seen as being completely different with respect to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Americans as they are 'lumped' under the term of 'Asian' by others that are not like them. This cultural group is the largest contributor to the American Western Expansion. They tend to live in larger cities and in significant transportation hubs in the U.S. and tend to maintain various forms of cultural identity from their ancestry. It is difficult for them to give up connections to their ancestry.

- **Black or African American.** Like other American Ethnic Groups, Black or African Americans tend to be “lumped together” to form one group, while many second and third generation Black or African Americans express concern about their Jamaican, Haitian, Dominican, African, or other extended cultural heritage not being represented in their U.S. National Identity. Religious beliefs, family and extended family values tend to sort sub groups into being less accepted by other like groups. Colors of skin (darkness versus lightness) as well as other biological features have tended to cause conflicts for acceptance within the culture.

- **Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.** There is no exception to being different culturally. As an example, Hawaiians are not the same as Samoans, but non-Hawaiians and non-Samoans tend to frequently lump both groups into one. Island families rarely leave their homeland other than for work, providing food for the family, or for higher education. There are other reasons people leave, but generally most Islanders reside with their family in their home on the Island.

- **White American.** Cultural DNA is frequently expressed as “being the same” when in reality the sub-groups of whites are as different as spots on a Dalmatian. Irish Americans are not the same as German Americans even when labeled as white. North African-Americans (or even South African Americans) are generally depicted in the white category while South Africans (though both white and black as well as other variations) are not typically depicted or accepted as being African American unless they are identified as Black. When white people from South Africa become American citizens, it seems appropriately complex to label them as ‘African Americans’ when other non-white groups struggle with that particular term.

- **Hispanic or Latino (White).** This group might include as many differences in language dialects as there are differences in people culturally. Puerto Rican Americans tend to be grouped in or near major cities where family members have lived for many years. Mexican Americans have moved from the bordering states to locations throughout the upper 48 states and have blended tremendous cultural differences into the farmlands and the cities of America today. Other differences in the Spanish historical contributions to the culture of America come from as far away as Spain and as close as Latin America or the narrow strip of land connecting the U.S. with South America. South Americans bring var-

“It is shocking for me to see how the father and mother in America kick their own children out when they become eighteen years of age. The most surprising thing about it all is that the young people do not seem to mind or think it is too cruel to be thrown out of their own family but accept it as the natural and normal way of behaving.”
ious cultural differences in food, language, religious beliefs, and family values to the Hispanic or Latino American group.

- **Hispanic or Latino (Not White).** Brings the same cultural dimensions as the white group. They might also bring cultural differences from the Black or African American group as well. Conflicts tend to exist with this group accepting skin color as a discriminator against their Hispanic or Latino ethnicity. Values concerning family life, religion, food, and roles are similar to other groups.

Additionally, though the OMB considered using Arab or Middle Eastern American as another group, the agency decided that there wasn’t sufficient data to use the terms as a category. The cultural differences in the two groups are distinct from the others discussed, but the number of members in the U.S. population and the military are not sufficient to compare with the other groups. However, the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) has included Arab American and Jewish American Experiences in its education and training programs to help further define the complicated American ethnic/cultural experience.

Dr. Vince Parrillo provides us further details about cultural (or ethnic) identities to include values, beliefs, traditions, customs, respectful courtesies, family, and community in his book “Strangers to These Shores,” a look at the American experience. Another earlier historical writing still remains unsurpassed in offering us the most penetrating analysis of America and Americans—Alexis de Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America.” Tocqueville tried to understand why Americans were so different from Europeans in the last throes of aristocracy. America, in contrast to the aristocratic ethic, was a society where hard work and moneymaking was the dominant ethic, where the common man enjoyed a level of dignity which was unprecedented, where commoners never deferred to elites, and where what he described as crass individualism and a system of market capitalism had taken root to an extraordinary degree.

To date, most writers of American military history have not yet attempted to define American differences. There is very little writing or discussion about how American cultural groups are integrated into the U.S. Military, although there has been some discussion on the concept of a particular Service’s needs, and each branch’s needs being the same and each branch’s needs being unique—without sorting out Service members’ multi-faceted cultural differences. Added to this dilemma is our lack of self-knowledge.

The War on Terror has changed the battle space—requiring individuals and units to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization operations and to interface regularly with the local populace. Subsequently, an important part of the ongoing transformation of the military involves an evolving cultural awareness (CA) campaign, which seeks to enhance Service members’ abilities to understand and leverage cultural factors. Contemporary analyses increasingly identify foreign populations as ‘centers of gravity,’ a fact that underscores the necessity of the CA Initiative (Hajjar, 2006).

**Tactical Application of Cultural DNA**

As the Army collected data on Iraq and Afghanistan from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, it became apparent that although U.S. troops were extremely well-trained for “kinetic” operations, their ability to conduct COIN operations and stabilization missions in developing nations depended more on individual or lower level command; thus past training results proved unsatisfactory. Consequently, a decision was made by appropriate command echelons to include language and culture in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Professional Military Education (PME) curriculum, as well as pre-deployment training. This paradigm shift requires a historical view to help us determine where we need to go with respect to cultural competency; therefore, we will look at two organizational models and how each has tackled the mandate to develop culture and language training for all purpose forces.

The U.S. Army response was that TRADOC and Fort Huachuca established the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) to develop content for Training Support Packages (TSP) and to implement a train-the-trainer program. TCC’s primary mission is the development of global/regional training as well as a culture general (3C) toolkit, supplemented by SMART books, immersive simulations and a host of other support materials, as well as collaborative partnerships. Other Service branches have likewise established their own programs.
While the efforts of the TCC have been successful for field commanders with respect to language and culture globally or in the theaters, there is still insufficient effort in developing the American (self knowledge) culture. This type of cultural understanding is very complex, but as much needed as the need to know, understand, and operate in cultures different than our own. We operate tactically in cultures around the world that are completely different from any form of American culture and while we are constantly trying to understand what makes people behave differently in these areas of operation, we tend to forget our own cultural identities. We say things like: ‘Why are they so different?’ or ‘Why can’t they just act like Americans?’ These unconscious thoughts (though most of the time verbally expressed) form barriers to understanding and operating in cultures that are different than our own (whether those cultures are U.S. Regional or Military).

In 2002, the TCC initiated contact with the DEOMI for collaborative work surrounding the use of the American cultural experiences in deployed areas. This led to several mutual working groups to show the relationship between U.S. culture and the different Ethnic American Groups as they relate to non-U.S. cultures. The DEOMI is not new to educating and training with respect to culture. The Institute has trained senior noncommissioned and commissioned officers (EO Program Managers) in recognizing the American culture as not being ‘all the same’ and to see how groups are historically discriminated against in society as well as the Military. The DEOMI used topics such as Concepts of Culture; Cross Cultural Communication; Communications in Genders, and Ethnic Cultural Blocks (The American Experience), to name a few topics that would make the EO Advisor and EO Program Manager better able to be empathetic to others and their differences. This modality of training and education started in the early 1970s and continues to grow in the 21st Century.

In conjunction with TCC and the DEOMI collaborative efforts, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness initiated a ‘National Language and Culture Initiative’ to begin development of more opportunities for culture and language to be trained in the military and supported at public and private school systems throughout the U.S. Formation of the Defense Language Office (DLO) and the need for a Senior Language Authority was followed soon after by the establishment of a cultural research arm, the DEOMI. While extensive research as well as education and training in the area of global (or operational) culture had been ongoing, there was little being done to help in the area of ‘knowing self’ or the American culture. The DEOMI and members of TCC formed collaborative efforts during several DLO Cultural Working Group Meetings to help build a program for American Cultural Awareness. This effort formed the basis for developing learning outcomes for every service member to accomplish during their assigned period of service to the military. The American Cultural Groups discussed at the beginning of this paper are specifically used for expansion of the cultural meaning assigned to all cultures, whether U.S. or global.

The TCC and DEOMI continue developing various forms of the American Experience for inclusion into all levels of education and training in the U.S. Army, as well as the other Services. Concurrently, additional gaps have been identified by Army Research Institute (ARI) and working groups that require our consideration and discussion.

**Gaps in Cultural Training: Next Steps**

Cultural DNA is useful as long as it fits its operating environment. When the environment changes, however, cultural DNA tends to continue to replicate itself, even though certain behaviors can doom success in the theatre of operations, and in the case of our military, can doom the survival of people within it. Therefore, when cultural DNA no longer fits the new environment (on a macro level–historical, political, social, economic; the micro level being the values, beliefs, behaviors and norms of different cultural paradigms) Soldiers must learn to self-regulate this innate tendency to act on their American DNA and subsequently, consciously reach into their ‘cultural toolbox’ for constructs that can help determine what dictates and motivates the cultural DNA of the adversary–or in stability operations, simply ‘the other’.

Subsequently, the development of additional cultural education and training, or the expansion of existing cultural education and training, must begin with analysis, research, and development. There are gaps existing in the overall process and we have elected to mention those gaps (not all inclusive) to
develop this paper for the future and to apply to academia. We have identified four of the gaps to be briefly discussed below.

1. **Fundamental gaps in research on cultural learning and instruction.** We have found that there is little research on cultural learning and instruction that might be applied to the U.S. military. On the other hand, there is significant information produced by the U.S. Peace Corps that seems to help sojourners adjust easily to cultures that are completely different than the U.S. culture(s). We must invest into researching further topics such as: front end analysis of the cultural knowledge and skills needed, conceptual knowledge models of cultural expertise and learning, comparison of instructional methods and technologies, validation of region/culture-specific content, transfer of learning, assessment metrics, and evaluation.

2. **Gaps in higher levels of cultural learning and development.** We must narrow the gap of learning outcomes beyond cultural awareness and initial rapport while expanding the need for specialist versus general-purpose forces. Such collaborations between policy and research and development will result in better specification of goals, requirements, and objectives. Additional gap narrowing can be achieved through the use of documented and follow-on training of lessons learned and development of assessment tools.

3. **Gaps in modeling, simulation, and technology.** These gaps require sequential levels of analysis—appropriate to moving from the individual to the integration of groups, organizations, and up to societal levels. We need to improve natural language processing that allows trainees to generate responses rather than choosing from a list. Likewise, we need continued development of virtual characters whose behavior (including proxemics, affect, etc.) reflects their cultural context, as well as characters and underlying models that can more readily be adapted to other cultures. We need to include more realistic interactive multimedia simulation training like InVism's award winning ‘Army 360’ series to prepare and inoculate our Service members prior to deployment in a concerted effort to reduce/avoid critical incidents in theatre that negate America's good intent.

4. **Integration of Technological Tools.** One last area of focus is how to best integrate these new technological tools—designed and developed to support and supplement PME, pre-deployment, and self-directed culture and language training—as depicted in ARI’s graphic below (ARI, 2008).

Challenges

Several challenges concerning the use of cultural DNA strategies are worth mentioning as we conclude this paper. First, there is very little written that helps to identify what we have presented as American Cultural DNA (or the differences in the hyphenated American cultural experience.) We collected various bits of information concerning how the American culture is so misunderstood and how historically the different American cultures have shared discrimination, successes, and failures. The challenge for education and training in the military is “How do we make the best use of being inclusive of our Service culture and our societal American cultural DNA (differences)?” Another challenge to consider is “How do we take what is already in use such as the Culture Matters Program in the U.S. Peace Corps and Expatriate Cultural training programs, and embed (at least) portions of the training into our fundamental military education and training?” We could begin this type of awareness and understanding by embedding it into various phases of pre-deployment training at the installation level or within the country of occupation. The next challenge might be “How do we get people to accept that something as basic as American DNA (cultural) must be understood and transmitted before we can be truly effective at cross cultural communication, operations or other competencies?”

The warfighters of today (and tomorrow) must be as competent in culture as they must be in tactics.
They must draw upon prior knowledge as a frame of reference to provide them a basis for understanding and comparison in order to analyze, interpret, and predict behavior of foreign nationals, as well as diverse fellow Americans. We cannot afford to ignore or forget the cultural misunderstandings of our past by hoping that we will not be deployed to fight other global battles. If we wait for another 50 years to begin to seriously study our culture or the culture of others, we will certainly be doomed for failure. We must begin immediately to look at our own identity as well as compare that identity to others globally.

**Recommendations**

Historically, understanding and navigating the socio-cultural terrain have not been recognized as core war fighter competencies, yet they’ve proven to be an unavoidable component of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, across the Department of Defense, widespread agreement has emerged that socio-cultural factors have a critical impact on current and future military operations. The need for these skill sets is service-wide, crosses all ranks, and is not specific to occupational specialties. The question now is how we can effectively and efficiently equip the force with the necessary capabilities. Army doctrine and training are shifting to place greater emphasis on cultural capabilities. To inform these shifts, research provides us an evidence base, identifying specific capabilities that contribute to success and effective methods for their development. It is imperative that we build partnerships with military and civilian institutions that have a long history in culture training.

Research for the Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency Analysis synthesized findings from disparate disciplines and developed conceptual frameworks and recommendations for education and training (Abbe, 2008a; Abbe 2008b; Abbe, Gulick, & Herman, 2007). Some of the primary conclusions from this research are as follows:

1. Cultural capability consists of three interrelated components: knowledge of specific cultures or countries, language proficiency, and capabilities that are culture-general—that is, they transfer to any cultural setting.
2. The most reliable contributors to effectiveness in cross-cultural settings are the culture-general capabilities, referred to here as cross-cultural competence. Non-ethnocentric attitudes, interpersonal skills, and flexibility are particularly important when working in a foreign culture.
3. Though assessments of cross-cultural competence have not yet been validated for military personnel, there are some existing conceptual models and assessment tools that can inform the development of such measures.
4. Foreign language is often assumed to be the gateway to cultural understanding, but empirical evidence for this assumption is lacking. Foreign language proficiency is a critical tool for learning about and communicating in a specific culture, but does not necessarily result in a broad, generalizable cultural capability.

We must include a program for building an American cultural experience that captures the multi-faceted differences in the hyphenated-American experience. This program could identify many of the similarities in our American Culture while showing how the past practices of separating culture would never bring unity to our culture. We don't need to reinvent the wheel. The program used at the TCC and DEOMI could be adopted for use across the U.S. military in all PME schools or even at the small unit level. There is no need to 'increase the size of the rucksack' or to 'take something out of the rucksack to accommodate this initiative.' TCC and the DEOMI can team up to build a composite training package—that would include global (or operational area) culture with ideas of our own American Experience—into a single model for improving knowledge, skills, and abilities (or attitudes) with respect to a unified American culture.

Finally, since we are building what we have identified as American cultural DNA, it must be noted that to include any of this conceptually into education and training, we must show how this knowledge can apply tactically or it won’t be of interest/use to our military. While attending a recent conference hosted by the ARI and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling Program, in a workshop titled “Workshop on Developing Intercultural Adaptability in the Warfighter” we listened to various speakers from the social science fields in academia and the military talking about possible models for the future, although very little was said about understanding or education and training of American culture.
With this in mind, one particular presentation stood out (for me) as dangerous ‘cultural ignorance’. A video clip depicting an American Soldier in a village near a combat base, supposedly showing the extent to which stress causes Soldiers to become disoriented and not care about their surroundings, was a perfect depiction of how we misrepresent American culture while in the presence of ‘others.’ The male Soldier was boasting about proficiency in the language of Afghanistan as he was teaching a group of local youngsters (appearing to be ages 7 to 10) to say various phrases in English. He smiled as he told the children to ‘Repeat after me, I am an idiot!’ The children did not hesitate to say the same thing loudly and with a smile. The Soldier seemed to not care about what he was doing or had done; certainly, he didn’t pay attention to the possibilities of a ‘tactical mission failure’ in winning the hearts and minds through playing a possible explosive game with children.

What seemed like fun to him could have been disastrous for many others in the area. This type of event is not something that happens now and then, but seems to occur far too frequently. His actions could have been more positive had he compared his ‘cultural DNA’ to the differences of the children around him. Undoubtedly, we can reduce such events through a system of education and training that enhances our own understanding of cultural DNA and its application to tactical situations.

**Conceptualizing Cultural Capabilities**

In conclusion, cross-cultural competence (3C) is the knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enables individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments. 3C is an individual capability that contributes to intercultural effectiveness regardless of the particular intersection of cultures. Although some aspects of cognition, behavior, or affect may be particularly relevant in a specific country or region, evidence suggests that a core set of competencies enables adaptation to any culture (Hammer, 1987). The knowledge and affect dimensions provide a foundation for skills that enable effective intercultural behavior.

We are not suggesting that cultural DNA should supplant the hard work and effort to develop and acquire 3C within our Services; rather, we believe that drilling down into a much deeper understanding of the complexities and differences in our American cultural DNA provides a framework for our military to operate effectively in the global theatre of operation.

The field is ready to move beyond our initial effort for ‘cultural awareness’ training. Training development must be anchored in front-end analysis and back-end evaluation. There is a continued risk of a widening gap between the science of cultural learning and technological capabilities; however, multi-disciplinary collaborations and solutions will help mitigate that risk. We must transition research findings and lessons learned into military education and training. Materials selected need to strike a balance between didactic and experiential methods to include the use of engaging first-hand narratives tied to relevant military experience, all supported by cutting-edge technology and built upon a framework of knowing who we are as Americans.

Soldiers should be aware of the pervasive international perception of ‘the Ugly American,’ a perception possibly rooted in a historical view held by most Americans of a people confident that their economic and political system was, and is, better than most other countries and that America is an ‘exceptional country with exceptional people.’ The phrase “city upon a hill”—and the idea behind it that America should be a beacon of all humanity—has resonated through the ages within an American sense of ‘exceptionalism’ (Weaver, 1-2). What ultimately translates to us as belief in oneself and/or the Nation—an essential element for success—is often viewed by many people around the world as American arrogance.

At a much deeper level, Dr. Stephen M. Covey, in his recent work, *The Greater Identity Theft is Our Cultural DNA*, posits a significant word of caution. Covey warns about ‘negative cultural DNA’—a profound identity threat that comes from people being raised in a comparison-based, individualistic culture, where people focus more on secondary greatness, such as to become rich and famous, rather than primary greatness, which deals with genuine character and contribution. This switch to secondary greatness is alluring and occurs throughout many of the world’s cultures. Covey suggests that secondary greatness has replaced primary greatness, that trust has deteriorated and confidence has gone down. We’re now living with its consequences, as evidenced by the global financial crisis (Covey, 2008).
It’s a healthy thing to be humbled by this or any other crisis, to realize that we have to take an inside-out approach in learning to be humble, to focus on integrity and character, on making a contribution by serving other people and to serve worthwhile causes locally, nationally, and around the globe. American cultural DNA training (referring to the metaphor... the differences in cultural groups) should focus on strengthening primary greatness through contribution with a goal to achieve individual and national character. Then, if we understand the “cultural DNA” of nation-states, their citizens and their organizations, we will be empowered to better manage the destiny of nations, our lives, and our work in today’s post-global world. Cross-cultural lenses provide us a new way of understanding why we do what we do, at home, at work, and at war (Foster, 1995).

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What Does Culture Have To Do With It?

by Joe McDermott

Introduction

I recently returned from a second overseas tour supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Kirkuk and Baghdad, Iraq and Bagram, Afghanistan. When I first traveled to Kirkuk in 2007, I had never been to the Middle East, and was as unfamiliar with the culture as I was with the language. I should begin by stating that, by profession, I am a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector, which is new school speak for Intelligence Interrogator. I understand the imperative to learn as much about a culture and society into which I am placed, for without that knowledge, I would be powerless to successfully execute my missions.

In order to function effectively among people from or in a different culture, it is vital to understand their culture so as to understand why they do things the way that they do! One need not necessarily be required to speak or understand their language if they have become educated about their culture. Interpreters can provide the bridge to language, but there is no substitute for cognizance concerning a society’s culture. So, the short-answer to the title question is: **Everything!**

My background in the Intelligence arena centered on Europe and the former Soviet Union, so when I was asked to ply my trade at a U.S. Army Brigade Detention Facility in Kirkuk speaking with people who were incarcerated for various reasons, and attempting to extract useable intelligence information from them, I discovered that I needed an education about Iraqi culture in a hurry! I was fortunate to have an Interpreter assigned to me who was my Instructor and mentor when I arrived and soon became a close friend. “Matthew” was born in central Iraq and is an Iraqi-Assyrian Christian, seasoned in the business of interpretation. Matthew guided me in the nuances of the Iraqi culture and instructed me in useful words and phrases for me to use when engaging Iraqi detainees. I was able to perform full personal background screenings in the Iraqi dialect of Arabic in a very short time, thus laying the foundation for my success in achieving the goal of any HUMINT Collector—obtaining the maximum amount of information in the least amount of time.

I no sooner became comfortable with Iraq when I received a re-assignment to Bagram, Afghanistan. The people and the culture in Afghanistan were vastly different from that which I encountered in Iraq. I came to a quick realization that Afghanistan was actually not a part of the Arab world. It is actually in Southwest Asia! This was important to know and to understand in my interactions with people there. I also needed to become better educated on the significance of tribal relations in Afghanistan. While Iraq and much of the Arab world have tribal-based societies, the dynamic is very different in Afghanistan and the role of tribal leaders and elders is much more prominent in Afghanistan than it was in Iraq. My interpreter in Afghanistan, “Ramazan,” was instrumental in my smooth transition in dealing with Afghans, and he educated me in particulars of Afghan culture. Ramazan was born and raised north of Kabul and was of Hazara extraction and instructed me in basics of the Hazara and Pashtun people-groups and the Pashtun language.

Rapport Building

One cannot underestimate the value of building rapport as a component in cultural awareness, especially when seeking something from someone else. In this case, the people with whom I was speaking potentially possessed information of intelligence value to warriors on the battlefield. I have been in the interrogation business for more than 30 years, and I understand rapport-building. I have never comprehended the perceived need by others in my profession to believe that they must rely on other-than-approved methods for extraction of information from people. The simple act of learning some of the local language and being aware and sensitive to Iraqi, Afghan, and Muslim cultures showed, or at least led detainees to believe that I actually cared about them and that I
was interested in them as a person and not just the information that they might have.

It is important to understand that we, as Americans, have had a very short period of history from which to draw our global perspective. Only 233 years have elapsed since our incorporation as a nation. To many, this is a long time, however when juxtaposed with the nations and civilizations of Asia and the Middle East, the U.S. history is quite short. Our counterparts abroad find it somewhat amusing that the worldly “youngsters” have the temerity to speak about righteousness, purpose and ideals when we have only been in existence for such a short time.

American Culture

What is American culture anyway? We appear not to have a clearly defined “national culture”, whereas, for example, Iraq is rich in history, culture and significance on the world stage. We have a tendency to keep to ourselves a great deal and we generally believe that our way is the only way and everything else is somehow inferior. If something does not directly concern us or affect us, then we do not have the time for it, hence, our overall ignorance concerning the other nations of the world. If we can have our “Baseball, Hot Dogs, Apple Pie and Chevrolet”, who really cares about “Baghdad, Hulagu Khan, Dolma and the Qu’ran?” Well, if we want to enjoy success in dealing with Iraqis, it might serve us well to become educated about the area in which we live and the things that are important to the Iraqi people.

Many of us insist that “foreigners” who encroach upon our lives and neighborhoods adapt to and assimilate our language, customs and rules, yet we are reluctant to do the same when we are the “foreigners”. Please do not misunderstand me–I am proud to be an American, and I served for more than 20 years on active duty in the U.S. Army. I have been and I am willing to die for this country. I have had the opportunity to work and live in several different countries in my life however, and I know how crucial it is to truly understand the people with whom I live and work.

The “average” American who has spent most of his life in the local community, and who was thrust headlong into the Military culture, then to Iraq or Afghanistan without any real preparation on how to function among the peoples there, may find himself confused and conflicted on how to act—or perhaps better, how to interact—with the local populace. We have historically seen this played out in many locations around the world, particularly as it relates to conflict: World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, Vietnam and even places like Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia and South America.

In the past, if Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines were being sent to another part of the world and a different culture, the best that they could hope for was a quick briefing on what they could/should do and what they could not/should not do when interacting with the “locals.” The U.S. came to an understanding of the importance of cultural awareness in the 19th century, and applied it to diplomatic and higher-ranking military officials, but the importance and significance of it never really trickled down to the frontline troops of the military until the later 20th century, with increasingly significant strides being made since 2004.

Current Operations

Today our dedicated military professionals are provided with a continuum of cultural awareness and understanding within the framework of their professional military education. Training is provided beginning with Initial Entry Training and continues at each level of professional development including Military Occupational Specialty Courses, the Advance Noncommissioned Officer Course, Basic Officer Leadership Course, Captains Career Course, Army Basic Instructor Course, and many others. Students receive increasing levels of understanding of culture, cross-cultural communications from a general perspective as well as targeted instruction on specific cultures within a region or nation (e.g., Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Bosnia, and Iraq). The instruction provided promotes maximum active involvement by students in the classroom through the application of critical thinking skills and the execution of practical exercises tailored to the level of the target audience. This is not your father’s cultural awareness. Today’s military is being prepared better than ever and being equipped with knowledge and skills which will pay dividends in success on the battlefields, wherever they may be!

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Curriculum Offered:
- What is Culture and Who Am I?
- Influences on Culture
- Social Organization
- Political Structures
- Cross-Cultural Negotiations
- Rapport Building
- Cross-Cultural Communications
- Egypt
- Iran: Ethnic Groups of Iran
- Afghanistan: Culture Overview
- Pakistan
- Saudi Arabia
- Yemen
- Iraq: Culture Overview
- China (PRC): A Cultural Overview
- Indonesia
- Philippines
- Taiwan
- Horn of Africa Region
- North Africa Region
- Trans-Saharan Africa Region
- West Africa Region
- Smart Books:
  - Afghanistan
  - Pakistan
  - Yemen

The mission of the TCC is to provide the U.S. Army with mission-focused culture education and training. This includes training all units and Soldiers that prepare to deploy, and enabling all institutional organizations to effectively educate and train culture. In collaboration with the sister service culture centers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, and in cooperation with the Army’s Combat Training Center, the TCC developed the Army Culture Education and Training Curriculum. The Core Curriculum is designed to provide a basis for developing military cross-cultural competence. It also assists students in identifying the Army’s definition of culture and gaining cultural awareness to conduct their military duties. These courses bring specificity to the contemporary operating environment and further highlight the importance and use of culture in military operations. Establishing the foundation for useful skill-sets such as negotiations, language familiarization, influence, and communication, this curriculum helps soldiers achieve cultural understanding.

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