Operations in Afghanistan
In this issue, three articles offer perspectives on operations in Afghanistan. Captain Nenchek discusses the philosophy of the evolving insurgent “syndicates,” who are working together to resist the changes and ideas the Coalition Forces bring to Afghanistan. Captain Beall relates his experiences in employing Human Intelligence Collection Teams at the company level in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Lawson provides a look into the balancing act U.S. Army chaplains as non-combatants in Afghanistan are involved in with regards to Information Operations.

Colonel Reyes discusses his experiences as the MNF-I C2 CIOC Chief, detailing the problems and solutions to streamlining the intelligence effort. First Lieutenant Winwood relates her experiences in integrating intelligence support into psychological operations.

From a doctrinal standpoint, Lieutenant Colonels McDonough and Conway review the evolution of priority intelligence requirements from a combined operations/intelligence view. Mr. Jack Kem discusses the constructs of assessment during operations—measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, common discussion threads in several articles in this issue.

George Van Otten sheds light on a little known issue on our southern border, that of the illegal immigration and smuggling activities which use the Tohono O’odham Reservation as a corridor and offers some solutions for combined agency involvement and training to stem the flow.

Included in this issue is nomination information for the CSM Doug Russell Award as well as a biography of the 2009 winner.

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Sterilla A. Smith
Editor
**Purpose:** The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

**Disclaimer:** Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

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By order of the Secretary of the Army:

**JOYCE E. MORROW**
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0919801
On June 14, 2009, the U.S. Army celebrated 234 years of answering the call to duty. Since its inception in 1775 our Army has continued to evolve by becoming ever more flexible, innovative and better prepared to tackle new challenges. These characteristics will become increasingly important for our Army and our branch as we re-focus on Afghanistan as part of our expanding involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Looking at our Army’s history, whether it originated within the Continental Army or the State Militias, overcoming multifaceted adversity to achieve victory is our hallmark. The intelligence successes we have achieved together in this current conflict have required intense dedication to our profession, innumerable personal hardships, the unwavering support of our loved ones, and all too often, the ultimate sacrifice of our brothers and sisters with whom we served. The lessons we have learned over these many years in which we have been engaged in OEF have come at a great cost that we will continue to bear. However, the sweat and blood which we have shed to pay for these lessons has also made us more determined, more agile, more proficient, and more assured of victory.

The challenges and sacrifices we have all endured are not unique to our time. We share these hardships with those who formed our Army at its inception. I recently read a book entitled *Founding Father* about General George Washington’s experiences as the Commander of the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. An introspective man, a great leader, a great Soldier, before becoming a great president, he feared his task might be too great for his talents. Yet under his leadership the Army endured years of misery and setbacks. Think about the men who served under his command. Those Continental Soldiers always seemed to be one misfortune away from defeat. They faced frequent shortages of food, supplies, medicine, and ammunition. For five years, Washington and his men continually faced defeat, death and internal setbacks. It took every ounce of courage, determination, faith, and a belief in what they were fighting for was truly worth the sacrifices each Soldier bore. After six years of fighting, on October 19, 1781, the Continental Army achieved victory with the surrender of British General Cornwallis at Yorktown.

That’s persistence. That’s staying power. That’s what this Army was born with and born of, and that’s what our Army possesses today. It is this spirit of courage and tenacity that lives within each of us within Military Intelligence (MI) working every day to find and bring to justice the radical extremists who killed more than 3,000 of our innocent men, women, and children on September 11, 2001 and continue to threaten our nation.

Still, there’s another aspect of our Army that we should be equally proud and will be increasingly important as the nature of this conflict evolves, and that is the degree of compassion and understanding U.S. Soldiers bring to the fight. Our adversaries know that American Soldiers will protect, care, and treat with dignity those whom we defeat or capture. Civilians with whom we come in contact do not fear our presence, for they know we understand their plight, their sacrifices, and their desire to live in peace.

You’ve had to serve not just as Soldiers, but as diplomats; not just as Warfighters, but as peacekeepers. And with every new challenge, you have demonstrated the ability to rise to the occasion.

(Continued on page 4)
Earlier this month we celebrated the Army’s 234th birthday. On June 14, 1775, our country’s founding fathers established the Continental Army in preparation for revolution against the British. In that regard, the Army has been around longer than the U.S. itself.

What began as a mostly untrained group of 15,000 farmers and craftsmen has grown to become one of the largest, most elite and technologically advanced fighting forces in the world. The Army’s mission today remains much the same as it was more than two centuries ago—to champion the cause of freedom on our shores and abroad.

Throughout the history of the Army, the noncommissioned officer (NCO) has played a vital role in the overall readiness of the force. Since 1775, the Army has set its NCOs apart from other enlisted Soldiers by insignia of grade. With more than 200 years of service, the U.S. Army’s NCO Corps has distinguished itself as the world’s most accomplished group of military professionals.

Through wars and military operations in every corner of the globe, America’s soldiers have served our country with bravery and pride. Seventeen U.S. presidents and 2,403 Medal of Honor recipients have served in the Army. Of those Medal of Honor recipients, almost half were NCOs. Thousands more heroes have sacrificed their lives in the name of liberty and millions have dedicated their lives to the service of their country.

Historical and daily accounts of life as an NCO are exemplified by acts of courage, dedication, and willingness to do whatever it takes to complete the mission. In recognition of our commitment Secretary of the Army, Pete Geren, announced last October during the annual Association of the U.S. Army Conference, that 2009 will be the “Year of the NCO.” He stated that “the Army will accelerate the NCO development of strategic initiatives, develop new initiatives that enhance training, education, capability, and utilization of the NCO Corps, showcase the NCO story to the Army and the American people, honor the sacrifices and celebrate the contributions of the NCO Corps, past and present.” In its 234 year history, this is only the second time the Army has used this theme “Year of the NCO.”

In the winter of 1778, during Valley Forge, Inspector General Friedrich von Steuben wrote the Army’s first manual, “The Blue Book” and described the importance of choosing the right soldiers as NCOs. “The order and discipline of a regiment depends so much upon their behavior, that only those who show their merit and good conduct are entitled to it.” NCOs have been celebrated for decorated service in military events ranging from Valley Forge to Gettysburg, to charges on Omaha Beach and battles along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. NCOs have led from the front by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. The NCO Corps has and will always be the backbone supporting the greatest fighting power in the world!

On May 20th, Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr. stated, “Any officer out here will tell you . . . that they are the officer that they are today, because there was an NCO behind them every step of the way. To some extent, all of us stand on the shoulders of great NCOs.”

Today’s NCO is an innovative, competent, and professional enlisted leader grounded in heritage, values and tradition. I encourage all NCOs to embody the Warrior Ethos and live the Army Values. We must lead by example, train from experience, maintain and enforce standards, take care of Soldiers and adapt to a

(Continued on page 5)
We’ll be victorious in this War on Terrorism. Of that I am absolutely certain and confident. It’s not just because of our overwhelming firepower, professionalism, dedication, and the sweat and blood the men and women of our armed forces bring to the fight. We have a secret weapon on our side—the unwavering belief, shared with the Continental Army, that ours is the true cause of liberty, equality, and human freedom. Through your efforts the forces of darkness will be defeated. The forces who would turn the clock back on civilization will fail and the forces of light will be victorious. We will not fail in this fight.

For over 200 years, the Army has been at the forefront of defending the freedom that makes our country such a very special place; a place where men and women are judged not by race, religion, creed, or family heritage, but on their individual merit. America has always been that flame burning bright where anyone with a desire to serve can excel with drive and talent.

Every MI Soldier and the civilians serving alongside them are helping to write a new chapter in our Army’s glorious history. I know you will make it a proud chapter. Heritage is a burden on occasion. At other times it’s a great joy. Sometimes ‘Army Strong’ seems an understatement to me in describing what you do. Our nation may never know each of the individual successes made by MI professionals serving around the world, but they will never forget the sacrifices and commitment you brought to this fight. Because of you the Army will proudly celebrate many birthdays in the future.

Always Out Front!

MG John Custer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, and Fort Huachuca’s youngest Soldier, PFC Garrett Bouldin cut the cake during the Army Birthday celebration on 12 June at Brown Parade Field.
changing world. We are an important and essential part of the Army. The NCO Corps provides invaluable service and sacrifice in the line of duty. We continually prove our dedication and our willingness to make great sacrifices on behalf of our Nation. This goes not just for the Army, but for all services. NCOs of all branches are accomplishing great feats everyday that deserves recognition by the American public.

I have witnessed first hand other nations, allies, and even our enemies seek out the expertise of our highly skilled, expertly trained, and proficient NCOs. They are amazed with our organization, skill set, initiative, and professionalism. Most importantly, they are impressed with the level of respect given to our NCO Corps.

NCOs understand the mission at hand. They are mentors, leaders, true professionals. Above all, they take care of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines and ensure their safety. Although our military continues to challenge its service members with a heightened OPTEMPO, back to back deployments, and often times missions which seem unattainable, I encourage you to strive to remain relevant! I want to remind you of what Secretary of the Army, Pete Geren has said, “At the front of every Army mission in the U.S. or overseas, you’ll find NCOs. They know their mission, they know their equipment, and most importantly, they know their Soldiers.”

I would like to relate the story of two amazing NCOs who were part of an event that truly changed the world. Before the USS Cole bombing, before 9/11, there was Somalia. On October 3, 1993 the world saw pictures of a dead American Soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia. Although Soldiers in every conflict and war have seen that level of hate, this was the first time the American public and the world saw it.

Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart were part of an operation that many people don’t even know had a name. That name was Operation Gothic Serpent. At the second crash site, the two Delta Snipers were inserted by helicopter (at their own request) to defend a crashed helicopter from hundreds of advancing Somalis in the Battle of Mogadishu.

Ultimately both snipers were killed and the pilot, Michael Durant was taken hostage. But the fight that these NCOs showed left the impression to the Somali Militia that whomever they were protecting must be important, and perhaps that is why he wasn’t killed. SFC Shughart and MSG Gordon were the first Soldiers to be awarded Medals of Honor posthumously since the Vietnam War.

Not every NCO will be put in a position to sacrifice his or her life. But every NCO will be expected to lead; they will be expected to make decisions that impact lives and missions. They will be expected to successfully complete missions, and they will be expected to live with the decisions that they make. We are at a point today that even junior NCOs are expected to take the level of responsibility of a senior NCO ten years ago. That may seem a tall order but the NCO Corps has been and always will be the backbone supporting the greatest fighting power in the world.

NCOs Lead from the Front!
Introduction

From June 2007 through June 2008, I deployed to Iraq and served as the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) C2 Combined Intelligence and Operations Center (CIOC) Chief. Like so many Military Intelligence (MI) Soldiers returning again to Iraq, I had mixed feelings regarding the actual threat environment, how it changed or evolved, how I was going to understand the complexities, and how I would leverage the intelligence battlefield operating system capabilities to help the warfighters in the find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, and disseminate targeting process.

This article is based on my own personal experience and observations during my tour. It outlines how I attempted to make sense of and develop processes into the system, provides some challenges faced, and offers some recommendations for consideration to future CIOC chiefs as our military continues to support this endeavor.

Organizational Analysis and Solutions

1. Know your environment, know the plan, know the players, and know your capabilities. Realizing that the environment was complex, fluid, and involved aspects of PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) covering the tactical to strategic spectrum, I reviewed the MNF-I Commanding General’s (CG’s) Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) to understand the CG’s intent and vision. As I integrated into the daily battle rhythm of intelligence analysis, production and dissemination, I learned to appreciate the MNF-I network of key players. The diagram is only intended to illustrate the organizations that I was personally involved with for information flow and operational support.

What it does not adequately capture is the intricate cross-flow of information among and between all of these organizations and the CIOC. Although the CIOC had a formal request for information/intelligence (RFI) system, there were multiple means of information sharing that resulted in ongoing actions or RFIs that were difficult to track. Thus, there was no single and comprehensive entry point into the CIOC. Another point to note on the diagram is the CIOC composition. We were fortunate to have robust interagency cell support, specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency as well as the U.S. State Department.

Although we had a good relationship with the other governmental organizations, we did not have embedded analytical support in the CIOC. This would have been most helpful in synchronizing intelligence and operations.
Analytically, the CIOC provided a very capable, in-theater, all source fusion capability. How we tailored our efforts and support is covered later in the article. One of our challenges was providing the depth and fidelity of intelligence analysis that our broad audience required including, but not limited to, the CG, MNF-I and the various staffs, and the Iraqi intelligence, law enforcement, and judicial systems.

During this phase, we identified the CIOC’s major essential tasks, how we were configured to accomplish those tasks, and how we mitigated loss of key personnel due to rotation and transition/train up time. We categorized the CIOC functions into analytical support, administrative support and overhead; thereby narrowing the field of available analysts. We further broke down the analysts into three sub-categories of expert, journeyman, and novice. The major criteria that distinguished the expert from the journeyman categories were the actual subject matter expertise (SME) on the specific topic and amount of time spent on the specific topic (“dwell time” whether in theater or via reachback).

At the end of the study it became apparent that we had three layers of analyst proficiency. DIA (Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism and the Iraq cell (IZ)) mainly comprised the experts, along with a handful of CENTCOM analysts. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and a handful of Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS) analysts comprised the journeymen. The majority of the WIAS analysts fell into the novice category. In September 2007, we provided this analysis to the senior MI leadership (DIA, CENTCOM, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. One of the issues we discussed was balancing the need to support the CG, MNF-I with robust forward based analytical expertise and briefings/products and that we would place demands on the intelligence community (IC) reachback infrastructure in the Beltway. We knew that the journeymen and novices would have to overcome a steep learning curve and still provide value added in support of the rapidly moving intelligence cycle.

Additionally, we looked at whether CIOC physical realignment (identify sections that collaborated on the most common issues, and physically redesign the CIOC floor to better facilitate this flow of information and intelligence sharing) was feasible, made sense, and would outweigh any costs to interrupting OPTEMPO and timely intelligence support. Our methodology was to review the CIOC battle rhythm, given a snapshot in time. We captured a 45 day period, noted the daily CG MNF-I battle update assessment (BUA) notes, identified key comments and taskers to the C2, and grouped these into major issues. We then used Visio and Analyst Notebook programs to graphically associate these issues with the respective CIOC Analysis & Production (A&P) functional area sections (i.e., Sunni, Shi’a, national issues, etc.) On paper, we redesigned the CIOC main floor to physically position those sections that shared common issues.

We discovered that, in many instances, more than one analytical section was in fact working on the same CG issue. Additionally, with some exceptions, the current physical layout of analysts on the main floor did not lend well to “coffee breath close” analyst interaction across the various sections. However, the sheer logistical and information technology efforts required to relocate entire analytical sections would adversely impact continuous intelligence support to operations. So, for this phase, we ended up moving less than a handful of analysts to help synergize analytical efforts and information flow between the sections.

2. CIOC Functional and Physical Re-alignment Analysis. Based on the previously mentioned study, we had to ensure that we maximized our capabilities to provide the most responsive, accurate and predictive intelligence to the warfighters. We realized that we had to “flatten the organization command and control (C2) wise and information flow wise.” We intuitively understood that the identified core of experts would carry the heavy analytical load and briefings/products and that we would place demands on the intelligence community (IC) reachback infrastructure in the Beltway.

3. Additional re-look based on “Knowledge Centers” concept. Not quite satisfied with the current structure, we continued our organizational re-look. We still had to flatten the organization for better responsiveness. To maximize success, we realized that we needed to align our efforts with the opera-
tional structure found in the MNF-I STRATOPS. Its structure revolved around operational planning teams that directly supported the JCP lines of operation (LOOs). Using CJCSM 3500.04D, 01 August 2005, Joint Mission Essential Task List as our guide, and specifically Strategic-Theater (ST) Objective 2 “Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance”, 2.1 through 2.26, we identified 38 CIOC tasks, in accordance with Annex G (Intelligence) JCP OIF, v.1, 27 November 2007. We then cross walked these tasks to the current analysts on hand, and formed five major groups, or Knowledge Centers. These included the following:

- Government of Iraq C2 (covered Ministries and Governance.)
- Regional neighbors (Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.)
- Countering Iranian influence.
- Countering maligned actors influence.
- Foreign terrorists/fighters.

This reorganization greatly assisted CIOC efforts in identifying the daily OPTEMPO product requirements in concert with STRATOPS, STRATEFF and the Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC), establishing the “core” of required SMEs, journeymen, and novices to focus on the problem sets, and mitigating the loss of fully trained analysts due to tour rotations. This, in turn, helped CENTCOM and DIA better support the mission via their reachback and forward deployed assets.

During my tour, the CIOC was able to “build the SME bench strength” up to 22 to 25 SMEs from CENTCOM and DIA. What was also significant was the in-theater senior analytical firepower at the Senior Executive Service (SES) level. Rich Baffa (A&P Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)), Tom Greco (CIOC SIO), and Dan O’Brien (DIA Forward Element, Iraq) provided the C2 with real time, forward based, executive level analysis, as well as critical reachback connectivity and support from the national IC. This proved to be the added edge we required to “think and analyze at the graduate level.”

**Lessons Learned**

- Flattening the organization for responsiveness is a good thing. However, we occasionally experienced the challenges of quality control and duplication of effort due to the fact that some “in the chain” were unaware of ongoing actions or its status. Analysts at all levels must ensure, and leaders must demand, that information is passed to those who need to know.

- Products/deliverables tended to be living documents with constant updating due to the fast moving OPTEMPO and requirements. Although we strive for the 100 percent solution, perfection is often times the enemy of good enough given the environment and demands.

- Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO)/Translator review was a huge issue and often times a staffing impediment. Forward based elements required robust FDO and translator capabilities that required quick turn approval from the stateside originating agencies. We encountered many situations where the FDO approval process was not responsive to the CG requirements directing the CIOC to brief and provide “releasable IZ and non-releasable IZ” level products on short notice that would help shape the conditions for furthering the CG’s JCP or other missions.

- Ensure that the right analysts are deployed to meet the requirements. We studied the TF 714 rotation model that trained, deployed forward, then redeployed but maintained continued expertise by dwelling on the target from sanctuary. Both DIA and CENTCOM patterned their methodology on this process. The challenge, as stated earlier, was to ensure that the maximum time and numbers of analytical expert presence forward based occurred. Deployment times varied from as little as three months to a year. Our experience indicated that six months was the acceptable duration for expert level deployments, but we also realized the challenges associated with sustaining the analytical base in sanctuary. Finally, we were able to deliver at the four star level because the C2 had the SES team to help develop, shape and operationalize his vision.

- The same rigor in screening requirements for DIA and CENTCOM must be applied to contractor and WIAS analyst requirements. Although the requisite level of security clearance is a must, analytically qualified and experienced analysts are the standard.

- Establish tactics, techniques, and procedures on how to conduct business. This is another
time consuming task but it must be done to offset the rapid personnel turnover and trainup time, and continuous OPTEMPO. Simple 3x5 cards that outline, step by step, the required tasks to run the morning C2 preparatory session, CG roundtable briefings, develop daily BUA themes, etc., will get the team into a predictable battle rhythm, increase time efficiency, and reduce the stress associated with discovery learning.

✦ "No one wakes up in the morning wanting to fail." Leaders at all levels must always positively coach, teach, and mentor their respective teams or sections. They must always believe, and make their troops believe, that regardless of the incredible tasks and impossible deadlines, they can and will accomplish the mission to standard.

✦ OPTEMPO required a formal C2 chief of staff to assist the C2 in orchestrating the various moving parts and missions in the Perfume Palace and downtown. I noted that the other MNF-I staffs had authorized chiefs of staff. To this end, I informally initiated weekly (Sunday) deconfliction meetings with the other O-6 staff heads to help synchronize efforts, share information, and focus intelligence support across the MNF-I staff.

✦ Next to the C2, the most important position in the C2 is the Deputy C2 (DC2). The DC2 needs to be operationally experienced, proficient in directing a staff, a leader, and a team builder and synchronizer. Anything less and the C2 risks fracture within his organization and mission failure.

✦ The MNF-I OPTEMPO often required coordination with the stateside IC during off duty hours or weekends. This often created a synchronization challenge for our more senior analysts charged with the daily C2 0600 BUA updates and CG Sunday morning roundtable briefings. CENTCOM C2 noted this challenge and refocused his Tampa based IZ cell main effort and “local time” to Baghdad time. Although this understandably created a certain level of discomfort in CONUS, the CIOC analysts greatly appreciated the support to the main effort in Iraq.

✦ As stated earlier, not only does the CIOC provide timely, relevant and predictive strategic level intelligence to the CG, MNF-I and warfighters, but the intelligence helps shape the strategic battlespace for the MNF-I staff to prosecute the four LOOs (political, diplomatic, economic and security) in support of the JCP. Thus, intelligence must support the strategic information operations efforts (STRATEFF), operations (STRATOPS), engagements and reconciliation efforts with maligned individuals and groups (FSEC), and overall strategy, plans and policies as we evolve as an organization supporting the post Provincial Iraq Control (PIC) environment (Strategy Plans and Analysis).

✦ The physical separation from the MNF-I staff often created challenges involving priority of support/work, information sharing, and coordinating efforts. However, we mitigated this shortfall by embedding intelligence officers across the MNF-I staff. The intent was to inject operationally savvy, and intelligence attuned officers who could leverage the CIOC’s capabilities, understand the staffing requirements and prioritize intelligence support, and ultimately help the operational staffers shape the battlefield conditions in order to successfully prosecute the JCP.

✦ The C2 was often tasked with supporting the detainee review board by providing compelling intelligence on various detainees, high value individuals, and maligned actors in order to justify their conviction in an Iraqi Court of Law. This proved to be difficult as intelligence analysis was not always translated into hard, evidentiary proof. As we continue along the post-PIC timeline we can expect an increasing support role of this nature as MNF-I transitions more functions to the Government of Iraq. Continued collaborative efforts and formal education/sharing between the IC and the legal system will help mitigate some of these challenges.

Colonel Reyes is currently serving in HQ, INSCOM as the G3, Director for Operations and Training, and will assume command of the 116th MI Group (NSA Gordon) this summer. Prior to the CIOC deployment he commanded the Joint Analysis Center, Molesworth, UK. He has commanded and served in principal staff positions in MI, Infantry and Special Forces units, and also served in the J3, Joint Staff. Colonel Reyes previously deployed to OIF 1 as the G2, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT).
Introduction
For over seven years, American and international forces have been waging a bitter, forgotten war in Afghanistan. Recently, the Afghan conflict has risen in focus and prominence as the war in Iraq draws down and the international community realizes that the Taliban and global jihadists have not been defeated as easily or swiftly as was once thought. In order to defeat this resilient and adaptive foe, more than a “new strategy” must be applied to this problem set. The solution first requires a nuanced understanding of the nature of the Afghan insurgency and the myriad of factors influencing this situation.

Mao has aptly compared guerrillas to fish, and the people to the water in which they swim. If the political temperature is right, the fish, however few in number, will thrive and proliferate. It is therefore the principal concern of all guerrilla leaders to get the water to the right temperature and to keep it there.1 Mao’s analogy of fish and the maintenance of political temperature is uniquely appropriate to the current evolution of the Afghan situation. Many insurgent groups and regional powerbrokers have a vested interest in the maintenance of a weak central government. Without the unifying presence in Kabul of a strong central government, enabled by a viable economy and represented regionally by effective Afghan National Security Forces, conditions will continue to be set for regional insurgents and transnational terrorists to proliferate. Afghan insurgents capitalize on the relative deprivation of the Afghan population. Discontent with the distribution of opportunity is a theme that insurgents have used to pull tribal youth away from the cultural tribal elders and toward sympathetic religious leaders. To understand the impact the Afghan insurgency has on this situation, a better understanding of the full-spectrum operational environment must be achieved.

The Insurgent Syndicate
In his book, “Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Antonio Giustozzi describes a crisis in Afghan rural society that has led to a “revolution of rising expectations.” He postulates that this situation cannot be resolved by the current counterinsurgency or development strategies for Afghanistan. In addition, the border issues and policy problems with Pakistan have exacerbated this problem.2

These factors have influenced the current operational environment in Afghanistan, which is dominated by an evolving insurgent syndicate strategy. It is a unique and adaptive force, comprised of competing insurgent elements which interact and cooperate in order to serve mutual tactical interests and contribute to their overall strategic objectives in Afghanistan and the greater area of interest. In Afghanistan, we have seen the emergence of two distinct insurgencies: a Kandahari-based Taliban in the south and a more complex, adaptive insurgency influenced, though not controlled, by Al Qaeda’s global jihad in the east.

This insurgent syndicate operating within Afghanistan, the destabilizing influence of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the political situation inside Pakistan, as well as the level of support provided to various aspects of the Afghan insurgency by Al Qaeda have ensured that Mao’s “political temperature” within Afghanistan remains optimal for continued insurgent efforts. This situation has afforded the diverse enemy groups within the East to develop the emerging insurgent syndicate strategy. Based on necessity, these groups with otherwise divergent goals operate in harmony. Logistical disruption and setbacks caused by Coalition operations, as well as governance and development successes evident
throughout Afghanistan, have given the insurgency reason to ally in order to retain local and regional relevance and to maximize the potential for tactical and operational results.

**Revolution vs. Resistance**

Small wars and counterinsurgency expert Bernard Fall studied the American and French experiences in Vietnam extensively. From his observations, he concluded that conflicts, and indeed, the conflicts of the “future,” would not be “sublimited warfare,” “insurgency,” or “counterinsurgency,” but:

**RW=G+P**

Or “revolutionary warfare (RW) equals guerrilla warfare (G) plus political action (P).” This formula for revolutionary warfare is the result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system. This type of warfare is evident in Afghanistan; however, the endstate is not a revolution in the common understanding of the concept. Instead, it is more of a resistance to change and those ideas that run counter to their extremist ideology. The change being resisted is embodied in the Coalition’s efforts to bring democracy, freedom of choice, and religious tolerance to Afghanistan. The global jihad of Al Qaeda is viewed as preferable to the more radical initiatives of the Coalition. All aspects of the Afghan operational environment fall on the continuum between revolution and resistance. Pakistan falls along a similar continuum but is less impacted by Western revolutionary influences. The following graphic depicts this paradigm from the perspective of the Afghan populace:

![Scale of Revolutionary Warfare in Afghanistan](image)

**Key:**

- ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
- GIRoA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- HIG – Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
- HIK – Hezb-E Islami Khalis
- TNSM – Tehrik Nefaz-e Shariat Mohammadi
- IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- LeT – Lashkar-e-Taiba
- TTP – Tehrik Taliban-I Pakistan

On one end of the scale of revolutionary warfare is “revolution.” This extreme is embodied by the U.S. and ISAF, which promote the concepts of democracy and universal rights—terms foreign and revolutionary to Afghanistan. On the other extreme of the continuum is Al Qaeda and its strategic goal to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems “non-Islamic”; to expel Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries (particularly Saudi Arabia), and to attempt to carry out future attacks against the U.S. and its worldwide interests. Along this scale fall the different, though often cooperative, insurgent groups with varying degrees of separation between revolution and resistance.

**Lessons from Vietnam**

In 1968, Army Chief of Staff General H.K. Johnson briefed the new U.S.-Vietnamese strategy for Vietnam. It was aimed at destroying the revolutionary position using what was described as a “two-pincers strategy”: a violence program and a rural construction program. The violence program can be compared to a conventional Security line of operation focus; whereas the construction program is likened to the Governance and Development lines of operation. At the time, the strategy was nearly all focused on the violence program, leaving only a small percentage of the overall effort to the rural construction program. It is evident that the American military approach to this conflict relied too heavily on an “umbrella theory,” which points to the allegedly...
decisive role of the enemy’s conventional military forces and of pre-stocked bases.⁵ Such an “umbrella theory” might be contrasted to Mao’s fish theory, according to which proper social conditions are decisive and, once these are achieved, make the enemy’s conventional military forces largely irrelevant.⁶ The strategy to counter the Afghan insurgency is falling into the same pattern as the umbrella theory, which is incapable of answering the revolution of rising expectations and allows the insurgency to keep the political temperature right to allow this conflict to survive.

Conclusion

While Afghan insurgents will always have a vested interest in a weak central government, it is critical to GIRoA and ISAF success to give the Afghan people capable governance enabled with stable and viable economic development. More than a renewed commitment, but increased resources along with a detailed and comprehensive plan for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, must be levied in Afghanistan in order for Al Qaeda and the complex Afghan insurgency to be defeated.

Endnotes

1. FMFRP 12-18, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare, 1989, 8.
5. Ibid., 226.
6. Ibid., 227.

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Introduction

These are buzzwords heard every day in the 9th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion (Airborne) headquarters as commanders and staff plan and prepare to support tactical PSYOP missions worldwide. I served in this unit for nearly nine months as the Battalion S2 after graduating from the Military Intelligence (MI) Basic Course. It was not, however, until my move from Battalion S2 to Company Intelligence Officer that the above phrases came to mean anything to me.

Tactical PSYOP companies are attached to other units; therefore, intelligence requirements are typically met by the supported unit, similar to the way administrative needs are met. Unfortunately for an eager lieutenant fresh out of the basic course, being a Battalion S2 in PSYOP meant passports, clearances, and security management. I served under leaders who recognized this issue and within a few months the unit was willing to forfeit a battalion staff officer to be the first ever Tactical PSYOP Company Intelligence Officer. During my time in this position, I served in the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), among the military’s finest. Serving among men and women of this caliber in the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community was not only intimidating, it was inspiring. With this new found respect and title I earnestly set out on a quest to crack the code on intelligence support to PSYOP.

The Threat

The first step for any intelligence professional is to gain atmospherics on the current threat and in my case PSYOP preparation of the operational environment (OE). This included understanding the idealism that drove militias and high value individuals (HVIs), but more specifically it meant seeing the conflict from the Iraqi people’s perspective. To understand their perspective the OE must be put in context of culture, education, religious affiliation, economic stature, history and every other anthropological consideration. Ultimately I was trying to understand how Coalition Forces could change perceptions, and eventually behaviors. Since I was mostly alone in my quest among my analyst peers, I found a way to simultaneously support Psychological Operations and bring a PSYOP perspective to SOF intelligence.

The Challenge

The concept of perception management or influencing with words is not always embraced in the Armed Forces and certainly was not in an organization as kinetic-based as CJSOTF-AP. However, after five years of lethal operations military planners at every level were forced to re-evaluate the need for such force and ultimately place more emphasis on non-kinetic effects. This transition was due in part to the success of the surge, the Sunni awakening, and the ceasefire agreement with Muqtada Al-Sadr (leader of a major Shia militia). But mostly it was the realization that changing perceptions may just be the key to getting out of Iraq. Through these turns of events PSYOP, and consequently intelligence support to PSYOP, received a level of interest at CJSOTF-AP that was unlikely given to PSYOP planners during the earlier phases of the war. PSYOP leaders took advantage of this momentum by making perception management a consideration on every mission and intimately integrating themselves within the J3. Conspiracy theories run rampant among a populace as ill informed as Iraq’s and experience has taught us if we don’t tell the story someone else will.

Often times a three man Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) is the only voice of an entire Army. Intelligence support to these operations is critical and leaves little room for error. There is a common saying in the 4th PSYOP Group (A) that “no PSYOP is better than bad PSYOP,” and the same is true for intelligence. The majority of my work came before operations began and after they completed. This included finding...
and confirming facts on HVIs used for posters and handbills, compiling imagery for leaflet drops, and analyzing enemy propaganda to see how our products might be viewed in light of the competition.

The Information

When I wasn’t monitoring behavioral changes and non-kinetic effects, I focused on meeting the immediate intelligence needs of the Company through requests for information (RFIs.) In this regard my mission was not much different from other intelligence professionals; however the nature and content of these RFIs varied greatly and consequently I could not always rely on conventional unit’s products or my fellow SOF analysts. The PSYOP Soldiers on the ground were more interested in perceptions than any other factor so I often researched symbolism, animal and color associations, clothing attire, susceptibilities to products like medical aid vs. soccer balls, local graffiti, regional verbiage, even tribal history. On one occasion in particular, I reached back to 1st Information Operations (IO) Command to better understand the value put on horses in Arabic culture. This inquiry eventually led to a well received product used to mourn the loss of a loved tribal leader.

This type of research and eventual knowledge gave me a chance to support PSYOP with relevant timely intelligence and bring a PSYOP perspective to CJSOTF-AP. This dual support ultimately meant job security for me. As the first intelligence officer to deploy with a tactical PSYOP company at CJSOTF-AP, it was imperative that I distinguished that role from traditional support and establish some level of credibility for intelligence specific to PSYOP. I was enthusiastic about this task because I came into the deployment feeling very strongly about providing intelligence tailored to the greatest information manipulator in the OE. I came out of my deployment equally enthusiastic about this task but more realistic in my expectation of meeting it.

The Way Ahead

Veterans of MI and IO recognize the deficit that exists with regard to intelligence support. The consensus for a solution seems to be education. Providing good intelligence analysis is simple—doctrine and training reinforced with experience. A good analyst should know intelligence software, data mining, basic analyses, and stand ready to support any unit, in any capacity. One of the toughest challenges facing intelligence support to PSYOP is understanding PSYOP information needs. This problem will only be resolved with mutual efforts between PSYOP and Intelligence to better understand each other. Most PSYOP specialists will tell you the Army doesn’t un-
understand what they do, and after an eight month deployment with a Tactical PSYOP Company I can tell you this is mostly true. Like any major military change it takes time, especially for veteran Soldiers, to relook the way they see the fight. This transformation has made significant progress over the last five years as reflected in current stability, counter-insurgency and operational field manuals, but there is still much work to be done. The PSYOP and intelligence community must embark upon integration training that focuses on change, with a mutual respect for what each branch brings to the table. The success of PSYOP depends in part on its ability to integrate with the intelligence community and this integration depends primarily on good leaders who recognize the necessity and are diplomatic enough to integrate and move forward.

**Educating the Support**

Intelligence analysts at the lowest level of PSYOP units are a legitimate and necessary asset. PSYOP specialists are effects-based and really no different than maneuver in terms of their support needs. They do not have the time to read every situation report, track trends, gather imagery and conduct pattern analysis. At the very least, intelligence analysts free up PSYOP specialists to plan and operate. For far too long PSYOP specialists have been forced to do their own intelligence analyses in addition to the already demanding target audience analyses. There is much value added in cross training Soldiers but MI professionals will not get better at analysis by conducting operations and operators will not get better at executing by doing analysis. Intelligence support to PSYOP is unique but it is still by definition a support element and for the sake of providing world class PSYOP should be trained on all facets of IO.

The disconnect here is often in defining needs and requirements from top down. For example, when TPTs need special equipment they request it through their headquarters element, which in turn tasks supply. It is not up to the supply sergeant to anticipate a special need any more than it is up to an intelligence analyst to tell the commander what information needs his operators will have. Doctrinally speaking, intelligence drives maneuver and the commander drives intelligence. This type of guidance is traditionally generated through priority intelligence requirements and information requirements but it can be done in any capacity that defines and articulates the commander’s objectives. Analysts need to be given areas of focus, especially when dealing with a theater of operation as complex as Iraq or Afghanistan. The real danger in not giving adequate guidance regarding information needs is unnecessarily risking lives of Soldiers in TPTs to disseminate ineffective or even inaccurate products.

**The Code**

Essentially intelligence support to PSYOP provides the tools, in the form of information, necessary to understand and eventually influence behavior. Cracking the code on intelligence support to PSYOP cannot be done in one rotation but that is not to discredit the aggressive efforts that are underway to integrate, educate and ultimately improve the support. A crucial part of this solution is getting intelligence analysts integrated with the PSYOP process and the evidence of this is the 4th PSYOP Group’s ability to provide trained analysts with a broad, and when necessary, in-depth understanding of IO in terms of function, capability and application. The more each branch understands the intricate details of the other, the more likely they are to maintain successful longevity in meeting worldwide missions. Long term success for both elements is interdependent–support to PSYOP is not a success until PSYOP leaders wouldn’t conceive of going to the planning table without all resources available to them, and this includes intelligence assets.

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Introduction

The most fundamental change within Army intelligence transformation is an effort to change the behavior and expectations of intelligence producers and consumers. The Army leadership views this as an essential step toward changing organizational and operational culture. Intelligence producers will transition from a current requirements orientation to an anticipatory approach while consumers shift their mindset from one of fighting with knowledge to one of fighting for knowledge. This new mindset views every soldier as a collector and as an analyst.1

The Military Intelligence (MI) Corps exists to provide commanders at all levels intelligence analysis to support decision making for planning and execution, assist in understanding the adversary, and define the operational environment. Since we will never have sufficient intelligence collection assets or analysts to produce all the intelligence a commander may want, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) help focus collection and analytical production on select intelligence requirements. However, many of today’s U.S. Army operational commanders2 and key staff officers simply do not understand or are not aware of doctrinal changes and the increased extent of what PIRs are supposed to do for the commander. There are three primary reasons for this misunderstanding or lack of awareness.

First, and most importantly, this misunderstanding is directly tied to our warfighting culture reflected through our operation’s doctrine since the mid-1970s. Doctrine, of course, provides a common frame of reference as a guide to action and is not a strict or inflexible set of rules. Army operations’ doctrine has shaped how we fight, plan, and interpret how all warfighting functions support operations. For the past three decades, this context shaped the culture, focus, and viewpoints that today’s senior field grade and general officers use to make decisions as well as establish processes to assist in their decision making.

Second, Army Transformation has further complicated the issue. Prior to transformation, division and corps commanders could assist ground commanders primarily in the form of increased logistics, deep attack aviation or artillery, or more intelligence assets. Today, brigade commanders have capabilities once reserved for division commanders. Resultantly, brigade commanders have increased responsibility and capacity thus increasing the potential for decisions they have to make. Corps and division commanders have fewer or different decisions to make, especially in decentralized counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Finally, while there are similarities in PIRs for conventional (offensive and defensive) operations, there are differences for unconventional type conflicts (stability or civil support) such as COIN or Foreign Internal Defense.

Operations and Intelligence–The Inseparable Link

Before addressing PIRs, we must discuss the inseparable link between operations and intelligence. Specifically, we will highlight the evolution of Army operations’ doctrine since this is the driver of all other warfighting functions’ support. This doctrine shaped today’s senior leaders, our training centers and programs, and our planning and execution for operations. Since the 1970s, operations’ doctrine was predominantly tactically and offensively focused against a Soviet threat. Competing with this doctrine was the reality of world conditions, most notably the threat and collapse of the Soviet Union, and emerging military, information, and intelligence capabilities and our ability to exploit them.

After the Vietnam War, the Army rebuilt itself and largely forgot about its operations during Vietnam. While it rebuilt itself, the traditional Soviet threat in Europe regained its preeminence in our world
view. Directly related to this was the realization during the 1973 Yom Kippur War that the conventional battlefield had become more lethal. As a result, the 1976 Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations envisioned an active defense in Europe against numerically superior Soviet military forces. This prescriptive and tactical manual focused on firepower more than maneuver and fixated on fighting and winning the first battle.3

In 1982, the Army released an updated version focused on the offense. Known as Airland Battle, the manual focused on conventional offensive operations to fight outnumbered and win. The main threat was still the Soviet Union in Europe. The manual introduced the four tenets of Airland Battle: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization, as well as the operational level of war and the linking of the strategic to the tactical.4 A legacy of the synchronization of operations and all other warfighting functions, while well intentioned and necessary, was an emphasis to synchronize finite assets over time and space for Airland Battle. This became increasingly more restrictive and, arguably, counterproductive in later years despite updated concepts of Army operations.

The 1986 version of FM 100-5 moved beyond Europe and recognized unconventional, low intensity conflicts and light infantry divisions. It was also more general and theoretical which allowed flexibility for commanders.5 However, it was still tied to the concept of Airland Battle, especially conventional offensive operations and the desire for synchronization.

In 1993, recognizing the world had changed after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Army published a new FM 100-5. The manual was largely influenced by operations in Panama and Kuwait as well as emerging technologies. The manual emphasized depth and simultaneous attack in order to bring about a quick resolution.6 Synchronization of the multiple lines of operations or effort was a critical component. The manual placed more emphasis on unconventional, low intensity conflicts and conflict termination; a conspicuous change from the 1976, 1982, and 1986 manuals. However, the new FM lightly addressed these issues with the substance of those types of operations covered in other doctrinal publications. Conventional offensive operations remained the Army’s doctrinal focus. The stunning application of this doctrine during Operation Desert Storm not only validated the Army’s conventional offensive focus but solidified its primacy and focus throughout the Army.

The 1998 version of FM 100-5 provided balance between offensive and defensive operations, simultaneous and sequential operations, and emphasized joint operations. It also folded the concepts of unconventional and conventional warfare into this manual. Prior to this manual, a generation of Army leaders grew up learning offensive operations in a conventional warfare context. This type of warfare lends itself to decisions and decision points on a battlefield where battalion through corps level commanders have to make decisions such as when to commit a reserve, conduct a deep attack, shift the main effort, etc. along a linear battlefield.

In 2001, the Army published FM 3-0 (previously numbered as 100-5) Operations. It clearly defined operations in a more holistic manner—offense, defense, stability, and support operations. Despite this more encompassing approach, like the previous versions of FM 100-5, the Army focused on defensive operations just long enough to generate enough combat power to reinitiate offensive operations. This permeated the construct of our National Training Center (NTC) and mission readiness exercises (MREs) in the 1980s and 1990s. It has taken the reality of the past seven years to finally acknowledge and provide equal weight to stability and support operations; operations that were marginalized as late as 2003 in our training centers and MREs.

In February 2008, the Army produced the latest FM 3-0. The manual clearly acknowledges a holistic and complex operational environment; one that is multidimensional and increasingly fought among the population. This doctrine acknowledges an “operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.”7

Army operations doctrine has changed from a singular focus on conventional offensive operations to a more holistic and inclusive recognition of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. PIRs have also changed in recognition of today’s more complex environment.
Evolution of PIR

Today’s senior Army leaders have spent the preponderance of their military careers serving in an army equipped, trained, led, and educated to defeat a nation-state peer-competitor....The officer professional development career path designed to defeat this threat is a rigid path that has evolved into a “best answer” process....The Army teaches its leaders from day one that there are almost always proven sequences of events that, if followed, will lead to the desired outcome. Facing a templateable enemy like our Cold War adversaries, adherence to Army Doctrine became the glide path into “how to think” and “what to do”....this approach has resulted in the development of narrow, sometimes inflexible leadership qualities and decision making processes that are not necessarily suited for today’s contemporary operating environment. Army leaders have been quite successful...putting conventional warfighting and leadership skills into a “black or white” category. The challenge faced today and in the future is reassessing and reorganizing these skills to operate just as effectively and efficiently in the ever-growing “gray” world.

For three decades, the Army focused on conventional, offensive operations while ignoring or short-changing other operations. This is not a critique of that focus given the strategic problems facing our nation and the Army’s answer to meet that challenge. It is simply to highlight the cultural environment that today’s senior officers grew up in during their formative years coming up through the ranks.

Before 1990, the Army had eleven mechanized, one airborne, one air assault, one motorized, and four light active duty divisions. After the draw-down in the 1990s, the Army possessed six mechanized, one airborne, one air assault, and two light active duty divisions. Mechanized units are ideal for fighting a peer competitor such as the Soviet Union. The preponderance of today’s senior officers were influenced in some fashion by conventional, offense oriented training and doctrine. The Army’s training centers and exercise events reinforced our predilection to make decisions in order to take action.

Since the opening of the NTC in 1981, most “of America’s top Army generals carry with them the almost-war stories of their trips to Fort Irwin.” Until fairly recently, the NTC focused on conventional force-on-force exercises with little attention paid to other types of operations. Additionally, our training centers and MREs are designed to force battalion through corps level commanders and staffs to plan and make decisions in a very compressed time frame in order to meet multiple training objectives. This in turn reinforces our cultural tendency to want to “do something” or make a decision as opposed to demonstrating patience and realize that a decision or action may not have to be made.

The training center exception is arguably the Joint Readiness Training Center. It was designed for light infantry, airborne, and special operations forces as a light infantry equivalent of the NTC. A typical pre-9/11 training scenario consisted of an insertion and counterinsurgency operation; a defense (in response to a fictitious enemy attack), and culminated with an attack into a Military Operations in Urban Terrain complex. However, units still planned and made decisions in a very compressed time frame in order to meet multiple training objectives.

On a final note, division and corps commanders are typically infantry officers; they grew up in the Army inculcated in our offensive, tactically focused doctrine. A majority of division and corps level staff officers typically have only served at the battalion or brigade level in staff and/or command positions prior to serving on a higher staff. Since we are all victims of our past experiences, we are comfortable using methods that have worked in the past in new positions. This becomes important when related to PIR development.

The 1994 FM 34-2 Collection Management and Synchronization Planning collection management doctrine is nested in the conventionally focused operations doctrine of the past. FM 34-2 recommended that intelligence officers and commanders should refine PIRs to specific questions that are linked to operational decisions. Additionally, Collection Managers usually developed specific information requirements for both PIRs and intelligence requirements (IRs) to “complete the collection strategy by associating each requirement and its corresponding decision points and timelines.” This inference linked PIRs, already linked to decisions, to arguably more constricted decision points.

However, in 2004, the definition of PIRs became less constrained. FM 2-0 Intelligence, expanded the
definition of PIRs by stating that answers “to the PIRs help produce intelligence essential to the commander’s situational understanding and decision-making [emphasis added].”

The new February 2008 FM 3-0 further loosened the confines of PIRs solely being tied to offensive focused decisions and decision points and related them to the more inclusive definition of operations (offense, defense, and stability). PIRs, along with friendly force information requirements (FFIR), are part of what are known as commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). CCIRs are information requirements identified as critical to facilitate timely decisionmaking. CCIRs directly influence decisionmaking and facilitate the successful execution of military operations; they may support one or more decisions. FM 3-0 states that a PIR “is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment….PIRs identify the information about the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that the commander considers most important.”

Finally, the just released 2008 FMI 2-01 (the replacement for the 1994 FM 34-2), ISR Synchronization, states that a PIR is “an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, which the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment.”

**Transformation**

As described above, a generation of Army operations’ doctrine created a culture and leadership mindset that emphasized conventional offensive operations, decisions to conduct an offensive fight, and synchronization of all available warfighting capability towards that focus. Additionally, until the Army’s ongoing transformation efforts, the Army has been a division centric organization since World War I. Pre-transformation divisions were the largest tactical units considered to be a combined arms team, self sustaining, and capable of independent operations. Transformation has changed this paradigm with brigades now the emphasis. This has exacerbated the friction between senior leaders working or commanding at the division or corps level, educated in the culture of the past 25 years with less or different ability to influence the battle space, and transformed brigades who enjoy significant autonomy, more combat power, increased situational awareness, and larger battle space.

Transformation restructuring resulted in an Army that is now brigade combat team (BCT) centric. Simplistically, capabilities once assigned to a division are now organic in a BCT, providing them with means to accomplish more tasks. For example, the division formerly had a military intelligence (MI) battalion with division level assets. Under transformation, this MI battalion no longer exists; many of its assets are now organic to a BCT while the rest are obsolete and no longer in the Army inventory. This reduced a division’s traditional ability to shape the battle space for a brigade commander with additional intelligence collection.

Additionally, transformation has expanded the battle space for BCTs and increased the length of the lines of communications laterally between units and vertically between command and support echelons. The end result are BCTs that are the Army’s primary tactical formations and more autonomous than before; a significant friction point between BCTs and higher level organizations commanded by leaders whose formative years were shaped by the Army’s division centric and conventional offensive operations culture. BCT commanders are largely no longer dependent on the division to provide resources. Technology has expanded a BCT commander’s ability to see the battle space and affect it with organic assets. Today, intelligence is distributed and managed in nearly a flattened network where all echelons receive the dissemination of intelligence at nearly the same time and share the same databases of information. There is no real stove-pipe or special highly classified intelligence that is not shared with all echelons. BCTs are no longer dependent on a division for “seeing over the next ridge” and for early warning of enemy intentions and actions. This creates some cognitive dissonance for senior officers at the division and corps level since this new dynamic is not what they grew up with in the 1980s and 1990s. The type, scope, and timeliness of decisions that both BCT and higher level commanders have to make have changed.

**Priority Intelligence Requirements**

In 2003, to meet the needs of Army Transformation, the Army G2 created TF Actionable Intelligence
to change the way that MI would operate in the future. One of the four Task Force Actionable Intelligence concepts was to change the culture and mindset of intelligence producers and consumers. To achieve this goal, the task force envisioned organizational, procedural, and technological changes to affect our culture in order to facilitate intelligence, information, and insights from all echelons.

Part of this procedural change is to recognize that PIRs have changed as well as the types and timeliness of decisions that commanders have to make. PIRs help to provide commanders with an understanding of the operational environment which assists in planning and making decisions.

PIR development involves not just anticipating what decisions a commander may have to make but also the relationships between friendly units; information systems; collection, processing, and dissemination systems; and the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time operational variables. Answers to PIRs (and FFIRs) help the commander visualize the operational environment. Crafting PIRs is important because every PIR costs time, resource allocation, and analytical effort.

Intelligence officers validate and recommend PIRs. Commanders approve IRs essential to mission accomplishment as PIRs, which form the basis for planning and executing operations. Typically, PIRs are developed during MDMP and are reviewed and adjusted as conditions change, operations progress, or the PIR(s) are answered. Each set of PIRs is unique to the circumstances and context of the time. FM 5-0 and FMI 2-01 describe how PIRs are developed during MDMP.

The following highlight the PIR guidelines [emphasis added] from 1994 to present.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>They ask only one question.</td>
<td>They ask only one question.</td>
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<tr>
<td>They focus on a specific fact, event, or activity.</td>
<td>They focus on a specific fact, event, or activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>They provide intelligence required to support a single decision.</td>
<td>They provide intelligence required to support a single decision.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIR should be focused, specific, and directly related to friendly decision expected to occur during COA execution.</td>
<td>The are tied to key decisions that the commander has to make.</td>
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<tr>
<td>They give a latest time information of value (LTIOV).</td>
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The guidelines have changed little between 1994 and the new FMI 2-01. However, there has been a subtle and nuanced expansion of PIRs supporting a single decision to supporting a single planning task, decision, or action. Another guideline is that FMI 2-01 states that PIR should be satisfied using available assets or capabilities. While this seems obvious, it usually inferred technical intelligence capabilities in the pre-Transformation Army. This is especially important for a division that no longer possesses any organic intelligence collection assets. A unit’s collection assets or capabilities are all its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and non-ISR resources. All units and Soldiers are potential sources of relevant information to support the commander’s PIRs.

PIRs today need to support those key IRs that a commander needs to achieve better overall situational understanding of his operational environment that he deems a priority for mission success. These priorities do not necessarily need to be linked directly to a commander’s decision; one PIR in fact may be linked to multiple decisions, actions, or future planning efforts. Also, PIRs must not be so restrictive that they force rigid and singular enemy/threat based collection requirements. Additionally, despite these guidelines, it is sometimes acceptable to ask more than one question. For example, if you want to know where an enemy force might attack, it is almost automatic to ask when they might attack. So, instead of writing two PIRs where the answers are interrelated, it should be acceptable to create a PIR such as “Where and when will Threat Group X attack U.S. forces in our operational environment?” Finally, PIRs can be solely about nonlethal aspects of the full spectrum of operations such as focusing on understanding the capacity of a community’s essential services it provides or the effectiveness of its local security forces and local governance.
ISR assets include: infantry and armor scout platoons; cavalry units; battlefield surveillance brigades; all human intelligence; geospatial intelligence; signals intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence; counterintelligence assets; unmanned aerial system units; fires target acquisition sections; long-range surveillance units; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear squads; reconnaissance squadrons; and attack and/or reconnaissance aircraft. ISR capable units are units that do not have surveillance and/or reconnaissance as their primary mission but can be directed to perform ISR functions. The units include combat engineer battalions; engineer reconnaissance sections; infantry battalions; military police; and brigade combat teams. Other units that can collect and disseminate PIR information include unit leaders that meet with local leaders; civil affairs teams; and transportation or sustainment units.

Since a unit’s collection assets or capabilities are all its ISR and non-ISR assets, the operations officer synchronizes intelligence collection throughout the organization. “The operations officer (in coordination with the intelligence officer and other staff members) tasks available ISR assets to best satisfy each requirement.” PIRs are answered by multiple echelons of units and staff sections across a unit. The collection manager synchronizes intelligence collection assets and ensures, in conjunction with the operations officer, that other non intelligence collectors are worked into an overall synchronization plan.

Irregular Warfare (COIN)

The 2008 FM 3-0 states that a PIR is a requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment and can identify information about the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. All major operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability elements. PIRs that support COIN operations are often different than conventional operations’ PIR. This is not to suggest that creating PIR for conventional offensive and defensive operations is not difficult or complex. PIRs for these types of operations are simply understood better by our senior officers and are more often tied to decisions or situations they have been trained to make by the Army’s training and education centers before 9/11. Stability operations, particularly ones with an irregular warfare (e.g., COIN) operational theme, differ distinctly from offensive and defensive operations.

Successful COIN operations rely heavily on good intelligence and a thorough understanding of the enemy. “Counterinsurgents have to understand that [every situation is different] in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.” Insurgencies are struggles for control over contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers. Insurgencies are fought in a complex environment consisting of government; physical terrain; information, propaganda, and the 24 hour news cycle; insurgent ideology; refugees, displaced persons, and mass migration; ethnic, tribal, clan or community groups; nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations; armed private contractors; porous borders; external funding; social classes; local and foreign armed groups; urban and rural populations; economic and political institutions; unemployment; crime; bandits; narcotics traffickers; smugglers; couriers; black marketers; and religious parties. Many independent and interlinked individuals and groups contribute to the complexity.

Because COIN operations are dispersed, a counter-insurgent’s own actions are a key generator of intelligence. Operations produce intelligence that drives subsequent operations. “Reporting by units, members of the country team, and associated civilian agencies is often of greater importance than reporting by specialized intelligence assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable tempo (rate of military operations), drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical level.” Collection with ISR and non-ISR assets occurs at all echelons. Additionally, effective COIN operations are decentralized; local commanders have the best grasp of their situations.

As previously discussed, it is important to observe the linkage between PIRs and collection management since PIRs should drive all future collection and analytical priorities. In today’s current COIN environments, divisions and corps are not maneuvering combat formations as in conventional “high intensity” offensive or defensive operations. There are few, if any, decision points and immediate decisions a division or corps commander need to make.
Combat operations are executed in a decentralized manner by “empowered” BCTs who are responsible as the battle space owner for a defined area of operation. BCTs drive daily collection requirements based upon broadly defined guidance to include PIR and SIR and Commander’s Intent which is usually summarized in a written or verbal division fragmentary order to subordinate units. BCTs must translate this broad collection guidance and division ISR objectives and priorities into operational plans with clearly defined collection tasks and purposes.

To ensure that intelligence collection is synchronized, the overall intelligence synchronization plan ensures that PIRs are nested at all echelons; they can be tailored to local or regional circumstances but tactical and operational collection efforts should support one another. Additionally, a headquarters monitors requests for information from lower echelons and taskings from higher which assists to validate the synchronization effort. Also, operational and some tactical ISR synchronization assists host nation, inter-agency, inter-service, and multinational efforts. These in turn can provide valuable information that assists in answering a unit’s PIR. Finally, because every Soldier is a potential collector, the intelligence synchronization plan addresses day to day tactical operations; every patrol or mission should be given intelligence collection requirements as well as operations requirements.

Because COIN operations by their very nature are decentralized and lower level commanders have a better understanding of the operational environment, higher level commanders have different and, in many cases, less decisions to make. Directly related, transformation has removed the traditional tools of influence, particularly for division level commanders, altering or removing decisions that a pre-Transformation division commander may have had to make. Thus, the synchronization plan should be less restrictive and constraining the higher a headquarters given the fewer decisions required and/or the larger degree of time to decide. This facilitates the flexibility, nimbleness, and decentralization required during COIN operations.

Conclusion

PIRs are an important part of understanding the threat we face, the operational environment as a whole, and what decisions a commander may have to make. PIRs help commanders to both visualize the operational environment and facilitate both planning and decisionmaking. PIRs have changed and are no longer rigid and inflexible with the intent of providing answers to a checklist of questions. Operations and intelligence doctrine have evolved to fully appreciate the complexity of today’s battlefield. Today’s senior leaders and military intelligence professionals must be educated on these changes.

Today’s complex operational environment requires less prescriptive processes and thinking and more commanders’ coup d’oeil or intuition based on information, intelligence, and experience. As our doctrine has evolved along with our strategic requirements, our processes for asking the right questions have changed. Senior field grade and general officers today must have the mental agility to acknowledge that the processes and doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s do not meet all challenges we face today. Simply put, all operations are contextually and operationally dependent; PIRs based on conventional offensive or defensive operations differ from COIN. Also, transformation has changed the methods and scope of influencing the battle space. BCTs today have as much combat power, technology, and situational awareness as divisions of the past. Brigade and lower and division and higher commander’s roles have changed and with it, the type of intelligence required and the type and timeliness of decisions these commanders have to make. Today’s commanders must put away their antiquated understanding of PIRs they grew up with during their formative years and recognize that PIRs will vary for offensive, defensive, and stability operations and are not solely tied to immediate decisions or decision points.

Endnotes


2. For the purposes of this article, operational commanders refer to tactical BCT, division, and corps Commanders, and the G3, Chief of Staff, and Assistant Commanders in divisions and corps organizations; officers primarily from the Infantry but also from the Armor, Artillery, and Aviation branches. These are the key leaders leading transformed BCTs and today’s tactical and operational organizations or running the staffs of these organizations.


5. FM 100-5, Operations, 5 May 1986, i.


11. Ibid., 3-14.


15. FMI 2-01, ISR Synchronisation, 1 November 2008, 1-6.

16. Smith, 60.


20. Ibid.


22. FM 34-2, 3-7; FMI 2-01, 2-4.

23. FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005, Chapter 3, and FMI 2-01, Chapter 1.

24. FM 34-2, D1 to D2.


27. FMI 2-01, 2-5.

28. Ibid., 4-2.


30. Ibid., 2-3 to 2-4.


34. Ibid., 3-1.

35. Ibid., 1-23.

36. Ibid., 3-24.

37. Ibid., 1-26.

38. Ibid., 3-25.

39. FM 3-24, 3-27.


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Introduction

Army chaplains and chaplain assistants serving in Afghanistan have numerous opportunities to interact with local Muslim clergy. The mullah, or religious leader, of a village is a vital element of village political, religious, and cultural life. Many chaplains reach out to mullahs as points of contact for humanitarian activities (donating school supplies; rebuilding orphanages; distributing gifts and candy to Afghan children in hospital) conducted by U.S. Soldiers. With the permission of unit commanders, chaplains frequently engage in these humanitarian missions.

A potential controversy exists when a chaplain is asked for specific information from commanders or intelligence officers related to his interaction with local mullahs. Chaplains, as doctrinal non-combatants, could be placed in the awkward position of providing targeting information to commanders, a combatant task. In order to examine the doctrinal tension between chaplains and Information Operations (IO), we will first review the roles and responsibilities of Army chaplains. Next we will examine the components and capabilities of IO. Finally, a discussion of chaplains’ experiences in Afghanistan related to mullah engagements (religious leader liaison) and IO will illustrate the tensions in this fragile relationship with suggestions for success for the overall mission of the commander.

Doctrinal Guidelines

The two guiding Army documents that articulate the roles and responsibilities of chaplains are Field Manual (FM) 1-05, Religious Support, and Army Regulation (AR) 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, reinforced by Title 10 of the U.S. Code, guarantees every American the right to the free exercise of religion. Americans in the military enjoy this right as well as civilians. Commanders are responsible for insuring the religious freedoms of their troops through the chaplain as a staff officer. FM 1-05 states:

*The mission of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) is to provide and perform religious support to soldiers, families, and authorized civilians as directed by the commander. Chaplains serve as personal staff officers to commanders at all levels of the command providing essential information on troop and unit morale, quality of life matters, free exercise of religion issues, ethical decision making, and the impact of religion on the operation.*

The religious support activities of chaplains are widely known. They consist of religious services, counseling, religious education, advisor to the commander and staff, and other activities, including coordinating “religious/humanitarian support.” The FM states that such support includes humanitarian support programs on issues of religion, morale, morals, and ethics. The chaplain, by doctrine, then is to assist...
the commander with religious/humanitarian support. Chaplains are also, by regulation, to “provide liaison to indigenous religious leaders in close coordination with the G5.” Additionally, chaplains coordinate with elements of the G9 (Civil Affairs) in religious liaison/mullah engagements.

**Information Operations**

Based primarily on advanced technology, IO is an element of combat power. It encompasses attacking adversary command and control (C2) systems while protecting friendly C2 from adversary disruption. Thus IO has both offensive and defensive capabilities. The goal of IO is to produce information superiority over the enemy at decisive points. Commanders conduct IO to apply combat power to achieve information superiority on the battlefield. Enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and targeting are all part of IO. Offensive IO seeks to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, and exploit enemy forces. A high value target of IO is enemy center of gravity, typically communication and headquarters locations, to target enemy decision makers and information systems.

IO maximizes the use of technology to shape the combat power of friendly forces. In FM 3-13, *Information Operations*, the following summary of IO is provided:

> “Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) IO to apply the information element of combat power. Combined with information management and ISR operations; effective IO results in gaining and maintaining information superiority. Information superiority creates conditions that allow commanders to shape the operational environment and enhance the effects of all elements of combat power. IO has two categories, offensive IO and defensive IO. Commanders conduct IO by synchronizing IO elements and related activities, each of which may be used either offensively or defensively.”

> “IO brings together several previously separate functions as IO elements and related activities. To provide unity of effort, IO is placed under a special staff officer, the assistant chief of staff G7. The G7 has coordinating staff responsibility for IO. He does this by means of the G7 section and IO cell. Placing responsibility for synchronizing the activities of the IO elements and related activities on one special staff officer helps commanders mass their effects to gain and maintain information superiority.”

The Army chaplain is a noncombatant. As a religious leader and a staff officer, AR 165-1 states, “Chaplains are noncombatants and will not bear arms.” This regulation is clear enough. The confusion relates to the idea of information as a weapon, and that a chaplain may receive information that IO personnel in the G2, G3, or G7 would like to use in offensive action against enemy forces. There is no approved doctrinal standard for the role of the chaplain in IO. However, AR 165-1 does suggest possible roles of the chaplain. For example, it states that, “Commanders will detail or assign chaplains only to duties related to their profession. Chaplains may perform unrelated duties in a temporary military emergency.” It also states that a commander will not detail a chaplain as an “information” officer. AR 165-1 further states, “Commanders will not...require a chaplain to serve in a capacity in which he or she may later be called upon to reveal privileged or sensitive information incident to such service.”

The Army chaplain will have some role in advising the commander on religious and cultural issues in the area of operations (AO). FM 1-05 states that the chaplain will provide “support to the commander on matters of religion, morals, and morale, as affected by religion and the impact of indigenous religions on the military mission.” It further states that the chaplain will “provide liaison to indigenous religious leaders in close coordination with the G5/S5.” The question remains: “At what point does a chaplain as a religious advisor to the commander cross the line and partake of combatant activities in IO?”

Army chaplains concerned about their involvement with IO are on safe ground when they concentrate their efforts primarily on providing religious support to soldiers. Religious support includes religious services, rites, sacraments, ordinances, pastoral care and counseling, religious education, and humanitarian support. As a staff officer, the chaplain supports the commander and staff, administrates, and acts as an advisor to the command on indigenous religions. As one chaplain stated, “It is conceivable to witness commanders demanding that chaplains provide information advantageous to U.S. forces that may...
be gleaned from a liaison and contact with local religious leaders. One would be naïve to think that the chaplaincy would be exempt from the pressure of a well-meaning but ill-advised commander. The focus of chaplain ministries must first be on religious support to the soldiers within the unit and not on humanitarian missions to indigenous peoples.

The expanding role of religion in contemporary operations will increase the requests for religious advice on local populations. The senior chaplain should be a subject matter expert in this area, a key point of contact in advising the commander. When the opportunity arises to perform a religious liaison with local clergy, such as the mullah engagements in Afghanistan, chaplains should follow the following guidelines:

- A religious liaison mission must be endorsed by the commander.
- The chaplain must staff his intentions with the G2, G3, G5 and G9 sections.
- Only chaplains of field grade (Major) or higher should participate.
- Emphasis should be on common humanitarian and religious concerns and not on political/military matters.
- After the mission, chaplains are not to provide information related to targeting or offensive operations to the command. Some non-lethal targeting information may be appropriately shared with the command, such as the location of schools, religious sites, and orphanages.

In stability and support operations, chaplains will have an increasing role in engaging indigenous religious leaders to help facilitate the peace keeping and nation building missions of U.S. troops. This liaison role of Army chaplains with local clergy must be practiced with caution, as more and more demand on chaplain religious expertise will be requested by IO personnel. As one chaplain warned, “Caution must be applied to avoid the slippery slope of grasping for a deeper and inappropriate role. With an increasing command emphasis on IO, the [Chaplain] Corps must guard against justifying its value in its role in IO.” The role of a chaplain is justified as a provider of religious support to all soldiers, not as a tool of IO to coerce intelligence from indigenous clergy.

The Role of Religion in IO

In Operation Enduring Freedom, religious issues weighed heavily in the commander’s decision making process. Religion served as a source of information and as a type of information. As foreigners in a Muslim land, the sensitivity to religious issues for U.S. troops in Afghanistan was paramount. The customs and rituals of Islam are unknown to most Americans, making it increasingly important for chaplains to advise commanders and soldiers on the religious/spiritual aspects of indigenous Afghans.

Chaplains are expected to provide the commander information related to the religious customs and practices of indigenous peoples. In Afghanistan, the typical U.S. soldier has no idea of the differences between Sunni or Shiite, and between a mullah and an imam. First, the chaplain must determine what types of religious information are essential for the commander to understand. Next, the chaplain analyzes the local population to see how it understands these categories. Finally, the chaplain briefs the commander and staff and soldiers as appropriate. This type of religious advice to a commander is standard practice in the Army chaplaincy, a typical responsibility understood by all chaplains.

Army chaplains are not in the intelligence gathering business. Chaplains, as religious advisors, must not allow themselves to drift too far into the realm of IO. It is one thing to interact with local religious leaders...
to facilitate dialogue and understanding to better advise the commander on the impact of local religions on the military mission. It is another thing altogether for a chaplain to gather information in a religious liaison capacity that unethically could be used for targeting or other offensive operations. Afghan religious leaders place a high value on clergy. The U.S. Army chaplain can engage in a respectful dialogue and exchange of ideas and cultural sensitivities in discussions with indigenous clergy. But the sacredness of such dialogue must not be compromised by IO personnel eager to glean any information from the chaplain that may help their mission. A military chaplain who compromises the sacred bond between clergy will be instantly discredited by Afghan clerics, promoting distrust and disdain of all U.S. personnel.

There are some legitimate ways a chaplain can serve as a staff officer in general support of IO. Chaplains working as liaisons with indigenous clergy can have a positive influence on the way American intentions and operations are perceived. These chaplain “liaison officers” are a part of IO and require a thorough understanding of the key religious leaders, religious worldview of the population, and social structure. The G2, G3, G5, and IO personnel often overlook or underemphasize this understanding. The staff chaplain, as a liaison with indigenous clergy, can be a crucial person in the analysis of religion and culture in IO, preventing U.S. and allied troops from committing cultural or religious blunders. For example, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 allows the chaplain to advise commanders through their liaison roles with host nation religious leaders. Army Field Manual 1-05 states the same thing, instructing chaplains to support the Commander through relationships with indigenous clergy.

The optimal time to integrate the analysis of religion and culture is during the mission analysis phase of the military decision making process (MDMP). This responsibility generally falls upon the G2/J2 Plans section. Here the chaplain can provide input as to the role of religion on military operations. Since IO sections can be small and limited in time and religious resources, ad hoc members are necessary to develop the cultural analysis requirement. It is here that a staff chaplain can contribute significantly. During the mission analysis, the IO section develops the IO Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Essential elements of IO IPB include: an in-depth analysis of religion; an awareness of important religious and cultural dates and observances; an understanding of religious and social structure, and recognition of key religious leaders and their probable influence.

FM 3-13 defines IO as “…the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making.” The FM specifically excludes the chaplain from the list of coordinating, special, and personal staff who have IO planning and support responsibilities. UMT personnel, both chaplains and chaplain assistants, should not be involved in the planning or execution of IO with the sole exceptions of security for themselves and friendly forces and the location of sacred or humanitarian sites.

All the core and supporting IO capabilities and functions, with the exception of operational and physical security, are either combatant tasks which chaplains, as noncombatants, are not legally authorized to directly engage in or highly technical tasks which are outside the realm of chaplain’s professional responsibilities. Chaplain assistants, though combatants, should not be involved in the planning or execution of IO with the same exceptions, because their close association with the chaplain could create the appearance or contribute to the perception of the chaplain’s involvement in IO.

**Chaplains as Liaisons with Indigenous Clergy and IO**

Afghanistan is a religious country. Almost 100 percent of Afghans practice some type of Islam. Religion is a major cultural factor throughout all levels of the society. The role of religion and clergy in peacekeeping and nation building here must not be devalued. Most senior U.S. Army chaplains, as clergy and as officers, are well suited to advise commanders on religious issues and to act as intermediaries between military and indigenous religious leaders. Chaplains are positioned to communicate with local religious leaders to promote trust, coordination, problem solving, and to reduce local violence. They can serve their commanders by acting as mediators with local mullahs or imams to build a relationship for civil military operations.
Military Intelligence

Any role for a chaplain as a liaison with indigenous clergy must be balanced by security concerns, by the commander's intent, and by the skills and willingness of the chaplain. Some chaplains, for theological reasons, opt not to serve as religious liaisons to local clergy.

The primary role of Army chaplains is to minister to the troops, the commander, and his staff. But chaplains as staff officers do have a role in networking with indigenous clergy. Chaplains can help to win the hearts and minds of local populations in support of U.S. policies to rebuild a peaceful Afghanistan which lawfully elects its own leaders and maintains a civil and humane society. The role of Army chaplains as liaisons with local clergy is mentioned in FM 1-05, which states: "Chaplains will support the commander through advisement in the following areas that may influence CMO: Relations with indigenous religious leaders when directed by the commander." When Army chaplains serve in a Joint Task Force or similar assignment with Navy, Air Force, or Marine personnel, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 provides guidance on chaplains as religious liaisons. Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations, states:

The JFCH [Joint Force Chaplain], after careful consideration and only with the Joint Force Commander's approval, may serve as a point of contact to host nation (HN) civilian and military religious leaders, institutions, and organizations, including established and emerging military chaplaincies, through the Civil-Military Operations Center.20

As clergy and non-combatants, Army chaplains are respected in the Muslim world. By this status they are in a position to build bridges and networks with indigenous clergy. Unquestionably, the chaplain's primary role is to provide religious support to Soldiers and their families, yet the role of a chaplain as a liaison to local clergy is clearly mentioned in various military publications. The doctrinal guidance is broad, giving commanders and chaplains flexibility in determining how best to fulfill this responsibility. Due to the ongoing nature of the War on Terror in Afghanistan, the U.S. will maintain peacekeeping, nation building, and stability operations for the foreseeable future. Since military personnel will have to engage the local population more and more in these operations, chaplains must be prepared to dialogue and interact with indigenous religious and community leaders.

This is not an unusual or unrealistic expectation. In Afghanistan, military Judge Advocate General officers routinely work with the Afghan legal system; military surgeons work closely with Afghan community medical services; military engineers are active throughout Afghanistan working with local contractors on a wide array of construction projects; military Civil Affairs soldiers are active in rebuilding schools and donating school supplies to Afghani children; and military chaplains throughout Afghanistan are interacting with local mullahs and imams.

Army chaplains routinely coordinate or assist with humanitarian and religious liaison missions. Because of these relationships with indigenous clergy, knowledge is gained through informal conversations that may contain information related to the U.S. military mission. Unsolicited information that affects the security of U.S. and allied forces should be reported. Relaying information about threats against U.S. interests does not violate the non-combatant status of a chaplain. But the chaplain who uses his religious status to gain intelligence from indigenous clergy with the intent of feeding that information to the G2, G3, or the IO staff has crossed the line and has assumed combative targeting tasks in violation of the non-combatant status of chaplains.

Chaplains must instruct their commanders and the command staff as to the roles and responsibilities of a chaplain related to IO. It can not be assumed that a commander or a command staff will know the details of what a chaplain can or cannot do related to the chaplain’s non-combatative status. Commanders must take care not to utilize chaplains against military regulations. FM 1-05 states, “Under Title X of the U.S. Code, Chaplains should not perform the following: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection and/or target acquisition.” Commanders must not utilize chaplains as intelligence officers. Chaplains are responsible for advising the commander when such expectations are prevalent. No military regulation states precisely...
what information a chaplain should or should not relay to the IO staff. The guiding principles are military regulations, maintaining the chaplain’s credibility with indigenous religious leaders, guidance from the commander, input from supervisory chaplains, and the conscience of the individual chaplain. These flexible guidelines must be assessed in light of the chaplain’s clear understanding of his non-combatant role.

Army chaplains in Afghanistan were frequently involved with humanitarian missions. These missions, typically coordinated by chaplains with local mullahs, helped to renovate schools, supply orphanages, and rebuild mosques. Falling under the general identification of CMO, chaplains on humanitarian missions often worked with Civil Affairs officers and Public Affairs. In such relationships the chaplain must protect his non-combatant status, in that both Civil Affairs and Public Affairs soldiers routinely contribute intelligence to IO. In a Muslim culture, a U.S. Army chaplain is considered a clergyman, a person of esteem at the level of a mullah. The chaplain must ensure that his credibility is not compromised by working on CMO projects with other soldiers who are combatants. As one chaplain stated, “UMTs should...avoid the appearance of involvement in the execution of IO related activities to avoid undermining their credibility in support of CMO. Part of the reason that UMTs can be effective in conducting the CMO related function of liaison with indigenous religious groups is because of the perception that as religious leaders they will act as “honest brokers.”

Contributions of Chaplains to IO: What Can the Chaplain Do?

There are numerous examples of chaplains excelling in their role as a liaison or bridge-builder with local mullahs in Afghanistan. Chaplains were able to successfully perform these liaison and humanitarian missions without compromising their integrity as non-combatants. An example of interacting with indigenous clergy while rejecting the opportunity to feed intelligence to IO personnel was CH (CPT) Eric Eliason, who deployed to Afghanistan during 2004. As chaplain to the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, CH Eliason refused to provide HUMINT or targeting information while he worked with local mullahs to coordinate the rebuilding of village mosques.

An example of a senior Army chaplain who properly balanced his roles as a religious leader and a staff chaplain was CH (LTC) Larry Adams-Thompson, the CJTF 76 Chaplain in Afghanistan from March 2004 through March 2005. Continuing the work of his predecessor CH (LTC) Ken Sampson, CH Adams-Thompson organized monthly meetings with local mullahs. The intent of these meetings was to discuss religious issues, moral concerns, and to build clergy-to-clergy relationships. Chaplains obtained funds to assist mullahs in the renovation of village mosques and orphanages. In one encounter, he learned that U.S. funds were readily building Afghan public schools but not the traditional religious schools, the madrassas. This created the perception that the U.S. was secular and not concerned about the religious needs of Afghanistan. CH Adams-Thompson knew that if he could get the construction of some madrasas authorized, a clear message would be sent to the Afghan people that the U.S. cared about the local religion and culture. In reflecting on the relationship between CH Adams-Thompson and local mullahs:

Note that the feedback from the mullah was not related to combat operations. Rather, it provided an awareness of wider issues in the area of responsibility (AOR). CH Adams-Thompson encouraged chaplains to take similar issues from their meetings with mullahs back to their commanders. This example demonstrates how chaplains can advise commanding officers on the ways religion impacts the AOR. Local religious leaders, who usually are quite influential in their communities, can provide unique viewpoints on issues and concerns among the populace. Such insight is crucial for commanders, and chaplains are often in a unique position to provide it. This information is not tactical; rather, it is situational awareness that can be utilized to build bridges with the general population. As a result of CH Adams-Thompson bringing the education mullah’s assessment back to the command, approval was given to fund the construction of a madrassas in Kapisa Province, the first U.S. effort of its kind in Afghanistan.

Staff communication between the chaplain and the commander and his staff is essential to maintaining the unique status of chaplains as non-combatants. As chaplains communicated plainly what they were and were not able to do related to intelligence collection, their commands almost always respected
those boundaries. For example, shortly after arriving in Afghanistan, CH Adams-Thompson met with the G2 and told them what he could and could not do related to IO. He indicated that during his 12 months in Afghanistan the command never asked him to utilize his connections with indigenous clergy in an improper manner. It is the responsibility of the chaplain as a staff officer to inform the command of his non-combatant boundaries.\textsuperscript{25} Chaplains must be careful not to allow their networking with local religious leaders to be used inappropriately as targeting or human intelligence collection opportunities. If chaplains allowed themselves to be debriefed by G2, G3, or IO personnel in order to gain information related to combat operations, they would place their unique role as clergy non-combatants in jeopardy.

What the chaplain can or cannot do related to interaction with indigenous clergy is guided by the commander. No commander wants his chaplain kidnapped, killed, or injured. Security for mullah engagements is a vital consideration. The concern is not only for the Army chaplains but for the local clergy with whom they meet. There were instances in Afghanistan in which intimidation, violence, or murder was committed against religious leaders who dialogued with U.S. chaplains. For example, CH (CPT) Guy McBride of the 173rd Combat Support Battalion, who was in Afghanistan from March 2005 through March 2006, recalled, “The mullah engagements in my area were not successful. I remember two of these engagements, after which both times the mullahs were assassinated.”\textsuperscript{26} Careful consideration must be given as to how much danger local leaders face in relating with U.S. chaplains. Obviously the opportunity for chaplains to interact with indigenous clergy will be restricted or eliminated when the danger is too great. Chaplains must balance their roles as advisors to the commander on local religious issues against operational and force protection concerns.

While Army chaplains typically enjoyed their interaction with indigenous clergy, there were moments of apprehension. Occasionally a chaplain understood that he was very close to becoming an intelligence officer gathering targeting information on the enemy. For example, CH (CPT) Isaac Opara of the 25th Infantry Division conducted four mullah engagements during his June 2004 to April 2005 tour in Afghanistan. He lamented that he did not have set IO guidelines as to what he could and could not report to his commander and staff. While helping with the rebuilding of schools and orphanages, he learned many things about the Afghan people. He stated that he walked “a thin line between hosting mullah engagements and becoming an Intel officer.” He stated, “I did not cross the line but I was an ear to the local people to hear complaints…I never reported info to anyone except my brigade chaplain.”\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Conclusion}

To fully develop the role of the military chaplain as a religious liaison for the commander, more training is needed. It is inaccurate to assume that chaplains with the rank of major or above are competent in religious liaison activities. Military chaplains must be trained at the major level and above to dialogue as religious leaders with indigenous clergy; to be sensitive to the religious culture of allied personnel and the HN; to understand mission and situational awareness related to religious issues; to engage in liaison activities with a clear understanding of the Commander’s intent and end state; and to not be used in any way as an intelligence gathering or targeting tool for IO.

Chaplains of the rank of major or above are a valuable but underutilized resource in developing the analysis of an adversary’s religion and culture for the MDMP. Many IO missions begin before combat
operations, and failure to understand the complexities of religion and culture can negatively impact those operations. Commanders and operations staff officers should understand that experienced chaplains can be a valuable multiplier in the total planning process by assisting in developing a religious impact assessment for the commander and staff. Chaplains should insist on the opportunity to participate in the process, although such participation is always bound by their status as non-combatants. Their products are critical for background support to IO, which requires an in-depth understanding of culture for operations involving combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and civil affairs.

Endnotes

2. Ibid., p. 1-6.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 4-40.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 1-5, 1-6.
10. Ibid., 1-1.
12. Ibid., p. 5.
13. The term “religious/spiritual” refers to the system of beliefs and practices that give meaning and purpose to people’s lives, FM 1-05, F-1.
23. Adams, 16.
24. Ibid., 17.
25. Ibid., 18.
27. Correspondence from CH (CPT) Isaac Opara to CH (LTC) Ken Lawson, 14 February 2007.

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The HUMINT Heresies: The Disposition of Human Intelligence Collection in Counterinsurgency

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by Captain David Beall

Introduction

“Because intelligence and operations are so closely related, it is important for collectors to be linked to the operators and analysts they support...collectors should not passively wait for operators to submit requirements; rather they should closely monitor the operational environment and recommend requirements based on their understanding of operators’ needs.” –FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 3-129

Many have now written on the necessity for the maneuver company commander to have an analytical capability within his formation. The Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) or Company Intelligence Cell has already been much discussed, even within this very publication, and few now disagree with the concept’s value. However, we must now begin to take the next step: Empowering the maneuver company commander not only with increased analytical capability, but intelligence collection capability as well.

In a counterinsurgency (COIN), maneuver is the most important column on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection matrix. The maneuver company and its platoons are in constant contact with the local populace everyday, from planned engagements to traffic control points, even to local nationals coming to the patrol base. The pulse of the insurgency lies with its ability to influence the population and that pulse can only be felt with the everyday contact made at the company level and below. Thus, the maneuver company commander is forced to devote an immense amount of his time to the collection and analysis of information. Sir Frank Kitson adds that, “…the system involves a commander in collecting all the background information he can get from a variety of sources including the intelligence organization, and analyzing it very carefully in order to narrow down the possible whereabouts of the enemy, the purpose being to make deductions which will enable him to employ his men with some hope of success as opposed to using them at random in the hope of making a contact.”

Besides his own soldiers and perhaps a Raven Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), the maneuver company commander has no organic intelligence collection capability. He is forced to compete with his peers for assets to assist in his gathering of background information. The first place he looks is naturally to the battalion, where in practice there are more maneuver forces, in the form of different platoons, and the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Team (HCT).

The HCT is usually made up of three to four Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35M HUMINT Collectors with one serving as the Team Leader. “The guiding principle to the use of HUMINT in support of offensive operations is to minimize the time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, and local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them.”

As the name implies, the HCT is taught to operate as a team, all or most attending every source meeting, thereby guaranteeing security and source familiarity with the collectors in case something should happen to one of the collectors (e.g., injury or Environmental Leave). This proves very frustrating to the Infantryman; the only time he interacts with the HCT is when he is tasked to escort them to source meetings, the information from which may not even concern his area of operations (AO). To make matters worse, in terrain where weather and distance hamper timely transportation between outposts, such as Afghanistan, or heavily IED’d lines of communication restrict regular movement, such as certain parts of Iraq, an HCT’s circulation to all company AOs is often severely hobbled.

The Art of Locality

“Insurgencies are local...The mosaic nature of insurgencies, coupled with the fact that all Soldiers and Marines are potential collectors, means that all echelons both consume and produce intelligence. This situation results in a bottom-up flow of intelligence. This pattern also means that tactical units at brigade and below require a lot of support
for both collection and analysis, as their organic intelligence structure is often inadequate.” –FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 3-5

To most effectively gather and analyze intelligence, the collector and analyst must become intimately familiar with the area in which they operate. Outside intelligence organizations provide products and analysis that are very useful, particularly for the objectivism that certain types of collection can give. But the primary source of what happens on a day-to-day basis has to come from those who live in the area and interact with the populace. The analyst from afar can never fully appreciate the situation on the ground, and subsequently his products most often lack a focus that the supported unit is driving at. The same is true of the collector from afar and the collector who comes to visit only occasionally.

This “visiting collector” is the HCT. As previously mentioned it comes to support when it has source meetings in companies’ AOs. The HCT will of course do its best to respond to any priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) of the company, but this is difficult since most company commanders have not been taught to create their own PIRs. Thus, commanders are constantly pinging the battalion S2 shop for HUMINT support until they are fed up with the irregularity.

If the HUMINTers are not local, then they never learn the métis they require to be fully successful. That is, they never completely gain the local knowledge that is comprised of “a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment.” If the HUMINTer lives with the company and constantly goes on patrols to spot and assess when not in source meetings, then his local knowledge is that of the company, and there is no loss between the collector and the customer due to misunderstanding. Furthermore, by developing métis, the HUMINTer is a better collector; he understands the rationality behind the actions of those he aims to influence by living in their context and is also less susceptible to be taken in by false reporting.

That is not to say HUMINTers do not go out on patrols with companies when they are placed at the battalion level. From time to time the HCT visits to go on missions with the company to see the AO and spot and assess. The argument however, is that in the most common configuration (the HCT as a battalion level collection asset), the access that the HCT has to every company’s AO is limited and generally is restricted to either whichever AO has more reporting, or whichever company commander is easier to work with. For the most part, the HCT is just another enabler that the commander is trying to juggle and coordinate for, just another visitor to his AO.

As a visitor, the HUMINTer is only left with his techne, his understanding of his craft as a science, and lacks contextual insight. An HCT armed with its craft is powerful, but it is not COIN. COIN is local, and therefore intelligence collection must be as well.

The HUMINTers are Part of the CoIST

“HUMINT collectors may have to be placed in DS of lower echelon combat maneuver forces (battalion and lower) to support operations. HUMINT and combat reporting by units in direct contact with threat forces and local inhabitants becomes the means of collection.” –FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 3-16

HUMINTers need to be at the company level. Clearly, for MOS-specific training, this is impractical, but for operations it is necessary. The CoIST is, in effect, the S2 shop for the company; it empowers the company commander with a staff for information management and intelligence analysis. The CoIST pre-briefs and de-briefs patrols; analyzes combat information to create a company level enemy situation template; develops threat courses of action; targets, both lethally and non-lethally, at the company level; serves as a company link to the battalion S2; and recommends ISR requests and develops recommended PIR for the company commander.

The HUMINTer is a natural extension of this concept, as he is capable of providing much more benefit than just Military Source Operations (MSO). The 35M works in concert with the company commander and the CoIST team leader to better focus his collection. He reviews every patrol de-brief to expand his knowledge of the AO and to identify future sources of collection. He helps plan the company’s missions, sometimes planned around the HUMINTers’ source meetings. He also runs the company commander’s informant network; every company commander has informants, and these are often mishandled when the commander tries to illegally task them as if they were sources. The HUMINTer keeps the commander ‘legal’ by managing who is worthy of being a source
and handling them appropriately. Within the CoIST, he can have a dedicated analyst, which provides sharper focus to HUMINT operations. But perhaps most importantly, the HUMINTer goes on the majority of patrols, every planned operation, and attends every possible local leader engagement. The HUMINTer is now providing intelligence collection in support of all the lines of effort at the company level, and not solely focusing on security. He develops the métis necessary to become a part of that company fight and AO through practice and experience.

Despite the HUMINTer becoming part of the CoIST, the 35M reporting channels are unchanged. The individual HUMINTer still sends his reports to the HCT team leader, who in turn forwards the reports to the Operational Management Team. The HCT is not disbanded, just dispersed. The team leader still has responsibilities despite the team not operating as one unit. In addition to reviewing and editing his team’s reports, he is also responsible for weighting heavy collection areas or planned operations with additional HUMINT support. The team leader must still hold meetings, virtually or telephonically if need be, with all of his HUMINTers to provide mentoring and ensure information sharing across the battalion’s AO. He also has to manage, with oversight from the MI company (MICO), which HUMINTer is with which company. Certain HUMINTers may not fit into some companies’ command climates, so the team must remain flexible to adjust.

The HUMINTer’s interactions with the company commander, platoon leaders, and other members of the CoIST are as important as his interactions with the local populace. This fusion of the collector, the analyst, and the consumer at the company and platoon levels, enables counterinsurgents to execute operations more effectively, sooner.

Iraq

“All actions designed to retain and regain the allegiance of the population are relevant to the process of collecting background information....” —Sir Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping

As the S2 for 3-509th Infantry Battalion (Airborne), I had a very interesting deployment to Iraq. Before the deployment began, I set up CoISTs in each of our companies. We began the deployment with our Transfer of Authority (TOA) in Iskandariyah, at the end of November of 2006. In December we were detached from our brigade and sent to the Marines in Al Anbar. We returned to Iskandariyah at the end of June 2007, where we served in a Brigade Strike Force for three months. We then owned battlespace in Iskandariyah again for the final two months. In each of those moves, the methods available for collecting intelligence varied greatly. Often the sources of intelligence were extremely undeveloped or not available at all at the start of each new phase of the deployment. This fomented the establishment of creative methods to maximize collection and generate substance for the targeting process. Our time in Garmah, Iraq, a small city and region northeast of Fallujah, was a notable example.

We arrived in Garmah in late December 2006, and took control from an Iraqi Army Brigade(-), who relocated to Baghdad in support of the Surge. There was no Relief in Place/TOA and no intelligence hand-off. The Shi’a Iraqi Army had largely alienated the local Sunni population and had become prisoners in their own patrol bases due to Al Qaida’s dominance. The Iraqi Army had burned every HUMINT source they had. We started from zero.

At first, my HUMINT Team Leader intended to run operations like he had in Iskandariyah, largely waiting for walk-ins to come to the forward operating base (FOB) and requesting to go on missions with companies when he felt the team had time. However, one of the biggest changes from Iskandariyah to Garmah was that the companies were now living in six separate combat outposts, and not on the large FOB where the Battalion Headquarters was located. There was no HUMINT reporting.

The continued absence of HUMINT reporting was decisive in persuading the HUMINTers that they needed to live with the companies or they would never acquire any sources, nor have any idea what the environment was like. Once they left, they never came back. The HCT was divided in order to have at least one collector per company. Staff Sergeant Ken Del Valle maintained all of his team leader responsibilities, and still provided constant feedback to the battalion S2 shop.

At first company commanders did not know how to use 35Ms, but through coaching from the HUMINTers themselves and the S2 shop, eventually all of the commanders began integrating them into mission planning. Captain Matt Gregory and his Able Company, 3-509th IN (ABN), took the greatest advantage of having a HUMINTer at the company
level. He quickly recognized the concept’s utility: “The 35Ms assigned to my company were the biggest combat multipliers by far.”

Able Company accelerated past her sister companies in the battalion task force due largely to superior intelligence collection efforts. They focused on gathering background information on the local area and populace that either had never been gathered before, or had been lost. Additionally, CPT Gregory incorporated SSG Del Valle and the CoIST into his mission planning process. Able Company began focused patrols and planned missions where the HUMINTer was the main effort; “We conducted patrols specifically in order for SSG Del Valle to engage the local population in specific areas, and this had a tremendous effect over time.” By integrating into Able Company, he began to not only spot and assess on every patrol, but also gained the local knowledge that he could not have by simply visiting from Camp Fallujah. CPT Gregory soon recognized that the HUMINTer could assist in more than just producing reports, and began to utilize him in planning his political engagements and information operations messages.

Another innovator was CPT Stew Lindsay, commander of Charlie Company, 3-509th IN (ABN) in North Babil Province, Iraq. Early in CPT Lindsay’s command, there was no HUMINT support, and he was forced to run an extensive informant network in order to gather any intelligence on the ground. “Local nationals would come and tell me information all of the time, but because I was not a HUMINTer, I could not put the intelligence into a format that would allow me to detain someone.” The Iraqis living in Charlie Company’s AO were frustrated since they were providing information on Al Qaida, but the Coalition Forces were unable to arrest the enemy. Visits from HUMINTers alleviated some of the reporting legitimacy problems, but did not adequately resolve the issue.

After receiving a dedicated 35M, CPT Lindsay was able to reorganize his operations to focus on building the intelligence framework necessary to support one of the most successful company targeting efforts in the brigade. “I took my HUMINTer with me everywhere; I took him to Sheik engagements, Iraqi Security Force meetings, infrastructure events, raids, you name it...” Additionally, Charlie Company’s HUMINTer, Sergeant Micah Boor, assumed CPT Lindsay’s informant network, was able to apply his craft, and turned most of them into legitimate sources. SGT Boor played an integral part in the company’s targeting process as Lindsay adds, “I was focusing on so many different things as a company commander; having SGT Boor and the CoIST there to keep all of the background information straight and make realistic lethal, non-lethal, and ISR targeting recommendations was tremendous.” Through targeting with SGT Boor, and later 35M Specialist Wayne Border, Lindsay’s weekly detainment rate rose 800 percent over a three month period. Finally, CPT Lindsay established a Company SOP for operations on the objective that featured the HUMINTer screening potential detainees with focused tactical questioning (TQ), while his CoIST performed tactical site exploitation (TSE) and started detainment paperwork.

Unfortunately, some company commanders were less open minded with tactical planning or distrustful of intelligence in general. There was some misuse at first, until the battalion field grade officers could be convinced to correct it. The other companies’ success with their assigned HUMINTers was more gradual, but it was nevertheless there. It took more time for them to learn CPT Gregory’s lesson: “If you put him [the 35M] at the back of the patrol and forget about him you will get nothing in return, but if you put him up front and put his talent to work, then you will get more than you could ever ask for.”

**Afghanistan**

“Yet a man who uses an imaginary map, thinking that it is a true one, is likely to be worse off than someone with no map at all; for he will fail to inquire whenever he can, to observe every detail on his way, and to search continuously with all his senses and all his intelligence for indications of where he should go.” –E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful

Following the Iraq deployment of 4th Brigade (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division (Light), I moved from battalion S2 to MICO Commander, and naturally sought to incorporate the intelligence lessons learned into training and operations for the current deployment to Afghanistan. It is difficult to effect change in a large organization without the support of the chain of command. But this turned out not to be an issue as the new brigade commander also believed strongly in both the importance of the CoIST, and also the company level placement of HUMINTers. He had drawn the same conclusions from his previous...
service in Afghanistan as I had in Iraq. Accordingly, the CoIST concept was soon implemented in every maneuver company in the brigade.

The 4/25th ABCT CoIST is comprised of six people, and is uniform throughout the brigade’s maneuver companies. The only MOS-specific positions are one MOS 35F Intelligence Analyst and one MOS 35M HUMINT Collector. The other positions are the CoIST Team Leader, the Raven Operator, the Analyst Assistant, and the HUMINT Assistant, and are MOS immaterial. Careful training and control has been placed on the HUMINT Assistant to ensure that no laws are broken. They cannot conduct MSO, but rather serve as a dedicated analyst for the 35M and perform some tasks HUMINTers receive more in-depth training in, such as TSE/TQ, etc.

There are, of course, challenges with the both the CoIST concept and having HUMINTers at the companies. The first, as I mentioned in my Iraq experience, is that most Infantryman do not know what a HUMINTer can do, and they are subsequently misused. My First Sergeant and I have played a direct liaison role with all of the maneuver companies; we sought early in the life cycle to establish positive working relationships so that we could help them understand the role of intelligence at the company level and prevent collectors and analysts from being relegated to radio watch and the like.

Another valid argument is that just as in any unit, the HUMINT platoon members have a varying level of experience and maturity. One maneuver company will get a noncommissioned officer with combat experience and additional HUMINT schools, and another will get a HUMINTer straight out of initial entry training. Therefore, the junior 35Ms can scarcely get the mentorship needed in their craft. The junior soldiers are also likely to be less confident in their HUMINT skills and may have difficulty making solid recommendations to Infantry captains. We identified these issues in advance and did our best to match personalities of command teams to HUMINTers, but were confident that these hurdles were worth it. Leader training was the priority in pre-deployment, and I stressed that it included every HUMINTer. There have been some conflicts, and we have adjusted to the best of our ability to ensure adequate support for all the units.

A third problem was the availability of Category-II Interpreters in order to maintain legality for HUMINTers conducting MSO. Obtaining all of the interpreters was easier than we anticipated. We provided detailed justifications for our increased interpreter requirement to the contracting companies and, in less than a month, they all arrived.

When we arrived in Afghanistan, we relieved the previous unit’s “HUMINT map.” Three-fourths of its organic HUMINT collection had been placed in one battalion's AO. They were placed there because that was where the unit believed the majority of collection was to be found. In addition, a few attached HUMINTers provided coverage in two other areas. Another reason they never tried to expand their HUMINT coverage geographically was that they thought other organizations were already collecting where their brigade had gaps, so there was no point to alter the order of things. However, the most important reason why the majority of the maneuver companies rarely saw the HUMINTers was because there were only four HCTs, and they remained intact.

By focusing on their imaginary HUMINT map, no one could confirm or deny whether there were more sources to be had in many of the remote areas. Instead of replacing HUMINT one-for-one, we drove on with our more dispersed CoIST-focused HUMINT lay down. Our HUMINTers are spread out over fifteen different locations. They were able to take on the former unit’s source pool and quickly expand it. In the areas where there wasn’t supposed to be any reporting, we have acquired sources. The previous unit failed to confront the fact that even if there were other organizations running sources in some areas, those organizations would be collecting on a different set of criteria and responding to a different chain of command’s priorities. The area that our sources report on has approximately doubled the previous unit’s network in less than ninety days. The area covered by our source network also has a greater correlation to occurrence of significant activity than the previous HUMINT map. However, these are measures of performance, and not effectiveness. The measures of effectiveness will not become evident until more reflection has been achieved. But, as of right now, it would be fair to say that several of the earlier internal critics have been greatly persuaded, if not won over.

**Conclusion**

“They said...that he was so devoted to Pure Science ... that he would rather have people die by the right therapy than be cured by the wrong.” –Sinclair Lewis, *Arrowsmith*
Afghanistan is not Iraq, anyone who has deployed to either knows this and is frequently reminded. However, whether addressing an urban insurgency or a rural insurgency, “...the HUMINT collectors must be able to maintain daily contact with the local population.” The closer a HUMINTer can get to the population the better. In a bottom-up intelligence structure, the place of the collector is at the bottom, not mid-way.

There has been much resistance to the changes that constitute this concept. The majority of this resistance comes not from the collector himself, but from those with great HUMINT experience in the pre-9/11 Army. Team centricity is well established in the HUMINT schoolhouse and amongst its subject matter experts. But it has been my experience that when this concept is tried, the hands-on experience turns some doubters into believers. Just like my Team Leader in Garmah, who fought against separating the HCT and living with the companies, once they go, most don’t look back. Still others remain entirely obstinate, because it is not taught that way and involves letting go of control. In the end, however, this concept is really just another manifestation of the HUMINT collector being able to, “operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely information if deployed forward in support of maneuver elements.”

“There are never enough HUMINT collectors to meet all requirements.” But this is a maxim true of all intelligence, whether collection or analysis, and doubly so in COIN. The increased intelligence burden that COIN creates easily exposes the inadequacy of the BCT intelligence modified table of equipment. Low-Level Voice Intercept Teams in every CoIST would allow Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and tactical intelligence fusion at the company, but the MICO’s SIGINT manning simply doesn’t support it. The UAS platoon is designed to only have one aircraft flying an ISR mission at a time. But, with more operators and maintainers, it would not be difficult to sustain aircraft conducting persistent surveillance on multiple objectives.

There aren’t enough collection assets in the BCT’s MICO to satisfy the requirements of the maneuver company. This problem is exacerbated even further by the employment of field artillery and brigade special troops battalions as maneuver formations, as is common practice in Afghanistan and Iraq today. As demonstrated earlier in the article, intelligence collection in a COIN is not “plug and play,” you cannot train effective intelligence collection systems while divorced from maneuver. The modular design of the BCT necessitates an intelligence collection system that is integrated with maneuver during training and in combat. All of these factors place the tactical company grade MI officer in the pillory for the lack of organic intelligence capability within the BCT. It becomes his job to “create” more. Training non-MI MOS soldiers in the crafts of some INTs involves plotting an absurd course between the desires of maneuver and the requirements of statutes, both military and non-military. But that, clearly, is another article.

Endnotes
2. Kitson, 97.
7. Scott, 317.
10. Ibid.
11. Interview. Major Stewart Lindsay, USA, FOB Salerno, Afghanistan, 12 May 2009.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Interview, Gregory.
16. This is not intended as criticism of the out-going unit. Their approach was not unreasonable and, in fact, might be considered normal and customary. Instead, the intent is to document the gains achieved over the traditional methods of HUMINT operations.
17. FM 2-22.3, 3-9.

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Introduction

The border that separates the U.S. and Mexico runs for approximately two thousand miles through some of the most challenging and inhospitable terrain in North America. It is also a place plagued by persistent violence and crime. Currently, smugglers move thousands of undocumented immigrants and massive quantities of illegal drugs across the border into the U.S. Moreover, until recently, illegal activities along the border have steadily increased over the last several decades.

During the same period of time, violence along the border has become almost endemic thereby forcing the Mexican government to directly confront the extremely well financed, well armed, and dangerous Mexican drug-trafficking organizations of northern Mexico. Smugglers who operate along the border spread terror by killing police, reporters, officials, and members of rival organized crime units. In border cities such as Agua Prieta and Naco, Sonora, increasingly violent acts against police and other officials now make it difficult for Mexico to recruit people to serve in law enforcement. Since December of 2006, more than 5,000 Mexican citizens (including many public officials) have been killed in drug-related violence.

In addition to the tumult that organized crime brings to the region, gang members and smugglers also effectively bribe and intimidate people on both sides of the border. They know how to recruit people driven by need, as well as those driven by greed.

Mexican drug cartels and criminal gangs have greatly expanded their operations since the Medellin and Cali drug cartels in Colombia were curtailed by the cooperative efforts of the governments of Colombia and the U.S. In addition to illegal drugs, these cartels and gangs are also engaged in human smuggling.

Whereas most Americans worry about the onerous implications of the current situation, people who live near the border in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas regularly experience first hand the impacts of illegal immigration and drug trafficking. For many communities in these states, smuggling strains the capabilities of their law enforcement and emergency response agencies. Furthermore, the recruitment of young men and women by drug cartels weakens the social fabric of American towns, cities and rural counties in the region. Although human and drug smuggling along the entire reach of the border between Mexico and the U.S. is an immense problem that is, in one way or another, felt by all Americans, no community has suffered more than the residents of the Tohono O’odham Nation of Southern Arizona.
The southern boundary of the Tohono O’odham (formerly called Papago) Reservation runs for approximately 78 miles along the U.S. border with Mexico. When the current boundary was established in the mid-nineteenth century by the Gadsden Treaty between Mexico and the U.S., no one seemed to notice that the new border cut through the traditional homeland of the Tohono O’odham (Desert People). The Desert People generally disregarded the border and travelled back and forth between Mexico and the U.S. with few restrictions. Over the last several decades however, tightened security has made cross-border travel for the Tohono O’odham increasingly difficult. For all practical purposes, the Tohono O’odham who have always wanted to be left in keeping with their traditional ways and values (Him-dag), are now caught in the middle of the ongoing international crisis on the border.

The Tohono O’odham

The Tohono O’odham have occupied the desert region of southern Arizona and northern Sonora for centuries. Their traditional semi-nomadic, agricultural lifestyle was intrinsically intertwined with the summer monsoon rains of the desert that brought their crops to fruition.

Prior to the official demarcation of the Reservation, the Tohono O’odham system of governance focused on the family, clan, and village. Traditionally, villages were led by headmen who settled disputes and provided guidance. Headmen also protected the sacred artifacts of the village and made certain that ceremonies followed proper traditions. Throughout their history, the Tohono O’odham were, and have remained, a peaceful people dedicated to the preservation of their language, culture and traditions.

Spanish Influence

When the Spanish first arrived in the Santa Cruz River Valley in the 1680s, they were surprised to find irrigated fields spreading out for several miles on both sides of the river near the village of Bac (near the site of modern-day Tucson). Soon after, the Spanish priest, Eusebio Kino arrived in the region and almost immediately initiated the construction of missions in order to convert the indigenous people to Catholicism. He also sought to establish European style ranches and mines. Although he was primarily interested in saving souls, Father Kino also had a passion for farming and ranching. He introduced European crops to indigenous farmers and encouraged them to move into permanent settlements near the missions.

In the 1700s, the Apache began to raid O’odham villages. Despite European influences and Apache raids however, the Tohono O’odham continued to cling to their traditions. They were nonetheless changed by these encroachments in that many adopted the Catholic faith, learned to raise cattle and European crops, and were forced to develop effective defenses against those who attacked them.

The Tohono O’odham and Mexico

Mexico became independent from Spain in 1821. By 1828, the Mexican government began closing Spanish missions throughout the Tohono O’odham homeland and for the most part, left the Desert People alone. Even so, many Mexican citizens continued to establish farms, ranches and mines in areas traditionally occupied by the Tohono O’odham. By 1840, such encroachments were becoming serious enough to cause conflicts between Mexican immigrants and the Desert People. At one point, the Tohono O’odham battled with these immigrants near the Mexican border-town of Cobota.

The Americans and the New Border

In 1846, the U.S. and Mexico fought over the location of the international border between the two nations. In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the war, but the exact location of the border was not formalized until 1853 when both nations signed the Gadsden Treaty. Despite the fact that the new border cut through the heart of the Tohono O’odham homeland, the U.S. and Mexico did not include representatives of the Desert People in the negotiations. Moreover, the U.S. did not grant citizenship to the Tohono O’odham who lived on the north side of the new border. Without citizenship, and without the protection of a formally established reservation, the O’odham homeland north of the border became part of the public domain of the U.S., thereby opening these lands to American settlers. As non-Indians began to settle on their land, the Desert People moved further into more isolated parts of their territory. Additionally, the Desert People and non-Indians disagreed over the use of land and water. To put an end to this tension, President U.S. Grant created the 71,000 acre San Xavier Reservation near the city of Tucson, Arizona.
in 1874. In 1882 the federal government set aside another 10,000 acres near Gila Bend, Arizona.

Because many of the Desert People did not move to the reservations, they continued to clash with non-Indians in the area. In 1916, the federal government responded by setting aside more than two million acres for the use of the Desert People. Over the next thirty years, it added additional pieces of land to the Reservation. It is now the second largest Native American reservation (after the Navajo) in the U.S.

In 1934, in keeping with the Indian Reorganization Act, the Tohono O’odham established the “Papago Tribe of Arizona.” The creation of a centralized tribal government was a dramatic departure from the traditionally decentralized, village-based, consensus-oriented O’odham culture and many tribal members continued to go to their villages to discuss problems and ask for decisions.

Over the years following the implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act, the tribal government located at Sells, Arizona has increased its authority over the affairs of the Desert People. Moreover, the Tribal Legislative Council is empowered by its fiduciary role for federal and tribal dollars and by the tendency of all non-O’odham to go to the Council to transact business on the Reservation. Therefore, though many continue to practice traditional ways, and the O’odham language is spoken throughout the Reservation, regular interaction with the dominant society makes the preservation of the traditional culture an increasingly challenging goal.

The Tohono O’odham Reservation

This is a vast, rugged region of exceptional beauty that encompasses approximately three million acres immediately north of the U.S. border with Mexico. Despite some urban development near Sells (the Nation’s capital) and the cultivation of thousands of acres by the tribal farm, the lion’s share of the Reservation continues to be characterized by large tracts of natural desert and open range dotted with small villages and family compounds.

The desert of Southern Arizona is characterized by hot summers with temperatures often exceeding 100 degrees. Although winters are generally mild, night time temperatures sometimes drop below freezing. Normally, rainfall is scant, but from time to time, summer thunder storms result in torrents of water that flood washes and restrict travel. Natural vegetation on the Reservation is surprisingly lush and includes a wide variety of desert flora. Reservation wildlife, typical of the desert climate, remains diverse and abundant despite years of cattle ranching.

Despite its great beauty, the desert presents major challenges to those who are unaccustomed to its extremes. Summer heat, winter cold, long distances between sources of water, poisonous wildlife, wild animals, rough terrain, and vast areas of isolated country pose serious risks to those who try to travel over the Reservation on foot.

Crisis on the Border

Until recently, the Desert People were free to travel back and forth between Mexico and the Reservation to visit family members and to take part in ceremonies and celebrations. Recently however, robust enforcement makes cross-border travel difficult. Whereas, stronger border security inconveniences tribal members who travel back and forth between Mexico and the U.S. legally, thousands of immigrants from Mexico use the isolation of the Reservation to avoid detection to cross illegally into the U.S. According to the Tohono O’odham Police, as many as 1,500 people from Mexico pass through the Reservation every day. Furthermore, since 2000, the U.S. Border Patrol has investigated 1,156 deaths of illegal migrants that have occurred on the Reservation as a result of the harsh remoteness of the environment. These deaths have placed immense psychological, social, and financial burdens on the Desert People.

Over the last decade, there have been several incursions into the Reservation by people dressed in Mexican uniforms. In March 1999, Homeland Security personnel were fired on by personnel wearing Mexican military uniforms who were smuggling illegal drugs into the U.S. In April 2000, a cattle truck drove into the village of Menager's Dam on the O'odham Reservation carrying men wearing Mexican military uniforms and armed with machine guns. In January 2002, two men, dressed as Mexican soldiers, crashed into a car and killed two innocent people while smuggling drugs through the Reservation. Later in May 2002, a Tohono O'odham
Nation Ranger was pursued by men wearing Mexican military uniforms and driving a military vehicle.\(^17\)

**Impacts of Illegal Immigration on the Reservation**

Through no fault of their own, the Desert People are now caught in the middle of an immense crisis created by decisions made long ago and exacerbated by perceptions of wealth and opportunity in the U.S. relative to the poverty and deprivation that is often synonymous with life in Mexico. Furthermore, illegal immigration and drug smuggling on the Reservation directly threaten the best efforts of the Tohono O’odham to preserve their traditional culture and way-of-life.

Many illegal immigrants who come from Mexico to the Reservation arrive in need of water, food, and medical attention. The humanitarian needs of these people cannot be ignored by the Tohono O’odham who must, by tradition, help others in need. On the other hand, tribal members do not want to be arrested for aiding illegal immigrants. Because of these and other similar problems, Tribal Chairman, Ned Norris, stresses the need for better communications and consultation between O’odham leaders and federal officials. Though cooperation between the tribal and federal government is evident, and despite efforts by the U.S. Border Patrol to improve relations with the O’odham nation, many tribal members believe the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should show greater concern for the sovereignty of the Tohono O’odham Nation.\(^18\)

Large numbers of illegal immigrants have resulted in increased levels of crime on the Reservation. During March 2008 alone, an estimated 15,500 illegal immigrants entered the Reservation.\(^19\) The Desert People now find it necessary to secure their homes because immigrants have stolen food, clothing and other possessions. Sometimes, people find undocumented immigrants sleeping on their porches or in outbuildings near their homes. Until recently, people who lived on the Reservation were able to walk through the desert without fear. Now they have found it increasingly necessary to take personal security measures in order to protect their families and their possessions.

Although these problems are immense, one of the most damaging ramifications of human and drug smuggling on the Reservation is the instant wealth that smugglers offer to people who have lived in poverty and deprivation for generations. The lure of tax free dollars in exchange for transportation, food, water, and shelter has led some tribal members (especially the young) to participate in smuggling. Additionally, for humanitarian reasons, some people have established water stations along well-travelled routes through the Reservation. Whereas these stations save lives, they also draw illegal migrants and smugglers. Water stations are a contentious issue on the Reservation, and families are sometimes torn apart by differences of opinion over interaction with illegal migrants and smugglers.

The Tohono O’odham value privacy and do not welcome intrusions by outsiders. The smuggling of large numbers of people and drugs now brings hundreds of law enforcement personnel to the Reservation. As Border Patrol agents and employees of other agencies attempt to apprehend undocumented migrants and drug smugglers, they often find it necessary to intrude on the private lives of the Desert People. Additionally, most of the authorities who are assigned to work on the Reservation have not studied the nature of O’odham culture, values, attitudes and beliefs. Sometimes, this lack of knowledge leads to misunderstandings and tense encounters.

**Costs of Illegal Immigration**

Illegal immigrants leave more than 2,000 tons of cast-off bottles, clothing, back packs, and human waste on the Reservation each year. This trash is more than merely an eyesore; it is hazardous to wildlife, domestic animals, and local residents. The Tohono O’odham Nation now finds it necessary to spend thousands of dollars each year to remove this garbage. Furthermore, those who live in the small villages and ranches scattered over the Reservation are also forced to haul away truck loads of garbage and waste left near their homes.\(^20\)

In 2003, the Tohono O’odham Nation spent more than three million dollars to combat illegal immigration and smuggling and these costs have continued to escalate. This, however, is not the only potentially disastrous ramification of illegal immigration and smuggling. The involvement of some tribal members in these activities seriously complicates the Nation’s long term commitment to the preservation of the Tohono O’odham culture. Smugglers are will-
ing to pay local people as much as $1,500 per person to drive illegal immigrants from the Reservation to the Phoenix metropolitan area. They also pay for storage, food, water, shelter, and the transportation of illegal narcotics. A person who has access to a six passenger vehicle could receive more than $7,000.00 (tax free) for making an eight hour round trip. For many people who live on the Reservation, that is a lot of money. While no one knows the exact amount of personal income that comes to some tribal members as a result of providing these services, one study found that the annual total may exceed $13,795,000.21

The Desert People live in close-knit communities. For them, the participation of tribal members in smuggling and other such activities presents an immense challenge because the Tribal Police are sometimes called upon to arrest people who they know very well. Even so, they work closely with federal, state, and county authorities to enforce the law and stem the flow of illegal migrants and smuggling on the Reservation.22

During fiscal year 2002, the Tohono O’odham Nation was forced to spend nearly $7,000,000 to deal with the manifestations of illegal migration. During this period, 85 illegal immigrants died on the Reservation causing $266,050 to be spent on autopsies and other related costs. At the same time, Tribal Police dealt with 140 drug smuggling cases at a cost of $642,880; twelve immigrant related homicides costing $260,000 to investigate; towed nearly 4,000 abandoned immigrant vehicles at a cost of $180,000, and provided medical emergency treatment to immigrants at a cost of more than $500,000.23

Although the Tohono O’odham Nation receives some assistance from the federal government, the massive numbers of illegal entrants to the Reservation have made it necessary for the Desert People to divert scarce resources from other pressing needs including support to schools, economic development, and infrastructure improvements.

Law Enforcement Issues

While most tribal members want to put an end to crime on the Reservation, many are uncomfortable with the presence of large numbers of non-O'odham law enforcement personnel in their communities. Tribal members tell their leaders that sometimes they are inconvenienced, or even harassed by these personnel. They also point out that many federal law enforcement officers and agents seem to know little about the traditional ways of the Desert People. They call upon the Federal Government and other governments to respect the sovereignty of the Tohono O'odham Nation.24

Tribal Chairman, Ned Norris, Jr., in written testimony to a Joint Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives in April 2008, noted that the Tohono O’odham Nation has worked closely with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to find alternatives to walls along the border. He argues that viable alternatives include vehicle barriers, towers, check-points, and camera-radar systems. He believes that these methods can effectively improve security without causing the environmental damage and personal inconveniences associated with the construction of a wall. The Tohono O’odham are particularly concerned about the impacts of a border wall on migratory wildlife such as the Mexican jaguar. Chairman Norris now calls upon the federal government to repeal the authority given to the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive the limitations of the Environmental Protection Act in the interests of security.25

In recent years, the Border Patrol has sought to expose agents who patrol on the Reservation to Tohono O’odham culture. It also employs a community relations officer who works closely with tribal members to insure effective communications.26 Nevertheless, the training that most Border Patrol personnel receive about the culture of the Desert People remains fairly light. Given the complex nature of the current situation, it is clear that law enforcement personnel assigned to work on the Reservation would benefit from training designed to immerse them in the traditions, values, attitudes, and beliefs of the Desert People.

Initiatives to Deal with Illegal Immigration and Smuggling

Tribal police, as well as federal and state law enforcement agencies, are making strides in finding effective ways to stop the flow of illegal migrants and drugs through the Reservation. Among the more important of these initiatives are the employment of Native American ‘Shadow Wolf’ trackers, and the training of law enforcement personnel in the gathering, analysis and use of actionable intelligence by
the Directorate of Intelligence Support to Homeland Security (DISHLS), U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

**The Shadow Wolves**

Although high-tech intelligence and tracking techniques are employed in order to capture illegal immigrants and smugglers on the Reservation, the Shadow Wolves effectively employ low-tech procedures and techniques. These federal agents are a Native American group of interdiction specialists, who work under U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), within the DHS, using their highly honed tracking skills to find and apprehend drug smugglers operating on the Reservation.

During the first six months of 2007, the Shadow Wolves seized almost 50,000 pounds of marijuana on the Reservation. In addition to putting their tracking skills to work, they also train other U.S. law enforcement agents as well as border guards from other nations including Lithuania, Latvia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Macedonia.27

**Cultural Awareness and Intelligence Training**

The ongoing war against terrorism in the Middle East has brought about increasingly sophisticated intelligence capabilities, more effective training strategies and techniques, and an expanding emphasis on cultural awareness training and education within the U.S. military. Although the Tohono O’odham are loyal U.S. citizens, they are strongly committed to the preservation of their culture and language, and they think of the Reservation as a sacred homeland. Non-O’odham law enforcement personnel assigned to work on the Reservation should receive cultural awareness training that is at least as robust as the training given to members of the U.S. Armed Forces who are stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. USAIC has been at the forefront in the development and delivery of cultural awareness training for the military.

For six years USAIC, through DISHLS, has provided basic and advanced intelligence training and education for personnel from a variety of agencies associated with the DHS mission. DISHLS has provided specialized training via mobile training teams (MTTs) including courses on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the reporting of intelligence data, intelligence preparation of the operational environment, combating terrorism, interviewing techniques, interrogation, and effective report writing.

DISHLS has made courses available to U.S. Border Patrol and other law enforcement agencies in a variety of locations throughout the U.S. and provided training to personnel attached to the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol, charged with protecting the border from the Eastern Yuma County to the Arizona/New Mexico boundary.
under control. In keeping with this concept, the DISHLS and UMI are working to provide access to such training and education to appropriate tribal, community, county, and federal personnel. This initiative is designed to increase the cost effectiveness and timeliness of homeland security training and education, and rests upon the current federal mandate to all branches of government to share information and resources wherever and whenever possible.

Securing the Reservation Border

Although there is, as yet, insufficient data available to definitively state that illegal immigration from Mexico into the U.S. is in a long term decline, Leslie Fulbright (San Francisco Chronicle), reported in October 2008 that the numbers of illegal immigrants have decreased in response to a slowing U.S. economy and more effective border security measures. Ronald J. Hansen (The Arizona Republic) stated that illegal immigration in the U.S. has dropped by about eleven percent over the last year. He attributes this to the slowing American economy and the stepped up efforts of the Border Patrol.

Despite these reports however, there has yet to be a noticeable decline in the social and economic costs of smuggling and illegal immigration on the Reservation. Tribal, state, and federal personnel continue to find enforcement of the 78 mile Tohono O’odham border with Mexico a daunting challenge and continue to seek effective and efficient intelligence training opportunities through which they can enhance their abilities to collect, process, and apply intelligence to their vital homeland security mission.

Conclusion

The creation of the border between Mexico and the U.S. caused many serious, although not immediately apparent, problems for the Desert People. In 1853, none who signed the Gadsden Treaty could have foreseen the wave of violence and crime that now characterizes life on the border. Because they had nothing to do with creating the border in the first place, the Tohono O’odham have historically regarded it with ambivalence. In recent decades however, drug and human smuggling have made it necessary for federal officials, including the Border Patrol, to critically scrutinize roads and communities throughout the Reservation.

Although the majority of the Desert People support efforts to stop smuggling and illegal immigration from Mexico into the U.S. through their vast Reservation, many are often disconcerted by constant interaction with non-O’odham law enforcement personnel. Differences in values, attitudes, and beliefs sometimes lead to misunderstandings that are not conducive to effective cooperation between local tribal members who may have information that could help build the intelligence base needed to secure the border.

Gaining the cooperation of the Desert People could be more easily accomplished if they were convinced that non-O’odham law enforcement personnel understood, and showed deference to, O’odham ways and culture. The successful completion of a comprehensive course on the language, history, traditions, values, and culture of the Desert People by all non-O’odham tasked with securing the Reservation border with Mexico would be compelling evidence of the desire of local, state, and federal governments to work in respectful partnership with the Tohono O’odham Nation. Such a course could be developed and offered (some parts of it via DL) through a cooperative venture between USAIC (DISHLS and UMI) and the Tohono O’odham Community College.

Many tribal members now view with alarm the numbers of O’odham youth who have been recruited to work for the drug cartels and smugglers. They know that unless the current invasion is halted, the Reservation cannot become a prosperous, safe hearth of traditional O’odham culture. An effective, well planned long term effort to stop illegal immigration and drug smuggling on the Reservation is possible if federal, state, and other authorities fully cooperate and consult with the Tohono O’odham Nation.

Though the federal government has a moral obligation to protect the rights of all indigenous groups in the Nation, shielding the Tohono O’odham from the disastrous consequences of smuggling and illegal immigration is especially important because the security of the Reservation is increasingly linked to the security of the entire U.S. Actionable intelligence coupled with high quality applied training and education can do much to assist the tribal police, Border Patrol and other law enforcement agencies as they cooperatively endeavor to secure the border.
Endnotes


5. Logan.


8. In general, American Indians were not granted American citizenship until the Indian Citizenship Act was enacted in 1924.


12. The Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act) of 1934 called for Indian Nations to establish home rule or tribal governments. See http://www.maquah.net/Kafkaesque/statutes/IRA-330.html.


18. McCombs and Volante.


22. Ibid.


24. Madsen.

25. Norris.


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Day three of the MRX in the 1st BCT TOC: The Battle Captain remains focused on the CPOF in front of him as battalion events continue to populate his “BCT Events” effort from simulated, subordinate battalions. The Fire Support Cell shouts out, “Acquisition! AO Mustangs!” based on the AFATDS display, which immediately causes the brigade staff to execute its Indirect Fire Battle Drill. In the White Cell room, a “puckster” continues to provide event injects (events and reports) from his BCST computer into the brigade ABCS network.

Introduction

The introduction of various complex digital Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) across the Army over the past several years has been accompanied by the creation of complicated, and often costly, simulations programs and specialized applications to stimulate the ABCS boxes. Units required a training capability to exercise and sustain ABCS skills to ensure user proficiency and employment of the entire ABCS network. Current simulation programs, such as the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) and the Joint Combat and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) serve very useful purposes for major training exercises, but require high overhead for small unit training purposes. Some of this overhead includes external support and extensive lead time for coordination.

History

As a result of unit requests for ABCS stimulation assistance, the National Simulation Center (NSC) initially developed a low-overhead software application, which we know today as the Battle Command Staff Trainer (BCST). Since its creation, the NSC worked with numerous agencies and program managers to transition BCST and ensure mutual capability refinement. The Product Director, Common Services, under direction of Program Manager Battle Command, now has responsibility to continue development of the BCST. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager-Battle Command (TCM-BC) is responsible for requirements generation and oversight.

Uses

BCST enables units to conduct battle staff training on ABCS command and control systems via internal resources with minimal setup time and effort and facilitates collective and individual staff training (sustainment and refresher) for specific sections or entire staffs, from battalion through U.S. Army Service
Component Command levels. Significant training opportunities afforded by BCST include: maintain and improve highly perishable ABCS skills, train new battle staff personnel, apply staff coordination drills, battle rhythm development and train-up for exercises/events. This software also provides an ability to stimulate the battle staff reactions to friendly and enemy events, as well as planned Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) injects to initiate staff reactions. **BCST should only be used on training networks, never on real-world operational network. The risk of mixed BCST simulated and real-world operational events is too great!**

**What BCST is and is Not**

BCST is a training program that operates on standard personal computer systems with Microsoft Windows XP and is applicable to both Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) units, as well as Battle Command Training Centers (BCTCs). However, this software application is **not**: hardware or computer, a substitute for ABCS, or a replacement for CBS, JCATS, or other constructive training simulations. These systems, like BCST, were born of necessity and serve a very useful purpose for larger-scale training exercises.

**How Units Receive BCST**

Currently, BCST is provided to Army units through unit set fielding (USF) beginning in December 2008 or via the BCST AKO download site. Based on the approved USF schedule for AC/RC/National Guard units, the software fielding and new equipment training (NET) dates are synchronized with the unit’s input. The computer discs issued during NET include the actual BCST program, as well as a reference disc that includes training support packages (TSPs) with specific scenarios. Units that have recently completed USF and ABCS NET may download the BCST program and TSPs from AKO at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/10244567.*

**BCST NET**

Prior to BCST NET, units should receive all ABCS equipment and complete NET for those systems. During BCST NET, select personnel from the S/G-3 and S/G-6 will receive instruction on how to connect the BCST into the ABCS network, BCST operator training, and exercise scenario skills. Additionally BCTCs and Centers of Excellence will receive the BCST program and NET based on delivery coordination. A tiered support apparatus will provide support to units for assistance with the BCST program to resolve identified issues.

**Summary**

BCST has tremendous training potential for any Army battle staff, especially at brigade and battalion levels. BCST provides: a flexible training medium to maintain operators’ proficiency on their respective systems; flexible training employment, and great resources for quality collective training at no cost to the unit. Additionally, this capability enhances and complements BCTC supported events and exercises. The application and references provide a low-overhead training capability package that commanders, staff sections, or institutions, can use to train on ABCS system-of-systems with organic resources when they choose.

Questions and comments may be directed to: TCM-BC, ATTN: C2 Branch (BCST), 806 Harrison Drive, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2326 or POCs Major Michael Spears at michael.r.spears@us.army.mil, (913)684-4505 or Mr. Gregory Eddy, at gregory.j.eddy@conus.army.mil, (913) 684-4597 of TCM-BC.

Once units have received the software, familiarized their units with it, and used it, send suggested improvements and recommendations for new features to MAJ Spears and/or Mr. Eddy.

*Meanwhile, back in the White Cell room, the BCST operator checks his MSEL, and initiates an event that stimulates the DCGS-A box, as the brigade staff continues to execute their staff coordination and battle drills . . .*

*AKO users will request access to this site from the BCST POCs.*
Introduction

One of the most important functions during operations is assessment—determining if the operations are achieving the tasks and purposes that are intended. The use of three different constructs assist in assessment: indicators, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness. Understanding these constructs and their use is critical to determine if operations are focused on the desired end state.

The purpose for this article is to describe in detail two of these concepts: measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Indicators are an important construct, but most intelligence professionals are familiar with indicators—items of information that are measurable, collectable, and relevant to give insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance.\(^1\)

**MOP and MOE Joint Doctrine**

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* provide an explanation of the terms measure of performance and measure of effectiveness. The following are the definitions from JP 5-0:

**Measure of Performance (MOP):** A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment.

**Measure of Effectiveness (MOE):** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.\(^2\)

JP 5-0 also provides an explanatory chart that provides some clarity to the concepts of MOP and MOE and how they interrelate.\(^3\)

It is important to note that MOPs relate to the tasks being performed with the question “Are we doing things right?” MOEs relate to the effects and objectives with the question “Are we doing the right things?” JP 5-0 states that “MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment” whereas MOEs “measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance.”\(^4\)

**MOP and MOE—Army Doctrine**

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, provides a similar explanation of the terms MOP and MOE. FM 3-0 states that “measures of performance answer the question, “Was the task or action performed as the commander intended?” A measure of performance confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed.” For MOEs, FM 3-0 states “measures of effectiveness focus on the results or consequences of actions taken. They answer the question, ‘Is the force doing the right things, or are additional or alternative actions required?’ A measure of effectiveness provides a benchmark against which the
commander assesses progress toward accomplishing the mission.\textsuperscript{5}

FM 3-07, \textit{Stability Operations}, provides a more explicit definition of the concepts of MOP and MOE:

**MOP**: A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). At the most basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains a formal or informal checklist to track task completion. The items on that checklist are measures of performance. At battalion level and above, command posts monitor measures of performance for assigned tasks. Examples of measures of performance include the construction of a training facility for host-nation security forces or an increased border presence by friendly forces.\textsuperscript{6}

**MOE**: A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). They focus on the results or consequences of task execution and provide information that guides decisions to take additional or alternate actions. Examples of measures of effectiveness include reduced insurgent activity, reduced inflation rates, and improvements in agricultural production.\textsuperscript{7}

FM 3-07 also provides an excellent description and example of how indicators are used to assess MOPs and MOEs.

**Indicator**: An indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance. Indicators use available information to inform a specific measure of performance or measure of effectiveness. A single indicator can inform multiple measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Valid indicators are measurable, collectable, and relevant to a specific time. Examples of indicators include bushels of apples sold in a specific market in the past month, number of escalation of force incidents along a given route in the past 90 days, and number of bridges repaired in a province.

**MOP and MOE–Relating the Concepts**

One useful way to think of MOPs and MOEs is to think of them in terms of task and purpose. MOPs relate to accomplishment of the task and MOEs relate to the accomplishment of the purpose. For example, a unit may be given the task and purpose of occupying a hill in order to provide early warning. The task of occupying the hill expertly executed; the accomplishment of this task provides a MOP. If the occupation of the hill does not provide early warning, or doesn’t achieve the intended purpose for the occupation, this is reflected as in a MOE.

Another example is that a unit may be tasked to conduct at least ten patrols a day in a neighborhood in order to gain the confidence of the local populace. Even though the unit might conduct the requisite number of patrols to standard, it still may not result in confidence. From a MOP standpoint, the unit is successful; from an MOE standpoint, it may not be. As a result, MOP could easily be considered more of a quantitative measure, while MOE tends to be a qualitative measure.

The focus for MOP is primarily internal, answering the question “Are we doing what we are told to do?” MOE may have an external focus, answering the question “Do our actions have the effect on others that we are expecting?"

The chart below illustrates a comparison of the concepts of MOP and MOE and how they relate to task and purpose, quantitative vs. qualitative measures, internal vs. external focus, and the primary questions to ask for each measure.

**MOP and MOE–Examples from Operations**

Using MOP and MOE for assessment does not just apply to combat operations. The concepts also easily apply to stability operations and to support to civil authorities. In stability operations, there may be a number of objectives that easily translate into MOP and MOE measures. For example, if a line of effort in a stability operation is the establishment
of the rule of law, there will be a number of tasks that are given to units to support the legal system in a region. The task and purpose for a unit could be stated in such a way: Establish/fund judicial training institutes in order to establish civilian trust in the legitimacy of the judiciary system and to further the establishment of the rule of law that fosters the confidence of the people in the legal and judicial systems.

In this case, the MOP and MOE could be:

**MOPs:** Numbers of judicial training institutes established.

Amount of funding contributed for institutes.

Establishment of accreditation agency for law schools.

**MOEs:** Increase in public trust in the judiciary system.

Increase in confidence in the legal and judicial systems.

Another example from a support to civil authorities mission could be in support of a line of effort for public health and medical services. The task and purpose for a unit could be stated in such a way: Re-establish public health and medical services in order to remove disease threat to save lives, mitigate human suffering and restore critical services and to enable the transfer of DOD relief operations to civil authorities.

In this case, the MOP and MOE could be:

**MOPs:** Number of patients treated.

Number of hospitals operational.

Number of vaccines administered.

**MOEs:** Decrease in disease threat.

Restoration of critical services in the community.

Increased ability of civil authorities to respond.

In both of these cases, the MOPs relate to the task, are primarily quantitative measures, and are focused on the internal actions of the unit. MOEs, on the other hand, relate to the purpose, are primarily qualitative measures, and are focused on the external effects that result from the unit’s actions.

### Conclusion

Understanding how to apply MOPs and MOEs for assessments is a critical task in both planning and during operations. JP 3-0 provides the following summary: **Assessment is a process that measures progress** of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to **determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective**. The assessment process uses **measures of performance** to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and **measures of effectiveness** to measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward achieving objectives.8

Selecting appropriate MOPs and MOEs—relating them to task and purpose—can ensure that actions are focused on the desired end state.

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Introduction
Weapons Intelligence Teams (WITs) have been a critical asset in the War on Terrorism and the counter improvised explosive device (CIED) fight since 2004. WITs are consistently proving their worth as the battlefield commander’s resident technical intelligence expert and force multiplier. These teams are filling a critical gap and providing timely and actionable intelligence to the Warfighter. Their unique skill sets, training, experience, and equipment provide commander’s with the capability to reach out and influence insurgent networks before they strike against U.S. and Coalition forces.

We are training these young men and women to go into harm’s way, to willfully and purposefully expose themselves to the most dangerous weapon of all—an enemy with no regard for human life, an unyielding desire to kill us, and the technical means to succeed at his mission. WITs are helping battlefield commander’s get at their enemies with unprecedented success rates. Prosecutions in tribunals and criminal courts are enjoying much higher conviction rates thanks in part to evidence and material collected and exploited by these teams. We are training and equipping these teams with the singular purpose of defeating this enemy and his weapons “left of the boom,” before he can inflict casualties on us or our Coalition partners.

In this article I will discuss the history, training, mission, composition, and future of Weapons Intelligence and the teams that conduct it.

WIT History. A brief look at the history of these teams provides the background necessary to understand how they work and why they are such a critical component in waging a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. As operations in Iraq transitioned to Phase IV, the tactics employed against Coalition Forces changed dramatically. The IED became the weapon of choice against us and as such “IED” became a common expression. Commanders at every level realized that the IED networks had to be eliminated. The problem was that, at that time, there wasn’t an organization particularly well suited to combat this threat. As a result, a decision was made that a CIED capability must be created and fielded as quickly as possible.

Army leadership at the highest levels took the lead in the fight against the IED by creating the Army IED Task Force (TF) in October 2003. It proved its worth over the following months by reducing the success rates of insurgent IED attacks despite an overall increase in the total number of attacks. In 2004, under the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, the decision was made to transform the entity into a Joint IED TF (JIEDD-TF). In early 2004 JIEDD-TF (now the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)), the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and the Department of the Army (DA) G2 began the process of identifying gaps in intelligence support needed to combat the growing number of insurgent IED networks. The next step was
to assign responsibilities for the execution of training, equipping, and fielding the resulting teams.

INSCOM tasked the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) with developing a workable Concept of Operations to implement a CIED program. NGIC’s mission analysis led to the recommendation of establishing a Counter IED Targeting Program (CITP). The CITP would consist of three basic cooperating, but separate, sections: WITs; a forward fusion cell, and a CONUS based fusion center. The current CITP mission is to increase the collection of technical intelligence (TECHINT) using WITs and to provide forward and rear fusion cells producing actionable intelligence to support the targeting of bomb-makers and their networks.

The first WITs received sixteen days of training at Fort Gordon, Georgia in 2004 and immediately deployed to Iraq. These initial teams enjoyed limited success, but more importantly, succeeded in validating the concept of the WIT. Additionally, the teams were instrumental in getting the word out to battlefield commanders that they now had a valuable asset in the CIED fight. The second WIT rotation (Phase II) was assigned to the 203rd MI Battalion (TECHINT) which deployed to Iraq to assume responsibility for the WIT mission in 2005. Since 2006, WITs have been made up of a combination of personnel from the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy.

In June 2006, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona was designated as the proponent for the WIT training mission and assumed responsibility for the training, development, and integration of weapons technical intelligence (WTI) in the CIED fight. The first formal Weapons Intelligence course was taught at Fort Huachuca in September 2008.

**WIT Training.** WIT training, conducted at the USAIC, consists of fifty-one days of instruction divided between classroom academics, performance-based practical and laboratory exercises, and a comprehensive field training exercise. The course is currently taught three times a year to support deployment requirements. There are two separate tracks within the course. The primary track trains students who will deploy as team members. The secondary track trains students assigned to the analyst cell of the Weapons Intelligence Company (WIC).

All WIT members are trained to the same standard and every prospective team member must demonstrate proficiency in each task before graduating from the course. Individuals are assigned to a team upon arrival at the course and in most cases will train and deploy with that team for the duration of their assignment. Team member training content consists of the following broad categories:

- **Battlefield Forensics:** Material collection and preservation; fingerprint fundamentals and techniques, and forensic photography.
- **Media Exploitation/TECHINT Kit:** Exploitation of captured media and instruction on the use of team equipment.
- **Weapons Intelligence:** Scene exploitation; IED fundamentals; electronics theory; investigation and questioning, and report writing.
- **Operational Support Functions:** Land navigation; explosive systems recognition; combat tracker operations; cultural awareness, and foreign weapons identification.
Training for the analysis cell consists of various intelligence software applications; IED fundamentals; report writing; targeting, and WTI analysis techniques.

The Weapons Intelligence Mission

WITs are small tactical teams that provide WTI support to Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and U.S. Marine Corps regimental combat teams or other similar elements as required. They are an intelligence asset that provides both a collection and an analysis capability at the BCT level. WITs provide battlefield commanders with a dedicated, IED related, tactical intelligence collection and exploitation capability in support of targeting efforts. Commanders may employ WITs at attack sites (post-blast IED, sniper incidents, etc.) or at locations where weapons are discovered (pre-blast IED detected and rendered safe, cache sites, bomb making facilities, etc.) WITs may also be employed in other operations such as supporting a raid or cordon and search by providing in-depth tactical site exploitation on the objective. As the WIT concept matures, it becomes more valuable to the commander. The Weapons Intelligence program was initially focused primarily on the IED threat but has evolved over the years and is no longer limited solely to the CIED fight.

In addition, WIT provides the following support to division and higher CIED intelligence efforts:

- Produce intelligence reports and products.
- Communicate/disseminate intelligence to supported units and higher headquarters.

WIT Composition. The Weapons Intelligence Company (WIC) deploys in support of a Corps or joint task force (JTF) level headquarters. The current WIC Headquarters is placed within TF Troy, supporting the Multi-national Corps-Iraq. It provides planning and coordination support for the Corps or JTF staff and exercises technical control (TECHCON) of WTI capabilities (the WI Detachment and all WITs) supporting the Corps or JTF. The WIC commander advises the Corps/JTF commander on task organization, distribution, and employment of WTI capabilities, supporting him in the area of operations (AO). The WIC also links the Corps/JTF commander and staff to the Theater and National TECHINT enterprise. The company consists of up to fifteen personnel: the WIC commander (0-4); WIC Executive Officer (0-3); WIC NCOIC (E-9); administrative specialist (E-6/7); supply specialist (E-6/7); and eight to ten intelligence analysts (any rank up to E-7). The analysts receive WIT reports and collected materials from the teams. They process the reports, conduct further analysis, and forward intelligence products to higher headquarters for dissemination and targeting as required.

The Weapons Intelligence Detachment (WID) deploys to support a division-level headquarters and normally works directly with the Intelligence staff. The WID advises the commander and staff on task organization, distribution, and employment of WTI capability in the division’s AO. It also provides TECHCON of WITs assigned to the division. A critically important function of the WID is to provide a link for the division’s Intelligence staff into the

Essential tasks and functions include:

- Move tactically.
- Conduct technical collection and exploitation missions.
- Conduct media exploitation (including printed and electronic media.)
- Conduct WTI analysis.
Theater and National level TECHINT enterprise. The WID consists of the Detachment Commander (0-3) and the Detachment NCOIC (E-7).

**WITs** normally consist of five enlisted personnel. Specific military occupational specialties (MOSs) may vary between teams but in general have consisted of a combination of the following:

- The Team Leader is historically a qualified explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician. In addition to being the Team Leader, he or she functions as the liaison between the BCT commander and staff and the WITs higher headquarters. The Team Leader will also coordinate with EOD units that provide support in their local AO.

- The senior and junior analysts are Military Intelligence personnel from the U.S. Army, Air Force, or Navy. Typically the senior analyst is an E-5 or E-6 and the junior analyst any rank below that of the senior analyst. There is no specific Intelligence discipline required in order to be assigned to a team. However, analysts with strong briefing skills and multi-discipline experience are preferred and traditionally do better within the teams.

- A combat cameraman or photographer’s mate brings an in-depth knowledge of shot composition, mid-level photography expertise, and some limited public affairs experience to the team.

- An Army Military Police Investigator, Air Force Office of Special Investigations Agent, or a Navy Master at Arms serves as the team’s law enforcement expert. They understand crime scene investigation, evidence preservation, evidentiary rules and procedures to a greater degree, and can coordinate with other investigative agencies when necessary or beneficial to accomplishing the mission.

- The final team member is the combat arms representative. He contributes to the team by providing expert tactical analysis of incident sites. The combat arms advisor determines how the incident was set up and how the attack was executed from a tactical point of view, records any changes to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and makes recommendations on how to counteract any new enemy TTPs.

In order for the team to accomplish its mission, every member is cross trained in each individual position. Because every team member has a basic knowledge and proficiency in each skill, the Team Leader is able to divide the team up when necessary. Team members are expected to train each other on their unique skill set throughout their tour of duty. Much of this training occurs in the forward operating base between missions. Over the last two years, many of the teams in theater have been required to conduct split operations in order to support units within their BCT that are not co-located. Having an individual team member who can conduct each portion of a successful WIT operation is a definite advantage to the supported unit.

**The Future of Weapons Intelligence**

In the summer of 2008, the Department of Defense announced that Weapons Intelligence would become an enduring capability, with DA as the Service proponent. While it’s clear that having teams with this unique skill set is critical to winning any COIN fight, there are several issues that still have to be worked out.

First, WITs don’t technically exist on any unit’s organizational authorization documents. As a result, scheduling Soldiers for training, and tracking utilization of the Soldiers trained and equipped to perform as a WIT is challenging, to say the least. Plans are underway to create a WIT force structure requirement at the BCT level which would authorize units to train Soldiers to fill those positions. Once this requirement is established, USAIC will be prepared to conduct periodic classes throughout the year to meet the requirement for WIT trained Soldiers.

Over the last two years, requests from deploying units to train their Soldiers have been tremendous.
The value of an organic WIT capability within the BCT has finally caught on. At present, there are typically a few seats in each class that aren’t filled by those deploying to support one of the CIED TFs down-range. Those seats are offered to deploying units, the only cost to units is the TDY for their Soldiers. In the past two years, we have trained teams from the 82nd Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and many others.

Secondly, equipment issued to the teams is not currently in the Army supply system. USAIC is diligently working to identify equipment requirements and establish a TECHINT Kit as a program of record so that units can order it as a major end-item through the standard Army supply system. Additionally, each component of the kit will have its own national stock number so that it can be easily replaced. Over the last year we’ve been working with experts in the fields of forensics, law enforcement, intelligence, and site exploitation (as well as the associated industries) to assemble a better tool kit for the teams. The intent was to make the kits as light and easily transportable as possible while still equipping the teams with the necessary tools for the job. Currently, the price of each kit has dropped by almost fifty percent. Keeping cost low was a huge consideration while designing a kit so that units could afford it without having to sacrifice other needed equipment.

Lastly, the WIT does not have assigned MOSs, and likely will never be assigned them. It does, however, fit the model for an additional skill identifier (ASI). USAIC has begun the process for the creation and award of an ASI to Soldiers trained as WIT members. Having a WIT ASI will allow the Army to recognize Soldiers who have graduated from this unique training, and also allow the Army to assign Soldiers against WIT coded positions in the future based on this ASI. With the ASI approved and WIT authorizations determined for the BCT, it should be a simple process to assign the right Soldier to the right job.

Conclusion

We are excited about the future of the Weapons Intelligence program. Recently completed construction of two specially designed weapons ranges allow us to conduct live explosives demonstrations for training purposes. These ranges add realism to the training and expose students to the realities of IEDs on a practical level. Additionally, we will teach the next course in a newly renovated Weapons Intelligence Compound separated from other USAIC instructional facilities. This new compound will allow us to train all WIT students to a higher standard in a consolidated and secure atmosphere. We’ve spent the last eighteen months updating the training curriculum to ensure it remains relevant to the CIED fight and WTI needs of the Warfighter. The course is ready to train and equip the best WITs in the world. Our staff of instructors are dedicated to this mission and united in providing the most professional, realistic, and relevant training possible.

Major Chris Britt is the Course Manager for the Joint Weapons Intelligence Course. He has served as a Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, Company Commander, Brigade S6, and ISR Operations Officer.
Background

How does an organization acquire the skills needed to develop and conduct training in the high technology environment of today and tomorrow? For some, the answer may be in contracting or hiring from the “millennial” generation. While both approaches have been used successfully at Fort Huachuca, a lesser known program has been providing Department of the Army (DA) civilians these necessary technological and educational skills for the past ten years. That program is the “Educational Technology” plan of study offered by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) in cooperation with the University of Arizona South.

The concept for the program grew from discussions during 1997-1998 between Dr. Gregory M. Kreiger, then Dean of Continuous Learning, and Dr. Glenn L. Kjos, Chief of the Staff and Faculty Development Office at the time. Their concern was that the Intelligence Center needed to keep up with the wave of educational technology and, at the same time, retain the vast experience level of the current work force. The solution they arrived at was to “grow our own.” They decided, with command support, to invest in the technological training and education of those experienced instructors and training developers already in the schoolhouse.

Working with Dr. Phil Callahan of the University of Arizona South, they came up with a three-year program of study known then as the “Master of Arts in Educational Psychology, Educational Technologies Emphasis” (today it is simply the “Educational Technology” program). The curriculum was focused primarily on the needs of the Intelligence Center’s training community, although the program was also open to members of the community.

The Center’s sponsorship of the program got underway in the fall of 1998 when 12 DA civilians began classes during the evening hours at the University’s southern campus in Sierra Vista, Arizona. Sponsorship means that the Intelligence Center pays the students’ tuition fees. Students pay for their books, transportation costs, and incidental expenses. Sponsored students in the program usually take two courses per semester for six semesters, and can, if they stay with it, complete the program in three years. Courses are conducted in the evenings and do not conflict with the normal duty day.

Among the courses taken by the initial students in the program were: Computer Applications in Education; Multimedia Applications in Education; Design of Instructional Technologies; Advanced Design of Instructional Technologies; Introduction to Educational Research; Statistical Methods in Education; Educational Tests and Measurements; Learning Theory in Education; Educational Evaluation, and Theories of Human Development.

Program Focus—A Practitioner’s Approach

The program focused, and still does, on a practitioner’s approach to the design, development, and evaluation of instructional technology for education and industry. The program addresses issues related to learning, instructional design, visual design, multimedia development, evaluation and research.

What is interesting is the fact that of those 12 civilians who started the program in 1998, 10 are still working for the government, and eight of those are still at the Intelligence Center. The other two have retired. The government is still getting a return on its initial investment in the professional development of these instructors and training developers as they apply the technical skills and ed-
ucational foundations developed in the program to their daily work requirements.

At this time, a total of 22 DA civilians have taken advantage of this opportunity to enhance their technological skills and earned a master’s degree in educational technology as a result. Nineteen are still government employees. Currently, there are eight civilians scheduled to continue and/or start the program in January.

When you ask graduates of the program what impact this opportunity has had on them personally or in their job performance, their answers reinforce the original intent of the program.

Mr. Leon Leszczynski, an Education Specialist with the 111th MI Brigade here at Fort Huachuca, notes that the program “provided me an opportunity to ‘retool’ my skills, knowledge, and abilities to those required by the Intelligence Center.” Further, “this program gave me a solid grasp of learning theory and how it relates to instructional system design and, consequently, I am better able to advise and assist brigade training developers and instructors design, develop and implement the training and training products for which they are responsible.”

“I highly recommend this program to anyone who wishes to remain competitive and upwardly mobile at the Intelligence Center. The time and effort invested in the program pale in comparison with the dividends enjoyed as a result of completing it,” he adds.

Similar comments come from Mr. Pete Shaver, Director, MI Foreign Language Training Center, also a graduate of the program. He feels the program provided him “the capability to design, develop and evaluate language education programs” and the “ability to assess their effectiveness.”

Addressing both the personal and professional benefits of the program, Mr. Shaver adds, “thanks to the program, I feel my contribution to the language community and Fort Huachuca linguists has been more effective and beneficial.”

Evolving Curriculum

As is the nature of educational technology, the curriculum is constantly evolving to better meet the technological and educational needs of the Intelligence Center and its DA civilians, and remain relevant. Unlike those first 12 students in the program who received their training in the University’s traditional classrooms and computer labs, the students now in the program receive almost all of their training online.

The change to an all online program is reflective of the direction training is taking, and is a major effort of Dr. Betul C. Ozkan, who currently heads up the Educational Technology Department at the University of Arizona South. Experienced in technology integration, teacher education, distance learning environments, educational technology research, and emerging technologies, she is moving ahead to make the program relevant to the “millennial” generation of students.

And so, while the core courses in instructional design and computer applications in education and training remain, today’s DA civilians in the program are heavily involved in such courses as Application of Technology in Education; Multimedia Applications in Education; Introduction to Interface Design; Designing Online Learning Environments; Educational Change Through Technology, and Emerging Technologies in Education. They are engaged in web based development, authoring tools, basic programming, scripting, streaming audio and video, dynamic content determined by server database values, and many other areas of study.

The program is project based with each course requiring a major development effort by the student. Students are also expected to complete a comprehensive best-works portfolio demonstrating competency within the discipline as a requisite component for program completion.

Conclusion

The curriculum evolves to meet the ever changing wave of educational technology, but the commitment remains the same. After 10 years, the Intelligence Center is still “growing” their own—investing in the technological and educational development of it’s civilian training developers and instructors.

Richard K. Ward is an Instructional Systems Specialist in the Training, Development and Support (TD&S) Directorate, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He serves as the Chief of the Staff & Faculty Development Division (SFDD). Mr. Ward holds an MA in Education Psychology and Technologies from the University of Arizona. He can be contacted at rick.ward1@us.army.mil
Embedded Training: What MI Needs in the Future

by Ramona McCaa

Embedded training (ET) is defined as a function hosted in hardware and/or software, integrated into the overall equipment/system/capability configuration. With ET the soldier receives information from the display on the equipment/system and takes action by making menu selections, pushing buttons, etc. These actions can change the common operating picture (COP) and the information is transmitted to other platforms updating the COP in all the other platforms in a training exercise. As part of the normal fielding of a new system/equipment New Equipment Training (NET) is provided to the system operators and other key personnel.

However NET is usually entry-level training on “knobology”, the type of skills traditionally documented in user manuals, not “battle-focused” training that achieves and sustains proficiency on all possible Soldier, leader, and collective tasks. The ET that is required for the future will support commanders and tactical operations staffs, units, and soldiers to practice and hone critical warfighting skills through direct interactions with their warfighting systems. These systems will incorporate a full spectrum of training support modes as integral components of the system design.

For the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWF) a system-of-systems intelligence training capability with priority to the operational training domain (home station, combat training centers, and deployed); secondarily to the institutional training domain, and lastly to the self-development training domain is needed. This ET stimulation training capability needs to be fielded to the Army to support tactical Military Intelligence (MI) units in brigade combat teams (BCTs) and above. This will enable realistic battle command training through the high fidelity simulation, stimulation, and presentation of Joint and Army intelligence capabilities. It must be designed to stimulate the MI collection systems with scenarios which replicate battlefield situations utilizing an overarching constructive simulation as the driver. This will put the MI Soldier in the training loop using the operational/warfighting equipment and provide the required reports and data to the combat commander and his staff.

This capability, encompassing the latest doctrine and best practices from the operational force, will ensure digital training for intelligence systems and replicate as closely as possible the current and future Intelligence operational environment. The intent is to concentrate on each applicable individual, section and/or team’s role and requirement in the collection, synchronization, integration, production and dissemination of intelligence to support the commander and drive operations. This capability relies on actual processors of intelligence to train cross-queueing of multi-discipline intelligence interactions, forcing the production of intelligence products to achieve the needed training for Commander’s, battle staff and Intelligence system drivers as a cohesive team.

The BCT/Brigade Special Troop Battalion Commanders, MI company commanders and S2s will use this ET stimulation/capability to ensure their organizations and MI soldiers are trained to support Full Spectrum Operations, and sustain the low-density MI MOSs training of perishable skills which support the IWF, as an integral part of operations. This sustainment training capability provides the BCT Commander an accurate evaluation of the IWF capabilities, and accesses the BCT’s IWF training needs; thereby increasing confidence in the ability to execute the warfighting mission. This capability allows the BCT Commander to train IWF as an essential element of Battle Command As a Weapon System on intelligence collection through production, integration, and reporting using the very systems the Soldiers employ. This allows the IWF to train as it would operate and to develop effective Intelligence Soldiers as appropriate combat multipliers. This training capability is not exclusive to the BCT; it also supports training and evaluation of the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade and IEW/ISR system training at all echelons in a similar manner.

Ramona McCaa served as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army with primary experience in the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps. She is currently a contractor with the New Systems and Training Integration Office at Fort Huachuca, Arizona where she serves as the Deputy Operations Group Chief. She may be contacted at (520) 533-2590.
More than 5,300 participants from 50 states and eight countries, including the Philippines, Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom came together for the 20th Annual Bataan Memorial Death March.

Paul Kerchum of Benson, Arizona, a Bataan survivor, who served with B Co, 31st Infantry Battalion, had this to say, “10,000 men died on that hot, dusty road. They were shot, bayoneted, beheaded, or beaten to death for no reason whatsoever, . . . I think of that limerick composed by an anonymous member of the 31st Infantry on Bataan:

We are the battling bastards of Bataan,
No mama, no poppa, no Uncle Sam.
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews or nieces,
No guns, no ammunition, no artillery pieces,
And nobody gives a damn!”

Team Hell Hounds, HHC, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Arizona from left to right: SPC Zachary Taylor, SSG Charles Dybo, SFC David Schreiner, SGT Austin Thomas, and SSG RJ Niesen.

Everyone who participated had their individual reasons for being there, but all came to honor the Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Sailors who sacrificed their lives. Military and civilian, young and old marched, ran and rucked side by side across the rough terrain.
For more than 50 years, black men from around the United States called Fort Huachuca home and became known as Buffalo Soldiers. On April 23, their contributions to the Army and the Southwest were recognized at the dedication ceremony of the Buffalo Soldier Legacy Plaza.

The plaza, located across from the traffic circle in what is known as Old Post, is also the new location for the Buffalo Soldier statue that stood by the main gate for many years. The statue, first dedicated over 30 years ago to mark Fort Huachuca’s 100th anniversary, was moved when Major General Barbara Fast, a former post commander, formalized the idea for the plaza and Legacy Trail. The walking trail begins at the plaza and takes visitors through Old Post stopping at many historical sites such as the Fort Huachuca Museum.

The legacy of the Buffalo Soldier is one dating back to 1866 when Congress passed legislation approving the formation of six Army regiments which included the 9th and 10th Cavalry. The 24th and 25th Infantry were formed separately several years later, and conducted missions around the West. Beginning in 1892, all four of the units were permanently located at the remote Army post in Southeast Arizona and remained there for years to come. Major General John Custer reminded all in attendance that, although many other Army installations claim they are the home of the Buffalo Soldiers, Fort Huachuca is the true home of the black soldiers.

“We should all hold that very dear,” he added. The guest speaker for the dedication was the Honorable Ronald James, the assistant secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). James, also a retired Army Officer, spoke of the long history black Soldiers have made in the military, not only the Buffalo Soldiers, but others dating back to the Civil War. His remarks centered on people such as his great grandfather, Alexander Hogan, who was born into slavery and entered the military later in life. He added that many such as his great grandfather made the ultimate sacrifice for a divided nation not fully appreciative of their service and dedication. James also spoke about how the plaza would be a lasting tribute to all black Soldiers and the steps they made to make a difference in the Armed services.

The dedication concluded with James, Custer, Colonel Melissa Sturgeon (Fort Huachuca garrison commander), Joan Way, representing the Southwest Buffalo Soldier Association, and Ron Eppich of the Old Guard Riders, unveiling the plaque in front of the Buffalo Soldier statue and then raising the red and white Buffalo Soldier Cavalry Guidon.
The 22nd Annual Military Intelligence (MI) Corps Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony was held at Fort Huachuca on 26 June 2008. Including this year’s seven inductees, only 217 MI professionals have been selected for membership into the Hall of Fame. The selection process is deliberate and thorough. Each nomination is judged by a board of active and retired senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and professional MI civilians.

The 2009 inductees are: Major General Robert A. Harding (U.S. Army, Retired); Major General William E. Harmon (U.S. Army, Retired); Brigadier General Roy M. Strom (U.S. Army, Retired); Chief Warrant Officer Five Wallace S. Price (U.S. Army, Retired); Chief Warrant Officer Three Doris I. Allen (U.S. Army, Retired); Command Sergeant Major Odell Williams (U.S. Army, Retired, Deceased); and Command Sergeant Major Ronald D. Wright (U.S. Army, Retired)

**Major General Robert A. Harding, (U.S. Army, Retired)**

Major General Robert A. Harding is a native of New York City (NYC). He was commissioned as a second lieutenant from the Officer Candidate School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in April 1969. From September 1969 to April 1971, then Second Lieutenant Harding conducted Counterintelligence (CI) investigations and operations with the 108th MI Group in NYC. He left New York to command the Inchon and Uijongbu Field Offices in Korea. He concluded his initial assignment for the 501st MI Group in May 1972. Captain Harding then assumed command of Headquarters Company, 1st MI Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In early 1975, Capt Harding was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the Pentagon as the strategic analyst for Korea, where he served until October 1978. Following this assignment, he served first as the S2 of the 1st Battalion, 59th Air Defense Artillery, 8th Mechanized Infantry Division, and then as the S2 for the 1st Brigade, 8th Mechanized Infantry Division. While serving as the Brigade Intelligence Officer, Capt Harding was promoted to the rank of Major. Returning stateside, he was assigned as the Professional Development Officer, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia. Approximately two years later, he would report as a student to the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Upon his graduation in June 1983, Maj Harding assumed the duties as the Executive Officer, Army CI Directorate in the Pentagon. In October 1985, he moved to the
position of Assistant to the Director of the Army Staff, where he served for almost three years, and during which he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

LTC Harding then assumed command of the 524th MI Battalion, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea. Returning from Korea in July 1990, he attended the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. From July 1991 to June 1992, he served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and was promoted to the rank of Colonel. Following his promotion, COL Harding commanded of the 902nd MI Group (CI) at Fort Meade, Maryland, for two years. After leaving this post, he was assigned to the Pentagon as the Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army.

In September 1995, he reported to Quarry Heights, Panama, to serve as the Director of Intelligence (J2) for the U.S. Southern Command, where he was responsible for directing and managing daily collection and reporting activities. He planned and executed intelligence support to military operations, including contingency planning and crisis actions. During his tenure as the J2, COL Harding was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in July 1996. Upon completing his duties in Panama, BG Harding returned to DIA to serve as the Director of Operations from December 1996 to March 2000. While serving as the Director of Operations, he was promoted to Major General in October 1999. MG Harding’s final assignment in uniform was as Deputy G2, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. He concluded his distinguished Army intelligence career of 33 years when he retired in August 2001.

Major General Harding’s awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Army Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (3 OLCs), the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Army Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLCs), and the Army Staff Identification Badge.

Major General William E. Harmon, (U.S. Army, Retired)

Major General William E. Harmon was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry in the summer of 1960 and reported for the Infantry Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, Georgia in August 1960. His first assignment was as an Infantry Platoon Leader with D Company, 2nd Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry at Fort Campbell, Kentucky where he served nearly two years as a Platoon Leader and Company Executive Officer. In 1962 Lieutenant Harmon was detailed from Infantry to Army Intelligence, before MI became an active duty branch. He received training at the Intelligence Research Officer Course, U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland. While there, he transferred to the newly formed active duty Army Intelligence and Security Branch, and remained in MI until his retirement thirty two later.

His first MI field assignment was in 1963 as a CI Officer, 201st MI Detachment, I Corps Group Headquarters, Uijongbu, Korea. In February 1964, he served as the G2 Security and Automation Officer, while assigned to the 11th MI Detachment, 11th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning, during the Army field testing of the air assault concept. Moving to Fort Bragg in December 1964, CPT Harmon assumed the duties as Chief, Current Intelligence Branch, G2, U.S. Army Kennedy Center for Special Warfare. In September 1965, he reported as a Plans Officer, S3, 519th MI Battalion to help plan and ex-
execute the movement of the 525th MI Group to Vietnam. Once in Vietnam he was attached to the 5th Special Forces Group (VN) as the CI Officer for Detachment C-5 (Project Horse). CPT Harmon then returned to Fort Holabird to attend the MI Officer Advanced Course. Following the course he was assigned to the Office of the G2, U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii with duty on the Korea Desk for a brief period; then was reassigned to the Vietnam Desk following the Tet Offensive.

Major Harmon would return to Vietnam and serve on the III Corps Desk, J2, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). In August 1969 he attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College before reporting to London, England to become a Desk Officer studying the Soviet Army on the British Intelligence Staff. After three years in England, MAJ Harmon assumed command of the 203rd MI Detachment, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. Following command, in March 1976 he became the G2, 2nd Armored Division. In May of 1977, Lieutenant Colonel Harmon assumed command of the 522nd MI Battalion (CEWI), 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood. Following battalion command, he attended the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Upon graduating from the War College, Colonel Harmon assumed the duties as the Director, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Division, Intelligence Systems Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army. For one year he would serve in the Pentagon before returning in July 1980 to Fort Bragg to become the XVIII Airborne Corps Deputy G2. In January 1981, COL Harmon assumed command of the 525th MI Group (CEWI), XVIII Airborne Corps. He would command the Group for two and half years. In June of 1983, he became the Director, Intelligence Systems Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army.

In November of 1984 until 1990, Brigadier General Harmon was the Program Manager, Joint Tactical Fusion Program Management Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. His final assignment was as the Program Executive Officer for Command and Control Systems, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. He retired in 1992 after a distinguished career spanning 32 years.

Major General Harmon’s awards and badges include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal (2 OLCs), Meritorious Service Medal (1 OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Master Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab and the Army Staff Identification Medal.

**Brigadier General Roy M. Strom, (U.S. Army, Retired)**

Brigadier General Roy M. Strom was commissioned as a second lieutenant in Artillery in 1954 and reported to Artillery Officer Basic Course at Fort Bliss, Texas. His first assignment would be as a second lieutenant serving as a Platoon Leader, 764th Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 90/120 mm Gun Battalion at Fort Clayton, Panama, Canal Zone. He also commanded the Caribbean Command Honor Guard Company to honor dignitaries during their visits to the Canal Zone. Returning to the U.S., he attended Gunnery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, then the Airborne School at Fort Benning. In November of 1959, Captain Strom reported to Columbus, Ohio where he would assume the duties as an Intelligence
Officer, Columbus Field Office, 109th CI Corps Group. Serving for approximately two and one half years, he departed Ohio in January 1962 and transferred to Korea where he served as the Officer-in-Charge of the Inchon Field Office, 502d MI Battalion from May 1963 to May 1964. His next assignment was at Fort Holabird where CPT Strom would serve the next 19 months as the Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, Intelligence School, Fort Holabird.

In July 1967, Major Strom was assigned as the Intelligence Officer to the Army's Alternate Command Post, Operations Group, Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. After two years in Pennsylvania, MAJ Strom took command of the 519th MI Battalion, 525th MI Group serving in combat operations in Vietnam. In January 1970, he took command of the 4th MI Battalion, 525th MI Group also conducting operations in the Delta region of Vietnam. After concluding his second command, Lieutenant Colonel Strom reported to Munich, Germany, where he took command of his third battalion, the 18th MI Battalion, 66th MI Group. He left command in March 1972 and complete 16 months as the Adjutant of the 66th MI Group in Munich before returning to Washington, D.C. where he would become a CI Officer and Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. LTC Strom served a little over two years in the Pentagon and then became the Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Special Security Group in Washington. Moving over to DIA approximately one year later, he became the Staff Chief, Special Intelligence Operations from June 1977 to June 1978.

In July of that year, Colonel Strom took command of the 500th MI Brigade, INSCOM at Camp Zama, Japan. Two years later, in July 1980, he assumed the duties as the Deputy Commandant and served as the Commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Early in 1982, BG Strom returned to Washington, D.C. to become the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

His final assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), Fort McPherson, Georgia. It was during this tour that he and his staff developed a workable language maintenance program fitting the reserve components, as well as active forces, to keep pace with the requirements of an army facing the need for language facility. In March 1985, he retired from active duty in the U.S. Army after having served honorably for 31 years.

Brigadier Strom's awards and badges include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (3 OLCs), National Defense Medal (1 OLC), Vietnamese Service Medal, Department of Army Staff Badge, U.S. and Vietnamese Parachutist Wings.

Chief Warrant Officer Five Wallace S. Price, (U.S. Army, Retired)

A native of Oregon, Chief Warrant Officer Wally Price began his Army career in 1966 with the Army Security Agency (ASA). He attended Defense Language Institute (DLI) for Czech language training, and following advanced training at Goodfellow, AFB, Texas was assigned to Detachment J, 16th ASA Field Station, Schneeberg, Federal Republic of Germany. From 1967 until 1970, he provided intelligence support for U.S. Army Europe and NATO commands during the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Upon completion of his tour of duty in 1970, he returned to civilian life to attend school, graduating in 1974 from the University of Texas at Austin with a BA in Slavic languages. In 1975 he returned to active duty in the ASA. His initial assignment was as a Technical Language Advisor at DLI, where he worked with native instructors to provide unclassified training in military occupational specialty (MOS) related military and technical terminology. In 1976 he was appointed as a Warrant Officer and returned to Germany, where he served as a watch supervisor overseeing operations at the U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg. While there, he achieved certification by the National Security Agency (NSA) as a Language Analyst and Voice Language Analyst. He became proficient in three languages—Czech, Russian and German, and maintained his proficiency for the remainder of his military career.

CWO Price returned to the DLI Foreign Language Center in December 1980 for advanced language training in Czech, graduating with honors. He remained for a year as a Training Officer in the Slavic Language Group until September 1981. Heading to Fort Devens, Massachusetts from DLI, CWO Price became the Chief Instructor and Officer in Charge of the MOS 98G (Voice Intercept Operator) Task Force. He returned to Germany for a third tour in 1983, serving in several different positions at Field Station Augsburg. While there, he served on the task force responsible for transitioning of the field stations into the 701st MI Brigade. He would serve at Field Station Augsburg until March 1986.

Fort Meade became CWO Price’s home again from April 1986 until December 1991. While there he first was assigned to Operations Group A at NSA, where he served in sensitive technical and leadership positions. Although his title would be Senior Technician and Deputy Branch Chief, NSA, he would serve in a variety of roles. During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, he volunteered to augment the Cryptologic Support Group at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward Headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he served as a team leader directing CSG operations on watch. In 1992, he became the Deputy Chief, Exploitation and Production, Bravo Company, 743rd MI Battalion, Menwith Hill Station, United Kingdom. While serving in England, CW5 Price helped lead the Support Military Operations efforts for Operations Provide Comfort, Northern and Southern Watch in Southwest Asia and for NATO operations in the Balkans.

Chief Warrant Officer Five Price returned to Fort Meade in November 1993, as the Team Chief and the NSA representative to the National Military Command Center, where he assisted in establishing the Cryptologic Support Team, and ultimately the Cryptologic Support Group at the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. Nearly two years later in the spring of 1995, CW5 Price was transferred to the 344th MI Battalion, Goodfellow AFB, where he served as the Officer-in-Charge of the MOS 98G training where he oversaw the design, planning and execution of all Army SIGINT/Electronic Warfare (EW) linguist training.

In 1997 he was assigned as Senior Technical Advisor in the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element to the 704th MI Brigade. While there, and following the 9/11 attacks and onset of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), CW5 Price initiated an international collaborative effort with Commonwealth Allies, helping to create the first U.S./Canadian SIGINT-EW Operations Coordination Center in Afghanistan using the NATO model. Later he worked on the creation of the first NSA Cryptologic Support Teams deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In July of 2003, he served as the Special Assistant for Military Affairs to the SIGINT Director, NSA. CW5 Price retired from the Army after 35 years of distinguished service. After retirement, he began work at INSCOM in the Army Cryptologic Operations office at Fort Meade. He became a driving force in developing the concept for SIGINT Foundry support. He continues today serving as a DA civilian assigned in support of INSCOM as an Intelligence Staff Officer in the Army Cryptologic Office. Currently, he is engaged in planning and coordinating pre-deployment orientation visits to NSA for division, brigade and battalion commanders preparing for OIF and OEF rotations as part of a FORSCOM G2 program.

Chief Warrant Officer Five Price’s awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal (1 OLC), the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (1 OLC), the Joint Services
Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal (1 OLC), the Army Achievement Medal, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Doris I. Allen, (U.S. Army, Retired)

Chief Warrant Officer Three Doris I. “Lucki” Allen, a native of El Paso, Texas, enlisted into the Women’s Army Corp through Jackson, Mississippi in late 1950. She completed basic, then advanced training, as an Entertainment Specialist at the Adjutant General School in 1951 at Fort Lee, Virginia. She spent a few months at the Presidio of San Francisco, California and Fort Lewis, Washington before going overseas. Private First Class Allen served for a year and half as an Entertainment Specialist organizing Soldier shows and as the Editor of the Military Newspaper for the Army Occupation Forces in support of the Korean War in Camp Sendai, Japan.

Upon returning Corporal Allen was assigned as a radio broadcast specialist at Camp Stoneman in California. After the closing of Camp Stoneman, Specialist Five Allen was assigned to Oakland Army Base, California and then attended the Armed Forces Information School at Fort Slocum, New York for the Information Specialist course. In 1956, SP5 Allen returned to Japan and served as a Public Information Officer and Newspaper Editor. After two years in Japan, she returned to the U.S. and served as an Information Specialist. From 1958, she served for five years as an Information Specialist for the Headquarters at Fort Monmouth. After completing French language training at DLI in 1963, SP5 Allen became the first military female trained in a Prisoner of War Interrogation course at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird.

Upon the completion, she was assigned as an interrogator to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command Intelligence Center, Fort Bragg. For the next two years she would serve as the sole strategic intelligence analyst covering Latin America affairs until 1965. While at Fort Bragg, and as one of only 22 persons in the entire Armed Forces to hold that rank, Specialist Seven Allen completed interrogation and intelligence analyst courses where she was the honor graduate in three consecutive courses conducted by the Third U.S. Army Area Intelligence School in 1967.

SP7 Allen would then report to Vietnam and serve as the Senior Intelligence Analyst, Army Operations Center, Headquarters, U.S. Army (USARV) at Long Binh, Vietnam. While in Vietnam she started her second tour and held the position of Supervisor, Security Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans, and Operations, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Vietnam. In the Spring of 1970 she would be appointed as a Warrant Officer. She was then one of only nine female warrant officers in MI and one of only 23 in the entire Army at the time.

WO Allen began her third consecutive tour in Vietnam in March 1970 as the Officer in Charge of the Translation Branch, Combined Document Exploitation Center–MACV, Saigon, Vietnam. Despite not being able to speak Vietnamese, WO Allen supervised approximately 40 South Vietnamese nationals employed in the translation of the large amount of captured enemy documents brought to the center on a daily basis. Her loyalty, diligence, and devotion in all of her assignments in Vietnam earned her the Bronze Star with 2 Oak Leaf clusters.
Returning to the U.S. from Vietnam in September 1970, she would serve as an Instructor for Prisoner of War Interrogations, Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Holabird and moved with the school in 1971 to Fort Huachuca. After completing the CI Transition Course in 1971, WO Allen returned to DLI where she completed the German course.

After a stint with the intelligence unit at the Presidio of San Francisco, Chief Warrant Officer Two Allen was sent overseas. Her follow on assignment was as a Special Agent with the 527th MI Brigade, Federal Republic of Germany. In 1977, CW2 Allen reported to the INSCOM’s CI and Signal Security Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco, where she worked as the Senior CI Agent and Security Manager. While at the Presidio, CW2 Allen would be promoted to Chief Warrant Officer Three in 1978. CW3 Allen retired after a distinguished 30 year career in 1980.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Allen’s awards and decorations include the Bronze Star (2 OLCs), Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Good Conduct Medal (6th award), Army of the Occupation Medal (Japan), National Defense Service Medal (1 OLC), Vietnam Service Medal (10 Campaigns), United Nations Service Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal, the Korean Service Medal, Presidential Unit Citation, Meritorious Unit Commendation, and the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm.

Command Sergeant Major Odell Williams, (U.S. Army, Retired, Deceased)

Command Sergeant Major Odell Williams entered the U.S. military on July 26, 1955 and was first trained as an Aircraft Mechanic, and then later trained and served as a Firefighter in the U.S. Navy Reserves until May 1960. In September 1960, he entered the U.S. Army and attended the Manual Morse Collector’s Course at Fort Devens, graduating in April 1961. That same month, then Specialist Four Williams would report to his first assignment as a Morse Interceptor at Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia where he served until October 1961. In November 1961 he reported to the 5th Radio Research Unit, Bangkok, Thailand serving as a Morse Interceptor for a year and a half. Specialist Five Williams returned to the U.S. in April 1963 where he would complete two more assignments as a Morse Interceptor. The first assignment was to the 303rd ASA Battalion at Fort Carson, Colorado from May 1963 to May 1964, and then at Fort Lewis from June 1964 to June 1965.

In summer of 1965, Staff Sergeant Williams served as Senior Morse Interceptor with Detachment 2, 3rd Radio Research Unit, U.S. Army Pacific and the 11th Radio Research Unit during combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam. The following year, September 1966, he became Senior Morse Instructor at the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, ASA Training Center, Fort Devens, where he served in the position for three years.

In the fall of 1969 Sergeant First Class Williams would transition from duties as instructor to those of leader and supervisor. In September, he reported for duty with A Company, ASA Field Station, Sobe, Okinawa, where he supervised all Morse Intercept operations. Because of his outstanding performance as supervisor, he was selected to become the A Company First Sergeant in April 1971, a position he held with distinction for nearly two years until he was reassigned in 1973. His reassignment brought SFC Williams back to the U.S. for additional training; first at the Cryptology Supervisor Course from April to May 1973, and then to Senior NCO training with C Company, ASA Support Battalion (SB), Fort Devens.
from May to July 1973. Following his training, SFC Williams would serve as a Senior Instructor with the Operations Company, SB, Fort Devens until May 1974. That same month he reported to 2nd Battalion, ASA SB, Fort Devens and for a second time would serve as the First Sergeant of a company (F Company, 2nd Battalion).

Two years later, from April 1976 to March 1977, he was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, ASA Field Station Korea where he served as Mission Management Supervisor and Operations Sergeant. In 1977, Master Sergeant Williams served as First Sergeant for the Operations Company, ASA Field Station Korea. In June 1977, MSG Williams returned to the U.S. where he would serve as First Sergeant for the fourth time with F Company, 2nd Battalion, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens. Having served for two years MSG Williams was selected attended the Army Sergeant Major’s Academy at Fort Bliss. In February 1980, he transferred to Germany to serve as the Operations Sergeant for Field Station Berlin. In June 1981, Command Sergeant Major Williams served as the S3 Sergeant Major, Field Station Berlin. CSM Williams was then assigned to Kunia, Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii in July 1982 where he served for three years as the Command Sergeant Major for the Army component. His leadership and vision ensured that the field station at Kunia would become the premier listening post in the Pacific. Late in 1985, he became the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), U.S. Army Element NSA at Fort Meade. He served as the Command Sergeant Major for NSA/CSS for three years.

CSM Williams was the first ever Command Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Director to the NSA where he led in a multi-service environment. His leadership and intelligence support contributed to the successful diplomacy and the executions of operations in incidences such as the TWA hijacking in Lebanon in June 1985, the rescue of the Achille Lauro in October 1985, and the bombing raid in Libya in April 1986. CSM Williams retired in 1988 after honorably serving 33 years with a distinguished career in Army Intelligence.

Command Sergeant Major Williams’ awards and badges include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (6 OLCs), National Defense Medal (1 OLC), Vietnamese Service Medal, Department of Army Staff Badge, U.S. Parachutist Wings, and the Vietnamese Parachutist Wings. In 2001 he was awarded the National Military Intelligence Association’s Major General John E. Morrison Award for outstanding professionals.

**Command Sergeant Major Ronald D. Wright, (U.S. Army, Retired)**

Command Sergeant Major Ronald D. Wright is a native of Fort Smith, Arkansas. He enlisted in the U.S. Air Force and served from 1971 to 1975 as a parachute rigger. In 1979, after a four year break in military service, he entered the U.S. Army as an Intelligence Analyst. Specialist Wright served as the Senior Intelligence Analyst and as the Assistant NCOIC of the Battle Information Coordination Center, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell. During his assignment at Fort Campbell, SPC Wright was promoted to Sergeant. He would then be assigned to the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Armored Division (Forward) in the Federal Republic of Germany. While in Germany, he exhibited initiative, resourcefulness, and professional competence. Because of these qualities, he was selected by his leadership to compete for NCO
of the Year for U.S. Army, Europe. In 1983, Sergeant Wright’s exemplary past performance and future potential was recognized when he was selected. He was also promoted to Staff Sergeant and inducted into the U.S. Army Europe Sergeant Morales Club.

That same year, SSG Wright returned to the U.S. and served as an instructor for the Intelligence Analyst Course, USAIC and School, Fort Huachuca. He would then move to the NCO Academy as a Senior Instructor from 1984 to 1986, teaching Intelligence Analysis. In 1987, he returned to Germany and served as the First Sergeant for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 56th Field Artillery Command (Pershing Missile). In the fall of 1990, Master Sergeant Wright reported in to the 111th MI Brigade, Fort Huachuca where he became the Operations Sergeant Major responsible for preparing plans, operations, and providing soldier training for the 6,000 officers and enlisted personnel at the Army’s intelligence schoolhouse. After eight months as the Brigade Operations Sergeant Major, MSG Wright became the First Sergeant of C Company, 304th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade. C Company was the only deployable Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) company in the Army. His efforts contributed to the selection of the Hunter as the Army’s next generation UAV. First Sergeant Wright was instrumental in the development of the MOS 96U UAV Operator. He served as a subject matter expert and briefed senior Army leaders worldwide on the UAV program. He also helped draft the ground rules for UAV airspace management, ensuring the safety of other military and commercial air traffic. 1SG Wright was soon thereafter selected and promoted to Command Sergeant Major and attended the Command Sergeant Major’s course.

In 1994 he reported to Fort Hood as the Command Sergeant Major of the 522nd MI Battalion, 2nd Armored Division. A year later, the unit was reflaged as the 104th MI Battalion, 4th Infantry Division. Two years later, CSM Wright returned to Germany in 1996, and became the Command Sergeant Major of the 302nd MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade. He was then selected to become the 205th MI Brigade Command Sergeant Major. Following his successful tour in the Brigade, he was selected to serve as the INSCOM Command Sergeant Major at Fort Belvoir. As the senior enlisted advisor, his leadership was instrumental in positive changes to the command’s architecture, force structure, training and combat development. He brought a unique perspective to the budgetary issues and provided input to the disposition of the command’s budget that totaled over 500 million dollars a year. CSM Wright oversaw the development and execution of the Command’s Strategic Business Plan. At the time INSCOM was responsible for over 12,500 Soldiers and civilians located in 21 countries around the world. As INSCOM CSM, he also represented the Sergeant Major of the Army at various functions and meetings. CSM Ronald Wright retired in 2001 after serving his country honorably for 26 years.

Command Sergeant Major Wright’s awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (4 OLCs), the Army Commendation Medal (3 OLCs), the Army Achievement Medal (1 OLC), the Army Good Conduct Medal (6th award), the Air Force Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service (2nd award), the Vietnam Service Medal, the NCO Professional Development Ribbon (4th award), the Overseas Service Ribbon (4th award), the NATO Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal, the Army Superior Unit Award, the Air Force Parachute Riggers Badge, Air Assault Badge, Master Instructor Badge, and the German Marksmanship Badge. He received the Field Artillery’s Order of Saint Barbara and the MI Knowlton Award. CSM Wright is also an Honorary Member of the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club.

2010 MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

All commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, and civilian intelligence professionals who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position elsewhere within the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. Full nomination procedures can be obtained by contacting the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence, Deputy Director, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (23), 110 Rhea Street, Second Floor, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7080, (520) 533-1190, or timothy.quinn@us.army.mil. The Nomination Board convenes annually at the direction of the Chief of the MI Corps (the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca), usually during September/October. Although nominations are accepted year round, to be considered by the current year Nomination Board, nomination packets must be received not later than 15 September.
Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare is an examination of why the U.S. Military has difficulty conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) despite the increased funding and attention given to special operations and intelligence used in conducting UW operations. The author, Hy Rothstein, is a former career Special Forces officer who currently teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School. He argues that the types of operations that include UW and stability operations are not necessarily best conducted by conventional means although, in Afghanistan for example, a conventional approach is what has been taken. In order to support the author’s perspective, the first one-third of the work is organized into chapters that focus on the historical context of UW. These early chapters describe how special operations have evolved to meet the challenges of these types of missions. This background is both informative and contextually relevant for those professionals who deal with the complexity of UW to include Conventional Troops and Special Operations. The author focuses on Special Forces although Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs are also discussed at length.

Of the many bureaucratic obstacles facing Special Operations are organizational constraints and a failure to develop processes of innovation in the army. Rothstein thus utilizes the remaining two-thirds of his work in a progression that moves from theoretical to practical considerations. First, he focuses on Organizational Theory and how the concept of Contingency Theory could be a more successful model for the organizational structure of the highest levels of military decision making. For example, Rothstein argues that the Department of Defense (DOD) is not organizationally structured to allow for options that fall outside of conventional warfare paradigms. Contingency Theory, however, could potentially guide DOD decision making in a more appropriate direction for the types of future conflicts that will invariably be unconventional by definition and difficult to predict in nature. As the author notes, “Organizational scholars have concluded that Weberian-type bureaucracy found in many large, modern organizations is ineffective in coping with the demands of a dynamic and uncertain environment. Additionally, standardized procedures, a fundamental tenet of bureaucracy, inhibit innovation and the flexibility necessary to effectively operate

Reviewed by First Lieutenant Nathaniel L. Moir
under conditions of uncertainty. Contingency theory is the alternative organizational model for environments where Weberian Bureaucracy falls short.” Further, Rothstein spends a great deal of effort in demonstrating how and why UW must not be diluted by focusing on the attrition end of the spectrum of operations, a fact that is of great importance when conducting stability operations. The Special Forces, it is argued, is being over-used for direct action (DA) operations (due to there being many other assets that can conduct DA) and it needs to be tasked more usefully as practitioners of UW, a niche skill unique to special operations.

When stability operations are considered in the context of the War on Terror, urgency is added as American public support is needed to continue political support for the army’s work in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rothstein supports the view that success in those campaigns must be measured by the confidence of the host nation populace:

“The war on terrorism requires the use of Special Forces teams, and Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, all tasked to do UW. Success in this war will require an emphasis on winning local cooperation. Conventional and DA forces are least likely to elicit this, while UW forces are most likely to.” The dichotomy, as described by Mr. Rothstein, of how conventional and unconventional capabilities conduct stability operations elicits a historical comparison of stability operations with the Gordian knot. How to best metaphorically unknot that classical enigma may be through the type of organizational structure that best utilizes Contingency Theory. However, it may also be the type of organization that is structurally aligned with that theory but still possesses the flexibility to incorporate conventional capabilities and forces. In sum, Mr. Rothstein’s work poses important questions that may guide decision making and organizational structure for conflicts, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, that require UW capabilities.
“Operation Ruthless” by Mark Sommer

By 1940 the greatest threat to the Allies was U-boat attacks on North Atlantic convoys. If the Allies could discover in advance where U-boat packs were assembling, they could direct convoys away from them. Bletchley Park’s code breakers were not breaking German Naval Enigma code. It was essential that current Naval Enigma material for them to work on should be captured from German ships. On 12 September 1940, Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR, Personal Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence, concocted an extraordinary plan to crash-land a captured German plane in the English Channel and overpower the patrol boat crew that came to rescue its “survivors,” thereby gaining access to the much needed code books. Fleming’s proposal, Codename ‘Operation Ruthless’ was as follows:

**TOP SECRET.** For Your Eyes Only, 12 September 1940.
To: Director Naval Intelligence,
From: Ian Fleming

Operation Ruthless

I suggest we obtain the loot by the following means:
1. Obtain from Air Ministry an air-worthy German bomber.
2. Pick a tough crew of five, including a pilot, W/T operator and word-perfect German speaker. Dress them in German Air Force uniform, add blood and bandages to suit.
3. Crash plane in the Channel after making 8:00 S to rescue service.
4. Once aboard rescue boat, shoot German crew, dump overhead, bring rescue boat back to English port.

In order to increase the chances of capturing an R. or M. (Kübelboot – a small minesweeper; Minensuchboot – a large minesweeper) with its richer booty, the crash might be staged in mid-Channel. The Germans would presumably employ one of this type for the longer and more hazardous journey.

N.B. Since attackers will be wearing enemy uniform, they will be liable to be shot as franc-tireurs if captured, and incident might be fruitful field for propaganda. Attackers’ story will therefore be “that it was done for a lark by a group of young hot-heads who thought the war was too tame and wanted to have a go at the Germans. They had stolen plane and equipment and had expected to get into trouble when they got back.” This will prevent suspicions that party was after more valuable booty than a rescue boat.

Fleming added that the pilot should be a ‘tough bachelor able to swim’; and that a German-speaker would also be needed to travel on the bomber. He put his own name forward. Is it coincidental that Commander James Bond, RN, 007, was also tough, a bachelor and an accomplished linguist? ‘Operation Ruthless’ was quickly given the go-ahead. A plane and crew were procured and Fleming travelled down to Dover to put it into practice. However, to the deep frustration of the Bletchley Park’s code breakers, the plan was abandoned due to the lack of suitable German boats operating at night.

Frank Birch, Head of German Naval Section at Bletchley Park, lamented that “Turing and Twinn (both key code breakers at Bletchley Park) came to me like undertakers cheated of a nice corpse ... all in a stew about the cancellation of Operation Ruthless.” It now seemed that only the Naval equivalent of a miracle would enable the code breakers to break into Naval Enigma but the prolific genius of Ian Fleming for writing spy plots had been born.

The Bletchley Park Post Office, in cooperation with their Museum Trust, produces highly collectible philatelic items, and as part of their fundraising functions, produced these stamps and commemorative covers, to honor the birth of James Bond creator/author Ian Fleming, on his one hundredth birthday, January 8, 2008.
When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence (MI) and Intelligence Communities (IC).

Articles about current operations and exercises; TTPs; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take up to a year to publish some articles.
- Although MIPB targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.
- Please note that submissions become property of MIPB and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

What we need from you:

- A release signed by your unit or organization’s information and operations security officer/SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the article and any accompanying graphics and photos are unclassified/FOUO (IAW AR 380-5 DA Information Security Program). A sample security release format can be accessed at our website at https://icon.army.mil.

- A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
- Your article in Word. Do not use special document templates.
- A Public Affairs or any other release your installation or unit/agency may require. Please include that release(s) with your submission.
- Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. Do not embed graphics or photos within the article. Send them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg and note where they should appear in the article. PowerPoint (not in .tif or .jpg format) is acceptable for graphs, etc. Photos should be at 300 dpi.
- The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for MIPB. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to help us ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

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DSN 879.0956.
CG's Reading List

Abraham: A Journey to the Heart of Three Faiths by Bruce Feiler, 2002.
The Arabs by Peter Mansfield, 1992.
From Beirut to Jerusalem by Thomas Friedman, 1990.
The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality by John Esposito, 1999.
Israel’s Lebanon War by Ze’ev Schiff, 1985.
The Multiple Identities of the Middle East by Bernard Lewis, 2001.
A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and Creation of the Modern Middle East by David Fromkin, 2001.
The Tragedy of the Middle East by Barry M. Rubin, 2002.
What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle East Response by Bernard Lewis, 2002.
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan by Lester W. Grau, 1996.
Countering the New Terrorism by Ian O. Lesser, 1999.
Inside Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman, 1998.
The Philippine War 1899-1902 by Brian McAllister Linn, 2002.
Small Wars Manual, USMC, 1940.
Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam by John Esposito, 2002.
NOMINATION INFORMATION FOR THE 2010
CSM DUG RUSSELL AWARD

The annual CSM Doug Russell Award recognizes the outstanding achievements of Soldiers within or on the behalf of the Military Intelligence (MI) Community. Eligibility criteria include:

- Rank of sergeant (E-5) or below.
- In the Active Army, Army Reserve, or National Guard.
- Actions that directly contribute to the MI Corps.
- Must be fully eligible for re-enlistment.
- Does not have to hold an MI MOS.

Anyone may nominate a Soldier for this award. There can be only one nomination from each of the following:

- MI Group, Brigade, Battalion.
- Brigade Troop/Support Battalions within a maneuver division.
- MI Support Elements (G2/Brigade S2/Battalion S2) within a maneuver division.
- DCSINT oriented organizations (EAC units and positions not formally assigned to a specific MI Group/Brigade/Battalion).

Nomination packets must be unclassified. All classified packets are automatically eliminated from the award process. Nomination packets must be submitted in hard copy only (No disk or email). The only exception is the photograph, which must be sent via email to the POCs, in addition to the hardcopy. Packets must contain:

- Cover letter signed by the originator of the nomination.
- Narrative specifically stating the nominee’s key accomplishments and achievements, and the impact on the MI Corps.
- Endorsement letter from the first 0-6 in the chain of command.
- Biography of the nominee.
- 8” X 10” photograph of the nominee in Class A uniform (DA Photograph preferred).
- Copy of the nominee’s Enlisted Record Brief.
- Completed DD Form 2266 Hometown News Release Information (Unsigned).

Waivers for other than an 0-6 endorsement may be requested from the POC below.

Unclassified nomination packets must be sent via Certified Mail to the MI Corps CSM to:

Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Ft. Huachuca
ATTN: CSM Doug Russell Award (ATZS-CSM)
Alvarado Hall 1903 Hatfield Street
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

Nominations must be received by 15 December 2009. Nomination packets will be reviewed from 4 to 8 January 2010 by a board consisting of the MI Corps CSM, Honorary MI Corps CSM, INSCOM CSM, Army DCSINT G2 CSM, and CSM Doug Russell, Retired. The Chief of the MI Corps has final approval of the board results.

The winner will be invited to attend the MI CSM/SGM conference in March 2010 to receive:

- The CSM Doug Russell Award.
- The Knowlton Award (Courtesy of MICA).
- A one year MICA membership (Courtesy of MICA).
- The American Military Society President’s Coin.
- A one year membership in the American Military Society.
- A plaque inscribed with the MI Soldier’s Creed.
- A $150.00 gift certificate from AAFES.

The winner will be announced NLT 22 January 2010.

POC: CSM Wykoff at DSN 821-1145 or 821-1146; Comm (520) 533-1145 or 533-1146 and via email at gerardus.wykoff@conus.army.mil OR SGM Phillip Sharper at DSN 879-1211; Comm (520) 538-1211) and via email at phillip.sharper@conus.army.mil.
Sergeant Jones was born on 19 April 1985 in Boone, Iowa. He graduated from Basic Training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina in June 2003 and went to the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Monterey, California. At that time, he was a Signals Intelligence Soldier, but during the course of his Korean studies, he switched to MOS 35M, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector. After DLI, he came to Fort Huachuca, Arizona to complete his Advanced Individual Training.

His first duty station was Bravo Company, 524th MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade, Republic of Korea. From December 2005 until June 2006, SGT Jones served as a liaison officer in the Waegwan MI Detachment. In 2006, he deployed to Afghanistan in support of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).

While in Afghanistan, SGT Jones served as a Tactical HUMINT Team Leader for fifteen months. He conducted over 40 enemy prisoner of war interrogations at a field detention site and was responsible for maintaining the site, enabling intelligence operations to occur at a remote firebase. The intelligence collected at this location drove successful operations for CJSOTF-A forces. He was awarded the Bronze Star Medal, the Purple Heart, and the Combat Action Badge for his accomplishments and contributions during this deployment.

Upon returning from this deployment, SGT Jones was assigned to the Busan MI Detachment, also a part of the 524th MI Battalion. While assigned to the Busan detachment, he provided language support to the Force Protection mission and was in charge of the Strategic Debriefing mission. From November 2007 until November 2008, he played a major role in the surge operations for Key Resolve and other operations and exercises.

His dedication to the HUMINT mission, the combination of his experience, language, and strategic debriefing credentials make him a major contributor to the 524th MI Battalion’s and the U.S. Army’s tactical and strategic missions.