FROM THE EDITOR

This is a special issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) showcasing the efforts of students in the MI Captains Career Course (MICCC) Seminar Program. These articles offer valuable personal insights derived from ‘boots on the ground’ experience on the application of MI across the spectrum to the current conflict. The program is briefly explained below by the commander of the 304th MI Battalion.

Sterilla A. Smith
Editor

“MICCC Seminar Program–Based on student performance on the Self Assessment Examination, not more than 10% of each class will be offered the opportunity to be in the MICCC Seminar Program. The Program is designed to challenge these students and provide them an opportunity to excel in certain areas based on their personal experience, aptitude, and expertise. MICCC students in the Seminar will complete all requirements at their own pace under the mentorship of a senior officer. All requirements must be completed to the satisfaction of the mentor and the block chief at no slower pace than the rest of the class. The goal of the Seminar Program is to allow students to produce products to be shared with the class in the form of OPDs, publishable works, and deeper analysis in various intelligence fields.”

From the MICCC Student Evaluation Plan

In the summer of 2007, the 304th MI Battalion reoriented its focus to capture intelligence officers’ combat lessons learned by instituting the MICCC Seminar Program. This program is designed to identify and select officers who were successful in combat and have them write about topics they are passionate about using their deployed lessons learned.

The result of that initial decision to form the Seminar Program is not only the enclosed articles, but also a series of officer professional development briefs and products that are spreading these lessons learned throughout the schoolhouse and the Army. MICCC Seminar students are briefing West Point cadets and University of Arizona students on what MI officers do, talking to MI Officer Basic Course students about what to expect while deployed, and producing training plans for officers serving as intelligence soldiers in military transition teams. We send them to participate in Joint training opportunities, pre-deployment exercises, and often ask them to stay and help educate the future generations of MI officers as instructors in the battalion.

Our Seminar students are currently serving as military transition team members, MI company commanders, battalion intelligence officers along with many other areas of service. These officers are the future leaders of the Corps. Their writings represent lessons from the front seasoned by multiple deployments and years of combat experience.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Special Issue

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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc., can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in any other U.S. Army publications.

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**Introduction**

The year 2008 dawns on the Military Intelligence Captains Career Course (MICCC) in transition. Six years of combat deployments is changing the face of the Course as new doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); along with downrange experiences, are filtering into the curriculum. Teaching techniques are moving from basic classroom instruction to more seminar style teaching using practical exercises (PEs) and student input. Additionally, technology is beginning to enter the classrooms as acetate and map boards are being replaced by digital imagery and advanced analytical tools. Even the way we manage students is moving to automated systems that enhance our ability to track officers as they inprocess and move through their training. Amidst this change, one constant remains—the MICCC’s mission is to produce relevant officers who can critically think, adapt, and be effective tactical intelligence combat leaders using proven Army processes.

In days gone by, the MI Officer Advanced Course was attended by officers looking to advance their careers by checking that block while getting some additional training before moving on to the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) and a tactical or strategic next assignment. We taught to the critical task list and were in a classroom more often than not, training doctrine written for Cold War Soldiers. That template worked for the time it was designed for, but with the advent of the War on Terror, leading to multiple combat deployments for most company grade officers, the MICCC must change to meet the needs of today’s Army at War and associated future threats.

Today’s MI captains are being asked to know and do more than at any other time in our Army’s history. They must be specialists and generalists, sometimes functioning at the strategic, operational, and tactical level simultaneously. They are held to a higher standard based on the perceived capabilities to collect intelligence they may or may not have access to. Their contemporaries are leaving the Army in droves. The typical MICCC student now has multiple combat deployments and expects to return downrange as a member of a brigade combat team or military transition team before their next promotion. MICCC students represent a wide spectrum of officers to include pure MI officers, branch detail officers, branch transfer officers, aviators, specialty branch officers (Civil Affairs, Information Operations), and interna-
tional officers from countries across the world in the ranks of first lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. The old CAS curriculum is now included in the MICCC, while distributed learning modules (Captains Career Course Common Core or C5) are being used to complete Army-wide required training for all captains. Demographics of the typical MICCC student are changing dramatically and instruction must keep up with the demand placed on it by our modern intelligence warriors.

**Instructional Tools and Methodologies**

Training year (TY) 2008 is a year of change for the MICCC. Targeting; Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; critical thinking, and intelligence automated tools are being introduced into the curriculum. Programs of instruction are being updated with freshly written doctrine, while lessons learned are used to keep the curriculum relevant. One of the biggest challenges for MICCC instructors is to maintain the balance between field expedient measures taken downrange during current operations and what is actually Army doctrine. Officers with multiple combat tours are exposed to modified decision making and intelligence processes downrange that often work and are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge there is a place for traditional Army process.

MI Corps is charged with producing officers who can use critical thinking tools to analyze and solve difficult tactical intelligence problems. This fits perfectly with current Army doctrinal processes taught such as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) analysis of enemy courses of action; the Military Decision Making Process, along with denial and deception.

Another initiative is the use of a self evaluation instrument during the first week of the course to select officers based on their proven tactical and technical expertise to participate in the MICCC Seminar Program. Ten percent of each class is offered the opportunity to write for publication on a topic they are passionate about based on lessons learned from their recent deployments. This is the first year of the Seminar program, and these students’ efforts are showcased in this special issue of MIPB. We hope to make this a yearly event.

Currently the MICCC has about a 40 to 60 percent classroom instruction to PE ratio. We are moving from the traditional classroom instruction to performance based learning, but more is needed. We teach processes using PEs, but the next level must be the assimilation of this information and application to real world situations that our officers are likely to face in their future jobs as intelligence officers. Two exercises the students enjoy working through during their Counterinsurgency block are Southern Cross and North Star. These exercises challenge students

**Noted author and journalist, Doug Farah, conducts OPD with MICCC class.**

Another dynamic at work is the “blind men and the elephant” paradigm. Each officer experience is different which leads to multiple perspectives on the same intelligence issue. Future instructional techniques are being considered to take these experiences into account. Critical thinking instruction is infused into the curriculum in a variety of ways. While students must still write a battle analysis paper, a new critical thinking assignment requires them to complete a staff study in accordance with current Army doctrine in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.
by simulating the constant barrage of information and analytical problems that they are likely to face while deployed. However, to perform up these exercises, students must still assimilate information from six days of instruction to be fully functional during the exercises. Lessons learned from downrange and TTPs are constantly updated and taught during this block. Again, the challenge is to ensure we capture student experiences while teaching approved Army doctrine.

The future is bright for officers attending the MICCC. TY 2009 promises to be a year of institutional change for the MICCC as new systems and teaching techniques emerge. Students will be able to preregister on the U.S. Army Intelligence Center’s Intelligence Center Online Network portal from anywhere they have access to a computer. This innovative system, also being used by the Noncommissioned Officers Academy, will expedite inprocessing time as well as streamline paperwork such as academic reports. The Distributed Common Ground Station–Army will be incorporated into most MICCC PEs so that students will be training on the actual tools being used by deploying units to help solve the PEs. MICCC students will be more responsible for their own professional development and learning as we incorporate their lessons learned and experiences into the curriculum through a more interactive, challenging instructional process. Using some of retired Major Don Vandergriff’s techniques, we will use directed reading in homework assignments leaving more time in class for problem solving and seminar type discussions combining student techniques with established doctrine. In fact, a typical MICCC day may look like physical training, seminar problem, seminar solution brief, directed solution discussion, individual test, retrain/retest, followed by directed reading for the next day. Even technical classes with detailed information can be taught effectively in this manner. For example, a Signals Intelligence block of instruction would begin with directed readings focused on capabilities and employment. The next day, an instructor would issue a tactical problem that incorporates the reading to a small squad sized group. The group will use the information from that reading and their own experiences to solve the problem and then brief their solution to the instructor. This gives the students and instructor an opportunity to synchronize doctrine and relevant experiences.

The danger associated with this type of instruction is that it places a larger burden on the student for his/her professional development. Understanding doctrine will take time. Applying doctrine combined with experience requires the students to be able to interact effectively within their group and with their instructor. While this may sound easy, the hard part is efficiently evaluating each individual student to ensure they meet the required standards. This is the instructor’s challenge. When does the student need to be retrained and retested? Instead of devolving into a ‘who shot John’ situation, students and instructors must be clear on what is expected of each group and how evaluations will take place. There will be few formal tests in the new MICCC. Test instruments will be situational problems that require the officers to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate the material they were taught in a realistic scenario. This must be the way forward.

**Conclusion**

“One day this war will end” are prophetic words from *Apocalypse Now*, the Vietnam era movie. We are currently focused on the close fight to ensure our officers are successful today. MICCC instruction must be flexible enough to ensure our officers are not only successful today, but also in the battles of tomorrow. We are concerned that with the demand on resources due to the War on Terror, instruction in conventional operations may suffer. This concern leads to the continuing evolution of the course as it focuses on intelligence processes that are applicable to tomorrow’s as well as today’s fight. We must maintain our ability to adapt processes to any condition on the future battlefield. That is the mission of the MICCC in transition.
Introduction

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counterintelligence (CI) are two of the most important capabilities a maneuver commander can leverage when conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the newly created battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB) provides additional CI and HUMINT assets to reinforce the collection efforts of tactical maneuver commanders. Although each brigade combat team (BCT) commander has a robust intelligence staff and organic Military Intelligence (MI) company equipped to plan and execute intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) within the BCT area of operations, BCT commanders have grown to rely heavily on additional CI and HUMINT assets provided by the BfSB in order remain effective in HUMINT-intensive, COIN operations such as OIF. Still in its infancy, the organization and mission of today’s BfSBs look quite different than that of the force designers’ intent, who forecast the maturity of the BfSB at the end of Army transformation in 2032. While the mature BfSB will provide the capability to fill collection gaps and provide much-needed situational awareness to a division commander, the doctrine of the future BfSB is largely inconsistent with the role the current BfSB is fulfilling in support of OIF.

Consisting of primarily two MI battalions, today’s BfSB serves as a force provider for tactical maneuver commanders—a role drastically different than the role force designers proscribe for the mature BfSB of the future. While these concepts have not yet been formalized into doctrine, proactive MI leaders attentive to Modularity’s changes can read the writing on the wall. Because the concepts of 2032 do not support the reality of 2008, MI leaders today are left facing a “doctrine gap.” If left unaddressed, this gap will allow MI leaders to choose which tenets of new or old doctrine to apply and which to ignore, thus stymieing the move towards Modularity and degrading ISR support to the combat Soldiers at the tactical level. Even FMI 3-0.1, The Modular Force does not truly define the application of current BfSB assets for a COIN mission, but rather defines the application of a BfSB that does not yet exist, designed for a mission in which tactical level commanders have sufficient ISR assets and do not rely on reinforcing assets from higher echelons.

This paper provides three key recommendations for MI leaders in the BfSB headquarters and MI battalion to consider in the application of their CI and HUMINT assets which, when applied, will provide the...
best support to the warfighter. First, there is no need for BfSB HUMINT assets to form a Tactical HUMINT Operations Section (THOPS) due to the establishment of the 2X capability at every echelon of CI and HUMINT operations. Second, CI Teams should operate as BfSB force designers suggest, rather than being dismantled and task organized with HUMINT collectors to perform as the Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) of the 1990s. Third, the advent of Modularity brings a paradigm shift within the MI branch from command-centric to staff-centric operations that, when embraced, will focus MI force providers on the importance of their role in training and support, thus improving the overall readiness of MI Soldiers supporting tactical operations.

**Force Design Evolution and the BfSB**

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved steadily to maintain the superiority of our fighting force against new threats and adversaries. The intent of the most recent doctrinal evolution moves the Army from a threat-based force toward a capabilities-based force tailored to defeat a dynamic, asymmetric enemy. Evolutions in force design commonly referred to as Modularity, accompany this move. Because the results of Task Force Modularity are transforming the Army from a division-based force to modular, brigade-based, self-contained units, a shift in our methods for ISR in collection, processing and dissemination is also taking place. Essential changes in the structure of the Army’s intelligence units at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels will produce the changes in ISR methodology that will increase actionable intelligence for commanders at all echelons and enable them to make better decisions more quickly.

The principal change in the intelligence apparatus at the tactical level is the creation of the division BfSB. Established after the elimination of the Force XXI Corps MI Brigade, the BfSB is designed to assist the division G2 in answering the division commander’s critical information requirements and develop situational understanding of unassigned portions of the division area of operations (AO). Upon the completion of transformation in 2032, the BfSB will consist principally of an MI battalion and a reconnaissance

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**Battlefield Surveillance Brigade**

Brigade Redesign (w/ Mod Force Review changes)

- 7 TUAV
- 5 GCS
- 6 Prophet
- 7 CI Tms
- 1 CI OMT
- 44 HUMINT Tms
- 11 HUMINT OMT

Brigade HHC

MI Battalion

R&S Battalion

Network Spt Company

BSC

OPCON/Attached

Base design capable of receiving and employing additional assets based on METT-TC

Figure 1.
and surveillance (R&S) battalion, but has the potential to receive additional collection capabilities as indicated in Figure 1.

Because BCTs subordinate to the division will focus their operations on populated areas and lines of communication, any large portions of the division AO not consistently monitored allow an adaptive enemy to exploit gaps in collection. Doctrine gives the BfSB commander and his staff wide latitude to develop the situation in these unmonitored areas. To support the collection mission of BfSB HUMINT, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and R&S assets, force designers provided the BfSB commander a twenty Soldier intelligence section—a section of roughly equal size to a BCT intelligence section (see Figure 2). When the BfSB conducts collection activities in unmonitored areas, the BfSB S2’s ISR Fusion Cell conducts situation development, prepares combat assessments and provides the BFSB com-

Tactical HUMINT Operations Section (THOPS)

According to the legacy FM 34-7-1, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operation, the THOPS provides the highest level of technical control within the MI Battalion. With little more than
one officer and no staff to manage CI and HUMINT operations, the THOPS performed a necessary function in the mid-1990s Balkans mission when the 2X concept was in its infancy. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) formalized the 2X concept with the development of the G2/S2X Course in 2005 and the 2006 publication of *TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook*. The 2X concept evolved from a one or two-person shop to consist of three components to manage all CI and HUMINT Operations at every echelon: a CI coordinating authority (CICA), a HUMINT operations cell (HOC), and an Operations Support Cell (OSC). While FM 34-7-1 described the presence of a THOPS as METT-TC, TC 2-22.303 calls it “one technique that can be used” to manage CI and HUMINT operations at the corps/Joint task force level, coordinating with the C/J2X for the management of CI and HUMINT assets providing general support (GS) to the C/JTF echelon.

The pundits at USAIC unanimously recognize the THOPS as a ghost of legacy doctrine that continues to haunt present day operations. A USAIC Directorate of Doctrine writer, the author of the S2X Handbook, claims he was “arm twisted” to add the THOPS concept to the TC’s initial draft after a barrage of dissatisfied emails from MI brigade commanders in the field who named the THOPS as a “critical element of the Corps MI Brigade.” A review of the THOPS ensued at the Directorate which produced the following report:

> “During the staffing of draft TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook, three MI Brigade Commanders (205th, 525th and 504th) opined on the fact that the THOPS was missing from the TC, and FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations. The Brigade Commanders voiced their objections to Doctrine, leadership in DCD, and the DA G2 staff regarding this matter. The Commanders recommend the THOPS be included in emerging Doctrine and built into the modular force. Once the Army transitions to a new modular force design, the Corps MI Brigade will eventually go away (replaced by the BfSB) and the new Corps/Division G2 staff will include a very robust 2X section, which will be fully capable of effectively managing all CI and HUMINT assets in the Corps/Division G2’s AOIR.”

The principal reason why doctrine writers remain uncommitted to making the THOPS having a permanent place in CI and HUMINT doctrine is because its purpose is now redundant, little more than a holdover from legacy doctrine. In operations as recent as OIF 06-08, a THOPS “augmented” the C2X’s management of HUMINT Collection Teams (HCT) GS to the Corps, performing the operational management team (OMT) function of report quality control and oversight of the GS HCTs’ collection mission. However, the THOPS was situated at the MI brigade headquarters and was not co-located with either the C2X or the C2X Source Manager. The physical separation of these elements at any echelon is detrimental to the effective management of CI and HUMINT operations; proper management requires constant communication to ensure the synchronization of collection requirements, actual collection, reporting, and source management and vetting. With the THOPS removed from the equation, the MI brigade, rather than the C2X, provided guidance to the THOPS, resulting in the MI brigade’s direction of GS HCT collection and requirements.

At times, the reach of the THOPS extended beyond management of the GS HCT’s and bypassed division and BCT 2Xs to the direct support (DS) teams organic to the force-providing MI brigade/BfSB. The THOPS used the HUMINT reporting system to task DS HCTs—managed by 2Xs and collecting for maneuver commanders—to answer MI battalion requirements or provide reporting statistics to the MI battalion. 2Xs found such requirements redundant to those of their own commanders or irrelevant to their commander’s mission. The THOPS’ superfluous requirements, directed by the MI Brigade/BfSB, confused 2Xs who were trained and capable of managing operations to support their respective maneuver commanders and expected only to receive collection or administrative tasks from their higher 2X element or respective S2/G2. The THOPS’ requirements also bogged down the DS HCTs, who are already troop to task by their 2X or supported unit S2/S3 with the requirements most pertinent to the supported commander.

The Director of the INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support Detachment at Fort Huachuca, and one of the designers of MI organizations in Modularity remarked that the THOPS “. . . does not exist in the organizational designs. MI commanders create a THOPS because they want to control reporting. This gets in
the way of information flow and reporting. We do not need a THOPS because we have built a robust 2X capability. The 2X deconflicts GS team operations and reporting.”

With the publication of TC 2-22.303, FMI 3-0.1 and Army Intelligence Comprehensive Guide to Modularity (AICGM), the intent of doctrine is apparent—the 2X apparatus was designed, created, and is now firmly in place to develop requirements for CI and HUMINT assets, as well as manage operations. It is critical that BfSB commanders at the company, battalion, and brigade level embrace “The Roles of the MI Unit and the 2X” with respect to training, planning and operations, and differentiating between OIF-style operations and future operations where the BfSB commander controls his own assets to support an ISR operations in unassigned areas of a division AO.

To ensure the most effective support to the warfighter, CI and HUMINT forces provided by the BfSB’s MI battalion to any echelon—corps, division or brigade—should be either under operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON) or DS to the gaining unit, enabling the gaining unit to decide how to provide those assets to their subordinate units. OPCON, TACON, and DS command and support relationships better enable the streamlining of requirements and operations under the supported unit 2X. In the past, MI battalion assets supporting the C/JTF in a GS relationship has resulted in the crisscrossing of MI battalion and C2X lines of operational control, resulting in disjointed operations, redundant requirements, and at times, wasted effort. To avoid this, any requirement from the C/JTF to the BfSB for HCTs or OMTs can be fulfilled by providing assets in an OPCON, TACON or DS relationship. In this manner, any assets performing THOPS-like management of Corps-level HCTs can be co-located with and properly subordinate to the C/J2X. If the C/JTF does not require such augmentation, any personnel from the BfSB set aside for a THOPS function can form HCTs or OMTs to support the BCT level, where the demand for HUMINT assets is always highest.

Theater and corps level leaders must realize that tactical maneuver commanders and their S2Xs are critically dependent on HCT and OMT support from the BfSB’s MI battalion. A BCT S2X currently operating in Baghdad remarks, “I’m frankly very disappointed with the whole Corps support piece in general. We’re spread so ridiculously thin in terms of HUMINT that I don’t know how some of our guys can manage. It’s a complete disservice to the warfighter and I personally think they should . . . get them down to the maneuver units where they’re most needed. I suppose if the BfSB was a division asset, then the support would be less conceptual and we’d actually feel their presence, but as it stands now, I can’t say that they’ve been much help to us . . .” Any collection asset a BfSB can provide to support the tactical warfighter is a more appropriate use of HUMINT personnel than assigning them to a THOPS not co-located with the C2X or performing actions redundant to those of the 2X.

The Application of CI Teams

The mission of CI is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit the entire spectrum of hostile intelligence collection efforts. During the Cold War when the threat of Soviet collection was high, the Army made a substantial investment in its CI program, which left the Army HUMINT program to focus on interrogation rather than conducting any kind of source operations. The end of the Cold War and the requirement for HUMINT in the Balkans redirected the Army’s focus. Because Army HUMINT collectors were little more than interrogators in the 1990s, the Army task organized them with CI Soldiers to form the Force Protection Team, a flexible asset which could leverage the strengths of both military occupational specialties (MOSs). Before 1995, the Force Protection Team consisted of three CI Soldiers, trained to conduct CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO), and one HUMINT Soldier trained to conduct interrogation.

After 1995, the Force Protection Team became the Tactical HUMINT Team (THT), consisting of three CI Soldiers and one HUMINT Soldier. According to the legacy FM 34-7-1, this task organization supported both the force protection plan and answering the commander’s intelligence requirements (IR). In 2002, Task Force Modularity implemented the recommendations of an Integrated Concept Team, reversing the ratio between CI and HUMINT capabilities at the tactical level. USAIC responded by redesigning the training program for HUMINT Soldiers to include basic skills in Military Source Operations (MSO) and expand-
ing the training center to produce more HUMINT-trained Soldiers each year. This change signified the end of HUMINT Soldiers’ dependence on CI Soldiers’ skills to conduct source operations. Additionally, CI agents at the strategic level assumed the majority of CI work, leaving CI agents at the tactical level to focus on providing CI oversight in HUMINT MSO and detecting threats in their AO. While the number of CI soldiers authorized at the tactical level is lower, the requirement for CI and the tasks these Soldiers perform remain.

While the task-organized THT model may have operated as doctrine intended in the Balkans mission, it was not so successful in the initial years of OIF. With such a heavy demand for HUMINT, mission requirements turned CI Soldiers away from their purpose of force protection and focused them wholly on answering commander’s IR. Although CI Soldiers received different, CI-specific training than HUMINT Soldiers at USAIC, they performed identical functions in support of OIF. Not only was the Army wasting precious resources in building a capability which was not being utilized, adversarial threats against tactical units in theater went undetected and unreported. MI concept and requirements developers noticed this critical problem and made two important changes. First, CI Soldiers were divorced from THTs and assigned to homogenous CI Teams, designed to perform the vital mission of CFSO in areas designated by the G2/G2X. Second, THTs became HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs), manned homogenously by HUMINT Soldiers with the sole purpose of collecting in support of the commander’s IR.

With the addition of CI Teams and a CI OMT to the Collection and Exploitation company of the BfSB’s MI battalion, the BfSB’s CI teams can perform the following critical tasks in support of tactical operations:

- Investigate events of CI interest to support PIRs and SIRs.
- Investigate the site of the terrorism, SAEDA, force protection, or sabotage event to identify key factors, threat involvement and to protect the force.
- Produce and disseminate force protection information as required/directed.
- Interview prisoners or detainees to obtain CI information and use a linguist if necessary.
- Segregate persons of CI interest to conduct further interviews.
- Assess the reliability of information gathered to maintain the fidelity of the information contributing to the common operating picture.
- Conduct CFSO to augment force protection.
- Determine and assess the enemy HUMINT, Imagery Intelligence, and SIGINT threat capabilities to protect the force and prevent exploitation or surprise from threat elements.
- Conduct product development and CI analysis to facilitate operations.
- Prepare CI reports to keep the commander informed and facilitate planning and targeting.
- Research information obtained and compare it against PIRs, SIRs, and current CI events to ensure that focus on PIR/SIR is being maintained in operations.
- Maintain CI maps and overlays to display current information.
- Conduct mission planning for all types of CI operations to facilitate the commander’s operation orders.

While many of these critical functions are currently the mission of strategic CI assets, CI Soldiers operating at operational and tactical level continue to have this mission and must have the ability to perform these tasks. In the asymmetric fight, both friendly and threat capabilities are not always neatly aligned into tactical, operational, and strategic levels. While strategic CI assets may be better trained and more capable of collecting against hostile intelligence threats, those threats are directed against friendly forces at the tactical level. Strategic CI assets will investigate the threat wherever it presents itself, collecting against it for National level requirements rather than in a way that directly benefits the tactical commander.

Now, more than ever, it is imperative that tactical commanders are provided with functioning CI assets to detect and neutralize the numerous threats to our forces. The 2007 implementation of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Iraq pushed American forces from heavily fortified forward operating bases
into combat outposts (COPs), small strongholds in the middle of urban areas, or to joint security stations (JSSs), shared garrisons with Iraqi military or police forces. Both COPs and JSSs are surrounded by potential insurgents, active or passive supporters of the insurgency—all of which are capable collectors for the enemy. The Cole Commission Report accurately describes today’s force protection threat to U.S. forces in Iraq and other areas worldwide. The report states that operating in a new world environment characterized by unconventional and transnational threats would increase U.S. forces’ exposure to terrorist attacks and require a major effort in force protection and the refocusing of intelligence to fight the War on Terrorism with emphasis on collection and analysis. While U.S. Army Intelligence is extremely successful at targeting terrorist networks and operations, the majority of our collection and analysis is dedicated to pursuing the enemy, rather than understanding how the enemy collects against us and deterring or thwarting preventable attacks.

Although force design has adapted to challenge these threats, BfSB CI assets have been reorganized at the unit level to reflect the THT task organization and pointed in the direction of conducting source operations alongside their HUMINT brethren. While HUMINT provides a wealth of information vital to the lethal targeting of enemy networks in Iraq, recent trends indicate U.S. led kinetic operations may not be so prevalent in the future. Coalition Forces have made great strides regarding the operational autonomy of the Iraqi military and police, as well as with the Reconciliation Movement. With Iraqi organizations becoming more capable of providing their own security, the high frequency of U.S. led targeted strikes will eventually diminish. Consequently, our close partnership with Iraqi organizations will only increase the importance of CI’s role in force protection.

**MI Paradigm Shift from Command-Centric Operations to Staff-Centric Operations**

Of the many advances brought about by Modularity, the two most apparent are the elimination of the divisional MI battalion and the creation of the BfSB. As noted an AUSA article on Army Transformation, “this has driven significant MI growth at the BCT and battalion levels, the establishment of reinforcing MI units... and new intelligence readiness programs ...Intelligence requirements have concurrently driven development and accelerated fielding of advanced, all-source, ‘flat’ network fusion analysis capabilities achieved through Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) workstations and network access down to battalion level.” These advances all point to one major change in MI culture: the paradigm shift from command-centric to staff-centric operations. In a recent meeting with MI captains, the USAIC Chief of Staff stated, “Times are changing. In the future, there will be more emphasis on building a professional intelligence officer, not a commander.” USAIC recognizes the shift in capabilities and operational decision making during combat operations away from MI commanders and towards G2/S2s. “It will be difficult for MI to break away from the command track,” he admitted, “but the 2 drives operations” to develop targets for effects-based operations.

The commander of USAIC’s HUMINT training battalion agrees. “We are a command-centric organization, however we are slow to adapt to the growing lack of command opportunities in MI.” For those officers fortunate enough to command MI Soldiers in the Modular force, the MI commander’s role is to “train, equip, prepare, deploy and provide” MI assets to support maneuver commanders. In today’s asymmetric fight, the tactical warfighter relies heavily on the capabilities provided by CI and HUMINT; therefore, the role of the MI commander in ensuring Soldier readiness prior to the deployment is critical. MI commanders in all formations must embrace this important responsibility, rather than focusing on planning for the operational management or collection requirements of assets that will be provided in OPCON, TACON or DS to maneuver commanders. As reinforced in the aforementioned sections of this paper, the CI and HUMINT assets belonging to MI commanders are operationally managed by the 2X. As a staff officer, however, the 2X is not directly responsible for the training, equipping, and preparation of CI and HUMINT Soldiers.

In an effort to meet the needs identified in the field, USAIC is making great strides in both CI and HUMINT programs for enlisted Soldiers, NCOs, warrant and commissioned officers alike; however, much of the re-
sponsibility for continued training is left to MI commanders. As stated in the AICGM: “All intelligence Soldiers are trained on baseline MOS and Soldier skills necessary to perform in their career field during entry-level training. Those individual skills only begin the life-cycle of that Soldier. The more advanced skills and techniques are a unit responsibility.” Still, several S2s and maneuver commanders continue to identify serious inadequacies with entry-level MOS 35M HUMINT collectors. A former S2 of 2-5 Cavalry and MI company commander recognizes that “many of these 10-level initial entry soldiers are not the appropriate personnel to satisfy unit needs due to their lack of life experience (recent high school graduates), lack of tactical experience (deployed within one year of being assigned to their first maneuver unit), limited interpersonal skills (inability to establish rapport with others), and youth (a cultural constraint).”

While MI commanders cannot control the age of their Soldiers, they can affect their skill progression in other areas by establishing a rigorous training program based not only on their MOS skills, but on the tactical and analytical skills a well-rounded collector requires to be seen as an asset rather than a liability to their supported maneuver unit. Even the concepts behind force design evolution emphasize this important requirement: “In the current operating environment with a 360° operational environment and asymmetric threats, it is imperative that the MI Corps embrace the CSA’s warrior ethos that ‘Every Soldier is a Soldier first.’ The intensity of this environment will increase both physical and psychological stress and demands increased individual competent judgment and decision making down to individual Soldier levels. MI Soldiers must be exposed to replications of these stresses in extremely high resolution training and education on a recurring basis.” It is not enough for MI commanders to plan training in a vacuum, developing training exercises that lack the authenticity of operating with an infantry patrol, conducting tactical interrogation in a high-stress situation, or a having to interact with battalion staff officers as to how his or her team’s collection task, purpose, method and endstate can specifically augment a planned operation. A captain in the 525th BfSB observed that “the [pre-deployment] training the BfSB does is not adequate. We don’t train with the BCTs at the [combat training centers]; instead, we hired a contractor to make up a scenario and then had our HCTs go through source meets at our MOUT site at Bragg . . . very few of the BfSB’s HCTs had any recent experience working with a maneuver unit and, as a result, some had difficulty understanding the needs of an Infantry battalion or company.”

As training must be the primary focus of the MI commander before the deployment, providing administrative and logistical support must be the focus during the deployment. Chapter One of TC 2-22.303 emphasizes the “team effort and shared operational responsibilities” of the MI commander and 2X. Effective communication and expectation management between these two entities is critical; when 2Xs and MI commanders fail to communicate or have different expectations of their roles and responsibilities—or different interpretations of the command and support relationships—CI and HUMINT Soldiers suffer the consequences.

FM 2-22.3’s table of Army Command and Support Relationships clearly indicates that in OPCON, TACON and DS situations the parent unit provides combat service support to the provided asset. For provided CI and HUMINT assets, this includes anything from computers, tactical equipment, vehicles, vehicle maintenance, mail and administrative support such as awards, NCOERs, and UCMJ action. It does not include providing collection requirements, intelligence analysis, source vetting or support to targeting. As collection priorities are established by the supported or gaining unit, so will the supported or gaining unit’s 2X, Fusion Cell (Analysis Control Element or Team) and Targeting Cell provide any and all operational guidance and analytical support to CI and HUMINT operations. Any redundant actions by the parent unit, often headquartered apart from the supported or gaining unit’s AO and possessing far less situational awareness, provide less accurate or irrelevant information to the OPCON, TACON or DS collectors. This confuses the provided CI and HUMINT Soldiers and distracts them from the operational guidance of the 2X. While the provision of logistical and administrative support may not seem a glamorous responsibility in comparison to targeting, collection planning, or directing collection efforts of CI and HUMINT assets, it is just as important.
When MI commanders focus on the operational aspects of the CI and HUMINT assets during a deployment rather than their logistical and administrative responsibilities, Soldiers suffer. For example, MI battalions recently deployed to OIF spent more effort on conducting redundant analysis, removing Soldiers from the supported/gaining unit mission to attend extraneous targeting meetings, or tallying report statistics—emphasizing quantity of reporting rather than the quality of the reporting to the supported/gaining unit. As a result of these misplaced priorities, there were delays in Soldiers’ mail and vehicle maintenance, insensible R&R leave schedules, and the redeployment of Soldiers without awards for their combat service.

Modularity introduces new systems and organization that enhance the ISR capabilities of maneuver units. These changes reflect the increasing dependence of maneuver commanders on the innovation, ability, and skill MI staff officers to plan and direct complex and challenging collection operations to support maneuver and targeting. While troop-providing MI commanders supporting operations like OIF are not directly called upon to plan or direct collection efforts, the vitality of their role in ensuring MI Soldier readiness prior to the deployment and supporting MI Soldier readiness during the deployment cannot be understated.

Conclusion

“Army Intelligence transformation begins with changing the behavior and expectations of both the MI leaders who produce intelligence and the combat arms consumers of intelligence.”31 This astute remark, presented at the close of the AICGM, rings especially true for any MI leaders providing CI and HUMINT assets or managing their operations. Achieving success at this critical juncture in intelligence transformation calls for MI leaders seek out and digest doctrine, understand its intent as applied to the Modular force, yet have the ability to apply it to current operations. “For MI leaders too this means moving from the current requirements orientation to an anticipatory approach to intelligence production. Instead of waiting for the question to be asked, intelligence producers must anticipate the next requirement and provide assessments/answers to relevant operational questions before they are asked.”32 In the absence of an intermediate doctrine that incorporates recent structural modifications with current mission requirements, MI leaders must heed the lessons learned identified in this paper while anticipating new challenges brought about by an ever-adapting enemy. Now is the time to eschew the bad habits of recently deployed MI brigades, exorcise the ghosts of legacy doctrine that haunt our planning and training, and gain a clear understanding of the direction in which MI is moving while realizing there are still a few years between now and 2032.

Endnotes


2. AICGM, 175.

3. Task Force Modularity Presentation, slide 35.

4. TF Modularity Presentation, slide 32. The 20 Soldier BfSB S2 section is roughly equal to the BCT S2 section when including the BCT MI company Analysis and Integration platoon’s analysts.

5. AICGM, 183. The purpose of the HUMINT Section has yet to be identified.

6. FM 34-7-1, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, USAIC, April 2002, 7-21 and 7-22.


8. Ibid, 5-1.


11. THOPS After Action Review. Provided by the CI and HUMINT Team, Concepts and Development Integration, USAIC. Personal interview, 5 March 2008.


15. Page 34-35 of the Operational and Organizational Concept for the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB) Version 3.04.5 explains that the MI BNs “. . . C&E company receives mission orders from the MI battalion that focus the collection of its HUMINT and CI OMTs and collection teams to support the BFSB mission” while the CI and HUMINT company’s assets reinforce BCTs. I posit that in missions like OIF where the intelligence requirements are driven from the lowest (tactical) echelon, all available CI and HUMINT assets should reinforce tactical collection efforts.

16. “The Application of CI Teams” portion of this paper was written after close collaboration with CW2 Marc Losito, CI OMT Chief, 504th BfSB.

17. FM 34-7-1, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, 7-6.


19. While this change has been completed within the BfSB’s MI Battalion, it is still in progress for the BCT MICO.

20. AICGM, 231.

21. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, HQ, Department of the Army, December 2006.


24. Chief of Staff, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Officer Professional Development with MI Captains Career Course Class 08-002, 28 March 2008.


26. AICGM, 602.


28. AICGM, 600.


31. AICGM, 599-600.

32. Ibid.
The Battle for Saydia:

An Ongoing Case Study in Militia Based Insurgency

by Captain Michael Comstock

Introduction

Shi’a militias fought for, and in many cases, won significant territory in Baghdad’s southwestern districts of West Rasheed by seizing neighborhoods of mixed sectarian composition, cleansing them of “undesirables,” consolidating their gains to fund future expansion, and utilizing explosively formed penetrators (EFP) to target U.S. forces. Being able to effectively identify this type of activity before it has progressed too far is essential. In these contested areas, the primary militia in question is the notorious Jaesh al’Mahdi (JAM), a Shi’a paramilitary organization affiliated with the junior cleric Moqtada al’Sadr. There are, however, several other militias operating in Baghdad; two noteworthy examples are the Shi’a Badr Corps and the Sunni dominated Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Over the course of Iraq’s regime change transformation since 2003, Shi’a militias have been continuously working to capture the prize of Iraq: control of Baghdad.

This paper seeks to focus on a handful of West Rasheed’s districts creating a microcosm case study that emphasizes how a militia operates in an insurgency. Through the benefit of hindsight, extensive open source reporting and a variety of personal experiences, these militia activities will be highlighted and examined. The resulting militia tactics, techniques, and procedures, (TTPs) once identified and removed from the clutter of a complex insurgent environment, will assist future combat leaders and intelligence officers to better identify and then defeat a militia throughout its development. The case study focuses specifically on Saydia and its neighbors to the north, Jihad, al’Amel and Baya’a.

The TTPs identified indicate the following actions will occur in a rough chronological order. First, militias first undermine basic services, conduct terrorism and utilize extensive inflammatory propaganda to drive away the unwanted demographic. Secondly, the militia will facilitate the repopulation of the contested area with a demographic sympathetic to its goals. This “desired” population will enjoy a restoration of basic services, for a fee, to finance future operations. Meanwhile, the militia will utilize a deadly weapon system in an attempt to limit U.S. combat power and demonstrate military potency to the local population. Thirdly, the militia will infiltrate any local national security force to facilitate and legitimize their actions. Finally, throughout the duration of these activities the militia will offer or impose its own brand of physical security on its base of support. Additionally, we will see how events far from the battalion’s traditional area of inter-
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est (AI) affect the fight. As this case study shows, activity occurs in fits and spurts and can easily be lost in the ‘noise’ of insurgent warfare, especially as the events progress over a long timeline, making their early recognition all the more important. When dealing with these difficult issues, consider General Petraeus’ statement to U.S. troops upon assuming command in early 2007: “Hard is not impossible.”

When approaching a complex problem so closely related to insurgency, a prudent first approach utilizes the framework provided in the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, where a simple definition is stated: “an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.” Within this broad definition there are five essential approaches that an insurgent group will likely adopt; the Conspiratorial, Military Focused, Urban, Protracted Popular War, and Identity focused.

Throughout the manual, however, little mention is made of militias and their specific modus operandi. The student of insurgency warfare is left to extrapolate from the broader insurgent approaches what evidence can be observed throughout the duration of combat operations. Using this method a clear picture of JAM comes into focus as a composite of the Protracted Popular War, Urban and Identity Focused approaches. Conspiratorial and Military Focused approaches to insurgent warfare do not suit militias. This overlapping of approaches gives JAM a significantly different flavor than AQI’s more Conspiratorial and Urban approach, or the other purely Islamist insurgent movements. This distinction is essential to effectively combat and defeat this type of insurgency, leaders and intelligence officers must learn to ‘taste’ the difference in order to discover which groups are operating within their respective areas of operation. This ability to differentiate various combatant groups is very difficult when confronted with a multitude of insurgent flavors in one area, especially one as complex as the following Baghdad neighborhoods.

Saydiya Neighborhood Demographics

Sandwiched between Baghdad International Airport to the west and the governmental district now known as the Green Zone to the northeast, are the neighborhoods of Jihad, al’Amel, Baya’a, and Saydia. These neighborhoods housed most of Saddam’s party functionaries, generals, and other Ba’ath party apparatchiks prior to the 2003 regime change. The population is estimated to be roughly one fifth of Baghdad with around 800,000 inhabitants. These neighborhoods were wealthy, affluent, and predominantly Sunni in sectarian makeup, although Saydia was importantly a mixed neighborhood. In addition to Saddam’s most loyal followers, Saydia housed many successful Iraqi entrepreneurs, academics, and military officers during the Ba’ath regimes tenure. Perhaps due to Saddam’s secularized tyranny, “demographic distribution [was] more dependent on economic status or profession than on religion and ethnicity. This is particularly true of neighborhoods built after 1958 to house members of specific professions, such as teachers, army officers, and others.”

Saydia, with its affluent inhabitants, was one of Baghdad’s mixing pots. Throughout the streets many houses incorporated the eight-pointed star, a symbol of the Ba’ath party, and as late as the summer of 2006, retired generals and academics could be found daily during combat patrols. In fact, the name Saydia has an important meaning in Arabic—‘loyalty.’ The neighborhood was constructed as a reward for Ba’ath party members that Saddam wished to keep close and in comfortable housing to discourage any need for dissent. Although a mixed neighborhood, most of the nice and imposing mosques are conspicuously Sunni. Following the 2003 regime change, many of these Ba’ath party members, regime participants, and military personnel fled the area and although exact numbers are not available, the quantity of large empty houses and the growing squatter communities attests to this population displacement. In Saydia, however, displacement was not extreme in the years of 2003 and 2004. The same cannot be said for the neighborhoods of Jihad, al’Amel and Baya’a.

An important aspect of this development was that formerly “disenfranchised Shi’a began migrating to the area and Sunnis began to leave.” Under Saddam’s regime, and indeed, throughout most of modern Iraqi history Sunni Iraqis considered practitioners of the Shi’a sect of Islam to be a fifth column, a group of
traitors who were beholden to the Persian influence of Iran. Despite the fact that Shi’a compose the largest group in Iraq, it was not until the 2003 invasion that they had any significant influence on the reins of power in Iraq. Their great collective moment of opportunity arrived, and the Shi’a seized the moment to begin affiliating themselves with the former regime’s trappings of power and influence. In the early post regime change years, the transfer of political power was not completely violent. Sectarian tensions lay beneath the surface of society as a dangerous kindling awaiting a spark amidst the broader insurgency in Iraq. Most Sunnis simply left, and the Shi’a quickly occupied their new housing. Squatter housing sprung up in empty fields and within half completed construction projects. A house, built from empty tin oil cans housing a family of seven with a small herd of goats, became common in 2006. “Many of the Sunnis we encountered in the area complained of the squatters and the Shi’a moving into the area.”

Events Igniting Sectarian Violence

Amidst this backdrop of demographic shifting, two principal events radicalized the situation and ignited the flames of sectarian war: Moqtada al’Sadr’s formation of the JAM with its 2004 insurrections and Zarqawi’s vicious anti-Shi’a attacks, particularly the March bombing of the al’Askari Mosque in Samarra.

In spring and summer of 2004, Sadr’s JAM forces instigated violent attacks against Coalition Forces (CF) in a misguided attempt to fast forward through many phases of insurgency and arrive directly at a large scale uprising that would seize political power from Iraq’s interim government and force a withdrawal of CF from Iraq. Considered as a whole, U.S. forces militarily crushed the roughly ten week rebellion and JAM’s early prototype, but left Sadr and some battle hardened survivors to create a new incarnation of the militia. Sadr utilized the street credibility his rebellion created to enter into Iraq’s political process, making him arguably the most influential Shi’ite leader after the revered cleric Ayatollah Ali al’Sistani. This newly formed JAM integrated key elements of urban insurgent warfare; particularly the infiltration of Iraq’s newly forming security forces and government institutions. The Iraqi National Police (INP), in one extreme example was almost entirely composed of Shi’a recruits, many of whom had formerly affiliated themselves with Sadr’s movement. JAM also moved to fill key ministries of the new government, notably the Ministries of Interior and Health.

These actions could reflect an awareness of another successful Shi’a militia, the Hezbollah movement of Lebanon, or it may have been a natural development in power accumulation. In any case, the Shi’a, under JAM auspices, quickly moved to control who was policed and who conducted the policing, as well as who received health care from the government. While this occurred, the Sunni population, stunned and shocked by their swift reversal of fortune, formed a host of insurgent movements and mostly boycotted the initial formation of Iraq’s government and security forces which exacerbated their lack of representation within the government security forces. Zarqawi’s infamous contribution to the Iraq War was his deliberate inciting of sectarian hatred. With the al’Askari Mosque bombing, the sectarian conflict erupted from Iraq’s subconscious prejudices and grudges out into the field of combat.

The Shi’a militias of West Rasheed were well prepared to exploit these developments and “began attacks against Sunni targets, [while] the Sunnis retaliated and events led to the quick escalation of a neighborhood civil war.” In the neighborhoods of Jihad and al’Amel, this progressed quickly as the Shi’a militias “initially attacked Sunni mosques and then started killing people and dumping their bodies on the street.” What was occurring in these formerly Sunni neighborhoods was a series of mini-Samarra attacks at a very local and personal level. Sunni insurgent groups responded in kind by utilizing large catastrophic bomb attacks, typically in a market or Shi’a mosque; JAM in turn using small arms fire and what has become known as Extra Judicial Killings (EJK) to drive the Sunni residents away. Any individual living in this environment essentially made the choice to affiliate with its respective sectarian insurgent group—a Shi’a militia or a Sunni terror cell. In Saydia of 2005, many residents chose to leave not only the neighborhood but the entire country following kidnapings and death threats, creating new openings for the Shi’a
militants. Generally speaking, “the Shi’ite militias were on the offensive and the Sunnis were reacting to their actions.”

**Effects of Shi’a Militia Expansion**

Jihad and al’Amel fell quickly to the Shi’a resurgence. This was partly due to their operationally sound tactic of locating an ‘Office of the Martyr Sadr Political Office’ (OMS) in southern al’Amel. Saydia was buffered from the OMS’s direct influence by physical distance—militias contended for Baya’a, providing a separation—and its historically mixed composition. Despite these factors, Shi’a militias were already moving toward expanding their influence into Saydia.

For example, near the boundary road between Baya’a and Saydia, Sunnis vacated a mosque that was in turn occupied by a Shi’a sect affiliated with the Badr Corps, the armed wing of a Shi’a political movement known as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The mosque was renamed Mhaba, the word for ‘love’, and its initial Shi’a Imam was killed sometime following its conversion. SCIRI is well known for operating in Iran during Saddam’s regime and is viewed as an Iranian proxy by both CF and Iraqis themselves. In a vivid example of the militia infiltration of the INPs, the Huseniyah located near the Mhaba mosque had both a Badr Corps political office and an INP security station incorporated into the building. This showed that although JAM certainly seized the moment, other Shi’a militia movements were also contending for political power in Baghdad. Additionally, in central eastern Saydia, Shi’a construction of a new Huseniyah was ongoing less than 20 meters from a large Sunni mosque in the summer of 2006. Shortly after the initial construction began a car bomb detonated destroying one of the initial walls in early 2006. In May, a car bomb killed one INP company commander suspected of Shi’a militia activity with the Badr Corps before U.S. forces could detain him. Apparently the Sunni insurgent groups were fighting back against the encroachment of the Shi’a. Simply put, “the driving force for violence when we were there were the Shi’a militias with their direct ties to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Sunni insurgents fighting back at the Shi’a campaign to take over all of Baghdad.”

Another example of Shi’a expansion came in the form of EFP strikes on Coalition patrols. Most consider these strikes a hallmark of Shi’a militia activity due to the attacks’ proximity to Shi’a neighborhoods and the locations of cache finds in Shi’a cities, such as Basra. As one battalion commander in the area from 2005 and 2006 stated, “I did notice a movement north of EFPs in Saydia proper which might have indicated a concomitant shift northward of Shi’a influence in terms of taking over parts of neighborhoods that were previously Sunni.” Within Saydia during early summer 2006, EFPs were a rare occurrence and the primary threat to the CF came from Sunni groups utilizing simple military munitions and an occasional shape charge improvised explosive device (IED).

Saydia’s relatively benign situation soon began to end. During “July, after the seating of the Maliki Government and the rise in power of the OMS/JAM in securing the Prime Minister’s seat [that] JAM began to remove Badr-loyal officers from the Ministry of the Interior and the number of murdered bodies began to increase significantly.” North, in the neighborhood of Baya’a, many Sunni mosques and businesses continued to receive threats from the encroaching militias, increasingly JAM rather than Badr Corps, reflecting the outcome of the internal Shi’a struggle for power.

**Subversion of the INP**

Menacingly, this militia intimidation began to show increasingly close ties to the local INP force as “ISF intentionally set up checkpoints near Sunni mosques, it seemed. Most likely to recon or to set the stage for future attacks. All Sunni mosques [at some point during the summer of 2006] came under attack by small arms fire, IED and rocket propelled grenade. . . in one case, we believed, evidence showed that the INP battalion commander himself was involved.”

While conducting joint patrols with INP units in Baya’a, I witnessed the phenomenon of the Shi’a dominated INPs only very reluctantly visiting Sunni mosques in the presence of U.S. forces—the Sunni Imams meanwhile, never said anything positive about the INP patrols unless U.S. forces were present. When at-
tempting to facilitate a meeting between the Sunni Imam of the Baya’a mosque and the Shi’a INP patrol leader, the assistant Imam had this to say: “Our Imam was killed three weeks ago,. . . The people around here are afraid to come here to pray on Fridays,. . . We would like to cooperate, but sometimes those people come to attack us, and we want to defend the mosque. Inside the mosque is our border. If they cross this line, we will shoot these guys.” During numerous patrols in the summer of 2006 many Sunni residents of Baya’a and Saydia stated that they did not pray at Sunni Mosques, due to fear of militia reprisals.

In another example of suspect Iraqi Police (IP) activity, one frantic Sunni woman chased me down begging for help. IPs apprehended her brother, Omar, and she feared he faced execution. After tactically questioning the involved IPs, and their hapless prisoner, the full convoluted story unraveled in this fashion: Omar’s business was located about two minutes walking distance from a permanent INP checkpoint along the main road dividing al’Amel and Baya’a. Omar claimed Shi’a security forces attacked him late at night when they were off duty from the nearby checkpoint. He fought them off with a pistol, his friend escaped, and IPs in uniform finally arrived from the checkpoint to arrest Omar. The IPs claimed Omar was a Sunni insurgent and had his name on a list of undetermined origin. What disturbed me was the prisoner’s hand, which was cleanly shot through the palm, reportedly during the struggle. During the questioning, conducted separately from the IP guards, he claimed all IPs and INPs were Iranian agents bent on destroying Iraq and he was sworn to destroy them.

Additionally, many Sunni residents of these areas feared revealing their names to soldiers at the Shi’a dominated security checkpoints throughout the city. In Islamic tradition many names are taken from Islamic saints, and often these names follow sectarian lines. Omar, for instance, is considered Sunni while Ali is considered Shi’a. Typically the naming convention stems from the initial split between Sunni and Shi’a early in Muslim history. Militiamen within the Shi’a dominated security forces now exploited this tradition to further terrify the Sunni residents.

The real value of these anecdotes lies in their indicative value of competing militias’ effect on society. When viewed collectively they show at the very least the menace of the militia’s influence in tearing down the social fabric between Sunni and Shi’a inhabitants of the neighborhoods. JAM aimed to terrorize the Sunni populace and clear them from the mixed neighborhoods, and their techniques became increasingly gruesome as 2006 transitioned from summer to autumn.

During Israel’s summer war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, several Shi’a mosques in al’Amel and the Office of Moqtada Sadr brazenly displayed the yellow and green flag of Hezbollah in a sign of sectarian solidarity. This emphasized the symbolic and literal similarities between the two militias: EFPs encountered first in Lebanon sporadically prior to the Iraq War became much more common in 2006; both militias attempt to gain control of local resources and services; and Sadr announced that an elite group of his JAM fighters were dispatched to Lebanon (although the veracity of this claim is uncertain). The war in Lebanon served to inspire JAM further, and their activities in Baya’a and Saydia continued to expand.

From July through October, the instances of murdered bodies being dumped near Sunni neighborhoods rose considerably, as well as drive by shootings and threatening letters given to Sunni residents and business owners. “The most popular was extra-judicial killings or murder ‘ordered’, or ‘sanctioned,” by local JAM and other Shi’a militias. The progression of an ‘EJK’ as they are commonly known is simple: “JAM/Shi’a militia group kidnaps a Sunni male from a mixed-sect market (or other public venue); takes [the] Sunni male to the edge of a Sunni dominated neighborhood; Sunni male taken from the vehicle and shot in the back of the head with a pistol; Shi’a militia drives off.” Other variants existed, typically involving sadistic torture utilizing home use power tools and other commonly owned items. On one occasion in August or September the U.S. infantry battalion operating in the area rescued a group of Sunni men who would most likely have suffered such a fate from a Shi’a Huseniyah. Unfortunately, these crimes became devilishly hard to stop, and often the only evidence was a body near a Sunni neighborhood. Saydia experi-
enced principally kidnapping at this point in time; nearly every street had a story of at least one man who had left for food, work, or pleasure never to return.

Another technique of intimidation and militia expansion began to develop at this time as well. In October, U.S. patrols prevented a house eviction. Upset Sunni residents who had been forced from their home at gun point by unknown men flagged down a U.S. patrol. This family fortunately maintained the presence of mind to take their property ownership paperwork with them and the patrol was able to assist the family in regaining their house and detaining the men. The most commonly reported technique for JAM involved the delivery of letters with threat notes and a single bullet inside with a timeline to depart and “anyone that was left was shot, tortured, or scared into leaving (i.e. grenade over [a] wall).” In the fall of 2006, these home evictions predominately occurred in the neighborhoods of Jihad and al’Amel, where JAM possessed a decisive lead in the indigenous balance of power when no U.S. forces were present. Once the militia cleared a neighborhood block of unwanted Sunni residents, JAM sanctioned a re-housing of poorer Shi’a families and “there were reports of having to pay the controlling faction a ‘tax’ to live there.” JAM then consolidated its hold over the larger area by “provid[ing] resources [electricity, food, water, health care] to only Shi’a... they also ensured all of their men protected the [local] gas station, so as to control the distribution and funds from it.”

The systematic process of driving the Sunni population of Saydia away accelerated in the winter of 2006/2007. Initially this took the form of intimidation. “Shi’a militias started infiltrating Sayidia from adjacent areas under their control. According to U.S. military officials, their movements were often aided by the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi police. ‘We were surrounded,’ [said] Omar Mohammed, a local Sunni resident. Iraqi police started setting up a maze of checkpoints throughout Saydia. Shi’a militants would often be lurking nearby. Reports of kidnappings of Sunnis in the vicinity of checkpoints started piling up in the spring.”

The ultimate goal of this campaign was resource control and the permanent expansion of militia support among the local populace. As described by the intelligence officer of the 1-18 Infantry Battalion, “We’ve noticed a trend used by Shi’a terrorists that I refer to as “reverse SWEAT [Sewer, Water, Electricity and Trash].” The intent is to attack key infrastructure and facilities to decrease the quality of life for the people living there. In a simplified version, this technique would include attacking the power supply, shutting down sewage pumps, conducting attacks in economic hubs such as markets, and blowing up mosques. With no social, economic, or religious support base, many residents move out. Those unwanted people who remain are intimidated to leave through kidnappings, threats, and straight up murder. Once a neighborhood is cleansed of the undesirables, a group such as JAM comes in and restores the essential services and brings in displaced families to live in the homes left behind. These displaced families are charged rent which finances the organization, and are made to participate in a ‘neighborhood watch’ to provide early warning for any opposing factions or CF entering an area.”

By 2007, the infiltration of Saydia by JAM and affiliated Shi’a militias had become a cold hard reality for residents there, and their activity continued to show a striking similarity to organized crime: “The Shi’a affiliated gangs/militias operating in Saydia traffic and sell weapons, [they] involved in the operation of whore houses, murder, intimidate and extort [residents] for support and money, steal, kidnap, torture, extort store owners for money, make explosives, and have successfully corrupted INP so that they provide active and passive support to their operations.” Based on interviews with the unit responsible for Saydia, roughly 1 to 2 mosque attacks occurred per month in 2007; all attacks were targeting Sunni mosques, and roughly 1 to 2 known forced house evictions occurred per month.

Shi’a militias subverted the local security forces in two ways. The first more directly affected the Iraqi residents of the area. Simply put, by the INP Transition Team Intelligence Team advisor, “facilitated by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) intelligence services and the INP, Shi’a militia presence has reinforced sectarian boundaries and led to forced emigration of Sunni residents from Saydia and Baya’a.”
The second form of subversion aimed at sowing distrust between U.S. forces and the INPs. This subversion was deadly for the U.S. forces responsible for Saydia, taking the form of EFP emplacement. “[T]hey are emplaced near INP positions and triggered by INP, or emplaced near INP positions in order to discredit INP and create distrust between American and Iraqi National Police.”

Although exact details on how this type of insurgent activity unfolds can easily vary by locale, and specifics are most likely classified, one technique to accomplish this would be for an INP shift being relieved to change out of uniform and emplace an EFP from a prepositioned cache—perhaps dropped by their relieving comrades who might also provide overwatch throughout the operation—and then occupy a building near an INP checkpoint and await a U.S. patrol to approach before activating the EFP’s passive infrared sensor to enable the device’s deadly warhead. In any case, the goal of such activity strove to instigate a direct fire fight between U.S. forces and their Iraqi counterparts. As Lieutenant Noyes continues, “the desired goal [was] creating distrust between INP and American forces Catastrophic Success being Americans firing on INP.” Fortunately throughout 2007 this technique “seems to have either failed in achieving its desired goal. . . or has been successfully deterred by SOI engagements with INP leadership leading to the establishment of a policy to arrest all personnel at the checkpoint that an IED goes off near.”

Earlier in 2006, sectarian propaganda was sparse and I only observed political billboards for Shia parties hanging above the Shia dominated security checkpoints. However, as the militia expanded into Saydia the propaganda followed quickly. Propaganda spread throughout Saydia and “Banners [were] strewn across the muhallas, as well as flags and graffiti to designate which neighborhoods [were] Sunni or Shi’a. Both the Sunni and the Shi’a elements use fliers to notify a resident that they are to vacate the Muhalla or they will be murdered within 48 hours. . . the IO message is broadcast as clearly as if it were posted on a billboard. Leave, join or die.”

In an example of how events in an AI geographically close can effect operations, as the U.S. Surge began in earnest the nearby neighborhood of Doura became one of Baghdad’s focus areas. The effects were profound. Doura, a Sunni and AQI insurgent dominated the area east of Saydia long remained one of Baghdad’s most violent neighborhoods. As increased U.S. forces in the area flushed out AQI insurgents, the combatants fled to Saydia where local Sunnis saw them as salvation from the ever encroaching Shi’a militias. These militants “began attacking Shi’as. It was not long before Shi’as militias, including the Mahdi Army (JAM) responded in kind.” In July of 2006, a complex vehicle borne IED (car bomb) attack struck the previously mentioned Hussiniyah/Badr Corps office in northeastern Saydia. The car bomb attacks bear the signature of Sunni insurgent groups, AQI in particular. Shi’a militias retaliated by utilizing the local security force: “INP occupied positions in the Al Sadiyah apartments (near a local Sunni) mosque and began a campaign to force all families out.” Sunni insurgents struck back; during this local campaign several high ranking INP brigade and battalion commanders struck an IED while leaving an abandoned apartment laden with furniture. Sunni residents spoke with Lieutenant Noyes, the U.S. Platoon Leader in Saydia at the time, and reported forced evictions by armed men, and extortion requiring the fleeing residents to pay the militia to move their own household goods away.

Meanwhile, north in Baya’a and al’Amel the JAM campaign shifted from cleansing to consolidating gains. As one company commander reported, “this whole area is just absolutely dominated by Jaish al’Mahdi. . .They control the power distribution.” Here, the ‘reverse SWEAT’ was nearly complete, “the Mahdi Army (JAM) has transformed the composition of the district’s neighborhoods by ruthlessly killing and driving out Sunnis and denying basic services to residents who remain. “General David H. Petraeus, [having recently assumed duties as] the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, described the area as ‘one of the three or four most challenging areas in all of Baghdad,’” U.S. forces noticed certain areas with a much better standard of basic services and cleanliness and correctly observed the correlation between material favors and militia activity saying, “It would be cool if it was a positive thing, but it’s not.” JAM’s support zone effectively completed its spread from Jihad and al’Amel into Baya’a, and with the expansion came control of local resources. U.S. forces in the area were able to mitigate some of these affects and as the local battalion com-
mander stated, “Jaish al’Mahdi, from our sources, is extremely upset that we’re putting so much pressure on the gas stations. It’s common sense. We’re shutting down the cash flow.” However, JAM was achieving its goal and as the intelligence officer stated, “now that the Sunnis are all gone, murders have dropped off, one way to put it is they ran out of people to kill.” JAM quickly turned these support areas into launch points for incursions into Sadiya, “militiamen in BMWs rode around the neighborhood with megaphones, demanding that residents evacuate. Mortar rounds launched from nearby Bay’a, a Mahid Army stronghold, began crashing down regularly in Sadiyah.\(^{59}\)

Moqtada al’Sadr’s JAM forces began to splinter as the cleric had reportedly moved into hiding in Iran to avoid the full brunt of the Surge, and recommended to his forces to lay low and avoid confrontation; “American commanders attribute[d] much of the current violence to what they are now calling ‘special groups’ or ‘secret cells’ of Iranian-backed militia men who may be acting independently of, or against, Sadr and his followers.”\(^{61}\)

In August of 2007, with the neighborhoods north of Saydia firmly under its heel, JAM began its cleansing efforts in Saydia proper in earnest. The neighborhood now became “strategically important because it represented a fault line between militia power bases in Al’Amil to the west and the Sunni insurgent stronghold of Dora to the east.”\(^{62}\) In one instance, this cleansing was halted by U.S. forces and as described by Lieutenant Noyes, “we interrupted a joint JAM-INP sectarian cleansing in Muhallah 827 (south western Saydia). INP established cordon positions and JAM moved in and forced Sunni families out of their homes, [and] once the families were out [the] INP moved in Shi’a Iraqis . . the INP claimed [these families] were displaced Saydiyah residents, but under questioning were obviously not.”\(^{63}\) In two separate mosque attacks, the Imam of the Al Sadiq Mosque (Sunni) was killed and the Ibrahim al’Khalil Mosque’s minaret “was attacked and destroyed by a JAM group who used the adjacent school, in cooperation with the Shia guard at the school, to infiltrate the mosque and plant the ordnance they used to destroy the minaret.”\(^{64}\) Two other Sunni mosques “were rigged with explosives and destroyed.”\(^{65}\) The terrified Sunni population continued to embrace the ‘protection’ of Sunni insurgent groups fleeing U.S. operations in Doura, “The Sunnis had no choice but to receive al-Qaeda, because nobody else was protecting them’ [said] Mr. Ibrahim, the Sayidia dentist.”\(^{66}\)

This problem of providing effective protection from warring militias turned Saydia from a mixed neighborhood in 2003 into a wasteland of sectarian violence by the fall of 2007. The local residents soon found that the solace provided by al’Qaeda to be short lived as “Sunni extremists embarked on a simple but brutal strategy: kill any Shi’a they could get their hands on.”\(^{67}\) At this time, attempting to end the spiraling violence, the U.S. battalion commander completed an “eight month campaign to kick out the corrupt INP Wolf Brigade.”\(^{68}\) In October, the Iraqi Army began conducting operations in Saydia, occupying the al’Fatima Hussiniyah and the al’Taqwa Mosque. Residents of the neighborhood became disillusioned with the militia violence, and the U.S. forces, taking heed of success in the westward al’Anbar Province began
to enlist local citizens into volunteer battalions known as the Saydiyah Guardians. These developments proved to be the first positive signs of improvement in Saydia in years. However, tensions between the Saydiyah Guardians and the Shi'a dominated Iraqi government remain high, and accusations of abuse by security forces and local guards come from citizens of either sect. General Petraeus upped his assessment of the area’s challenges and “said [that] he [saw] uneven progress in terms of stopping Shi’a militia violence. He mentioned Bay’a and al’Amil, two neighborhoods in southwestern Baghdad where the Mahdi Army... has emerged as a dominant force, as among the more difficult. He described another nearby area, Sadiyah, as probably ‘the toughest that is out there now.’

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen how JAM utilized and will continue to use several identifiable techniques to spread their influence through four neighborhoods of Baghdad, and it is highly likely that a militia in other insurgent battlefields will utilize similar tactics, adapting the specifics to each new environment. In Saydia, the fight is not over. Since the developments of September/October, Baghdad has experienced a welcome respite in the form of reduced violence. The neighborhoods of Jihad, al’Amel, Bay’a and Saydia are no exception; however the fight is not over yet and they are included in the “wide swaths of middle-class western Baghdad [that] remain locked down amid uncertainty over whether progress is lasting or is the result of a brief cease-fire between sectarian militias.” The current success of the Surge Strategy, combined with Moqtada Sadr’s ‘freeze’ on militia attacks has created a window of opportunity to roll back the militia’s gains. Disturbingly, there are no reports of the militia’s stranglehold over resources being broken, Sadr’s future intentions once the ‘freeze’ six month shelf life has expired cannot be known; in sum, it cannot be accurately determined at this time whether or not the Shi’a militia campaign for Baghdad has been checked, has been put on pause, or already achieved its goals in Saydia and Baghdad at large. Perhaps the greatest test to Iraq’s stability will come as surviving residents who fled between 2003 and 2007 begin to return home; how will the Iraqi government handle these refugees? Can they return to the previous homes, will they try and take them back with militias of their own perhaps with the help of the Saydiyah Guardians? In Saydia, the fight is not over.

Endnotes

1. The EFP is one of the deadliest IEDs the Iraq War has witnessed to date.

2. Due to the nature of the ongoing conflict in Iraq, this paper will focus almost entirely on “Red” forces—the insurgent militias of West Rasheed. Some may misconstrue the paper as pointing out only the bad and destructive developments while ignoring the blood, sweat, and tears shed by U.S. service members struggling to help a foreign culture in a distant land. This is not the case. Many positive developments have occurred in these areas, and perhaps the militia’s advancement, unchecked, would have been far more destructive. A comprehensive analysis of the Battle for Saydia, complete with Coalition TTPs and Coalition victories will only be possible once the conflict is complete.

3. Due to the significant differences between Arabic and English, these neighborhoods, Saydia in particular, are often spelled differently but pronounced the same. Saydiah, Saydyah, Saydiyah and others are all equally likely to appear in print.


5. FM 3-24, 114.

6. In the 2003 conventional ground war, the road lining these neighborhoods’ eastern boundary was the scene of the Thunder Run Operations detailed in Michael Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainer’s Cobra 2. For further detail see Heavy Metal: A Tank Company’s Battle to Baghdad by Captain Jason Conroy and Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad by David Zucchino.


8 Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Franche, The Arab Shi’a (New York: Falgrave, 1999), 99.


12. Haas, interview via email.


22. Robinson, interview via email.

23. A Huseniyah is a community center most often affiliated with the Shi’a sect of Islam. Huseniyahs are commonly located near a mosque of the same sect.

24. Haas, interview via email.

25. Gentile, interview via email.


28. Haas, interview via email.


34. Conversations with Iraqi citizens while patrolling Bay’a and Saydia in Summer 2006.

35. Personal experience patrolling Bay’a in Summer 2006.

36. Makay, interview via email.


40. Makay, interview via email.
41. Robinson, interview via email.
42. Robinson, interview via email.
43. Shishkin, “In Baghdad Neighborhood, a Tale of Shifting Fortunes,”
44. Captain Dan Kuehl, interview by author via email.
45. Lieutenant Matt Noyes, interview by author via email.
46. Captain Josh Francis, interview by author via email.
47. Noyes, interview via email.
48. Ibid.
49. Sphere of Influence engagement: when a local U.S. military representative attempts to elicit cooperation from local population leadership which can include but is not limited to military, civil, commercial, or religious leadership. This example is military in nature, through the INP leadership.
50. Ibid.
51. Military-speak for Information Operations: shaping the perceptions of the battlefield. IO can be conducted by U.S. or hostile forces.
52. Francis, interview via email.
54. Noyes, interview via email.
55. Ibid.
57. Joshua Partlow, “Mahdi Army, Not Al-Qaeda, is Enemy No. 1 in Western Baghdad,”
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
63. Noyes, interview via email.
64. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Partlow, 27 October 2007. In West Rasheed the Wolf Brigade was renowned for its corruption, Shi’a militia infiltration and has since been removed from the area.
A Historic Opportunity in an Evolving Region

On December 15, 2005, twelve million Iraqis went to the polls and ushered in a new era in the Middle East by electing, along sectarian lines, a representative government led by a coalition of Shia parties known as the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). While the initial celebration for that event has subsided due to an increasingly violent and devastating fight for power, a fight that will likely continue for another decade, the significance of that event for long-term positive change in the region has not diminished. After fighting persecution and Sunni suspicions for over a millennium and a more recent Shia history marred by Iran’s radical hegemonic ambitions, Shias are in power for the first time in the heart of the Arab world. As Vali Nasr has noted, the future of the region will be defined by this development and the Sunni response to it. Perhaps most significantly, this new Shia political power, based on the pragmatic influence of Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the competing interests of Iraq’s Shia factions, poses a considerable threat to the ideals of both Al Qaeda-led Sunni fundamentalism and Iranian-led Khomeinism.

Given such a historic opportunity, one would expect the U.S. to develop an enduring regional strategy. Nine days after Al Qaeda terrorists struck the American homeland, well before the Iraq war facilitated a Shia awakening, President Bush acknowledged the need for such a long-term strategy: “Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen.” Yet, six years after those attacks, the U.S. continues to measure results in Iraq and the Middle East in terms of days, weeks, and months. Perhaps this is due to the effects of mass media, electoral politics, or an age of national attention deficit disorder. Regardless of the reason, the U.S. must adapt and analyze the Islamic world with the broad sweep of history and the long-term future in mind.
A New Perspective and a New Framework

While future generations will view Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as the catalyst for the ongoing Shia political resurgence, the war is only the latest chapter in a long history of sectarianism, mutual suspicion, and political maneuvering in the region. Nor will OIF be the last such chapter. Al Qaeda and Iran will confront this reality, and each other, long after the U.S. completes its operations in Iraq. Therefore, it is critical for the U.S. to view developments through the lens of Middle East history and the current power dynamics at play in the region, rather than solely through the lens of the War on Terror. America must also do what it does best: look to the future with optimism, vision, and wisdom. Just as National Security Council Paper-68 and George Kennan’s “X” article, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, laid the framework for a long-term strategy to fight the Soviet threat in 1949-1950, so too must the current generation of Americans recognize the reality of a complex future and respond with a comprehensive policy. Such a strategy should rest on two pillars: crafting a long-term regional strategy and winning the war of ideas.

For both of these broad goals, precise steps can greatly enhance America’s ability to support the birth of a new political order in the region and respond to the diverse threat of Islamic terrorism. These steps should represent the baseline of an American policy that successfully looks beyond the horizon in the region; they are not all-encompassing. However, it is important to note that diplomatic and informational instruments of power should replace military force as the primary tools in shaping a new Middle East.

Iraq and Power Struggles in the Near Term

When Baghdad residents and American Soldiers tore down the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdous Square on April 9, 2003, Americans celebrated the fall of a despotic regime and the potential for democracy in Iraq. Muslims in Iraq and across the Middle East, however, viewed developments through a very different lens: the sectarian mindset that has driven the Islamic world for fourteen centuries. Shias, especially the urban poor in neighborhoods such as Sadr City, were overjoyed about the possibilities for political power and an end to a long history of persecution. On the other hand, many Sunnis across the region feared the potential for a Shia crescent that could stretch from Iran to Lebanon and threaten Sunni power in the region for generations.

Sunni authoritarian regimes and Sunni fundamentalist groups believe that they have the most to fear from a successful Shia government in the Arab world. The ferocity of the violence in Iraq is an indicator of the threat this development poses to Al Qaeda and Sunni extremists; otherwise, those factions would not fight so aggressively to ensure the failure of the Iraqi government. Al Qaeda envisions a Wahhabist Islamic nation founded on “fundamentalism as revival”, in which modern Muslims live under the strictest interpretation of the first Muslims’ example. The Al Qaeda strategy is based first and foremost on establishing safe havens in the Arab world that will enable future expansion and control of state governments. Such a safe haven is not likely in an Iraq under a Shia authority. While Al Qaeda hoped to unify all Muslims under the banner of its Caliphate, the organization now finds itself dedicated to murdering Shia civilians and attacking Shia shrines in an effort to foment civil war.

Iran, despite sharing its Shia heritage with a majority of Iraqis, has also had to adjust to the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq. From the first days of the Iraq war, Ayatollah Sistani indicated that a new Iraq would be based on political moderation and the idea of “one person, one vote”. This newfound Shia political power, based on a stark departure from the radicalism of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, has forced the regime in Tehran to ally itself with the new Iraqi government in an effort to consolidate Shia power for the future. Thus, the Shia awakening in Iraq is a double-edged sword for those in Iran who wish to perpetuate Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision of “fundamentalism as revolution”. That vision sought to establish a new, radical Shiism under the banner of a single political-religious leader. While embracing Shia power in Iraq will strengthen Iranian claims of regional hegemony, such a strategic move will also lead Iran to a more moderate path in the long-term, particularly as Iranian citizens observe the growth of democracy next door with keen interest.

Of course, the mere fact that a mainstream Shia government in Iraq threatens both Al Qaeda and radical Shiism does not mean that this new political
culture will survive and succeed. All states and organizations involved will have a say in the outcome. What, then, can the U.S. reasonably expect to occur in Iraq and across the region in the next five years? First, the U.S. should recognize that it is largely on the periphery of the fight for power in the Middle East. Whether it leaves Iraq in two years or ten years, Muslims themselves will remain the primary determinants of their own future.

In the next five years, the rise of the Shia in Iraq will only exacerbate sectarian violence. As Shias begin to take more ownership of the government in Baghdad, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni nationalist groups will fight harder to prevent that from occurring. Jaysh al Mahdi and the Badr Corps will respond in kind by ethnically cleansing Sunni neighborhoods and forcing Sunnis to leave Baghdad and the belt of cities south of the capital. Shia on Shia violence will also increase as the fight for power in southern Iraq escalates. The Iraqi government will remain divided over the critical issues of oil revenue sharing, militias, de-Baathification, federalism, and amnesty. While the political gridlock will frustrate the U.S. to a significant degree over the next five years, it would do well to remember its own history; after eleven years under the Articles of Confederation, the new American government had to begin anew with the U.S. Constitution. Seventy-four years later, America still found itself in civil war due to unresolved issues of slavery.

Increased tension will also characterize relations across the region over the next five years. The longstanding Saudi/Iranian rivalry will continue and likely escalate as mainstream Shia power in Iraq threatens the long history of Sunni dominance in the Arab world. Shia populations in the region will continue to voice greater demands for rights and representation, including the Shia minority in southeast Saudi Arabia. Lebanon will also remain in a precarious position as the plurality of Shias in that country will push for a new government framework that affords Shias political power equal to their numbers. In the short-term, Hezbollah will serve as the primary means for expressing such discontent. The regimes in Jordan and Egypt have already articulated their unease about the changing dynamics in the region, and this apprehension will persist in the short-term. Instability, extremism, and sectarianism will play major roles in the near future of the Middle East, particularly as the multitude of states and organizations in the region prepare for the impending influence of mainstream Shia power.

**Looking Beyond the Horizon**

While the immediate future of the region appears grim and will likely worsen, the changes underway will ultimately lead to a Middle East led by a mainstream Shia influence that is less threatening to the rest of the world. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently noted, the world is currently witnessing the “birth pangs of a new Middle East”. Mainstream Shia power will be the catalyst for long-term changes in the region; these developments will force states to adapt and reform in order to position themselves in the best way possible for the future.

In Iraq, a deteriorating security situation will eventually lead to real discussions that cross the sectarian divide in an effort to end the bloodshed. Sunni nationalists and former regime elements will continue to fight as long as they believe they can reestablish what they view as a historical birthright. However, Sunni extremists will in time recognize that the demographic landscape of Iraq is not in their favor and that Sunni dominance in Iraq is a thing of the past. This will not occur overnight or any time soon. In fact, it will likely take a decade of horrific carnage, if not longer. Ultimately, the Sunni population will come to accept a mainstream Shia authority over the more dangerous proposition of an Islamic Republic inspired by Iranian radicalism. When the population accepts this reality, Sunni insurgents will lose their base of support and come to the bargaining table.

For the Shia of Iraq, who lost their initial enthusiasm for liberation with the subsequent years of worsening violence, the long-term prospects for political power are bright. While today’s infighting between Shia elements such as Dawa, Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and the Sadr Accord have resulted in government stalemate, the next decade will result in difficult but necessary disputes over the future shape of Iraq. Muqtada al Sadr and those who wish to maintain a strong national government will eventually lose that battle to SCIRI and those pushing for a federalized Iraq. This is due to SCIRI influence in
southern Iraq and the character of the Iraqi constitution, which already creates the foundation for a federal solution. Many Iraqi Sunnis and foreign policy experts fear this development because of the perceived victory for Iran, who would allegedly gain de facto rule over southern Iraq. However, the historical divide between Iraqi Arabs and Iranian Persians will diminish Iran's ability to control that area.

Experts also fear the effect of a federalized solution because of Al Qaeda's intent to maintain an Islamic State of Iraq. After years of reprisal attacks from Shia militias, Sunnis will agree to an autonomous region in central and western Iraq that receives a proportion of oil revenue equal to or greater than their demographic percentage. However, Anbar province will not fall to Al Qaeda as many fear. Instead, Sunni tribal leaders will rule their own communities and resist the threats from foreign fighters; in fact, this development was already underway in 2007. In the Kurdish north, leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan will maintain their autonomous status; however, the U.S. will likely have to manage Kurdish desires to expand their control into the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran.

In addition to the slow but positive change likely to occur inside Iraq over the next 15 to 20 years, the region as a whole will also grow out of increased tension in the immediate term to develop a more sustainable future. Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan will eventually recognize the new Shia power in the region and move to ease tensions with Iran and the Shia government in Iraq. The eventual end to the power struggle within Iraq will pave the way for a similar alleviation of friction across the region. For the first time, Saudi Arabia and Iran will have an opportunity to bridge sectarian differences due to the moderating influence of Iraq. An effort to respect the rights of minority groups, such as the Shias in Saudi Arabia and the Sunnis in Iraq, will also contribute to the growth of a more peaceful region. Lebanon and Arab Gulf states such as Bahrain and Qatar will play critical roles as well. The growth of a new Shia political power in the region, while accelerating sectarian violence in the short-term, will lead to multiple reform movements and result in a more mainstream Middle East over the next two decades.

An American Approach for the Long Haul

Given the high stakes in the region's future, the U.S. must look beyond the short-term, which will primarily consist of increased violence and sectarianism, and prepare itself for a position of lasting influence within a new, Shia-focused Arab world. This will not be accomplished chiefly by force. While military operations might play a critical role at certain times, such as targeted strikes on terrorist leaders and organizations, these operations will not serve as the foundation for a successful strategy in the region. Instead, the U.S. will have to focus on diplomatic and informational instruments of power to achieve desired outcomes. Specifically, America must create an enduring regional strategy and win the war of ideas.

Crafting a Long-Term U.S. Strategy in the Middle East

For far too long, the U.S. has based its Middle East policy almost entirely on alliances with the old Sunni order in the region. These relationships with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt exist primarily to protect the free flow of energy resources and to counter a hostile Iran to the east. Due in part to the perception of a resurgent Iran and continued violence in Iraq, the realist branch of the American foreign policy establishment now recommends a return to those old allegiances. However, such a move would fail to align the U.S. with the growth of a mainstream Shia influence in the region over the next two decades. Additionally, the old policy does not adequately address American dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the indirect benefit this provides to Sunni terrorist organizations. Instead, it should adjust its regional alliances, begin a national effort to develop a new energy economy, and encourage the movement toward Islamic scholarship.

As the Middle East slowly evolves into a more Shia-focused region, the U.S. should align itself with those countries at the center of the change: Iraq and Lebanon. In Iraq, it helped to establish an elected Iraqi government and now supports it on both the security and political fronts. While Iraq will undergo devastating violence and countless challenges in the short-term, it will eventually become an example for mainstream Shias across the region while protecting the rights of its Sunni...
minority. In the case of Lebanon, the U.S. should support that government as it works to redistribute political power toward Shias in order to more accurately reflect its population. This will allow it to remain on the right side of change in the region as Lebanese leaders distance themselves from the more extremist voices of Hezbollah.

Preparing for Shia political power in the region will also require the U.S. to take on a new direction with Iran. Such a course will require incredible patience given the historical tension between the two countries. In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency participated in the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. Over the last quarter-century, Iran has fostered Shia radicalism, held American hostages in Tehran, supported terrorism across the region, and denied the Holocaust. Now, Iran continues to defy the international community and continue its pursuit of nuclear energy and possibly a nuclear weapon. Regardless of any specific policy response to the nuclear issue, the U.S. can take two steps to initiate a new direction with Iran. First, it should make clear to Iran the consequences of any offensive action it might take against the U.S., Israel, or the Sunni regimes in the region. This statement could mirror President Kennedy’s unambiguous response to the Soviets during the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962. Second, it should explicitly state that it does not seek regime change in Iran; this is a very real concern for the Islamic Republic after the Axis of Evil speech in 2002. These two steps will contribute to the reform movement in Iran as that country responds changes in the region.

In order to improve its position in the region, the U.S. must also commit to a new energy economy that better manages Middle Eastern oil. A national effort to minimize U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil by 2020, akin to the 1960s goal of putting a man on the moon, would allow it greater flexibility in planning its long-term policy for the region. For example, the American partnership with Saudi Arabia could focus on increased visas to the U.S. and greater reform within Saudi Arabia. Reduced oil revenue from the U.S. would force the Saudis to develop new sectors in its economy and enact needed political reforms to appease its Shia minority. These developments would also make it more difficult for homegrown Saudi terrorists to recruit members and finance operations. If the U.S. cannot significantly reduce its dependence on Mideast oil, it should work with the international community to standardize the price of oil. As Major General John Custer, former Director of Intelligence at U.S. Central Command, has pointed out, this move would encourage economic growth for mainstream Muslims in the region and help to contain the instability caused by the volatility of the oil market.

The U.S. should also recognize that it can accomplish a great deal to support a new Shia order in the region through the use of multiple international institutions. As it has learned in recent years, even a superpower cannot forcibly change a region without the commitment and support of the rest of the world. When dealing with mainstream Shias in the Middle East over the long-term, the U.S. should adopt what Francis Fukuyama has termed “multi-multi-lateralism”, in which America uses multiple institutions to create regional security alliances and build support for international initiatives. For example, in the case of the Middle East, the U.S. could encourage the development of a regional security agreement between mainstream Shias and the old Sunni order in the region. At the same time, the U.S. could work to rebuild other institutions such as NATO and the UN to more effectively respond to future crises. While overcoming fourteen centuries of mutual suspicion will prove arduous and test American patience, such opportunities will grow in the future due to the impact of mainstream Shia power.

Finally, the U.S. should encourage the movement toward Islamic scholarship and reform. This movement will gain momentum as Shia leaders follow the pragmatic philosophy of Ayatollah Ali Sistani over previous religious authorities that adopted rigid interpretations of Islamic law and refused to engage in open debate. The U.S. can contribute to this process by supporting the assimilation of mainstream Muslims around the world. In countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, Muslims continue to experience difficulties in balancing their religious heritage and their new Western identity. Educated Muslims in such situations continue to participate in terrorist acts in response to their societal alienation. In the U.S., on the other hand, Muslims have had much greater success in assimilating into society. The U.S. should offer its assistance to friendly governments to improve this process of
By creating a new regional strategy and planning for the long-term through prudent policies, the U.S. will position itself for a generation of positive influence with strong allies in the Middle East.

**The War of Ideas**

Winning the war of ideas, a concept championed by many but never implemented in a cohesive manner, is absolutely critical to supporting a new order in the region based on mainstream Shia power and defeating an extremist Islamic ideology. Today, the U.S. and its allies in the War on Terror are losing the war of ideas to Islamic extremists in a landslide. A new Shia culture of political moderation must defeat extremist ideologies, both Sunni and Shia, in order to maintain their impact on the region. It will take mainstream leaders in the region and across the Islamic world to truly address this challenge; however, America can begin to do its part starting now. While the notion of a war of ideas seems nebulous and ill-defined on the surface, the U.S. has many specific tools at its disposal to support such an overarching objective.

First, and most significant, as MG Custer points out, the U.S. must frame the debate in terms of mainstream Muslims versus the tiny minority (<0.005%) of Muslims that are extremists. In that context, the U.S. must stand by mainstream Muslims and continually emphasize that the West is not at war with Islam. Public diplomacy and cyber operations are absolutely essential in this fight. Public diplomacy efforts, likely headed by the Department of State, would highlight mainstream Muslim leaders around the world who publicly and forcefully reject the ideology of extremists. While American leaders should constantly supplement these statements with their own, the real force for change will come from the Muslim world. Cyber operations are also critical in order to effectively fight the war of ideas. Currently, Muslim extremists use the Internet immediately after major events in order to shape the situation to their advantage; meanwhile, the West is often painfully slow in response. The U.S. should redouble its efforts to sustain a cyber operations capability that exploits extremist web sites and quickly responds to events in order to maintain the initiative. The U.S. can still regain lost ground in this fight, but it cannot do so by sitting on the sidelines while its message is not heard.

The U.S. must also recognize that the threat from Islamic extremists is not a monolithic one. In fact, one could hardly imagine it more diverse. The use of rhetoric that unifies organizations as distinct as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the Abu Sayyaf group does not serve the interests of the U.S.. Instead, it confuses the debate and gives the false impression of an integrated front for terrorist attacks designed to achieve a single political objective. Terrorist organizations have myriad goals, including many that directly contradict one another. The U.S. is missing a tremendous opportunity to adopt a divide and conquer strategy by constantly noting the differences between these groups. Policy experts, media outlets, and government officials at home and abroad should begin to point out these differences and use them to their advantage. In Iraq, for example, the U.S. should strive to educate both the American public and the international community about the mutually exclusive goals of Al Qaeda and Iran.

U.S. leaders should also avoid using the rhetoric of fear in their public statements. This fear-mongering, as some would describe it, serves only to cause undue panic in the American population while offering no policy response to mitigate the threat. More ominously, this inadvertently legitimizes Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the eyes of potential recruits. Instead, the U.S. should adopt a FDR-style approach in which Americans will not allow terrorists to frighten them into changing their society or culture. The threat posed by Islamic extremists is undoubtedly a serious one, as evidenced by the devastation wrought by the 9/11 attackers. However, the real danger in terrorism is not the attack itself but in how the attacked state adjusts in response. In this sense, the U.S. must take great care to not play precisely into the hands of Al Qaeda. The U.S. should employ the rhetoric of ridicule rather than fear to take away the credibility of terrorist organizations.

A major change in the way American leaders describe terrorist organizations can help to shift the balance in the war of ideas. In this fight, under the spotlight of twenty four hour news coverage, words and images take on a heightened importance. As Doctor Douglas Streusand and Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Tunnell have noted, the use of words like *jihad*, which means striving in the path of God, and *mujahid*, which refers to one who participates in *jihad*, can unintentionally legitimize terrorist acts.
American leaders must use more sophisticated language to avoid this mistake. The Arabic word *hirabah*, which means sinful warfare contrary to Islamic law, should replace *jihad* in all future discussions of Islamic extremists. Similarly, the word *mufsid*, meaning an evil or corrupt person, should replace *mujahid* when describing these individuals. Such a shift will bring clarity to the debate and will have a significant impact in the Muslim world.

Finally, the U.S. must lead by example. While this concept is easier said than done given the complexity of American involvement in the world today, it is an essential element in winning the war of ideas. By demonstrating the merit of liberal, democratic values at home, the U.S. can indirectly influence outcomes in a positive way abroad. This was true during the Cold War and it remains true today. For example, while the Iranian population is still deeply religious, poll after poll has indicated that Iranians have a high regard for the principles of democratic government. Their perception of the U.S. can lead to positive change in Iran. The important point here is not increased American involvement in Iranian society, which is a source of deep historical animosity for the Iranian regime, but greater U.S. efforts to reflect its own principles, which can indirectly influence events for the better. Vigorously engaging in the war of ideas and eventually winning that fight will support the birth of Shia political power in the region and the spread of mainstream Muslim views around the world.

**Conclusion**

The next two decades will present countless challenges and historic opportunities in the Middle East as mainstream Shias assume real political power for the first time. The U.S. can align itself with the future of the region by taking prudent steps, but it must begin preparing for that future today. Looking beyond the horizon, particularly during a time of war when pundits and prognosticators constantly dissect daily events, will prove difficult. However, the U.S. has faced similar challenges in the past and succeeded. To do so, the U.S. must always consider second and third-order effects and plan accordingly. By crafting a long-term regional strategy and vigorously engaging in the war of ideas, the U.S. will prepare itself for the day when mainstream Shias overcome violence, sectarianism, and fundamentalism to lead the Middle East to a new era unlike any other in the history of the region.

**Endnotes**

3. Ibid, 149.
4. Ibid, 175.
5. Ibid, 149.
11. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

Captain Nathan Crook is a West Point graduate and served as an infantry battalion intelligence officer in central Baghdad from December 2005 to December 2006. During that year, he met weekly with the Chief of Staff for the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Shia majority party in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). He is currently deployed with the 101st Airborne Division in Afghanistan.

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**Introduction**

Effective bottom-up intelligence during today’s counterinsurgency (COIN) operations calls for units to augment intelligence teams with All-Source Analysts down to company level. The purpose of this article is to share a few of my tactical intelligence experiences as an assistant S2 and S2 during two rotations to Iraq and offer options to intelligence officers and commanders for organizing company intelligence teams to consider in preparation for future deployments.

Prior to deploying to Iraq in November 2005, my commander posed a challenge for my section because of a growing condition on the battlefield. Combat units were falling in on much larger areas of operation with companies conducting operations from remote, austere combat outposts, in most cases without Internet/SIPR connectivity or daily access to the battalion’s intelligence section. The task was to figure out how to provide the analytical subject matter expertise and support of my section directly to the company which I would likely only directly interface with 1 or 2 times per week. The challenge was accomplishing this with an authorized strength of 3 analysts, an 11-series noncommissioned officer (NCO), and a 35D second lieutenant (standard legacy modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) with an additional analyst).

The leaders in my unit and I remembered the lessons learned from an understaffed intelligence section, with only four intelligence personnel, from Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Although the Military Intelligence (MI) branch is answering this need through transformation with brigades and battalions receiving more robust authorizations in intelligence sections at these echelons, the reality at ground level is that there are still significant shortages of intelligence Soldiers to provide a company level capability. As the S2 OIC or assistant, you may find your section is not far from the aforementioned scenario upon arrival to your unit and initial assessment of readiness.

**The Final Product in Ramadi**

The above illustration depicts the intelligence organization that worked for Task Force 1-6 Infantry during operations in Ramadi, Iraq from June to November 2006. At the bottom of the diagram are the primary collectors within the battalion. Bravo 1-6 Infantry, the Task Force main effort, and Alpha 1-35 Armor quickly occupied combat outposts northwest of Ramadi, Iraq along the Euphrates River. A key component to successfully augmenting the companies with intelligence Soldiers while maintaining the Battalion’s own intelligence mission was the addition of three Soldiers from the Brigade S2’s Analysis and Control Team (ACT). The Brigade Soldiers...
eagerly accepted the opportunity to work at the company level and were more experienced as intelligence practitioners than the analysts and Infantry Soldiers working in the Battalion intelligence section. The less experienced analysts worked under the mentoring and supervision of the S2 and senior intelligence NCO in the Plans and Operations cells. Of note, none of the three Soldiers from Brigade are analysts by military occupational specialty (MOS), yet were far more effective at meeting company commanders’ requirements than the non-intelligence discipline Soldiers, requiring less direct supervision in order to accomplish the task. The intelligence-pure Soldiers possess the critical subject matter expertise and doctrinal knowledge base to provide company commanders with accurate, fused intelligence products, patrol prebriefs and debriefs focused on specific information requirements (SIRs), current enemy threats to maneuver forces, and targetable input to the task force S2 section.

As demonstrated on countless occasions in Ramadi, the intelligence Soldier working on the ground in geographically remote locations with the supported company can exploit gathered intelligence faster, provide the commander increased situational awareness, and increase the ability to act on time sensitive information. As a result of this expertise, forces can maneuver from one objective to another with reliable, hasty intelligence and systematically kill/capture insurgents in the area before they have the opportunity to react to our operations. The company intelligence teams rotated back to the main forward operating base (FOB) once a week to synchronize with the S2 and review/update targeting and collection focuses at the next echelons. When back at the FOB, they work in the plans cell.

**Response to the Field**

The Army hears commanders in the field sounding off on the need for additional intelligence resources across the full spectrum of intelligence capabilities from Intelligence Analysts to Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Teams (HCTs) with an interrogation capability to Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) analysts. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona has increased output of analysts and collectors enormously in an effort to meet the needs of the War on Terror. Acknowledging that the intelligence community currently does not have the personnel to support the anticipated increase of two intelligence Soldiers per maneuver company, with roughly 1,660 personnel and $10 million, USAIC developed a training support package to train non-intelligence Soldiers serving in these positions. The purpose of this training is to fill the critical current needs of commanders until analysts can fill these slots, arming Soldiers with current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned. There is also some debate as to how these additional 6 to 8 Soldiers will appear on unit MTOEs, either in the S2 sections or directly in the company headquarters’ authorizations.

**Section Organization for Company Support**

The concept of employing company intelligence sections is not a new one to current war fighters. The Army’s elite units traditionally employ enablers such as Operations, Logistics, and Intelligence cells, which are not part of a unit’s organic organization, while conducting small unit contingency operations. The feedback from units redeploying from Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the need for maneuver companies, Infantry and Armor, to have an organic intelligence capability to conduct effective COIN operations, and we as S2s must ultimately figure out how to accomplish this. During the last several years of fighting in Iraq, conventional units answered this requirement in a number of creative ways. The technique most widely used is cross training company fire support teams to perform Intelligence and Information Operation tasks. When properly planned, trained, and resourced this method produces exceptional results, but this is still ultimately and undeniably an economy of force mission. Commanders must form ad hoc intelligence cells, sometimes removing Soldiers from the line because of overburdened and undermanned S2 sections in order to provide the intelligence support they need to conduct daily operations. The previously mentioned technique of incorporating and training Soldiers from the Fire Support Element—including sharp combat arms Soldiers with solid skill sets for analytical problem solving—is the first step. According to a paper by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Sterrett and Paul Gallegos with the Asymmetric Warfare Group, company fire support officers (FSOs) are excellent OICs for this team due to their training in full spectrum operations and effects based tar-
The S2 should coordinate with the battalion FSO to plan and resource intelligence specific training for these Soldiers as early as possible.

The illustration above provides a recommendation for battalion organization to support company level intelligence teams based on approximate authorized personnel in the intelligence section. The future authorizations for most maneuver battalions include more MOS 35F, All Source Analysts, in the grade of E-5 to E-7, but reality on the ground will most likely see shortages of analysts and more junior grades. The result of this shortage is the continuing need to augment intelligence sections with Soldiers from front line units. The separation of a long range planning cell, company level intelligence teams, and current operations cell help battalion S2s deal with two givens about COIN operations in mature theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan. The first is the large amount of information flowing in on a daily basis. The plans cells and company teams are robust and organized to evaluate and refine this information into useable intelligence at battalion and company level. The second is that units and intelligence officers must be able to execute with imperfect or incomplete information, which can be difficult for many of us to accept or deal with. Maximizing intelligence assets in the company can bridge these gaps and mitigate the negative impact on operations.

The plans cell and intelligence teams working with companies are the two most critical parts, and are therefore staffed with the most intelligence discipline Soldiers and leaders. The company intelligence teams should have at least one NCO to lead and supervise the intelligence operations within the company. Select at least one experienced analyst regardless of rank who is the most capable of executing the tasks in the output column with minimal supervision. These are Soldiers who will advise commanders and drive company operations through intelligence support, so they should be the best and brightest. Leverage an additional officer to work in the plans cell as well. A lieutenant waiting for a platoon leader position working in the S2 section develops an excellent picture of the operating environment, current threat situation, enemy and friendly TTPs, and learns how to leverage intelligence in support of future operations prior to maneuvering a platoon. A branch detailed officer with combat experience also brings exceptional tactical experience and leadership to the section following platoon leader assignment. Both of these examples, used by Task Force 1-6 during operations in Ramadi, produced excellent results and were ultimately more professionally developing for the officer than battle captain or assistant S3 jobs.

The final piece of the plans cell is incorporating a Soldier from the Engineer company to work improvised explosive device (IED) analysis. Each brigade establishes an IED workgroup in theater, and adding this subject matter expertise does the same for battalions and companies at a micro level. In Ramadi, the threat and method of employment of IEDs differed throughout the battle space from command wire in the northeast to victim operated devices to the southeast and highways. This dynamic requires detailed analysis to find and fix the cells and protect the force; our combat engineers were the most familiar with this method of engagement.

The best incorporation of the non-intelligence discipline Soldiers is in the current operations and detainee operations cells as opposed to company intelligence teams. It is the easiest train-up for units to conduct because the subject matter expertise and equipment required, like remote video terminals for unmanned aerial system’s video in tactical operation centers (TOCs), is organic to the brigade. Additionally, these skills continue to benefit company level units when the Soldiers return to their assigned duty positions with a better understanding of how sensors link to and support maneuvering units and the detail/process involved with ensuring captured enemy fighters remain in custody. Augmenting in this manner maximizes the number of analysts free to support the critical intelligence functions at company and battalion. An important resource to coordinate with to achieve the critical
endstate of ensuring company intelligence teams having intelligence analysts is the brigade S-2 section ACT. Bottom-up intelligence starts at the platoon and company level and therefore should be the first echelon resourced with intelligence Soldiers.

Regardless of the outcome, there are two definite points to remember. First, the responsibility of intelligence training, professional development, supervision, and oversight in preparation for and during COIN operations belongs to us as the MI leaders. Second, if the Army decides to assign these additional intelligence personnel directly to the S2 section, we have an obligation to push the capability to companies as intended rather than hoarding intelligence assets to make our jobs easier. Inevitably, S2 sections will not have as many assets as we would like, but true bottom up intelligence does not begin at brigade or battalion. It begins at the maneuver company.

Training the Team

The key to successful embedding of the company intelligence team is to form the team early and integrate it into company level training exercises. The tasks completed at both the company and battalion level are essentially the same, so the only real difference for the intelligence analysts working in maneuver companies is where their focus/guidance comes from on a daily basis. As the battalion S2, incorporate company analysts into the squad and platoon situational training exercises developed at the battalion and company level. As the intelligence expert, commanders seek your input into training scenarios such as current enemy TTPs that drive squad and platoon leaders during home station training. The training for the company analyst does not end with consolidation and reorganization on the objective, but rather follows through with sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and patrol debriefing to turn additional information gathered at the point of capture into immediate objectives and future targets.

The single most important function of the company intelligence team is to provide detailed SIRs during patrol briefs prior to every patrol, whether routine combat or a combat logistics patrol. Every patrol must have a focus on answering information requirements developed at the battalion and company level, the reason Soldiers are in harm’s way. Potentially one of the most difficult tasks for the battalion S2 to accomplish in geographically separated areas is the dissemination of this critical information to the lowest level. The company intelligence team bridges this gap by providing patrols with current situation, likely enemy activity, threat analysis, when and where to focus, and what to collect.

The next task to train company intelligence teams is predictive analysis based on significant enemy activity, as well as friendly forces pattern analysis in order to determine the best opportunity in time and space for lethal platoons to fix and finish the enemy. Analysts must be able to see both in order to predict enemy actions and, ultimately, assist the maneuver commander in developing creative ways to fix an elusive enemy. Intelligence Soldiers are truly best suited for this task when they leave USAIC regardless of MOS.

Company level intelligence teams play a key role in detainee processing, specifically with regards to tracking and processing evidence required to take insurgents out of the fight for the maximum possible time throughout the capture process. These teams provide the focus of SSE plans through a running Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, maintaining current threat TTPs, organizational links, and individual relationships within the battlespace. This goes hand-in-hand with target folder development done at battalion and brigade levels, and applies to both lethal and non-lethal company targeting. The company level intelligence subject matter expertise also helps commanders maximize exploitation on objectives and the shock of capture during hasty operations through a shorter “reach-back” capability. All of the experts are no longer located two hours away in the battalion TOC.

Conclusion

Maneuver battalion and company commanders are the consumers of the intelligence our sections are responsible for producing, and the Infantry, Armor, and Cavalry leaders and Soldiers on patrol every day are the end users of those intelligence products and outputs. Countless Army leaders will attest that we are in a company-level fight, and lieutenants and sergeants fight it daily. As tactical intelligence practitioners, battalion S2 and tactical intelligence officers, we have the responsibility of ensuring analytical intelligence capabilities required for successful COIN operations get resourced with the right personnel and equipment down to the maneuver companies.
"You are still the ‘heart and soul’ of our total commitment to South Vietnam. . . . Your job is a most difficult and sometimes frustrating task. Under any circumstances, the relationship of advisor-to-advised is a testy and tenuous one. Here, that relationship is compounded by daily decisions with life or death consequences, and by communications problems complicated by language difficulties and different national origins. The training of the US military officer is characterized by conditioned traits of decisiveness and aggressiveness. The essence of your relationship with your counterpart is constituted by patience and restraint. As a threshold to development of a meaningful affiliation with your counterpart you must succeed in the reconciliation of these contrasting qualities."1

—General William C. Westmoreland, Letter to Officer Advisors, 1967

Introduction
As the War on Terror progresses, the conventional Army is fulfilling a role normally assigned to Special Forces’ Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Although the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only combatant command legislatively mandated to conduct FID, the conventional Army may conduct limited FID indirect support, direct support, and combat operations.2 To meet this demand, the Army formed Transition Teams (TTs), formerly referred to as Advisors. Even though the Army has employed advisors since the Civil War in countries around the world, it has never truly embraced nor fully implemented a program to train conventional personnel in the art of advising into its military education courses. Furthermore, this difficult and often precarious assignment must be filled with the right personnel to ensure the TT can effectively integrate into a host nation’s (HN) military and provide positive results. If TTs are to be a conventional force multiplier in the counter-insurgency (COIN) environment, then a Tactical Advisor certification...
program must be established to train soldiers in order to facilitate the successful integration of TTs into a HN’s military.

**Tactical Advisor Vice the FAO**

One might argue that foreign area officers (FAOs) serve as the Army’s Advisor force and therefore there is no need for additional Advisor certified individuals. It is true the modern FAO program, originating from the Military Assistance Officer Program, resulted from studies conducted on Vietnam advisors. However, the FAO is not located at the tactical level where the skill is needed. TTs need the cultural and language expertise of the FAO, and more importantly, someone who understands how to best integrate the team into a foreign culture. The amount of time necessary to produce enough FAOs to incorporate them into TTs is impractical, but it is feasible to train enough Tactical Advisors for all TTs. An individual trained in broad spectrum social, psychological, economic, cultural topics, and COIN can help span a chasm that desperately needs to be bridged. If a Tactical Advisor receives specialized language immersion prior to deployment then essentially every TT will have a FAO.

Liken the FAO to a combat medic. The combat medic possesses life saving skills necessary to stabilize patients until they can be medically evacuated to trauma facilities, yet additional platoon level medically trained personnel (combat lifesavers) are needed to provide field trauma care. The Army added the G2X/S2X to ensure that counterintelligence personnel and human intelligence collectors were effectively employed and that their operations were de-conflicted. Logically, an individual who receives additional training in advisory skills should augment the resources available to TTs or tactical commanders dealing with foreign militaries. It follows that the Army needs a Tactical Advisor program. A TT member, specially trained and certified as an Advisor would enhance its capabilities and effectiveness, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but anywhere a TT might deploy.

**Tactical Advisor Training Program**

Since FID is a core task of USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel should be specially trained in the nuances of the Advisory role. SOF advisory personnel: are volunteers; are carefully screened to ensure that they have certain desired qualities; successfully complete demanding qualification courses, and receive specialty training. In contrast, TT members are generally not volunteers and do not undergo a screening process to ensure compatibility with the mission. They do attend a 60 day training program, with three days of cultural immersion, five hours of which are dedicated to understanding the Advisor’s role and the fundamentals of COIN.

The TT training program does include three days of COIN application. Unfortunately, only the Team Leader and Team noncommissioned officer are required to attend. Other team members may attend at the Team Leader’s discretion, but during the COIN application instruction other courses are being taught concurrently. The course names and the designated TT member(s) required to attend are as follows:

- Advanced Communications–Communications Chief.
- Joint Fires Familiarization–Field Artillery trainer.
- Military Intelligence 101 and 201–Intelligence trainer.
- Advanced Medicine/Trauma–Medical trainer.
- Small Arms Repair–Logistics trainer.

In the 11 man team, at least seven individuals are in concurrent training programs during the COIN application training. This means that less than three-fourths of the team will understand COIN application, their roles as Advisors in the COIN fight, and how to integrate into a HN’s military force. In comparison, all personnel on a SOF team receive the same training. How do these equate? How can these two different training regimens be expected to produce the same end result? They cannot. A round peg can be forced into a square hole and appear to fit, but in reality it doesn’t, and it never will fit.

An individual who has received specialty training as a Tactical Advisor prior to deployment, will minimize these differences. Qualified and certified Tactical Advisors will ensure TTs can effectively integrate into a HN’s force and guarantee that the FID mission is properly executed.
Learning from History

Although history is the greatest teacher, it is rarely consulted because this is not the first time this recommendation has been officially made. “The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea” was published in 1957. One important conclusion was:

“Advisory duty in a tactical unit of a local national army, particularly under combat conditions, is exceedingly difficult and frequently frustrating and personnel selected for such duty must be temperamentally and physically able to withstand these stresses, in addition to being professionally competent. Qualities needed include tact, patience, emotional stability, self-sufficiency, self-discipline, and—in tactical units—command and combat experience if possible.”

It also provided recommendations for the Advisor selection process. It determined Advisors should be selected for duty based on:

- The officer’s professional competence, preferably demonstrated by command experience—including combat command if possible—for advisors to line units.
- Special screening of officers and enlisted men for qualities, temperament, and fortitude to withstand the strenuous psychological and physical demands of advisory duty in tactical units of a local national army, particularly under combat conditions.
- Personal characteristics of tact, patience, emotional stability, self-sufficiency, and self-discipline that will enable the officer to work effectively and harmoniously with local national personnel and that will induce a respect and confidence in Americans and the U.S.
- Preference to officers with facility in the local language.

The Vietnam War produced similar studies. Of particular interest are the results of Dr. Gerald C. Hickey’s study and the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by Major General John H. Cushman. Dr. Hickey’s study was published in 1965 and MG Cushman’s report was submitted in 1972, however the results were similar. From his research, Dr. Hickey concluded that the Advisor program could be improved by having a selection process and improved special training. He stated that Advisors should be volunteers to ensure enthusiasm for the mission. If the potential Advisor was to be selected at random then “careful screening of personnel was needed to test the suitability of candidates based on professional competence and experience; adaptability to foreign cultures; temperamental disposition to work with foreigners; language skills or abilities; and the possibility of ‘culture fatigue’ of fully qualified personnel who were no longer enthusiastic about this work.” Furthermore, he emphasized a training program that revolved around learning the language, culture, social norms, political structure, economic basis, Vietnamese cuisine and religion.

MG Cushman concluded that insight was the key to an Advisor’s success. “Insight—or the ability to see a situation as it really is—is the most valuable asset an advisor can have. Intellect alone does not guarantee insight. Soldierly virtues such as integrity, courage, loyalty, and steadfastness are valuable indeed, but they are often not accompanied by insight. Insight comes from a willing openness to a variety of stimuli, from intellectual curiosity, from observation and reflection, from continuous evaluations and testing, from conversations and discussions, from review of assumptions, from listening to the views of outsiders, and from the indispensable ingredient of humility. Self-doubt is essential equipment for a responsible officer in this environment; the man who believes he has the situation entirely figured out is a danger to himself and to his mission.”

Insight is important because not everyone has it and that careful consideration must be given when selecting people for this duty. MG Cushman stated that “an effective commander might not possess the qualities to be an effective advisor and vice versa.” He further noted that “a marked empathy with others, an ability to accommodate, a certain un军事 philosophical or reflective bent, a kind of waywardness or independence, and the like—these are often found in outstanding advisors, but may be frowned on in a troop chain of command situation. While it is entirely possible to find the man who excels both as com-
mander and advisor, these men are too rare, and we need to look for good officers who may not be all-purpose officers.  

Again in 1981, the BDM Corporation reported one of the major failures of the Advisory effort in Vietnam was the “inadequate selection of personnel.” It went on to recommend that any future Advisory should consist of “highly trained specialist rather than a massive effort by amateurs.” All of these studies had the same conclusion but, as with history, it has only been read and not heeded.

Recommendations

The Army should conduct special screening for personnel considered for Advisory roles. Unfortunately, the Army personnel system is reluctant to do additional work in order to fill the number of TTs needed in the War on Terror. However, it should be possible to provide at least a few specially-qualified individuals to fulfill this task. The need for a Tactical Advisor is obvious but as in the past, the Army personnel system deemed it too hard or unnecessary to fund or field qualified individuals. During Vietnam, a rudimentary selection process was emplaced that identified soldiers who had served in foreign countries or had previous combat tours as ideal for Advisor duty. Personnel who had temper problems or abrasive personalities were identified in the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course and dismissed from the program. If personnel selected to fill TT assignments are not effective during the deployment, then they should be pulled from the team or risk jeopardizing the mission.

This article does not conclude that TTs will fail. It reminds leaders that the conventional Army has often deployed Advisors and that there are many unheeded lessons learned. These lessons all state that an Advisor must be specially selected and trained. JP 3-07-1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for FID outlines the minimum training plan for conventional forces. The required training includes language training; cultural awareness and interpersonal communications training; general FID and internal defense and development principles training; revolutionary warfare training; force protection and antiterrorism awareness training; security assistance (SA) team orientation training and SA technical training. The Transition Team program of instruction ensures team members are well trained in military skills; but the selection process is haphazard at best. Corporations recognize the importance of having the right people for the right job. Why doesn’t the military recognize or address this basic tenet? The Tactical Advisor is a good start that requires a justified position and course. The Tactical Advisor should be able to expand on the initial cultural training the team receives as well as enhance the team’s intelligence effectiveness. The Tactical Advisor can coordinate with the local FAO or military or cultural attaché in order to ensure that the team properly understands the area of operations prior to arrival. The American soldier is trained to accomplish the mission with a can do attitude, but not all cultures understand or value this principle. The Tactical Advisor can help bridge cultural misunderstandings that might take place and ensure the continued integration of the team if the leadership of the HN’s unit changes. The Tactical Advisor can enhance the team’s understanding of COIN. The value of having an individual trained in the subtleties and idiosyncrasies of a foreign culture increases the probability of success of the TT mission in any region.

Conclusion

Transition Teams are becoming a priority in Iraq and Afghanistan. Well-trained, dedicated Iraqi Security Forces are necessary if they are going to control their own country. Brigadier General Dana Pittard, Commanding General of the Iraqi Assistance Group, commented in an Army Times interview that “many of those selected to work as advisors were of high caliber, but that the Army needed to do a better job selecting and training candidates to ensure that all were up to the mission.” BG Pittard’s statement echoes all the past studies on advisors but nothing is being done to correct the problem. When will the Army recognize that “one size does not fit all” and that not all members of the U.S. Army are qualified to serve on a TT?

If the proper selection of TT members is going to be continuously ignored, then a stop-gap method might offset that balance. That method is the introduction and fielding of the Tactical Advisor. The
trained Tactical Advisor would ensure the Transition Team’s successful integration into and cooperation of a HN’s military units while enhancing the team’s overall success and understanding of their battle space. The Tactical Advisor’s skills will not apply to TTs alone. Commanders will be able to tap into these resources as the Tactical Advisor rotates back into conventional units. The Tactical Advisor is a force multiplier that enhances a unit’s abilities and effectiveness in a COIN environment. It’s time that the conventional Army absorbs the lessons learned from past Advisory missions in order to make the Transition Teams successful now and in future operations.

Endnotes
3. Ramsey, 64.
8. Ibid.
10. From review of initial draft by Mr. Lester Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Introduction
The RQ-7B Shadow 200 Tactical Unmanned Aerial System (TUAS) observes a mortar team in a pickup truck displacing from the point of origin of an indirect fire attack. The TUAS payload operator (PO) and vehicle operator work with the mission commander, supported unit, and brigade battle captain to track the pickup truck as it navigates erratically through complex urban terrain. The battle captain orchestrates aviation assets and maneuver ground forces to destroy the truck. The Shadow TUAS, currently a proven veteran in the War on Terrorism, continues to support units in comparable scenarios as it accumulates over 290,000 hours flown worldwide.¹

According to the developers at Aircraft Armaments Incorporated (AAI), this ubiquitous system, found in every brigade combat team (BCT) of the U.S. Army, operates as "the eyes of Brigade Commanders to see first, understand first, and act first—decisively."² With the Shadow TUAS, brigade commanders can tangibly achieve situational awareness, a vital combat multiplier essential in any armed conflict. Yet as a nascent system employed since 2003, the Shadow TUAS still requires refinements to adapt to dynamic mission requirements. AAI addressed some of the technical issues by replacing the antiquated VHS media device with a DVD recorder, upgrading engines to assuage chronic icing problems, adding a video capture device and external hard drive to standardize imagery processing, and transitioning to the One Source Remote Video Terminal (OS-RVT) for telemetry and mobility.³ Yet despite these technical upgrades, the need for organizational and structural change still exists. The present analytical organization in support of the TUAS platoon, the inefficient task allocation, and the current communication process limits the system from realizing its full potential in the battlefield. This article addresses these inherent issues and presents possible solutions to meet the critical exploitation, tasking, and dissemination requirements.

Need for Integrated Imagery Analysts
Despite the growing multi-discipline intelligence assets owned and leveraged by today’s BCT, the lack of a fundamental analysis team for Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) limits its ability to fully profit from UAS missions. According to its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), the BCT is authorized two military occupational specialty (MOS) 35G Imagery Analysts assigned to the Military Intelligence company. Filling this requirement varies between BCTs based on perceptions of rel-
evance and available personnel. The TUAS platoon typically consists of a platoon leader (35D), warrant officer (MOS 350U), vehicle operators (MOS 35K), and a maintenance section consisting of systems maintainers (MOS 35T) and power generation repairers (MOS 52D). In terms of flight operations and the ability to meet collection requirements in direct support of Maneuver BCTs, this current TUAS platoon MTOE exceeds expectations. Yet in terms of imagery analysis, this platoon MTOE does not allow for realization of the BCTs exploitation requirements, a vital intelligence component to enable a higher degree of analysis. Unless a Soldier attended an imagery course in the past, the platoon MTOE does not demand any organic imagery analysts. In fact, the platoon leader often qualifies as the only analyst trained in the fusion of intelligence, albeit without any required training in imagery analysis. The warrant officer handles frequency management, aviation standardization, and flight operations, a multifaceted duty description that limits time for any analysis of TUAS live feed or forensic analysis of video captures.

As for the TUAS operators, the current Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, and Acquisition (RSTA) and Imagery curriculum taught at the TUAS training center in Fort Huachuca, Arizona lasts a mere nine days and only covers level 1 analysis in scrutinizing imagery. (Level 1 analysis pertains to the basic level of identifying principally Soviet manufactured military equipment within a 24 hour reporting period.) Relating this to the mortar truck scenario mentioned earlier, this equates to the ability to identify a civilian truck with a probable mortar tube of some sort. This satisfies the basic collection requirement, but who provides the higher level exploitation? Who conducts a forensic examination of the TUAS video, geo-rectifies the grids, and pinpoints the five different houses the mortar truck visits following the attack? Higher level exploitation requirements can take from 7 to 30 days depending on the requested product. In the BCT framework, the S2 operations section or MOS 35F analysts from the Analysis and Control Team (ACT) occasionally create relevant products from the TUAS feed including overlays of known enemy houses, routes taken by fighters, and locations of roadblocks. However, these products result more as an afterthought by a resourceful analyst than as a deliberate exploitation effort.

Other factors limit MOS 35F all source analysts from devoting energy towards imagery exploitation. First, constrained by the other daily intelligence requirements, these analysts seldom deviate from their daily products. Analysts at the battalion level find it even more difficult to meet this higher level exploitation requirement given the limited staff. Second, analysts who spare themselves a few hours to examine the TUAS feed need to understand how to cross reference the system telemetry with mapping programs like FalconView or ArcGIS to resolve the target location error (TLE) of 80 to 240 meters inherent with all Shadow TUAS feeds. Third, S2 analysts at the brigade and battalion level often neglect the crucial task of monitoring and communicating with the TUAS operators using the Internet Relay Chat client (mIRC) in order to complete other tasks. S2 sections occasionally forget when they possess dedicated TUAS support especially when inundated with volumes of sensitive intelligence.

The U.S. Army, aware of the requirement for integrating imagery analysts into the BCT, eventually plans to transition Common Ground Station (CGS) analysts (MOS 35H) into imagery analysts (MOS 35G) with 21 weeks of focused training. According to the MTOE, this provides up to six MOS 35G Soldiers for the BCT. These imagery analysts will provide the short term solution to imagery exploitation. A long term solution requires integration of at least four imagery analysts into the TUAS platoon to cultivate a functional relationship. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command must emphasize higher level imagery analysis in the curriculum to equip the TUAS POs with the knowledge necessary to augment the MOS 35Gs and intelligence sections within the BCT. The BCT should take a lesson from the Aerial Reconnaissance Support Team (ARST) attached to Task Force ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize). This team, consisting of four imagery analysts (MOS 35G) and an all source analyst (MOS 35F), works with the TUAS mission commander to provide real time as well as forensic analysis of imagery. Each of the imagery analysts in the ARST handles a critical task: monitoring full motion video (FMV), communicating with supported units, developing products from exploitation of imagery, and supervision of operations.

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BCT IMINT support structure). A thorough forensic analysis following an hour long firefight in an urban environment could result in a product showing each of the multiple houses used by the gunmen as possible cache and rally points.

Furthermore, dynamic retasking of the Shadow TUAS often results in neglecting the essential elements to effective collection. For example, following an ambush resulting in a wounded Soldier, the TUAS should collect on hostile elements attempting to exploit the patrol’s vulnerabilities rather than fixate on the victim. The temptation to observe friendly maneuvers often averts the TUAS from observing potential enemy movements. In order to ensure efficient task allocation of the Shadow TUAS, the platoon leadership along with the collection manager (CM) should deliberately educate the BCT on the capabilities and limitations of the system prior to deployment. This education process requires face to face discussions with S2 and S3 staff at the battalion and brigade level.

Communication and Dissemination
Efficient communications between the TUAS platoon and the BCT assures not only relevant missions revolving around the brigade commander’s priority information requirements but also unity of effort with other collection assets to adapt to the dynamic environment. The arrangement of key staff sections within an office environment positively or negatively impacts communication. The location of the TUAS operations section widely varies among BCTs, with some operating directly across from the battle captain and key staff, and others operating remotely using electronic communication mediums. The optimal arrangement to streamline the intelligence process features a small operations cell including the platoon leader, warrant officer, and mission commander present within the tactical operations center close to the battle captain, fire support cell, collection manager, and CGS analysts. This allows for dynamic retasking in response to troops in contact or indirect fire attacks, direct feedback to the collection manager, and close coordination in response to CGS spot reports. For example, a valid collection requirement may ask whether insurgents use a certain open area as a cache site. Instead of potentially waiting months for feedback, the CM can easily turn to the CGS
analysts and TUAS operators for direct input. In addition, this framework encourages direct communication with the battle captain if retaskings cause unnecessary deviation from missions, especially during misuse of the finite asset.

The TUAS platoon leadership, PO, or imagery analyst needs to participate in ACT fusion meetings not only to provide feedback on observation of NAIs, but also to maintain a clear understanding of the dynamic area of operations (AO). By increasing the platoon’s awareness of the AO, the POs will engage in active collection as opposed to passive. For example, suppose a TUAS PO observes an increasing number of burning tires and trash barriers along road intersections in a particular town. If the operator knew that this town held the last remnants of a threatened religious group, it should kindle a response to alert the battle captain or S2 section of a possible attack. As mentioned previously, battalion level S2 analysts cannot devote the time to constantly monitor mIRC and observe the FMV. TUAS POs often memorize the layout and day to day activities within the AO from repetitive observation of NAIs. As the idiom goes, “every Soldier a Sensor” (ES), the TUAS POs cannot resort to passive collection.

The TUAS platoon also needs to espouse effective communications in the dissemination process. Depending on the emphasis placed on dissemination and standard operating procedures, the TUAS platoons vary in how they email the products or post the products on a website or shared drive. To find an old video or image of a particular mosque on a website or shared drive could prove laborious depending on how the platoon named the file. An Image Product Library (IPL) dedicated to the TUAS platoon with a standard naming convention for images and video will assist in the dissemination of products to the consumers and facilitate the push/pull ability to transfer products.

**Conclusion**

The Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David Petraeus, recently stated that as a key enabler, “the commanders downrange are always looking for additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).” Until the development of newer ISR systems, this ‘additional ISR’ capability results from enhancing the employment of current ISR systems. Although the Shadow TUAS decidedly meets current collection and processing ISR requirements, the system requires organizational and structural change to effectively meet the exploitation, tasking, and dissemination ISR requirements. Integrating imagery analysts and empowering POs to actively collect enables advanced exploitation. Extensive collaboration with the CM ensures efficient task allocation and a clear focus for the finite asset. Promoting direct communications with key staff members and the development of a standard IPL ensures effective dissemination. The Army provides more UAS coverage than any other service. Realizing the full potential of the Shadow TUAS will result not only from technological upgrades, but more importantly, from these fundamental internal changes to deliver high level imagery products pertinent to the Soldier on the ground.

**Endnotes**


3. Interview with Course Manager, UAS Operations Technician (150U), USAIC, 23 March 2008.

4. Interview with Chief, GEOINT Branch, Requirements Determination Directorate, USAIC, 12 March 2008.

5. Interview with Course Manager, UAS Operator (35K) Common Core Course, UASTB, USAIC, 18 March 2008.


7. AAI Corporation, *Shadow RQ-7B System: Providing Critical Battlefield Intelligence*

8. Interview with Course Manager, UAS Operator CCC, USAIC, 18 March 2008.


Applying the Diamond and Strange Models to Completely Defeat an Insurgency

by Captain Tanya Mack

Fighting an insurgency requires a counter insurgent force to defeat the insurgent group while at the same time creating the conditions in a nation that will prevent an insurgency from thriving. Focusing on the center of gravity (CoG) in both the nation and the insurgent group allows a way of analyzing and solving both the problem of an insurgent group and of an unstable nation that would allow the insurgent group to grow. There are different models that focus on defeating an insurgency but do not give the tools to focus on how to overcome these issues. The McCormick Diamond Model focuses on the CoG in a nation and gives the counter insurgent force a method of building a nation that does not allow an insurgency to thrive. The Strange Model focuses on the COG of the insurgent group and provides a methodology to defeat this group other than killing or capturing all of its members. These two models used simultaneously will enable a counter insurgent force to defeat an insurgency rather than solely quelling it.

**Definition of CoG**

In order to find the CoG, one must first define it. In Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the U.S. military defines it as “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” This is in line with what many translate Clausewitz to have decided the CoG to be—the hub of all strength. Others interpret Clausewitz’s view not as a hub of strength, but as the glue that holds it together. Although arguable, the two definitions are the same when looking at an insurgent group because the power that holds a group together is not always physical. In terms of an insurgent group, the CoG is often an intangible source of the group’s power.

One must find the CoG in order to allow a counter insurgent force what it needs to focus on in order to defeat the insurgency. The CoG for the nation is different than that of the insurgent group. The nation’s CoG is the people. The nation’s people must have a proper balance in their lives that will make them believe in their government and therefore not want a change. Likewise, the insurgent group must have something that holds it together and makes its members want to fight for a change, often using it to gather support from outside or bring more people into their group.

**The McCormick Diamond Model**

The McCormick Diamond Model focuses on nation building. In the figure below, the legs aim towards legitimizing the government while de-legitimizing the insurgency in the eyes of both the citizens and the international community. Furthermore, Leg Three calls for capturing or killing the insurgents.

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McCormick Model as described by Wilson.
The principles show planners what they need to focus on in order to achieve this outcome. It has recently proven in the Philippines to be a sound way to defeat an insurgency.

To analyze how to defeat the insurgent group specifically, we must focus on how to target it in order to de-legitimize it and render it ineffective. This can come from killing or capturing all of its members; a very difficult task especially if the insurgent group is constantly recruiting new members. It can also be defeated by destroying the key aspects that allow it to continue. The Strange Model allows the counter insurgency to analyze the insurgency in order to accomplish this.

The Strange Model

The Strange Model focuses on defeating the insurgent group. Robert Leonhard postulates the Queen Theory in his rendition of Maneuver Theory by stating that the COG is defined, not as the source of strength, but as the critical vulnerability. This is discussed because, although it is not the definition of COG previously defined, the Queen Theory shows the importance of looking at the critical vulnerabilities. Additionally, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning discusses that when reviewing the CoG, it is important to look at three other aspects and how they correlate with the CoG: critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. Accordingly, this leads to the use of the Strange Model which analyzes the CoG using these three aspects.

| Center of Gravity-The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. |
| Critical Capability- A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). |
| Critical Requirement- An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. |
| Critical Vulnerability- An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. |

When analyzing an insurgent group using this model, a commander is able to see what he can target or exploit to defeat the group in his area. Unlike a conventional battle where the CoG might be the command post, an insurgent’s CoG is not always a tangible target. Exploiting vulnerabilities, cutting off critical requirements, and destroying critical capabilities all lead to defeating an insurgent group.

The current situation in Iraq provides an example of the need to utilize both of these models to defeat an insurgency. In 2003 when Iraq’s government was dissolved, the conditions for the current insurgency were simultaneously set into place, allowing insurgent groups an area to conduct operations.

Application of the Diamond Model

The Iraqi government and Coalition Forces are working together to build the legitimacy of the government and complete the same goals that the legs of the Diamond Model call for. To complete legs one and two, build the legitimacy between the government and the people while simultaneously de-legitimizing the insurgent group, the needs of the people must be focused on. Security forces in Iraq are being trained and utilized to secure the people. Infrastructure is being built to give people the basic needs of water, electricity, sewage, etc. To complete legs four and five and de-legitimize the insurgent group in the eyes of the people domestically and internationally, information operation (IO) campaigns, international meetings, and building of infrastructure for international trade are occurring. To complete leg three however, each insurgent group operating in Iraq must be thoroughly analyzed to determine how to destroy the group. This is where the Strange Model must be utilized in addition to the McCormick Diamond Model. The two insurgent groups in question are Al Qaeda and the Mahdi Militia.

Al Qaeda and the Application of the Strange Model

The example of Al Qaeda is used because this is a group that has spread to different nations and participated in other insurgent campaigns. As the insurgency in Iraq or Afghanistan is defeated, this group will find other locations, such as in the African nations, to foster an insurgency. Therefore, these nations must
be stabilized using the McCormick Diamond Model at the same time as this insurgent group and its splinter groups are defeated, stopping it from continuing to be part of or the cause of insurgencies.

The CoG for this insurgent group is its ideology. As Whalid Phares describes in *Future Jihad*, this ideology is calling for the installation of Sharia Law and a return to a Muslim Caliphate. This ideology is used in different ways to persuade international actors to financially and passively support this organization. One way is to proclaim that Western countries are trying to occupy Muslim nations. This ideology helps them continue and is used to recruit others to their cause. In many extremists, this is not something that can be changed or destroyed. Their capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities however, can be. Altering or destroying these will help lead to the defeat if not the destruction of this group.

A critical vulnerability is that many Muslim leaders do not agree with the ideology and methods of Al Qaeda. Pushing these leaders to denounce Al Qaeda helps de-legitimize the group in the eyes of many Muslims. This has been effective on the tactical level as leaders in the western parts of Iraq have taken a stand against Al Qaeda and pushed much of this organization away from their communities.

This insurgent group can be dissected tactically, operationally, and strategically to see its capabilities, vulnerabilities, and requirement in order to defeat it as a whole.

**Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Militia**

Analyzing the Mahdi Militia, the CoG can be seen as the feeling of belonging to this group. Many will assess the people as the source of power and although they are a critical piece as this group continues to build, the feeling received by being in this group is the source of its power, or the glue holding it together, as in many gangs in the U.S. This is not a physical thing but contributes to and incorporates many other things. Being part of and supporting this group gives many Shiites in Iraq a sense of security. As the group takes credit for some of the infrastructure actually built by the government of Iraq, the Mahdi Militia is seen as providing the basic needs described by Maslow. For example, when the Jaish al Mahdi militia fixes a broken water pipeline, people see them as providing water. Additionally, the group provides a job and/or money to many unemployed men, allowing them to provide for their families.

These entities do not solely hold this group together or alone gives it power, but are all critical capabilities of it. Seeing these capabilities make people want to belong to this group. Further dissecting these capabilities shows the critical requirements. In order to provide security, it must have men and arms along with an unstable area that requires security. To persuade the local populace that
the infrastructure is provided by the Mahdi militia, they must have good propaganda means. To provide jobs, they must have funding. All of this can be further dissected and evidence put to show where the instability, propaganda, and funding come from based on the specific region but to stay general and unclassified, it is not discussed here.

This group also has critical vulnerabilities coinciding with the requirements and capabilities. Primarily, they are an illegitimate group. The infrastructure is not built by them and can be proven as such. There is a legitimate source of security in the Iraq government in the form of the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police. Furthermore, when a Mahdi Militia member is caught committing an act that causes instability, it is an IO opportunity for the government of Iraq to show this group is not providing security but causing much of the instability.

Many Mahdi militia members are poor young men who are not necessarily against the government and trying to see it fail, they just want what this group can provide to them. These men are not the part of the insurgent group that needs to be killed or captured; just persuaded in other ways to disassociate from the group. Dissecting the Mahdi militia in this manner gives many more targeted ways of defeating the group and making people not want to join. Strong IO against the Mahdi militia, cutting off funding, and using uncorrupted Iraqi Security Force personnel to provide security are all ways to work to defeat this insurgency.

Defeating an insurgency is a task that requires simultaneously building a stable nation and defeating the insurgent group. Completing only one of these operations will not entirely defeat an insurgency. Defeating an insurgent group without stabilizing the nation will not deter others from joining and carrying out the group’s cause. An example of this is Fidel Castro’s takeover of Cuba. In 1956 there were only 15 members left to carry out the mission. The dictator, General Batista, did not change the conditions in the nation that caused Castro’s insurgency and in 1959, Castro took over Cuba with large popular support. Soley setting the conditions in a nation that does not invite an insurgency will not stop insurgent groups either. They must be destroyed. Al Qaeda has conducted attacks in over 19 countries, to include the U.S., Spain, Egypt, and England. In countries such as Iraq where an insurgency is on going, both missions of building a stable nation and defeating the insurgent group must occur. Using the McCormick Diamond Model and Strange Model together gives a method to achieve this.

Endnotes
5. Phares, 54, 59

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Introduction
At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. defeated the Philippine insurgency eventually leading the Philippines toward a democratic state and independence. Today, the U.S. finds itself embroiled in an ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Iraq that bears similarities to the Philippine War (1898-1902). Several lessons can be extracted from both conflicts to avoid making the same mistakes while building and executing a more effective and expeditious COIN campaign in the future.

The U.S. has been involved in several COIN campaigns, both successful and unsuccessful. One successful campaign was the Philippine War. The expulsion of the Spanish from the Philippine Islands by the U.S. sparked an insurgency once the Filipino people realized that the U.S. was unwilling to leave the country and allow them self-governance. Similarities between that war and the ongoing Iraq conflict include: initial presidential policy regarding each country; the rapid establishment of U.S. military dominance; the early declaration of victory; a failure to immediately recognize the presence of an insurgency; insurgent tactics; lack of available U.S. troops; cultural issues; stability and support operations (SSO), and the underestimation by the U.S. of the occupied country’s strength and willpower.¹

U.S. Presidential Policy and Expectations
The initial situation was the same in both the Philippines and Iraq—both conflicts involved presidents who attempted to justify the U.S. occupation of a foreign country to improve human rights and because
each country was strategically important, while others claimed it was imperialistic. In the Philippine War, President McKinley believed that the Filipinos would be grateful to the U.S. for liberating the country from the Spanish, and thus have little to no objection to a U.S. presence in the country as it attempted to build a democracy. Both Presidents McKinley and Bush had the goal of creating democracies in strategic locations allied to U.S. interests however both were dealing with countries unaccustomed to democratic rule and populations opposed to an occupation force. These circumstances led to the development of an insurgency in both situations.

Similar too, is the shared belief that the military defeat and occupation of the capital would lead to automatic authority over the rest of the country. In both conflicts, major combat operations were rapidly concluded with minimal U.S. casualties. Presidents Bush and McKinley both declared victory early, after the defeat of the capital but before the rest of the country was secure. Our government believed that overwhelming military defeat combined with a population grateful to be freed from oppressive rule would result in the entire population falling in line behind the U.S., ready to become a democracy. Instead, it was viewed as an unwanted occupation force resulting in an insurgency attempting to expel U.S. troops from each country. In both cases, the U.S. was pulled into a violent COIN campaign.

Adding to the struggle was the initial U.S. failure to realize an insurgency had developed, therefore failing to deploy the troops necessary to overcome the insurgency. In 1899, the U.S. was unable to capitalize on the confusion in the Filipino ranks after the removal of the Spanish because they were in the middle of a relief in place, awaiting reinforcements. The initial 26,000 troops were unable to hold the territory they had moved so quickly through during their initial action to take Manila. This left the area clear for Filipino rebels to take over.

This also occurred in 2003, when the U.S. moved rapidly towards Baghdad, leaving the rest of the country open for insurgents to take hold of and control certain areas. In both conflicts, U.S. troops would fight in a certain area, occupy a town or city, then withdraw to another area, allowing insurgent forces to retake the area they had just left. Also, in both cases, the U.S. government failed to plan for the possibility of an insurgency and thus failed to deploy enough troops at the outset to conduct successful COIN operations, and deny the insurgency a chance to grow. More significantly, in the case of Iraq, the U.S. failed to persuade NATO, the United Nations, and many of its Allies to join the coalition, resulting in fewer numbers of troops and perceived legitimacy. The U.S. planned to invade and occupy Iraq with 130,000 U.S. troops and 25,000 British troops which was not enough to handle the state of lawlessness and the power vacuum that erupted after the removal of Saddam Hussein. In both situations, our government failed to realize the quantity of troops it would take to pacify a country from which the ruling power had been abruptly removed, allowing the insurgencies to take root unopposed, in each country.

In both the Philippines and Iraq, the U.S. underestimated the strength and willpower of the insurgents. During the Philippine conflict, the U.S. government believed that over time the insurgency would die on its own due to internal conflict and discouragement among the rebels. In both conflicts, the U.S. believed the initial violence of the insurgents to be that of the last fighters of a dying regime rather than an insurgent uprising.

**Insurgent Tactics**

Insurgent tactics were similar in both conflicts. In the Philippines, the rebel leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, encouraged the rebels to attack U.S. troops, then blend back into the civilian population, never becoming decisively engaged. This is similar to the use of improvised explosive devices and sniper shootings in Iraq, the insurgents fight at a distance. They know that the U.S. is a superior military power. Instead of facing U.S. troops directly, they attack and then hide, creating instability and fear. This tactic grants them safety and time allowing them to continue harassing attacks until the U.S. gets frustrated and withdraws from the country. In both conflicts, the insurgents conducted criminal activities, attacked U.S. troops, damaged the infrastructure of the country, and even targeted their own people in order to maintain a general feeling of fear and instability throughout each country, further encouraging the idea
that the presence of U.S. troops is the reason for the terror and malfunctioning infrastructure within each country. In both cases, the key to insurgent success is the control of the civilian population.

In addition to creating a general feeling of fear and instability, insurgents use propaganda and intimidation to control local citizens. They attack and kill local nationals working with the U.S. and ambush U.S. convoys. The insurgent strategy is to continue the war until the U.S. breaks down. They just need to hold out long enough for the U.S. to withdrawal. In the Philippines, Aguinaldo waited for the U.S. troops to become weakened from disease and exhaustion or until the U.S. public opinion turned against the war. In Iraq, with the help of the media, insurgents broadcast their propaganda campaigns worldwide not only turning U.S. public support, but the entire world, against the war. In both cases, a challenge the U.S. faced was gaining popular support when the host nation (HN) population is constantly under the impression the U.S. may withdraw at any moment, leaving those who supported us as targets for the insurgents remaining behind after we leave.

**Geographical and Cultural Issues**

In both conflicts, geographical and cultural issues hindered U.S. forces’ ability to gain popular support. In the Philippines, U.S. Soldiers had to deal with 7.4 million people, spread over 7,000 islands, speaking 5 different languages, as well as multiple dialects and all with unique societies, cultures, and economies. U.S. troops were foreign to the population linguistically and culturally. The same is true of U.S. troops in Iraq today with the addition of being religiously dissimilar.

Unlike the Philippines, where only a small population was Muslim and the vast majority Roman Catholic, the majority of Iraqis are Muslim, creating a large cultural divide between U.S. troops and the population. U.S. troops are not only linguistically and culturally different from Iraqis, but they also have to deal with the religious differences and be sensitive to religious customs and courtesies in Iraq. Within Iraq, there are different factions of Islam, to include Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd, and several factions within each of these groups, resulting in sectarian violence among the groups as they fight to determine who will prevail.

Sectarian violence has made the U.S. mission even more difficult as it fights to stabilize Iraq and to legitimize the Iraqi government. Not only does the U.S. need to pacify a country where they are foreign occupiers, fending off attacks directed at the coalition and developing a government from scratch, but it must also stop Iraqis from killing each other. The problem lies in the fact that sectarian violence has been going on for centuries and is embedded in the Iraqi culture. Historically, a rift exists between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam due to different belief systems regarding who should be the caliphate. Currently, the violence that exists between these two sects is a battle for control of Iraq as the new government is established. The majority of Iraqis do not have to participate in the violence as it only takes a few to destabilize the government and the security situation to the point that coalition efforts up to this point are almost futile in halting the killing of Iraqis by Iraqis.

In addition to the sectarian violence, the U.S. is fighting an insurgency that has no real purpose other than to cause harm to U.S. forces and eventually expel the troops from Iraq. There is no one leader to target or one cell to eliminate. Rather, the insurgency is spread over several different groups all with different ideologies, goals, and leadership. In the case of the Philippines, once Aguinaldo was captured, the insurgency was essentially over. Today, there is no one leader or one target to eliminate. This leads to the problem of how to extract an insurgency from a country if it cannot be targeted in the first place.

**Winning Support**

There are several lessons the U.S. military learned from its involvement in the Philippine War, leading to the eventual defeat of the insurgency. Two of them were to involve the local population in COIN operations as a way to gain popular support, and legitimize the HN by encouraging citizens to support their government to end popular support for the insurgent forces.
**Local population.** One of the most successful measures the U.S. utilized to quell the insurgency in the Philippines was to make use of the local population by keeping the fight local and by employing the local populace to help target insurgents. In the beginning, the U.S. Army moved rapidly through towns and villages, quickly establishing dominance although they were unable to hold the terrain due to lack of manpower. The population was rarely punished for acting against U.S. forces and was offered incentives to support the Army, which was ineffective since the population feared the insurgents more than the U.S. troops, resulting in their continued support for the rebels. Eventually, the U.S. was able to recruit supporters in northern Luzon, but failed to do so in the southwest provinces due to family bonds, community, and ethnicity. To deal with this, the U.S. resorted to constant patrols and exploited the relative calm in the north to redirect troops to the southwest. Pressure was also placed on local leaders to support the U.S. by threatening their economic and social power.

U.S. forces recruited supporters of Tagalog ethnicity from other provinces and brought them to the southwest to undermine the ethnic dimension of the Tagalog-led insurgency. These steps led to the search for insurgent leaders not only by U.S. troops, but also by their own people. The U.S. recruited scouts from non-Tagalog ethnic groups to gather intelligence, since they were familiar with the countryside and did not support the Tagalog-led insurgency. U.S. Soldiers also utilized former insurgents to gather intelligence by releasing detainees if they agreed to give up their former cell members or to lead U.S. troops to their safe houses and hiding places.

**Legitimizing the HN.** The emergence of the Philippine Federal Party, along with the U.S. policy of “attraction and chastisement,” were elements leading to U.S. victory over the insurgents. It was a strong political party that could lead the Filipinos to political stability through working with the U.S. and eventually working towards Filipino independence. It was comprised of former rebels and wealthy conservatives who supported U.S. authority and realized the only way their country could achieve independence was to work with the Americans. This political movement called for the progressive modernization of the Philippines along American lines. The party was able to negotiate with rebel leaders, organize civil governments, and encourage the general populace to support the U.S. The people of the Philippines were offered evidence of the political and economic advantages of working with the U.S., which led to popular support for U.S. programs as well as convincing several insurgents to support U.S. troops and HN government. Eventually, the U.S. adopted a policy of “attraction and chastisement” in the Philippines, meaning that instead of doing nothing when the population supported the insurgents, they rewarded support for the U.S. and punished opposition, both amongst the population and the insurgents. This proved to be an effective operational strategy in turning the local populace against the insurgents and gaining support for U.S. operations.

The U.S. must work to legitimize the HN government. Indigenous forces augmenting U.S. forces must truly desire to serve their country rather than working as U.S. agents while it is occupied. The legitimacy of a country’s government is determined from the outset by the manner in which the U.S. occupies the area. If the U.S. enters a country and immediately takes over the political, military, and COIN operations, the HN government is automatically viewed as puppets of the U.S. and loses popular support. A government cannot be legitimized without the support of its citizens, so in order to succeed the government needs at least the passive support of its population. One way to gain this legitimacy is to use professional, indigenous police and security forces to augment and ultimately replace occupation forces. These local forces not only add troop strength but they are also aware of cultural norms and customs and have the linguistic ability that the occupying force lacks. These indigenous forces should be trained in intelligence, COIN, police, and security operations immediately in order to be able to hand power back over to the HN as soon as possible.

Another way to legitimize the HN is for the U.S. or coalition occupying force to act in the background and allow the HN government to make the decisions, with the U.S. in advisory role. For this to succeed, it would have to be highly publicized that U.S. troops are there only to aid the HN, and to demonstrate
to the population the local government is truly in charge and making all the decisions. In either case, a comprehensive formal training plan to educate the government and security forces must be established. In Iraq, the mission of the Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq is to “organize, train, equip, and mentor Iraqi Security Forces”.35

U.S. policy needs to be clear that U.S. Soldiers are present as advisors and peacekeepers to train local police units and that the Iraqi army conducts its own operations with U.S. troops in the background. This must be done in order to legitimize the government—any large military force or foreign presence in a country undermines the legitimacy of the HN government, the U.S. needs to step back and allow the Iraqis to run their own fight.36 It is only then that the U.S. can begin to hand over secured territory throughout a country and ensure the local forces are able to control the area and deny insurgents access.

SSO. In the Philippines, the U.S. also conducted Stability and Support Operations (SSO) in order to increase the quality of life for each population and to win the ‘hearts and minds’ as a way to gain support for the U.S. presence in each area.37 U.S. forces attempted to improve the conditions in Manila by restoring the water supply, cleaning the streets, building schools, opening the port, and providing medical support and food.38 Throughout the country, they built over 1,000 miles of roads,39 provided free medical care and vaccinations, distributed food, and created jobs for the population.40 The U.S. also attempted to relieve Filipino tensions by establishing contact with the rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo to assure him the U.S. was not there to make war with the Filipinos and to promise that personal and religious rights would be preserved.41 Similarly in Iraq, U.S. forces are clearing roads, building schools, providing medical support, and establishing local governments.

Defeating the Insurgents

Keep Military Operations Local. Besides winning the hearts and minds of the local populations and working to legitimize the Philippine government, the U.S. adopted a policy of keeping military actions local. U.S. troops would modify their tactics to fit their circumstances, based on the civilian population they were dealing with as well as the insurgents in their local area. The idea was that insurgent groups in each local area were different so decisions regarding pacification should be made at the local level by autonomous U.S. forces operating in these areas so they could more easily adapt to new insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).42 This policy gave local commanders the freedom to make decisions based on what they observed on a day to day basis, rather than utilize TTPs dictated to them from a higher headquarters (HQ) removed from the local fight. This lack of adherence to a rigid doctrine allowed officers to experiment with pacification policies in the communities.43 Constant patrols and immediate response to insurgent actions kept pressure on insurgents and prevented them from operating freely.

Most of the U.S. troops involved in the Philippine war were also veterans of other COIN campaigns, allowing them to incorporate what they learned from their past experience to this conflict.44 Soldiers remaining in the same area over time became familiar with the land and the people, gaining valuable intelligence regarding insurgent actions, members, and leaders. Soldiers were able to identify those who supported the insurgency by observing activities on a day to day basis.45 They observed patterns the insurgents and their supporters developed which aided in intelligence gathering and the detention of insurgents.

The U.S. in Iraq must develop a military policy empowering local unit leaders to experiment with different TTPs depending on their local areas of operations (AOs). The policy must allow for small unit operations where critical decisions can be made at the tactical level, rather than at an operational or even strategic level.46 Insurgent tactics are constantly adapting, and the U.S. is constantly reacting, trying to keep up. It is much more effective and efficient for units to adapt to the TTPs of the insurgents in their local areas, rather than attempting to adopt higher HQs TTPs as applied to the entire country. The local
population, its ideology, goals, and needs as well as those of the insurgent forces operating in a town can be completely different from the local populace and insurgents in another town. This makes it futile for units to try to defeat the insurgency and gain the support of the local population by utilizing TTPs developed by a higher HQ operating in another area with no situational awareness of what is going on in each unit’s local AO. It is vital for each unit to view the insurgency in their AO as different from that in other units’ AOs in order to emphasize and focus their local TTPs on the particular complexities and nuances of the insurgent forces they are dealing with.\textsuperscript{47}

**Develop Actionable Intelligence.** Such local operations also improve intelligence collection. By keeping a unit in a specific area for an extended period of time, it can develop relationships with the locals, recruit the elite to control the activities within their towns, and gather intelligence from the citizens.\textsuperscript{48}

In order to defeat an insurgency, it is necessary to be able to gather and analyze quality actionable intelligence. One of the first steps upon entering a new country should be to organize the intelligence architecture. Since intelligence is vital to the success of COIN operations, this plan should be made prior to occupation. This plan should include locations for police outposts as well as establish a comprehensive training program for indigenous police forces. Part of this training must include teaching the police how to extract, analyze, and disseminate the information they gather from the public or from detainees in order to use it in the apprehension of other insurgents. Some methods to conduct these intelligence gathering operations are to use surveillance, learn to recruit and manage sources, informal questioning, detainee operations and interrogation operations.

In addition to involving the local governments and populace in the security and rebuilding effort, it is also important to have trained intelligence officers or noncommissioned officers at the company level. As mentioned earlier, one of the best ways to gather intelligence is to operate at the local level by getting to know the local population and the resistance efforts in a specific operating environment. The units conducting these local operations would most likely be companies, so intelligence personnel need to be trained at that level so they can analyze the information gathered within the unit’s AO and help the commander develop the best course of action for their locale. U.S. troops can start a dialog with the locals by conducting small unit operations, remaining in one area for an extended period of time, and getting out on a daily basis in order to talk to the local leaders and citizens. By operating in a single area, units can determine the community’s needs, and provide for them accordingly.\textsuperscript{49}

One of the best ways the U.S. can eventually secure the country is to assign more troops to mobile transition teams in order to work alongside and train Iraqi units. An insurgency can only truly end if the local population is involved in expelling the insurgency from its country and security is established by the HN. By training the HN security forces, the U.S. not only teaches them how to operate effectively, but they also work towards legitimizing the government and eventually to handing over the security situation to the HN.

It is important for local police forces as well as other indigenous security forces to understand each of the intelligence gathering methods as well as other intelligence capabilities and the intelligence architecture as a whole, so they can be more effective in gathering and analyzing intelligence to neutralize the insurgency. The U.S. must train the police force in human intelligence (HUMINT) operations so that the indigenous security forces can exploit their personal contacts within a community to gather intelligence. Local police are the best group to gather intelligence in an area due to already established contacts, their experience in the area, and their cultural awareness. Most HUMINT is obtained through police work such as patrolling, talking to citizens, and investigating crimes. This daily contact with the population allows the police to develop intelligence databases with information on individuals’ personalities, incidents and activity in their AO. Such information will eventually lead to trend analysis and corroboration of different intelligence services and sources to put the bad guys behind bars. Such a database must be available to everyone with a need to know rather than holding the information at one agency or one level.
There is an issue of how to share information between the coalition and the HN forces, especially when the information is considered classified. One way to mitigate this is to find a way to declassify some information so the indigenous force can be incorporated into the coalition intelligence structure and operations, both in collection and analysis. As well as training the local security forces in intelligence gathering, a permanent intelligence structure must be established throughout the country. Local police forces and military units must be recruited, trained in intelligence gathering and analysis, and then deployed throughout their country as a way to control the insurgent presence and to manage an intelligence structure throughout the nation.

**Isolate the Insurgents.** As well as using the local population to gather intelligence on the insurgency and keeping operations local, U.S. troops in the Philippines focused on cutting the insurgents off from weapons, food, and safe havens in order to make it impossible for the rebels to continue to fight. One difference between this conflict and Iraq is that the rebels in the Philippines had a limited supply of weapons due to lack of foreign aid. Their source of weapons was captured arms and munitions and most of their ammunition consisted of reloaded cartridges which misfired sixty percent of the time. Realizing this, U.S. troops focused on disarming the insurgents by gathering as many weapons and ammunition as they could find. They paid for rifles or released prisoners of war in exchange for rifles or other major weapons. This strategy severely undermined the insurgents’ ability to fight. U.S. troops also cut off the insurgent food supply through constant patrolling, which kept the insurgents on the move and unable to secure food. Often, insurgents had to stop fighting in order to grow food. This strategy affected insurgent health and morale and led to increasing illness amongst the rebels turning them into an ineffective fighting force.

One of the more severe strategies, and perhaps the most effective, the U.S. used in the Philippines was the concentration of the population. U.S. forces made the population in a given area move into a designated town and sealed the area after a given date as a way to consolidate non-combatants. Any food found outside of the town after the date was confiscated, and any personnel outside the gate were detained as insurgents. This strategy eliminated popular support for the insurgents, since they were no longer able to support the rebel infrastructure. While effective, a strategy such as this would be considered too severe today since it limits the freedoms of the civilian population. The idea of a ‘concentration camp’ would not be accepted by the world no matter how effective it would be to rout out insurgents and possibly put a rapid end to the insurgency.

An important lesson is that whoever has the support of the population has the power to win. One method to gain this support and to quell an insurgency is to separate the insurgents from the populace. While the concentration camps to contain the population during the Philippine War may be too drastic for today’s world, a variation of this measure can be taken to close the borders so foreign fighters, weapons, and other supplies from abroad cannot enter the country. Another way to cut off logistical support is to place berms around the towns. While this method is unrealistic in larger cities, smaller towns can be pacified by creating these berms and controlling the access points into the towns. This will force insurgents out of these areas. While not completely eliminating the insurgent problem, it would start to pacify some towns, establish security, allow the HN forces to take over and begin to rebuild infrastructure. If the rest of the country’s population saw the strides that were being made toward a better lifestyle, it is possible others around the country will take it upon themselves to lend support to the coalition presence conducting COIN operations.

**U.S. Political Support and Public Opinion**

Prior to the U.S. entering a country, a clear policy should be prepared regarding the goals of U.S. involvement, plans for contingencies, and incentives to the local population in return for their support. While the government cannot control the media, a positive message of U.S. policy should be presented to the media, so it can then publicize this policy to the U.S. population, the country to be occupied, and the rest of the world in order for all understand the reasons for U.S. involvement. This policy should be
one of minimal force, civil-military cooperation with the HN government and a decentralized command structure in order to more effectively deal with the population and any insurgent operations that arise. The overall goal is to hand the country back to the Iraqi government. This policy must also present the idea to the world that any COIN campaign will be drawn out, the U.S. population must be prepared for such an involvement.

The first priority upon entering a country should be the establishment of law and order. Without security, the U.S. will lack popular support, will be unable to rebuild infrastructure, and will be unable to legitimize the HN government. Soldiers must gain the trust of the local populace by lowering force protection levels, such as exiting armored vehicles, walking amongst the population, and talking to the leaders and members of communities. Before this can be done effectively, all Soldiers must receive cultural awareness training so they do not offend from the beginning.

U.S. units must use force discriminately, as more force leads to less effectiveness. Units need to work ‘by, with, and through’ indigenous forces in order to provide basic necessities to improve the standard of living in a community. Involve the local population in SSO operations as poor quality of living is what motivates most people to support an insurgency. By providing jobs, better housing, electricity, running water, health care and education, people begin to want more, such as political freedoms and an overall better lifestyle. Iraqis should be hired and be responsible for rebuilding their own infrastructure rather than waiting for U.S. contractors to do the work. This would not only provide jobs and a source of income, but it would lead to pride in country and may result in the local population no longer supporting the insurgency because they do not want to see their hard work destroyed. The U.S. can play a supporting role by offering expertise and resources while allowing the Iraqis to manage projects and do the manual labor.

Establish security so those who do not want to support the insurgency feel safe enough to come forward and offer their support to the coalition. Citizens will not care about elections and the political process until they feel secure and their basic needs are met, it is only then that a political dialog can begin. People need incentives to act in support of one side or the other; they need to believe the side they support will win. The people must believe their future will be brighter if they support the COIN effort.

American public opinion regarding conflicts the U.S. is involved in is the center of gravity to political decision making. In the past, public opinion tended to be more concerned with losing the war than with how many troops were lost, resulting in the decision of the U.S. government to remain involved in conflicts until the situation was resolved. Today, however, with the pervasive presence of the media reporting on the death of every single U.S. Soldier lost in Iraq, it is much harder for the government to maintain a positive U.S. public opinion of the conflict.

The insurgents do not need a decisive military victory. Their goal is to hold out and prevent the other side from winning, which can be achieved by turning U.S. public opinion against the conflict and waiting for the occupation troops to withdraw. This is why it is vital for the president to articulate the importance of the U.S. mission and to detail the progress being made to the U.S. public, the citizens of the country U.S. troops are operating in, and to the rest of the world.

In order to defeat an insurgency it is necessary to achieve a decisive military victory over the insurgents before SSO can truly be effective. These operations cannot truly succeed until security has been established within the country. In order to achieve this military victory, rebels must be separated from the population to prevent disruption of civil organization, local governments, and SSO.

**Additional Challenges Facing U.S. Troops**

There are several additional challenges facing units conducting COIN operations today that did not exist during the Philippine War. These include the presence of the media and the Internet and the ability they provide for all to view the intimate details of a COIN operation. Other challenges are the technical and social changes that have taken place over the past century and the presence of international organi-
zations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the battlefield, as well as sectarian violence and the lack of a unified purpose and leadership to the insurgency.

The media presents a challenge to COIN operations because it leads to propaganda exploitation by the insurgents and can sway public support for or against the war. Coverage is almost instantaneous—daily events can be broadcast to the world over the nightly news to include specific operations, U.S. and Iraqi deaths, and the political situation in the country. This constantly reminds the U.S. and world population of the ongoing conflict, and can put a positive or a negative spin on U.S. progress, thereby affecting world opinion of the operation. News coverage influences everyone from the U.S. population to the undecided population of the occupied areas, as well as third parties in the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{64} Reporters are prevalent throughout the battlefield and have access to different regions in the country, the units operating there, and activities occurring on a day to day basis. News agencies have the power to report the progress the U.S. is making or to simply report the number of U.S. casualties each day, affecting public support for the war. The media has thus far been successful in presenting the future of Iraq as an inevitable American defeat.\textsuperscript{65} Insurgents use media sources to spread propaganda and to control information operations. The outlet they normally use is the Internet and Al Jazeera television to spread their messages of violence and to demonstrate their attacks against U.S. forces for the entire world to see.

The social changes that have taken place in the past century include world awareness for human rights to include the creation of international organizations limiting the TTPs U.S. troops can use today. Today, the use of concentration camps would not be acceptable treatment of the population and the rules of engagement (ROEs) regarding prisoners have changed, leading to the more humane treatment of detainees. Today, the eyes of the world are on the Iraqi conflict, so U.S. policy has to be clear regarding what Soldiers are and are not allowed to do. Soldiers have to know the ROEs regarding civilians and detainees, and they have to be aware of reporters and government officials on the battlefield, even more so than during the Philippine War when the world was not watching every move the U.S. made.

\textbf{Conclusion}

There are several lessons to be taken from both the Philippine War and Iraq that, when applied to future COIN campaigns, will likely expedite the process of defeating an insurgency. The U.S. must have a policy prepared outlining how different contingencies, such as an insurgent uprising, will be handled. The government and military must understand the importance the media plays in COIN operations. It must be understood that the population of the occupied country is the center of gravity and they determine whether or not the insurgency will succeed or fail. Military operations should be kept at the local level in order to better deal with insurgent forces and different communities’ needs and ideologies. An intelligence architecture must be developed to track insurgents and their activities and to train indigenous police forces in detainee operations and how best to gather information from their fellow countrymen.

Finally, the U.S. must work to legitimize the HN government. Without this step, all COIN efforts would be for naught because the government will not have the support of the people and the U.S. would be unable to hand control of the country back to the government since they would be unable to provide security. All these steps have been proven to work in the past and should be applied in the future. It is also important to consider the possibility of additional constraints and challenges arising, as in Iraq versus the Philippines. These possibilities must be considered during the planning stage of the operation, prior to the U.S. occupying any country, in order to be prepared to deal with them immediately rather than being involved in a conflict for several years before handling these situations.
Endnotes


4. Linn, 8.

5. Donnelly, 2.


7. Donnelly, 2.

8. Linn, 12.


11. Linn, 8.

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13. Linn, 15.


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19. Deady, 55.

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22. Linn, 12.


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32. Deady, 53.


34. Herman, 4.


36. Wilson, 2.

37. Linn, 9.

38. Ibid., 21.


40. Joes, 111-114.

41. Linn, 8.

42. Donnelly, 4.

43. Linn, 169.

44. Ibid., 25.


46. Mockaitis, 56.

47. Quinlivan and Nardulli.


49. Ibid., 42.

50. Clark, 14.

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53. Joes, 110.

54. Herman, 4.


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57. Wilson, 4.

58. Mockaitis, 17.

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60. Mockaitis, 53.

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65. Herman, 53.
 ISR: A Guide for Battalion S2s

by Captain Emily Rentschler

Introduction

Battalion S2s in fires and effects, operations support, and force sustainment units are often junior officers, ranging from second lieutenants to pre-career course captains who have little to no collection management experience. These junior officers are deploying and have the desire and necessity to effectively answer information requirements (IRs) using systems but have limited training. Although, collection management at the brigade level and higher is a job dedicated to one officer with additional training, battalion S2s are expected to understand and leverage the available resources to support their battalions’ mission. This guide is meant to provide junior officers serving as battalion intelligence officers with a baseline knowledge on what assets and resources are available; how to task, request and exploit those assets in a cohesive manner to solve intelligence problems, and effectively translate that into support to targeting.

The basis for all information here is doctrine. But, while doctrine provides a strong framework for all military functions and operations, there is much to be learned from the Soldier’s experience. The focus (and most of the experience shared) will be on the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the basics can be applied across a variety of missions. This guide will start with an emphasis on doctrine, both the collection management and targeting cycles, and will conclude with the application of those processes to intelligence synchronization and the solving of the intelligence problem.

Collection Management

In order to effectively target anything (a person, weapon system, or building) you must answer the existing intelligence gaps. In order to answer those intelligence gaps you must employ collection assets or receive information from assets already employed. Note: The term collection assets will be used as an all encompassing term, not limited to intelligence assets. The current operating environment in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom has brought us back to the concept of Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2). This process is collection management. Doctrinally, collection management is “the set of procedures that orchestrate ISOS (intelligence system of systems) organizations and systems to focus the intelligence effort in support of warfighting and operations other than war”. As a battalion S2 your job is to leverage the collection assets you have available (and those that are not apparently available to you) in order to support the mission.

To best employ and exploit all collection assets someone within your battalion S2 section must act as collection manager. Arguably, the lack of organic intelligence assets makes the job of your collection manager more difficult and requires a high level of threat knowledge in order to creatively answer the intelligence gaps. Within a typical collection management section in a division Analysis and Control Element, doctrine specifies three separate
functions: the Requirements Manager, the Mission Manager and the Asset Manager. Each of the functions is separate, but not mutually exclusive. They must operate with full knowledge of what the other function is planning. This is easily accomplished at the battalion level, as you will most likely have one person handle all three functions. If your section is manned with an assistant S2 or mid-grade noncommissioned officer I would recommend making him or her your collection manager. If not, then you will need to act as the collection manager (this is more likely the case in non-maneuver units). If you, as the battalion S2, are also serving as the collection manager, it is imperative that you work closely with the S3 section to have it actually task and manage the assets on the battlefield. Although you will not have three people carrying out the three functions, you must understand the purpose of each function in order to effectively manage collection.

**Requirements Management**

The Requirements Manager role starts during Step 4 of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process with the creation of the initial collection plan. The requirements manager has three questions to answer:

1. What to collect (priority and specific information requirements (PIRs/SIRs))?  
2. Where to collect (named areas of interest (NAIs))?  
3. When to collect?

The PIR and SIR are primarily driven from intelligence gaps that the battalion staff has identified during mission analysis. These requirements are pieces of information that the staff (and commander) need to know in order to develop a complete and cohesive plan. PIR and SIR are both linked to places and time. The places are NAIs which are the locations that an event is expected to occur which will answer a PIR or SIR. The time is a start, earliest time information of value (ETIOV) or earliest event information of value (EEIOV) and an end, latest time information of value (LTIOV) or latest event information of value (LEIOV) time or event during which the event is expected to occur. Both NAIs and ETIOV/LTIOVs are necessary for an effective collection plan, because even with ES2 there is a finite amount of collection assets with finite capabilities. Though the requirements are derived from intelligence gaps, they must support one of three priorities: determine an enemy course of action (ECOA), support the maneuver plan, or identify high payoff targets (HPTs). Support of these three priorities is critical due to the finite amount of collection assets. Most requirements during the initial planning process are from the battalion staff and higher headquarters, but as the planning process matures expect collection requests from subordinate units that you must integrate into the collection plan.

**Mission Management**

The second function of the collection manager is to manage the actual collection missions. That is, given the what, when, and where from the first step of the collection plan, assign and task or request the asset to collect. Assigning assets requires that an assessment be made of their suitability and availability. There are a few fundamentals that must be understood in order to effectively task and request assets.

First, you must have complete understanding of the capabilities of all available assets (organic, subordinate, higher, and national) and how to exploit those capabilities. When considering the availability of echelon above corps assets, consider how you can benefit from an asset without requesting it. For example, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) often flies set routes that are preplanned far in advance. If you are interested in an area within that coverage, consider requesting a product from that scheduled collection route.

Second, you must have an understanding of the maneuver plan and how that will impact availability of ES2. Third, the maintenance status of subordinate and organic assets is critical to know. For assets in your brigade MI Company (MICO) and other division and theater assets that you request on a regular basis it would behoove you to have an understanding of their maintenance schedule, as well as other constraints (many of these assets are contractor run and therefore constraints which limit the number of available hours, for example, are often in place). Fourth, understand how certain assets work well together. This will allow you to determine which assets can be used in a cueing relationship and which would be better utilized as part of a mix or redundancy package.

In order to task assets, a specific task must be created for them as part of the collection plan.
These are specific orders or requests (SORs). This allows the asset that you are tasking or requesting to understand exactly what you are expecting to receive from the collection. During the tasking process you must be cognizant of what you can task and request. For example, you may not be able to request specific assets within the MICO, but only be able to request the MICO itself. When tasking ES2, you may only have the authority to task a specific company, not a specific platoon. If this is the case, the wording of the SORs is vital. SORs can be worded in such a way that they determine which asset that MICO commander must use to collect or which platoon the commander must use based on planned missions. You will receive the information you require and maintain a relationship with the commanders, as well.

The other role of the mission manager is to exploit those requested assets. At the battalion level this will be most critical to answering intelligence gaps. The ability to push and pull information across the battlefield is most vital to all collection management; it eliminates the information stove pipes and creates a more efficient intelligence network by eliminating redundant missions. In the current operating environment almost all reports and products (at the Secret and below level) are transmitted over email. An approach that works is to get onto the distribution list for the asset you require. For example, if coherent change detection from the U2 is vital to a battalion’s mission, the battalion S2 must work with the higher echelon’s collection manager to get on the distribution list for the products directly from the analysts. Analysts are continually trying to improve their product, and will often ask for feedback. When that battalion S2 is able to provide feedback directly to the analysts (carbon-copying the higher collection manager after receiving his permission) they are able to provide more timely information to the end user. Develop an effective way to debrief your patrols, convoys, etc. and push that information to higher. It may not seem to have any value to you, but the presence of a new vehicle, large group of children, or new propaganda poster may fulfill a higher IR.

**Asset Management**

The final function of the collection management is asset management. This is the execution piece. This function is typically not completed by the collection manager, but the commander who owns the assets actually doing the collecting. The asset manager must execute collection in accordance with the collection plan which is provided by the mission manager. Commanders manage their assets, so you may be working with many asset managers, but it is important that you have oversight. Ensure that the asset manager is executing collection within the collection plan, specifically that requirements are fulfilled. The asset manager will rely mostly on the SORs to conduct the collection, which reinforces the importance of well written SORs.

The second function of the asset manager is to execute exploitation in accordance with the collection plan. For example, ES2 must be exploited, typically in the form of some sort of debrief. The collection manager will create the most effective method for debrief, ideally face to face, but realistically a debrief report can be just as effective. Exploitation of higher collection requests done at the battalion level will most likely be in the form of receiving products from higher. Again, JSTARS can be used as an example; “pulling” the product of the information from JSTARS that was coincidentally collected is exploitation done at the battalion/brigade level.

An effective collection manager must be knowledgeable of the available assets in order to effectively leverage them. Knowledge needs to go beyond understanding how an asset is typically used. You must know all the capabilities of an asset in order to effectively leverage all available assets. For example, non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR) may typically be used for route reconnaissance, but the optics/target pod (Sniper pod) on the aircraft makes it an effective tool to identify ground disturbances. JSTARS, in its typical role, is tasked to collect on an area with an analyst watching the feed on a common ground station monitor identifying changes to moving target indicators. In a non-traditional use of JSTARS an event occurs on the ground, such as an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion; JSTARS feeds from the previous 12 hours can be analyzed to identify any unusual traffic patterns that may be related to the IED attack and the point of origin of that unusual traffic. A second part of asset knowledge is knowing what is in the theatre you are operating in and knowing who to contact to exploit those assets. At this point you must work with your higher echelon.
collection manager to develop those relationships and have access to all assets.

ES2 is critical enough that it must be discussed as a collection asset. All Soldiers within your unit are sensors, whether they leave the forward operating base or not. Those assets must be exploited. In order to best manage the information received from these assets, create two main categories: tasked collection and walk-in information. Tasked collection is the category for specific information that you had Soldiers collect and walk-in information is all other information that they volunteer.Capturing the information with a method that allows it to be retrieved quickly and orderly is key to the success of ES2. If your collection tasks are recurring, create a report that incorporates all the information you require (each piece is an SOR). This ensures that the information is reported in a format that is consistent and contains all of the data that you need to catalog the information into your database. Walk-in information is usually best captured in a modified form of the SALUTE report. Using all or some of the SALUTE format will ensure that all pieces of the data are cataloged and available.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is often overlooked by collection managers as a valuable means to collect intelligence. In theater, you are likely to be consumed by the SIPRnet computer that you work on and all of the available information on it, but OSINT often gives a new perspective. Utilizing only classified media is similar to looking at the situation with blinders on; exploring and exploiting open source media, host nation, U.S., and international sources will give you a more complete perspective on the impact of events.

Collection Management Process

According to FM 34-2 the first step to collection management is to develop requirements. That is “the identification, prioritization, and refinement of uncertainties concerning the threat and the battlefield environment that a command must resolve to accomplish its mission”. This is conducted throughout the military decision making process (MDMP), beginning during mission analysis and IPB with the creation of the event template and matrix and initial ISR plan which supports the priority of determining threat COAs. Requirements are expanded upon and refined during friendly COA development and primarily support the maneuver plan. The initial set of requirements are finalized during wargaming with the focus on support of the priority identification of HPTs. Note: Requirement development never truly ends since the battlefield is fluid and changing and so are requirements. Once requirements are developed and prioritized they must be linked to time (ETIOV/LTIOV), location (NAI), SIRs, and indicators. This linkage fleshes out the collection plan and allows for SORs to be created and for assets to be tasked and requested.

The next step is development of the actual collection plan. The collection plan is “the integrated and synchronized plan that selects the best collectors to cover each requirement.” At this point, units (assets under your headquarters’ control) are tasked and higher assets are requested based on SORs. A method that can be used, but may not be possible in a time constrained environment is to evaluate available assets by INT to determine which are capable of collecting on a particular requirement and then assess which would give the desired results to include.

Figure 1.a

Cuing is the relationship of two or more collection assets. In this example a SIGINT and IMINT asset with one asset (SIGINT) collecting while the other asset (IMINT) is in stand-by mode. Once the SIGINT asset identifies the target within the NAI the IMINT assets is used to begin collecting on that NAI to confirm or deny the target.

those that would lend themselves to one of the four collection relationships (cueing, mix, redundancy, and integration). Items to consider include the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of the asset and any environmental constraints.

Collection relationships lead into intelligence synchronization and overall support of the intelligence
mission. Specific use of these relationships will be addressed in section three, but it is important to understand them now. **Cueing** (Figure 1.a) is quite simply the use of one asset to direct another asset. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) sensors are more “valuable” in that they have a smaller collection radius and are the most requested. Instead of “wasting” an IMINT platform to “watch” a specific NAI, use a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) platform to collect on multiple NAIs and then cue the IMINT platform to the NAI where an emission is reported. **Mix** (Figure 1.b) is the use of multiple INTs at the same time collecting the same information. This increases the likelihood of successful collection. For example, if a SIGINT platform is collecting on an NAI searching for a radar and there are scouts observing the same NAI, the radar can be identified even if it is not emitting. **Redundancy** (Figure 1.c) is the use of more than one asset of the same INT to collect on the same target. If a radar was an HPT, then dedicating more than one SIGINT platform to collect on that radar increases the likelihood that the radar will be detected.

### Targeting

Identifying HPTs is the third priority for intelligence requirements. Knowledge of the targeting cycle is needed to ensure that collection is used to influence the cycle and the targeting of HPTs. Doctrinally there are two targeting models used, but the role of intelligence in supporting these models is similar enough to focus on one model for discussion. Model one (and the model that will be used) is decide, detect, deliver and assess (D3A). The other is find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA). Intelligence is used throughout the process, but most heavily during detect (find) and assess.

The role intelligence collection has in detect and assess is larger and more obvious than the role it plays in the other two steps–deliver and decide (intelligence as a whole has the most important role during this step). But it has a role in those as well. The initial process of the targeting cycle is the decision to target a specific person, building, or piece of equipment. In order to target an enemy asset four things must be true:

- It must be valuable to the enemy’s COA high value target (HVT).
- It must pose a threat to the friendly COA (HPT).
- It must be detectable using the available assets.
- Available friendly assets (lethal and/or non-lethal depending upon the desired effect) must be able to deliver on it.

As a member of the targeting board the intelligence representative must be able to address all four questions, but as the collection management representative you must be able to identify the assets that are capable of detecting that target. It is important that you engage the collection relationships of cueing and mix to provide fidelity to the targeting board, as well as the commander, regarding the ability of the asset to detect that target.

The detect step of the cycle relies on collection assets and intelligence analysis to identify the targets, most often the HPTs. The collection plan will be heavily focused on identifying targets, but assets will need to be synchronized in order to best fulfill the needs during the different phases of the operation.

The intelligence role during the deliver phase of the targeting cycle may be secondary to that during the detection phase but is typically vital to successful targeting. After a target has been detected it will then be delivered on, which may involve a cue from an intelligence collection asset. When creating a col-
collection plan involving a specific target, assume that the collection asset’s mission will continue through the final assessment of the target. A collection asset must be able to cue the delivering asset and provide immediate feedback in the form of a battle damage assessment (BDA) in order to determine whether the target needs to be re-engaged. These are both cueing relationships, although not with a secondary intelligence asset but rather with a fires asset.

Assessment, as the final step of the targeting cycle encompasses battle damage assessment as well as munitions applicability assessment. Collection assets are required for the former, which will aid in the latter. BDA can be done ad hoc, but integration into the collection plan and consideration during intelligence synchronization will ensure a complete assessment is completed for each target. It may not be possible to plan to conduct assessment until the target has been detected, but a placeholder can be left in the collection plan based on the phase of the operation where the target is expected to be delivered on. Assessment is often overlooked, but when the cyclical nature of targeting is considered the next step, decide, cannot be conducted unless an assessment is made.

Intelligence support to the targeting cycle is fairly understandable when applied to a lethal operation using an airborne collection asset over a hardened target but intelligence support to a non-lethal targeting engagement is less concrete, yet the same principles do apply. Figure 2 above shows the use of a HCT (HUMINT Collection Team) to support an IO (information operations) engagement as well as unmanned aerial system (UAS) support to a lethal engagement.

**Intelligence Synchronization**

Intelligence synchronization is the key to solving the intelligence problem. Intelligence synchronization combines the collection requirements, the assets collecting, and the targets being collected on and ensures that they are interwoven. The collection plan that is created during mission analysis is the first draft of the final intelligence plan. The collection plan is modified during the remaining steps of MDMP to incorporate the identified HPTs and all of the commander’s decision points. Once these are incorporated into the plan the collection manager must now assign a specific collector (asset) to a specific place (NAI) at a specific time. The simplest and most effective way to ensure that all assets are synchronized in time and space is to use an intelligence synchronization matrix.

The intelligence synchronization matrix allows visibility of the big picture facilitating the prioritization of resources. The use of the collection relationships of cueing, mix, redundancy and integration
are essential for effective prioritization of assets. The ability to have three different collection assets collecting on three NAIs and simultaneously able to cue an additional asset provides greater depth to the collection plan and improves effectiveness.

A significant link between intelligence support to targeting and the intelligence synchronization matrix is planned BDA collection. The initial collection plan will not usually include planned collection after a target has been engaged, but as discussed above BDA is an essential piece to the last step in the targeting cycle and, more critically, is essential to the restart of the cycle for the same target if the previous engagement was unsuccessful. Although specific details for BDA missions may not be known at the creation of the intelligence synchronization matrix, generalities are most likely known for pre-planned targets. This allows for placeholders to be inserted into the synchronization matrix and assets to be on-call for BDA missions.

An advantage of having these assets on-call is the ability to task them with a different mission at the time of the suspected BDA mission, as long as the BDA mission is given a higher priority. In other words, if a target is to be engaged in NAI 1 at 1000 then you would plan to need an asset to collect in NAI 1 just after 1000, but the engagement mission could occur at 0930 or at 1030 in which case collecting in NAI 1 at 1000 could be ineffective. If the mission occurred early and was not successful, the enemy could have removed the piece of equipment from the area. If the mission had not occurred yet and the asset conducting BDA is identified by the enemy it could prevent the engagement from occurring. Therefore, a placeholder in the intelligence synchronization matrix that instructs as asset to be on-call for a BDA mission in NAI 1 from 0900-1100 will prevent the waste of a mission. Also, in order to capitalize on the availability of that asset it could be tasked to collect in NAI 2 from 0900-1100 with the instructions that it will be retasked after the engagement has occurred in NAI 1 to conduct BDA. This use of the integration collection relationship avoids the under-tasking of valuable assets through the change of the collection order to a higher priority mission. (Figure 3)

A second example of integration is tasking an asset to conduct collection during transit time. It takes time for an aerial or ground asset to transit to the collection location and begin on-station collection. The intelligence synchronization plan will fail if no consideration is made for transit time. However, this is not necessarily a negative constraint; planned correctly transit time can be used for collection. For example, a manned aerial imagery collection platform has a particular NAI to observe for three hours. It takes thirty minutes to fly from the airfield to the NAI and the route generally follows a secondary linear NAI. The asset is available for a total of five hours. Instead of losing one hour of the available time, task the platform to collect along the secondary linear NAI for an hour both prior to and following the collection at the primary NAI. This scenario accounts for and capitalizes on transit time. Conversely, if transit time is not planned for in the intelligence synchronization matrix it often is overlooked and assets are over tasked, resulting in less coverage than expected in certain NAIs. For example, a patrol that is tasked with covering three NAIs for 2 hours each during a 6 hour patrol will not cover each NAI for 2 hours. The intelligence synchronization matrix must account for the transit time even within a single patrol.

Finally, returning to doctrine and applying the concepts discussed above there are five overall goals for collection linked to intelligence synchronization...
which will lead to the desired end state of intelligence synchronization support to all SORs using a plan that is responsive and flexible enough to adjust during battle. These five goals are tied directly to collection goals discussed in the first section further illustrating the interrelatedness of the entire process:

1. All collection planned in the intelligence synchronization matrix must support PIRs.

2. All SORs given to collectors must support IRs. For example, a SOR to report on the destruction of a particular safe house based on a planned engagement would support an IR related to levels of enemy activity in a particular area, but the destruction of the safe house was not planned during the initial planning phase.

3. Intelligence must be timely. An intelligence synchronization plan that is not tied directly to the maneuver plan is of little to no value to the commander as none of the information received would be timely. Relevance to the current mission facilitates timeliness, therefore the intelligence synchronization matrix must be a fluid product. The intelligence synchronization plan can (and should) include a plan for the exploitation of collection and the analysis of the information received and should plan this to be completed expeditiously and within a timeline that supports the maneuver plan.

4. Intelligence must be disseminated in a timely manner. This is directly related to the timeliness of intelligence. From the collector to the analyst to production, all involved need to understand the dissemination process to include the appropriate recipients and the timeline for their receipt of the intelligence.

5. The intelligence synchronization matrix is only as effective as the execution of the plan. The intelligence synchronization matrix needs to be adhered to strictly, especially the timeline. That is not to say that ad hoc missions will not occur, but overall, the plan must be executed correctly in order for the overall end state to be met.

**Conclusion**

As there are factors for the success, there are also factors for failure. The first point of failure is poor decision making. The decision to collect at a certain location at a certain time must be linked to known information as well as support the commander’s priorities for collection. Uninformed decisions to haphazardly assign assets’ tasks without regard for either prioritization or applicability of that asset for that mission will lead to intelligence synchronization failure. Secondly, as important as it is to disseminate and analyze information in a timely manner, none of that matters if the collection itself is not timely. A collection plan may say that information pertaining to a SOR is of value from D-2 to H+12, but the intelligence synchronization plan needs to apply analysis to that period of time and assess when the most probable time is that SOR can be answered. If that analysis is neglected the synchronization plan is worthless. Thirdly, collection must be applicable to the current situation. To use the previous BDA example, collection prior to the engagement of the target for the purpose of doing BDA is not applicable. Finally, one of the easiest ways to fail with intelligence synchronization is the uneven tasking of assets. Collection managers (and commanders) become comfortable with a particular asset and task it for more missions than it can effectively cover or more often the case appropriately cover, while other assets that are less familiar to the collection manager sit dormant, not collecting. The most important lesson here is to become educated on all assets and critically apply assets to the intelligence synchronization plan in order to prevent failure.

**Endnotes**


2. Ibid., 3-1.

3. Ibid., 3-9.

**Other references**


Joint Publication 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 20 November 1996

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 April 2007
An Intelligence Problem

In the COIN environment of both Iraq and Afghanistan most targets are people or groups of people (or related entities). As an S2 at any level, in any type of unit, your goal is to understand and subsequently disrupt their decision cycle. The following is a simplified scenario to target individuals related to the emplacement of an improvised explosive device (IED). The IPB for the scenario has already been completed and all information supports engaging this target during two time frames, one in the morning (0300-0700) and one at night (1600-2000).

Your unit conducts patrols along a route and is routinely involved with an IED in the same location (NAI 1). From previous analysis you know there is an individual responsible for reconnaissance, emplacement, and initiation. You also deduce that there is a command and control element, a logistics cell, and a bomb maker, but you are not targeting them at this point.

Below is your collection plan.

---

**PIR Indicators**

- **Suspicious vehicle traffic**
  - Is there increased traffic on the ingress and egress routes?
  - Report time and % of increase from normal traffic patterns
  - 7:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Suspicious foot traffic**
  - Is there increased foot traffic near trigger man sites?
  - Report time, # of people and pattern of traffic
  - 4:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Suspicious foot traffic**
  - Is there increased foot traffic near recon sites?
  - Report time, # of people and pattern of traffic
  - 2:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Suspicious foot traffic**
  - Is there increased foot traffic near IED location?
  - Report time, # of people and pattern of traffic
  - 1:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Individuals loitering**
  - Are there personnel static at recon sites for more than 5 min?
  - Report time and # of people
  - 1:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Individuals loitering**
  - Are there personnel static at trigger sites for more than 5 min?
  - Report time and # of people
  - 4:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Individuals loitering**
  - Are there personnel static at IED location?
  - Report time and # of people
  - 1:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Unknown objects**
  - Are there disturbed earth at IED location?
  - Report description and time of change
  - 1:30 D+2 0 0 0 0

- **Increased communications**
  - Is there increased SIGINT communication?
  - Report time from normal communication levels
  - 3:30.4 1 D+2

**FOB**

**NAI Locations.**

---

You decide to target the triggerman as part of step one of the targeting cycle, heavily influenced by the ability to detect the different targets. In order to engage the target the following questions must be answered through collection:

1. Is the device in place?
2. Is surveillance in place?
3. Has the public been signaled?
4. Is the triggerman detected?

The following collection strategy can be used to answer the first question:

- **Exploit historical JSTARS feeds to determine normal traffic pattern and changes related to previous IED incidents.**
- Request current JSTARS coverage to monitor changes in traffic patterns.
- Request twice daily CCD/2CMV to monitor changes in the earth.
- Request AH-64 reconnaissance of the area.
- Fly Raven mission to detect any foreign objects at location (attempt to identify both the IED and any trigger markers).
- Utilize persistent stare (JLENS RAID Tower) from the FOB.

Given that the above plan confirmed the device, shift focus to surveillance:
- Request the reports from the guard towers near the gate of the FOB related to loitering individuals.
- Request SIGINT assets near the recon site after guard tower reports indicate loitering.
- Request AH-64 reconnaissance to identify any suspicious individuals.
- Task a patrol to question any suspicious individuals.

After confirming that surveillance is in place, determine whether civilians have been notified:
- Request current JSTARS coverage to monitor diversion of traffic away from site.
- Request higher aerial asset (UAS or manned) to further monitor civilian traffic at suspected IED site.

Once you have confirmed the first three questions are answered affirmatively, detect the triggerman:
- Activate an observation post (OP). This will be in place prior to the beginning of the targeting cycle, but will not become active until this point to detect the triggerman.
- Request on-call UAS coverage of the two NAIs linked to the triggerman and cue it using the OP.
- Request AH-64 to surveil possible egress routes for the triggerman.
- Task patrols to conduct route reconnaissance along possible exit routes and be prepared to conduct snap traffic control points once cued from the AH-64.

All four questions are answered, engage the target!

Your intelligence synchronization plan is as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Asset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000-0100</td>
<td>Patrol 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100-0200</td>
<td>Patrol 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200-0300</td>
<td>Patrol 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300-0400</td>
<td>Raven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0400-0500</td>
<td>Guard Tower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500-0600</td>
<td>HCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0600-0700</td>
<td>AH-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700-0800</td>
<td>UAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800-0900</td>
<td>Other Aerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>JSTARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1100</td>
<td>U2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1200</td>
<td>SIGINT</td>
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<td>2200-2300</td>
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<tr>
<td>2300-0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Time**
- **0000-0100**: Patrol 1
- **0100-0200**: Patrol 2
- **0200-0300**: Patrol 3
- **0300-0400**: Raven
- **0400-0500**: Guard Tower
- **0500-0600**: HCT
- **0600-0700**: AH-64
- **0700-0800**: UAS
- **0800-0900**: Other Aerial
- **0900-1000**: JSTARS
- **1000-1100**: U2
- **1100-1200**: SIGINT
- **1200-1300**: (Empty)
- **1300-1400**: (Empty)
- **1400-1500**: (Empty)
- **1500-1600**: (Empty)
- **1600-1700**: (Empty)
- **1700-1800**: (Empty)
- **1800-1900**: (Empty)
- **1900-2000**: (Empty)
- **2000-2100**: (Empty)
- **2100-2200**: (Empty)
- **2200-2300**: (Empty)
- **2300-0000**: (Empty)
Winning the IO War: Fighting the Sadr Propaganda Machine

by Captain Adam L. Riggs

Introduction
The Sadr Current has a successful propaganda machine aimed at legitimizing and empowering itself through subversive and destructive means and must be stopped for us to be successful. The propaganda effectively targets three groups of people: Iraqi decision makers; the Iraqi public; and Coalition soldiers, supporters, and decision makers. Understanding the importance of propaganda is critical to winning the war in Iraq because it feeds perceptions which form the basis for making decisions both at home and in Iraq.

Sadr Origins
The Sadr family has played a key role among Shiites in Iraq for centuries. They are direct descendants from the Prophet Mohammed’s family and have a claim to leadership in the religion. The current dominant member of the Sadr family is Muqtada al Sadr. Muqtada inherited a legacy of fiery conservative Shia Muslim from his forbears. His father and uncle engaged in activism against injustice and were murdered by Saddam. Muqtada has sought to do the same, as leader of the Shiite people. Since the U.S. led invasion he has fluctuated in his support of the newly formed Iraqi government, and at one time declared open war against U.S. and Coalition Forces. After being pinned down in 2004, a ceasefire was signed in which he promised to cease open war with the U.S. and use legitimate political means to achieve his objectives. However, since that time a portion of Muqtada’s Jaysh al Mahdi has been active in an asymmetrical war waged against the former Baathists, Coalition supporters, uncooperative Iraqi police, Iraqi Army and Coalition forces.

The Sadr Current conserved the ceasefire by ensuring that Jaysh al Mahdi has not come out in full force to confront U.S. forces. Rather an asymmetric war has been ongoing including improvised explosive devices (IEDs); mortar and sniper attacks; ambushes; kidnapping; murders, and intimidation operations. Sadr’s political wavering has transformed his party into the “swingman” capable of manipulating the Iraqi government. He accomplished this because of his propaganda machine. Muqtada’s short-term goal is to cause the withdrawal or draw-down of “Occupation” (Coalition Forces) in Iraq, repeated recently in his Friday sermon on May 25, 2007. His long-term goal is to dominate the government and to prevent any Sunni dictator, like Saddam, from ever taking power again; thus ensuring the greatest freedom to practice their version of Shia Islam.

Historical Comparisons
History offers some striking examples of the use of propaganda. Hitler used the psychology of repetition to reinforce his message and give credit to lies. He also used a strategy of ‘we love you, we just hate your leader;’ which sought to discredit Coalition leadership. Sadr does the same in criticizing President Bush and his allies. It shakes the
Soldiers’ and people’s confidence in their leaders and the cause which their leader has endorsed. Eric Banse, a Nazi expert in psychological warfare said:

“Applied psychology as a weapon of war means propaganda intended to influence the attitude of nations at war. It is essential to attack the enemy nation in its weak spots—and what nation has not its weak spots—to undermine and break down its resistance, and to convince it that it is being deceived, misled and brought to destruction by its own government.”

Hitler said “the victor will not be asked afterwards whether he told the truth.” He then used the 21 “incidents” on the Polish border as a pretext to start World War II. Sadr, in similar fashion, does not always tell the truth using propaganda pretexts as reasons to achieve his ends.

Mao taught that there are three tangible elements of war—weapons, logistics, and manpower—which are necessary for decisive combat operations and which western powers are very good at doing. There are three intangible elements of war—space, time and will. An enemy with inferior firepower, support, and manpower can win against a superior one with the application of the three intangible components. Time wears down the impatient superior force, as it drains resources and men in a foreign deployment. Sufficient time, space, and will will win every time. The half-hearted commitment will not survive the trial of time. Muqtada uses these elements very well. He dominates large areas that we cannot control. He plants the will to win in the heart of the people and his men. He uses time to wear down the American will, he can wait us out. Muqtada uses time by conducting a resistance war, a protracted war, which has proven effective against the impatient and uncommitted.

The Iranian regime led by Ahmadinejad and Khomeini carry an anti-Semitic, anti-western influence campaign poised to destroy Israel and lead opponents in a united effort to eclipse the power of the U.S. Their propaganda demonizes the Israelis’ intentions, focusing on conspiracy theories. There are frequent portrayals of Jews as satanic. They have sponsored and supported an “Anti-Global Alliance” which aims to nullify and counter the American led West’s purpose of spreading democracy, human rights, and western-style economy to the world. Iranian propaganda even denies the Holocaust. The Sadr Current is tied to Iran; and is part of this anti-Israel, anti-U.S. movement as demonstrated by graffiti found in Sadr City depicting the American and Israeli flags painted on the pavement.

Ahmadinejad views Israel as the occupier of Palestinian lands. The mission of all loyal and good citizens of Iran is to support the resistance against this occupation. The Sadr Current too has adopted the view that U.S. is an occupier. Graffiti on Sadr City school walls posted by Jaysh al Mahdi says: “No No to Occupation.” This propaganda method uses an emotional appeal to defend the country from occupiers, occupiers who were greeted as liberators a few years ago.

**Influencing Iraqi Decision Makers**

The Sadr Current is effectively influencing the decision makers of the Iraqi government. It has an active role in the government and the armed forces of the country, directly appealing to the government to provide jobs for his followers, particularly the military aged males. A large number are found in the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and in the Ministries of Transportation and Health. These organizations provide support bases for the Sadr Current. By involvement in the legitimate government, Sadr has credit, legitimacy, and a stake in what is happening. However not all is right in these interactions. Iraqi Police patrols have been seen with pro-Sadr, anti-American stickers and posters depicting burning HMMWVs stuck on the police patrol vehicles. Iraqi Police vehicles with mounted loud speakers blare pro-Sadr propaganda. Many of the citizens of Sadr City report that those unwilling to cooperate with the Office of the Martyr Sadr and the Jaysh Mahdi have been pressured, harassed, and finally punished.

The corruption has reached such an extent that the actions of police and Jaysh al Mahdi in Sadr City have often become indistinguishable. They go on joint patrols, guard checkpoints together, guard mosques together and exchange prisoners freely. This may seem at first sight to be the ideal arrangement supporting a vulnerable fledgling government; however it has effectively undermined the authority of the legitimate government. People who wish to pursue justice are frequently forced to take their complaints to the Office of the Martyr Sadr instead of the Police. Bribery and extortion are widespread. People do not know who to trust. One thing is clear though, a responsible and effective system of justice is not in place in Sadr City nor in many other areas of the country. The message being sent by the
Sadr Current in Sadr City to Iraqi decision makers is that “here we have peace, prosperity and freedom, all thanks to the Jaysh al Mahdi;” even though, in effect, a corrupt and compromised police force has been proven unable to prevent an effective reign of terror by the Jaysh al Mahdi. Basic rights and liberties are not present. There is only freedom for those of the right party, the right affiliation, the right religion with the right friends and family.

The effectiveness of the Jaysh al Mahdi to provide security is being promoted as the solution to the insurgency throughout Iraq, when in reality it is part of the problem. Many do not believe the Jaysh al Mahdi’s bragging and understand the dangers which follow an invitation for the Jaysh al Mahdi to come into a neighborhood and set up shop. The patrolling and vehicle checkpoints have culminated in “death squads.” A purging is in full effect with many bodies found daily that were tortured, bound, and shot execution style. Many of the death squads have disassociated themselves from the main Sadr Current to disguise their origin and supporting base.

The actions of U.S. forces to stop this vigilante justice have been frustrated. Its efforts bear less weight than the threats, murders, and propaganda of the Jaysh al Mahdi. When an American patrol stops a patrol of Jaysh al Mahdi, they are taken with their weapons and turned over to a local Iraqi Police station only to be released the next morning. Other members of Jaysh al Mahdi detained for attacking U.S. forces (after the ceasefire) are frequently released early, usually under the pretext that they were detained for political reasons.

This unjust amnesty for the Jaysh al Mahdi has led to further boldness. A case for having an autonomous zone patrolled only by Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army, with U.S. forces in advisory training takes place. The recent efforts to use numerous combat outposts interspersed throughout the city to shut down the mobility and dominance that the Jaysh al Mahdi had in Sadr City has met with a certain degree of success. However, there is a push for a return to the completely autonomous zone again, which is frustrating in an Iraqi political world where the current leaders of Iraq require the support of the Sadr Current.

The Sadr Current recognizes the power that the Iraqi Parliament holds. What the Parliament decides will have great effect on what happens in the future of Iraq. Iraqi leaders must create a place for the Jaysh al Mahdi and Sadr Supporters. It is not an option for them to imprison or punish up to a quarter of their population.

**Graffiti:**
- “Muqtada is the Prince of the Muslim People.” - Painted on the outer wall of a school’s grounds in Sadr City, Baghdad, 29 July 2005.
- “The Punishment for Helping the Occupying Force is Death” - Painted on the outer wall of a school’s grounds in Sadr City, Baghdad, 29 July 2005.
- “All Iraq is Mahdi Army, yeah, yeah, Muqtada” - Painted on the outer wall of a school’s grounds in Sadr City, Baghdad, 30 July 2005.
- “Yeah, yeah, Muqtada says during Friday prayers: No, no America!” - Painted on the outer wall of a school’s grounds in Sadr City, Baghdad 30, July 2005.
- “No No USA” - Painted on a roadside curb Baghdad, 21 June 2005.
- “The US Soldiers are cowards because they are killing the innocent.” - Painted on a wall in Sadr City, Baghdad, 21 June 2005.
- “No USA, No Israel, Yes Muqtada” - Painted on the outer wall of a school’s grounds in Sadr City, Baghdad, 30 June 2005.

The preferred method of gaining credit is evident in the many speeches, posters and media of the Sadr Current. Speeches at demonstrations and at Friday prayers habitually call for the withdrawal of “Coalition” forces. The term “occupation” was not frequently applied to U.S. forces until midway through 2005. By using this term, the Sadr Current calls into question the legitimacy of U.S. forces in Iraq. Using the term “occupation” draws ties to the Israeli, Palestine and Lebanon conflict, where Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah fought the occupation by Israeli forces with the ideals of defense of homeland and resistance against injustice and evil. The U.S. has a legal presence in Iraq sanctioned by the majority of Iraqis and the current government as well as the previous transitional government. The legitimacy of U.S. presence is being questioned and attacked. Muqtada’s speeches claim his right to conduct a resistance against an illegitimate occupation by U.S. forces. If the Sadr Current is successful at convincing the Iraqi decision makers, leaders and voters alike, the struggle of U.S. forces in Iraq will likely come to a quick close.
Influencing the Iraqi People

Muqtada holds a very special place for his followers. Just listen to a procession walk by, the participants seldom chant the more well known “Allah Akbar” chant, but have a separate Muqtada Chant which says “Muqtada, Muqtada, Muqtada, he gives us domination and victory over our enemies.” This is their rallying cry and motivation. Muqtada is more than just a man, or even a wise cleric. He is a symbol. Even his name alludes to him holding an important destiny—Sadr, signifying chest or heart, Muqtada signifying leader indicates his role as a beloved leader. He named the militia of the Office of Martyr Sadr, the Army of Mahdi, that is, Jaysh al Mahdi. The Mahdi is a name which refers to the 12th Imam who disappeared several centuries ago and will return as a messianic savior to save his people.

In a sense, Muqtada may believe that he is the representative of the Mahdi, if not the Mahdi himself. He lacks the proper education to traditionally take the lead as the head of the Hawza in Najaf, the center of Shia religious learning, but claims this leadership by virtue of his heritage and position. Holding this position makes him more than an ordinary person. Every public statement is something like a prophetic mandate, though with less permanence than the more formal fatwas. The faithful interpret what he says as divinely inspired. It is hard for the faithful to disagree with God’s will. This position of power and influence, more than any other, makes his propaganda machine seem legitimate and true in the eyes of his followers.

For his propaganda to remain effective Sadr must maintain this prophetic image. He dresses in humble robes, and maintains a frugal life devoid of extravagance and wealth. He honors the dead from the past, the widows, and the fallen warriors of today. He maintains an active charity sincerely helping others. In his posters Muqtada’s image over watches the actions of his Jaysh al Mahdi. Sadr is pictured with Nasrallah, the Lebanese Hezbollah cleric who in like fashion inspired a resistance against an occupation. He is pictured with his father, whose legacy he carries. He frequently quotes his father, although not against Saddam but against President Bush and U.S. forces.

The majority of the people of Iraq are ready for the fighting to be done and over. They do not want to fight, but instead yearn for peace. The frequent friction between insurgent forces and U.S. forces makes the tolerance of our actions seem unnecessary and unwarranted. The infrequent yet nightmarish occurrences at Abu Ghraib along with other incidents of murder and rape have been easily exploited, portraying them not only as common place and frequent but as the rule; when in truth, that kind of conduct was and is against our beliefs. The efforts of U.S. forces to prevent detainee abuse have been thorough and vigorous. The Jaysh al Mahdi abuses and tortures its prisoners frequently. Every rescued hostage from the hands of Jaysh al Mahdi in Sadr City in 2005 had signs of torture and abuse with severe bruising and lacerations. The problem of torture is much worse in their organization. The Office of Martyr’s Committee for Enforcing Good and Punishing Evil, a heritage from the Quranic Sharia Law, is vulnerable to corrupt practices and manipulation, justice is not well served. There are dead bodies, murdered execution style and dumped on the outskirts of Sadr City occur daily. They frequently have notes written on them stating “Baathist” or “Traitor.” The common Shiite in Sadr City has sufficient prejudice against former Baathists to take a passive role by doing nothing. These notes exploit a common prejudice, justifying...
the murders as necessary for preserving Shia freedom.

A recent criticism of atrocities, murders and corrupt practice of the death squads and punishment committee has been directed at Muqtada al Sadr and leadership of the Sadr Bureau. These accusations have been deflected by claiming that rogue elements of the Jaysh al Mahdi have taken on a life of their own, and do not follow the directives of the Office of the Martyr Sadr. While some of this may be true, it could also be a cover to maintain the virtue of the image of Muqtada as spokesman for all Shia People, and the symbolic messianic role Muqtada has played so far.

Sadr has stolen the credit for many of our reconstruction efforts. Coalition Forces have made a concerted effort to rebuild Iraq, in particular Sadr City. Over $100 million dollars in reconstruction projects were put into Sadr City, in particular, sewer, water and infrastructure projects. Insisting on using local contractors, all money is turned over to them for completion of projects. The contractors are obligated by the situation to turn a certain percentage over to the Office of the Martyr Sadr. This extortion effectively rerouted American and Coalition money meant for the general good. What’s more, the Sadr Current has claimed that they are the source of rebuilding and reconstruction. In order to counter these efforts to supplant our efforts, fliers published in Arabic were distributed in fall 2005 showing exactly how much had been contributed. If the Sadr Current gets the credit for our efforts, then our efforts have been neutralized. This cannot take place.

The main purpose of the Jaysh al Mahdi was originally to protect Shia mosques from the threat of suicide bombers and car bombs. Even now each Friday is a complete and organized effort. At every intersection within four blocks a group of Jaysh al Mahdi stands online to pat down waists looking for suicide belts of those coming to attend the service which typically numbers over 10,000. The Iraqi Police provide blocking vehicles and weapons support. This is a good and legitimate mission and gives credit to their cause, making it hard to believe that illegitimate and illegal activities are taking place.

In order to keep the Jaysh al Mahdi growing and powerful, a significant recruiting effort has been launched. Neighborhood schools are targeted in particular. A school room full of Sadr Current propaganda included violent posters showing U.S. vehicles being burned by Jaysh al Mahdi warriors. CDs are sold in Sadr City markets and schools depicting insurgent attacks on U.S. forces and fallen Iraqi dead portrayed as if in heaven, martyrs for the resistance cause against the occupation of American troops. Youth have been the target of recruitment into this cause. Training sessions locally and abroad offer opportunities to learn tactics and modern weaponry. Graffiti is frequently found on school walls, and say “No No USA”. Security guards and principals report that they dare not oppose the Jaysh al Mahdi who come by to paint these messages.

Everyone has had some sort of encounter with U.S. forces, ranging from traffic control points, searches of their home, or chance other encounters in the street. There have also been good encounters with U.S. forces such as giving away shoes, soccer balls, frozen chicken, sheep, school supplies and backpacks. But there have been deadly encounters, over 600 Jaysh al Mahdi died fighting U.S. forces in 2004 in Sadr City alone. Over 30 died in 2005 in lesser firefights and skirmishes with American forces. These
Subversion

The aim of the Sadr Current’s propaganda machine is not localized to Iraq only, but also includes within it the Soldiers, the voting American public, and decision makers. Several times a year a parade and demonstration occurs starting at the Sadr Bureau in Sadr City on Revolution Road, the main street of Sadr City, and marches down to Fardos Square where CNN and many foreign news agencies stay at local hotels. There they hold skits making fun of Coalition leadership and Saddam. Reenactments of Abu Ghraib and a protest against the occupation are held. The legitimacy of Operation Iraqi Freedom is denied. Propaganda is carefully aimed to blame the leaders of our nation in order to influence their supporters into thinking that the Coalition’s cause is unjust, the reason for coming was wrong, the reason for staying even worse, and that pull out is not only inevitable but should be hastened because this unwinnable war is needlessly draining our money and our men. Soldiers are depicted as disturbed victims or abusive murderers, and that someone should rescue them from the terrors of war. The aim of these demonstrations clearly wishes to influence American leaders and voters.

A Soldier in Sadr City will see a lot of propaganda aimed at him or her. One bit of graffiti written in English says “The American soldiers are cowards, they kill innocent people.” A constant thwarting of our efforts is underway. Our supporters, translators and sources end up dead, tortured and murdered. Our money and projects don’t get the credit they deserve. Our sacrifices are characterized at home as serving a hopeless cause. IEDs do not take the weakest or the unprepared; they take any one at any time without sense or reason. The rock throwers of Sadr City pound the passing HMMWVs. Saw blades and Molotov cocktails with the occasional grenade are also included. By inflicting a high quantity of low level threat, a constant harassment has frustrated efforts in the area. Patrols are cautious of large crowds. The people gather for many reasons, some to voice their concerns, most are benign but others crowd around to restrict freedom of movement. Once pinned down by pressing crowds, a patrol is a sitting duck for any enemy action. Watching prisoners get released, that were detained for attacking U.S. forces; and watching leadership validate the Sadr Current as a legitimate organization to be protected, even while attacks continue is mind

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**Posters:**

- “Ali says: ‘I called you to fight those people night and day, in secret and in public.’” -Poster depicting a photo of Muqtada Mohammed al Sadr over watching two warriors one with an RPG and the other with a PKC machine gun; found posted to the exterior site fence to a clinic construction site in Sadr City, Baghdad 1 July 2005.
- “[Long] live, live al Sadr, Muqtada for [bringing] a domination [which] is victorious” -Poster depicting Muqtada with two warriors with RPGs, found posted to the exterior site fence to a clinic construction site in Sadr City, Baghdad 1 July 2005.
- “The Third Sadr in Battle” -Poster depicting Muqtada, a warrior with a machine gun and a burning HMMWV, found in Sadr City, Baghdad 14 June 2005.

Deaths carry much higher impact than the gifts we have shared with them. Many understand the true reason U.S. forces came to Iraq, that a corrupt regime led by Saddam Hussein had violated UN mandates, committed atrocious acts against his people, and had a program of weapons of mass destruction, in an oil rich, strategically important country which represented a challenge to stability and security in the region, and which was vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists. However with graffiti at schools vilifying the U.S. and Israel, playing off the occupation idea to justify attacks against us, the local Iraqi is pressed to disbelieve in our cause. Training and successful operations give the Jaysh al Mahdi confidence. Demonstrations and parades in Sadr City rally the Jaysh al Mahdi giving a strong esprit de corps. These elements of the propaganda machine can be effective at convincing young military age men to join or at least support their cause.

The direct combat action and use of fear and terror against U.S. forces, unsupportive Iraqis, and former Baathists supports the recruitment effort. The fear of opposing the Jaysh al Mahdi has created a localized reign of terror. When actions are swift and lethal against those who oppose them, intimidation goes a long way in suppressing the efforts of those who would otherwise be Coalition supporters. The knowledge that every evening one has to pass through not only a Coalition check point, but also a Jaysh al Mahdi checkpoint, forces daily contact with them. Extortion has gone a long way to support the Jaysh al Mahdi as well. However, this also discredits the virtuous ideals attributed to Muqtada, and would rather make him look like a gangster boss rather than a peace loving prophetic leader and cleric of the Shia people.
boggling to the typical Soldier. These experiences on the streets coupled with the message coming from home and the media effectively frustrate Soldiers as they struggle with disillusionment with their leaders and the war. This is subversion.

**Doing More to Confront Sadr**

Sadr’s use of propaganda complements the actions by the Office of the Martyr Sadr and the Jaysh al Mahdi very effectively. He attacks our legitimate cause, our leaders, and our soldiers in word and in deed. He steals the credit for our work in security and reconstruction. He vilifies us and has helped turn a once supportive Iraqi public against the U.S. military.

The propaganda—Information Operations (IO) war is so critical to our success. This intangible struggle where mind, media, and battleground intersect will be where the war is won or lost. Every situation can be exploited by the enemy or by Coalition forces. We need to exploit every flaw, every mistake the enemy makes. The common Iraqi, like the common American, has a part to play and needs to know what is going on in Iraq. This makes all of us targets of propaganda along with our leaders. We need to launch a more aggressive IO-psychological operations-propaganda campaign to counter the effectiveness of Sadr’s propaganda machine. The target audiences should include the Iraqi people and Coalition partners as well. We need to use much more radio, posters, signs, newspaper, media, etc. in order to have a healthy dialogue discussing all sides of the matters at hand. We can’t hold back. Every effort should be brought to bear. We need to contend with the legitimacy question, the U.S. in Iraq, use of appropriate force, self-defense, rule of law, religion, and tolerance. We need to preach the gospel of liberty and democracy. We must address arguments candidly and with a balanced approach. The hearts and minds of the people in Iraq are key terrain in this conflict, we need to win them by word and deed.

**Endnotes**

1. The Sadr Current or Sadr Stream refers to the overarching movement connected to all the organizations of the Office of the Martyr Sadr, an organization which promotes the interests and ideals of the Sadr legacy and family; and includes all statements and actions by Muqtada al Sadr, the Jaysh al Mahdi and the politicians aligned with and directly sponsored and supported by Muqtada al Sadr and the Sadr Current.

2. Asymmetric warfare is typified by a small force engaging a large one through unconventional, guerrilla, insurgent, subversive and hit-and-run style attacks, ambushes and raids, enabling their forces to sap the forces and willpower of the larger force over time rather than in a decisive battle. The insurgent that uses asymmetrical warfare must survive to fight another day. Patience, careful intelligence and reconnaissance, and selective targeting enable the insurgent to accomplish his mission.

3. IED is an improvised explosive device, also called road side bombs, home made bombs, home made mines, size, force, materials, effectiveness and lethality vary greatly.


13. The Committee for Enforcing Good and Punishing Evil is also commonly referred to as the Punishment Committee. It functions something like a grand jury gathering evidence and sending enforcers to arrest suspects and perpetrators and bring them before a Sharia Council for judgment.


**Other References**


Introduction

“Always Out Front.” The Military Intelligence (MI) Corps is known for this motto, which reminds us that intelligence Soldiers will always be among the first forces engaged in an operation. The MI Corps will soon find itself “out front” once again—as its Soldiers test and field components of the Future Combat System (FCS). MI Soldiers will lead the Army as the FCS is deployed, as nearly all of the early components are intelligence related.

FCS Overview

The FCS is the cornerstone of the Army’s modernization strategy. It is the most ambitious development program managed by the Army in the last 40 years. The $162 billion program will field fourteen new combat systems plus an advanced network called the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE) that enables each of them to share information more quickly, efficiently, and securely than any previous systems.¹ FCS components are grouped into four main categories: unattended ground sensors (UGS), unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and manned systems. From the names of the categories themselves, one can see that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems make up a large portion of the overall FCS program. ISR systems are not limited to the unmanned categories, as a manned reconnaissance and surveillance vehicle is planned.²

Compared to the Army’s legacy systems, the FCS places a greater emphasis upon ISR and rapid dissemination of intelligence. Manned vehicles that will eventually replace systems such as the Abrams and Bradley are a part of the FCS, but these systems will be the last to be fielded. The Army’s priority is on unmanned and communications systems that increase situational awareness and provide actionable intelligence.³ Combat power will increase by the improved synchronization of reconnaissance and surveillance with kinetic firepower, not by simply increasing the number of combat assets within a formation. Systems will make use of sensor-based active protection systems that will improve deployability by reducing weight while simultaneously improving Soldier survivability.⁴

Recent Army transformation has focused on unit structure, with increased resources given to brigade combat teams (BCTs). Along with the structural changes, the Army fielded new systems such as the Stryker that can more rapidly deploy forces using current technologies. Other systems, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles improved force protection by increasing the amount of traditional armor. These modernizations are necessary to defeat the threat in the War on Terror. According to Army leaders, however, recent transformation activities and equipment purchases represent incremental modernizations. The most substantial
changes to the Army’s equipment and structure will come when the FCS systems are fielded.\(^5\)

The Army wants to get parts of the FCS to the Warfighter in the field as soon as possible. In order to speed up the acquisition process, components of the system will be fielded in a series of four “spin-outs.” These “spin-outs” will occur in two year cycles, in fiscal years (FY) 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. The spin-outs are designed so that they interface with and enhance current Army systems. Existing Bradley and Abrams will receive upgrade kits that allow them to communicate with all new systems until these vehicles are replaced by the FCS manned vehicles. When a unit receives all four spin-outs, it will complete the transformation to an FCS brigade, as it will own all of the new systems. Each year that a spin out is introduced, six brigades will field the new technologies. Each successive FY, six additional brigades will receive a given spin-out. New spin-outs will continue to be introduced to the first brigades as older spinouts are fielded to other units. The first brigade to field all fourteen new systems will achieve initial operating capability in 2015.\(^6\)

Before each system is released to the field, it will be tested by the Army’s Experimental BCT (EBCT), the 5th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas. The brigade consists of a combined arms test battalion, a simulation battalion, and a field artillery test battalion, as well as an OPFOR. The brigade conducts two types of tests: operational tests of spin-out systems to confirm they are ready for release to field and experiments and tests to aid the development of systems that will be fielded in later spin-outs. The EBCT falls under the command of the Future Force Integration Directorate (FFID), a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command general officer level headquarters at Fort Bliss.\(^7\)

The first spin-out systems will reach the first field units in the fall of 2008. This spin-out will include the Urban UGS (U-UGS) and Tactical UGS (T-UGS), Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), and the Network Capabilities Integration Kit. The NLOS-LS is an indirect fire system composed of a Container Launch Unit (CLU) with 15 Precision Attack Missiles, while the Network Capabilities Integration Kit allows HMMWV, Bradley, and Abrams vehicles to interface with FCS components.\(^8\)

The second spin-out will introduce the Active Protection System (APS) and Manned Ground Vehicle Mast Mounted Sensor. If development is completed in time for an early release, the Small UGV (SUGV) and the Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) will also be fielded. Decisions are still being made as to which systems will be released during the third and fourth spin-outs.

**ISR Focus**

Similar to the way that the Distributed Common Ground Station–Army (DCGS-A) allows intelligence professionals to collaborate directly with one another across unit boundaries, FCS systems will eliminate the barrier between Soldiers and the sensor systems supporting them. Infantry squads will have access to information from a whole new class of small, tactical ISR platforms. In addition to company and battalion level Raven UAS, Soldiers will receive data from platoon MAVs, T-UGS and U-UGS, and UGVs. Each of these new systems will be controlled directly by forces in contact.\(^9\) The data gathered will automatically populate the common operating picture (COP) at unit command posts. Soldiers will be able to view the same COP from small hand-held radios and data terminals in every combat vehicle; they need not be in the unit tactical operation center (TOC).\(^10\) Rather than the traditional architecture of intelligence data pushed down to the small unit from higher headquarters, FCS systems will distribute information from the bottom-up, as well as laterally to adjacent forces.

The COP produced by FCS systems will provide more than reported friendly and enemy positions, the type of information already available from the Blue Force Tracker or Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radio. Soldiers viewing the FCS COP will be able to access feeds from sensor systems distributed across the battlefield. If a squad is assigned a MAV, or one is operating in its area, the Soldiers will be able to view its video feed. Unlike legacy systems, the new generation of sensors will not require an operator to continually monitor incoming data. The sensors will automatically generate alerts when certain conditions are met. U-UGS sensors placed in cleared buildings will automatically alert Soldiers of an intrusion, while T-UGS sensors can be used to detect any movement along a unit’s flank. UGVs will enter buildings ahead of Soldiers,
providing video feeds and other data that reduce the risks to Soldiers in building clearing operations.\footnote{11}

**Systems Breakdown**

The T-UGS system uses networks of modular sensors capable of detecting, locating, and classifying targets. Certain sensor groups can take imagery and provide early warning for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. Each sensor field links to a node that fuses and transmits the data to the operator and COP feed. The T-UGS can be emplaced to observe a given named area of interest and are well-suited to observing dead space in the defense or a unit’s flank during an offensive operation. The U-UGS consists of sensors designed to be emplaced in locations such as stairways, hallways, tunnels, culverts, and sewers. They may be emplaced by hand by Soldiers or the robotic SUGV that is also an FCS component. U-UGS are designed for use in force protection and observing activity in buildings that have been cleared by U.S. forces.\footnote{12}

The MAV is a small UAS capable of being transported in a Soldier’s rucksack, weighing less than twenty pounds. The MAV is capable of autonomous flight and navigation—the role of the Soldier is to provide routes and targets to observe. It can take off and land vertically for use in wooded or urban environments. The MAV can also be used to relay communications to and from the ground Soldier while airborne.\footnote{13}

In one of the last two spin-outs, the Class IV UAS will be fielded. Compared to the Shadow, this system will have increased capabilities in communications relay, persistent stare over a target, and CBRN detection. The UAS will take off and land without a dedicated airfield and will be able to cue other sensors in the FCS network.\footnote{14}

The FCS contains two classes of UGVs: the SUGV and Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE) Vehicle. The SUGV is designed for use in confined spaces such as tunnels, caves, and buildings. It can mount a variety of modular payloads and can be used to enter high risk areas before Soldiers, such as rooms not yet cleared in a building or areas of potential CBRN contamination. It is small in size and weighs less than thirty pounds. While its name suggests a logistics only function, the MULE is actually a family of three vehicles.

The transport variant does perform the logistics role and is capable of following behind an infantry squad with up to 2,400 pounds of equipment. The other two variants are the Countermine MULE (MULE-CM) and Armed Robotic Vehicle Assault Light (ARV-A-L). Both of these vehicles serve an ISR function. The MULE-CM is capable of mapping, marking, and neutralizing minefields. The ARV-A-L has a weapons and ISR sensor package. Each vehicle in the system has a sophisticated propulsion and suspension system that allows it to traverse complex terrain and obstacles.\footnote{15}

The Manned Ground Vehicle Mast Mounted Sensor will be part of the FCS Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle, but will be fielded early in spin-out two for retrofit on other vehicles. The mast will contain a long-range infrared sensor and radio frequency (RF) sensor designed to locate, track, and classify targets from long standoff distances in all weather conditions. The mast will also include standoff CBRN sensors and most revolutionary, an RF intercept and direction finding system capable of RF mapping. The RSV will carry a suite of UGS, a MAV, and SUGV in its payload to give the onboard scouts greater capabilities.\footnote{16}

One of the major goals of the FCS is to improve the sensor to shooter linkage. The NLOS-LS will provide sensor-fused indirect fire capability at the platoon level. The NLOS-LS is designed to launch its 15 Precision Attack Missiles at High Payoff Target (HPT) within its range. Flight data changes can be transmitted in flight and laser designation can be used if desired. The missiles can operate in either direct or boost-glide trajectory mode. Prior to impact, the missile transmits in-flight imagery that can be recorded and used for Battle Damage Assessment or intelligence purposes.\footnote{17}

**Operational Recommendations**

Intelligence professionals at brigade and lower levels will need to rethink their methods of ISR planning as the FCS systems are fielded. New systems such as the UGV, MAV, and UGS will provide capabilities never before seen at the small unit level. Echelons as small as the squad and team will be able use raw feeds from each of these unmanned systems. Battalion S2s will be expected to be the subject matter expert on these systems and how they can best be employed.
As sensors become ubiquitous on the battlefield and the amount of combat data increases, intelligence products will increase in importance as ways to sort through all of the noise to the golden nuggets of information. The increased amount of data from all of these systems increases the importance of well-focused SIR derived from the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. Though the new systems contain software to aid in target identification and rudimentary analysis, it will be easy to be overwhelmed by the massive amounts of data provided. Battalion S2 sections will experience growing pains in developing a way to analyze the imagery and other raw data feeds at the battalion TOC without increasing the manpower in the S2 section.

Systems such as the NLOS-LS will enable Soldiers to engage stand-off HPTs with greater accuracy and speed. As each CLU contains only a given number of missiles, target prioritization will take on a greater importance. The S2 will continue to play a key role in developing the list of high value targets to aid in this prioritization.

The Manned Ground Vehicle Mast Mounted Sensor will give the battalion scouts an organic Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capability. As this capability has previously been confined to MI companies, the battalion scouts operating the systems will likely need training from the MI community and augmentation of SIGINT analysts for certain missions. In addition to the SIGINT capability, the sensor mast also contains next generation electro optical and RF sensors that will have improvements over current systems such as the LRAS-3. S2s should be aware of the capabilities of these new sensors when they are fielded.

One weakness of all the unattended sensor systems is that they rely on battery power that will eventually run down. Sensors that are transmitting or relaying data will have a shorter battery life than sensors in stand-by mode. S2s will have to keep this mind when tasking sensors that may already be in place. Commanders will need to keep this in mind if they plan on using established sensor networks in support of future combat missions.

Conclusion

The FCS will be a great asset for intelligence professionals in tactical formations. Combat Soldiers will have direct control of types of ISR systems that used to be controlled at higher echelons or that never existed before. Though MI Soldiers will not directly control each of these systems, the role of MI Soldiers will increase in importance in these echelons. Intelligence professionals will be relied upon to develop plans for the most effective ways of employing these assets on the battlefield. They will have a role in teaching combat Soldiers what to look for when operating the systems and will be expected to analyze the vast amounts of data coming from the new sensor fields. MI Soldiers will be among the first to employ components of the system, as the ISR components of the first spin-out are fielded beginning in the fall. MI Soldiers will be “out front” when these systems are first used in battle.

Endnotes
3. Ibid., 14.
5. Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, 3.
8. PM FCS (BCT), 2007.
11. Ibid.
12. PM FCS (BCT), 2007, 9-10.
13. Ibid., 10.
15. Ibid., 11.
16. Ibid., 14.
17. Ibid., 10.
Military Intelligence officers provide timely, relevant and accurate intelligence and electronic warfare support to leaders at all levels. MI officers lead, manage and direct intelligence planning and operations across the entire operational continuum.

Always Out Front!

Headquarters, Department of the Army.
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