From the Editor

This issue’s focus is on Army MI Transformation with a wide range of articles on a variety of topics. Three articles discuss how training is adapting and evolving to meet the challenges of the operational environments (OEs): *Training and Employing Every Soldier a Sensor* by Captains Pike, Brown, and Beaudin; *The Transition Team Intelligence Trainer: Moving Beyond the S2* by Major Quayle and Sergeant First Class Smith, and *Sharpening A Counter Threat Tool: The CI Special Agent Course* by Sergeant First Class DuVall.

Articles from the operational side focus on aspects of tactical intelligence: *Improving the Relevance of Tactical Intelligence in the COE* by Captain Gellman; *Developing Tactical Intelligence in a COIN Fight: Intelligence Fusion and Targeting* by Captain Decker, and *Romanian Tactical HUMINT Operations: Characteristics of Success* by Lieutenant Colonel Liebl.

At the strategic level, Colonel Wallace offers an assessment of the current status of our government’s national policies and strategies in the current conflict in *A Review of America’s Strategy: What It Will Take to Win the War on Terrorism*. Mr. Kem reviews the evolution of constructs used to analyze our OEs in *Understanding the Operational Environment: The Expansion of DIME*. Notes From the African Language Summit, sponsored by the Foreign Language Program Office, outline the challenges facing policy makers and educators as attention turns to Africa. From the Army Reserve, Colonel Augeri gives us a brief description of the USAR’s MI transformation in *Scoring the Army Reserve MI Concept—An Insider’s Look at the MIRC’s Strategic Future*.

Both MG Fast and CSM Saunders chose to commemorate the Buffalo Soldier through their columns in this issue. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca honors the Buffalo Soldier legacy by designating 2007 as the Year of the Buffalo Soldier. On July 27, ground will be broken, establishing the Buffalo Soldier Legacy Plaza here at Fort Huachuca.

We have a number of articles posted on the FOUO side of MIPB, please take time to review the valuable information in them. In the past, readers had difficulty accessing the articles, this has been resolved. If you had problems in the past please retry; the process is much simpler. Go to http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb to view the articles. Should you have any problems or are still experiencing problems email me at sterilla.smith@conus.army.mil.

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Sterilla A. Smith
Editor
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By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0713101

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
This year, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca celebrates the Year of the Buffalo Soldier. While many think of the Buffalo Soldiers as mounted men with pistols blazing as they charge after Geronimo, one of those revered soldiers has a significant link to Military Intelligence (MI).

Charles Young was born in May’s Lick, Kentucky, in 1864. His parents were both slaves. In 1889, he rose above that humble beginning to become the third African American to graduate from the U.S. Military Academy. He was commissioned a second lieutenant and sent to serve with the 10th Cavalry in Nebraska. Young spent his entire field career, nearly 28 years, with the black regiments, the 9th and 10th Cavalry, and the 25th Infantry. During his military career, he served in a number of interesting positions, including military science professor and national parks superintendent. Yet his passion was leading his troops. In 1916, during the Punitive Expedition in Mexico, Young led Fort Huachuca’s Troops F and H, 10th Cavalry, on one of the last horse-mounted cavalry charges in history. This highlight of Young’s career, perhaps the one for which he is most renowned, resulted in his promotion to lieutenant colonel in the 10th Cavalry. In 1917, he was promoted to colonel and served briefly as Fort Huachuca’s commander.

In addition to his brave service with the cavalry, Young’s lesser known accomplishments took place in the field of MI, particularly as a military attaché. Young was the first African American appointed to serve in that capacity since the birth of the attaché system within the Military Information Division in 1889. He was an accomplished linguist, fluent in Latin, Greek, French, Spanish, and German. From 1904 to 1907, then Captain Young served in Port Au Prince, Haiti, where he undertook an extended military reconnaissance of the country and the neighboring Republic of Santo Domingo and produced maps of much of the terrain. In 1912, he was selected for attaché duty in Liberia, where he advised the Liberian constabulary; helped train the Liberian Frontier Force, and supervised the construction of new roads to provide military lines of communication. For his services there, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People awarded Young the Springarn Medal, an annual award recognizing outstanding achievement by an African American. Young remains the only member of the U.S. military services to receive this award since its inception in 1915. For his attaché service, Young was also inducted into the MI Corps Hall of Fame in 1999.

Despite an exceptional career, Colonel Young was medically retired in 1917 for high blood pressure and Bright’s disease purportedly incurred during his attaché service in Liberia. He was, at this time, the highest ranking African American in the U.S. Army, and one of only three black commissioned officers. Charles Young’s quest to serve during World War I was denied, but he was recalled to active duty in 1919 to serve again as military attaché in Liberia. He died on January 8, 1922, in that post. At the time he was on a research expedition in Lagos, Nigeria. Although initially buried in Nigeria, his body was returned to the U.S. and interred at Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C., in 1923. In addition to being a fine Soldier and leader, Charles Young was a husband, father, poet, playwright, composer, and musician. He was known for his generosity, politeness, and dedication to his country and his race. He embodied the Army values.

Our Army is nearly always in a state of change. Today we call this Transformation, a focus on making our Army more efficient and effective. But historically we can look at transformations that have also made us morally and physically stronger, changes which also make us better able to meet the contemporary operating environment. Indeed, the Buffalo Soldiers are symbols of many of the transformations our Army has gone through in the past 200 years, and Colonel Charles Young is a symbol of personal and professional transformation. And best of all, he was an Intelligence soldier.

(Continued on page 4)
The Legacy of the Buffalo Soldier

On July 28, 1866, Congress passed legislation authorizing the formation of six Army regiments—the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st Infantry and the 9th and 10th Cavalry—to consist solely of black Soldiers. Black men had fought for the U.S. since the American Revolution; during the Civil War, 180,000 served in volunteer regiments. Yet not until 1866 were blacks officially accepted into the Regular Army. Lacking opportunity in the Reconstruction South, black men eagerly signed up for service. Many later cited their desire for steady paychecks and dreams of adventure and excitement as reasons for enlistment.

Unquestionably, the Army needed these ready recruits. In 1866, 40 percent of the Army was occupied with Reconstruction and black recruits were viewed as a solution to dangerous conditions on the western frontier. The nation’s expansion westward inevitably led to clashes between settlers and American Indians living on the frontier. Congress decided the settlers, as citizens of the U.S., deserved the protection of the government. So, as one of the great paradoxes of American history, the newly recruited black Soldiers, many of whom were experiencing freedom for the first time, were sent west to strip another group of people of the freedom they had always known.

This complex period in American history, often called the Indian Wars, lasted nearly the entire last quarter of the 19th century. The all-black regiments, along with several all-white cavalry and infantry units, participated in many of these campaigns. Initially, they helped bring the Indians to reservations set aside by the federal government. Once the Indians were on reservations, the units took on the role of an army of occupation but also protected the Indians from intruders.

Clashes between U.S. troops, including the all-black regiments, and the Indians were frequent and often bloody. On the Southern Plains, the Red River War against the Cheyenne, Comanche, and Kiowa lasted over a year. On the Northern Plains, warfare against the Lakota Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho coalesced into the battles at Little Big Horn in 1876 and later Wounded Knee in 1890. In New Mexico and Arizona conflict with the Apache began in 1871 and did not end until the leader, Geronimo, surrendered in 1886. Throughout these years, the all-black units made significant contributions to the pacification of the American Indians and the opening of the western frontier to white settlement. The Kiowa Indians gave the 10th Cavalry troopers the nickname “Buffalo Soldiers.” The name was quickly extended to all Soldiers of the original black regiments—the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments. The nickname has always been interpreted as a sign of respect because the Plains tribes considered the buffalo a sacred animal.

The Cavalry Units

The 10th Cavalry, perhaps the most well known of these units, was organized in July 1867 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under the command of Colonel Benjamin Grierson. Grierson was a staunch protector of his troops and believed in equal treatment. He demanded a high standard for his enlisted men and fought for them to have better equipment and horses. The enlisted men of the 10th came primarily from the states of Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, although others were recruited from as far away as Connecticut. These men, most in their early 20s, had been laborers and farmers, waiters, sailors, engineers, cooks, barbers, hostlers, servants, and masons. Very few had been slaves. The troopers of the 10th Cavalry were responsible for protecting settlers; guarding telegraph lines, stagecoach, and railroad routes; chasing cattle and horse thieves, and carrying the mail when no one else could.
The 9th Cavalry was organized in 1867 in Greenville, Louisiana, under the command of Colonel Edward Hatch. Unlike Grierson’s regiment, recruitment for the 9th was somewhat haphazard, and when the Soldiers marched out of Louisiana destined for border duty in Texas, many did not complete the trip due to friction with white settlers, illness, and too few officers to maintain control. The unit finally arrived at Fort Davis and Fort Stockton and spent eight years protecting white settlers of West Texas. They also protected mail and stage routes between El Paso and San Antonio, maintained law and order, and tracked down outlaws and Mexican revolutionaries. In contrast to the makeup of the 10th, the 9th Cavalry Soldiers were recruited primarily from former slaves in the southern states.

The Infantry Units
Originally, four black infantry units were organized: the 38th at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri; the 39th near New Orleans; the 40th recruited in Baltimore and Washington, D.C.; and the 41st in Baton Rouge. In April 1869, the Army consolidated the 38th and 41st Infantry to form the 24th Infantry with headquarters at Fort Clark, Texas. In November that same year, the 39th and 40th were reorganized to form the 25th Infantry with headquarters at Jackson Barracks, New Orleans.

The 24th Infantry Regiment stayed in Texas until 1880. In 1875, the 24th and 10th scouted for Apache and Kiowas on West Texas’ Staked Plains and at the same time mapped the region, particularly water sources, for future travelers. The infantry troops often remained behind to guard the post while the cavalry was out or they went along to guard supply camps during expeditions. The 24th then moved to Indian Territory; and to Fort Bayard, New Mexico in 1888, with companies also located at San Carlos, Fort Grant, and Fort Thomas in Arizona.

The 25th Infantry remained in Louisiana and Mississippi until 1870 when it then transferred to the Department of Texas and was distributed between Forts Clark, Stockton, Davis, and Quitman. While in Texas, its troops built and repaired military posts, roads, and telegraph lines; escorted wagon trains; stood guard duty; and scouted for Indians. Most of the roads in West Texas were built by the 25th Infantry. In 1880, the 25th transferred to the Department of Dakota and in 1888 to Montana. During this time, the regiment worked with the cavalry to round up Indians who had left their reservations and, through show of force, to discourage any further unfriendly activities.

The Buffalo Soldiers at Fort Huachuca
For 53 years, between 1892 and 1945, Fort Huachuca served as home station for these four Buffalo Soldier units, as well as two additional all-black units—the 92nd and 93rd Infantry Divisions—during World War II. The first Buffalo Soldiers on post were members of the 24th Infantry Regiment. While the Indian Wars had all but ended by this time, the Soldiers had plenty to keep them busy—maintaining peace and security for settlers in southeastern Arizona. Occasionally the Yaqui Indians came out of northern Mexico to raid in the area and the Soldiers chased them back across the border. The 24th remained at Fort Huachuca until 1896.
In 1898, the 25th Infantry arrived on post following a triumphant return from campaigns during the Spanish-American War in Cuba and remained until 1899. During this time, the 25th was joined by rotating companies of the 9th Cavalry for two years beginning in 1898. A detachment of the 9th also returned briefly to the post in 1912 when U.S. President William Taft ordered a troop build-up along the border in response to civil unrest in Mexico.

In December 1913, as the Mexican Revolution escalated, the renowned 10th Cavalry was assigned to the post, and for the next two decades it was a continuous presence. The 10th was primarily responsible for guarding the Arizona-Mexico border from outposts near Douglas. After Pancho Villa attacked Columbus, New Mexico in 1916, the 10th Cavalry's 11 troops, as well as two others at Fort Apache and Nogales, joined General Pershing's Punitive Expedition into Mexico. The 10th fought decisively at the Battle of Agua Calientes and again when it rode to the rescue of besieged American troops near the town of Parral. The Punitive Expedition was ultimately unsuccessful and increasing tensions with Germany forced the U.S. to recall its troops from Mexico. The 10th Cavalry returned to Fort Huachuca and resumed its presence on the border.

After World War I, the 10th Cavalry settled into regular garrison life, completing civil engineering projects and training exercises. Continuing unrest along the Mexican border kept them vigilant and also underscored the wisdom of retaining Fort Huachuca in an era of drastic Army reductions. During the 1930s, Fort Huachuca served as a Citizens Military Training Camp for reserve officers, as well as the location of the Arizona District Machine Gun School. The 25th trained various infantry troops in anti-aircraft, musketry combat, communications, intelligence, machine guns, chemical warfare, and truck driving, among other courses.

With the U.S. entry into World War II, Fort Huachuca began preparing units for war. The 93rd Infantry Division, which took the French blue helmet as its shoulder patch signifying previous war experience with the French in World War I, arrived in May 1942. Remaining Soldiers of the 25th Infantry were incorporated as cadre into the 368th Infantry Regiment of the 93rd which shipped out to the Pacific Theater in 1943. The 92nd Infantry Division, which took as its shoulder patch a buffalo, arrived at Fort Huachuca on the heels of the 93rd and left for Italy shortly thereafter in 1944.

A Legacy Worth Remembering

The legacy of the Buffalo Soldiers stems not from their role in stealing the freedom of another people. In fact, many of them struggled with their mission, but felt they had few other opportunities. In retrospect, they probably spent more time building or renovating frontier posts, opening new roads, mapping uncharted territory, and stringing telegraph wire than they did battling Indians. The Buffalo Soldiers did not serve for the glory, either. Although more than 400 Medals of Honor were awarded for actions in the Indian Wars, only 14 black Soldiers and noncommissioned officers received the prestigious honor. Despite a lack of recognition, the Buffalo Soldiers undertook their responsibilities with courage, cheerfulness, and endurance and they often received glowing commendations from their commanding officers.

The legacy of the Buffalo Soldiers is that they were the “first”—paving the way for future generations of black Soldiers and leaders. Even while they battled discrimination, the harshest environments, and second-rate equipment, they understood that they were carving out a place in history. George G. Mullins, a chaplain assigned to the 25th Infantry wrote in 1877, “The ambition to be all that Soldiers should be is not confined to a few…. They are possessed of the notion that the colored people of the whole country are more or less affected by their conduct in the Army.”

While largely ignored a century ago, today the Buffalo Soldiers are gradually becoming a ubiquitous part of Western history and one of the symbols of the Wild West. In 2007, Fort Huachuca proudly pays tribute to its own rich and lengthy association with the Buffalo Soldiers.

*With thanks to Lori Tagg, USAIC Command Historian.*
**MOS Mergers at the E-8 Level**

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) staffed an action with the Department of the Army (DA) that will consolidate/cap the following military occupational specialties (MOSs):

- 35F (96B) Intelligence Analyst
- 35G (96D) Imagery Analyst
- 35H (96H) Common Ground Station Operator
- 35L (97B) Counterintelligence (CI) Agent
- 35M (97E) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector

Consolidation of these MOSs at E-8 vice E-9 will improve grade structure and provide more equitable promotions. Early implementation of this action has been approved. The consolidated E-8 positions will be loaded into the enlisted distribution and assignment system (EDAS) by October 2007, allowing eligible E-7s in MOSs 35F (96B), 35G (96D), and 35H (96H) to be considered for promotion to E-8 in MOS 35X (96Z) and eligible E-7s in MOS 35L (97B) and 35M (97E) to be considered for promotion to E-8 in MOS 35Y during the next E-8 board.

**HUMINT NCO Special Recruiting Program**

The window for submission of packets for the August 2007 class under the HUMINT noncommissioned officer (NCO) Special Recruiting Program ended 10 May. Assessment teams are traveling the globe now to conduct interviews to determine which candidates are best suited for this program. Currently, the August class is the last scheduled class for this program. However, we are looking into the possibility of conducting another class some time in fiscal year (FY) 2008. Any changes to information about the program or the addition of a future class will be updated on the DA G2 Sergeant Major’s Website at http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/sgm and that month’s MI Corps update.

**MOS 98GA**

There are Soldiers within our ranks that are still holding the MOS 98GA. This MOS was deleted on 1 October 2006. As of last July, Soldiers holding this MOS should have chosen a new one. Soldiers who have not already selected a new MOS need to work with their career counselor in exploring their options before the Army chooses one for them.

**MOS 97E (35M) Erroneous “L” Enlistments**

On 8 October 2004, Major General Ralston, then Director of Force Management, issued a memorandum directing that language contracts for active component MOS 97E Initial Entry Soldiers be eliminated effective 1 October 2004. Between this date and 25 July 2005, there were 773 MOS 97E contracts issued by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command with the language code erroneously included. This oversight caused the Soldiers to believe that they would be eligible for language training when they enlisted.

MI Branch at the Human Resources Command (HRC) notified all Soldiers affected during this period of the oversight. It asked each Soldier to respond in writing as to whether they elected to attend language
training or if they wished to waive their right to attend language training. 291 Soldiers responded, stating that they wanted to attend language training. Less than 25 percent of these Soldiers had a Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) score on file that qualified them for this training. A majority of the Soldiers have no DLAB results on file at all.

In the electronic message I sent to the field on 11 June 2007 there is a spreadsheet attached listing all Soldiers that responded to HRC’s query. I ask you to check this list to see if any of these Soldiers are in your ranks. If any of your Soldiers are listed and don’t have a DLAB score, please ensure that they take the DLAB and send the results to MI Branch at HRC. In an effort to fulfill the terms of these erroneous contracts, HRC will attempt to schedule Soldiers who earn a qualifying score for training at the Defense Language Institute.

**98 C/Y (35N/S) Transition Training**

Continue to send your 98C/Y Soldiers to transition training. Information on the following classes can be found in the ATRRS at [https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrsc](https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrsc/)

- 232-98C1/2/3/4 (98C) (T) 98C to 98C transition 4 weeks (Ft. Huachuca, AZ), 1399 MOS 98C Soldiers still show in EDAS (as of May 2007) as needing transition training.
- 233-98Y1/2/3/4 (98K) (T) 98K to 98Y transition 7 weeks (Ft. Huachuca, AZ), 311 MOS 98Y Soldiers still show in EDAS as needing transition training.
- 232-98C1/2/3/4 (98J) (T) 98J to 98C transition 7 weeks (Goodfellow AFB, TX), 162 MOS 98C Soldiers still show in EDAS as needing Transition Training.
- 233-98Y1/2/3/4 (98J) (T) 98J to 98Y transition16 weeks 2 days (Corry Station, FL), 182 MOS 98Y Soldiers still show in EDAS as needing Transition Training.

The CG, USAIC and Fort Huachuca approved the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Alternative Transition Training courses listed below. Upon completion of this alternate training, the unit S3/G3 must forward a memorandum to OCMI stating that Soldier has completed the required courses. The memorandum must include Soldier’s name, SSN, MOS, and date that training was completed. It can be faxed to OCMI at (520) 533-1186, DSN 821-1186 or can be emailed to SFC Teddy Woods at teddy.woods@us.army.mil.

- MOS 98Cs (former 98Cs who need OPELINT skills) can attend FUSE 1100 and SIGE3110DV to receive credit for transition training.
- MOS 98Ys (former 98Ks only) can attend MATH1030, and SIGE2810 to receive credit for transition training.

**Star MOS List**

Team, continue to ensure that your warriors who meet the standards are recommended for promotion. We need to continue to be proactive in order to resolve this critical issue.

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<th># Needed</th>
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(Chart continued on next page)
Warrant Officer Prerequisites

Although not automatic, the 4 years of MOS experience prerequisite can be waived to two years of experience if one year is in a combat zone. Although not automatic, the BNCOC graduate prerequisite can be waived based on documented leadership in Operations Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom. POC for Warrant Officer issues is CW5 O’Meara at paul.omeara@us.army.mil or (520) 533-1183.

MOS 09L

❖ Changes. None.
❖ Proposed Changes. A proposed Force Design Update (FDU) is being worked between FORSCOM, HQDA G2 and the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs. This proposal is recommending the stand up of two companies with 149 09L Soldiers each.
❖ Issues. None.

MOS 35G (96D)

❖ Changes. None.
❖ Proposed Changes. A proposal for MOS 35G (96D) to assume all duties, functions, positions, and personnel from MOS 35H (96H) is included in the FY 2007 Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) submission (implementation in FY 2011).

The CG, USAIC and Fort Huachuca has approved the creation of an additional skill identifier (ASI) for use with MOS 35G to identify CGS operators when MOS 35G assumes the functions of MOS 35H. Former 35H Soldiers will be awarded this ASI upon reclassification to MOS 35G.
❖ Issues. None.

MOS 35H (96H)

❖ Changes. CG, USAIC and Fort Huachuca approved a 10-week reclassification course for 96Hs to become 96Ds. This is a result of her earlier decision approving the recommendation to recode and reclassify 96H Soldiers and positions to MOS 96D and subsequently delete 96H. The creation of an ASI for use with MOS 35G (96D) to identify CGS operators has also been approved.
❖ Proposed Changes. Delete MOS 96H.
❖ Issues. None.

MOS 35K (96U) (FY 2008)–15W (FY 2009)

❖ Changes. On 26 April 2007, the Unmanned Aerial Systems Training Battalion (UASTB) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona held an Aviation Badge pinning ceremony. MOS 35K (96U) Soldiers are now authorized to wear the Aviation Crewmember Badge. See your unit S1 for details.
Proposed Changes. The FY 2007 MOCS contains a proposal that MOS 96U Soldiers must complete an Army Class III medical physical prior to arrival at the training base and successfully complete this physical annually. The proposal also states that Soldiers in this MOS are not required to complete or pass the Type II decompression sickness/chamber training requirement.

Issues. None.

MOS 35M (97E)

Changes. None.

Proposed Changes. A five year language suspension for 97E Soldiers in the U.S. Army Reserves (USAR) has been approved by HQDA in a memorandum dated 19 May 2007. This suspension remains in effect until 1 April 2012. The suspension is requested to mitigate 97E/35M shortages in the USAR.

Issues. This MOS has a significant shortage of NCOs due to the rapid increase in requirements (E-6, 41 percent fill and E-7, 74 percent fill). We need the help of leaders at all levels to encourage the retention of these Soldiers. The current selective reenlistment bonus is 4A/4B/4.5C with a max cap of $30K. We also need your support in reclassifying quality NCOs into this MOS.

As demonstrated in the STAR promotion numbers above, we need to ensure every effort is taken to send qualified 35M (97E) Soldiers to the promotion board at their earliest eligibility. This will help the MOS health.

MOS 35N (98C)

Changes. None.

Proposed Changes. INSCOM requested adding a requirement for a CI Scope Polygraph for all Signals Intelligence MOSs. This proposal has been approved by CG, USAIC and Fort Huachuca and is currently being staffed with HQDA.

Issues. Ensure Soldiers attend transition training.

MOS 35P (98G)

Changes. None.

Proposed Changes. CI Scope Polygraph requirement.

Issues. None.

MOS 35S (98Y)

Changes. None.

Proposed Changes. CI Scope Polygraph requirement.

Issues. Ensuring Soldiers attend transition training.

MOS 96R

Changes. None.

Proposed Changes. None.

Issues. 96R deleted effective 1 October 2006 for Active Component; 1 October 2008 for Reserve Component.

“Soldiers Are Our Credentials”
Improving the Relevance of Tactical Intelligence in the COE

by Captain Brian Gellman

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to recommend change in the structure of the Army’s Military Intelligence (MI) community and to present ideas to improve the current force. While some of these ideas will be considered by many as unrealistic, unreasonable, far fetched or maybe just plain crazy by the reader, my intent is to stimulate discussion within the community about what can be done today to make intelligence support better drive operations, and what can be done to pave the way for improved support in the future. Some of these ideas are new; some of them have been discussed for some time. This article is based upon some key assumptions that I believe most will agree we must consider when looking to the future of our branch:

♦ The “big war” is still a possibility; however, the U.S. Army will continue to fight counterinsurgencies for the foreseeable future (as the Army has done for the last 150 years).
♦ There is a general sense within the Army Intelligence Community (IC) that changes must be made to keep up with the threat.
♦ Intelligence should drive operations.

To better understand my perspective of what I believe needs to be done, it is important to recognize the following assessments that are commonly shared views among many tactical intelligence professionals:

♦ The Intelligence school does not do enough to train intelligence professionals. Analysts are not taught effective analysis (the focus is on systems) and officers are given no formalized intelligence training on theory of intelligence or management of information.
♦ Intelligence does not drive operations because we cannot keep up. Young intelligence officers or analysts are often overpowered by commanders and operations officers who are senior to them.
♦ We are trying to do too much with entirely too little. In a decentralized fight where intelligence is fed from bottom-up reporting, there is a perception of a top heavy intelligence effort. Tactical intelligence sections are always under-manned, overtasked and under-experienced.

Recommendations and Discussion

1. Return of the MI Battalions with a vengeance.

   Problem: Intelligence is supposed to drive operations. However, there are not enough intelligence collectors and analysts at the ground level to support the ground commander. As a result, decision makers often get ahead of “intel” or never get the critical intelligence at all.

   Recommended fix: Increase the number and access of collectors by restructuring the brigade combat teams (BCTs). Place an MI battalion at each maneuver brigade. During the Cold War, Artillery was the King of the Battle. Field Artillery supported the maneuver commander with a brigade at division, a battalion at maneuver brigades, fire batteries in support of maneuver battalions, and fire support teams to help plan
artillery and coordinate the call for fire at the maneuver company level. This was a concept that worked very well, why don’t we use it as a model to redesign how we support the tactical commander? Why can’t Intelligence be the King of Counterinsurgency? In an operational environment where intelligence is the key to success, we should have an MI brigade for each division; an MI battalion with an ACE at the maneuver brigade level; MI companies at the maneuver battalion level with Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and an operational management team (OMT), and finally an intelligence support team with an MI lieutenant, analysts and a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection team (HCT) at the maneuver company.

Transformation is important, if we don’t adapt to the new threat, we will become irrelevant and will ultimately fail our mission. One of the interesting decisions recently made in transformation was the dissolution of the MI battalions in order to push down collection assets to the BCT level. The capabilities of direct support MI companies (MICOs) have increased; however, it is only a start.

The MI brigade can provide general support to the division with SIGINT collection platforms and unmanned aerial systems (UASs) such as the Hunter or IGNAT. It can control the division interrogation facility as well as manage the HCT support for the division commander. Most important, this brigade staff can ensure that MI assets and personnel throughout the division are getting the support they need to do the job.

Under the current structure with no MI battalions in support of divisions, the G2 wears two hats. He, or she, is responsible for providing the intelligence picture to the commanding general and staff, and is also responsible for managing all equipment and personnel issues for MI in the division. The latter is a daunting task and it can take precious time and energy away from the primary job of the G2 that is to support division level decision making. This is also very difficult because the G2 has no formal command relationship with any of the MI units within the division.

Similarly, an MI battalion in the maneuver brigade could assist the brigade S2 by providing oversight of the brigade MI assets. Under the current structure, the MICO commander or executive officer often spends time speaking directly to division or higher echelons in attempts to fix problems with equipment because there is no support structure in place for that MI company for purely MI issues. The current modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for brigade S2 sections is woefully undermanned and cannot fulfill this role.

Another issue brought about by the dissolution of the MI battalion is personnel management. The BCT has only one company with several low density military occupational specialties (MOSs) such as in SIGINT and HUMINT. When a Soldier is promoted, he or she is now leading his or her former peers. When these Soldiers were managed by an MI Battalion, it simply took an action from the battalion command sergeant major to make a swap between two companies. Today, if a low density MOS Soldier needs to be moved from a company for any reason, you have to get two brigade commanders to agree on the move. No company is going to give up a good Soldier if it doesn’t have to, especially if it is getting a rehabilitation Soldier, and there is no one to force it to do so.

MICOs at the battalion level will finally offer enough collection capability to the ground commander. Even more important than the collection assets, the MICO commander brings command and control for collection. The company should include an OMT to control HCTs in the companies along with one general support HCT for the battalion commander.

The MICO should have intelligence support teams led by MI lieutenants that work in direct support roles for maneuver companies, similar to how fire support teams work. The MI lieutenant along with two analysts can assist the company commander in analysis and collection. This team can conduct all patrol debriefs and ensure the information collected is formatted into a standardized report. This team should also include an HCT that can participate in patrols.

We should be aggressive in our transformation of MI in order to keep up with the operational environment and the ever-growing importance of intelligence. The simple solution is to increase our capabilities by adding more personnel (simple from a conceptual perspective; maybe not from an allocation of resources perspective). The real hard solution is to improve the quality of the force that we have today. This is our task, take the few we have and make them better.
2. Training intelligence professionals.

Problem: Intelligence professionals do not receive enough formal training in analysis.

Recommended fix: Restructure intelligence training focusing on how to do analysis, critical thinking, and the history of intelligence in a progressive education plan that continues throughout a Soldier’s career. Focus on the human side of analysis, not systems. The noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES) should offer associate/bachelor degrees in intelligence analysis; captains should work towards master’s degrees in intelligence analysis during the MI Captains Career Course (MICCC).

The amount of professional education offered to MI professionals of all grades is anemic, at times even depressing. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools focus on systems such as ASAS-L and processes that do not do enough to produce versatile analysts. There is very little training in critical thinking, analytical theory, psychology, writing, statistics, or history. As a result, analysts and officers arrive at their units unprepared for the contemporary operational environment, better known as the Global War on Terrorism.

We need versatile analysts who can integrate what they have learned during the course of their intelligence duties. We need well rounded, more professionally trained NCOs and officers who understand how to manage large amounts of information and can adapt their methods and procedures to meet the needs of the commander. We should challenge our intelligence professionals at all levels and have high expectations. It is not enough to memorize the steps to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and be good at PowerPoint. Analysis must be understood at the most basic level, avoiding the pitfalls and biases that even the most experienced analysts find hard to avoid (most fail to avoid them because they do not know what they are).

In order to do all of these things, the IC must reevaluate how we train the intelligence professional. There are many excellent programs available; however, only a tiny fraction of Soldiers receive the training. These courses include the Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP), the Undergraduate Intelligence Program (UGIP), the JOCCP (Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program), and the NSDP (National System Development Program), to name a few. Of these, the only program offered to enlisted analysts is UGIP and to maybe as few as 20 to 30 Soldiers a year. The other courses are offered to around 20 officers a year. These are all excellent learning opportunities that offer civilian education credits or degrees; however, the small fraction of analysts and leaders who benefit from these courses has a very limited impact on the Army. If it is unreasonable to send all of our Soldiers to these programs, we should incorporate aspects of these programs into the OES and NCOES.

Every MOS 96B (Intelligence Analyst) should be given the opportunity to earn an undergraduate degree in intelligence operations. A four-year program can be split into four phases:

- Advanced individual training (AIT).
- Through distributive learning and resident courses (the responsibility of the individual Soldier to accomplish).
- Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC).
- Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC)

Soldiers who accomplish their associate’s degree requirements (Phase two) prior to ANCOC receive an undergraduate degree upon completion of ANCOC.

Officer education should be even more challenging and continuous. The MICCC should be difficult. Courses should range from the history of intelligence, to psychology to focus studies of hot spots around the world. Information Management is one of the greatest challenges and should be addressed outside the confines of ASAS-L. When a captain graduates from the MICCC, he or she should earn a Master’s in Intelligence Operations.

Field grade officers can be given the option to specialize in a specific area of concentration (AOC) tied to regions like U.S. Central and Pacific Commands, etc. Each AOC will require additional schooling to better prepare the intelligence officer for the region of the world he or she will be working in. This will create better-trained, more specialized intelligence officers who will be value-added for the commander who is new to a region.

Recommended topics of study to MI professionals:
Intelligence doctrine (IPB)
- Intelligence theory (Indications and warning, collection planning)
- Collection capabilities; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) management; targeting
- Computer skills (PowerPoint, Excel, databases)
- Statistics (graphs, averages, correlation versus causation)
- History of intelligence
- Analytical theory (Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, etc.)
- Psychology of analysis
- Writing and research

However, no level of training will ever substitute for experience. We will have to find a way to strike a balance between time spent studying theory and actually practicing theory. Ultimately, experience is the best teacher.

3. Increase the rank and experience of tactical MI officers and senior NCOs.

**Problem:** Intelligence requires experience and maturity. Inexperienced intelligence Soldiers often bring little to the fight and often spend much of their time learning their job and not leading.

**Recommended fix:** Battalion S2s should be equal in rank (and not subordinate) to the operations officer. Place majors at battalion, lieutenant colonels at brigades and colonels at divisions. MI captains can lead platoons with master sergeants as platoon sergeants, MI majors can command companies with sergeant majors as the senior enlisted advisor. It is a proven rank structure in other branches such as Special Forces.

A seasoned lieutenant colonel often has little to learn from a junior captain straight out of the career course. That junior captain is subordinate to the operations officer and as a result intelligence from the S2 has a tendency to be subordinate to the experience and rank of the operations officer and commander. And why shouldn’t it be this way? A battalion operations officer often has twice the time-in-service of a new captain, and the commander may have up to three times as much service. Why should we expect intelligence to drive operations when we handicap ourselves?

A good intelligence officer has a thorough understanding of the enemy and a good working knowledge of how friendly forces fight as well. Branch detailed officers are usually the preferred MI officers according to tactical commanders because of their combat arms experience. However, the trade off with branch detail is that a junior captain knows very little of about intelligence operations. This is the ideal officer to be an MI platoon leader. Using leadership skills learned during the branch detail, the officer is ready to lead a platoon and can now focus primarily on learning intelligence instead of learning both leadership and intelligence at the same time.

Ideally, it would be perfect for MI lieutenants to serve at the maneuver company level as company intelligence officers similar to fire support officers. The MI lieutenant can have an HCT and a couple of analysts to provide direct intelligence support the maneuver company commander. By having intelligence professionals at the maneuver company level, we will also see the added benefit of improved reporting through more thorough patrol debriefs.

While serving at the maneuver company level, that lieutenant will learn tactics and operations by doing them and it will make him a better MI officer.

Of course, today’s MTOE does not allow for maneuver company level intelligence support teams, and even if it did, not all MI lieutenants would have the opportunity to serve in a combat arms job. Therefore, non-branch detailed MI lieutenants should be placed in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) assignments. In INSCOM, young officers could be treated as interns learning the intelligence trade and following a regimented education process that would expand upon what they learned in the MI Officer Basic Course.

What these young officers miss in tactical experiences can be made up for with a good, thorough understanding of intelligence. When these INSCOM lieutenants are promoted to captain, they can then focus on learning leadership as a platoon leader since they already have a background in intelligence.

An argument can be made that this concept is preferential to male officers and may discriminate against female officers. This is no more discriminatory than the regulations that prevent females from serving in combat arms units; female officers
would still have an equal opportunity to lead platoons and companies. In actuality, this concept is probably fairer to male lieutenants who are often passed over for tactical intelligence platoons due to having to fill male coded lieutenant positions at maneuver units.

In this concept, a company is made up of captains as platoon leaders with a major as the company commander. NCO duty positions should also increase proportionally to the officers. Master sergeants can serve as platoon sergeants and sergeants major at the company level. This adds increased upwards mobility for our intelligence NCOs and can serve as incentive to draw more combat arms Soldiers to reclassify into intelligence MOSs.

The maneuver battalion S2 should be equal in rank and experience to the maneuver battalion operations officer. On average a major has five more years experience than a captain. The extra experience affords the commander the benefit of better recommendations and a more seasoned understanding of collection capabilities and assessment of the threat situation. This will also help in preventing the intelligence officer from being stifled by an overbearing operations officer who has, “been there and done that” and already learned everything he needs to know about intelligence at Fort Leavenworth.

The next logical progression is lieutenant colonel S2s at brigade, and colonel G2s at division. This would bring great experience and knowledge of intelligence to every tactical commander and would reinforce the concept that intelligence is an important part of the decision making process, not a subordinate “warm-up” act for operations briefs.

But what happens when intelligence is operations? Who should control collection? Should it be an intelligence officer who only understands the collection requirements and very little about what it takes to collect the information? Who writes the orders that task the collectors? Who synchronizes collection of all the potential collection assets? Should an MI officer have tasking authority over maneuver patrols that make up over 90 percent of the potential collection capability?

4. **ISR management as an operational requirement.**

**Problem:** Intelligence collectors only represent a small percentage of the potential collectors on the battlefield. However, ISR managers are usually MI officers who have very little influence on the greatest collection platform available in counterinsurgency—the patrols. Currently maneuver brigades are not even authorized ISR managers and the task tends to fall to an untrained NCO or brand new captain or lieutenant.

**Recommended fix:** ISR is an operation and should be lead by operational officers. When every Soldier is a sensor, MI collection assets become only a fraction of the potential of ISR. A combat arms officer in the S3/G3 section along with assistance of an MI officer would have greater influence on the production of orders to reach the full potential of intelligence collection.

Currently, there is no authorized position for ISR managers for at brigade levels. Usually, a young MI officer or senior NCO is placed in the position at the last minute with no training and with no authority to task maneuver elements. Even MI officers in command usually do not have operational control of their own assets. The S2X controls HUMINT operations; however, without the support of the brigade S3, the S2X cannot even direct collection from HCTs that are in direct support to subordinate battalions. So why do we try to place an MI officer as an ISR manager to synchronize all collection assets? Who is synchronizing collection with non-MI patrols? The truth is, no one.

Patrols represent the greatest untapped potential for intelligence collection. It doesn’t require any special training or high speed monitoring equipment, it only requires a well thought out collection plan and, most importantly, an order tasking patrols to ask specific questions (SORs) at specific locations (NAIs). This sounds easy, however, talk to any S2 who has tried to make it happen.

Collection is an operational requirement and must be fully integrated into any operational plan. MI officers are effective at creating collection plans, but, these plans are useless without being published and enforced by the operations officer and commander. One way to fix this is to place the task of ISR management into the operations lane. A combat arms officer, with a subordinate MI officer to focus on intelligence collection assets, should serve as the ISR manager for a battalion or brigade. Since patrols and commander’s informants are forms of HUMINT collection,* the ISR manager can now truly
synchronize HUMINT collection across the brigade or battalion by ensuring that all HUMINT collection is mutually supportive, something the S2X does not have the authority to do. *Note: These are examples of human sources of information; not HUMINT.

5. Who is HUMINT?

Problem: HUMINT is critical to counterinsurgency, however, a large percentage of MOS 97E (HUMINT Collector) Soldiers lack experience, maturity and sometimes any aptitude for HUMINT operations. There is no time to train these Soldiers once they arrive at your unit and there are some intuitive skills that simply cannot be trained.

Recommended fix: No initial entry Soldier should be allowed in HUMINT. HUMINT Collectors should be experienced (E5 or above) Soldiers from combat arms who fit the psychological profile of a car salesman. Due to the availability of contracted linguists, language is not that important and should not be a requirement for 97Es at any grade.

"Who are these guys?" is a common reaction many commanders and S2s have to HCTs. Commanders who don’t own the HCT often don’t want anything to do with it because they don’t feel that the team brings much to the fight. Commanders who own the teams often misuse them because the HCT Soldiers are either too inexperienced or incapable to conduct effective military source operations (MSO). The leadership of the HCTs, often a young sergeant, does not have the rank to convince a direct supported unit commander on how to best use the asset. As a result, tactical HUMINT collection tends to be dynamically re-tasked daily, never reaping the benefits of establishing on-going relationships with formal contacts. An HCT that does not handle formal contacts is no better than any other Soldier who likes to talk to people. The HCT is no longer a combat multiplier.

There are a couple reasons why this tumultuous relationship with ground commanders occurs. The first reason is because our MOS 97Es who make up HCTs are not very well trained and are inexperienced. The common response from the schoolhouse is, “That is the commander’s job to train the Soldiers.” To which the commander asks, “When?” Prior to my most recent deployment as a MICO commander, I received twelve HUMINT Collectors out of AIT within months of deployment. There was barely enough time to teach them how to fire their weapons and go out on patrol, let alone teach them MSO, interrogation, or other intelligence basics. They had to learn on-the-fly. Commanders were less than impressed with their skills during the initial days of the deployment and it was very hard to earn the Commander’s respect.

Initial term MOS 97Es in HCTs have no tactical experience. This is of course true of any initial term Soldier, however, the difference is that most young enlisted Soldiers are members of squads and have several NCOs watching every move they make. It is not uncommon for the solitary young HUMINT Collector specialist to join a combat patrol. That Soldier usually does not have the experience to have much tactical sense and is often lacks any situational understanding. There is nothing a combat patrol resents more than having to baby sit a “combat multiplier.” When an HCT is a burden on a patrol or fails to deliver any value added, that team will not be invited on the next patrol.

A solution is to not authorize 97E as an MOS for initial term Soldiers, similar to MOS 97B (Counterintelligence). Recruit combat arms Soldiers to reclassify as MOS 97E through reenlistment bonuses and other incentives such as languages, career progression, and duty assignment preferences. These experienced, mature Soldiers will be in a much better starting place to learn the MOS.

A second reason HCTs fail is that we are selecting the wrong Soldiers to serve in MOS 97E. A HUMINT collector must be a “people person.” There are a few specific personality traits that are required to be a good 97E such as extroversion and being perceptive to people’s feelings and motivations. In psychological terms, more of an ENTJ1 rating on the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) personality inventory, or in layman’s terms, a good car salesman. But the only tests we give Soldiers are the Armed Services Vocational aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and a language proficiency test. The general technical (GT) score in the ASVAB is not an indicator of personality. At the very least, a sound personality test should serve as an initial screening for MOS 97E. Any introverted Soldier who does not like to talk to people should not be in MOS 97E.

Language should be an incentive and even a career enhancer, but not a requirement for the MOS.
There are plenty of contract linguists and the fact is some languages, specifically Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), are of little value in the real world of HUMINT. A Soldier who spends a year learning MSA is still not prepared to carry on a conversation with the average Iraqi. The MOS 97E still requires an interpreter because of dialectical differences. Some linguists will avoid learning a dialect because it will hurt their MSA proficiency score.


**Problem:** In an age of information, despite our efforts, news networks continue to report today’s events faster than military channels. There is little common understanding of the overall strategy or intelligence picture throughout theater.

**Recommended fix:** Using a format that is very familiar to us (cable news), establish a classified news network that can be broadcast over secure means, a Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to display a streaming video broadcast of today’s classified news. This can offer real time classified, or unclassified, reports, significant activities (SIGACTs) and conferences that can be displayed in every battalion’s tactical operations center (TOC). Talk shows can discuss intelligence assessments. It can serve as a venue for theater level leaders to brief campaign plans or share intelligence assessments, and answer emails or callers or debate the hot topics of the day. It’s all about sharing information in a format we are used to seeing.

How many times has an S2 had to answer a question from his or her commander that was prefaced with, “CNN reported that . . . ” If you can’t beat them, join them, or at least emulate them. Why not copy the success of cable news networks for information dissemination?

The idea is simple. Establish a theater level news network, a classified Fox News Channel. It should not be a Pentagon newsbreak on Armed Forces Network (AFN), but a dedicated video feed delivered to all units in theater through secure means (SIPRNET, Global Broadcast System, etc.) It can be fed into every unit’s TOC.

A news desk can show live video from SIGACTs either from reports in the field or overhead video feeds. A ticker at the bottom of the screen can display messages or SIGACTs. Each SIGACT can have unique numbers that correspond to the full detailed report on a SIPRNET website. This classified network can also be used by senior leaders to brief campaign plans and intelligence assessments. The Corps G2 can answer SIPRNET emails or even take phone calls. Ideas are unlimited as to how such a network could be used to share intelligence assessments and information.

7. Who is fixing our stuff?

**Problem:** Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) technicians are not trained on the equipment that is actually used in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). IEW sections, filled with MOS 33Ws (MI systems Maintainer/Integrator) are not trained to fix the equipment we use. Schoolhouse training for MOS 33W is not relevant, we are forced to use contractors to work on the equipment that we receive in theater.

**Recommended fix:** The schoolhouse can be more responsive by setting up mobile training teams (MTTs) or temporary duty (TDY) hands-on training sessions for MOS 33Ws prior to deployment, focused on the equipment that the deploying unit will use in theater. These MTTs or temporary duty TDY training events, constantly updated and tailored for specific units, should be mandated pre-deployment training.

Unless we keep our technicians relevant and highly specialized, we will find them doing their MOS tasks as a side project in between security patrols. In OIF, when your MOS is considered irrelevant, you become a truck driver or a gunner. These are important and honorable jobs and are jobs that everyone should have the opportunity to fill, however, our IEW technicians are finding that these security jobs are becoming their primary tasks because their school training does not bring anything to the fight. At Fort Huachuca, MOS 33W students receive hands on training on:

- Prophet System (AN/MLQ-40)
- Traffic Jam (AN/TLQ-17)
- Communication Control Set (AN/TYQ-128)
- Common Ground Station (CGS) (AN/TSQ-179)
- Guard Rail Common Sensor

Of those systems, the only one used in OIF by tactical brigades is the CGS (and this is very underutilized as well). In OIF, tactical brigades are also using the following systems and rely solely on contractors to fix them: Digital Receiver Technology (DRT), Com-
communication Central (Trojan LITE and Downsized LITE) AN/TSQ-266, a multitude of computer servers as well as a series of other SIGINT devices that come and go. MOS 33Ws are also asked to setup computer networks to share hard drives, printers, and other networking tools.

The equipment trained at 33W schools is important equipment that is still needed; however, an effort should be made to train MOS 33Ws on the equipment we use in theater. This training can come in the form of MTTs or TDYs run by the schoolhouse. Before a unit deploys, the MOS 33Ws should be required to receive hands-on training on maintenance and repair of the equipment they will actually maintain.

**Topics for Future Discussion**

**Support to Information Operations.** Information Operations (IO) is the name of the game, it is the number one insurgent weapon of choice. Everything the insurgent does is to reinforce his IO campaign or destroy ours. IO cannot be a sideshow, an afterthought, or a supporting effort by one officer within a brigade. Intelligence must do more to help out the IO fight. Critical to that fight is the collection of the “word on the street” and measures of effectiveness of the friendly and hostile IO campaign. IO needs dedicated collectors and analysts.

**Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) on the Battlefield.** Evidence collection is more important than body count in counterinsurgency. We cannot kill insurgents when they do not fight back, they know their chance of winning a court case is much greater than the chance of winning a firefight. Instead of relying on other government agencies or untrained combat arms Soldiers, each unit needs an organic CSI team that can conduct on-site evidence collection techniques to increase the successful prosecution of captured insurgents.

**Division Level Intelligence.** Divisions, or whatever we call them today, have no general support (GS) companies. As a result, the division headquarters is forced to take control of brigade MI assets (tactical UASs, SIGINT). A GS company needs to be reestablished at the division level that includes the ACE, SIGINT, TUAS and HUMINT collectors.

**Biometric databasing for the squad leaders.** A census is not enough, we need hand held biometric sensors and databases that will allow every Soldier (the sensor) to get a quick biometric scan of civilians during a patrol and can access a wireless database that will tell that squad leader everything he or she needs to know about the civilian.

**Take the “green suiters” out of INSCOM.** Soldiers must be forward, that is where the intelligence is generated in counterinsurgency, not in a palace in Baghdad or a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) in the Beltway. Department of Defense civilians do an excellent job at the strategic level, they offer more stability of effort and institutional memory. This is the opposite of what was proposed with Project Foundry. However, these are different times. During peacetime, it might have made sense to keep intelligence Soldiers in INSCOM, however, today’s life-cycle managed units are guaranteed to deploy once every three years (at the minimum), it is time we maximize our tactical efforts.

**Conclusion**

Most of these ideas will not happen, I am a realist. My intent is to stimulate discussion and “out of the box” thinking to encourage new ideas to make our branch more efficient, more effective, and more productive. The fact that the reader has made it to this paragraph without dismissively turning to the next article demonstrates that there is interest in change and progression. The next step is to take these unrealistic and crazy ideas and find a way to make them fit in the real world. This is our challenge.

**Endnotes**

1. For information on the MBTI, go to http://www.myersbriggs.org/my%2Dmbti%2Dpersonality%2Dtype/mbti%2Dbasics/

Captain Brian Gellman is currently serving as the Brigade Assistant S2 for the 4th BCT, 101st Airborne Division. He deployed three times to OIF from January 2003 through October 2003 and from May 2004 to December 2004 serving as the S2 for 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and again from November 2005 through November 2006 serving as the MI Company Commander for 4th BCT, 101st Airborne Division in Eastern Baghdad. Readers may contact Captain Gellman via email at brian.gellman@us.army.mil.
The U.S. Army Reserve’s Military Intelligence Readiness Command, fondly known as the “MIRC” by its Soldiers and civilians, was officially established on 15 September 2005. For the year and a half prior to that date, the MIRC staff weathered the growing pains of realigning Reserve Component (RC) operational and strategic force structure, supporting the growing demands of Army Service Component Commands and the combat support agencies while providing seamless support to the War on Terrorism. In the midst of growing the organization, the MIRC mobilized 518 Soldiers adding to the total of 3,935 who have been mobilized from organic RC units since 2001.

The MIRC currently serves as the Army Reserve branch proponent for all Army Reserve intelligence related issues. Having earned a reputation for professionalism under the visionary leadership of Brigadier General Gregory Schumacher, the MIRC is now forging ahead with aggressive integration plans for the Army Intelligence Campaign Plan (AICP) and the Army’s Modular Force.

Co-located with its “sister” component the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) in the Nolan Building at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, the MIRC enjoys a daily synergy and battle rhythm focus. Commanders and staffs from both organizations concurrently attend Department of the Army (DA) G2 intelligence conferences and campaign planning meetings. Force Management teams coordinate efforts weekly to ensure that a well-documented and unified plan best supports operational requirements documented by regional warfighters. Mobilization and training staffs synchronize Army Reserve Force Generation/Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (ARFORGEN/AREF) planning and, recently, the two organizations jointly honored their fallen intelligence Soldiers during a Memorial Day tribute at Fort Belvoir.

The MIRC has forged a partnership with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) G2 staff, resulting in a mutually-supporting relationship for intelligence training. This plays out daily across the U.S. at each of the five supporting Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs). The strength of this relationship was further demonstrated during the 2006 Spring Intelligence Training Conferences at Fort Huachuca, Arizona when Reserve Component leaders were invited to speak as guests of their hosting National Guard colleagues. MIRC and NGB staffs regularly collaborate on Modular Force structure planning and they will jointly represent RC interests to the DA G2 in the ongoing AICP process.

The MIRC provides daily support to the Army Service Component Commands via their theater support battalion reach-back capability and ARISC Intelligence Production Support programs. Mobilized Soldiers and Soldiers on voluntary Contingency Operations temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) orders provide overwatch support from Joint Reserve Intelligence Production (JRIP) sites throughout CONUS. Likewise, MIRC Soldiers on active duty are integrated in the Joint intelligence staffs of combatant commands and National intelligence agencies such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Elements of the MIRC augment the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) and Regional Signals Intelligence Operation Centers (RSOCs). This integration directly reflects the MIRC Commander’s vision for closely aligned operational relationships between the MIRC and its supported commands.
Recently, the MIRC became a full participant in the DA G2’s AICP process, both in a leadership and supporting capacity. MIRC action officers will ensure that Army Reserve equities are represented in the action plans for five major campaign objectives. This initiative spans the spectrum from Project Foundry implementation to revitalizing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to the Joint Intelligence Operations Capability/Distributed Common Ground System—Army (JIOC/DCGS-A) integration to operationalizing the Every Soldier a Sensor (ES2) concept for RC Soldiers. To achieve this, the MIRC will establish and/or support Integrated Process Teams, comprised of elements from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), INSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and DA G2 staff. As the Army Reserve’s functional MI Command, the MIRC will author the Army Reserve ICP.

In conjunction with directives from the Chief of Staff of the Army, the MIRC is providing a full review of proposed modular force structure in light of operational requirements. Planning the mobilization readiness for increased numbers of HUMINT collection teams, rotational MI battalions embedded in Battlefield Surveillance Brigades, and activation of Joint Interrogation and Detention Center battalions will influence the future of the MIRC as it increases in relevance and responsibility. The MIRC’s span of control will reach from the European Theater all the way to the Far East, including multi-component and elements of Joint organizations.

What originated as a concept plan to functionalize specialty branches in the Army Reserve has resulted in a major success story for AC and RC integration. As a result, the MIRC is quickly emerging as the Army Reserve’s example of expeditionary force planning at its best. Maturing existing relationships and fostering even stronger ones with the DA G2 staff for future resource programming will ensure the continued readiness of that one-third of the Army’s intelligence force found in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Colonel Julie M. Augeri, an Honors Graduate of the University of Kansas and the U.S. Army Officer Candidate School, has 25 years of service as a Regular Army and Army Reserve officer. Her leadership positions include assignments as Ground Surveillance Radar Company Commander, B Company, 108th MI (CEWI) Battalion, Wildflecken, Germany; TCAE Chief, 338th MI Battalion, Fort Meade, Maryland; Counterintelligence/MI Functional Course Manager, 2/84th MI Battalion, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; 164th Corps Support Group Executive Officer, Mesa, Arizona; Commander, 5/104th MI Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Army Reserve Element Commander, Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence, JFCOM, Norfolk, Virginia. COL Augeri is currently the Commander of the 3300th Strategic Intelligence Group, Washington, DC. Her staff assignments include Logistics Officer, 108th MI Battalion (CEWI); Staff Plans Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQDA; HUMINT Staff Officer, Caribbean/Latin American Desk, INSCOM; Director of Personnel, S1, 164th Corps Support Group, Mesa, Arizona; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2, 63rd Regional Readiness Command, Los Alamitos, California, and Deputy Director for Force Programs, Mobilization for the Chief of the Army Reserve, Washington DC. COL Augeri is a 1998 graduate of the Command and General Staff College and a 2006 graduate of the Army War College. In her civilian profession, she serves as the Director for Plans, Analysis and Integration for the U.S. Army Garrison at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, the U. S. government has used the term Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) to describe one of our nation’s highest priorities. Our government’s strategic planning policies in the GWOT are comprehensive and proscriptive. However, our strategic guidance has some shortfalls that must receive additional attention and emphasis. Although our government’s concept involves a comprehensive, strategic plan involving offensive and defensive measures, the approach misses the mark with regard to understanding exactly what makes our enemies tick and how we should prioritize our efforts to defeat them. Until our government, the people of the U. S., and our allies know and understand whom we are fighting, it will be impossible to win the “war of ideas” which is a critical aspect of the struggle. Sun Tzu made first reference to this age-old maxim in his book *The Art of War* when he wrote, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”

This article offers a critical assessment of the current status of the U. S. government’s national policies and strategies to fight and win what has become a protracted conflict and recommendations for improvement in seven specific areas. There are no easy, short-term solutions to this highly volatile and complex problem. However, one thing is crystal clear: AQAM (Al Qaeda and Associated Movement) must not be allowed to succeed, or our way of life and very existence are in serious jeopardy.

Before we can design an effective strategy, we first need to understand who our enemy is, what they want, why, and how they plan to accomplish their objectives. This analysis is critical to understanding one of the universally accepted maxims of war—center of gravity. AQAM plan is simple—they want to use a modern form of historically proven insurgency models for political movements to defeat legitimate governments. “The fundamental precept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to defeat.”

The current buzz word for this theory of war is “Fourth Generation Warfare.” This theory is not new; it is basically an Information Age version of Mao Tse Tung’s “People’s War” of ideological mobilization. Successful examples of where this type of insurgency methodology has worked and in which the U.S. was involved include: Cuba, Lebanon, Somalia, and Vietnam. Another recent example is Russia’s experience in Afghanistan. These types of insurgency can be defeated; however, it requires a thorough understanding of the enemy and a thoroughly integrated, patient plan that incorporates all of the elements of national power. The U.S. cannot force its adversaries to fight a short duration, high technology war in which we easily dominate.

**AQAM’s Strategic Plan**

The AQAM master strategy to take over the world and turn it into an Islamic state was recently revealed by Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein. Hussein reports al Qaeda views its struggle as a long-term war with seven distinct phases.
Phase one is the *Awakening* in the consciousness of Muslims worldwide. The aim of the 9/11 suicide attacks was to provoke the U.S. into declaring war on the Islamic world, thereby mobilizing the radicals.

Phase two is *Opening Eyes*, which should last until 2006 and where the terrorists hope to make the “Western conspiracy” aware of the “Islamic community” and make their secret battalions ready for battle.

Phase three, *Arising and Standing Up*, should last from 2007 to 2010, with increasingly frequent attacks against secular Turkey and Israel.

Phase four, between 2010 and 2013, will see the downfall of hated Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Phase five occurs between 2013 and 2016, at which point an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared.

Phase six, from 2016 on, will be a period of *total confrontation* between believers and non-believers.

Phase seven, the final stage, is described as *definitive victory*. This phase should last no longer than two years and be completed by 2020.

Hussein writes, that in the terrorists’ eyes, because the rest of the world will be so beaten down by the “one-and-a-half billion Muslims,” the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed. Their desired endstate is to establish an Islamic theocracy by destroying the moderate wing of Islam, destroying Israel, and inflicting maximum damage and human suffering on the infidels.

**AQAM’s Operational Plan**

AQAM wants the world to believe that Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was a mujahedin, strategic genius who left Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime to prepare for an anticipated insurgency in Iraq. Their ideological story is that Zarqawi left to become AQAM’s Amir of Iraq and the leader of AQAM in the Arab world. His mission was to cleanse the Arab lands of infidels and carry AQAM’s cause forward to the third phase. Zarqawi’s mission was to isolate U.S. forces in Iraq; target Iraqi police and National Guard that shield Americans; target Arab and foreign diplomats to the infidel regime; attack Shi’a groups identified as “the symbol of heresy of the sons of Al-Alqami (Badr Corps, clerics Al Hakim and Ayatollah Sistani), and export the Iraqi insurgency model throughout the rest of the Middle East in the form of a global Jihad movement.”

“The West knows well that a victory of the Jihadi insurgency in Iraq means that ‘the Jihad will move to the rest of the Middle East and the other Arab countries, and from there will become worldwide in the form of a global jihad movement’.”

**AQAM’s Center of Gravity**

Despite factionalism and ideological differences between militant fundamentalist Islamic organizations, there exists a few broad unifying themes. They share a core set of virulently anti-western beliefs and generally have some common goals: to destroy the moderate wing of Islam, establish Islamic theocracies, and destroy the nation-state of Israel. Based upon this evaluation, it is assessed that the movement’s center of gravity is their militant, extremist ideology.

Foremost, an insurgency requires an alternative ideology or ruling system to replace the existing government. The insurgents must offer an alternative form of governance; without legitimacy, there is no chance for success. Additional capabilities and characteristics required for success include: leadership (organization); popular support; safe haven (training, planning, recruiting, etc); perception of legitimacy (chance for success); resources (money, weapons, etc.); communications (media), and mobility (freedom of movement). All of these areas must be engaged by simultaneously applying harmonized interagency efforts.

When fighting an opponent who has no army to destroy and no capital to capture, one must devise an alternative solution in order to defeat him. An indirect approach may offer some answers to defeat AQAM. President Bush may have characterized the GWOT best by stating at a journalist’s convention on August 6, 2004, “We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies and who happen to use terror as a weapon.”
U.S. National Policy and Strategy Assessment

The National Security Strategy states, “Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command and control, and communications; material support; and finances.” This characterizes our opponent in a physical context which is far easier to deal with by conventional, direct attack means. However, if one correctly understands the enemy and environment, we have our priorities slightly out of order. It is our Information Operations (IO) themes and messages that should have a higher priority and receive more attention at the highest levels. We must first attack the enemy’s center of gravity by winning the “war of ideas” through an extensive and comprehensive IO campaign—winning the hearts and minds—and then capturing/killing the terrorists who seek to do us harm. Our National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy espouse supporting themes and nested concepts.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security designates AQAM as “America’s most immediate and serious threat.” The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is the capstone document for the U.S. conduct of the GWOT. It states, “The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism . . . ” The Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.” Terrorism is not an end in itself; it is merely a tactic used by an asymmetric threat. Throughout history, countless movements have used violence to destroy established order in a society and bring attention to their cause. This is the basis of an insurgency. Joint Publication 1-02 describes insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” However, the enemy’s center of gravity remains their violent, extremist ideology of hate and intolerance, not terrorism; terrorism is only a secondary tactic. Our enemies are violent extremists, and by Presidential decree, so are those who support them.

Although controversial, the policy of preemption contained in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is a good example of the kind of tough-minded responsiveness required that democracies seldom muster the nerve to enact. Other welcome post-9/11 interagency policy changes are the creation of the Muslim World Outreach, Iraq and Afghanistan Interagency Operations Groups, and the Terrorist Finance Policy Coordination Committees.

There is no doubt that stopping terrorism is vital to protecting our nation. Ultimately, we cannot defeat our opponent without overwhelming force. However, military force by itself will not stem the flow of suicide bombers and cowardly attacks against unarmed civilians. Our long-term battle is with the ruthless ideologues and their ministry of hate. It is in this realm that we will regain the initiative and advantage.

What has Changed In the Global War On Terror

The U.S. and our allies are engaged in an epic ideological struggle facing a different enemy than we were on September 11, 2001. Prior to then, AQAM had a clear center of gravity that was vulnerable to conventional military means. However, our early successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, including estimates as high as 50 percent of senior leadership captured or killed, hundreds of millions of dollars seized, and as high as 75 percent of financial support mechanisms disrupted, have forced our adversaries to transform the way they are organized and operate. AQAM has demonstrated that they are flexible, adaptive, and capable of making significant organizational changes while retaining the ability to command and control, communicate, and conduct combat operations. This resiliency and effectiveness is illustrated by the numerous communications released by senior AQAM officials and their demonstrated ability to continue conducting complex terrorist attacks. There is ample evidence available regarding this point; the most notable recent examples of sensational attacks claimed or attributed to AQAM are the Bali nightclub bombing on October 12, 2002 which killed 202 people; Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004 when near simultaneous attacks on four commuter trains killed 191 people; London, England on July 7, 2005 when four bombs exploded...
within 50 seconds targeting the underground rail and bus transportation networks killing 56\textsuperscript{17}; and the November 9, 2005 simultaneous attacks against three hotels in Amman, Jordan killing 57 people\textsuperscript{18}.

Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation offers the best description of AQAM’s transformation in his September 2005 Congressional testimony.

_The al Qaeda movement therefore is now best described as a networked transnational constituency rather than a monolithic, international terrorist organization with an identifiable command and control apparatus it once was. The result is that today there are many al Qaedas rather than a single al Qaeda of the past. The current al Qaeda therefore exists more as an ideology that has become a vast enterprise—an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base . . .\textsuperscript{19}_

In order to counter this evolving threat the U.S. and our allies are going to have to get tougher and react faster while working together on an unprecedented scale over the long haul. Today, America needs to wage a different type of war against an enemy that evolves to counter our tactics and strategy.

**What Needs to Change**

Initially, the Bush Administration got our nation’s foreign policies and overall strategy to win the GWOT about right. Some would argue this point, but the lengthy list of early successes mentioned earlier is impressive. However, it was weighted toward the military using a “capture or kill” mentality. What worked early on will not necessarily work now. For the most part, our current national policies and strategy are thorough, comprehensive and complementary. However, AQAM cannot be defeated in a series of tactical military operations. Most analysts agree that winning the GWOT and destroying AQAM will take several years if not decades to achieve. Winning will require a comprehensive, adaptive “network approach” to policy and strategy design which simultaneously leverages all the elements of national power. To ensure our continued success there are four **distinct decision points** (1 through 4) and three **critical capabilities** (5 through 7) that require continuous emphasis and a holistic, integrated approach. I refer to these items as the 7 I’s.

1. **Information Operations**

Most experts agree that AQAM’s center of gravity is the appeal of their radical ideology. Most critics would also agree that our current strategic communications (SC) plan has thus far been grossly ineffective. Convincing the people of the Middle East that we have common interests and values and more to offer than AQAM is critical to winning the “war of ideas.” Key to this is creating a more favorable image of the U.S. in the Muslim world. In order to accomplish this we should thoroughly overhaul our public diplomacy and communications strategies emphasizing three core SC messages and themes. First, we must deprive AQAM of the ability to discredit the U.S. and our ideals. In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Zeyno Baran wrote,

_In the wake of the war in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghrab and Guantanamo Bay, however, the credibility and moral authority of the U.S. in the Muslim world is at an all-time low and so this will not be easy. In fact rehabilitating America’s image will probably take decades and require an ideological campaign highlighting values common to Western and Muslim worlds.\textsuperscript{20}_

Second, Muslim government leaders must be convinced that the AQAM goal of overthrowing “apostate” governments is a real and credible threat. They are the key to influencing and “helping moderate Imams win the theological and ideological civil war currently taking place in the Muslim World.”\textsuperscript{21} Third, AQAM must be exposed for the fraud to Islam that it truly is.

Osama bin Laden is recognized world-wide for his role in the attacks of 9/11 and as the eloquent, charismatic leader of the AQAM movement. Today, his face has the same level of international recognition as that of any legitimate ruler of a country. During World War II, Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt successfully demonized Adolph Hitler and the Nazi party by demonstrating their human rights abuses and oppressive regime, and American leadership successfully did the same to communism during the Cold
War by highlighting it as a threat to democratic values and our way of life. Our IO campaign should discredit Osama bin Laden and expose his dogma of hate and intolerance for what it is. Some would argue that he is irrelevant and that the war will continue when he is eventually captured or killed, but he is a folk hero to millions of Muslim youths and represents a strong cult of personality that acts as a lightning rod for Jihadist recruiting.

Fundamentally, the struggle against violent extremism is a war of ideas and a more aggressive, direct attack on those ideas and the men behind them is required to win. Our IO campaign must portray the GWOT as an all-out campaign to expose, everything AQAM stands for—murder, horror, intolerance, disrespect for human rights, and a false view of Islam.

A recent National Security Report suggests that, “The U.S. needs to recognize the soft underbelly of this movement, a set of tensions that the senior Al-Qaeda senior leadership could not do more to elucidate for us—namely, that the old guard is panicking . . . is repeating mistakes made in past jihadi experiences: killing innocents, which serves to disaffect the public to their ideology. In short, the U.S. should be pursuing a strategy that separates broader Muslim populations from this body of ideas in all dimensions of this fight, particularly over the internet.”

The report describes a virtual Internet Emirate that AQAM is using for command and control, and propaganda purposes. The conclusion is that AQAM is using our own Western technology against us. Until we find mechanisms to control dissemination of violent, radical ideologies over the Internet, our opponents will continue to use it to propagate their ideology on a global scale. Of course, fear of censorship in free democracies will hamper getting this phenomenon under control, but control measures must be emplaced soon.

Deterrence worked during the Cold War and may be useful in this situation. Some people argue that deterrence no longer works against terrorists. Colin S. Gray provides some insight into how deterrence can still work. “Al-Qaeda[sic] has many would-be martyrs in its ranks, but the organization is most careful with the lives of its key officers, and it functions strategically. It can be deterred by the fact and expectation of strategic failure.” He goes on to explain how this weakness can complement our strategic IO campaign. “It is necessary to demonstrate that terrorism fails. Brave people will sacrifice their life[sic] for a cause, but what if nothing seems to change in the world? Al-Qaeda[sic] has some distinctly terrestrial goals, and those can be denied by competent policies and strategies. Many of its officers and recruits should be discouraged by a growing realization that the Jihad they are waging is an exercise in futility.” This is a powerful concept that can serve to link our IO campaign with our military kinetic options.

Our moderate Middle East partners struggle continuously with the popular perceptions that the U.S. is only concerned with the Middle East because of our dependence on oil. Consequently, they feel exploited. We should endeavor to reduce our dependence (as well as our allies’) on fossil fuels. We should make every effort to change the Middle Eastern perception that we are occupying their territory.

Our most potent weapon against the enemy’s militant, extremist ideology is IO. We must rally universal public opinion and support by making fundamental changes to our public diplomacy and find better systems for delivering our message. Relevant themes are: de-legitimize the extremist movement by exposing its leaders as apostates, false prophets and mass murderers of innocent Muslims. Clarify our relationship with our allies in the Middle East. Emphasize that we are not imperialists exploiting their country’s wealth. We should create an all-out campaign to ridicule and destroy members of the insurgency by exposing their cause’s intolerance and disrespect for human life, and a false view of Islam. Finally, the U.S. government should establish a cabinet-level department akin to the British Ministry of Information (MOI) to manage the effort.

2. Iraq

Iraq has become the nexus for the GWOT and will be a critical test of America and our allies’ strength and resolve. We must be successful in establishing a stable, democratic government. The stakes are
tremendously high and we absolutely cannot afford to withdraw our forces before the job is done. Otherwise, we risk handing the jihadists a significant strategic victory on the level of the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Our capitulation would have severe consequences by giving AQAM a new base of operations (with considerably more wealth than Afghanistan had under the Taliban) for exporting their jihad to the rest of the Middle East, Europe and Africa; not to mention a tremendously significant propaganda platform for recruiting and financial support. The new DOD Directive 30000.05 amounts to formal acknowledgement of DOD’s role in Stability Operations. It will go a long way toward changing the military culture and support to the mission in Iraq. Another significant recent publication is the National Strategy for Victory In Iraq, published in November 2005. The document is a little overly idealistic about democracy and freedom in the Middle East because AQAM will not close up shop if every Muslim country were to suddenly become democratic. However, it is tempered by a healthy dose of realism in the expectations of its eight pillars and strategic objectives. One of the most refreshing aspects of this document is the acknowledgement of the need for flexibility and repeated calls for assessments and adaptation.

3. Iran

Iran is another decisive point in the GWOT. The U.S. needs to take determined action against Iranian support to terrorism and AQAM. “Iran became home to some of AQAM’s most wanted after the fall 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Tehran has admitted as much, claiming that AQAM operatives were under ‘house arrest’ and would be tried.” No trial has ever taken place and AQAM operatives continue to move about freely to plan terrorist operations world-wide. Equally well known is Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations. Iran cannot be allowed to provide support to and be a safe haven for such organizations. Iran continues to interfere in Iraq and Afghanistan by supporting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces. The fact that Iran desires to acquire nuclear weapons is equally disturbing, but remains a future problem; terrorism is here and now. The solution on nuclear weapons may be to assist Iran with acquiring legitimate nuclear power while extracting verifiable concessions that preclude them from building weapons. The U.S. must continue taking a hard line toward Iran. We should work together with the United Nations (UN), France, Russia, China, Japan, and Germany to place tough diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran to turn over its AQAM guests and stop anti-democratic activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

4. Israel-Palestine

Probably the most significant issue is the perception of unqualified U.S. support for Israel against Palestine. Since 9/11, the Bush Administration has focused its attention on issues other than seeking solutions to the Israel–Palestine conflict for the last five years. The U.S. is the only government that can influence Israel to make any meaningful progress in peace negotiations. The issues are well known and workable, but not if all parties are not at the negotiation table. “Being seen to play a more active and equitable role in resolving this conflict will have an enormously salutary effect on Middle Eastern stability, global Muslim attitudes towards the U.S., and America’s image abroad.”

5. International

Promotion of good governance through pluralism, representation, and the rule of law can change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror. Oppressive dictatorships drive dissenting opinions underground and breed radical reactions. Democracy and political reform allow other good things that increase stability such as reducing ungoverned areas (safe haven), and increasing equality/women’s rights, education and economic development. Arab leaders must begin the process of slowly reforming their governments to become more democratic. Our partners in the GWOT must find innovative legal ways to suppress militant imams that preach hate, jihad, martyrdom and anti-Semitism without sacrificing too many civil liberties. This is the quickest way to disrupt the spread of radicalism.

These delicate tasks must be accomplished before trained jihadists begin returning home from Iraq. Overly aggressive measures risk creating additional disaffection and discontent thereby breeding fertile grounds for AQAM’s recruitment effort. How nations decide to deal with the spread of Global Jihad to
Europe and other Arab countries and the new generation of “Iraq Veterans” trained to use weapons and explosives will be critical. Border security will be more important than ever in dealing with the new generation of Jihadis and mujahedin trained in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sharing international databases for border security is essential. Other key areas to encourage international cooperation include oversight of curriculum at Madrassas, regulation of the Hawala banking system and monitoring the sermons of radical Imams.

Our friends and allies in the GWOT should not be taken for granted. In order to regain and maintain the momentum, international relationships need to periodically be reassessed, repaired, and strengthened.

If the GWOT is going to be successful over the long haul, civilized nations are going to have to treat the causes of terrorism by promoting economic prosperity, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and fighting organized crime and corruption. Coalition building and mutual support is paramount. Organizations to leverage include the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Some we work well with and others need bridges built between them and ourselves.

6. Interagency Reform

Interagency reform shortfalls are well documented and are receiving close Congressional scrutiny; however, the rate of change is inadequate to keep pace with our opponent’s transnational mobility and ability to adapt. We must create highly capable, streamlined counterterrorism organizations able to act quickly that have broad powers and function decisively with maximum efficiency. Currently, the Executive Branch and National Security Council (NSC) are the lowest levels at which policy and strategy issues can be developed and integrated. Given the President’s competing roles in domestic affairs and party politics he cannot focus on national security as originally envisioned in the Constitution.

**Although our current national security structure and culture remained effective for decades, they cannot compete with today’s more competitive, sinister, and capable enemies. Structural and cultural flaws undermine America’s ability to respond to complex, long-term threats such as terrorism and other security, economic, environmental and demographic problems that will increasingly emerge.**

Interdepartmental bureaucracy inevitably leads to competition that focuses more on resource allocation than on threats to national security and badly needed interagency reform measures. Some sort of innovative, legislative forcing function like the 1947 National Security Act or the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act are required in order to address national security issues holistically by leveraging various government agencies to develop and implement integrated, comprehensive strategies. A recent National Defense University paper recommended some form of Executive Order or legislation to force the interagency to make the following reforms:

- Create national-level Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) that bring together all parts of the government to focus on specific counterterrorism issues.
- Lower the decision-making authority for interdepartmental and interagency decisions to the deputy undersecretary level.
- Establish a permanent executive or governing board from the departments and agencies to function like the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These changes will ensure “jointness” and interoperability among the various departments and agencies by empowering a GWOT board or chairman, clarifying the chain of command, centralizing authority and mandating interagency participation in the GWOT process. These reforms will improve development of policies and strategy implementation as well as improve the balance between military and other instruments of national power. These changes will not occur without decisive action by Congress or the Executive Branch.
7. Intelligence Reform

Intelligence reform efforts are well underway and are receiving close Congressional scrutiny. Examples of some initiatives are included in the 9/11 Commission Reports and Congress’ focus on intelligence reform. Significant changes are underway throughout the national intelligence community and are captured in the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America published by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Some of the more notable changes are the formation of the office of the DNI empowered with oversight of all national intelligence agencies, creation of Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) at all of the combatant commands, the formation of a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the Policy Coordination Committee for Terrorism Finance. However, the rate of change is inadequate to keep pace with our opponent’s transnational mobility and ability to adapt. Several difficult changes are required before intelligence reform is complete. For example, there still is no single database for tracking and analyzing terrorist movement and activity between national intelligence organizations, combatant commands and law enforcement agencies. Centralized direction is needed to correct this serious shortfall. Each agency has significant investment in their legacy systems and will not change unless ordered to do so. Additionally, Intelligence Oversight laws do not permit interoperability and information sharing between law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the intelligence community. Further, there are serious cultural and security hurdles to negotiate to protect sources and methods for intelligence assets. None of these obstacles are easy to breech. Until they are, we will have blind spots that may provide our adversaries a tactical advantage.

Conclusion

“In summary, new times, new threats, and new challenges ineluctably make a new strategy approach and new organizational and institutional behaviors necessary.” A good first step is providing a clear vision, policy and strategy with ways linked to means that will enable a multi-dimensional, interagency and international approach. Arguably, our national policies and strategy have the majority of the requirements documented already. This author recommends including additional clarity in our national policies and strategies concerning the “7 I’s” discussed above.

Even the best strategy will not succeed if the attitudes and actions of government leaders (domestic and international) are not changed. Poverty, unemployment, and a Middle Eastern “youth bulge” create a fertile environment of disaffected youth. Combine that with alienation of half of the population (women) and our enemies have a fertile base from which to recruit. We must help our allies with opportunities and economic growth through trade and free enterprise. In order to succeed, we need leaders at all levels united in a common cause, working together in a spirit of mutual collaboration and cooperation to make the necessary changes to meet the challenges we face. This will undeniably be the most difficult, and perhaps the most critical, missing piece to the puzzle. How far should democracies go to get tough on terror? Unfortunately, most democracies do not have the stomach to go far enough. Regrettably, it will probably take another 9/11 type event to garner enough public and government resolve to make the hard decisions required to be more than marginally effective at counterterrorism. Maybe renaming “GWOT” to more accurately reflect what it really is will rejuvenate the effort—“Global War On Poverty and Oppression” (GWOPO).

Our nation’s strategic strengths are its message of freedom and democracy, and tremendous military, patriotic and economic power. We must develop a strategy to leverage these strengths to overcome our opponents.

Endnotes

4. Mu’ayyed al-Din ibn al-‘alqami was a Shi’a minister of the last Sunni Khalifah of the Abbasid Empire during the Mongol occupation of Baghdad in the 13th century. He was accused of high treason and of assisting the Mongol army of Hulagu. He became in Islamic Sunni
history, a symbol of Shi’ia high treason against Sunnis. In recent years he has been a leading topic in the discourse of the Jihadi Salafis against the Shi’ia in Iraq. *aqam in Arabic also means one of the most bitter plants—Colocynth.


8. In fairness to our senior leadership, this aspect may have been deemphasized to ensure that GWOT did not become characterized as a religious war against Islam.


12. Ibid., 216.


21. Ibid., 79.


24. Ibid., ix.


27. Peter Brooks, “Iran-Al-Qaeda Axis,” New York Sun, 31 October 2005. AQ members in Iran include Saif al-Adel AQ’s number three man, three of UBL’s sons (Saad, Mohammad, and Othman) and spokesman Sulaiman Abu Gaith. Some estimates run as high as 25 AQ thugs living in Iran. Why AQ and Iran? Their common goals are global Islamic rule and failure of U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan.


31. Ibid., 54–55.


Colonel Mark R. Wallace is currently assigned as Director of Doctrine, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. His previous assignment was as the Director of Operations, Joint Intelligence Center Central (JICCENT). Prior to that, he was assigned to J2 Plans, U.S. Central Command; preceded by Recruiting Battalion Command; and G2 Plans, XVIII Airborne Corps. A 1983 graduate of Western Illinois University, he also holds an MA in Computer Resources and Information Management from Webster University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the Army War College. His military schools include the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, and resident Army War College.
Introduction

Our nation faces more than our traditional adversaries who try to gain an advantage over us in various economic, political, and military conflicts. The threat has expanded beyond the traditional foreign intelligence agency stealing classified and unclassified data. Terrorist groups, organized crime, drug cartels and international business interests try to obtain information on technologies at all levels to include critical classified technologies for their own profit or to conduct their own illicit operations. The means to carry out these activities has greatly diversified and expanded in terms of sources and technical sophistication. The mission of Army Counterintelligence (CI) is to protect the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) against these traditional and non-traditional adversarial threats during peace and all levels of war.

The intelligence community (IC) has recognized the damage done to the nation’s intelligence and defense capabilities by spies such as John Walker, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen which was compounded by the events leading up to and following 11 September 2001. To address the deficiencies that led to these events, the Army established common training and professional development standards for CI Special Agents and recently modified the CI Special Agent Course (CISAC) located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona to meet these challenges. The resulting prototype course has become the Army’s premier curriculum that trains officers, DOD civilians, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers in the important and timely topics of tactical and strategic CI, counterterrorism, and security. The course provides an extensive baseline of universal CI core competencies that professionalizes Soldiers and civilians.

The eighteen week, four day course provides rigorous, hands-on, performance-based instruction that trains CI Special Agents to detect, assess, deter, neutralize, and exploit individuals worldwide who would engage in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities or the intentional compromise of national security information on behalf of a foreign power or for personal gratification. The course requires students to have sufficient experience in the core competencies of reading comprehension, writing, oral communication, creative and analytical thinking, and teambuilding and interpersonal skills. Without experience in these basic skill sets, students will have difficulty completing this demanding course.

In order for the CISAC cadre to determine the students’ motivations for attending the course and their ability to express themselves in writing, each student must submit an autobiographical essay from five to twenty pages prior to attending the course. In order to get a basic understanding of the course material, students are also encouraged to read:

- *Dressed for Success* by John T. Molloy.
- *Traitors among Us* by Stuart A. Herrington.
- AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities.
- AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (SAEDA).
- AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program.
The Course in Detail

The course consists of four modules: Fundamentals of CI (9 days), CI Support Operations (10 days), CI Controlled Source Operations (CICSO) (21 days), and CI Investigations and Surveillance (48 days). To meet the goals and objectives of the course, training days are long and students are off only on federal holidays. A typical day for students begins at 0800 when they meet with their academic advisors who mentor them on the previously learned concepts and skills. This is followed at 0830 by the instructional activity scheduled for the day. A study hall (with an instructor) is provided each evening. Students are given a syllabus that provides them with their homework and reading assignments. Prior to all classroom and practical exercise instruction, students must read applicable army regulations, field manuals, and associated material to better prepare them for the day’s instruction.

Module A: CI Fundamentals

The course begins with the fundamentals of CI. Classroom instruction introduces students to the underlying principles of investigations and operations. Students will learn how to use, control, and maintain their Badge and Credentials, conduct investigations within the Law and Intelligence Oversight, and determine whether they have jurisdiction over an incident. The hands-on, performance-based portion of training consists of a practical exercise in providing CI advice and assistance to commanders who will rely upon the CI Agent in making their decisions. Students will develop and conduct SAEDA briefings, learn about and conduct Security Manager inspections, and prepare and conduct Threat Intelligence Briefings.

Module B: CI Support Operations

The objective of CI Support Operations is to train the student how to manage CI assets and analyze collected information in order to produce CI products and provide security advice and assistance at various echelons. The Open Source lesson examines the threat posed by the growing availability of information to U. S. adversaries through radio, television, newspapers, and commercial databases, images, and drawings on the Internet. If not protected, such information often provides an opportunity for exploitation by adversaries or competitors working against U.S. interests. The subtle extraction of information during a normal and innocent conversation is explored during the Basic Questioning and Elicitation platform instruction and off-site exercise.

The growing use of computer programs that can monitor computer users’ activities and steal information from their computers is forcing CI to adjust its counterespionage and counterterrorism strategies. The cyber-terrorism instruction delves into ways to stop cyber-savvy foreign agents and terrorists from gaining information from our computer networks.

Until recently, the importance of understanding culture in CI operations was underestimated. Students will gain knowledge and understanding of cultural differences in order to conduct interpersonal CI activities more effectively and efficiently. The use of an interpreter and conducting CI Screening Operations are two activities where understanding other cultures will benefit the CI Agent. In a practical exercise, students will learn to carefully consider the selection, preparation, and employment of interpreters. Students will conduct screening activities to identify sources for collection activities and assess the suitability of foreign nationals to work on deployed installations. Information gathered is useless if it not turned into intelligence and disseminated to the commander in time for him to use it in the decision making process. To aid the commander in this process, students will create a CI Estimate and conduct a performance based Threat Vulnerability Assessment.

Attacks against the Marine barracks in Beirut; Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole in the Port of Aden highlight the targeting priorities of terrorist organizations and the adversarial intelligence activities that support them. A major portion of this lesson is a 23 hour block of instruction on terrorism that provides students with a basic understanding of terrorist ideologies, motivations, tactics, and organizational structure. Students will become familiar with the offensive and defensive measures defined in the U.S. Counterterrorism
and Antiterrorism Programs. There is an extensive practical exercise in using analytic tools to perform predictive analysis to develop and conduct a brief to a supported command in the tactical environment.

Module C: CISCO

Local nationals, refugees, host nation (HN) officials, nongovernmental organizations, partisans, foreign military organizations, and paramilitary organizations are just a few of the groups that CI Agents encounter while performing their missions. How to interact with these individuals in order to gain force protection and intelligence information is the primary instruction in the CICSO phase of training. During this 59+ hours lesson, students will be divided into three- or four-man field offices and using the small group instruction method, train the specific activities related to human assets. Platform instruction begins with the Source Operational Concept followed by the administration, supervision, control and use of Intelligence Contingency Funds. Students will learn how and when to conduct liaison with other federal and military organizations, HN law enforcement agencies, and civilian agencies operating in the CI Agent’s area of operations. Since information is useless unless disseminated to the consumer, students will also learn to produce reports detailing every aspect of their operational activity. The legal principles the students learned earlier in the course will be exercised during this phase of training when the student initiates procedures 7 and 9 (AR 381-10) requests to conduct CI investigative search, seizure, and surveillance activities.

Module D: CI Investigations and Surveillance

CI investigations are conducted against individuals or groups suspected of committing acts of espionage, sabotage, sedition, subversion, terrorism, and other national security crimes perpetrated on behalf of adversarial intelligence. Investigations are also conducted when Army personnel fail to follow regulations and directives governing reporting of contacts with foreign citizens and “out-of-channel” requests for defense information. These investigations provide commanders with information used to eliminate security vulnerabilities thereby improving the command’s security posture. Students learn to properly conduct local records checks with military and civilian agencies, plan investigations, and conduct interviews to prove or disprove allegations.

Second only to operating sources, surveillance is the most frequently employed investigative technique in obtaining arrests, indictments, and convictions. Over a nine day period, students learn to conduct foot and vehicle surveillance during investigations to identify subjects, their activities and their associates, along with their residences, places of business, hangouts, and other operational locations. This sensitive CI activity will take place in off-site locations and requires the students to dress according to the environment in which they will conduct the operation. Students are introduced to and practice collecting, handling, and reporting evidence that is admissible in the prosecution of a national security crime. The final test for the CISAC student is to present a capstone briefing to the course leadership explaining the duties, responsibilities, capabilities, and the support the CI Agent can provide to a supported brigade commander.

Homework

Recent lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for better report writing by CI Agents. In order to meet the challenge from the field, the CISAC has incorporated into its course of instruction six report writing exercises ranging from five to ten pages in length. These homework assignments include essays on the Functions of CI, Intelligence Warfighter Functions, Open Source Intelligence, Cultural Awareness, National Security Crime Case Study, and Adversarial Intelligence. These homework assignments allow the students to apply what they are learning and encourage them to think critically about future CI developments. Students will also spend their out-of-class time preparing for various briefings and studying for upcoming tests.

Conclusion

We face a world characterized by political disorder, intense economic confrontation, regional instability, and constant terrorism. To remain ahead of these challenges, potential Army CI Agents must receive comprehensive and specialized training that develops well-rounded, career-oriented professionals with credibility within the broader IC. Competent and professional CI Agents require a substantial investment in time and resources. The CISAC nurtures and motivates students to mas-
ter the skills and disciplines necessary to meet the current threats and those of the future. CISAC is but the beginning of the CI education process. To remain relevant in the changing threat environment CI Agents must develop higher-order cognitive skills through both structured and unstructured learning, throughout the entire course of their career.

SFC Raymond W. DuVall is a master instructor/writer in the CI Special Agent Course at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He holds an MA in National Security Studies. He can be contacted at raymond.duvall@us.army.mil or (520) 533-1262. For further information about the course, please contact CW3 William G. Phillips through the Army Knowledge Online Forum or through cisac.usaics@us.army.mil.
Romanian Tactical HUMINT Operations: Characteristics of Success

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction
Since September 11, 2001, Romania has emerged as a steadfast ally of the U.S. in the fight against terrorism. Romanian forces deployed as early as 2002 and have distinguished themselves as being professional, tactically proficient and have provided a myriad of support to the coalition. One area where Romania has particularly excelled is in the field of tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.

Intelligence has been described as the “life blood” in the fight against terrorism and Romania is helping to provide that “life blood” in the form of tactical HUMINT to commanders in the field. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans, Romanian Military Intelligence (MI) HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs), have helped fill critical shortages in tactical HUMINT and have distinguished themselves as being outstanding in the field. Both U.S. and Coalition partners have requested the support of Romanian HCTs to support their operations and they have proven to be so capable that Romanian teams in Kosovo work directly in support of the U.S.-led task force. Today, the Romanian Armed Forces continues to invest in the development and expansion of this niche capability.

Why are the Romanians so successful at tactical HUMINT collection? What characteristics make them successful? These are intriguing questions that are not readily identifiable and quantifiable. That said, there are some general characteristics that do contribute to the success of Romanian HCTs. This article is an attempt to highlight some of those key characteristics.

Training—The Basis for Success
Intelligence training, by its very nature, is a sensitive subject and this is not an attempt to provide detailed information on the training developed and employed by Romanian HCTs. In general terms however, Romanian MI views tactical HUMINT as a “highly qualified intelligence operation” and requires “highly trained operators” to perform the mis-
These HCTs are viewed as an elite formation within the Romanian Armed Forces and draw many of its operators from the reconnaissance and airborne ranks.

In a somewhat novel approach, training for the HCTs begins with the premise that each HUMINT operator is a “unique, highly skilled asset.” Operators receive entry-level training in the same skills required of other elite Soldiers within the Romanian Armed Forces. After this common training, Soldiers destined for other elite units attend advanced training in Special Forces, airborne, or reconnaissance, while HUMINT operators attend basic and advanced level training in HUMINT operations. HCT personnel then attend specialized training focusing on language skills; cross cultural communications; detailed area studies, and advanced skills training. Having a solid background in airborne, reconnaissance, and small unit tactics and techniques makes the Romanian HUMINT operator more self-confident and self-reliant and enhances the operator’s confidence in his or her abilities to perform the mission.

**Maturity and life experience**

Individual maturity of the Romanian HUMINT operator also factors into their success. The average operator is in his late 20s or 30s and has generally been recruited from the ranks as a noncommissioned officer or junior officer. Most come from operational units; many have already experienced operational tours in theater. Only after a rigorous pre-screening and selection program do candidates attend the Romanian Intelligence Training Center. The Romanian MI Directorate looks for maturity and “life experience” when selecting their operators. The ability to build rapport and establish close personal relationships as well as operate with little direct supervision often depends on the maturity of the individual.

Thus, selection and training gives Romanian HCT operators an advantage that makes them successful, but these alone are not the sole factor contributing to their success. Much of the success enjoyed by the HCTs can loosely be attributed to factors that make up the “national character” of the people themselves.

**Hospitable Social Culture**

Social characteristics of a culture are a complex subject. In general, those characteristics are often developed as a consequence of larger environmental demands; the nation’s evolution determined by both internal as well as external factors. These factors shape the national character of a people and in Romania’s case, some of these factors have indirectly contributed to their success in their ability to perform HUMINT missions. Although these characteristics are generalizations and do not apply to each and every individual, they do factor into the personalities of the Romanian HCT operators.

The HCTs are adept at building camaraderie in professional and inter-personal relationships. Romanian HUMINT teams in the field are able to quickly establish rapport with the local populace, a critical skill for HUMINT operators. When queried as to why this is so, many operators attribute it to their being “a Latin people.” To better understand this statement, it is necessary to understand a bit of the history of Romania.

Dacia, as the ancient territory of Romania was called, flourished from the first century B.C. to the first century A.D., under the leadership of a series of successful rulers. Dacia entered into conflict with the expanding Roman Empire, engaging it in two fierce wars (101-102 A.D. and 105-106 A.D.), before being conquered by the Roman armies led by Emperor Trajan. Dacia was integrated into the Roman Empire between 106 and 271 A.D. and the Dacian population adopted the vulgate Latin language of the Romans. A Daco-Roman population formed which simultaneously received the Christian religion and formed the basis of the present day Romanian people. Emperor Aurelian, facing the onslaught of the barbarian invasions, withdrew the Roman military garrisons and civil administration south of the Danube in 271 A.D. The Daco-Roman population remained in villages and territorial communities. These communities survived successive invasions and continued organized life during eight centuries of barbarian migrations across their lands. The assimilation of the Dacians into Roman culture and the subsequent “Romanization” of the Dacians set Romania apart from its neighbors in Eastern Europe. Often described as a “Latin island surrounded by a sea of Slavs”, throughout its history Romania has maintained its Latin-based culture.

It is this “Latin” influence that makes the Romanians generally a warm and personable people, a trait that
has served the Romanian HUMINT teams well. The ability to establish and foster inter-personal relationships with their contacts in the field can, of course, be attributed to their training, but the persuasive influence of Romania’s “Latin” heritage cannot be discounted. Romanian HCTs are successful in establishing themselves with the local population. They quickly adapt to the local style of dress, improve upon their fledgling language capabilities, mingling with the locals as much as possible given force protection considerations, and take every opportunity to establish contact.

Many HCT operators easily blend into the areas where they are currently operating, having physical characteristics that allow them to look similar to persons from the area, no small factor when working to establish rapport. In one instance, a Romanian HCT operator in Afghanistan looked so much like the locals that he was mistaken for one of the local cleaning personnel assigned to the base.

The “Latin” influence in the Romanians also makes them less averse to cultural norms such as physical contact between men. The willingness to engage in close physical proximity to their male contacts, in a male-dominated society, helps them to communicate on a social level that many Americans would find uncomfortable. Romanian HUMINT operators will often embrace their contacts, reflecting the cultural norms of the region. Thus, the ability of Romanian HCT teams to build rapport, win the confidence of their contacts, and convince them to provide information is largely a result of their cultural affinity to build close personal relationships.

**Adaptability—“Learn or Perish” Mentality**

As mentioned, throughout history Romanians have learned to adapt to the changing forces surrounding them, adopting at times both passive acquiescence and active resistance in order to preserve themselves. This characteristic has become, over time, an integral part of the national psyche. Mental agility, adaptability, and improvisation prevail in the Romanian mindset. In the Romanians, their instincts for adaptability and flexibility were honed by life under the brutal police state of Nicolae Ceausescu. It de-
veloped in the people a natural tendency to be ob-
servant, to be adaptable in order to survive under a
harsh totalitarian regime.

One observation made is that Romanian HCTs
are able to quickly ascertain and exploit the lo-
cal operational environment to their success. The
Romanian HCTs appear to be able to quickly com-
prehend the “informal” networks that exist, who
the key individuals and leaders are, both formal
and informal within a community, and then work
to exploit this understanding. This innate abil-
ity to understand complex webs of family, tribal,
business and criminal networks, alliances and
associations can be indirectly attributed to their
own “national experiences” under the harsh con-
ditions of Ceausescu’s regime. In a totalitarian
regime, the ability to understand who has control
and influence can mean the difference between
life and death. Having historical insights and ex-
periences of living in such an environment has
clearly benefited the Romanian HCTs.

Romanian HCT personnel also always appear
eager for new missions, especially when work-
ing alongside Americans. They readily accept ad-
ditional missions, adjust to the requirements of
new assignments, and accept uncertainty as an
inherent part of their work. New training opportu-
nities are welcomed and even informal exchanges
of information and experiences are frequently
sought by them from their American colleagues.
Romanian HCT personnel are quick studies when
it comes to assimilating new materials. They rap-
idly adapt to new guidance, incorporating U.S.
best practices and lessons learned quickly into
their own protocols and procedures. They also
take responsibility for disseminating the knowl-
edge gained from U.S. training to others within
their own units, thereby providing a multiplier ef-
fect for U.S. training programs within the Ro-
manian military. Mission-oriented lessons learned
are also quickly absorbed. After action reports
are scrutinized, adjustments to procedures are
made and resultant information made available
to other Romanian units, not only within their
own command structure, but to other Romanian
units.

Conclusion

A Romanian general once described the HCTs by
saying “We have a National Treasure—our HUMINT
teams.” They have certainly proven themselves
to be an invaluable asset to Romanian defense
capabilities and an important contributor to the
global war on terrorism. Romanian HUMINT ex-
pertise has proven so pervasive that Romania has
become the internationally recognized leader for
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Allied Command Transformation Headquarters
has approved the establishment in Romania of a
NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence.

The success of the HCTs can be attributed to
both tangible factors such as training, but also
to certain cultural and social characteristics that
lend themselves to HUMINT collection. Train-
ing Romanian personnel with the basic combat
skills provides them with a strong tactical back-
ground and makes them capable, confident Sol-
diers first. It also instills in the individual the
confidence that they are highly trained Soldiers
and that self-confidence reflects in the conduct
of their HUMINT collection mission. Maturity
and “life experience” also facilitate the establish-
ment of rapport and confidence building required
to establish positive relations with contacts and
sources.

Finally, the combination of a hospitable social
culture and adaptability rounds out the charac-
teristics of Romanian HCTs, making them true
experts in the field. The opportunity will now ex-
ist, through the NATO Center of Excellence for
HUMINT, for Romania to share its wealth of ex-
perience in the training of other NATO and coali-
tion partners.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Liebl is the Army Attaché to
Romania. He has held a variety of leadership positions
throughout his Army career ranging from Infantry Platoon
Leader to Special Forces Company Commander. His last
assignment prior to serving as the Army Attaché was as the
Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy,
Zagreb, Croatia. His military education includes the Infantry
Officer Basic and Advance Courses, Ranger School, Pathfinder
School, Air Assault School, Special Forces Detachment
Officer Qualification and the Jumpmaster course. LTC Liebl
conducted Foreign Area Officer training in the Netherlands
and attended advanced civil schooling at Indiana University
where he earned an MA in West European Studies. LTC Liebl
is a graduate of the Belgian Command and Staff College.
Introduction

The purpose of this article is to provide the intelligence community (IC) with a better understanding of “Every Soldier a Sensor (ES2)” and to enhance our ability to leverage the Soldier Sensor. ES2 is an initiative of the Department of the Army G2. Its premise is that Soldiers are the most capable and sophisticated system of sensors on the battlefield. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the need and importance of understanding a complex environment. The enemy continues to follow Henry Kissinger’s premise that “the conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerilla wins if he does not lose.” The limited quantity of traditional intelligence sensor assets, combined with an ever-increasing demand for better intelligence, makes the Soldier Sensor the only system capable of interacting with a multifaceted problem in a timely manner to defeat an insurgency.

A rudimentary version of ES2 already occurs in the U.S. Army and has been since its inception. Leaders and Soldiers at every level are interacting with their surroundings to ensure mission success and provide force protection. They are listening to sheiks and pilgrims, warlords and henchmen, the affluent and the poor. The Soldier is collecting information that leaders need every day while on patrol. The difficulty is not convincing commanders of the merits of ES2, but determining how to employ it. The enemy has its own version of ES2. Insurgencies thrive because they work from the bottom up. The insurgent knows the neighborhoods and social networks and knows how to influence them. The insurgent uses simple but effective weapons to overcome technological and logistical shortfalls and sees the immediate effects of policy at the lowest level and adapts to remain viable. The U.S. Army is learning how to harness the knowledge of its Soldiers too. Compounded with first-rate information networks, ES2 has the potential to bring information dominance to a completely new level of effect.

The ES2 concept challenges the U.S. Army to find ways to collect, compile, and leverage the knowledge already in its organization. The bottom line is that it is not a unique intelligence process, but rather an untapped source of information to be analyzed and exploited. Four aspects for the implementation of ES2 are discussed below: Soldier Sensor training, Soldier Sensor system employment, Soldier Sensor data collection, and Soldier Sensor data exploitation.

Training

The Soldier Sensor must undergo continuous training in order to be an effective collector. An example of how poor Soldiers are at everyday observation can be seen from an exercise conducted at a basic officer leader’s course. During a release run, the majority of the class ran a counterclockwise route. Three other
students picked up two AK-47 rifles and a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) from a cache site and then ran the route clockwise against the main body. After the run, less than 25 percent of the officers had noticed that someone ran by them carrying an AK-47 or RPG launcher with round. In addition, at the end of the run another Soldier wore a suicide vest consisting of two canisters each roughly the size of a one liter bottle and a hand detonator over his PTs. Less than one tenth of the class noticed as they were stretching in a circular formation afterward. One Soldier even walked and talked with the “suicide bomber” for roughly 200 meters without ever noticing that something was amiss.

The 2-54th Infantry Battalion, 192d Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia, has realized its role in the ES2 training process and integrated it into its Initial Entry Training. The battalion broke ES2 into five basic concepts: situational awareness, actionable intelligence, threat/cultural awareness, human intelligence (HUMINT)/combat patrolling, and improvised explosive device (IED) detect and defeat training. Each concept is its own separate entity, but linked in the holistic systems based view of information/intelligence collection and dissemination during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The aspects of ES2 have been defined, debated, approved, disapproved, and executed with varying degrees of success and failure depending on the individual commander’s/instructor’s familiarity with the training content and methodology. Accepted by all, however, is the holistic nature of ES2 training and implementation.

The battalion developed the entire 14 week One Station Unit Training Course Map and completely integrated ES2 training concepts into nearly every program of instruction event. In order to equip Soldiers with the tools they will need to collect actionable intelligence; display cultural awareness; conduct tactical questioning (not source operations), and conduct normal traffic control point/entry control point operations, the Checkpoint Operations training includes:

- Basic Iraqi Arabic Language.
- Escalation of Force (EOF).
- Graduated Response.
- Area specific hand and arm signals.
- Personnel search procedures.
- SCRM and A-H reporting procedures.4
- Vehicle search techniques.

Urban Operations training includes:

- Employment of a fire team.
- Enter and clear a room.
- Shoot/don’t shoot scenarios.
- Basic information gathering in language.
- Keep in memory (KIM) testing.5
- Target detection/target discrimination.
- Room search techniques.
- Civilians on the battlefield in both precision and high intensity clearing techniques.

IED Detect and Defeat training includes:

- Iraqi mine identification.
- The Multinational Force 5 Cs (Confirm/Clear/Call/Cordon/Control).
- 5/25 meter checks.
- Nine Line Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)/IED reporting.

The field training exercise integrates the full spectrum of Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills with ES2 training scenarios centered on a forward operating base training environment with a culminating event that forces the individual Soldier to think and make decisions on events that he will encounter in the Current Operating Environment (COE).
The purpose of this ES2 training program is to enhance each Soldier’s overall perceptual skills and improve his ability to act/react/respond in the COE. The endstate is that all Soldiers are trained in the fundamentals of intelligence and information gathering and response in the attempt to craft the next generation of U. S. Army Infantryman/Soldier. The essential element in this training is that leaders cannot train ES2 in one block of instruction, or even in a week. Leaders must integrate ES2 into everything if they are to develop an effective sensor.

Employment

ES2 requires the IC to produce intelligence analysts who can interface with the Soldier Sensors and vice versa. Analysts require expanded skill sets in order to employ them effectively. The analyst must first understand the Effects Based Approach (EBA) and System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) in order to understand the operations side of the house. Second, analysts must understand the Soldier Sensors in order to identify intellectual strengths, unique skill sets, and maturity. Third, analysts must recognize common, innate human biases. Finally, analysts must be able to communicate with the Soldier Sensors before and after patrols in a collaborative way.

Before analysts can employ ES2, they must first have at least a basic understanding of SoSA and EBA. With SoSA, they will receive information that relates to more than the enemy location and activity. SoSA is a collaborative process of multiple Sensors that requires analysts to tie a broad range of information together, not just find the information that identifies an insurgent cell or an insurgent plan. Analysts must know more than the enemy location and associated activity if recommendations are to be made that matter. They must understand the political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII) issues of the area of operations (AO).6 The concept of winning the population through civil affairs, information operations, and economic reform cannot be separated from finding and killing the insurgents. They are two sides of the same coin. For example, a failure to find a job may be a reason to join an insurgency or become an extremist in order to undermine the government. A social obligation may require an attack on U.S. forces in order to settle a debt of honor. The Soldier Sensor will gather this information because in the mind of the populace all these events are related. Therefore, if the locals’ daily reality is influenced by a complex interaction of factors then the analyst must be able to discern these factors and their interaction in order to provide worthwhile recommendations. The analyst must understand the PMESII factors in order to analyze and explain in military terms the competing factors of the local civilian’s life. Analysts must understand EBA well enough to identify, analyze, and relate elements of the adversary’s system in order to assess and exploit vulnerabilities.

ES2 challenges the young intelligence analyst to be somewhat empathic; to understand what the Soldier Sensor thinks happened and find the facts. As an example, consider a platoon conducting its right seat rides with the Marines. An IED explodes as they are establishing a traffic control point. The Marines open fire on the neighboring area after believing they came under direct fire. During the debrief, instead of taking the initial report, the analyst stops, takes a breath and asks if the Marines saw anyone fire? What made them believe they were under direct fire? After a series of questions, it turns out the gravel blown up by the IED landed on their HMMWV causing them to think they were under direct fire. Situations like this illustrate that unlike other intelligence systems, built to design specifications and more or less the same from unit to unit, the Soldier Sensor is unique. The analyst will have to work to come to know the Soldier Sensors and training must be planned to present opportunities for analysts to develop these skills.

A wide range of people choose to serve in the military and a battalion’s complement might have a wide range of skill sets; anyone from a fluent Arabic speaker, a nuclear scientist, or a football hero to a person who first set foot outside of the back woods eight months ago to join the U.S. Army. All are great Americans; the analyst will have to get to know each of them to be able to recognize things like special skills, maturity, and worldliness. Unfortunately, the S2 and All-Source Analyst can not know every person in the battalion; however, they can overcome this problem with a three-pronged approach. Groups have personalities just like people. Analysts must know the platoons, their personalities, and their unique skill sets.
The platoon leadership will know its people. The S2 must coach and help these leaders to leverage their platoon's unique skills to provide the best information based on the intelligence requirements. The S2 can identify those people who might have unique skills that can provide critical information such as the Soldier who speaks Arabic, the Soldier who the locals just seem to trust, or the Soldier who always knows when something is not right. Then, the analyst can create custom intelligence requirements for these select few in cooperation with the chain of command. If an analyst cannot interact with the platoons and Soldiers, then the analyst will never be able to leverage the Soldier Sensor.

Analysts will have to understand how to evaluate the available (and potentially biased) information in order to make good recommendations to the commander. Our analysts must train to know and recognize sources of bias. The Military Intelligence (MI) Basic Officers Leader's Course has recently adopted Richards J. Heuer’s *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* to train junior leaders to recognize bias. He covers the most common biases in the following passage.

> “Judgments about cause and effect are necessary to explain the past, understand the present, and estimate the future. These judgments are often biased by factors over which people exercise little conscious control, and this can influence many types of judgments made by intelligence analysts. Because of a need to impose order on our environment, we seek and often believe we find causes for what are actually accidental or random phenomena. People overestimate the extent to which other countries are pursuing a coherent, coordinated, rational plan, and thus also overestimate their own ability to predict future events in those nations. People also tend to assume that causes are similar to their effects, in the sense that important or large effects must have large causes. When inferring the causes of behavior, too much weight is accorded to personal qualities and dispositions of the actor and not enough to situational determinants of the actor’s behavior. People also overestimate their own importance as both a cause and a target of the behavior of others. Finally, people often perceive relationships that do not in fact exist, because they do not have an intuitive understanding of the kinds and amount of information needed to prove a relationship.”

The last skill set is the ability to communicate. To interface with the Soldier Sensor the analyst will have to be a collaborative communicator, comfortable talking with groups of Soldiers of all ranks. The analyst must be able to conduct both pre-briefs and debriefs and must learn how to sensitize the Soldiers to the unit’s information requirements. The requirements should be communicated in plain language that the patrol can understand and relate to easily.

**Collection**

**The analyst must add the Soldier Sensor to the Collection Plan.** In this section we cover briefing formats, information types, and some techniques to analyze and exploit the information from the briefs. The Soldier Sensor, with time and experience in theater, will develop knowledge and insight into the situation that no other sensor can obtain. Consider an example from World War II where allied forces intercepted Nazi telegraph communications. Over time, the individuals listening to this traffic could tell, based on the “tone” of the dots and dashes, who was transmitting. They were able to track operators across Europe as well as determine the urgency of the message based on how the operator was transmitting. They went beyond the signals that produced a dot or dash to hear the person on the other side and even distinguish his mood. The Soldier Sensors conducting patrols of the area will also gain knowledge like this over the weeks and months that they patrol their sector, providing the intelligence analyst with a source of information that no other sensor on the battlefield can collect.

The Soldier Sensor can provide three types of information:

1. Technical expertise—“I smelled fluorine near that facility, it may have been a chemical facility.”

2. Factual information—“I saw a pickup truck with a rocket launcher in the bed moving south on Route Black.”

3. Intangible information—“A local told me that he and his neighbors are tired of being bossed around by foreign fighters.”
The analyst must be able to gather the information in all its forms. Ways to gather the information already exist: SALUTE Reports, debriefs, after action reviews, and sensing sessions, whether in person or electronically. It is worth mentioning nontraditional methods of retrieving information from the Soldier Sensor to include threaded discussion forums, sensing sessions, emails, and forums. Young Soldiers are used to and feel comfortable sharing ideas over the Internet. Electronic avenues may provide the analysts and commanders a key resource for flattening information sharing. Additionally, sensing sessions may provide the opportunity for the analyst to sit with the group and gather opinions about everything from the local populace to the insurgency, providing knowledge about the intangible aspects of the AO. These open forum discussions also provide the analyst with the added benefit of getting answers to the intelligence requirements no one thought to create.

Whatever the mechanism, these analyst-to-sensor exchanges should be a part of the unit standard operating procedures, and the unit’s senior intelligence officer should ensure their quality. At a minimum (as offered by Brigadier General James C. Yarbrough at the 2006 Intelligence Warfighting Seminar) two pre-brief/debrief questions Soldier Sensors should consider are:

- What was different today?
- Did anything make the hair on the back of your neck stand on end?

The Soldier Sensor can elaborate on either question if he has more to offer. However, the analysts should not try to draw more information than the Soldier Sensor has to offer or attempt to ask leading questions to fill in the blanks. As explained by Gladwell in *Blink*, people can see and understand things in a split second, which they might not be able to verbalize. The power of our adaptive unconscious is not something to dismiss just because it defies our ability to explain. Soldiers who are on the street everyday will undoubtedly develop an understanding that is critical to their survival and may not be able to verbalize it in any coherent manner. To draw more information than is there to offer can cause people to try to fill in the gaps with supposition or false memories. More information is not always better information. Analysts have to take the information offered and use it.

**Exploitation**

The information offered by the Soldier Sensor, like any other information source, has to be analyzed to become intelligence. So what methods are available to analyze and exploit the information the analyst can expect to collect? Several common techniques are discussed here, including trend analysis, event matrices, cellular analysis, and a technique called “dotology”.

Dotology, or ink spotting, is the first and most immediate way to take qualitative information and analyze it to retrieve quantitative data. The other techniques are based upon and rely on this method to varying degrees. Dotology uses dots in different contexts to look for trends and find meaning in apparently random data. The contexts may be a time wheel, a timeline, or a map. The data may then be used to tip-off more refined collectors. Take the second question that General Yarbrough offered above, the reports could be plotted on a map and a time wheel. If too many Soldiers report a specific area gives them the creeps, it might be time to task a HUMINT team to visit the location or conduct a cordon and search or cordon and knock.

Trend analysis is a common and well employed technique. Patterns in events and incidents may become more evident in a bar or pie chart to show and compare trends over time. Timelines with events are also a
good way to notice trends in apparently random data. Trends, while not predictive intelligence, can influence operations in less dramatic ways such as modifying force protection posture.

Event matrices take timeline trends to a new level of analysis. This approach creates enemy lines of operations (LOO) needed to accomplish attacks. Soldier Sensors can offer insight into what activities are or are not present in patrolled areas. By plugging reports of potential indicators of events such as IED construction into LOO templates, operational funding activity, or bomber reconnoitering of the site, the analyst can help predict when the next attack is possible and potential indicators of attack. By predicting events in time, the command has an increased range of options for operations.

Cellular analysis expands the event matrix to the map. By placing known locations of attacks, suspected insurgent supporters, and link-up points on a map and constructing radii based on assumed capabilities (walking, driving, etc.), it is possible to gain insight on where future attacks may come from. The Soldier Sensor has intimate knowledge of what the ground truth of the terrain is and how or where insurgents could operate. The cellular analysis technique can predict events in time and space and has the greatest impact on operations as it empowers commanders with a form of predictive analysis. The key point for exploitation is that the information provided by the Soldier Sensor is worth analyzing and using to guide operations.

Conclusion

This article by no means addresses all the challenges associated with ES2. The major obstacle to overcome is the sheer amount and diversity of information the Soldier Sensor is able to provide. This discussion outlines immediate steps units in the field may use to begin to leverage what information the Soldier Sensors are already collecting. Perhaps the ideas presented here will allow analysts and commanders to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures are relevant for ES2. Regardless of which methods move into doctrine, the U.S. Army’s ability to train and employ the Soldier Sensor and then collect and exploit the information the Soldier Sensor is critical in overcoming insurgencies.

While the information provided by ES2 is extremely valuable at the strategic and operational level, operational and strategic assets are not capable of providing the information. Only the tactical units with the unique Soldier Sensors can gather the intangible information from the battlefield. The operational and strategic level organizations are counting on the tactical level units to provide the intelligence collected from the Soldier Sensors.

Endnotes

2. From an interview conducted on 5 January 2007 with Lieutenant Colonel (P) James Norwood, Central Director, Theatre Ground Intelligence Center by Captain Eddie J. Brown
From an ES2 lane run at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Paying attention to small details while being placed in a situation that causes sensory overload allows the intelligence officers to see the difficulty in gaining an accurate picture of events during the debrief. In order to properly understand the situation, Soldiers have to identify cultural nuances.
The Transition Team Intelligence Trainer: MOVING BEYOND THE S2

by Major Chad Quayle and Sergeant First Class Zachary D. Smith

Editor’s Note: The writers are currently serving as Intelligence Trainers for Military Transition Team 5/4/6 at Forward Operating Base Falcon, Baghdad, Iraq where they are training Iraqi Army soldiers.

Introduction
Supporting the warfighter with effective intelligence is the primary focus of Military Intelligence (MI) within the context of the conventional American military. The role of the Intelligence Trainer on a Transition Team transcends this scope in that one must also effectively coach, mentor, and develop the Iraqi Army counterpart while taking into consideration the counterpart’s realities and limitations. Those aspects of the S2 “lane” such as physical and personnel security, predictive analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield are only a few of the tasks which require knowledge and competence on the part of those assigned to Transition Teams as Intelligence Trainers. Throughout this article the term “Intelligence Trainer” is used interchangeably with respect to the Intelligence officer and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) assigned to the team. In order to effectively execute the advising and training mission it is essential that the Transition Team’s Intelligence component function as a single entity; distinctions between the duties of the officer and NCOs are, from our experiences, superficial. Functioning together as a team is a prerequisite for mission accomplishment.

While frequently referred to as the “S2”, the role of the Intelligence Trainer in a Transition Team requires skills and knowledge beyond those normally associated with a conventional S2 position. Success as an S2 remains connected to the ability to demonstrate those skills required by the commander to help visualize the battlefield. As an Intelligence Trainer success is measured by the ability to influence the Iraqi counterpart and the ability to develop his capability to execute his mission. Competence in MI professional skills remains a prerequisite, but to effectively advise the Iraqi Army (IA) counterpart one must develop skills as a diplomat and a teacher. Knowing the MI profession is one thing, being able to teach it to someone else is a different skill set. Knowing how to get the Iraqis to listen and heed advice is an art form all its own. As an Intelligence Trainer one lacks the positional authority to which we are likely accustomed. Servant leadership and developing the ability to persuade the Iraqis to implement the trainer’s suggestions are the keys to success in this assignment. Until a productive relationship is built with the counterpart the ability to effectively carry out the mission is considerably reduced.

In order to effectively advise the Iraqi counterpart, credibility must first be established. Unlike in our western culture, credibility with the Iraqis depends more upon who you are than on what you know. In order to teach, one must first establish rapport with the IA counterpart. This is an assignment that requires the diplomat-soldier mindset. The Trainer’s age, family situation, military experience, education, rank, and personality will carry more weight with the Iraqis than professional competence. While this is anathema to the American mindset, when dealing with Iraqis it is the way it is, accept it. During the first several weeks of the assignment, the Trainer invests a significant amount of time simply talking with his counterpart about topics that will seem completely random. These exchanges are the foundation upon which the relationship will be built and it is essential that the initial personal investment is made if there is to be any significant influence (and hence, mission accomplishment) later on down the road. Having discussed how the role of
a Transition Team Intelligence Trainer differs from that of a conventional S2, we'll now focus on specifically what MI officers and NCOs can do prior to arriving for Transition Team training at Fort Riley, Kansas, during training, and after arriving in the area of responsibility (AOR) that will increase your effectiveness and chances of mission success.

**Initial Preparation—Get Smart**

Reading material related to the area and the mission remains the single most important thing you can do prior to reporting for training. The return on your invested time merits the additional effort. Developing your knowledge of the culture, regional politics, historical examples of counterinsurgency, and the differences in communication between high context and low context cultures will make your transition markedly easier and will help establish yourself as the regional expert within your team. *Arabs, Islam, and the Middle East* by William G. Baker is a particularly useful book in gaining general knowledge on the culture with which you will interact on a daily basis. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* by David Galula is also highly recommended as an introduction to the concepts of counterinsurgency.

In addition to reading about the area and counterinsurgency theory, we recommend reviewing FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, FM 7-20 The Infantry Battalion, and FM 4-01.45, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for Convoy Operations. Serving on a Transition Team is one assignment where everyone is an infantryman and everyone fights. It’s that simple.

By becoming familiar with the basics of fire and maneuver you will enhance your standing both within your own team and with the Iraqis with whom you work.

Being highly competent in your intelligence duties is great, but the knowledge of basic tactics will help bring you home alive. When moving outside the wire normally everyone on the team will have to roll due to the limited number of team numbers. Competence with tactics and weapons is a must and for this reason reviewing the technical manuals (TMs) for the M240B medium machine gun, M2 .50 caliber machine gun, M16 rifle, M9 pistol, and M1114 HMMWV is also highly recommended. You will receive training on all of these systems at Fort Riley and in Kuwait, but if you’re not familiar with them taking the time to read up on the subject will help flatten your learning curve. Additionally, if you have the opportunity to attend ranges for any of these systems prior to your report date, take the opportunity. Trust us; when you get in country you’ll be glad you did.

Driving is another skill that we normally take for granted and yet, once in theater, you never seem to have received enough training. Get used to driving the HMMWV. This seems to be particularly applicable to the officers. Typically the NCOs have significantly more experience driving but in this job everyone must have these skills. Again, you’ll get the training at Fort Riley but every little bit of experience you can get before you show up helps.

Start learning the language as soon as possible. This was one area where the training we received

![SFC Vansluytman and CPT Jimenez establishing security south of Baghdad.](image1)

![MAJ Quayle observing Iraqi checkpoints vicinity ASR Jackson, Baghdad.](image2)
fell short of what we needed. Focus on building your confidence with the simple social phrases. You’ll gain a lot of mileage with this and it will prove invaluable in building your rapport initially with the Iraqis. Learn to be nice; if you can manage that, the Iraqis will teach you the graduate level phrases over the next year. You should also learn those phrases which you’ll need to know in tactical situations where time doesn’t facilitate the use of a translator: “Stop”, “Drop your weapon”, “Turn right/left”, etc. One last point regarding language training—make sure the material you’re using is for the Iraqi dialect. We spent a fair amount of time using the Rosetta Stone software only to find out later that it was based on standard Arabic and not the local dialect. Consequently the payoff for that effort was significantly less than desired.

Much of your value added as an intelligence professional once in country will come from your ability to acquire and produce imagery products. The Iraqi commanders are much like American commanders in this regard, they all love a picture. Having a working knowledge of the Buckeye and FalconView programs will allow you to make a more significant impact by providing the team and the Iraqis with usable products. If you aren’t familiar with these programs, become proficient before you report for training. Once in country you will not only find yourself producing the imagery but you’ll also likely find yourself teaching the subject to your Iraqi counterparts. FalconView Lite Compact has been deemed releasable to the Iraqi Army. By having a working knowledge of this program you are able to give the Iraqis something tangible and help develop their long term imagery capability.

Additionally, make sure that you have an AKO-S account set up prior to reporting to Fort Riley. AKO-S will be the only means you have for accessing classified information once you begin your training at Fort Riley. Most of the other team members don’t routinely deal with classified information so, at least initially; the Intelligence Trainers frequently serve as the conduit for classified information.

**Transition Team Training at Fort Riley—Get Comfortable**

Once you arrive at Fort Riley one of the first things you should do is find out which team you’ll be replacing and make contact with them as soon as possible. By doing this you and your team can focus your collective training based upon the current reality facing your team. As the Intelligence Trainer you’ll also place yourself in a better position to get the most current intelligence from the team that is in country which will help alleviate some of the angst that each team experiences as they are preparing to deploy.

In addition to making early contact with your team in Iraq, make the most of the meetings and training scenarios using interpreters and Iraqi role players. Don’t get too concerned with the specifics of the given scenario but focus instead on the use of the translator and the interaction with Iraqis. This is what you’ll spend a significant amount of your time doing once you link up with your Iraqi Army counterparts. Becoming comfortable in this environment will prove critical to your future success once you arrive in Iraq. The bottom line: Get used to talking to Iraqis.

Familiarization with the Iraqi area of operations in general terms is an obvious must for the Intelligence trainer. Don’t get into detail regarding specific areas because there is a high probability that you will end up somewhere else (the assignment of individual Training Teams upon arrival remains a dynamic process). Instead focus on the big picture. Know the locations of the major coalition units, know the general structure of the Iraqi Army (or police if that is applicable) and how they’re geographically situated, and know the general trends regarding insurgent TTPs. Don’t spend too much time developing specific TTPs on your own. The insurgent tactics change very quickly and the team you’re replacing will likely have their own TTPs in place, usually for a very good reason. When prioritizing your effort, start by making yourself smart on the big picture and then work your way down. This will help guard against investing too much time learning about things that may be irrelevant by the time you actually get to your final destination in country. One of the best resources we’ve found for overall situational awareness is the daily email distribution of intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) provided by U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). If you send an email from your SIPRNET email account to portalposting@inscom.army.smil.mil and ask them to add you to their distribution list, they will send you copies of the INTSUMs from all of the major commands in the U.S. Army Central Command.
(CENTCOM) AOR. This saves a significant amount of time since the daily INTSUMs are pushed to you instead of you having to hunt for each individual report.

Two other subjects in which you will likely find yourself intimately involved include foreign disclosure and operational security (OPSEC). While OPSEC doctrinally falls into the operational realm of the S3, the reality is that you will likely be called upon as the subject matter expert. When training at Fort Riley, ensure that your team develops a mindset that values OPSEC. Bad habits are hard to break; trying to break bad OPSEC habits in-country can prove lethal. Becoming smart on foreign disclosure is a must. In your day-to-day dealings with the Iraqi Army your team will, out of necessity, have to share information with your counterparts. Knowing the difference between disclosure and release, knowing what the criteria are for each, and ensuring that the proper guidelines are followed will be one of the contributions that you make as an intelligence professional that will help your entire team. You should receive more detailed training on this subject once you arrive in country (the rules are constantly changing) but knowing the basics of the process before you arrive will make it easier for you to assimilate the theater specific details once you get here.

One last area that you should concern yourself with prior to departing Fort Riley concerns the handling of evidence. When you’re offered training on this subject, pay attention. If you’re not comfortable with the subject, ask for more training. This particular area is one where you will need to invest a significant amount of personal effort. As an area of command emphasis that falls right into the lane of the Intelligence Trainer, you must exercise due diligence. Failure has major repercussions and, left unsupervised, your Iraqi counterparts can generate a disproportionate amount of pain for all involved since the failure to follow proper procedures will likely result in the release of the suspected insurgent.

**Upon Arrival in Iraq—Become a Chameleon**

Once you arrive in theater you’ll receive additional training in Kuwait and at the Phoenix Academy located at Camp Taji, Iraq. Little of the training you receive here will be new but it generally covers old subjects at a higher level of resolution. Once you link up with the unit you are replacing you will begin the Relief in Place/Transition of Authority (RIP/TOA). At this stage your learning curve is almost vertical. If you approach RIP/TOA with this in mind it will actually make your transition easier. Keep a list of questions you want the established Intelligence Trainer to answer since you will likely forget many of the points once you actually arrive due to the accelerated pace.

Once you begin your RIP/TOA, it is critical that you begin establishing rapport with your Iraqi counterpart. You will likely spend a seemingly inordinate amount of time discussing things that in any other circumstance would be considered trivial, here it is not. The rapport you establish will largely dictate the future success or failure of your mission. Don’t forget that standing within the Iraqi culture comes from who you are, not from professional competence.

When establishing your relationship with your Iraqi counterpart, pay particular attention to demonstrating the importance of the intelligence NCO. Initially, we recommend that you always go visit your counterpart as a team. This will reinforce the concept of the intelligence team and help ensure that the Iraqis understand that the NCO speaks with the officer’s authority when the officer isn’t available. The IA remains an officer centric organization which
can result in the marginalization of the U.S. NCOs. By presenting yourselves as a team you can substantially mitigate this risk.

Another major part of establishing rapport and cementing your relationship with your Iraqi counterpart will involve learning about their reality. Determining your counterpart’s limitations and constraints (both personal and organizational) will help establish your baseline. Assess whether or not your counterpart has credibility with his commander (i.e., Is he in “the circle of trust”?). Evaluate with an open mind the roles of the NCOs in the Iraqi unit you’re advising. Every unit is different; don’t stereotype. See for yourself how the NCOs are utilized and make your own determination as to how you can help the Iraqis develop and improve the NCO Corps within their unit.

The relationship between you and your American counterpart working with the Coalition Forces unit partnered with the Iraqi unit you’re advising is also extremely important. The best results come when the two of you work as a team. The Coalition Forces have imagery and special intelligence, but the IA generally has better human intelligence (HUMINT). By developing these relationships with your American partner unit you can facilitate the use of Coalition Forces’ assets to cue IA HUMINT and vice versa, thus facilitating more effective intelligence collection on both sides.

The last relationship that we’ll highlight involves the interpreters assigned to your team. Get to know them, know their priorities and motivations, know their strengths and weaknesses. Some of the translators are better with interpretation, some are better with translation. Some have pretty good field craft and others are better at document exploitation. Personalities become a significant factor. Learn about the personal dynamics between your interpreters and the Iraqis. Some of the Iraqis can understand and relate to one particular interpreter better than others. The same concept applies to the American side of the equation. Take care of them by ensuring that they are paid on time (sometimes they aren’t), that they have the appropriate body armor and equipment (some don’t), and always ensure that they’re looked after when you’re outside of the wire. They’re part of your team and they need to be treated accordingly. Failure to take care of your interpreters will have adverse consequences for your team that will cripple your chances for mission success.

**Conclusion**

Serving on a Transition Team will likely be an experience unlike anything you’ve experienced so far in your military career and the challenges facing Transition Teams are unique to each team. What we’ve focused on in this article are those facets of basic Soldier and professional intelligence skills that we believe have a more universal application to Transition Teams serving in Iraq. Flexibility and teamwork provide the foundation upon which your team’s success will be built. From the perspective of the Intelligence Trainer remember these five things:

1. It’s their war. They have to win or lose on their own. Your goal should be to train yourself out of your job.

2. You’re not the S2, you’re an advisor. If you’re doing a lot of S2 operational work, you’re failing. Focus on improving the Iraqis’ processes.

3. Never forget that you can learn from them as well. It’s their country. Your counterpart can teach you a thing or two if you’re willing to learn.

4. Provide professional counsel and show the Iraqis the right direction. Constantly apply the common sense test. If it doesn’t pass the sanity check, tactfully rein them in.

5. Stay in the shadows. Seldom should you be seen or heard when in public. Let your Iraqi counterpart receive the credit.

Major Chad Quayle has previously served as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, and S1 with the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Other assignments include serving as an infantry battalion S2, MI company commander, and strategic analyst in C/J2 Estimates, CFC/USFK, Yongsan, Republic of Korea. Major Quayle has a BA in political science from the University of Georgia and an MBA from the University of Hawaii. Readers may contact him at chad.quayle@us.army.mil.

Sergeant First Class Zachary D. Smith is currently on his fourth tour in Iraq. His previous assignments include Intelligence Analyst, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR; S2 NCOIC, 701st Main Support Battalion; Targeting NCOIC, 3rd U.S. Army, and Intelligence Trainer, 24th Infantry Division Forward. He is currently pursuing a degree in Computer Science from Franklin University. Readers may contact him at zachary.smith@us.army.mil.
Introduction
The Operational Environment (OE) in which Army forces find themselves operating has become even more complex in the past six years—and analyzing that environment has also become more complex. There has consequently been a corresponding increase in the acronyms used to analyze the operational environment that include DIME, DIMEFIL, MIDLIFE, ASCOPE, and PMESII. Understanding each of these acronyms and applying their constructs when appropriate can assist in developing detailed analysis of the OE. Of course, each of these constructs can be used to analyze the OE from both the friendly and adversary point of view.

DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic)

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, defines the “instruments of national power” as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, normally referred to as the DIME. 1 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, uses the term “instruments of national power” to define strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” 2

Even though the military may be the primary instrument of national power during warfighting, the other elements of the “DIME” are not excluded; in fact, they continue to be essential instruments in the strategy of conducting the war. At the operational and tactical levels, the other elements of the DIME continue to be essential for mission success. It may be common to see all of the different instruments of national power used as “logical lines of operations (LLOs) where each of the instruments has complementary tasks and subtasks to meet the overall strategic objectives. This is especially true when considering all of the actions that may be taken prior to the initiation of hostilities with “flexible deterrent operations,” or FDOs. These FDOs may be derived from any of the instruments of the DIME such as information operations (the “I” in DIME”) or economic sanctions (combining diplomatic and economic instruments of power).

There is also an evolving construct for stability and reconstruction operations. The basic construct of the DIME is still considered, but the military instrument of national power focuses on security, while the diplomatic instrument focuses on governance. Hence, you may see “LLOs” in a stability and reconstruction operations that refers to the four components of governance, informational, security, and economic instruments or elements of national power.
For analyzing the OE, DIME is a useful construct to determine the distribution and nature of national power for both friendly and adversary sides of a conflict. Obviously, having a full understanding of the DIME provides insight into a particular strategy and the inherent strengths and weaknesses of that strategy.

**DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement)**

DIMEFIL is an extension of the DIME construct that can be found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT). The NMSP-WOT defines DIMEFIL as the means, or the resources, used for the War on Terrorism. The NSCT provides further clarification of the additional elements to the traditional DIME:

> The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. ⁴

The financial instrument of power is closely related to the economic instrument of power; there are, however, some important differences. The economic instrument of power concerns issues such as regional and bilateral trade, infrastructure development, and foreign investment. Examples of the use of the economic instrument of power might include enacting trade sanctions, enacting restrictions on technology transfers, and reducing security assistance programs. The financial instrument of power concerns issues such as the transfer of funds and banking. The NSCT states:

> Financial systems are used by terrorist organizations as a fiscal sanctuary in which to store and transfer the funds that support their survival and operations. Terrorist organizations use a variety of financial systems, including formal banking, wire transfers, debit and other stored value cards, online value storage and value transfer systems, the informal 'hawala' system, and cash couriers. ⁵

The intelligence instrument of power relates to continuous operations to develop the situation and generate the intelligence that allows forces to take actions against adversaries. Having an understanding of the intelligence capabilities of the adversary, and his ability to develop the situation from his perspective, is also a critical element in understanding the operational environment. The NMSP-WOT describes the intelligence instrument of power as used by adversaries:

> Extremist networks require specific and detailed information to achieve their ends. They gather this information from open sources, human contacts (both witting and unwitting), reconnaissance and surveillance, and technical activities. Terrorists use the resulting intelligence to plan and execute operations, and secure what they need to operate and survive. The intelligence component of extremist networks includes countermeasures to protect against infiltration or attack. Terrorist entities perform counterintelligence, apply operational security measures, use denial and deception, and exercise great care in determining the loyalty and reliability of members, associates, active supporters and other affiliates. ⁶

The law enforcement instrument of power relates to legal means within the operational environment, such as the Patriot Act and United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The NSCT specifically addresses UNSCR 1373, “which imposes binding obligations on all states to suppress and prevent terrorist financing, improve their border controls, enhance information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, suppress the recruitment of terrorists, and deny them sanctuary.” ⁷

The **law enforcement** instrument of power is particularly important in counterinsurgency operations (COIN). **FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency**, addresses this important issue:

> The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals enhances the Host Nation government’s legitimacy. ⁸

Having an understanding of the **law enforcement** instrument of power and the legal system is critical in understanding the operational environment, especially for countering terrorism or in COIN operations.
MIDLIFE (Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Information, Finance, Economic)

Interim Field Manual FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, used the acronym MIDLIFE to describe the same instruments of national power as the acronym DIMEFIL. FMI 3-07.22 expired on 1 October 2006 and was replaced by FM 3-24, but the acronym MIDLIFE still lives on, probably because it is easier to remember and to say. The interim manual described counterinsurgency as “an offensive approach involving all elements of national power” and “leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency.”

Interestingly, the current COIN manual, FM 3-24, just uses the acronym DIME when describing instruments of national power:

> The U.S. Government influences events worldwide by effectively employing the instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic…. During COIN, country team members meet regularly to coordinate U.S. Government diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities in the host nation to ensure unity of effort.

ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events)

FM 3-24 does address another acronym used to describe civil considerations—“how the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations (AO) influence the conduct of military operations.”

FM 3-24 also indicates the relationship between the concepts of DIME and ASCOPE:

> Civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on operations in progress. However, at higher levels, they also include larger, long-term diplomatic, informational, and economic issues. At the tactical level, civil considerations directly relate to key civilian areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events within the AO.

FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, provides the detailed definitions for the six components of ASCOPE:

- **Areas.** Key civilian areas are localities or aspects of the terrain within an AO that are not normally militarily significant. This characteristic approaches terrain analysis (OAKOC) from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the missions of their individual forces as well as how military operations affect these areas.

- **Structures.** Existing structures can play many significant roles. Some—such as, bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams—are traditional high-payoff targets. Others—such as, churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals—are cultural sites that international law or other agreements generally protect. Still others are facilities with practical applications—such as, jails, warehouses, television and radio stations, and print plants—that may be useful for military purposes. Some aspects of the civilian infrastructure, such as the location of toxic industrial materials, may influence operations.

- **Capabilities.** Commanders and staffs analyze capabilities from different levels. They view capabilities in terms of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that priority. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities and a populace with key functions or services, such as, public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food. Capabilities also refer to resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as, interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. The host nation or other nations might provide these resources and services.

- **Organizations.** Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. They influence and interact with the populace, the force, and each other. They generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations may be indigenous to the area. These may include church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch
groups. Other organizations may come from outside the AO. Examples of these include multinational corporations, United Nations agencies, U.S. governmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Red Cross.

- **People.** *People* is a general term used to describe nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces. The term includes all civilians within an AO as well as those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission. Individually or collectively, people can affect a military operation positively, negatively, or neutrally. In stability operations and support operations, Army forces work closely with civilians of all types.

- **Events.** *Events* are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations. Examples include national and religious holidays, agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations. Other events are disasters from natural, manmade, or technological sources. These create civil hardship and require emergency responses. Examples of events precipitated by military forces include combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and paydays. Once significant events are determined, it is important to template the events and to analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.  

**PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure)**

FM 3-24 identifies another construct for analyzing the operational environment which uses the acronym PMESII.

Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. This can include eliminating those extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government. Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity. COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines.  

The PMESII construct is an extension of doctrinal development concerning Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and System of System Analysis (SoSA). The Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 4 (JWFC Pam 4) provides this description of the concepts of PMESII, ONA, and SoSA:

SoSA is a collaborative process that continues throughout the ONA life cycle. It views the adversary as an interrelated system of PMESII systems. SoSA attempts to identify, analyze, and relate the goals and objectives, organization, dependencies and inter-dependencies, external influences, strengths, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of the various systems. The objective is to determine the significance of each PMESII system and its various elements to the overall adversary system in order to assess the systemic vulnerability of the various elements and how we can exploit them to achieve desired effects.  

![Figure 2. PMESII](image)

PMESII is different than many of the other constructs used to analyze the operational environment. The SoSA approach includes not only analyzing each of the components of PMESII but to also analyze the nodes and links within the system. According to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, nodes are “an element of a system that represents a person, place, or thing” whereas a link is “an element of a system that represents a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes.” The key in PMESII analysis is to not only evaluate each of the components of the system, but also to determine the interaction...
between the systems and thereby identify the key nodes, those nodes that are critical to the functioning of the system.

The PMESII construct has been adopted for use in both Joint and Army doctrine, including JP 3-0, JP 5-0, the current draft of FM 3-0, FM 3-24 (as mentioned above), and FMI 5-0.1. The current draft of FM 3-0 describes the use of PMESII in analyzing the OE:

“At the operational level, analysis of the operational environment proceeds through the following categories: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII). The Army views the OEs through PMESII with the additional variables of physical environment and time to add breadth and depth to the analysis and represent the nature of land operations. Conceptually, PMESII (with variables) provides an unconstrained view of the situation, not only in basic terms, but also in terms of its emergent characteristics. Such a comprehensive view assists commanders in appreciating how the military instrument complements the other instruments of power.”

Interim Field Manual (FMI) 5-0.1, The Operations Process, provides further clarity on the value of PMESII analysis. This analysis “helps staffs identify potential sources on which to focus indications and warning activities” as well as helping with determining potential decisive points and assisting center of gravity analysis and operational design. PMESII analysis also allows joint staffs to consider “a broader set of options and identify desired and undesired effects to achieve objectives.”

Conclusion

All of the currently used tools for analyzing the OE (including DIME, DIMEFIL, MIDLIFE, ASCOPE, and PMESII), provide a wide variety of constructs for analyzing both friendly and adversary systems. Although all of these constructs may not be necessary in all environments, they provide a useful set of tools for the analyst to gain a greater understanding of the operational environment.

Endnotes
5. NMSP-WOT, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionV.html
6. Ibid., 17.
7. NCST at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionVI.html
9. Ibid., paragraph 2-50.
10. Ibid., paragraph 3-19.
11. Ibid., Appendix B-11.
12. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, paragraphs B40 to B 54.
14. JWFC Pam 4, 5.

References

FM 3-0 DRAG (Doctrine Review Approval Group), Full Spectrum Operations, November 2006.
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006.
FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, August 2003.
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, December 2006.

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), February 2006.
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), September 2006.

Colonel (Retired) Jack D. Kem is an Associate Professor in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a Battalion S2, G2 Plans Officer, DTC Support Element Chief, and Battalion XO in the 82d Airborne Division; as a Brigade S2 in the 3d Infantry Division; as a Company Commander and Battalion S3 in the 3d Armored Division, and as the Battalion Commander of the 319th MI Battalion, XVIII Airborne Corps. Colonel Kem graduated from MI Officers’ Advanced Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Air Command and Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College, and the Army War College. He holds a BA from Western Kentucky University, an MPA from Auburn University at Montgomery, and a PhD from North Carolina State University. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at jackie.kem@us.army.mil.
The 20th Annual Military Intelligence (MI) Corps Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony was held at Fort Huachuca on 29 June 2007. Including this year’s six inductees, only 204 MI professionals have been selected for membership into the Hall of Fame. The selection process is deliberate and thorough. Each nomination is judged by a board of active and retired senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and professional MI civilians. The 2007 inductees include Ms. Jean M. Bennett (DISES-4, Retired), Chief Warrant Officer Five (Retired) Lon D. Castleton, Major General (Retired) Roderick J. Isler, Major (Retired) Yoshio G. Kanegai (Deceased), Chief Warrant Officer Five (Retired) Ivan Sarac, and Colonel (Retired) Lawrence Schneider. Congratulations to this year’s inductees on behalf of a grateful MI Corps!

Ms. Jean Bennett (DISES-4, Retired)

Ms. Jean Bennett served her first ten years with the U.S. Army in a variety of developmental budgeting and programming positions at Headquarters (HQ), V Corps, Germany. Following her service in Germany, she became the Chief, Financial Management Division and Budget Officer in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Ms. Bennett began her service in the Intelligence field when she was selected for an assignment as the Chief, Resource Management, Army Intelligence Agency, and then as Chief, Plans and Programs Division in the Intelligence and Production Management Activity. Her first mission as a Senior Intelligence Executive Service (SIES) was as the Director, Intelligence Programs and Analysis, HQ, Department of the Army (DA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G2. Subsequently, she served as the Director, Resource Integration, HQDA, Office of the DCS, G2.

As the Director, Resource Integration, HQDA, Office of the DCS, G-2, Ms. Bennett was responsible for all Army National Intelligence Program (NIP) resources, including the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). She also governed select Joint Military Intelligence Programs and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Programs. After the tragic events of September 11th, Ms. Bennett organized her staff to support the Army’s War on Terrorism (WOT) and the Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan. Because of her leadership, productivity of the organization spiked during an extremely difficult period resulting in significantly enhanced Army MI capabilities. Ms. Bennett also facilitated the establishment of the Army Senior Intelligence Officer, DCS, G2, as the integrator for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) within the Army.

Ms. Bennett’s career of over 30 years of loyal government service led to the significant enhancement of the Army’s Intelligence capabilities and contributed immensely to the Intelligence Community’s success. Even after her retirement, her professional, sound advice is still sought after today. Ms. Bennett is the...
Chief Warrant Officer Five Lon Castleton (U.S. Army, Retired)

Chief Warrant Officer Five Lon Castleton enlisted in the Army in 1973 as a Transportation Movement Specialist. He soon transferred to MI and was selected as a Counterintelligence (CI) Agent. As a noncommissioned officer he served in the 470th MI Group, Republic of Panama; the 525th MI Group, Fort MacArthur, California; and the 209th MI Battalion, Seoul, Korea.

In 1981, CW5 Castleton was appointed as a CI Warrant Officer. His first duty was to establish the 902nd MI Group’s field office at the newly activated National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Upon completion of the MI Warrant Officers’ Advance Course, he was assigned as the Chief of CI and Security in the forward deployed 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fulda, Germany.

In 1987, CW5 Castleton was selected for the Great Skill Program and served as the project officer in the Army Special Plans Office. He also served as the program manager, developing extremely sensitive chemical and biological warfare strategic plans. These plans were soon put to the test in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. CW5 Castleton served as the Chief, Operations Branch of the Army Field Support Center where he provided specialized mission support to units throughout the world. He was also selected for an assignment with the newly formed Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service and was recognized as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) expert on counter drug and counterterrorism operations. CW5 Castleton was selected by the Great Skill Program to serve as the career manager and senior recruiter for the Area Intelligence Program.

Throughout his career, CW5 Castleton was always committed to training the best Intelligence Soldiers possible. This commitment led to his selection and subsequent assignment as the Chief of the CI and HUMINT Training Committee at the Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He was later selected to serve as the Chief Warrant Officer of the MI Corps and was immediately selected to be the MI representative to the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA’s) Army Training and Leader Development Panel. During this time, he volunteered for a deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom where he conducted detailed CI and HUMINT assessments. Currently, he is working as a Security Specialist for the Air Force F-22 Program and is the Adjutant of American Legion Post 129 in Huntsville, Utah.

CW5 Castleton retired with over 31 years of faithful and devoted service to his MI Corps and the Warrant Officer Corps. He is the recipient of the Legion of Merit and the Defense Meritorious Service Medal (2nd Award).

Major General Roderick Isler (U.S. Army, Retired)

Following his enlisted tour, Major General Isler was commissioned after completing Officer Candidate School (OCS) in 1971. He was assigned to the MI School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts where he received Signals Intelligence training. MG Isler then attended flight school, serving as both an aviator and battalion adjutant. Following the MI Officers’ Advanced Course, he was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division G2 staff at Fort Lewis, Washington. Subsequently, MG Isler commanded the 335th Army Security Agency (ASA) Company and served as the S3 for the 109th MI Battalion.
Following his tour at Fort Lewis, MG Isler completed the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base and was assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to serve as the Aviation Standardization Officer. Recognized for his exemplary performance, MG Isler was selected to command a new MI Aviation Company. Under his leadership, this new unit was deployed to both Panama and Honduras providing significant, unwavering, and continuous intelligence support.

MG Isler was selected by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) to serve as Director’s Fellow, Continental U.S. Army MI Group. Following this assignment, he was selected to serve as the Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, National Security Agency (NSA). He was subsequently assigned to command the 748th MI Battalion (INSCOM) in San Antonio, Texas. After a stellar two year command, MG Isler was selected to serve as the Chief, MI Branch, U.S. Army Personnel Command. MG Isler served on the DCSINT staff as the Task Force Branch Chief, Plans, Modernization Support Division until he was selected to command the 501st MI Brigade in Korea. He was then selected by the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, to serve as the first Army Assistant Chief of Staff, J2.

Following his selection to Brigadier General, MG Isler returned to NSA to serve as the Assistant Deputy Director of Operations (Military Support). During this assignment, he was selected by the CSA to serve as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, C2/J2, Peace Stabilization Force (SFOR), Bosnia and Herzegovina. MG Isler returned to NSA and was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to serve as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. After two years at the CIA, MG Isler was selected to Major General and then moved to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) where he served as the Director of Operations until his retirement.

MG Isler concluded his distinguished Army career of over 33 years when he retired in 2002. He is the recipient of the Defense Superior Service Medal (2nd Award); the Distinguished Service Medal; the Legion of Merit, and Defense Meritorious Service Medal and was inducted into the OCS Hall of Fame in 1994.

**Major Yoshio Kanegai (U.S. Army, Deceased)**

Major Yoshio Kanegai was a native of Gardena, California. In 1942, MAJ Kanegai enlisted in the Army and after completing initial training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he was sent to Camp Savage, Minnesota to the MI Language School. He served as the Acting First Sergeant for all incoming Soldiers. While at Camp Savage, his leadership, compassion, and understanding made him a role model for many of the Japanese-American Soldiers he encountered.

From 1943 to 1945, MAJ Kanegai served in the G2, General HQ, in Brisbane, Australia; Manila, Philippines;
and Tokyo, Japan. He was discharged in late 1945, but returned to active duty in the spring of 1947 and was assigned to the G2/GHQ, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) in Tokyo as part of the Allied Occupation of Japan. This special intelligence section was moved from Australia to Tokyo after the war with the mission of evaluating and disseminating information gathered and extracted from captured documents and prisoners of war.

During the Korean Conflict, MAJ Kanegai served with the 115th Army CI Corps (CIC) Detachment and the 441st CIC Detachment in Tokyo, Japan. Subsequently, he was sent to Korea where he commanded Company B, 502nd MI Battalion (formally the 308th Army CI Corps) in Seoul. His command tour occurred during a period of political chaos and turmoil in the Republic of Korea (ROK) when a group of ROK military officers overthrew the civilian government in the south. MAJ Kanegai was tasked by the G2, Eighth U.S. Army to provide intelligence on the coup and the future plans of the new military government. MAJ Kanegai personally carried out this mission. He was not only able to meet with the coup leader, Major General Park Chung-Hee, but he developed a lasting and trusted relationship with him that would eventually lead to the most reliable communications link between the ROK and U.S. governments. His intelligence accomplishments during 1961 and 1962 were the highlight of his 22-year military career.

MAJ Kanegai retired from the U.S. Army in 1962 and on 17 April 2004, passed away. He was the recipient of the Legion of Merit and the Republic of Korea Presidential Order of Service Merit (5th Class).

**Chief Warrant Officer Five Ivan Sarac (U.S. Army, Retired)**

Chief Warrant Officer Five Sarac enlisted in the Army in 1966. In 1983, he was appointed a Warrant Officer and assigned to the 519th MI Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina where he served as the Senior Interrogation Team Chief. Following this assignment, CW5 Sarac was assigned to the 18th MI Battalion in Germany. He served in both Munich and Augsburg as the Officer in Charge and Senior Strategic Debriefer, increasing the quality and quantity of intelligence reporting during the fiercest fighting in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force credited him with saving countless lives. CW5 Sarac's actions contributed heavily to the recognition his unit received when awarded the DOD and National Intelligence Community’s Best HUMINT Collection Unit distinction.

While assigned to the 18th MI Battalion, CW5 Sarac volunteered to deploy to Southwest Asia with the 519th MI Battalion in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He supervised interrogation operations and was responsible for over 12,000 Iraqi prisoners. CW5 Sarac was then assigned as Assistant Army Attaché, Domino Anker, to the U.S. Embassy Defense Attaché Office, Belgrade, Zagreb, Croatia and later Sarajevo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. CW5 Sarac and his wife, Theresa, a collection manager for U.S. Defense Attaché Office Zagreb, hold the unique distinction of being the only husband and wife team in the Intelligence Community to be nominated four times and awarded twice the Director of Central Intelligence Exceptional HUMINT Collector Award.

He was later assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo where he again distinguished himself as the longest serving U.S. diplomat in the Balkans. Upon his departure, Peter W. Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, wrote to the Director of DIA, and expressed his gratitude, admiration, and respect for CW5 Sarac concluding that, “CW5 Sarac will be difficult to replace, and this will be a lesser Embassy when he departs.” CW5 Sarac was subsequently assigned to the 66th MI Group as the HUMINT Collection Manager.
where he leveraged his vast experience to focus his unit in support of the WOT.

CW5 Sarac concluded his distinguished 33 year Army career in 2005 when he retired while assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is the recipient of the Defense Superior Service Medal (2nd Award); the Legion of Merit; the Defense Meritorious Service Medal (2nd Award); the Meritorious Service Medal (5th Award), and the Croatian Legion of Merit.

**Colonel Lawrence Schneider (U.S. Army, Retired)**

Colonel Schneider enlisted in the Army CI Corps in 1964. He served his first tour overseas working undercover on an aggressive counterespionage assignment. Following completion of OCS, he was commissioned as an Infantry officer and qualified in Airborne and Special Forces, serving a tour in the Republic of Vietnam, with the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Following his tour in Vietnam, he branch transferred to MI. His first assignment as an MI officer was with the U.S. Pacific Command where he served in a Joint intelligence assignment. His subsequent assignment was with the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado where he served in successive positions as the Division CI Officer; S2, 2nd Brigade; Commander, Combat Support Company, 1-77 Armor Battalion, and Commander, 4th MI Company (CBTI). COL Schneider then served as the Assistant Army Attaché in the Philippines and then commanded the Army’s only counterespionage battalion that was subordinate to the 902nd MI Group.

Following attendance at the U.S. Army War College, COL Schneider served as the G2, 1st Cavalry Division, providing critical intelligence to the Division and Corps during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He also served as the G2 and Deputy Chief of Staff, III Corps and Special Assistant to the Commanding General, III Corps where he was responsible for leveraging emerging technology for the Corps’ intelligence and battle command systems.

COL Schneider concluded his distinguished Army career of more than 30 years when he retired in 1994. He is the recipient of the Legion of Merit; the Bronze Star Medal (4th award), and the Defense Meritorious Service Medal. Following his retirement, he was appointed as a member of the Army Science Board working intelligence, information operations, and asymmetric operations issues.

### 2008 MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

With the 2007 Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony fast approaching, it is time to start thinking about our 2008 nominations. Nominating instructions are posted on the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin’s (MIPB) Homepage at www.umi-online.us/mipb under MIPB Latest News. You may request nomination guidance by either writing to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (HOF), 110 Rhea Avenue, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7080, or by sending an email message to OCMI@hua.army.mil. We will notify nominators of a packet’s receipt and the date of the next Selection Board.

**Always Out Front!**
The African Languages Summit was held at the Center for the Advanced Study of Languages (CASL), University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland on 4 May 2007.

Introduction

*Doctor Laura Murray, Director of the Foreign Language Program Office,* explained that the primary mission of the FLPO is to improve foreign languages capabilities within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Some of the biggest challenges to the IC have been the less commonly taught languages. It has often been extremely difficult to find interpreters/translators, instructors, curriculum and materials, teaching aids, and instructional technology in these less commonly taught languages. The main purpose of this summit was to gather U.S. government policy makers and educators together to discuss mission needs, requirements, and instructional shortfalls involving the non-colonial African languages. This would allow for prioritization of needs in order to determine where and how to invest our resources.

Background

*Ambassador Robert Houdek, National Intelligence Council,* clarified that there is no one “African language.” There are over 1,500 languages spoken in Africa. In fact, there are about 250 languages spoken in Nigeria alone. It is not uncommon for Africans to switch back and forth between multiple languages without conscious thought. It is an erroneous myth that Americans can function in Africa if they can speak only English or French.

Language is a key to cultural understanding. For example, proper greetings and the use of honorifics can greatly facilitate the effectiveness of communication. Indigenous Africans often use Swahili as a *lingua franca,* especially among military forces.

Some of the earliest and best work to capture language grammars and vocabularies was done by missionaries. Many influential intellectuals went to Africa as missionaries and advanced the study of indigenous African languages. However, analytic capacity and institutional knowledge about Africa has degraded over time. The reduction of resources, both financial and human, began at the end of the Cold War, and the 9/11 surge took away even more resources. Many scholars are no longer visiting Africa for many reasons, such as a high crime rate, warfare and conflicts, etc.

*Major Gert (Gary) de Wet, AFRICOM Transition Team,* advised that the importance of Africa to the U.S. government is now growing. In the IC, Department of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other agencies, there has been a growing need for African languages and cultural expertise. The U.S. is in the process of standing up the Africa Command (AFRICOM). This is because African security challenges are unique, growing, and merit focused responses to achieve theater security and cooperation, as well as to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance operations. Responsibility for Africa is currently divided among three different commands that also have other areas of concern. The standup of AFRICOM will address this fractured approach. The new command will work closely with multiple organizations and with local forces across Africa. There is still no set approach to identify required language skills, but it is understood that there is a need to have the ability to interact with local forces and residents using indigenous languages and with effective knowledge of the culture. The final location and organizational structure of AFRICOM are still in the planning stages.
African Language and Culture Observations and Issues

*Doctor Antonia Schleicher, National African Languages Resource Center,* highlighted the current status of the teaching of African languages at academic institutions. Few African languages study programs exist at educational institutions in the U.S. Dr. Schleicher detailed the capabilities of the National African Languages Resource Center at the University of Wisconsin, a program funded by the Department of Education, where they are developing standards and resources for African languages instruction.

Concerning African language training, there are many challenges associated with developing teaching and reference materials for the less commonly taught languages. Often, the indigenous languages are not formally taught in the African countries. Getting access to individuals who can advise and consult is also difficult. In addition, many of the countries in which we have interests are involved in conflicts and full-scale warfare. There is unfortunately a lack of trained language teachers. There are also many instances of African language instructors having problems with U.S. students due to cultural differences and instructional styles. For example, African instructors may view student questions as a “criticism,” or “challenges to authority.”

**Highlights from U.S. Programs for African Languages**

*Stacia Falat, National Security Education Program (NSEP),* briefed that NSEP is meant to strengthen U.S. National Security through development of critical language and cultural expertise. NSEP sponsors the David L. Boren Scholarships and Fellowships. The Boren awards are provided to study languages abroad and develop proficiency in language and culture. Less than 8 percent of the awards have gone to send people to Africa. Everyone who participates in the program must work in a National Security position for at least one year. In order to track African specialists, there is a database of all participants who have studied abroad.

*CPO Derek Beck, U.S. Navy Advanced Language Response Team,* briefed they take highly capable language-trained military personnel and provide them additional training in less commonly taught languages, including several African languages. They currently have fifty-five linguists assigned to the team. They support local language needs and also deploy abroad. Selection of languages for training is based on customer requirements.

*Everette Jordan, Director of the National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC),* briefed that the NVTC was created in 2003 and is now an ODNI organization. NVTC has a growing pool of translators (over 500 from 46 different states) and uses them where they reside via Internet and other network connections. NVTC has some capability in African languages. The translators are primarily native speakers, and they are tested for English language proficiency. They have a wide variety of knowledge and skill sets. NVTC provides translation services to a broad range of government agencies, including IC agencies, DOD, law enforcement, and others.

*Dr. Donald Fischer, Provost of the Defense Languages Institute (DLI),* briefed that DLI provides extensive language training support. DLI has developed Language Familiarization Kits (FamKits) that provide language survival skills to individuals who are being deployed overseas. They are in many new languages and formats and over 100,000 kits have been distributed. It takes about 90 days to make a new FamKit. There is also an Iraqi Headstart CD, an 80-hour self-paced interactive program which could serve as a model for the development of instructional materials for African languages.

*Cliff Lynn, Language Center Chief for the Sub-Saharan African Languages for the National Security Agency* highlighted their current work and challenges (this briefing was classified).

*Eric Hammersen, Senior Language Authority for the Defense Intelligence Agency,* focused on the lack of requirements for African languages for Foreign Area Officers and Defense Attaches to be assigned to Africa. Current requirements are limited to colonial languages such as French and Portuguese. There is also a lack of training and testing resources. Many African languages do not have a Defense Language Proficiency Test or other standard test, with the result that there are no objective criteria to indicate the proficiency of those tested.
Benjamin Kloda, Foreign Service Institute (FSI), briefed that FSI teaches 60 to 70 languages and tests in more than that. Training is available to U.S. government personnel, and to their family members when funds are available. Of the African languages, FSI has only one long-time permanent faculty member to teach Swahili; training in other languages is organized on an as-needed basis.

Machine Translation (MT) and African Languages

Dr. Judith Klavans, ODNI FLPO, reviewed the history of machine translation as it might be applied to any “low density” language. There are specific challenges with African languages such as orthography and limited resources. Though some interesting work has been done in this field, more research is needed to develop better machine translation of written and audio materials in African languages.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

Participants debated which African languages should receive priority attention. Other points brought out during the discussions:

- There is a severe shortage of expertise in African languages across the IC; often, one individual is the expert for two or more languages, and when that individual retires there is no replacement. There are current operational shortfalls, even in crisis and WOT areas.
- The IC needs its own experts in African languages to work with foreign partners to be able to verify the accuracy of their work.
- Currently none of the IC or DOD language schools agencies employ full-time teachers of African languages. Nearly all instruction is contracted out to vendors, with uneven results, since the vendor instructors rarely have training in language pedagogy. The group believed the ODNI should support hiring of full time instructors of African languages whose focus would be on improving training and instructional materials, as a resource to be shared across the community.
- There is a need to address the lack of billets for African-related positions in both language training, analysis, and operations. The IC and DOD need to build a new generation of African specialists with deep knowledge of languages, culture, and regional issues.
- There is a real need to establish testing and assessment requirements for African languages. The lack of tests and standards is a challenge for both recruitment and training.
- We should devote resources to improve MT in African languages and domains of interest. We must research how to rapidly ramp up system/technology support.
- We should develop effective approaches to engage heritage communities. It would be beneficial to support programs such as the National Security Language Initiative to develop pre-college language training in African languages, both to introduce American students to African languages and to maintain and/or improve the language proficiency of native and heritage speakers.

“The primary mission of the FLPO is to improve foreign languages capabilities within the U.S. Intelligence Community.”
The Department of Defense announced today the award of four grants totaling $2 million to Indiana University, San Diego State University, the University of Mississippi, and the University of Texas at Austin as part of the new Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Language and Culture Project.

“The department’s goal is to expose ROTC cadets and midshipmen to the study of languages and cultures of the world critical to national security,” said David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. “Through this innovative effort we hope ROTC cadets and midshipmen will have the opportunity to learn a foreign language which will prepare them for future duties as commissioned officers.”

As part of this project, Indiana University will offer scholarships for study at their prestigious summer institute in languages including: Arabic, Russian, Azeri, Kazakh, Pashto, Tajik, Turkmen, Uyghur and Uzbek. San Diego State University plans to re-shape their military science minor while drawing on the resources of the community around them to teach different dialects of Arabic as well as Farsi and Russian. The University of Mississippi will offer opportunities for study of Chinese including summers of study abroad. The University of Texas at Austin will invest in material and curriculum to expand their programs in Arabic and Farsi.

While the scope and approaches of the projects differ, additional components include study abroad opportunities and scholarships, distance learning and other technology, and additional tutoring and mentoring. The project’s aim is to increase cadet exposure to and study of critical languages as well as to enhance language proficiency and cultural awareness and expertise.

The ROTC project is overseen for DOD by the National Security Education Program (NSEP), which has a distinguished track record in partnering with U.S. higher education to enhance opportunities for students to learn critical languages. NSEP oversees the National Flagship Language Program and all participants in the ROTC effort will have access to curriculum and best practices from flagship universities.

**Unit Profiles**

Tell us about your unit. Please send us a write-up with the following items and information:

- High resolution color photographs or high resolution soft copy (preferred) of the unit crest.
- History of the unit to include campaigns and decorations.
- Current unit subordination, status and mission (unclassified).
- Operations your unit has supported in the last 15 to 20 years.
- Recent special accomplishments or activities that make your unit unique.
- Images of specialized equipment (unclassified).
- POC name, email address and phone numbers for this project.
- Full unit mailing address.
- Other information you would like included not listed above.

In order to allow our graphics designer time to create your unit crest, please send any photographs at the earliest possible time to:

MIPB
Box 2001
Bldg. 51005
Ft. Huachuca, AZ 85613-7002

Please send the soft copy crest and the unit write-up to sterilla.smith@conus.army.mil.
Does a People’s Republic of China 1992 Barcelona Olympic stamp include a veiled protest of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre? The five-Yuan stamp pictures six marathon runners, the first three of which have numbers on their uniforms. From left to right, the numbers are 64, 9, and 17.

At the time the stamp was issued, some stamp dealers and traders in China reported that these numbers referred to June 4, 1989, the day the military began the crackdown that crushed the democracy movement. This was sometimes called the “6-4 Incident.” The 64 could represent that date. But getting 1989 out of the numbers 9 and 17 is more difficult. Newspapers explained how this was done. Of the remaining numbers, adding 1 and 7 equals 8; combining that with 9 gives 8-9 or the year 1989. According to an Associated Press story, the stamp designer, Yin Huili, refused to say if there was any connection between the stamp design and the democracy movement.

Mark Sommer holds a BA in Political Science from Yeshiva University and an MA in International Relations from Fairleigh Dickinson University. He teaches at Stevens’ Institute of Technology in the Humanities Department. His philatelic memberships include The American Philatelic Society (www.stamps.org); Military Postal History Society (www.militaryPHS.org); Forces Postal History Society (UK), and The Psywar society (www.psywarsoc.org).
When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence or Intelligence Communities (IC).

Articles about current operations and exercises; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

✦ Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
✦ Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
✦ We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles.
✦ Although MIPB targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.
✦ Please note that submissions become property of MIPB and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

What we need from you:

✦ A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, non-sensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified/FOUO. Once we receive your article, we will send you a sample form to be completed by your security personnel.
✦ Your article in MS Word. Do not use special document templates.
✦ A Public Affairs release if your installation or unit/agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.
✦ Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the who, what, where, when, why, and how), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. Please do not embed graphics or photos within the article’s text, attach them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg. Please note where they should appear in the article.
✦ The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

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Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)
Box 2001
Bldg. 51005
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7002

If you have any questions, please email us at sterilla.smith@conus.army.mil or call COM 520.538.0956/DSN 879.0956. Our fax is 520.533.9971.

### Upcoming Themes and Deadlines

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2008 themes upcoming in July-Sept issue.
Official opening of the DOD HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE) and the Joint Coordination Element (JCE) at Tallmadge Hall, Fort Huachuca, Arizona on 10 April 2007. Photo by Thom Williams.

Imagery Analyst students from A Company, 305th MI Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona receive a briefing from a 12th Airborne Command and Control Squadron Crewman on E8 JSTARS Aircraft features. Photo by 1LT John Keegan.