From the Editor

This issue’s theme is Cultural Awareness (CA) with an emphasis on the TRADOC and USAIC efforts, through the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC), to educate Soldiers in the whys and hows of using cultural tools for mission success. I include Mr. Dearing’s well-stated comments below on the philosophy behind the TCC as well as training methods used to achieve its goals. (More information about the TCC is inside the issue.) We have a wide range of articles to include one on the Canadian CA philosophy and training initiatives at the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence.

Sterilla A. Smith
Managing Editor

The Global War on Terrorism and the War of Ideas

On a daily basis the media interjects images of car bombings, suicide attacks, and other acts of violence into the public debate on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), yet we are missing out on a significant piece of this war. Outside of the violent war, there is another, more important war that will determine not only the future of Iraq but perhaps our success in the GWOT. The War of Ideas (WOI) is not a war you will hear about in the mass media, but it is the strategic epicenter of our struggle for the next quarter century. The WOI is fought not in the streets of Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, or Khartoum, but in the minds of citizens whose role in the WOI is not underestimated by the extremist groups we are engaging. In order to win the WOI, we need to understand not only the culture of the local population but the culture that we, as Americans, bring with us so we can identify areas of conflict. The purpose of the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) is to provide training materials that empower the deployed Soldier with the background necessary to navigate the host population as well as make decisions that more efficiently accomplish the mission.

Cultural Awareness (CA) has been associated with sensitivity training under the presumption that a culturally aware Soldier may be emasculated or prevented from engaging targets by his or her new sensitivity, or even worse, such training may induce sympathy for opposition forces. This is an unfounded presumption. Every Soldier is given a tool kit as soon as he or she enters the Army. As he or she progresses through training, more tools are added to this kit such as combat training. Overall, there is still an underlying belief in many combat unit command structures, reminiscent of Cold War-era thinking, that the effectiveness of a Soldier is measured by his or her ability to destroy threats to the unit and the mission. With this approach, kinetic tools are the primary, and very often the only means of accomplishing the mission.

CA training displaces this mindset and demonstrates to the Soldier that there are, in fact, non-kinetic tools to accomplish his or her mission. The goal is not only to expand the list of tools in the Soldier’s tool kit but also to convince him or her of the effectiveness of non-kinetic options in accomplishing the mission, as well as avoiding unnecessary conflict in our WOI. In the end, if kinetic tools were the only options available to the Soldier for accomplishing the mission, he or she may miss out on numerous opportunities where awareness of non-kinetic options might prevent attacks or perhaps facilitate mission success without civilian casualties. CA training is not another block of training to be checked off during pre-deployment preparation; it may very well determine the combat effectiveness of the unit in the human terrain into which the it may be deployed.

The TCC’s current focus is towards tailoring the curriculum using practical exercises and applied activities which challenge the Soldier with situations found in the specific region of study. A lesson is only valuable as it relates to the Soldier’s mission; yet this approach can be difficult. For instance, how can one make Middle East history practical to a Soldier being deployed? This is not easy, but the approach that guides the solution of this problem is that all Soldiers have experiences, pre-conceptions, and ideas about their mission. They are encouraged to contribute to the class by discussing their ideas and analyzing their own values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms. Once Soldiers understand their own culture and the culture of the host population, they can make predictions on potential conflicts between the cultures. In addition, if one understands the host population’s culture, one will have more options in engaging the local population in the mission.

Using the pedagogical approach known as Constructivism, the goal is not necessarily a specific solution to a problem, but the ability of the Soldier to think his or her way through the problem and the relevant issues. Ultimately, the goal of CA training is the establishment of a general knowledge base, as well as a practiced ability to look at situations and generate options that fall outside of kinetics in order to accomplish the mission.

In the WOI, it is not enough to believe in representing a great cause; the local population must be convinced of this as well. This cannot be done without knowing the cultural norms that guide communication and interaction among the host population. A culturally ignorant Soldier may be combat effective in the Cold War model, but when the mission changes to counterinsurgency, combat effectiveness is not limited to the health, morale, and training of the unit; it is also characterized by the ability to interact with the population as well. The TCC’s mission is to assist Soldiers in discovering this new model.

—Christopher Dearing, TCC Curriculum Developer and Instructor
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By order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
0622802
Commanding General’s Letter to the Field, April 2006

Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Update

A number of decisions concerning Officer professional development and management were recently made by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) at a 9 February 2006 briefing. This briefing was the second in a series of briefings provided to the CSA on OPMS. His intent remains to better position the Officer Corps to meet current and future operational requirements in light of Modularity and Army Transformation. Specifically, at this briefing, he approved a new Functionally Aligned Design to be implemented over the next year. What this does to Military Intelligence (MI) is to confirm that we remain in the Operational Support group along with Signal and a number of other direct support functional areas such as Space Operations and Telecommunications.

While we see no major impact at the moment, especially in terms of promotion or selection for command, this shift in association may prove to be important to all of us because the CSA further directed the implementation of position sharing within and between the three new management categories. His intent is to broaden officer professional development. This means that MI, both Area of Concentration (AOC) 35 (All Source Intelligence Officer) and Functional Area (FA) 34 (Strategic Intelligence) Officers, will continue to be selected for promotion and command based on branch and FA 34 coded requirements, respectively. However, under the position sharing concept, roughly 20 percent of all MI and FA 34 coded positions will be identified for sharing among the MI Branch, FA 34, and Foreign Area Officers.

Additionally, another 10 percent (this could be from within the previously identified 20 percent) of all branch and functional areas positions will be made available for sharing across the Army. While serving in any of these positions may require officers outside of MI to receive additional training in order to perform in a specific assignment, the overall intent of the CSA is to build a Corps of well-rounded Pentathlete Officers. There remains quite a bit of work to be done on implementation but you can expect to start hearing more about this in the days ahead.

Advanced Schooling Opportunities

The CSA has also approved an increase of Advanced Civilian Schooling (ACS) opportunities starting in fiscal year (FY) 2006. In addition to traditional ACS opportunities the Army will start offering additional graduate school opportunities to outstanding junior Officers in order to broaden their experience and to enhance their value in a Joint and Expeditionary Army.

The Expanded Graduate School Opportunities for Junior Officers Program will be offered to officers in Year Groups (YGs) 1998 through 2003, with a portion beginning graduate school in FY 2007. Officers will generally begin attendance between their eighth and twelfth years of service. Officers in YGs 2004 and 2005 are expected to be offered increased graduate school opportunities in their third year of service. The majority of the expanded graduate school opportunities will be distributed through the major commands (MACOMs) to local commanders to use as a developmental and retention tool for outstanding officers. Projected goals are: 35 for YG 1998; 54 for YG 1999; 62 for YG 2000; 83 for YG 2001; 420 for YG 2002, and 420 for YG2003. MILPER Message 05293 will provide you with the details of this program.

(Continued on page 6)
Intelligence Center Online

Hello Team, Let me introduce you to your Intelligence Center Online Network (ICON). It is a Knowledge Management tool that enables Intelligence soldiers all over the world to communicate, collaborate, and investigate. It hosts discussion forums, and serves as a single point of entry to get to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center’s (USAIC) Intelligence Community (IC) websites, and other Army websites. It hosts a variety of public and private web applications that support directorates across the Fort Huachuca area and the IC worldwide with both Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) access. It has a Document Management System that is a comprehensive, searchable, secure (role-based) mechanism to browse, upload, and manage documents of interest to the Military Intelligence (MI) Community. The Public Applications section provides access to USAIC Lessons Learned; the Army Intelligence Comprehensive Analysis Tool (AICAT) Data Mining and Research Application; the Noncommissioned Officers’ Academy (NCOA) Course Pre-registration; the Quality Assurance Office (QAO) Survey Application, and the Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS) documents tracking web and repository as well as other private (role-based) Specialized USAIC web applications.

The SIPNET ICON Portal (ICON-S) is accessible from a SIPRNET terminal or computer at https://icon-s.army.mil. You must use your AKO-S credentials to access this site. Currently the ICON-S site is a mirror of the NIPRNET site and we will be looking to populate it soon with classified content and discussions.

FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector Operations

The recently approved HUMINT Manual, FM 2-22.3, can be found both inside and outside ICON. Access ICON at https://icon.army.mil and click Enter. This will get you to the ICON main page. Bookmark this page on your browser for future access. You will find the HUMINT Manual video posted under “What’s New.” Also from this page, if you wish to enter ICON, click on the key icon in the upper right hand corner of the page. Type your AKO User Name and Password in the appropriate spaces and click the “OK” button. This will take you
Military Intelligence Warrant Officer Recruiting

In previous articles I highlighted how many of the Warrant Officer (WO) cultural aspects have and will continue to change in order to meet the Army’s needs. WO recruiting seems to be an area that is a constant challenge. The requirements levied on our WO force by combat operations and the Army’s transformation are many and as a result the demand for competent WOs has never been higher. Unfortunately the accession of new WOs has not kept pace with the requirements for several years. This column focuses on the Military Intelligence Corps continuing initiatives to seek, identify, and increase the recruitment and accession of Warrant Officers.

The yearly WO accession mission is determined by the Department of the Army (DA) G-1 based on Army personnel requirements (retirements, shortages, etc.). Although, the Military Intelligence (MI) WO recruiting effort has fallen short of its intended accession mission for many years, fiscal year (FY) 2005 was a great recruiting year for the MI WO cohort and, thus far, FY 2006 looks like it is going to surpass last year’s performance. Thanks to all of you who participated in the recruiting, mentoring, and education of new WOs. Your efforts helped to fulfill our Army current and future requirements.

The following WO recruiting areas generate most of the questions I receive. If you have other questions dealing with MI WO care and feeding, contact me.

**Temporary adjustment of MI WO prerequisites.**

It is important to reiterate that in addition to the Army’s prerequisites there are MI branch specific prerequisites for the WO program. These are: Sergeant (E-5) minimum, four years in the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), and successful completion of the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC). These prerequisites have been in effect for years.

The Army developed short-term prerequisites to increase the number of WO applications to meet the current and future requirements. These short-term prerequisites seek to harvest the experience gained in combat. The experience gained while performing a job under combat conditions is very difficult to replicate in a classroom. The prerequisites are as follows: Sergeant (E-5) minimum, two years in the MOS (if one year was performing the job in combat), BNCOC (waiver possible if soldier served in a leadership position).

In the short time in which these new prerequisites have been implemented the number of WO applications has dramatically increased. This is good news for two reasons. One, it allows MI to satisfy increasing WO requirements, and two, since there are more applications than requirements it ensures a competitive board process and thus ensuring that the best applicants are selected.

**Alternate WO Accessions Initiative.**

The Army is considering using alternative methods to access WOs. The current WO accession process is reactive in nature (it depends on applicant decisions to submit or not to submit) and is therefore slow. A proactive accessions method is needed to expedite the WO acquisition process. A proposed accession methodology would screen and board NCO performance files for a specific shortage WO AOC, establishing an Order of Merit List (OML). These files must contain the full prerequisites (GT Score 110, 5 to 12 years active federal service (AFS), 4 years in the MOS, completion of BNCOC, etc.). After the board, those (determined by the DA G1 based on requirements) selected would be notified that they qualify for the WO program. This is a volunteer program. If they accept, a request for orders will be issued sending the selectee to WO training, Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) and
the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC), en route to their first unit as a WO.

The initial thrust of the initiative would be to increase the number of WOs to support the Army’s transformation. I expect that if implemented, this methodology would target a small number to address shortage WO AOCs (mostly MI). If the concept proves to be viable, it could be exported for use by the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). More on this later as the concept matures.

**Accession Bonus.**

The MI WO accession bonus was approved in March 2006 and has already shown its usefulness in attracting WO applicants. This bonus awards $20,000 for WOs in AOCs 350F All Source Analysis Technician, 351L Counterintelligence Technician, 351M Human Intelligence Collection Technician, 352N Traffic Analysis Technician, and 353T IEW Systems Maintenance Technician upon graduation from the WOBC. This bonus is for the active component only. The USAR and NG have their own bonus programs.

**WOCS Redesign.**

The WOCS has transformed in order to take into account the professional capabilities that NCOs already possess. The course gives credit to NCOs who have graduated from any of the NCOES courses. These NCOs; however, are required to finish a common core instruction block via distributive learning before reporting to the WOCS. This is a major shift in training methodology at Fort Rucker. The change is designed to encourage more NCOs to apply for the WO program and to teach them “officership” while discarding the harassment associated with this program in the past. Please inform your soldiers, NCOs, WOs and Officers of this change.

**Waivers.**

Any applicant can apply for a waiver of any prerequisite (except for GT score). I will address the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), or P-2 profile, and the AFS waivers. I do not want to discourage any qualified NCO from applying, but it is important that the right information is disseminated about these programs.

- The APFT (or P-2 profile) waiver request is processed by the DA G3 and is intended to provide quality and technically proficient NCOs who have service related injuries (combat, jumping, etc.) the opportunity to become officers in our Army. Approval is not automatic. Waiver request approval is dependant on the physical condition, long term prognosis, and the applicant’s performance file. The applicant must not have a condition that prohibits world-wide deployment.
- The AFS waiver is mandatory for applicants who have between 12 and 15 years in active service (Reserve service does not count for this purpose). It is adjudicated at the DA G1 and just like the APFT waiver, approval is not automatic. Approval or disapproval decision is focused on the individual’s performance file.

**Conclusion**

In closing, the opportunity to become a WO in MI has never been better. I know that with so many changes and developments in the WO recruiting arena it is difficult to stay informed. Those NCOs interested in becoming a WO should contact the WO Recruiting team at http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/ for information. This website will have the latest information on the WO accession program. If you require additional information that the U.S. Army Recruiting Command cannot provide or to inquire on prerequisites, contact me at james.prewitt@us.army.mil. I encourage you to redouble your recruiting efforts. Change happens is not just a saying—it is constant and necessary. We can drive it or get trampled by it.

“Remember the past but look to the future”
Centralized Command Selection List (CSL):

Prior to the CSA’s briefing, the Vice CSA (on 26 January 2006) also approved an OPMS recommendation to have Centralized Battalion Commander Selection elects assume their duties one year later. On average officers should expect to command at the 19 year mark for battalion command. This is being done to provide officers with additional time to gain broadening and Joint experience prior to command. It will also allow for a longer developmental timeline to complete pre-command training.

Warrant Officer Accession Bonus Update:

In my last note I told you that we had requested an accession bonus for those Soldiers who agree to become MI Warrant Officers (WOs) in the following Military Occupational Specialties (MOS): All Source Intelligence Technician (350F), Counterintelligence Technician (351L), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Technician (351M), Area Intelligence Technician (351Y), Traffic Analysis Technician (352N), and Intelligence Electronic Warfare Systems Maintenance Technician (353T). This request was approved effective 8 March 2006 and qualified individuals will now be paid a lump sum of $20,000 for accession into the WO ranks upon completion of technical certification and the MI WO Basic Course. Additionally, enlisted Soldiers who are receiving a Selective Retention Bonus (SRB) or Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) and are appointed as a WO, will no longer be required to repay previously awarded SRB/CSRB disbursements. (NOTE: The March 2006 WO Board results are out. Although MI continues to make progress in most WO MOS, we are still falling behind in accessions for MOSs 351L and 351M. With your continued recruiting efforts and the above bonus we will get there.)

HUMINT MOS Update:

On 19 December 2005 I provided a briefing to the MI leadership (the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)) on our recommendations for the way ahead with regard to MOSs 97E (HUMINT) and 351M. The briefing was the culmination of a review of the two MOS by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC& FH) with assistance from Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), the Human Resources Command (HRC), and the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The thrust of the review was to determine how to solve the current problem of keeping pace with the rapid growth of MOS 97E/351M requirements while sustaining continued support to the Global War on Terrorism. The MI community agreed that for MOS 97E we must take the following steps:

- Temporarily suspend the language requirement as an MOS qualification for 97E for all Soldiers who obtain the MOS during the suspension period. This decision will be reviewed annually and the language requirement will be reestablished once the MOS reaches an operating strength near 90 percent. When the strengths support reestablishing the language requirement we will also review whether language training should remain at Skill Level (SL) 30 or revert back to SL10.
- Merge MOSs 97B and 97E at the Master Sergeant (MSG) rank rather than the Sergeant Major (SGM) rank (already in place for 96 and 98 series).
- Establish an incremental bonus based on the DLAB score in order to expand the in-service recruiting pool for MOS 97E.
- Increase the SRB from a maximum of $20K to $40K (DA G1 supports $30K).
- Offer a CSRB of $150K to Sergeants First Class (SFCs) and MSGs to improve careerist retention.

For WO MOS 351M the MI community agreed the following steps should be undertaken:

- Approve an accession bonus of $20K. (Already approved).
- Access WO candidates without a language but require language qualification prior to their first assignment; (anyone dropped from the Defense Language Institute (DLI) will be encouraged to transfer to another shortage MI Specialty).
- Increase the MI WO MOS 351M CSRB to $150K to match the senior enlisted bonus.

All of these recommendations have been endorsed by TRADOC and were forwarded to the Army Staff for action on 8 March 2006. I will update you as the above changes are approved and implemented. Our analysis
April - June 2006

indicates that, if these strategies are undertaken, we should see the MOS 97E force filled to approximately 90 percent in FY 2009 and the MOS 351M force at approximately 94 percent by FY 2008.

Revision of Career Management Field (CMF) 98

The Transitional Training Strategy for CMF 98 Soldiers (Effective 1 October 2005) changes as approved in Notification of Future Change to DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, E030423, Revision of CMF 98 (Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare), dated October 2002, were implemented. This implementation merged several MOSs to reduce the total number of MOS and to create multifunctional Soldiers better suited to answer commanders’ Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) needs for the future. This implementation created a new MOS (98Y, Signals Collector/Analyst), and a transition training requirement for existing 98C (SIGINT Analyst); 98J (Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst), and 98K (Signal Collection/Identification Analyst) Soldiers in the force. The original plan was that the required MOS qualification training requirement would be addressed via resident training courses noted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Number</th>
<th>Course Title</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>233-98Y1/2/3/4 (98K) (T)</td>
<td>Signals Collector/Analyst (Trans)</td>
<td>7 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232-98C1/2/3/4 (T)</td>
<td>98C Transition</td>
<td>4 weeks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These courses came with a significant Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) bill. The initial plan was to address the resident training requirement via 30 percent temporary duty (TDY) enroute seats, and 70 percent TDY and Return seats. In an effort to mitigate training resource requirements and TTHS growth, USAIC has reviewed and approved an INSCOM proposal regarding alternatives to resident transition training in two areas. While the preferred method for transition training is still attendance at the resident courses (especially for Soldiers who may have been working outside the scope of their MOS or due to a permanent change of station (PCS) have the opportunity to come TDY enroute), USAIC understands that the current world situation and resource realities require flexibility as long as the training standard is maintained. Details of approved alternatives are listed below:

- **MOS 98C (new) Soldiers (former 98Cs)** needing to receive Operational Electronic Intelligence (OPELINT) training can obtain Transition Training Credit through completion of National Cryptologic School courses:
  - FUSE1100: Introduction to ELINT in Fusion Analysis
  - SIGE3110DV: Apprentice Level Operational ELINT (Classroom in Denver, Colorado)

INSCOM has approximately 70 percent of all the 98Cs in the force so this alternative training method potentially reduces the TTHS impact of this part of training by 70 percent. At Denver, where the SIGE3110DV course is currently being conducted, unit personnel rotations over a three year period could potentially cover 150+ 98C Soldiers.

- **MOS 98Y Soldiers (former 98Ks)** needing to receive Technical Electronic Intelligence (TECHELINT) training can obtain Transition Training Credit through completion of National Cryptologic School courses:
  - MATH1030: Math for SIGINT (self paced or classroom).
  - SIGE2810: Fundamentals of TECHELINT (self paced with unclassified CD) plus Gale Lite system training via on-the-job training (OJT) at their unit.

INSCOM has approximately 90 percent of all the 98Ys in the force so this alternative training method potentially reduces the TTHS impact of this part of training by 90 percent.

I or my designated representative will retain the final approving authority that a Soldier has completed required transition training. My point of contact for this transitional training strategy is Walter J. Crossman at commercial: (520) 533-4644; DSN 821.

Always Out Front!
to the ICON Portal. Major General Fast’s message on the new HUMINT manual is also posted in the “What’s New” area of the ICON Portal.

**DOD Advanced Source Operations Course**

In cooperation with USAIC, the newly activated Department of Defense (DOD) Human Intelligence Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE) announces the creation and the fiscal year 2007 class schedules for the new DOD Advanced Source Operations Course (ASOC). The mission of the ASOC is to train DOD personnel in advanced military source operations (MSO) to support military and combatant commanders’ requirements. The class schedule for 2007 is:

- 07 January 2007 to 06 April 2007
- 03 June to 24 August 2007

Each class will support twenty students from across the Joint community who will be identified through a formal screening process. The following prerequisites are required for attendance:

- Candidates must be a U.S. military or DOD civilian in the grade of E6 or higher or GS/GG 11 or higher, and assigned to, or entering, an operational HUMINT position.
- A commander’s nomination, endorsement, and verification of no integrity or criminal issues in the candidate’s past.
- Candidates must hold or be eligible for a Top Secret clearance.
- Candidates must meet their service specific medical and physical fitness standards and be in a deployable status.
- Candidates must be a graduate of at least one of the following courses: SOC, CFSO, MAGTF CI/HUMINT Course, or ASOT II. Other courses that may serve as a prerequisite are ASOT III, AFCITC, MOTC, or FTC.

**NOTE:** In the absence of the academic prerequisites, a candidate’s on-the-job experience through real world deployments and service in operational HUMINT roles may be considered and must be stressed within the commander’s nomination and endorsement.

- Candidates must have at least two years remaining on their service obligation.
- Candidates will be required to complete an application, including a one page autobiography and description of prior HUMINT experience. Additionally, candidates may be required to participate in a telephonic interview.
- Waivers will be granted on some prerequisites on a case-by-case basis. Nominations for this course are currently being taken. Interested individuals are encouraged to contact the HT-JCOE as soon as possible to apply. The application deadline is 01 November 2006. Those favorably screened and accepted for attendance will receive TDY orders provided by the HT-JCOE. The HT-JCOE POC can be reached at (520) 538-1024; DSN: 879-1024 or (520) 533-4066; DSN: 821-4066. There are still slots available for the January class.

As always I am extremely proud of our Intelligence Warriors and the contributions you make each day to support our Nation at War!

**SOLDIERS ARE OUR CREDENTIALS**
The TRADOC Culture Center

by Major Remi Hajjar

Editor’s Note: This article printed with permission of Military Review.

Author’s Note: I wish to thank Dr. Russell Watson and Mr. Peter Shaver from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Mr. Bruce Wood and Dr. Charles Morrison from the TRADOC Culture Center for their assistance, insights, and suggestions in the preparation of this article.

Introduction

An important part of the ongoing transformation in the U.S. Army is its cultural awareness (CA) campaign, whereby the Army seeks to enhance soldiers’ ability to understand and leverage cultural factors to accomplish the mission. If the early stages of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) provide an accurate foreshadowing of wars that the U.S. will fight in the coming years, then the need to understand foreign cultures takes on an unprecedented level of significance. Contemporary analysis increasingly identifies foreign populations as centers-of-gravity (COGs), which underscores the necessity of the CA initiative in the U.S. Army and military. ¹ One important development to promote CA in the U.S. Army is the creation of the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC), located at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This article provides some basic information about the TCC, and how this unique organization serves the U.S. Army by providing the Force with relevant education on foreign cultures.

Background

The TCC opened its doors in the summer of 2005. While the main purpose of the center is to support CA development and training, it also disseminates relevant cultural training, knowledge, and products across the Army (and potentially across the Department of Defense (DOD) in the future). ² The vision for the Center includes cross-cultural training, education, research, collaboration among military and civilian scholars, and physical and virtual organizational features. Ultimately, as the TCC matures, it anticipates influencing the rise of new cultural centers across the Army and the DOD.

Its conceptual construct of how to leverage cultural knowledge to enhance military operations includes four levels of varying depth and understanding of a particular culture, ranging from initial entry soldiers at the lowest level to key military decisionmakers at the apex. ³ Some preliminary emerging charters of the center include:

- Production of Middle Eastern and South East Asian cultural products (with heavy emphasis on the Middle East).
- Development, refinement, and assessment of training standards.
- Development of proficient trainers.
- Ongoing virtual initiatives including a digital library and a cultural web site to support the “MI University” (University of Military Intelligence).
- Development of partnerships with military and civilian institutions that contribute to the Center.

Structure of the Center and its Branches

As figure one illustrates, the TCC’s structure includes five sections. ⁴ The front office or headquarters supervises all aspects of the Center’s missions and functions including overseeing critical training missions; assisting in developing and cultivating beneficial partner relationships; developing grant proposals; and determining requirements and associated research assignments for relevant present and future country and area studies.

Figure 1. The TCC’s Structure
The Center falls under the Training, Development and Support (TDS) Division of the USAIC, and ultimately the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The Cultural Training and Education Branch develops and provides cultural products to all customers to include USAIC courses, other TRADOC schools, Army units, DOD and National agencies, among others. Its main mission is to coordinate and train CA trainers (“Train-the-Trainer”) and developers for its customers. This part of the Center manages trainers and instructors for classroom support; develops and exports distributive learning products; develops and assists in lesson plan development; and coordinates the exchange of cultural knowledge and training products with such partners as the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

The Language Center existed prior to the development of the TCC. Its charter includes providing language sustainment training opportunities for cadre and students; serving as a repository for foreign language literature; conducting language testing (such as the Defense Language Proficiency Test); sponsoring video-teleconferences that support language training, designing, and development; implementing language sustainment programs (some recent examples include the Iraqi Language Trainer and the Somali and Liberian Language Trainer Programs); maintaining close ties with DLI, and providing the rest of the TCC team with salient, language-oriented insights.

The Partnering Branch of the TCC develops collaborative relationships with a variety of military, government, academic, and civilian agencies for the purpose of developing grants and furthering the Center’s purpose, mission, and vision. This branch seeks to build a synergistic team that simultaneously enhances the Center and also benefits professional allies. An example includes the building of alliances with foreign students attending USAIC schools, drawing on their expertise and insights. Other TCC partners include the University of Arizona; Georgetown University; Columbia University; TRADOC and CAC (including FMSO); New Mexico State University; Cochise County Community College; DLI; other Army branches and U.S. military services; the American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Program; the Army Research Lab (ARL); other U.S. intelligence agencies; DA staff; the 300th MI Brigade, Utah National Guard; and Brigham Young University. This is not an exhaustive list, and the partnering branch continues to expand its associations and relationships to provide the Center and its customer base with cutting-edge research, knowledge, and ideas.

The Cross-cultural Applied Research and Dissemination Branch coordinates and conducts applied research for both current and anticipated future needs. Its main tasks include helping to generate funding in support of research and dissemination; serving as a repository of cultural materials; initiating the publication of a refereed journal of applied cultural research; coordinating and supervising the visiting scholars program; and providing support across the Center, particularly to the training and education branch.

The Center’s Diverse and Talented Membership

A very unique and talented team with the ideal background and experiences propels the TCC forward in support of its purpose and vision. The Center’s membership has sixteen CA experts and educational specialists—including 12 linguists; four members with doctorate degrees; many members with other advanced degrees; and combined military and civilian experiences in the Middle East that exceeds 100 years. Some of the members are former interpreters; others are retired military officers. One is a former journalist, and many of the members speak Arabic and have extensive experiences living in the Middle East. Most of the TCC members are contractors.

Preliminary Accomplishments and Value-Added

The Center has already made significant progress in support of the Army’s CA campaign. Recently, it arranged for an Imam affiliated with Georgetown University to brief USAIC on moderate interpretations of Islam, helping to bolster knowledge and CA about this important, salient topic. The Center has also developed common core standards and topics for all levels of professional military education (PME) and lesson objectives and classes enabling units across the Army to train soldiers in cultural issues that are paramount to winning the GWOT. The Center has expanded the development of Middle East and South East Asia cultural products (with emphasis on the Middle East, as figure 2 indicates), and has made noteworthy progress on potential future CA needs, including development of products on Africa, among other emerging threats. The Center has provided mobile training teams (MTTs) Army wide to prepare CA trainers and soldiers preparing to deploy (see figure 3). Additionally, the Center has produced some creative and innovative educational ideas for practical exercise training through the use of CA video games.
to cater to the younger generation of soldiers’ penchant for them. On the whole the TCC, despite the fact that it is still in its infancy, has provided value added in the realm of CA for the Force. The Center will continue to grow in size, scope, and mission set.

Present and Anticipated Challenges for the Culture Center

Preliminary insights from some Army battalion commanders whose soldiers received training from the TCC speak to some of the value added as well as some areas to target for refinement regarding the Center’s operations. On the one hand, it seems that some commanders thought that the Center generally provided sufficient CA training for entry level soldiers, such as enlisted troops across the Army. The feedback indicated that the CA overview for junior enlisted soldiers provided relevant, important training on cultural factors that would help them in contemporary missions. On the other hand, at least one commander wished the Center provided more sophisticated and detailed country and even village specific cultural knowledge and factors for Army leaders (e.g., senior NCOs, chief warrant officers, and other officers). So it seems that the TCC’s higher level training—intended for more senior military audiences—might benefit from some refinement to address this important customer feedback.

Some preliminary feedback also suggests that perhaps there is mild resistance to CA training. Specifically, one Quality Assurance training evaluator for the Army received feedback from a host of TRADOC installations that they did not have the time to conduct CA training due to an overwhelming host of training requirements to accomplish. So this resistance is not necessarily directed at the specific type of training but focuses rather on being over-tasked and therefore, CA training becomes difficult to find sufficient time to conduct. This finding points to a recurring reminder for Army commanders everywhere: the need to set unit priorities for training (especially pre-deployment training), and to seek sufficient, quality training on those tasks deemed most imperative. If organizations within TRADOC feel over-tasked with regard to accomplishing CA training, then it begs the question about whether sufficient hours and attention are dedicated to CA in PME across the Force. Again, if foreign populations increasingly constitute a COG in current and projected military operations, then CA training becomes of paramount importance, and therefore must receive adequate time and attention in order to truly become a force multiplier in the GWOT.

Conclusion

The TCC, with its focus on CA, is an important part of the Army’s transformation. The Center has already demonstrated its value to the Force by creating and training solid CA classes on relevant cultures for PME, deploying units, and the Army at large. Like any new organization, it faces some preliminary challenges including securing long-term budgeting, additional resourcing to meet growing requests for CA support, and some refinement and expansion on regional analysis and associated classes. The Army benefits from the emergence of the TCC, and all members of the profession should tap into this valuable new institution that exists to serve and reinforce CA in the force.

How to Request Support from the Culture Center

Mr. Art Vigil (art.vigil@us.army.mil) is the Center’s scheduler and point of contact regarding CA training. The Center’s training schedule goes out to 18 months and fills up quite quickly. Please contact him at the earliest possible time to arrange pre-deployment training or other

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Center support. The Deputy Director hopes to expand the size of the Center in the near future so as to increase the Center’s capacity to support all of its missions, including providing personnel to travel to Army installations worldwide in support of CA training.

Endnotes

2. “USAIC Cultural Center Proposal.” May 2005, produced by the US Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This information packet on the center provided the backbone for this section of the paper.
3. Ibid., 9-14. The description of the objective structure of the center stems from this document.
5. Ibid., A3.
6. “Cultural Awareness Training in Common Core PME: Decision Brief to CG, CAC.” September 14, 2005, 13-14. Figure Two comes from this briefing.
7. Ibid., 15. Figure Three comes from this briefing.

Major Remi Hajjar, MI, served as an assistant professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) from 2002 to 2005. He holds a BA from the USMA and an MA in Sociology from Northwestern University. His research interests and publications have focused on culture, cultural diversity, military sociology, leadership, bureaucracy, intelligence, and education. He has served as a platoon leader, executive officer, company commander, intelligence officer, and intelligence instructor in assignments supporting the 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
Training the Corps

USAIC&FH Cultural Awareness and HUMINT Mobile Training Team Opportunities

by Captain John E. Gribble

It’s time. Your unit has been ordered to provide support in the Middle East. There are many things that need to be done. One of those things is training. How can I get my soldiers ready? What is our mission? Can we support the mission with what we have? What is it like in the Middle East? There are many questions the soldiers will have. You need to be able to answer those questions or direct the soldiers to someone who can.

Let’s look at one of the questions—What is it like in the Middle East? How can you find out about the cultural, religious, geographical, and historical aspects of your area of operations that will impact mission success? This is where the U.S. Army Intelligence Center’s (USAIC) Cultural Awareness and HUMINT Mobile Training Teams (CA and HUMINT MTTs) come in. Part of the USAIC Training Division, the CA and HUMINT MTT Branch was originally created in 2004 and is located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. To date, we have trained over 26,000 soldiers.

What can the CA and HUMINT MTT Branch do for you and your soldiers? Well, let’s start out by saying that we can provide up to forty hours of CA training focusing on Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM and tailored to the level and depth your unit requires. In addition we can provide both HUMINT Collection Team (HCT) and Tactical Questioning (TQ) training. And the training comes to you, it’s that easy.

Editor’s Note: The CA MTT course contents are at www.umi-online.us/mipb in the FOUO folder.

The need for CA training is nothing new. It is just that up until recently we have learned it is to our advantage to train all soldiers in CA and not just the select few in order to successfully accomplish our mission. The old adage “just tell me who to shoot” is not the acceptable way of doing the business of war. In the Global War on Terrorism we need to know as much about our enemy as we can so we can take that knowledge, obtain reliable intelligence, and apply it to accomplish the mission.

CA and HUMINT MTT Branch Organization

All of the instructors on the CA and HUMINT Team are American citizens or first and second generation Arabic or Middle Eastern descent and may have or follow the Muslim faith. Other team members include former soldiers and other civilians who have experience and education in Middle East studies providing a soldier’s perspective. The CA and HUMINT MTT can provide your unit with the information it needs to better understand the region in which it will be operating. Soldiers can learn about the history of Islam, Arab culture, Iraq/Afghanistan culture, tactical application of cultural knowledge, Middle East geography and many topics off our long list of classes. You’ll learn the myths and facts.
To successfully complete their mission in their area of operations, Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers need to understand the environment to which they may deploy. They must comprehend not only the geography, religious, social and political aspects of the people but their mindset as well.

Cultural Awareness has been integrated into all levels of training at the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona through the efforts of TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) Institutional Training Team (ITT). The primary mission of the TCC is to provide awareness of the culture, religion, geography, and history of the contemporary operating environment to soldiers, civilians, and contractors at Fort Huachuca. Our focus is currently on the Middle East, however we are expanding our training efforts to include other areas of interest around the world to include the Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The depth and intensity of cultural awareness training vary from Initial Military Training (IMT) courses through the MI Captains Career Course (MICCC). At the IMT level, for example, students develop a basic understanding in the geography, culture, and religion of the contemporary operating environment. In the MICCC, students complete a country analysis to determine how U.S. involvement in the Global War on Terrorism affects aspects of the country’s society, politics, economy, and religion. In addition, all instructors at Fort Huachuca receive a twenty hour block of instruction while attending the Instructor Training Course (ITC) to prepare them to teach the Cultural Awareness block of instruction in their courses.

Editor’s Note: A course outline for the MI Officers Basic Course can be viewed at the FOUO Section of the April June 2006 MIPB.

Deborah Ross is the Team Leader for the TCC ITT. She retired from the U.S. Army in 2004. She is participating in an understudy program in Cultural Anthropology at the University of Arizona and attended the Joint Special Operations University at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Ms. Ross can be contacted at 520-533-5406, DSN 821-5406 or Deborah.ross@hua.army.mil.
Language Action

Culture and Language Training

by Peter A. Shaver

Introduction

The interdependence of culture and language may be expressed as “language conveys culture and culture defines language.” Franz Boas realized in his study of Native American languages “…how greatly ways of life and grammatical categories could vary from one place to another. As a result he came to believe that the culture and lifeways of a people were reflected in the language that they spoke.” ¹ Further, Benjamin Whorf asserted that, “we dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages…the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds—and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.” ²

My purpose in presenting these ideas is to illustrate the inescapable connection between language and culture. Without language to transport and illustrate cultural or natural phenomena, culture would be limited or perhaps even cease to exist. Our culture and environment define our language in how we describe and express our feelings. When teaching a language survey class, I would often illustrate the effect of culture and environment on language using the example of isolating a group of individuals in the upper elevations of the Wasatch Front in Utah and then in about 100 years or so comparing the language with those who remained in the valley given no interchange between the two groups. The two groups would use different vocabulary, possibly even different grammar and syntax to describe their lifeways which, over time, would become even more distinct. Edward Sapir commented that, “we see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.” ³

The following are a few examples of the misuse of English taken from a presentation given by Dr. Ray Clifford, Brigham Young University, at the 300th Military Intelligence Brigade Language Conference on March 17, 2006. They will illustrate the connection between language and culture, specifically the lack of American cultural knowledge which results in misunderstanding of the message’s meaning and intent:

- Sign in a Moscow hotel: If this is your first visit to Moscow, you are welcome to it.
- Sign in a Hong Kong tailor shop: Ladies may have a fit upstairs.
- Thermostat instructions in a Japanese hotel room: Cooles and Heates: If you want just condition of warm in your room, please control yourself.
- Sign in a cocktail lounge in Norway: Ladies are requested not to have children in the bar.
- Sign in a foreign airport: For restrooms, go back toward your behind.

Intelligence Center Takes the Initiative

We must conclude that culture and language are inseparable and where one is taught, so should the other. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) has recognized the requirement to train soldiers in cultural awareness (CA) since 2003, understanding the wide cultural gulf between our Western world view and that of the Middle East or other cultures. To that end we continue to organize our CA training as mandated by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Combined Arms Center (CAC). Our current key tasks include:

- Conducting train-the-trainer instruction delivered by our research and development (R&D) team to senior military instructors.
- Sending mobile training teams (MTTs) to units preparing to deploy.
- Conducting R&D to ensure our information is timely and current.
- Encouraging partnership agreements to exchange cultural information with university programs.
- Collecting (or harvesting) CA training programs from DOD and government entities such as the Marines...
and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to avoid redundancy and to be mutually supportive.

In addition to the cultural aspects there is also a language consideration. Language training should be addressed along with CA training to meet unit requirements especially where language knowledge will be part of the mission. Basic, survival-level instruction is often requested by deploying units. To that end, we have partnered with Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLI FLC) to provide language training in support of the CA instruction.

TRADOC Culture Center

Our TRADOC Culture Center is structured around culture and foreign language operations. An explanation of the kinds of support the Center can provide is outlined in a DOD message dated April 7, 2006: “TRADOC’s Culture Center (TCC), located at Fort Huachuca, also provides MTTs and materials (at no cost to the unit) that are focused on cultures in the Middle East and Afghanistan. MTTs are focused on cultural awareness familiarization and pre-deployment preparations. With the assistance of Soldiers in Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 09L and other experienced individuals, the TCC provides an in depth view of the various countries, cultures, and their people. Based on unit requirements, the TCC can provide training in module format ranging from four to forty hours.”

The operational structure of the TCC includes training and development, partnering, harvesting, cross-cultural R&D, and MTTs. Language operations include program design, testing, and sustainment training. The TCC staff includes four PhDs with backgrounds in Cultural Anthropology and Archaeology as well as three retired soldiers with college degrees and operational experience in Iraq. Another team member speaks five African languages fluently having spent over fifteen years in the region. The institutional training team includes a Persian-Farsi linguist, and two others with knowledge and experience in Arab culture and religion.

Editor’s Note: The TCC is online at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/tcc/default.asp.

Partnering efforts have resulted in collaboration with several universities to include Georgetown, Columbia, and the Universities of Arizona and Arkansas. Some of our harvesting efforts include Twenty Nine Palms, California; Fort Drum, New York; Quantico, Virginia, and the JRTC. Our MTT unit, which has trained over 12,500 deploying troops since 2003, has educated and trained native instructors from Palestine, Morocco, and Algeria.

Cultural Awareness Training Methodology

Our CA training methodology is focused on interactive, task-based and exportable lesson plans implementing current CA scenarios. Feedback we have received from our MTTs has shown that soldiers prefer to be more actively engaged in the learning process and that information given by native instructors is considered more valid and timely than that presented by American instructors, albeit just as informational. DLI provides basic language skills instruction supplemented with Language Survival Kits which Soldiers will use for refresher training while in the field or where there is no access to language instruction. Online sources such as Lingnet, Langnet, and Satellite Communications for Learning (SCOLA) are available when accessible.

The TCC development team has just completed the 2007 professional military education (PME) instructional curriculum which, after staffing and comment, will be part of all TRADOC schools’ curriculum from initial military training (IMT) to the Captains Career Courses (CCCs). Schools will choose how much of the cultural training they wish to integrate, but there will be a recommended minimum number of hours for each subject. Terminal Learning Objectives will address culture, American culture, the contemporary operational environment (COE) culture and impact of COE culture on military operations. Specific cultural topics addressed are religion, Arab culture, cross-cultural communications, history, geography, tribalism, and tactical application of cultural knowledge. The amount of class time spent on each subject area will increase from IMT to the CCCs.

Foreign Language Operations

Our Foreign Language Operations (FLO) section supports all MI linguists including those at Fort Huachuca and Goodfellow Air Force Base with MTTs and video teletraining classes as well as resident immersion courses in Yalta, Chile, Egypt and, in the future, China. Our University of Military Intelligence website provides further training through the Language Training Guide with links to language training sites such as Lingnet, Langnet, and Rosetta Stone through Army Knowledge Online, SCOLA and other sites as they become available. R&D efforts in language training products include the Iraqi Language Trainer; Korean (and soon Arabic) Language MOS Enhancement Program (LMEP) for interrogators; Somali Language Training, and Project Mercury.
Additionally, we implemented a community outreach program with the Huachuca Foreign Language Academy (HFA), Buena High School (Sierra Vista, Arizona), and the Department of Homeland Security. The HFA was an intensive foreign language program for middle school students under the direction of Ms. Cecilia Gross, a gifted and talented teacher from Johnson Elementary School at Fort Huachuca. It was a ten week program in Spanish and Arabic with the objective of providing foreign language training for younger, verbally gifted students to prepare them for high school foreign language classes with the goal of eventually establishing a pipeline of foreign language students for universities, and ultimately service in DOD.

We have met with foreign language instructors and Reserve Officer Training Corps students at Buena High School to explain foreign language programs and careers available through the Army and our FLO. The FLO has also provided two-week Spanish acquisition classes for the Drug Enforcement Agency and, in the future, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Marshals Service.

Additionally, we fully support language and cultural expertise; the concept of surge capability; establishing a cadre of level 3 subject matter experts; and tracking language professionals established in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap prepared by the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel, and Readiness for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

“Conflict against enemies speaking less commonly taught languages, and thus the need for foreign language capability, will not abate. Robust foreign language and foreign area expertise (Cultural Awareness) are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations.”

**Update on MOS 09L**

MOS 09L Interpreter/Translator is transitioning from Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to active component (AC) control. The program began at Fort Jackson, South Carolina as a contract to develop the program of instruction and lesson plans. Eventually it migrated to the control of USAIC&FH with the DLI FLC developing and designing the instruction. The Under Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs directed the recruitment of Arabic and dialect native speakers to be trained as translators and interpreters. The 09L program recruits native and heritage speakers of Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Kurdish and Pashto directly into the IRR. After Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training these Soldiers become interpreters in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. This program has graduated over 200 soldiers who have been deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, South Africa, Kenya, and the Sudan. Some of their commanders’ thoughts on the performance and heroism of their 09Ls in theater:

- “During fights, (he) was critical helping me get info quick from captured insurgents. In fact, his work helped us find a huge cache and an insurgent cell, emplaced by the insurgents to break up the elections in January 2005.”
- “I had a $500,000 bounty on my head so if nothing else, (09L) working next to me for months validated his bravery.”
- “He’ll always be that goofy 18 year old with my CSM yelling at him and he’ll also be that soldier who ‘terped for me and jumped in front of me when a sniper tried to drill me on January 29, 2005, the day before we made history with the first election.”
- “While the sergeant and his team were on missions in Kenya, they traveled through a small town and were planning to spend the night. Using his knowledge of animal tracking that he had learned hunting warthogs and African buffalo in Ethiopia, he knew by footprints on the ground that something was amiss. He saw fresh footprints of a group of 30 people and could tell by the impressions in the grass they had rested for a moment and recently dispersed. He knew these were not locals and told his team it was not safe to stay there and that they needed to immediately push ahead to the next town. A report came the next morning that a massacre had occurred that very same night.”

**Conclusion**

CA and foreign language skills are force multipliers in the COE to include our coalition partners from other countries; they are intertwined and inseparable, one cannot exist or be instructed without the other. I heard a comment that, “We are a nation at war and I do not have time to send my linguists to do language training.” Allow me to submit that is precisely why we are at war because we did not have the required language and cultural knowledge to prevent attacks on our country from those whose desire it is to destroy our way of life.

One of the conclusions drawn from the November 2005 Military Language Conference, was that it is imperative to
establish a pipeline of language students who are ready to support and fulfill our nation’s language and culture requirements. We must start in the public school system now and provide incentives to colleges and universities to establish additional foreign language and cultural programs. General John Abizaid asserted, “...[We need to] drive the importance of language and regional expertise from the top. Tell the Services to place greater value on such skills.” This is the task for all of us to go forward with urgency to ensure that “no foreign language or cultural training is left unlearned.” This challenge must also include the languages and cultures of our globally represented coalition partners. To close, a statement from the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap:

“Establishing a new “global footprint” for DoD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for language and regional knowledge (cultural awareness) to work with new coalition partners in a wide variety of activities, often with little or no notice. This new approach to warfighting in the 21st century will require forces that have foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today’s force.”

Endnotes

Peter Shaver is the Director, TRADOC Culture Center Chief, Culture, Foreign Language Integration Center (CFLIC) and the 09L Translator/Interpreter Course Training Manager. Readers can reach him via email at peter.shaver@hua.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 538-1042 or DSN 879-1042.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The United States must do more to communicate its message. Reflecting on Bin Ladin’s success in reaching Muslim audiences, Richard Holbrooke wondered, “How can a man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading communications society?”

Use Precise Terms Precisely

The answer to Mr. Holbrooke’s question is an unsophisticated one: Bin Ladin speaks in a language that his Muslim listeners understand. We, on the other hand, simply do not comprehend the meaning of many words that we use to describe the enemy. American leaders misuse language to such a degree that they unintentionally wind up promoting the ideology of the groups the United States is fighting.

Furthermore, it is important to make sure that the civilian community in the United States and that of our allies and coalition partners accurately understands the nature of the enemy that we are fighting. Unfortunately, Western governments, intellectuals and journalists commonly use words that inadvertently (or sometimes deliberately) authenticate the doctrines of our enemy as truly Islamic. Correcting this vocabulary is a necessary step to educate the wide-ranging groups who are affected by the war; to discredit those who either passively or actively, or wittingly or unwittingly support Islamic totalitarian terrorism; and to reveal the truly insidious nature of our enemy.

What Are We Really Saying?

This essay discusses the most egregious and dangerous misuses of language regarding Islamic totalitarian terrorists; a comprehensive study would require a book. We begin with the word jihad, which literally means striv-
ing and generally occurs as part of the expression *jihad fi sabil illah*, striving in the path of God. Striving in the path of God is a duty of all Muslims. Calling our enemies jihadis and their movement a global jihad thus indicates that we recognize their doctrines and actions as being in the path of God and, for Muslims, legitimate. In short, we explicitly designate ourselves as the enemies of Islam.

Muslims have debated the meaning and application of the concept of jihad for centuries. Our application of the term to the actions of our enemies puts us on their side of the debate. We need not concern ourselves with the identification of the original or legally correct meaning of the term; individual Muslims will make up their own minds. As Professor Streusand has previously written, “Classical texts speak only to, not for, contemporary Muslims.” It is also important to note that opposing jihad, a basic principle of Islam, violates a classical text of our own. The United States Constitution denies our government the ability to prohibit the free exercise of religion; consequently, we should never use a term, such as jihad, that misstates our current and historical position on religion.

**Mujahid (plural mujahidin or mujahideen):** One who participates in jihad, and frequently translated in the American media as “holy warrior.” The use of this term designates the activity of the enemy as jihad and thus legitimizes it. It was quite proper for us to describe the warriors who resisted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as mujahidin, many of whom are now our allies in Afghanistan. To extend the term to our current enemies dishonors our allies as well as authenticates our opponents as warriors for Islam. Even to a Western audience it can lend a sense of nobility to an otherwise ignoble enemy.

**Caliphate (khilafa):** This term literally means successor and came to refer to the successors of the Prophet Muhammad as the political leaders of the Muslim community. Sunni Muslims traditionally regard the era of the first four caliphs (632-661) as an era of just rule. Accepting our enemies’ description of their goal as the restoration of a historical caliphate again validates an aspect of their ideology. Al-Qa’ida’s caliphate would not mean the re-establishment of any historical regime; it would be a global totalitarian state. Anyone who needs a preview of how such a state would act merely has to review the conduct of the Taliban in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001.

**Allah:** The word Allah in Arabic means the God, nothing more, nothing less. It is not specifically Muslim; Arabic speaking Christians and Jews also use it. In English, Allah should be translated as God, not transliterated. While translation emphasizes the common heritage of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (the three faiths which identify their God as the God of Abraham) it does not imply that the Abrahamic faiths share identical concepts of God. Even though some Muslims use Allah rather than God in English, the practice exaggerates the divisions among Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

### What Are the Right Words for the Job?

Now that a few unsuitable word choices have been addressed, it is time to begin to identify the proper expressions to use whenever discussing the global Islamic totalitarian terrorist movement. Many of these terms will be unfamiliar to Westerners, but not to most Muslim audiences. Only those who actively, passively or even unwittingly support al-Qa’ida’s (and similar groups) professed goals would find the terms, and their use by non-Muslims, offensive.

To refute challenges to the new context surrounding these expressions, any user of these terms must be able to define the words in order to defend their accuracy and the appropriateness of their use. Otherwise anyone who dares to define the enemy using its own Islamic language can be challenged by a variety of “pundits” who still see the struggle in terms of religion or poverty rather than political ideology; who despise Western society, capitalism or democracy; or who oppose the war for any other reason.

**Hirabah:** This word, which is derived from the Arabic root which refers to war or combat, means sinful warfare; warfare contrary to Islamic law. There is ample legal justification for applying this term to Islamic totalitarian terrorists and no moral ambiguity in its connotation. We should describe the Islamic totalitarian movement as the global *hirabah*, not the global jihad.

**Mufsid (moofsid):** This word refers to an evil or corrupt person; the plural is *mufsidun*. We call our enemies mufsidun, not jihadis, for two reasons. Again, there is no moral ambiguity and the specific denotation of corruption carries enormous weight in most of the Islamic world.

**Fitna/fatin:** Fitna literally means temptation or trial, but has come to refer to discord and strife among Muslims; a *fatin* is a tempter or subversive. Applying these terms to our enemies and their works condemns their current activities as divisive and harmful. It also identifies them with movements and individuals in Islamic history with negative reputations such as the assassins of the Caliph 'Uthman in 656, who created the first fissure in the political unity of the Muslim community.
**Totalitarian:** Calling our enemies totalitarian serves several purposes. There is no such thing as a benign totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is a Western invention and it appeared in the Islamic world as a result of Western influence (first fascist, then Marxist-Leninist). It is also in direct contrast to the idea that the enemy would actually establish a caliphate if they defeat the United States, our allies and coalition partners.

**Not the Last Word, Just the Beginning**

This essay is neither definitive nor complete. It is only the beginning of a “primer” of the terminology used to describe Islamic totalitarian movements. There should be far more discussion about the right words to use to describe the variety of threats posed by transnational terrorists—Islamic groups and others. This article, we hope will help jumpstart the discourse.

Notwithstanding the fact that this article is a small beginning, the terms proposed herein should become an indispensable part of the vocabulary of America’s leaders, reporters and friends immediately. The wrong terms promote the idea that terrorist elements represent legitimate Islamic concepts, which in turn might aid in the enemy recruitment of disenfranchised Muslims because we have identified to them a seemingly “traditional” outlet through which they can voice their dissatisfaction. It is essential to use the right language to address worldwide problems so that various audiences—which include the American-Muslim community—understand the full scope of the problem and are intellectually able to identify with potential solutions that are reasonable and ethical.

This paper offers word choices not just for public officials and correspondents but even students in the classroom and others studying terrorism. In fact, anyone who is interested in current events should have some familiarity with these words as well as the concepts and new dialogue they represent. We must use the right turn of phrase whenever attempting to inform and educate; language is a key component for us to be able to, in a way that makes sense to any audience, ask for assistance or demand action that will help defeat the scourge of Islamic totalitarian terrorism.

**Endnotes**

2. The 9/11 Commission’s own report is guilty of this by using Jihad (and other variations of the term such as Jihadists) throughout. Jihad, discussed more in detail later, does not have a negative connotation for most Muslims—even when combined with descriptions of terrorist purpose or action.
5. For example the leader of al-Qa`ida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, stated that Shiites are rafada or rejecters of Islam. The Salafist Sunni terrorist groups, the most well-known of which is al-Qa`ida, do not recognize other traditional Islamic sects as acceptable or Muslims. Use of rafada is from Fouad Ajami, “Heart of Darkness,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2005, pg.16. As cited in the on-line version of The Early Bird, https://www.us.army.mil/suite/earlybird/sep2005/e20050928393978.html, accessed September 28, 2005. The al-Qa`ida attack of civilian weddings at three hotels in Amman Jordan on November 9, 2005 is another case in point of terrorist attempts to promote discord among Muslims. The attacks killed 57 people and wounded 115, the majority of whom were Jordanian and Palestinian. Direct attacks by al-Qa`ida in Iraq against Shiite holy sites throughout Iraq continue as of February 28, 2006.

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Cultural Awareness
Or
If The Shoe Does Not Fit...

by Lieutenant-Commander Sylvain Therriault and Master Warrant Officer Ron Wulf

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policy of the Canadian Department of National Defence or the Government of Canada or any other government.

Introduction

The Aztecs were a wealthy society of the Mexican central valley who were satisfied with their limited empire, yet incessantly waged battles with enemies to enslave and primarily sacrifice their prisoners to secure the caring will of their Gods.

“Because such a destiny—to be bound to the wheel of endless propitiation of an unloving and blood-hungry divinity—coincides with no vision of the world to which any modern holds, the temptation is to dismiss Aztec warfare as an aberration, having no connection with any system of strategy or tactics that we would consider rational. That, however, is because we have come to separate the need for security from trust in a divine yet immediate intervention in worldly affairs. The Aztecs saw things in an exactly contrary light: only by repetitive satisfaction of divine needs could divine harshness be held at bay.”

This extract from “A History of Warare” by John Keegan shows how looking at a situation from our perspective can bring serious errors in judgment when appraising actions of others. While the Spanish Conquistadors were not obligated to gain the trust of the Aztecs, and consequently easily annihilated their opponent’s society, we are facing a very different state of affairs in our contemporary scenarios where we often intervene militarily to bring security, and stability and eventually allow the society to flourish.

In an era where information operations are taking the front stage to achieve effects during peace support operations, all tools must be considered to reach the mind of the leadership and the population. Cultural awareness is an essential mission enabler, yet historically little has been done in preparing military forces to understand human factors and for their daily interaction with the local population and local leaders. In the same vein, intelligence analysis is often inadequate in its attempt to assume the shape and the mind of the opponent as well as considering his environment and consequently failing to predict the effects on the battlespace. What are the consequences of being unprepared? How can cultural awareness support mission objectives? What is the role of intelligence? How can we maintain cultural awareness? We will also look at the Canadian Forces’ current training, education and current initiatives regarding cultural awareness.

Tactical Errors—Operational and Strategic Consequences

“When a neighbourhood of Kabul was identified as harbouring insurgents involved in preparing improvised explosive devices, patrols were sent in houses with “sniffer dogs” to detect explosive material. Worse yet, dogs were allowed to smell Muslim women! Immediately after, it became impossible to obtain any form of support from the local population. Previous successes by psychological operations (PSYOPS) disseminator teams in influencing the population were lost. Street patrols were thereon greeted by insults from people who would previously offer welcoming gestures. Months of confidence building had disappeared over night.”

Trivial actions such as that described above can have significant consequences, especially when taken cumulatively during peace support operations in unfamiliar places of the World. Once the shock actions are completed and reconstruction starts, trust building and diplomacy begins in the streets of those we are trying to help. The only way to be successful is to obtain the cooperation of what is often an unsettled and apprehensive population. Obtain-
ing cooperation can be competitive. Where an insurgency exists, the more common scenario, the population will be pulled by two competing forces and the one that shows respect and understanding will have a head start. The insurgent is, or was, a member of the society; therefore, our forces have much to learn and prove to get the upper hand, at the minimum to avoid hatred and retribution. Regarding for local customs is an essential requirement. Consequently, the daily actions of soldiers interacting with the local population have a strategic effect in achieving acceptance or rejection of the entire organization the forces in place represent.

**Authority and Strength through Cultural Awareness**

"**Mister nice guy must show strength, with respect.**"

Many will retort that constantly obeying local customs will show weaknesses and result in loss of authority when needed. In fact the opposite is generally true. Most cultures and theocracies respect strength. Islam, for example, is very harsh when comes time to punish crimes, lack of respect, and treason. Providing security in an environment where some must be protected and others must be targeted (such as the current NATO mission in Afghanistan) is a delicate balance between escalation and de-escalation of situations. When dealing with the general populace, de-escalation is generally in order; however, dealing with the insurgents is likely to be better served through strength and show of force. Caution must be exercised in maintaining good relations with the innocents while eradicating insurgency. Where strong actions are likely to violate cultural factors (such as an operation involving religious and sacred grounds), a supporting information operation should be mounted to clearly defend the action taken. In any situation, weighing the gains and the losses of conducting such operations should be carefully considered in that consequences can be devastating in regard to the campaign objectives.

**Clash of Cultures**

"An attempt to reach an agreement on areas of responsibility with the Russians in Kosovo brought a Canadian officer to drink heavily with Russian counterparts. Although successful in reaching a favorable agreement to NATO, the officer had contravened a Canadian order on alcohol consumption ban in theatre. He was charged and found guilty. What initially appeared as a success in negotiations backfired and further agreements could no longer be reached by local commanders as the Russians saw lit-}

This scenario highlights the real challenges that emerge when respecting local customs brushes against one’s own rules and values. Honesty is likely to pay for itself in that first contact; polite education of the other party can only benefit in the long term. However, it is a two way street. Establishing the boundaries of our Allies’ and our own cultural and legal characteristics will only come with first showing respect for the local boundaries in customs and culture. In any case, cultural differences simply will not just go away.

It is also essential not to fall in the trap of adopting other cultures’ values and habits simply because it might suit our needs at any point. Although attractive to resort to their ways to achieve short-term results, it is clear that we can only fail in achieving our information operations in the long term. In any case, it is not about becoming the enemy or melting into the population, it is about respecting their values while retaining ours.

**Cultural Intelligence**

"**During an encounter, a Canadian, a Japanese, and an Afghani discuss how to face a difficult economic future. The Canadian quickly states that he will work longer hours and turn to safer investments. The Japanese pauses and states that he will work harder and save his earnings. The Afghani simply indicates that he will share whatever he possesses with his poorer relatives.**"

During peace support operations, intelligence is all too often blindsided in its assessment of the insurgents’ counteraction and the population’s response. How often do we hear intelligence analysts asking themselves why the opponents have not taken a predicted course of action when the questions should be: What have we missed? or What is it that we don’t know? What did we not consider? Judging the opponents’ actions will fail if we cannot view the situation from his position. As shown in the scenario above and if anything else, cultural characteristics and values must become the base of our analysis toolbox when conducting predictive analysis of an opponent or a target audience. Simply using military factors such as tactics, procedures, and doctrine as a baseline for analysis is clearly insufficient.

While target groups will have core beliefs and values that will guide their actions, blindly generalizing can also be fatal and intelligence analysts can rapidly find them-
selves in minefields of inaccurate assessments. Cultural characteristics are not only national, but can also be regional, such as the French Canadians of Québec. The differences can be as geographically fractured as to the size of a city or a village. Religions, language, gender, individuality, and the limitless combinations can all result in group differences. A combination example can be as follow: Iranians and Saudis are both majority Muslims. However, an attempt at generalization will surely result in serious failure since the former is majority Shia Persian and the latter is majority Sunni Arab. Notwithstanding, by starting with the cultural roots of selected group’s behaviour we can forecast with a surprising degree of accuracy how the various groups will react to our plans. We can also make conjectures as to how they will approach us. In all cases, without cultural guidance, commanders are likely to make erroneous decisions and erroneous assumptions that will impact mission objectives.

Cultural intelligence is not only an analysis tool. Intelligence staff should also include cultural factors in their intelligence requirements and provide situational awareness to the commander and his team prior to and during the mission. In the contemporary operational environment, one can no longer rely on pre-determined characteristics of the groups of interest. Intelligence must be able to determine the cultural diversity within its intelligence area of interest as well as monitoring potential changes affected by friendly forces in theatre, such as PSYOPS outcomes and the impact of daily interactions.

**Pre-deployment Preparation in Canada**

Currently, Canadian personnel proceeding on peacekeeping and military observer missions receive two days of cultural awareness training specific to the theatre of operation or mission. The training is conducted at the Peace Support Training Centre. The same program has been introduced at the Canadian Manoeuvre and Training Centre for Task Forces deploying on missions. Training is provided by screened and approved natives, which provides honest and accurate descriptions of the values and core beliefs of a society or groups of interest.

**Constant Reminders**

Intelligence specialists should become local experts on cultural factors and its evolution in theatre. Friendly troops can easily overlook subtle changes in local behaviour. Intelligence briefs should incorporate updates and refresher knowledge on cultural characteristics of interest, related to specific missions while in theatre.

**Ongoing Education and Training**

Cultural awareness cannot simply become a subject of interest as we prepare our forces and intelligence personnel for imminent deployments. Service personnel come from various backgrounds, various levels of education, and various experience with exposure to cultural diversity, not counting the psychological obstacles created by conditioning from an early age. In addition, mishandling of cultural issues is not necessarily a consequence of cultural bias, but often a simple consequence of ignorance. Consequently, a baseline understanding of the importance of cultural factors during operations should become part of basic training. In Canada, cultural awareness is now part of some specialty qualifications training such as the Tactical Civil Military Cooperation qualification and all PSYOPS specialties. However, all military personnel should receive such training in that most will have to interact with various cultures on deployments, not counting the benefits when operating in multi-national operations.

Advance cultural knowledge should be part of intelligence and PSYOPS specialists’ training and education, especially as it pertains to extremists often found amongst insurgents. Pre-deployment and basic training are clearly insufficient for many specialties. Mission specific advanced cultural training should be developed for intelligence personnel and all PSYOPS specialties. In Canada, neither Human Intelligence (HUMINT) nor PSYOPS operators receive detailed specific cultural awareness training prior to deployment, which represents a serious shortcoming in preparing operators for challenging and complex environments.

**Canadian Initiatives at the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence**

As discussed above, understanding the importance of cultural awareness has led to including ‘cultural awareness’ as a standard subject for all pre-deployment training within most Western militaries, including the Canadian Forces. But this addresses only one issue—that of having soldiers and leaders understand the target cultures of a specific theatre, generally for the purposes of effective interaction. To effectively defeat any enemy, or in a more benign environment simply to more effectively achieve the aims of the mission without causing unwanted side-effects, two things are necessary: effectively interact, and understand. Current initiatives within the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI) seek to address both issues—although there are additional complexities.
An additional factor which has come to light over the past decade is that although specific cultures are taught to all servicemen and women prior to deployments, limited time is spent in teaching culture in general. And what time is spent is very limited, due to the demands of other subjects and frequent short timelines for deployment preparation. The fallout from this is that often only very basic rudiments are taught, such as don’t eat with your left hand or don’t show the soles of your feet. Additionally, this is frequently given without the soldier understanding the complex nature of culture that leads to these differences—perhaps acceptable for combat arms soldiers, but not for those required to assess intent.

Another realization is that although understanding of cultural difference is important for operational and predictive intelligence purposes, it goes well beyond ‘how to interact’ and ‘how to understand’, and can lead to insight in the area of ‘how to exploit.’ Naming conventions specific to a culture, for instance, can assist in performing link analyses, and kinship values can lead to insights in power structures and local loyalties.

The final issue is more academic and more insidious. Although generic ‘culturegrams’ and such exist, in many cases the cultures we need to deal with have not been extensively studied from an anthropological perspective. Most of the cultures we face today have never been thoroughly studied anthropologically because they were either perceived as already known or not unique enough to warrant study (how many anthropological studies have there been of the French, for example?). And certainly subcultures such as Islamist suicide bombers have not been studied extensively. What this means is that the intelligence community is in many senses operating in the dark, and the required references simply do not exist—we need to write them ourselves. Again, this points to training anthropologists, rather than training people to eat with their right hand.

Content of Training Courses

Because of these problems and because of the inability to train mission-specific cultures when it is unknown what missions soldiers will participate in ten years down the road, a very generic approach is taken at CFSMI. The additional benefit of this approach is that soldiers are aware of generic concepts so that even if insufficient time for full pre-deployment training is available, they will already know to look for differences in kinship patterns and world-view, for example.

How do we apply this? All students are provided with a basic introduction. Although entry-level non-commissioned members (NCMs) are trained to a very limited standard, entry-level officers and Sergeants are presented the full cultural package, and the Strategic Defense Intelligence Analysis Course (SDIAC) adds to this a number of academic guest speakers and extensive readings in order to facilitate a broad multi-disciplinary approach to inter-cultural conflict studies.

Instruction commences with a look at perception, in particular the perceptual cycle, in order to identify where errors can creep in and how cultural factors can affect perception. This is taught at the Psychology 101 level.

This is followed by a session on self-identification, on the premise that you cannot understand ‘the other’ (in anthropological terms) if you cannot understand yourself. This particular session is traditionally carried out in a closed-door non-attribution setting in order to permit students to air issues which may go well beyond what is politically correct—we are not ‘supposed’ to be biased, but we all are to some degree. Nobody ever uses racist slurs but it would be naïve to assume that nobody thinks them—and to fully understand ourselves and apply unbiased assessments we must fully acknowledge and understand our biases. Remember that the aim is for the analyst to accurately get into the head of the analytical target. Each session is started with guidance and caveat to ensure that respect is maintained in the classroom. Individuals are encouraged to speak up if they feel that ‘a nerve has been touched’. To date, although there have been several heated and charged discussions in these classes, there has not been any negative fallout. This class has been particularly well received by students, as it often helps identify biases of which they may not have been consciously aware, and teaches them how to deal with bias both in themselves and others in a positive way.

The other concept which is introduced here, in a round-about way, is that of *emic* versus *etic* in terms of anthropological approach, and the potential hazards (or lack thereof) of *emic* approaches. It should be noted here that careful and attentive facilitation is key to success, the potential consequences of failure of this class are obviously significant and serious, and care must be taken to ensure qualified and empathic facilitation.

The next standard step is review and discussion of bias using Richards J. Heuer’s *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* as a primary text. This is compulsory reading for all sergeants and entry level officers, with select chapters compulsory for entry level enlisted personnel.

Then, several examples of the influence tiny details have on perception and understanding are presented,
and concepts of divinity and religion are introduced with a focus on how these aspects affect behaviour and worldview. This is confirmed with a homework assignment that requires students to identify specific biases in selected texts and quotes. For this assignment, a broad cultural base is used, and it includes examples of bias 'from our own side.'

When moving on to specific analytical methodologies and intelligence specialties, students visit additional specific cultural features:

- Naming conventions and how they can assist link analyses (link analysis module)
- Cultural norms worldviews and how they can affect development of conflicts (conflict studies module—Officer and Warrant Officer courses only)
- Kinship relationships and worldviews and how they affect the individual (biographic intelligence module)
- Language, writing systems, and worldview (attached to the biographic intelligence module, although it also addresses issues relating to Document Intelligence (DOCINT) and in the fullness of time may be worthy of developing into a stand-alone module.)

As courses progress, students are exposed to specific problems which require them to apply a number of these principles in order to achieve an effective solution to the intelligence problem.

Conclusion

To summarize, there exists a need to train intelligence officers and enlisted to operate to some extent as anthropologists, and for all intelligence personnel to have good understanding of the basic tenets of those disciplines that study the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Additionally, a significant portion of these skills and knowledges is affected by attitude. This was addressed by introducing a challenging but not overly complicated multi-disciplined module that ensures that the basics are covered, intelligence personnel understand themselves better, and further study is promoted. It is not enough to present a few basics on a specific culture—this can be enough for combat arms soldiers heading into harm’s way, but for the intelligence professional who needs to get into the target’s head, a firmer foundation is critical.

Endnotes

1. CFSMI, located at Canadian Forces Base Kingston, about two hours north of Syracuse New York, fulfills the same roles in Canada as Fort Huachuca does in the U.S., albeit on a much smaller scale—CFSMI has approximately 30 full-time staff.

2. Currently, subjects addressed from the perspective of culture include psychology, anthropology, geography, history, political science, and religious studies, with eight to twelve professors from these disciplines each leading two to three hour workshops. We attempt to cover not only a wide gamut of disciplines, but also touch on most of the world. The geography module, for instance, focuses on Latin America, one of the psychologists (native Cantonese) speaks to Asia, one of the historians speaks to the Middle East, etc.

3. I believe that the more heated sessions actually result in more effective and long-lasting learning, and also contribute to positive workplace effects.

4. For those readers who do not have an Anthropology 101, the condensed explanation is that there are two ways of studying cultures: the etic approach seeks to understand a culture ‘from within’; anthropologists do this by living with the target group, where possible ‘as a member’ of this group. Foreign Area Officers and Military Intelligence Liaison Officers are generally as close as we get to this approach, but it also involves really getting into the target head-space and worldview—thinking like them.

In the etic approach we observe from outside and use comparative data—their gross domestic product is half ours, their disease rate is twice ours, etc. Historically, this has very much been how we study our targets. Its not a bad approach—but, in the authors opinion, if you really want to understand why, you need to get in their heads in a much more intimate way. (Emic = me, Etic = them is a useful mnemonic to distinguish the approaches.)

Note: For more information on the Etic-Emic perspective see the article in this issue titled Etic-Emic: Analytical Perspectives in Military Intelligence.

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Master Warrant Officer Wulf is the Commander, Advanced Training, at the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence and is also point of contact for analytical methodologies. Originally an infantry soldier, since becoming an intelligence operator in 1987 he has served in EW/SIGINT, analytical, and attaché office roles and was the I&W Officer for the Canadian Forces from 1995 to 2000. He has served in numerous locations dealing with many varied cultures. He is also a research assistant with University of Ottawa’s Intercultural Studies project.
It is imperative for a commander to understand and have a good relationship with the tribes and the tribal leaders in Iraq. Establishing a working relationship with the tribal Shaykhs can be very beneficial to a unit’s success in the Iraqi Theater of Operations. Understanding the tribe’s motives can help the commander determine the best methods to engage the tribe to set conditions for success. The tribal Shaykhs are the key individuals who control all the activities within their regions. Some of the biggest problems coalition forces face throughout the country are smuggling, foreign fighters, and safe havens for insurgents. All of these are influenced by the tribes in Iraq. This is why the commander must know the tribes’ intentions towards the coalition and insurgents.

There are over 1,000 tribes with several thousand sub-tribal units throughout the country. Tribes are a loosely structured, family-based organization with the sub-tribal units having unique identities and even tribal names. Also, the sub-tribal units or fakhdh may have differing political views. The fakhdh often affiliate with other tribes based on marriage or political views. The more generations separating a family from the “father of the tribe”, the greater possibility that a family will establish their own tribal identity.

Generally, the loyalties of tribal members are the same throughout Iraq. Members are loyal to family and clan first, then to the tribe, followed by loyalty to the government. Although the loyalties of the tribes are usually the same there is no guarantee that these loyalties will cause Iraqi tribes to act as a collective unit. Most of the tribes are either pro- or anti-coalition force, but others are fence sitters and may be persuaded to support the coalition and the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). This is why it is important for the commander to know the motives of the tribes so he can shape them to his advantage. Coalition forces can influence tribes in many ways by exploiting Civil Support opportunities such as a need for water pumps and power generators or better schools. The ability to assist the tribes with these items will help coalition forces shape tribal opinion in a positive manner. Although these incentives may work on some tribes, others will not be influenced so easily to help coalition forces.

Some of the main tribes in Baghdad that are anti-coalition are the Dulaym and the Zobai tribes. Members of the Dulaym tribe are still loyal to Saddam and carry out attacks against coalition forces. The Zobai tribe is located in the Abu Ghurayb region west of Baghdad. Abu Ghurayb is home to some of the main suppliers of improvised explosive devices (IED) and vehicle borne (VB) IED makers conducting attacks throughout Iraq.

The Jabouri and Karabash are two of the main tribes located in Northern Iraq covering the Talafar and Mosul regions of Iraq. The Jabouri tribe carries out many anti-coalition activities. The Jabouri is a very influential Sunni tribe with a strong loyalty for the former regime and are paid by the insurgents for carrying out attacks. The Karabash tribe has members with strong ties to the Ba’ath Party who have lost power and influence and they feel the need to rid of coalition forces in Iraq to regain power. The Karabash think we are invading their land and simply want the coalition forces to leave Iraq. Once the coalition forces are out of the country the Ba’athists will work to regain power throughout the country.
The Iraqi tribal structure consists of a confederation, tribe, clan, lineage, and the extended family. A confederation is a group of tribes who are related to each other by shared geographic residence, historical ties, kinship, ethnicity, or some other factor. The tribal confederation is not based on kinship rights. A tribe is a group of clans which vary in size, anywhere from a few hundred to several thousand members. A tribe is usually named after a founding ancestor who in some cases may actually be a fictitious figure. A clan is a group of lineages related through a common ancestor. The lineage is the number of extended families related through a common male ancestor. Traditionally extended families live within the same village, work on shared land, and act collectively as political and military units.

The leadership in a tribe is usually hereditary with particular clans or lineages holding the designated leadership rights, but sometimes this does not always happen. The order of leadership goes as follows: paramount Shaykh, Shaykh, senior male, and then the husband. The paramount Shaykh is the sole leader of a tribal confederation. This is usually the eldest male that is in direct blood relation to the confederation common ancestor. The Shaykh is the direct ruling authority over a tribe in a designated area. The senior male is the eldest member of the tribe and is looked upon for wisdom because of his age. The husband holds the authority over a household.

With over one thousand tribes in Iraq it is hard to find out each of the tribes’ thoughts about coalition forces, but it is important to determine which tribes affect you, what motivates them, and how you can influence them. When a new unit comes to Iraq it is a great advantage for the commander to open dialogue with the Shaykhs, develop relationships, and discover how to improve unit effectiveness.

Many of the tribes throughout Iraq will assist the insurgents in return for money or other favors. The tribes will provide the insurgents safe havens before and after attacks hiding them from coalition forces. They will also be involved with the smuggling of weapons for the insurgents because the northern tribal regions tend to have less coalition force presence. Some tribes feel that the coalition forces are not helping the government and are only getting in the way of the Arab way of life.

The Geramsha and Halaf tribes located in the southeast around the An Nasiriya and Amarah regions have negotiated a ceasefire agreement with coalition forces. However, they continue to stockpile weapons which make them a viable threat to coalition forces due to their size and capabilities. Weapons are stockpiled to ensure that if they needed to attack they would have the capability.

In the Najaf and Karbala region resides the Churburi tribe, which is a sub unit of the Jabouri confederation. They are located along the Tigris River which provides them the ability to easily smuggle weapons for insurgents. It is known that the river is used to transport some weapons. Elements of the Churburi tribe are known to foster anti-coalition sentiment and conduct attacks against coalition forces.

The Daini and Bazi tribes are located in the Kirkuk, Balad, and Baqubah regions, commonly referred to as the Zaeb triangle. Both of these tribes are known to carry out large complex attacks against coalition forces. The Daini tribesmen hide weapons throughout their homes because they believe that coalition forces will not raid their homes, due to the large isolated region. They will then sell these weapons to the insurgents for money in order to support their tribal needs.

Understanding the tribe’s motives is something a commander must understand to influence his battlespace. Once a Commander fully understands tribal motivations, he can effectively influence the Shaykhs and create a secure environment for his unit to operate in.

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Asymmetrical Factors in Culture for SOF Conflicts:

Gaining Understanding and Insights

by Scott Swanson

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

In 1965, R.L. Sproul, director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), testified before the U.S. Congress and stated, “It is [our] primary thesis that remote area warfare is controlled in a major way by the environment in which the warfare occurs, by the socio-logical and anthropological characteristics of the people involved in the war, and by the nature of the conflict itself.” Later, a DARPA program called Urban Sunrise published findings that recent U.S. involvement in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have confirmed this need for civil cultural intelligence collection, fusion, and effects-based analysis to support urban conflicts, peace-keeping, and stability operations. The conclusion of Urban Sunrise was that the success of our current and future operations will require expert culture awareness and competence in foreign social factor interpretation. Therefore, operational commanders who do not consider the operational factors of culture and religion during mission planning and execution invite unintended and unforeseen consequences, and even mission failure (Calvin Swain, Jr., The Operational Planning Factors of Culture and Religion), The lack of cultural intelligence support in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare has caused troops and policymakers to make many uninformed decisions about the populations that support either the U.S. or its adversaries or a particular ideology that is less tangible and not based on choosing specific sides.

On the other hand, when cultural intelligence has been used, success is the predominant general outcome. In the RAND study, “Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations,” Jamison Medby and Russell Glenn arrive at this same conclusion where “population analysis, which includes both demographic analysis and cultural intelligence, should come to the analytic foreground.” The very ideals relating to a need for more cultural intelligence are directly linked to fully understanding the nation of people increasingly engaged in combat and diplomacy, as opposed to direct fighting of uniformed soldiers on armed fronts and battlefields.

Cultural Evolution

Today’s military has increased its embrace of demographics and cultural (sometimes called civil or social) intelligence’s value to support strategic and tactical planning of the non-linear battlespace to leverage insight about an adversary’s mindset. The analysis tries to explain the rationale of a particular thought process; it attempts to predict adversarial intentions and examines the potential lengths that an adversary may pursue. The current forays into this space are a commendable improvement but the efforts and support can certainly be enhanced, especially with regard to the Special Operations community. Special Operations demand that comprehensive intelligence be collected and analyzed on particular areas of deployment to include the inhabitants likely to be encountered to the degree required for mission success. Special Operations Forces’ needs are critically information intensive as the teams are often the first “in-country” where little intelligence has been collected or it is provided at a high strategic level.

The unfortunate reality is that many leaders or “powers that be” who are pushing to have more cultural
intelligence added to warfare and peacemaking doctrine may not truly recognize how labor and resource intensive this intelligence capability needs to be in order to be done correctly to mitigate risk and ensure that odds are in the Special Forces (SF) Detachment Commander’s favor. While Special Operations targeting and mission planning demands vital timely, detailed, tailored, integrated, prioritized, rapidly updated, and focused intelligence in this area, many of the “target specific” items demand even more collection, research, analysis, and textual elaboration than normally afforded to conventional mission planning.

The exact degree to which Special Operations demand intelligence is often as elusive to the battlefield commanders themselves as it is to the intelligence officers and analysts that are tasked to help define a requirement and produce an actionable intelligence product. The reason for this void is simply the element of the unknown that we cannot identify and the mindset we have all heard of that is defined as “not knowing what we don’t know.” Training and doctrine try to fill some of these voids in human cognition but somewhere between the Special Forces’ “Q course” Robin Sage training and the situational awareness concept of System of Systems Analysis (SoSA)/Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) for Rapid Decisive Operations and Urban Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, the devil lurks in missing details. These gaps lead to inapt understanding of adversaries and area inhabitants, which can taint analysis, and therefore, accuracy in mission planning. JIPB consists of steps to ensure systematic analysis of operational environments and adversaries. But even such a process does not define the components in terms of other doctrine such as a political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII) nodal analysis in the checklist for Peacekeeping Operations and Information Warfare Battlespace Environment definitions.

Analysis from the Joint Information Operations Center has determined, “Finding and understanding the causal links in the adversary’s systems [or organizational structure] and measuring the effectiveness of disrupting those systems will be new fields of analysis for intelligence professionals as well as new responsibilities.” What this means is that the necessary capability to completely comprehend the complexities associated with asymmetrical challenges in correlation with ways to disturb adversarial activities is not prevalent today as a reliable resource. Significant intelligence products are failing to provide critical information required to increase the probability of mission success and reducing the degrees of risk with resources that are not yet up to speed to meet vital demands.

SoSA/Operational Net Assessment (ONA) teams are improving the capabilities to perform a “system of systems analysis” using every dimension of PMESII. Yet, Special Operation force missions do not only require this detailed level of planning for success; they require a great deal more details for field commanders, especially in the delicate nature of Psychological and Civil Affairs that are intrinsically tied to Information Operations and knowing exactly how a country and its populace are tied to a particular conflict and inherent belief systems.

The U.S. Marine Corps’ website for Small Wars Center of Excellence states that with regard to “small wars, the key factor in determining who wins and who loses will often be knowledge of the local culture. Culture is far more than language, folklore, food, or art. It is the lens through which people see, and make sense of their world. Culture determines what is admired and what is despised, what makes life worth living, and what things are worth dying for.” According to the Marine Corps Intelligence Agency (MCIA), over 50 percent of all requests for information (RFIs) from the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) are culture related.

Missing Link

The current focus of most cultural intelligence that goes outside of PMESII is only collected at the theater’s visible surface to an observer. Even the doctrinal format for the Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures suggests intelligence packages cover these surface level insights without demanding more insights below a level of basic cultural facade. This format misses the base of social beliefs and community behavior that create an individual or group’s intentions. National culture, from a psychological or sociological perspective, is the set of meshed traits that are passed down through members of a group. These traits are typically slow to change and, therefore, can be understood and/or identified well in advance of military operations. Further, these traits have been scientifically proven to have some genetic components that are passed through generations, and many of the social traits are so routine and automatic that they never reach a conscious level in the individual.

Typical civil and cultural intelligence content in its current state is limited to our five sensory inputs for attainment. These cultural traits can be defined as observable qualities to include: language, food, population, clothing,
pace of life, emotional display, gestures, or eye contact. Unfortunately, adversarial precognition answers remain a bit more hidden even beyond the typically analyzed social and political movements or characteristics. These elusive insights can involve: notions of time; how an individual fits into society; beliefs about human nature; the importance of work; tolerance for change; preference for leadership systems; motivation for achievement; communication styles; thinking styles, etc. They can also contribute to judgments about what constitutes acceptable levels of actions such as aggression.

While many of these insights seem a bit “touchy feely”, the characteristics become vastly important when formulating additional questions around essential elements of information (EEIs) to assess reliability of intelligence sources; mitigating ground surprises; influences of indigenous friendlies versus hostiles in an area, and recruitment susceptibility for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets or terrorist/insurgency forces. These answers cross validate data required by other methods that also consider the use of denial and deception and threat evaluations. JIPB attempts to answer many of these questions but does not completely take the data to a level of understanding of how each piece interrelates and has particular influence on a general population.

“Three-domain” urban models acknowledge a need to similarly model human organizational behavior (cognitive domain), information paths and structures (informational domain), and the physical infrastructure (physical domain). Yet for tactical intelligence at the field level, the intelligence should actually go deeper to assess the group/individual dynamics, predispositions, and possible reactions to identify an adversary’s human capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities by investigating the environmental factors found in values, beliefs, religion, etc. Such depth adds significant insight to strategies manifested in Special Operations Mission Planning Folders (SOMPF)–Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) in the social, cultural, and psychological areas that will in turn add more insight to the areas of government, military, trade and industries, friendly forces, hostile forces, or non-belligerent third-party forces.

Failures

Despite best intentions and transformation programs, until a change is made, failures to properly support field commanders will persist. Such commanders will lack the intelligence on the dynamics of theater cultures and behavior patterns (i.e., keeping the exclusive control over a piece of territory) and how tribal chiefs (e.g., war lords) establish and maintain control. This had been most recently experienced in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

In Somalia, for example, although armed opposition to the government of Mohammed Siad Barre had existed for many years, the war began with intensity in May 1988 when the Somali National Movement (SNM) began fighting the government in northwestern Somalia. Other armed opposition groups, mainly clan-based, arose over the next few years in southern Somalia, and in 1991 the Barre regime was deposed. Clan, sub-clan, warlord, and faction-based clashes continued with a number of prominent groups within Mogadishu, to include a faction of the United Somali Congress (USC) led by Muhammad Qanyare Afrah; another faction of the USC led by Muse Sudi Yalahow; the USC/Somali Salvation Alliance led by Umar Finish; and the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by Usman Hasan Ali Ato.

Within the web of clan and warlord conflicts, General Morgan and his forces historically clashed with the Jubba Valley Alliance led by Colonel Bare Hirale and Dabare and Luway sub-clans both from the Digil-Mirifle clan. An alliance of the Marehan sub-clans of Hawarsame Reh Hasan and Habar Ya’qub fought with Ali Dheere and Rer Ahmad forces. Militia of the Abgal clan allied to two rival businessmen from the Warsangeli and Wabudan sub-clans clashed with each other. Murusade and Duduble sub-clans, both from the Hawiye clan, clashed. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, General Ade Muse Hirsi, and Jama Ali Jama had been in conflict over control of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland.

The U.S. misperception of the Somali clan structure, rivalries, and ignorance of the notion of “collective responsibility” led the coalition to concentrate its attention on Ali Mahdi and Aideed, Somalia’s main warlords. In Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping, writer Tamara Duffey summarized that the unintended consequence of this was that United Nation actions actually enhanced the degree of power and authority which the warlords desired but, up to that point, did not legitimately possess. This then led to the marginalization of other clans, thereby upsetting the traditional balance of the Somali kinship system.

Without knowing the specific goals of the parties in conflict, troops enter a country not having the whole comprehension of the political and social situation to include the personalities involved. This includes: who in an area owes whom certain favors or debts; how families are in-
terlocked, favored, and ranked; knowledge of cross-border tribal and family relationships, and how having a U.S. military group in the area will affect daily civil dynamics. Situational awareness and social intelligence link to cultural integration, because troops must recognize the need to behave in a certain manner and be adaptable to act suitably.

Without such details theater engagement plans will not be able to cover much of the fine point details that soldiers need in the field to add proper contextual meaning to their observations to even translate into intelligence findings. Even ONA “Red” and “Blue” teams will likely not have enough ground level intelligence to truly think like the enemy. There are, in general, a number of reasons at this point for such gaps to include: some ignorance, lack of appropriate analytical training, cultural mirroring bias, or a combination of all.

Discovering Intent and Will

A generally accepted model used at the Joint Military Intelligence College dictates that Risk = Threat X Vulnerability. Within that model, Threat = (Capabilities X Intent) (Will X Action). The critical, yet less examined elements, in the model are Intent and Will. But by using a research framework that blends targeted intelligence collection, anthropological research, and psychology to permeate cultures, a combination of analytical techniques can expose these elusive battlespace elements covering the life cycle of a conflict to target correlating key nodes and links.

Relatively little is known about the terrorist or insurgent as an individual, and the psychology and history of unconventional warfare actors remains poorly understood. Attempts to clarify terrorism and activists in merely psychological terms ignore the economic, political, and social aspects that have typically motivated radical activists as well as the possibility that biological or physiological variables may be factors in bringing an individual to the point of carrying out terrorist acts.

The social psychology of political terrorism has received extensive analysis in studies of terrorism, but the individual psychology of political and religious terrorism has been greatly disregarded. This is regrettable because psychology has perfect tools to examine behavior and the factors that influence and control behavior, and it can provide practical, as opposed to purely conceptual, knowledge of terrorists and terrorism.

As an aside, SoSA ONA definitions in this area state “A Social System is a network of social relationships that is organized, integrated, and shares a common value system.” In broad theory, perhaps this is true. However, at ground level, one sees that codes, ideology/theology, beliefs, and behavior may have adjoining points that create a sense of harmony within groups, but individuals who are susceptible to changes will likely not share such an all-encompassing rigidly defined value system. Individuals may simply share “interests” at that particular time. In some cases, one group may come to scrutinize the beliefs and actions of another group as fundamentally evil and morally intolerable. This can result in internal hostility or violence and damages the relationship between the two groups. For this reason, moral conflicts tend to be quite harmful and inflexible or exploitable for the urban warrior.

One element of the psychological analysis in this process is the use of behavioral science, but at a more complex level than that of typical profiling techniques. A belief model coupled with social cognitive theory can define human behavior as a dynamic interaction of personal factors, activities, and environment. The process illuminates what is reality for groups and individuals, and therefore how that behavior is interpreted, predicted, and can potentially be changed. To support this analysis, comprehensive intelligence collection and anthropology must be conducted to also consider a level of likely scenario-based ramifications to consider ever-changing free will before mission planning and during missing execution. This is also where significant anthropological methodology approaches to participant observation, fieldwork, and historical research makes a contribution to the puzzle for assessments of historic and recurring experiences.

According to defense analyst and anthropologist Doctor Montgomery McFate, anthropology as an intelligence contribution is noticeably absent as a discipline within our national security establishment, and especially within the intelligence community and Department of Defense. Dr. McFate defines anthropology as “a social science discipline whose primary object of study has traditionally been non-Western, tribal societies. One of the central epistemological tenets of anthropology is cultural relativism; that is, understanding other societies from within their own framework.” Here is a very important emphasis of “understanding within a society’s own framework” which is quite different from understanding a society from our own mindset and framework. The differences between the two (us versus them) are found to be quite different from the standpoint of predispositions in interpretation and context. As an example, the Tuaregs,
a North African Sahara Berber people, govern desert space and confederations by a blend of informal economies, loosely structured laws, historic boundaries, and most importantly self-understanding. Due to the fact that their “rules” can not be defined in modern state infrastructures, the French and the involved nation states have often come in conflict with the Tuaregs when extensions and intrusions to the territories are committed. Conflicts and rebellions will continue without a better sense of how the Tuaregs think and how their society and culture has historically evolved to be what it is today.

Conclusion

To avoid segmenting adversaries or potentially hostile individuals into randomly defined groups (and our own convenient categories, tables, and data fields), cultural intelligence analysts should ideally depict inferences from three main facets that can be found in social cultures:

- **Cognitive.** Judgment and reasoning traits (strategies used in decisionmaking)
- **Motivational.** Inducements to action (beliefs about good and bad)
- **Behavioral.** Actions and reactions based on internal and external stimuli (the observable traits such as customs, language, social interaction).

These inferences take form in definable qualities, whether they be links, nodes, indicators, etc. that can be applied to pattern recognition surrounding the adversary or the indigenous people of an area of interest.

Those surrounding factors will be seen in the environment or a typical area study (geography, political, economic, sociological, linguistic, demographic, and cultural) but consider a more tactical consideration that is brought down to a local or personalized level to assess individual perspectives, behavioral patterns, psychographic profiles, etc. Herein lies the real “ground truth.”

With improved cultural intelligence net assessments, leaders and SF Senior Sergeant and SF Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant soldiers can better construct EEIs for engagement and even survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) needs. U.S. Army Lieutenants David P. Fitchitt and William D. Wunderle confirmed their experiences and observations as they wrote on the subject, “Cultural adaptability includes learning such things as language acronyms, slang, and jargon that are unique to the culture; goals and values (formal rules and principles, as well as unwritten, informal goals and values that govern behavior); history (traditions, customs, myths and rituals that convey cultural knowledge); and politics (formal and informal relationships and power structures within the culture).”

At such a micro-level, a tactical urban warrior can focus on maximizing courses of action and cover strategic, operational, and tactical needs. From here commanders are enabled to take surprise from the enemy; forecast, expanding upon the capabilities of intuitive intelligence and introducing “presencing” to the equation; come to a better understanding of the relationship one enters with the adversary—known, suspected, and unknown; and fully understand the local power chains of influence.

Field Manual Interim 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Manual, October 2004 highlights this micro-level as a formal process, “Understanding and working within the social fabric of a local area is initially the most influential factor in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately, this is often the factor most neglected by U.S. forces.” By becoming aware of the full human reasoning process within an area and the choices people make; between observing data to ultimately taking action, personal and situational understanding can also transform to an ability to change or even shape others’ beliefs. This is the stage where one truly knows an adversary. Perhaps it is stated best by a former expert in this area:

“When I took a decision or adapted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant and many irrelevant factors. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards all were at my finger ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side.”

—Colonel T.E. Lawrence, 26 June 1933
Imagine you are a Soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan. Wouldn’t you feel safer if your combat leader was a linguist and conversant with local customs? What if your company’s intelligence was provided by an illiterate? What if your best translator was someone the locals despised or considered to be a spy?

How can we distinguish between the respected, the thugs, the honest, or the dregs of a foreign society, if we cannot understand what they say to us? We Americans have a cultural bias against learning languages other than English, but now our Soldiers’ lives depend on our doing so.

How accurately and well we analyze the indigenous people we deal with during the Global War on Terrorism might well determine the success or failure of counter-insurgency operations. Our combat training will be for nothing if our linguists do not tell us the truth or fail to recognize it because of a lack of training. The lack of foreign language skills is our Army’s Achilles’ heel. Timeliness and accuracy are everything in intelligence, and thus, a linguist’s skills are more important than firepower. With the former, you might not need the latter.

Foreign language skills are mission essential for an expeditionary army. Our Soldiers die in foreign lands because American comrades they can absolutely trust lack those skills. We forget that our job is to move, shoot, and communicate, and we forget that “communicate” does not refer just to radios.

When we conduct a raid and find no one there, what was the cause? Was the intelligence bad? Did we give the mission away because of poor operations security? Were we led to the wrong target? Were we too late in getting there? Was the enemy tipped off that we were coming? Is it possible our linguist missed a critical nuance because of his lack of skill? Where should the damage assessment begin? Who knew the truth? And who translated it for him?

For Want of a Language

Pham Xuan An, who wrote for *Time*, was a Communist spy during the Vietnam War. Erudite, witty, and insightful, he was said to be a pleasure to deal with. Ideologically motivated, he worked to destroy us. At the other extreme is the Iraqi who makes a separate peace because if he does not the enemy will kill his family. Both types of spies (for the lack of a better word) gain access to our plans because they are skilled in our language and we are ignorant of theirs. The way into the American fortress is through the open gate of language.

Platoon leaders and operations center chiefs rely on linguists. Linguists are the interpreters on the streets for our patrols and the translators of recently recovered documents. For better or worse, we rely on who is available when we deploy. Army officials predicted a need for hundreds of Arabic speakers before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The Army ended up with 42. We deployed 140,000 troops to Iraq with 42 interpreters!

A Perishable Skill

Unless a Soldier has learned Arabic as a child, he will find conversing in it a perishable skill. Few retain a lan-
language without frequent practice with those who can conduct serious, adult conversations. Of the 42 linguists deployed during OIF, probably only half could speak the language intelligently.

The ability to speak a foreign language skillfully cannot be put in cold storage in the hope that it will sparkle again someday. Communicating with words is one level of skill, but to understand nuance, culture, and traditions is another. The latter should be a career pursuit. The Army, however, does not offer its Soldiers such an opportunity. As a fighting force, we are utterly dependent on linguists for field intelligence, to help in rapport building, and for the many unexpected missions that befall occupation Soldiers. Linguists speak with information sources, interpret important documents, and even read road signs for us.

**Desperately Seeking Interpreters**

All the financial assistance we allocate and all the infrastructure and civic assistance we provide must be explained to Iraqis and foreign nationals by someone, and the more reliable that person is, the better. The usual Army method is to seek out foreigners who speak English, but this often means tapping exclusively into Westernized groups. In Vietnam, we relied on French-Vietnamese Christian elites who had little, if any, contact with the country’s Buddhist population. In Bosnia, we dealt with anyone who spoke English, regardless of his background, about which we usually knew next to nothing. Our Somali translators were ex-taxicab drivers granted interim security clearances.

Nothing has changed in Iraq, our understanding of local social hierarchies is limited at best, a matter of total ignorance at worst. There are people you do not deal with in some societies and others who are invaluable when you are attempting to understand an entire culture, not just its parts. When problems arise regarding local customs, traditions, taboos, and social mores, someone who has spent his professional career understanding such issues is a godsend. (Of course, without such a person, you do not know you have the problem in the first place.) Absent a culturally astute American linguist, we are forced to rely on whomever can help us muddle through. Ours, the most thoroughly trained, best-equipped Army in history, relies on virtually unknown foreigners vulnerable to insurgent death threats. How long will they valiantly resist threats to their loved ones before they betray us?

**Training Our Own**

How can we train our own effective translators? Those who study languages must understand the long-term utility of devoting themselves to years of rigorous study and practice. Unfortunately, there is no career path for officers to pursue this skill, and money incentives alone cannot do it. In the 19th century, the British Foreign Office assigned a man to a country more or less for his career. He became the man on the spot, the go-to civil servant who could be relied on to know his area and the personalities resident there. But there will never be a Lawrence of Arabia in the U.S. Army. He would be reassigned seven times or more before he developed the expertise Lawrence had.

Foreign language training must involve constant immersion. As a graduate of the Defense Language Institute (DLI), I would immediately implement a Berlitz-like foreign language-only teaching regimen there. Assignments for graduates in their target countries should be either at embassies or consulates if no military bases require their presence. Assignments that demand interaction with local nationals should be highly sought after and rewarded as much as any other service position. No graduate of DLI should be allowed to live on post. His job is to interact with the locals, how better to do so than to live among them? When I was assigned to Germany, I knew three words for light machinegun, but none for diaper. It was through common, everyday dealings with young German families that I learned their words and ways and became better at my liaison job. Foreign area officers should also be assigned to foreign units. They should attend foreign schools; in fact, it should be a job requirement to do so.

**Employ Incentives**

We have native-born Americans who study languages at some of the finest universities in our land, yet we offer them nothing in the way of incentives to employ their language skills in an Army career. We have citizens who speak every language in the world. They are first- or second-generation immigrants. Yet the Army has not tapped into that linguistic reserve programmatically by encouraging them to help us become truly combat effective in the lands of their ancestors.

The Army must offer a career path for linguists. A good speaker of a foreign language is an asset. A trusted, trained language professional can save many lives. It is time to do something about the Army’s Achilles’ heel.
Editor's Note:

Mr. Peter Shaver, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center’s (USAIC) 09L Course Manager offers the following information about an initiative to alleviate some of the issues Major Davis speaks of: About 2 years ago the U.S. Army (Fort Jackson, USAIC, and DLI), by order of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, designed and developed the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 09L, Interpreter/Translator, to train native and heritage native speakers as interpreters and translators. Native Arabic, Pashto, Kurdish, and Arabic dialect speakers are trained at Fort Jackson, South Carolina for six weeks in escort and liaison interpreting and tactical level translation. They must be proficient in English and, of course, their native language to qualify for entrance into the program. Over 250 Soldiers have been trained and deployed to tactical field units where they have been very successful in serving as interpreters and translators for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM commanders and units. Additionally, their cultural acumen has been employed in several life-saving situations.

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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the contributors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Military Academy or any other agency of the U.S. government.

Introduction

The Internet is a critical means of communication for the newest generation of terrorist groups. The salafi jihadi movement in particular has used the Internet to pass strategic, operational, and tactical instruction to its followers, becoming adept at utilizing the anonymity and global reach of online communications to promote its message. Visual imagery provides a key aspect of the terrorists’ message in that it allows these groups to paint a picture of their objectives, their enemies, and their strategy through graphics, photographs, and symbols. The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the U.S. Military Academy has developed an online open source catalog of these images and their meaning. The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda provides analyses for one hundred key motifs that appear throughout the jihadists’ visual propaganda. It is our hope that this project will be useful to scholars and practitioners alike. We welcome comments and feedback.

Fred Barnard once said “One picture is worth a thousand words,” summarizing the reason why we focus on pictures as much as words when we communicate with one another. As many people grapple with how to communicate effectively with the Islamic world, understanding the pictures, motifs, and images and, more importantly, the emotions that they evoke are essential. This project is the first comprehensive cataloging of the most important and recurring images used in violent jihadi literature, websites, and propaganda. These images can have very different meanings in different cultural contexts, and it is essential for students, teachers, and policy makers to have a way to understand the meaning of these images.

This project supports the mission of the CTC, which is to better understand the foreign and domestic terrorist threats to security, to educate leaders who will have responsibilities to counter terrorism, and to provide policy analysis and assistance to leaders dealing with the current and future terrorist threat. The CTC is part of the Department of Social Sciences of the U.S. Military Academy and is closely integrated with the instruction for cadets and the Academy’s outreach and support of projects to educate and inform current and future leaders.

Jihadi Imagery and Visual Motifs

The study of Islamic imagery has heretofore been the exclusive domain of art historians and museum curators, with pre-modern art being the central area of interest. Thus, there is a palpable lack of information on modern imagery associated with political Islam, especially imagery that is produced by radical and often violent Muslim groups. Nowhere is the dearth of critical research more apparent than in the study of jihadi organizations. These organizations have had a brief but prolific history in the production and distribution of visual propaganda and have arguably created their own distinct genre of Internet-based Islamic imagery. While the tragic events of September 11 highlighted the importance of understanding the ideology and methods of jihadi groups, the process of achieving this understanding is still at the early stages, and the remaining areas of ignorance are profound.

The current study on jihadi imagery, the first of its kind, is an important step in this process. Herein, visual propaganda is considered to be more than just a host for textual messages; rather it is treated as an expressive medium unto itself, one which communicates ideas just as effectively, and sometimes as explicitly, as the written word. We regard jihadi imagery to be a primary vehicle for the communication and diffusion of jihadi ideas and an essential tool utilized by radical ideologues, terrorist organizations, and sympathetic propagandists which plays to the particular religious and cultural experiences of their audience. Therefore, understanding how these images work, what ideas they convey, why they are employed,
and what responses they may elicit, is vital to our struggle against the influence of jihadi organizations and the violence they create.

Since 2001, the U.S. and its allies have catalyzed two significant changes in the way the jihadi movement learns, communicates, and recruits. First, by eliminating the extensive network of al-Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan, the United States has forced jihadist terrorist groups to find new ways to transfer knowledge to their membership. Second, by killing or capturing two-thirds of al-Qa'ida’s senior leadership, the U.S. has drastically undermined the jihadi movement’s ability to formulate and communicate its strategic vision.

In the face of such challenges, the Salafi jihadi movement has adapted, finding new ways to keep the movement driving forward. Numerous analysts have recognized that jihadi websites are rapidly proliferating. The number of radical Islamic websites has increased exponentially, providing religious instruction and operational training; indeed, these websites have created a virtual global community.

The Internet is providing a convenient way for jihadist to pass tactical and operational level instruction of the kind that they had been delivering in the Afghan training camps. More importantly, it allows them to paint a picture of their objectives, their enemies, and their strategy using visual imagery. This imagery is a sophisticated mix of graphics and photographs that reference architecture, religious symbols, historical events, and more.

Visual motifs accomplish several objectives for jihadi propagandists. First, they create a mental conception of reality for their audiences. The use of carefully edited images evokes existing emotional or historical memories, eliciting an emotional response that may be conscious or subconscious. Often, these motifs tap into deeply held beliefs or intersubjective understandings within a public as a means of communicating an idea.

Importantly, Constructivist theory teaches that there is no unmediated knowledge of reality. There are only symbolized, constructed understandings of reality, mediated through language and images. Each viewer of this propaganda, therefore, approaches the images with a unique set of experiences and knowledge that help to cognitively frame the messages being promulgated in the images.

Secondly, they help the author, or propagandist, communicate a message, which is often a visual argument for something or against something. Texts and language, including imagery, provide interactive ways for jihadis to engage the ideology itself. The notion of resonance, the ways in which a message harmonizes with existing understandings of an audience, is the outcome of this dialectical process.

This project identified recurring themes within a discrete sample of radical Islamic imagery obtained over the course of the past several years by the CTC. These patterns, or motifs as we call them, pervade most of these radical jihadi websites.

For the purposes of this assessment, the CTC identified one-hundred motifs that commonly occur in jihadi propaganda and then developed a glossary entry for each of these motifs. Each entry is grounded in a deep reading of Islamic history, culture, language and experience. The result is a “first cut” at a topic that merits much more time and attention, although we have reached a number of preliminary conclusions.

These images speak for themselves—quite literally. In most cases, one does not need to be able to read any of the text within the images to understand the broad meanings conveyed by the propagandists. The motifs may have a significant impact on people who are not literate in Arabic so long as they possess a cultural frame of reference that allows them to decode the components of the images.

Many of the photographic images that are used by jihadi propagandists were not originally created by the propagandists; rather they have been lifted from other websites and various media sources. The propagandists have reappropriated these images for their own purposes, both literally and figuratively, and the only modification may be the addition of a terrorist logo, or the name of a city, or individual. In short, originality and authorship do not matter beyond the desire for a particular group to show that it is participating in the global jihad.

Although the photographic images are fairly contemporary, the motifs are often based on ancient traditions and historical cultural references. There is a certain timelessness to these motifs, which reflects the authors’ desire to portray their extreme interpretation of Salafi thought as a logical refinement of traditional Islamic thought. The propagandists use easily recognized symbols as a basis for creating new motifs that support a radicalized interpretation of Salafi ideology. The new motifs gain legitimacy when used in proximity to widely accepted symbols and cultural references. An example of this technique can be seen in the frequent use of a photograph of Osama bin Laden on a horse, which connotes his (supposed)
kinship and affiliation with the companions of the Prophet Muhammad.

Conclusion

Much work remains to be done in order to comprehensively capture and catalog the full range of jihadi visual propaganda, particularly in regards to monitoring the frequency of existing motifs and identifying the incidence of new motifs. The rate at which particular themes become more or less popular may reflect broader changes in ideology and orientation of the global jihad movement and its sympathizers.

The CTC believes that this analysis will facilitate greater understanding of the subtleties of jihadi propaganda among counterterrorism professionals. Creating links between diverse professional fields such as art history, communications, and counterterrorism will enrich our understanding of terrorism-related issues. Finally, this analysis may serve as a template or reference point for further research in this area.

Go to http://www.ctc.usma.edu/imagery.asp to view the entire imagery catalogue.

The following CTC faculty members created the Islamic Imagery Project:

Afshon Ostovar is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at the University of Michigan and also serves as a Research Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center. He is trained in both the premodern and modern fields of Islamic history, and has lived and worked throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. Currently, his research focuses on the social, cultural, and intellectual history of political Islamic movements and jihadist visual propaganda. Mr. Ostovar identified and categorized the key motifs from the CTC’s extensive collection of jihadi imagery and wrote the analyses of the individual motifs.

Lianne Kennedy-Boudali is a Senior Associate in the Combating Terrorism Center and also serves as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Professor Kennedy-Boudali holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University where she specialized in International Security Policy and Middle East Affairs. She served for two years as a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer in Niger, and has also lived in Morocco. Ms. Kennedy-Boudali’s research interests include terrorism in North Africa, strategic communication in terrorism and counter-terrorism, and the process of political-religious radicalization. Ms. Kennedy-Boudali directed the research, development, and publication of this project.

Dr. Jarret Brachman holds a joint appointment as Director of Research in the Combating Terrorism Center and as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. His research interests include al-Qa’ida strategy and Salafi jihadi ideology on which he has both published and discussed with a range of audiences. Dr. Brachman consults with agencies across the federal government, and the New York Police Department as well as multiple national new organizations. He served as a Fellow with the Central Intelligence Agency before coming to West Point. Dr. Brachman personally collected the images that comprise the CTC’s image library. Dr. Brachman and William McCants conceived the original project design and served as consultants throughout the project.
Introduction

We do things to “get” things. In the military, the “get” is usually framed in terms of defeating an enemy force. In a larger sense, though, our “get” is influencing our opponent’s decisionmaking process. We use combat operations to influence him toward courses of action (behaviors) that achieve our goals.

The “get” from the civilian populations in our areas of operation (AOs) is behavior that assists us and inhibits our opponents. Senior officers, including Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, have noted that a lesson learned in recent deployments is that the responses of the civilian population to our military presence and operations are at least as important to our success as combat operations. At the tactical level, day-to-day, face-to-face involvement with various factions, and the significant consequences of misjudgments, puts as high a premium on understanding the motivations of, influences on, and preferred behavior patterns of the civilians in our AO as it does on understanding opposing armed forces.

However, before we can mix up the appropriate kinetic and/or informational “cocktail” of influencing measures, we have to know how the local population is organized (think groups instead of units), the belief sets of the various groups (sound like doctrine?) which cluster of beliefs they use to assess the current situation (their military decision making process), and the relative strength of the belief sets. Put another way, we need to know:

- Who are these people?
- How can we get them to do what we want/need?
- With whom do we deal? On what basis? With what expectations?
- What are they likely to do next?

To answer these questions, field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan have been adapting their Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). In 2004, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) captured some of the more often-cited questions for collection in a Smart Card “Cultural Operating Environment IPB: Important Local Knowledge for Tactical Leaders” (Table 1) and posted it on the CALL website.

But answers to these questions only provide raw data. How do we use it? We suggest an approach to analyzing civilian populations based on group structure, behavior, and belief sets. Computer-aided tools to assist in this are
under development by Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, however the basic resources to do it manually are already within the hands of G2/S2s and require only "fine tuning" rather than additional tasking. Hopefully, the concepts which follow will spark thought, discussion, further testing, and add to the professional knowledge of the Military Intelligence Corps and the Intelligence Community at large.

**Why Groups?**

Politically, militarily, or socially, anything that is accomplished—and particularly those things that influence the success of military operations—are done by groups, i.e. refugee congestion, insurgency, political activities, re-

**Table 1. Cultural IPB**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>These are cultural factors every tactical leader must find out.</th>
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<tr>
<td>What is your local area of operations (AO)? What is your area of interest?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the local peoples' basic assumptions about life? Is the world hostile? Who do they regard as threats? How can threats be handled? What are their chances of achieving their goals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What things are the people in your local area willing to die for?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the basic social structure of your local area of operations? Is the prime unit the family, clan, tribe, neighborhood, village, political party or religious congregation or a combination of these?</td>
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<td>Who holds the social, political, economic, religious leadership in your local area? Do they have an armed following?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who are the &quot;protectors&quot; (armed citizens, clan or religious militia, police, and army) for the basic social unit (family, clan, tribe, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the religious affiliation of the local people in your area?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent are the local people in your area influenced by religion in daily life?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the dynamics and structure of the local religious leadership?</td>
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<td>Do the people in your local area have loyalties, dependencies or connections (family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, religious sect) that cross outside the boundaries of your AO?</td>
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<td>Are there cultural, religious, or ethnic divisions in your AO? What are the points of friction between the groups?</td>
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<td>How do people earn their living in your local area?</td>
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<td>What is the primary legal industry (agriculture, manufacturing, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What illegal activities provide significant income (smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping robbery/banditry, black marketeering, etc.)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which of the illegal activities are considered socially acceptable, tolerable or are habitually overlooked by law enforcement?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What percent of the people are unemployed? Is unemployment a significant problem?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do people have difficulty acquiring basic necessities, i.e., water, food, shelter, clothing?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How, when, and where do the people buy and sell or acquire goods and services especially essentials such as food, water, fuel, medicines and medical care, clothes, seed, livestock, building materials, vehicles, vehicles repairs?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the patterns of influence and corruption? What services require payment of bribes and who receives them?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the points of social etiquette, customs, or mores that can either enhance or harm your acceptability and effectiveness with locals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do the people of your local area get their information or news? Which sources have credibility among the local people? How do rumors start and spread? What is your feedback loop to know what the people are really thinking and saying?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the most credible source of news/information for the people? Do local elites value a different source?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do the locals trust the police? Local military? US Forces? Local government?</td>
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**Table 2. Defining Characteristics of a Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Characteristics</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Composition</strong> - Who are the members (Demographics)? What is their motivation for joining together?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong> - What are the members trying to achieve? This can be derived from propaganda (speeches, public statements of policy and/or intent) and actual observed behavior (i.e. participation in political events, acts of violence, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past Behavior</strong> – What have they done to come to our attention? Does it conform to their propaganda?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

construction. A key individual may make a decision, but it takes some sort of organized implementation by others to achieve an effect.

When individuals join together to achieve a goal which they believe they cannot achieve by themselves, they modify their individual belief sets and behavior in order for the group to accomplish its goals. These generalized beliefs and behaviors are easier to identify than individual beliefs, even in a data-sparse environment, and experience and research have shown that reasonably accurate inferences as to future preferred behavior (a form of "What are they likely to do next?") can be made.

Groups can be identified based on at least three criteria as shown in Table 2, and depending on the motivation for joining and broad goals, they can be categorized as social, religious, economic, professional, political, militant, and military. Structural and belief templates have been created for each type. 4
A group may contain elements of several types, e.g., Religious and Militant, or Social and Political or it may be transitioning from one type to another. While any and all of these group types may be encountered in an operational area, Table 3 lists those with which military organizations are most likely to interact in the course of their operations.

### The Analytical Structure

The analytical approach we propose is composed of four elements. It is not the “only” approach to Target Group analysis. It is, however, based on the authors’ over thirty years’ experience in Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Information Operations (IO), and the need to operationalize theories of human behavior, particularly to allow for computational modeling in support of military decisionmaking. As such, it represents a more pragmatic view of the role of “culture” in military operations than found in open source literature published to date, addressing cultural influences with respect to the type of questions a commander needs to have answered given the tools that are available.

**Taxonomy.** Templates based on a taxonomy of group types allow us, in a data sparse environment, to develop an initial picture of how a group type might be organized and what its key belief sets may be in order to guide intelligence collection and course of action testing.

**Belief Sets.** For military purposes, we have synthesized fourteen belief sets from political and psychological research into fourteen questions which research and on-the-ground experience have shown to have an influence on group and individual behavior. See Table 4.

### Table 4. Belief Sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Philosophy (How the group sees the world from their perspective):</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Larger Goal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World View</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short Term Goals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Role of Group in the Larger Culture</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferred Means of Achieving Goals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Utility and Role of Different Means of Achieving Goals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Chance/Fate (luck, opportunity)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Best Approach for Selecting Goals for Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Chances of Achieving Goals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Acceptable Means of Achieving Goals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Best Approach to Calculation, Control, and Acceptance of Risks of Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Best Timing of Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Constraints on Achieving Goals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment Commitment,</strong> whether of the leadership to the global goal, or the membership to the leadership, or the members to the global goal, is a factor which waxes and wanes based on situational influences. It is simultaneously both a product and a modifier of the other factors. Certain group types and goals require higher levels of commitment than others. This need for commitment and the need to maintain it have implications for both the organization and the most effective leadership style for the group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Structural Factors. A description of group structural factors which have proven to be significant influences on or indicators of group behavior and possible indicators of vulnerabilities that can be leveraged by the commander is at Table 5. These factors interrelate—some obviously so, as in the belief sets (see Table 4) of “Larger Goal,” “Preferred Means of Achieving Goals,” “Best Timing of Action,” “Perceived Constraints,” and “Commitment,” and the structural factors of “Leadership Style,” “Power Dynamic,” “Communication Dynamic,” and “Group Discipline”, others less obviously.

Modeling. Some of the computer-based tools being developed by the DOD include modeling environments which range in complexity to allow for the computational representation of human behavior. Models built with these tools allow analysts and operators to observe the causal relationships among influences and have the potential to explain current behavioral phenomenon, as well as to assess probabilities of future events. While such tools are under development, the analytic process presented here can be manually implemented by G2/S2s and IO sections through standard office productivity software.

Application of the Belief Sets and Structural Factors

In this article, although we give a brief outline of how the analytical structure is applied, we will focus on the belief sets and structural factors and how they give meaning to the information gathered by the cultural IPB questions. Since the CALL Cultural IPB Smart Card represents collection requirements that commanders and G2/S2s have found useful, let us look at how these questions relate to the belief sets (aka “Fourteen Questions”) at Table 4 and the structural

Table 5. Group Structure Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Style</th>
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<tr>
<td>Laissez Faire</td>
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<tr>
<td>The leadership “leads” in name only. It may preside over group meetings, collect dues and generally propose policy or courses of action, but it has no mechanisms to enforce its decisions. Membership willingness to follow the leadership is a major factor in all decisions. This style is most often seen in Social groups. It rarely produces effective action in a political or military sense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic/Collaborative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership seeks to build consensus for policies and decisions, and use that consensus to guide action. The membership, having “bought in” via an election or some other mechanism generally follows the leadership. This leadership style can use moral suasion based on the group consensus and may have powers granted by the membership to sanction non-compliance to a limited extent, for example mechanisms such as expulsion from the group. This is an effective style for Social, Economic, and Professional groups, and has been seen in Religious and Political groups. It tends to be destabilizing in Militant and Military groups, and can be so in Religious groups depending on the particular dogma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive/Autocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership sets policy and expects membership compliance. Can range from benevolent to highly autocratic. Membership opinion carries less influence on leadership decisionmaking, but the leadership still considers it a factor (an internal control belief) and there are still mechanisms available to the membership to influence or replace the leadership. The membership has only general input to policy making. Removal of the leadership from its positions is difficult and therefore that option is not seen by the membership as a viable alternative except under unusual conditions. Non-compliance with leadership decisions can be sanctioned with ostracism, possibly financial fines, and possible loss of membership benefits up to and including expulsion. This is a very effective leadership style for groups that have goals which involve influencing outside groups because it allows efficient organization for action. This style is most often seen in Religious and Political groups, and may be seen in the Military groups of cultures which place a high value on individualism. It may be seen in Militant groups in its more heavy-handed form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictatorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The leadership exerts no influence on policy formation and must either comply with decisions or be severely sanctioned, up to and including death. It is most often seen in Militant, extremist/fundamentalist Religious groups, and Military groups in collectivist cultures, although it can appear in any group type. It often shows high organizational ability in its early stages. However, in groups where commitment is not high, dictatorial elites are either replaced or the group dissolves. Even in Militant and Religious groups with high commitment, this style often results in factions plotting to take over which dissipates group energy and effectiveness. Eventually, the leadership starts to spend more and more resources to maintain itself in power. This further diverts group effort from achieving the group goals. Dissatisfaction leads to more plotting, desertions, failed actions and eventually the leadership is replaced by a new elite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Power Dynamic (Formal vs Actual)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Formal Power Structure.</strong> Who decides what and what powers they have;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal Power Structure.</strong> Who actually influences decisionmaking or wields influence. Although this is hard information to gather, a large disparity between the two structures should be considered a vulnerability and possible a source of instability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Communication Dynamic (Formal vs Actual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How information is taken into the group and how it is disseminated. Again, if the two structures are close, the communication dynamic can be a source of strength; if there are large disparities, a vulnerability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Discipline</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This factor, coupled with group type and leadership style, is one of the main determinants in the ability of the group to take effective action to achieve group goals. It has three components:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Ability of leadership to motivate</strong> This is a function of the perceptions of the membership (charisma and perceived effectiveness) and the leadership’s ability to reward good performance and sanction poor performance. Rate as: Low, Medium, or High.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Member commitment</strong> How willing is the membership to sacncte other perceived values to achieve group goals? This could be time, money, personal freedom or personal safety. The level of member commitment must match or exceed the level of outside resistance to the group achieving its goals. Rate as: Low, Medium, High.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Sanctioning mechanisms</strong> What mechanisms are available to the leadership to compel the membership to follow their decisions? Do they feel able to use those mechanisms? Do they have the will to use them?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
factors as laid out in Table 5. **Note:** Rarely will you ever have full details on each of the belief sets or structural factors, but often, just by looking at the IPB questions from these different perspectives, you will find that you have more than you thought. This was the case with the S2 of a Military Police battalion who had recently returned from Iraq. His initial response to questions about the cultural factors in his AO was that he had had no information on this or that. However, when the questions were re-framed from the point of view of the Fourteen Questions, he realized he had, in fact, had more information than he believed.

**What is your local AO? What is your area of interest (AI)?**

This defines your immediate “battlefield,” but also alerts you to adjacent areas whose military, political, social, or economic situation may impact on the people in your area. Are there similarities or variations in “World View,” “Larger Goals,” “Short Term Goals,” “Preferred Means for Achieving Goals,” and “Perceived Constraints on Achieving Goals” (“Constraints”) between your AO and AI?

**What are the local people’s basic assumptions about life? Is the world hostile? Who do they regard as threats? How can threats be handled? What are their chances of achieving their goals?**

This addresses two belief sets: “World View,” and “Perceived Chances for Achieving Goals.” “World View” is the filter through which everything that happens in their environment is passed and given a positive or negative meaning. It determines how U.S. forces and our actions are perceived. Are we good guys or bad? Can they cooperate with us or must they resist us? Do they respond to threats with violence or some other means of conflict resolution? You can probably cite other attitudes and behaviors that, from your experience, give insight into “World View.” As you develop information on their “World View,” you can assess how our operations will be perceived: Which ones will get us closer to achieving our political-military goals, and which ones will make problems for us down the road.

If some people like U.S. forces and others don’t, is that an individual variation or do we find that the people who hold those views are related in some way? If so, can Table 2 be applied to identify them as a group? Identifying sub groups in your AO is critical.

“World View” is very resistant to change. Almost everything that happens in the group’s environment reinforces it. Civil Affairs (CA) activities and PSYOP may start to modify it, but one event of overreaction or collateral damage will require rebuilding trust. If we target the features of their “World View” that seem to support our objectives and also incorporate trust building actions, our operations will have a better chance of influencing target groups.

“Perceived Chances of Achieving the Goals” can be influenced both directly—preferably through actions—and indirectly via influencing other belief sets, notably “Perceived Constraints on Achieving Goals” and “Best Timing of Action.” To separate one group from another, i.e., reducing popular support for an insurgency—we can also raise issues about “Acceptability of Means” and the “Utility and Role of Different Means.”

Not all target groups have a clear perception of their chances of achieving their goals. For example, an aggregate (the citizens of Southern Ramadi) may have very vague goals, often focused on emotion or survival—safety, food, water, jobs. A militant group may not have any expectation of achieving its goals directly, rather seeing their efforts as setting the stage for those that follow.

**What things are the people in your local area willing to die for?**

This gives an idea of how strongly held the “World View” is and what the “Larger Goals” and “Short Term Goals” are. It also gives insight into their conflict resolution norms.

**What is the basic social structure of your local area of operations? Is the prime unit the family, clan, tribe, neighborhood, village, political party, or religious congregation or a combination of these?**

This explores the structural factors of the local culture and sub cultures and helps to identify groups that may be targeted. In the process, you will probably also wind up with information to answer the next question.
Who holds the social, political, economic, and religious leadership in your local area? Do they have an armed following?

This focuses on the leadership elite’s beliefs about their “Role in the Larger Culture”–both the larger group/tribe and the larger society–ego issues. It will also give insights to how they exercise their authority/power, which provides insights to the “Leadership style” and “Formal and Informal Power Dynamics” of the various groups. Does the membership faithfully follow decisions of the key leaders? Does decisionmaking require some sort of group consensus? Are there power factions whose buy-in is necessary? What kind of discipline does the group show? If the Sheik vows to run off the insurgents (assuming he means it), what are the chances he will be able to enforce it? What are the risks to him if he fails? If he succeeds, what are the rewards and/or risks to him and his close supporters?

The presence of an armed following of any of these leaders will make your G3/S3’s day. Compare the group’s “Power Dynamic” with the belief sets “Best Means of Selecting Goals for Action,” “Calculation, Control and Acceptance of Risks of Action,” “Best Timing of Action,” “Constraints,” and “Group Discipline” to get an idea of the leadership elite’s decisionmaking process and how they see the usefulness of the armed element. Understanding this calculus allows the possibility of influencing it either through kinetic means and/or PSYOP, as part of an integrated IO program.

Who are the “protectors” (armed citizens, clan or religious militia, police, and army) for the basic social unit (family, clan, tribe, etc.)?

Look at this fairly standard intelligence collection requirement from the perspective of the groups in your AO. A police force or Host Nation military may not be seen as protectors. Who do they look to for protection? How do the “Protectors” interact with their group leadership elite? The structure of the “protectors” will also give indicators about “Commitment” and “Group Discipline.”

What is the religious affiliation of the local people in your area?

Are there special local variations in the religious beliefs or practices which can indicate potentially significant different attitudes? Not all devotees believe the same things. Neighboring groups can vary widely in their attitudes, and therefore their behaviors.

To what extent are the local people in your area influenced by religion in daily life?

Which areas of daily life are influenced, how, and to what extent? This is an element of the “Role of Chance/Fate” and “Acceptable Means for Achieving Goals.” Don’t accept the answer from regional studies handouts or textbooks. The influence of religion can vary from village to village.

What are the dynamics and structure of the local religious leadership?

What are the religious “Power Dynamics” and “Communication Dynamics” in your AO? Not in a text book, not on your last tour, not in the big city 100 kilometers away. Use the same belief sets as when analyzing the political and social structures. If the religious leadership elite is also a major political player, your work is already part done. Take an extra coffee break.

Do the people in your local area have loyalties, dependencies or connections (family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, religious sect) that cross outside the boundaries of your AO?

This is the relationship between AO and AI. Maybe you need to compare notes with your adjacent units’ G2/S2, PSYOP and CA folks?

Are there cultural, religious, or ethnic divisions in your AO? What are the points of friction between the groups?

This addresses the relationships between groups. How is friction handled: Negotiations? Vendetta? Belief sets such as “World View,” “Preferred Means,” “Utility and Role of Different Means,” and “Acceptable Means” will give
good indicators as to how the groups would prefer to handle conflict. Does that match up with what they are doing? If it doesn’t, why not? Compare notes with the PSYOP and CA folks about how U.S. forces are perceived in relation to inter-group conflicts.

The next seven questions, besides providing an economic profile of your AO, will provide you with information on the “Utility and Role of Different Means for Achieving Goals,” “Preferred Means for Achieving Goals,” “Acceptable Means to Achieve Goals,” and the “Perceived Role of the Group in the Larger Culture.” You may also develop information on what various groups perceive as their “Short Term (tactical) Goals.” You will also gain insight into their susceptibility to groups or sub groups that offer to fill unmet needs.

- How do people earn their living in your local area?
- What is the primary legal industry (agriculture, manufacturing, etc.)?
- What illegal activities provide significant income (smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping robbery/banditry, black marketeering, etc.).
- Which of the illegal activities are considered socially acceptable, tolerable or are habitually overlooked by law enforcement?
- What percent of the people are unemployed? Is unemployment a significant problem?
- Do people have difficulty acquiring basic necessities, i.e., water, food, shelter, clothing?
- How, when, and where do the people buy and sell or acquire goods and services especially essentials such as food, water, fuel, medicines and medical care, clothes, seed, livestock, building materials, vehicles, vehicles repairs?

What are the patterns of influence and corruption? What services require payment of bribes and who receives them?

Patterns of influence or corruption are not just quasi-legal or illegal practices. They can, in some cultures, have a positive and socially uniting effect. Identify the patterns to see how they fit into the local culture. Who receives bribes or gratuities can also point to key individuals or power players. Additionally, just because a culture is used to paying bribes or skimming contracts, there is usually a socially acceptable limit. What seems to be the limit? (“Acceptable Means for Achieving Goals”)

What are the points of social etiquette, customs, or mores that can either enhance or harm your acceptability and effectiveness with locals?

There are many guides on this, but confirm their validity for your AO. Time spent learning what is considered polite, and what happens when customs are violated, can save lives in your AO.

How do the people of your local area get their information or news? Which sources have credibility among the local people? How do rumors start and spread? What is your feedback loop to know what the people are really thinking and saying?

U.S. forces will probably not be the most credible source of information to the locals. Even if PSYOP efforts are successful, if anything bad happens, the locals will turn to their own sources first. The population’s willingness to assist or hinder our efforts (and give you more information) will be based on their perceptions of what is going on. What they perceive (via “World View”) IS reality. Who is talking to the population of your AO? Coordinate with the PSYOP and CA folks and stay on top of what is being said, and by whom.

What is the most credible source of news/information for the people? Do local elites value a different source?

This addresses the “Formal versus Informal Communication Dynamic”—how information is supposed to be gathered and disseminated within the group versus how it really is. If the leadership elite and the membership
use different information sources, there is a potential for influencing the information one or the other receives, and through that their attitudes and behavior. It can also indicate potential divisions within the group which may be exploited.

Do the locals trust the police? Local military? U.S. Forces? Local government?

This gives more information on “World View,” “Larger and Short Term Goals,” and “Constraints.” As you develop the “Why” aspect, you may find things that fit into other belief sets.

What Do We Do With IPB Information?

These IPB questions will develop a picture of the local population’s group dynamics, and within it, the existence of individuals and sub groups who seem to be in a position to either influence the success of our operations or support opposition to them.

First, as we identify a discrete group, we compare what we know about them with the taxonomy templates. As more data about their belief sets (Table 4) and structure (Table 5) is collected, the template is refined and adjusted. The group will probably vary from the template. Variations may indicate vulnerabilities, that is, weak leadership style in a Militant group, or “Short Term Goals” which violate the “Acceptable Means of Achieving Goals” of the larger culture, etc., which can be manipulated or attacked to throw a hostile group off plan or create opportunities for communication with influential groups.

Missing data fields become Requests for Information (RFI). Inferred data also become RFI.

Second, we examine what we know about the group’s Belief Sets as revealed by the Fourteen Questions (Table 4). Determining a group’s perception of the “Preferred Means to Achieve Goals,” “Best Timing of Actions,” and what they view as “Constraints” on their actions will provide us with an idea of what they would prefer to do, the general timing of action, and how their tactics may be adapted. This will indicate opportunities for IO, either “kinetic” or informational. Again, RFI are generated to fill in gaps or confirm/deny inferences.

Applying the belief sets within the modeling process, computer-assisted or manual, will then allow us to infer preferred behaviors of the group. We then war game these preferred behaviors/courses of action as part of the MDMP to determine which of our options can best influence the group or forestall undesirable behavior. Then we conduct operations to shape the target group’s environment. If nothing else, we may be able to upset an adversary’s game plan, thereby creating a psychological asymmetry and an opportunity to gain the initiative.

After we have executed a course of action, informational or combat/security operations, re-surveying is necessary to see if it produced the desired behavior in the target group.

NOTE: Some belief sets are harder to influence/change than others, particularly “World View.” Changing belief sets requires the ability to show that the belief set is working against achieving the group goals. In pre- and post-hostility phases, we may not have the ability to control the target audience environment as fully as we can during major combat operations. A desired behavior may be too hard to achieve in the time desired, or it may be necessary to conduct “shaping” efforts to bring the target group behaviors in line with what we desire, i.e., providing information to you.

Advantages and Caveats

The authors believe the above approach has the following advantages:

- Allows a G2/S2 to begin analysis of unfamiliar groups, armed or civilian, as soon as he encounters them, to include pre-hostility planning.
- Provides insights into how groups may react to his unit’s operations.
- Provides insights on how to influence their behavior to assist in achievement of unit Lines of Operations.
- Leverages intelligence collection efforts.
- Does not require a standing data base, building what it needs “on the fly.”
Is applicable to both armed and unarmed groups, so intelligence collection efforts are integrated rather than competing.

Corresponds to, but expands the capabilities of, modeling processes used for years by experienced Intelligence Analysts and PSYOP operators.

We do, however, offer caveats. Maintaining focus on the group’s perceptions is critical and the most common failure in cross-cultural analysis (mirror-imaging). The wording of the questions which capture the belief sets must reinforce the answers that come from the target group’s perception.

Another common trap is the belief that assessments of probability equal prediction. Human behavior, according to respected researchers, cannot be predicted because of the number of uncontrollable variables. Groups are easier to analyze, but the same caveat holds. At best, we are trying to identify what the target group would prefer to do in “X” situation, normally in the range of three options. This is still helpful in that it narrows the universe of possible behaviors to manageable proportions. The mathematics behind the computer tools under development is capable of indicating strengths of belief sets or possible preferred courses of action, but these are still only probabilities.

Summary

The approach we have outlined provides a framework which allows visualization and clustering of the group structural and belief sets which influence group behavior. It enables a G2/S2 to rapidly develop a picture of groups with very different belief sets and value systems than our own, refine it, and determine how the behaviors those beliefs influence can be used to either assist his commander in the accomplishment of his mission or be minimized if they don’t. In the process, it contributes to more focused intelligence collection planning and the development of refined IO campaigns.

End Notes


Colonel (Ret) Bryan N. Karabaich has 26 years of experience in PSYOP and IO as a planner, operator, lecturer, and consultant. He was a member of the team which developed the Psychological Warfare and International Information plans for the U.S. Central Command in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and authored the PSYOP plan for NATO forces replacing the U.N. in Bosnia. Since his retirement he has served as a consultant to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, and several firms designing behavioral analysis tools. From 2000 to 2003, he supported the Battle Command Training Program and from 2003 to 2005 was a Senior Military Analyst at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, focused on Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. He holds a BA in History from New York University and an MA in Political Science from East Carolina University. He is the publisher/contributing editor of Post-Operational Analysis of Psychological Operations During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, (USSOCOM) 1992; contributing editor to Final Technical Report: Evaluation of Cross-Cultural Models for Psychological Operations (PSYOP) (Metrica Corp), 1998; Cross Cultural Negotiations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, (Center for Army Lessons Learned), 2005, and the works cited in the Endnotes. Readers may contact Mr. Karabaich at (913)651-6542 or via email at ksis@flash.net.

Dr. Jonathan D. Pfautz’ research is focused on intelligence analysis, PSYOP, practical cultural anthropology, organizational psychology, and social network analysis. He and his research team are involved in various efforts to develop tools for reasoning about the role of cultural and organization factors in human behavior. Before joining Charles River Analytics, Dr. Pfautz was a post-doctoral researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Research Lab of Electronics, where he worked on designing cognitive models of human personality and affect, and creating adaptive cognitive and psychophysical assessment technology. Dr. Pfautz received a BS and M.Eng. in Computer Science, and a BS in Cognitive Science from M.I.T. He obtained his PhD in Computer Science from Cambridge University (United Kingdom).
Insurgency, Terrorism, and Communication

by Christopher Dearing
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction
This article reviews some important terms that are often used in the media. Our current struggle against extremists involves eliminating terrorist organizations and insurgencies in places like Iraq, however there is confusion on what these terms mean. Also, while most people can tell you that groups like al-Qaeda need to be eliminated, there is general confusion on what kind of war or ‘wars’ need to be fought for this to happen. The intention of this article is to define terrorism and insurgency and give some insight into why communication and cultural awareness are important to the Intelligence Community and our struggle against violent extremism.

Insurgency or Terrorism? Does the Label Really Matter?

In an article published by the Army News Service, “terrorists” continue to attack Coalition forces as well as civilians in Iraq. The Associated Press in conjunction with CBS News printed a similar article referring to combatants in Afghanistan as “insurgents.” Likewise, MSNBC has referred to many fighters as “insurgents.” President George W. Bush defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” While by no means is this definition incorrect, there is good reason to look past the commonly held descriptions of terrorism to better differentiate it from insurgency, especially when both terms are so commonly used interchangeably.

Is there a semantic difference between the two words and (more importantly) does this difference serve any value in our Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? The answer is yes. Doctor Thomas Marks best explains both terms and pinpoints the essential difference between the two—“The key element of terrorism is the divorce of armed politics from a purported mass base, those in whose name terrorists claim to be fighting. Little or no meaningful effort goes into construction of a counter-state, which is the central activity of insurgency.” The essential difference between these two terms is the presence or absence of a mass political movement. Terrorists encapsulate their political movement (if any); insurgents embody a political movement far more extensive than what is seen in the militant branch.

Like an iceberg, the violence, car bombings, kidnappings, etc., are what we see above the surface of the water. In disgust, the human response is to label the perpetrators of these acts as “terrorists”, hoping in some way to de-legitimize the hideous nature of the acts. But in so doing we put ourselves at risk of focusing all of our energy on the small piece above the water, missing the 95 per-
cent submerged beneath. The portion beneath the water, which represents the mass political movement, is often times under-reported by the media.

The common response is to meet violence with violence as the primary focus of addressing these unsavory elements of society, unknowingly missing the strategic epicenter of the struggle which is being waged in the minds of the people. The problem, as most see it, is one of a “law-and-order” problem. Thus, “security, security, security” becomes the watchword in fixing the terrorist/insurgent problem, when in fact, the problem lies far deeper below the surface. The epicenter below the surface is the society’s infrastructure. And the battle being waged by insurgents is over whose infrastructure is more legitimate or correct; the insurgent’s infrastructure or the state’s?

This leads me to the point that there is great value in knowing what type of label to apply and how this affects the outcome of the struggle.

Terrorism and insurgency both lie in the political warfare realm, and for both, violence is a medium for communicating political terms. However, because an insurgency rides a political movement, the strategic victory lies in disarming or discrediting the political ideology/political terms that the insurgents are communicating to the masses. If you can discredit the legitimacy of the insurgent’s political platform, you discredit their use of violence as a medium for communication. Communication in this sense is more complex than words; communication in this sense is a dialogue of ideas and images clothed in cultural idioms that the target population can recognize.

Today’s GWOT requires far more than security forces. Whereas the salient parts of our fight against “terrorism” are seemingly against “pure terrorists” who lack a political movement; many of our battles overseas are being conducted in the context of local insurgencies. We are, in fact, battling al-Qaeda terrorists who are trying to ride the wave of local insurgencies and political movements. Thus, in Iraq, we may face foreign fighters with weak local sympathies but who have tried to ally themselves with locally produced fighters who represent a movement with significant support from the masses. The epicenter of our struggle is not in the law-and-order realm, even though this is the most widely seen piece. Our fight lies in reaching the masses and convincing them that the insurgents’ political platform is not in their best interest. A significant part of this fight over ideas involves knowing and using cultural idioms so that we are communicating the right message.

Cultural knowledge has been widely considered to be a topic for the Civil Affairs realm, but we need to start recognizing that it can be a force-multiplier for the combat arms as well. Training your soldiers in the culture and religion within their area of operations will give them an edge in understanding the context of their surroundings. They will not just simply be foot soldiers in a foreign land, but empowered advocates for a cause that, in many parts of the world, we are having trouble communicating.

Even though today, the use of the word “terrorist” and “insurgent” are constantly interchanged with little thought, there is a difference and the value of this difference lies in the fact that one requires simply the elimination of the violent elements and the other, a great deal more. Insurgencies are not defeated on the battlefield but in the homes of common citizens. If we do not know how to communicate with these citizens in a way that they can recognize and appreciate, then we not only prolong our struggle but we allow the enemy to gain strength despite our efforts to the contrary.

Endnotes

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Military Intelligence

by Charles R. Morrison, PhD

Introduction

Foreign cultures can be analyzed in two ways. The most common and accessible is the etic approach; the more difficult is the emic. Kenneth Pike, a linguistic anthropologist, coined these terms in 1954 to identify the distinction between those features of a language meaningful to a native speaker (emic) and those meaningful to the scientific observer (etic). Subsequently, the concept has been extended to methodological theory explaining native versus scientific analyses of other cultural phenomena, particularly analysis by cultural anthropologists influenced by Marvin Harris. All analysis of cultural information, either consciously or unconsciously, precisely or imprecisely, employs the etic-emic distinction. This article outlines the characteristics and applications of the etic-emic distinction in cultural analysis to provide a guide for Soldiers operating in the global, asymmetrical contemporary operating environment (COE).

Broadly, the difference in perspective between etic and emic analysis can be illustrated by two famous books. The etic is illustrated by Mark Twain’s humorous Innocents Abroad. Slyly, Twain offers observations on an alien culture during his 1867 tour of Damascus and Jerusalem. He describes people and places seen through the cultural lens of a cynical American observer. Thus, all he reports is exotic, strange, and peculiar (by contrast with Americans and America). The emic approach is illustrated in T.E. “Lawrence of Arabia” Lawrence’s more earnest Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Lawrence, a British intelligence officer specializing in the Middle East, attempts to represent to the reader the worldview of bedouin Arabs around 1916. His goal is to make Arab behavior patterns intelligible to the English-speaking Westerner. Lawrence tries to move beyond mere observation and get ‘inside the mind’ of Arabs.

Etic-Emic Characteristics

Pike’s distinction between the etic and the emic is simple in concept: The etic perspective (Twain’s) is “an alien view—the structuring of an outsider,” while the emic (Lawrence’s) “is domestic...an insider familiar with and participating in the system.” Twain was writing for the Western reader as the witty outsider; Lawrence wrote addressing the same audience as a serious insider. The etic-emic distinction is not only academic. It is a profound distinction when analysis of cultural intelligence is the activity, where matters of life and death are at stake. In the operational context, both etic and emic convert data about an alien culture into information relevant to mission objectives, but the two types provide different levels of discrimination, or granularity, when analysts make claims to knowledge.
The Harrisian variation of Pike’s distinction is broadly applicable to Military Intelligence and the COE. In practice, it works like this: When cultural information is processed into intelligence, the first question the evaluator must ask is, what claim to knowledge can be made? Other considerations are: How can the cultural intelligence producer claim to know what he or she claims to know? Is this intelligence based on an etic or an emic analysis of cultural information?

Intelligence, “a product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas”, 2 is based ultimately on some kind of claim to knowledge. In mission critical situations, product evaluation is nothing more than the evaluation of claims to knowledge based on analysis, and it is there that the etic-emic distinction applies. Ultimately, evaluation, interpretation, and—ideally—prediction of human behavior is a claim to knowledge of the foreign culture, either etic or emic.

The anthropologist, James Lett, has provided practical definitions of etic and emic in Harrisian terms:

**Emic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories that are regarded as meaningful and appropriate by members of the culture under study. An emic construct is correctly termed “emic” if, and only if, it is in accord with the perceptions and understandings deemed appropriate by the insider’s culture. The validation of emic knowledge (epistemology) thus becomes a matter of consensus—namely the consensus of native informants, who must agree that the construct matches the shared perceptions that are characteristic of their culture. Note that the particular research (collection) technique used in acquiring anthropological knowledge has nothing to do with the nature of that knowledge. Emic knowledge may be obtained at times through elicitation as well as observation, because it is entirely possible that native informants could possess scientifically valid knowledge.**

**Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories that are regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the community of scientific observers. An etic construct is correctly termed “etic” if, and only if, it is in accord with the epistemological principles deemed appropriate by science (i.e., etic constructs should be precise, logical comprehensive, replicable, falsifiable, and observer independent). The validation of etic knowledge thus becomes a matter of logical and empirical analysis—in particular, the logical analysis of whether the construct meets the standards of falsifiability, comprehensiveness, and logical consistency, and then the empirical analysis of whether or not the concept has been falsified and/or replicated. Again, the particular research (collection) technique that is used in the acquisition of anthropological (cultural) knowledge has no bearing on the nature of that knowledge. Etic knowledge may be obtained at times through elicitation as well as observation, because it is entirely possible that objective observers can infer native perceptions.**

Awareness of how aspects of a culture shape the COE has recently been identified through lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. “Factors such as religion, language, politics, and crime are some of the most important factors of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).” 4 Asymmetrical warfare dominates the most probable COEs in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and its attendant stability operations in foreseeable deployments: “Stability operations and support operations demand greater attention to civil considerations—the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an Area of Operations (AO)—that do the more conventional offensive and defensive operations. Commanders must expand IPB beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces or terrain but may be restoring basic services or influencing public support. Cultural information is critical to gauge the potential reactions to the operation, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the operation. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest a needed change in tactics or even strategy. Biographical information and leadership analysis are key to understanding adversaries, or potential adversaries, their methods of operation, and how they interact with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the contingency underlying the deployment are vital to mission success, preventing mission creep, and ultimately achieving the objectives of the operation.” 5

Culture is the ultimate open source where mapping the human terrain is key. “There’s another expression though that is worth remembering in terms of what has to be done out there at all levels of our command and is done by all levels of our command. We’ve talked increasingly over the last several years as we continue to move forward in Afghanistan with the idea of what we call the human terrain. The military, let’s say back in the 1980s and ‘90s, we talked
about the geographic terrain, that we fight over the hills, the forests we go through. We’re in a campaign in Afghanistan which is about stability operations, strengthening the state of Afghanistan which is about a counter-insurgency where the key terrain is the human terrain. That is, what do the people of Afghanistan think about their own security? What do they think about their government? How confident are they? So it’s those walks through their bazaars, it’s talking to the governors, it’s talking to the tribal leaders where we’re working over the human terrain of Afghanistan.”

**Training**

Most important, the nature of the Soldier’s training for most probable COEs must necessarily change through introducing CA in both kinetic and non-kinetic intelligence products. Major General Barbara G. Fast, USAIC&FH Commanding General, well understands the kind of training required by the most probable COEs. She observes that:

“A body of knowledge on culture, economics, geography, military affairs, and politics that was once in the domain of “grey-beard” scholars now rests in the hands of high school graduates.”

In most probable asymmetrical COEs, warfare includes the continuation of a cultural struggle for ideological legitimacy. A sign of the changed global operational environment is the incorporation by the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas of 136 hours of Anthropology in the Red Team Leader’s Course. A reflection of the recognition of cultural variables in most probable COEs is also found in a nascent professional specialty, Military Anthropology, and in articles appearing in the U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection. The task of the military anthropologist is similar to that of the Intelligence Analyst; the collection and processing of open source information about foreign cultures. Military Anthropology adds policy and mission objectives to constructs of cultural facts in light of military mission.

The crucial question for the evaluator of cultural intelligence is whether the product is based on etic or emic analysis of sources. If the claim is that the interpretation of information coincides with the native’s worldview, then the implicit claim is that the analysis represents a consensus of the native view—it is an emic analysis. The epistemological claim is that the analyst is making the same cultural distinctions a native makes. Such claims are best validated by native informants. Emic analysis can be therefore difficult to evaluate.

Etic analysis, by contrast, imposes templates and categories generated by the analyst to structure cultural phenomena, emphasizing knowledge acquired by participation, observation, generalization, and inference. This is the Western scientific research technique, where the “boom and buzz” of culture is structured by the observer’s (i.e., the analyst’s) worldview.

**Conclusion**

The importance of Cultural Awareness applied to intelligence in the COE lies in understanding the epistemologies of the social sciences, and it can reasonably be expected to grow in importance in the most probable COEs. The integration of Cultural Awareness training in the Professional Military Education in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools and guidance is advancing as the nature of GWOT becomes more apparent. For example: Some in the non-Western world reject Western political and cultural values. In some instances, regimes that use Western political forms of government are under attack by ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups seeking to establish or reestablish their identity. As tribal, nationalist, or religious movements compete with Western models of government, instability can increase. This instability threatens not only Western interests within the state, but often threatens to spill across borders.” Military understanding of the nature of cultural intelligence and modes of its analysis will certainly increase in importance.
Endnotes


8. FM 3-07, 1-30.

Dr. Morrison is an instructor/curriculum developer for the TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Dr. Morrison holds a BA in Anthropology from the University of New Mexico, an MA in Anthropology from the University of Arizona, and a Doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University. He has taught at the graduate level in Japan, Korea, and Arizona. His military experience was with the Army Security Agency in Korea and Colorado. He also has 27 years of federal service in agencies of the Department of the Interior as an archaeologist specializing in cultural resources management.

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The 19th Annual Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Ceremony was held at Fort Huachuca on 23 June 2006. During the ceremony, the MI Corps inducted five new members:

- Lieutenant General James C. King (U.S. Army, Retired).
- Major General Robert L. Halverson (U.S. Army, Retired).
- Colonel Jon M. Jones (Deceased).
- Lieutenant Colonel James A. Chambers (U.S. Army Retired).
- Lieutenant Colonel/SIES Thomas Dillon (U.S. Army Retired).

**Lieutenant General James C. King (U.S. Army, Retired)**

LTG James C. King distinguished himself and the MI Corps through exceptional service in the Army from June 1968 to August 2001. Throughout his exceptional career, LTG King made significant contributions to the Army, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).

LTG King received his commission through the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) as a Second Lieutenant in Military Intelligence (MI). Initially assigned to the U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA) Field Station in Hakata, Japan, he distinguished himself as a Company Commander, S1, and S3. Immediately following duty in Japan, he was assigned to the Republic of Vietnam where he assumed command of the 509th Radio Research Group, responsible for tracking North Vietnamese forces during the final days of American presence. Subsequent assignments included staff positions at NSA and in the 307th ASA Battalion in Germany, where he gained the reputation as an insightful and visionary officer who could be counted upon to provide commanders timely and relevant Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Following Command and General Staff College and graduate school, he went to the first of his two assignments at U.S. Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). Later he returned to Germany to command the 307th MI Battalion (Operations), Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI), and distinguished himself by pioneering the introduction of new tactics, techniques, and procedures to assure timely and predictive intelligence to the commander.

After graduation from the Army War College in 1988, LTG King became the Chief, MI Branch at PERSCOM where he developed procedures to better manage MI officers’ careers while ensuring that family needs were considered and met whenever appropriate. Following his assignment to PERSCOM, he was handpicked to serve as the Chief of Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA Staff in June 1989. There, he guided the development of the first modernization plan for Army intelligence systems, which remains the basis for MI system development to this day. During his tenure he made bold and visionary recommendations to senior Army leadership, Congress, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) which resulted in significantly increased funding and a more capable tactical MI force.

Following his time in Washington, LTG King assumed command of the 66th MI Brigade, Germany. Through-
out his command tenure, he reinforced his reputation for excellence—gaining well-deserved special recognition from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), for his innovation in leveraging National, Theater, and Joint capabilities to satisfy the USAREUR Commanders’ Priority Intelligence Requirements. After command, he returned to the Army Staff and served as the Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).

Selected for Brigadier General in 1993, LTG King became the Associate Deputy Director for Operations (Military Support)/Chief of Operations and Targeting Group at NSA, Fort Meade, Maryland. Again, his extensive SIGINT experience coupled with this operational assignment allowed him to refine the focus of NSA efforts in collecting and processing relevant intelligence. In August 1994, he was assigned as the Director of Intelligence (J2), U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM), at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. There, he personally spearheaded a major effort to reinvigorate critical warfighting skills and intelligence exchange programs in support of CENTCOM. Under his guidance, new Joint intelligence architectures were developed and a complete overhaul of the command’s indications and warning system was put in place. He ensured that the command’s views were included in all of the National Intelligence Estimates that dealt with Southwest Asia.

Moving to the J2, Joint Chiefs of Staff, position in 1996, he began a period of incredible challenges managing such diverse crises as the terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia to the conflict in the Balkans. With his keen ability to clarify conflicting reports, succinctly summarize problems, and recommend solutions LTG King earned the respect of the country’s senior military and civilian leadership. His promotion to Lieutenant General and appointment as the Director of NIMA were validation of his remarkable career. At NIMA he used his unique planning and programming skills to transform it into a premier combat support agency. LTG King was the driving force behind the “geospatial” concept, causing the Intelligence Community to integrate the entire spectrum of NIMA products into their planning and lexicon.

LTG King truly served the MI Corps with distinction. Very few officers have served with equal achievement in the Army, NSA, JCS, and NIMA assignments. His grasp of the intelligence profession is unparalleled and his record as a soldier and leader serve as testimony to a truly remarkable career.

Major General Robert L. Halverson (U.S. Army, Retired)

MG Halverson began his military career on August 9, 1963 as an Army ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate. His first assignment was as an assistant platoon leader for A Company, 303rd U.S. ASA Battalion. After holding successive company grade staff positions as a lieutenant, he took command of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, ASA Field Station, Herzo Base, Germany. In May 1968, he transferred to the Republic of Vietnam where he served as an Intelligence Advisor in the I Corps Tactical Zone. In January 1971, he moved to Headquarters, ASA, in Arlington, Virginia, where he served in several key staff positions. In September 1974, MG Halverson was ordered to Fort Hood, Texas, where he became the S3 of the 303rd ASA Battalion. His final active duty assignment was to serve as Commander, Special Liaison Office, Headquarters, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium from July 1977 through January 1979.

Upon leaving active duty in 1979, MG Halverson entered the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). In October 1985, he transferred to the Texas Army National Guard and was assigned to Headquarters, State Area Command (STARC). He became the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2) for the 49th Armored Division (NG) in May 1988. After completing this assignment, he transferred back to STARC, where he successively served as Chief of Military Support; Chief of Mobilization and Readiness; Chief of Plans, Operations, and Training; and finally as the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General. In October 1994, he returned to the 49th Armored Division as the Chief of Staff, and then transferred to the position of Chief of Staff, 71st Troop Command in April 1995. He became Deputy Commander, 71st Troop Command, in April 1996.

In August 1997, then BG Halverson, became the Deputy Commander for Support, 49th Armed Division.
Promoted to MG, he assumed command of the 49th Armored Division in September 1998. From March to October 2000, MG Halverson commanded Multi-National Division (North), Stabilization Force 7 located in Bosnia-Herzegovina comprised of the 49th Division Headquarters, Signal Battalion, and Engineer elements, as well as the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Upon his return to Texas, he continued his command of the 49th Armored Division during mobilization for airport security throughout Texas and security of sites in multiple states following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States. MG Halverson concluded his military career in March 2002. Following retirement, he continues to serve as a mentor for other National Guard division and brigade commanders and staffs preparing for their missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina which have included the 29th Division (Maryland), 28th Division (Pennsylvania), 35th Division (Kansas), 34th Division (Minnesota), and 38th Division (Indiana) for their respective peacekeeping missions.

In addition to his military service, Mr. Halverson worked for the State of Texas for nearly 20 years. He served in the Governor’s Division of Emergency Management where he was responsible for all aspects of planning, preparation, and response for emergencies and disasters. He also served in the Department of Insurance as the Deputy Insurance Commissioner for Safety where he oversaw all safety and loss-prevention programs of insurance companies doing business in Texas. He retired from his career with the State of Texas in August 1998.

Colonel Jon M. Jones (U.S. Army, Deceased)

Commissioned as an intelligence officer in 1980, Colonel Jon M. Jones went on to serve successive tours of duty in increasingly responsible positions. He became one of the Army’s premier experts in the planning and development of Army doctrine supporting the multi-discipline intelligence role in combat intelligence operations. Progressively increasing responsibility in tours of duty with intelligence commands, divisions, installation staff, and the Joint staff resulted in his achieving recognized expertise in the field of tactical and operational intelligence systems.

In 1998, Colonel Jones was selected to command the 751st MI Battalion, an elite intelligence battalion in one of our Army’s most sensitive areas—Korea. There he commanded approximately 425 soldiers, Department of Army civilians, civilian contractors, Korean nationals, and Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program personnel. Handpicked to assume command of this most demanding and highly visible organization, he was personally responsible for the maintenance and management operations of the three remote detachments located along the Demilitarized Zone, a helicopter detachment, and a $3.8 million budget. Under his leadership, the battalion consistently set the standard on how to train for war while executing intelligence operations. Shortly after taking command, his battalion exceeded all quantifiable standards in maintenance, supply, and training readiness by winning the Army’s Maintenance Excellence Award in Fiscal Year 1999. Through his tireless and selfless efforts, his battalion also received recognition as the major command nominee for the DA Supply Excellence Award and the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) Connelly competitions.

Because of his superb performance in a multitude of diversified and extremely challenging assignments, he was chosen for assignment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Deputy Information Operations (IO), Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA), J3. As Deputy IO, JWCA, he authored and orchestrated three Joint Requirements Oversight Council issues that significantly improved the combatant commanders’ ability to execute IO missions. Additionally, he was the primary architect and coordinator on Joint Staff initiatives to improve the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) ability to protect and defend computer networks and systems. A natural leader with a take-charge attitude, Colonel Jones made things happen.

In June 2002, Colonel Jones was selected to command the 513th MI Brigade at Fort Gordon, Georgia. He effectively led this elite organization of soldiers and civilians based in five states and forward-deployed in seven countries. An integral part of his character as commander was his overwhelming commitment to caring for both his soldiers and their families. As a brigade commander, Colonel Jones was consistently focused on the task at hand and understood the requirements of the Army’s warfighters to ensure success while engaged in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). His initiatives were extremely impor-
tant given the nation’s participation in the Global War On Terrorism. He knew the Army, the intelligence systems that support our forces, and where to apply his personal leadership.

Colonel Jones met every challenge as the 513th MI Brigade Commander; the Army’s only deployable, echelons-above-corps, contingency force-projection Brigade. He worked tirelessly to conduct ground and airborne multi-discipline intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) support to force protection and counter-drug operations directly supporting the Commander, 3d United States Army; CENTCOM; Army component commanders of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); and other commands. He synergized and engaged his entire command in supporting Army Intelligence operations around the globe, providing real-time high-payoff intelligence operations support to Army warfighters actively engaged in the GWOT.

Colonel Jones was a tremendous leader commanding one of the Army’s most diverse and complex brigades. He superlatively led more than 2,400 soldiers and civilians into battle during OIF, ensuring all personnel received the proper training and had the necessary equipment facilitating mission success. A leader with great instincts, he laid the groundwork for Coalition Forces intelligence successes by forging multidiscipline, "space-to-mud" intelligence architectures. As a result of his direct involvement and intuitive understanding of intelligence operations, COL Jones made the interagency, joint service "Intelligence Exploitation Base" viable through vision, teambuilding, and determined focus on Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) and higher priorities. His conceptualization of the wider sensitive-site exploitation mission was the foundation for the Exploitation Task Force to which he provided dedicated intelligence support for the entire campaign. He aggressively pushed brigade collection capabilities to pivotal positions on the battlefield, supporting and reinforcing units in direct contact with the enemy, contributing to the successful OIF outcome. Colonel Jones personally molded the Joint Analysis and Control Element into the theater’s premier intelligence fusion center. He truly made a significant difference in the planning, execution, and employment of critical intelligence systems. His exemplary performance of duty earned him accolades and respect throughout the CENTCOM chain of command and from warfighters on the battlefield.

Colonel Jones passed away unexpectedly on 6 June 2004 while leading his soldiers through one of the most challenging times in our nation’s history. A Soldier’s Soldier, Colonel Jones never relinquished America’s Guidon of Freedom and never lost sight of his responsibility to lead, train, and mentor soldiers.

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Chambers (U.S. Army, Retired)

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) James A. Chambers entered the Army as a private in April 1955, spending nearly four years as an enlisted soldier. After studying Polish at the Army Language School, he attended the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, and was assigned to the 1st Infantry Regiment at West Point. He reenlisted in 1958 and attended the Infantry Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia, where he graduated third in his class. Following OCS, he attended both the Ranger and Airborne Schools. His first assignment as a commissioned officer was with the 507th U.S. ASA Group, Germany, where he served as a platoon leader, Executive Officer, and Company Commander. In 1960, he volunteered for Special Forces (SF) duty at Bad Tolz, Germany where he commanded the 12th Radio Research Unit, later designated the 402d ASA Special Operations Detachment (SOD).

After attending the Advanced Officer Course and Special Forces Officer Course, he was assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to command the 403d ASA SOD, 7th SF Group. While in command, he deployed to the Dominican Republic in support of combat operations in 1965. Returning to Fort Bragg, he was detailed to assist in the formation of the 3d SF Group. Upon returning to the 7th SFG, he served as the Executive Officer, Detachment B5, and then in succession as the S3, S2, and S1 of a C Team.

Assigned to the 5th SFG in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in 1966, he served as the Assistant Group S2, followed by assignment as the S2 of Project Delta participating in numerous interdiction operations throughout Vietnam. Following his first tour in Vietnam, he served as a Communications Intelligence Staff Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In 1968, he returned to
Vietnam with the 4th Infantry Division, initially as an Assistant G3 and Assistant G2, followed by assignment as the Commander, 4th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID). In 1969, he returned to Fort Bragg where he commanded the 82d MID, 82d Airborne Division, until his selection for the Command and General Staff College and a Boot Strap assignment at Saint Mary’s College in 1971. After completing his degree, he was assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) Doctrine and Literature Division.

Upon retiring from the U.S. Army on 31 October 1975, Mr. Chambers chose to continue to serve the Army as an Army Civilian. During this period he contributed to the development of several important MI doctrine and training manuals, to include completing Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations and many training circulars to assist MI’s transition to the Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) organization. In 1982, he was the key author of MI’s first Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Mission Area Analysis (MAA). This extensive study of the tactical intelligence mission area served as the basis for the acquisition of numerous crucial future systems including the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs), various manned aerial collection systems, as well as ground systems such as Prophet. From 1977 to 1997, Mr. Chambers was the Activity Career Program Manager for the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) and its predecessor. In this position, he played a critical role in the development and management of all civilian intelligence personnel and training programs.

He was directly responsible to the Commander, USAIC, for the review actions that opened 1,500 officer, warrant officer, and enlisted positions in divisional and corps units to women. Likewise, on two successive occasions during the late 1980s, the Armor Branch (followed by other branches) attempted to change G2 and S2 positions from fill by MI officers to their basic branch officers. He developed compelling arguments against this change as well as strategies to increase the fill of MI battalion and squadron S2 positions with qualified MI officers. Ultimately, no single person has done more than Jim Chambers to implement and promote the establishment of the MI Corps under the Army’s Regimental System.

One of his longest lasting contributions to the MI Corps has been the establishment of the MI Corps Hall of Fame program. His many past actions brought the Hall of Fame from an inauspicious beginning held in the foyer of Alvarado Hall using a few folding chairs to the inspirational program that is now the standard.

Another enduring and significant action he took in support of the MI Corps, was to keep a failing and defunct MI Museum Foundation alive, if only on paper, until the MI Corps Association (MICA) formed in 1994. This action kept the archives stored in a safe location and retained the foundation’s treasury for use in the establishment of the MI Museum. He served as one of MICA’s first elected officers and continues to work selflessly to ensure the best for our MI Soldiers and their families.

Over the past five decades, Mr. James Chambers (as a Lieutenant Colonel and subsequently as an Army Civilian) has consistently made enormous contributions to the Military Intelligence Corps. His dedication, loyalty, and pride in our Corps are legendary. His legacy lives on in virtually everything associated with MI today.

Lieutenant Colonel/SIES Thomas Dillon (U.S. Army Retired)

LTC Dillon’s Army career began as an Infantry platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division. In 1960, he entered the intelligence field, where he was trained as a Counterintelligence (CI) officer and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) case officer. Throughout the 1960s, He served with distinction in a number of critical CI and HUMINT assignments in Munich and Berlin, Germany, where he led teams conducting clandestine HUMINT collection against the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations. Following two tours of duty in the Republic of Vietnam, he was reassigned to Bangkok, Thailand. There, he served as a commander until 1975 responsible for running controlled Army HUMINT collection operations throughout Southeast Asia.

Mr. Dillon retired from the Army in 1975 as a lieutenant colonel, but soon returned to his nation’s service as a civilian Army intelligence officer. In this capacity he was assigned to Germany in 1976, where he served in a series
of assignments of ever-increasing responsibility culminating as the Senior U.S. Army Europe Intelligence Liaison Officer to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1981 to 1985. Subsequently, he assumed the position of HUMINT Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I) at the Pentagon. In this role he provided oversight on all Defense HUMINT activities and developed new policies regarding HUMINT support to drug interdiction and Special Operations.

In 1989, Mr. Dillon returned to Germany, this time as the Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe. With the fall of the Soviet Union and breakup of the Warsaw Pact, HUMINT efforts in Europe posed unique challenges and opportunities for Army collection efforts. Our changing relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany in these turbulent years greatly exacerbated these challenges. Mr. Dillon was the Army’s key player in managing this unique and evolving relationship, personally working with senior German intelligence and security officials to guide the relationship to ever more productive Joint endeavors. His efforts were widely acknowledged in the highest circles, resulting in his receipt of the Gold Cross of Honor from the Federal Republic of Germany in 1995.

Upon returning to the United States, Mr. Dillon was given a lead in the transition and establishment of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). He oversaw restructuring of the entire DHS collection operations program, ensuring that collection was redirected quickly to respond to new challenges brought about by asymmetric threats and those facing our military commanders. His extraordinary operational accomplishments in reshaping DH operations made critical contributions in such priority areas as U.S. assessments of Russian and Chinese weapons of mass destruction capabilities; protection of U.S. interests from terrorist activities; information operations, and “on-the-ground” intelligence support to deployed forces in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. In Bosnia, he deployed DH operational personnel before the signing of the Dayton Accords in order to prepare the U.S. sector for the introduction of U.S. peace-keeping forces. Mr. Dillon then constructed a complex and highly classified intelligence collection capability in the region to continue to ensure the safety of U.S. forces.

He is singularly responsible for fostering unprecedented cooperation between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and its sister intelligence organizations. He worked closely with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the National Reconnaissance Officer (NRO), forging a partnership which greatly improved the level of commitment, integration, and effectiveness of Joint operations. Mr. Dillon also partnered with many foreign governments in the establishment of Joint, multilateral, and bilateral collection programs that resulted in the furthering of U.S. national objectives.

Recognizing the demands that the GWOT would place upon the Army’s tactical forces, Mr. Dillon moved quickly to reconstitute an organic Army HUMINT capability, which had been largely disestablished after the standup of DHS in 1995. He secured the necessary resources to allow immediate reestablishment of this capability, and through his leadership, secured additional resources setting the conditions for it to nearly triple in size by fiscal year 2008. This reinvigorated intelligence organization, known as the Army Operational Activity, achieved an initial operating capability in early 2003. His establishment of this Army HUMINT capability is credited with going a long way towards meeting commanders’ critical intelligence requirements while fusing HUMINT collection assets with tactical and Special Operations forces.

During this period Mr. Dillon additionally spearheaded a complete transformation of the Army’s CI efforts. In cooperation with the newly established Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), sister Services, and other U.S. Intelligence Community agencies, he implemented several major initiatives in response to the GWOT. Among these was establishment of worldwide CI Force Protection Detachments to work with host nation intelligence and security services in providing crucial force protection information to troops in transit through potentially hostile regions. Another was the placement of Army CI agents in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the United States, enabling a complete interagency effort to be brought to bear in the GWOT.

Another illustration of Mr. Dillon’s achievements was his establishment of the Army Research and Technology Protection Center (ARTPC). The ARTPC mission is to ensure that critical enabling technologies are safeguarded from exposure and that the U.S. military maintains its technological edge over all adversaries. This effort has become the model throughout the DOD on how to provide an integrated effort to ensure safeguarding of critical technologies. Combining CI, security, and engineering expertise into one organization, the ARTPC brings together the Research and Development (R&D), acquisition, and the CI communities in order to identify and protect critical tech-
nologies early in their lifecycles from compromise. These efforts are ensuring that the expenditure of billions of dollars in military R&D and procurement are not in vain and, as importantly, will ensure that U.S. Soldiers in combat continue to have overwhelming technological superiority against any foe.

With a career spanning over four decades, Mr. Dillon has remained a strategic thinker, leader, manager, and doer who has used his considerable talents in the service of our nation, DOD, the Military Intelligence Corps, and the United States Army.

Read any good books lately?

We welcome reviews of books related to Intelligence or Military History. Please review our list of available books and book review submission standards under the Professional Reader Program at www.umi-online.us/mipb. Email your book reviews along with your contact information to mipb@hua.army.mil.

Unit Profiles

Tell us about your unit. Please send us a write-up with the following items and information:

- High resolution color photographs or high resolution soft copy (preferred) of the unit crest.
- History of the unit to include campaigns and decorations.
- Current unit subordination, status and mission (unclassified).
- Operations your unit has supported in the last 15 to 20 years.
- Recent special accomplishments or activities that make your unit unique.
- Images of specialized equipment (unclassified).
- POC name, email address and phone numbers for this project.
- Full unit mailing address.
- Other information you would like included, not listed above.

In order to allow our graphics designer time to create your unit crest, please send the any photographs at the earliest possible time to:

ATTN ATZS-CDI-DM
USAIC&Ft. Huachuca
550 Cibeque St.
Bldg 61730, Room 124
Ft. Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017

Please send the soft copy crest and the unit write-up to mipb@hua.army.mil.
A “stampless” envelope with “Free” postage marking, this item was sent from the “Copacabana Palace, Rio de Janeiro” (on reverse) to an officer in Arlington, VA. It was sent from Lieutenant Colonel Barclay via the MIS (Military Intelligence Service) Mail Room Pentagon. Note the four line return address “War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington.

Sealed at left side with US Censor tape “EXAMINED BY 2972”, this is an example of a rare item from a British Intelligence Officer operating out of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Front of envelope.  
Reverse of envelope.

Mark Sommer holds a BA in Political Science from Yeshiva University and an MA in International Relations from Fairleigh Dickinson University. He teaches at Stevens Institute of Technology in the Humanities Department. His published works in the intelligence field include: “Getting the Message Through: Clandestine Mail and Postage Stamps,” MIPB, October-December, 1992 and “Undercover Addresses of World War II,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Fall 1993.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF). Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians who have served in a U.S. Army Intelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, Futures Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (HOF), 110 Rhea Avenue, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7080, or call commercial (520) 533-1180, DSN 821-1180, or via email at OCMI@hua.army.mil.
When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence and Intelligence Communities (IC).

Articles about current operations and exercises; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles.
- Although MIPB targets themes, you do not need to “write” to a theme.
- Please note that submissions become property of MIPB and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

What we need from you:

- A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified/FOUO. Once we receive your article, we will send you a sample form to be completed by your security personnel.
- A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
- Your article in MS Word. Do not use special document templates.
- A Public Affairs release if your installation or unit/agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.

We will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for MIPB. From time to time, we will contact you during the editing process to ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Send articles and graphics to MIPB@hua.army.mil or by mail on disk to:

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If you have any questions, please email us at MIPB@hua.army.mil or call 520.538.0956/DSN 879.0956. Our fax is 520.533.9971.

### Upcoming Themes and Deadlines

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COL Stewart, CSM Rodriguez, distinguished guests, family and friends, and students of the Community Imagery Analysis Course. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.

As the Sergeant Major of the Army, I spend much of my time traveling to posts, bases, camps and stations, visiting Soldiers and their families. Currently, we have more than 235,000 Soldiers deployed to over 120 countries. It is no secret that we are a busy Army. I travel to the AOR quite frequently to talk to not only Soldiers but to service members deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and the Horn of Africa. I was the Command Sergeant Major of V Corps and Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Baghdad in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Every time I travel back to Iraq to visit Soldiers I see incredible progress, and that is due to the hard work of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of Defense Civilians.

The United States military is vastly different today from the one I joined in the 1970s. Back then we were a ‘threat-based’ organization, designed to defend against a specific threat—the threat of the Soviet Union on a traditional battlefield. Today, we are a ‘capabilities-based’ force, focused on building a wide range of capabilities to fight on an asymmetric battlefield against an unpredictable enemy. We are taking the fight to the enemy in this Global War on Terrorism. The enemy is constantly changing his tactics, techniques, and procedures and we must also adapt to successfully defeat our enemy. Soldiers and service members forward deployed are proving our adaptability every day.

Sergeant Elizabeth Leroux, an Imagery Analyst from the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion out of Wiesbaden, Germany, is a stellar example of the type of Soldiers we have in our Army today. SGT Leroux is currently deployed to Iraq and was providing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support during a raid on an insurgent ‘safe house’. It seemed like an ordinary raid but the situation quickly changed when she spotted two insurgents who ran out of the house into a small shed. The insurgents climbed on top of the shed roof and hid.

The Soldiers on the ground did their sweep of the area but could not find the insurgents. SGT Leroux directed the payload operator to the shed and pointed out a hidden entrance on the roof to the team on the ground. The raid team apprehended the insurgents without firing a shot.

Just last week, Private First Class Katherine Baker, an Imagery Analyst from the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion, provided force protection for President Bush’s unannounced visit to Iraq. This young Soldier provided operational over-watch using UAV imagery, monitoring the surrounding area for any unusual activity. We now know the President’s visit was a safe one, thanks to Soldiers like PFC Baker.

Examples like these prove that your job is an extremely important one in today’s Global War on Terrorism. Every mission our service members undertake relies on intelligence and how quickly we can exploit and integrate it into our current operations.

This graduation marks a significant day for all of you. You have just completed 11 weeks of intermediate Imagery Analysis training. This course has helped you bridge the gap from entry-level imagery identification to critical thinking and analysis. Those types of skills are crucial as you lead and mentor young Soldiers and service members at your home stations.

Our military today is more ‘Joint’ than it ever has been. In this class alone, you have nine Soldiers, two Airmen, two Sailors, one Marine and one Civilian. That is a good representation of our Armed Forces. There is also a lot of deployment experience in this class. These professionals have deployed to places such as Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Qatar. Your experience is invaluable to our Armed Forces.

The media has said that Task Force 145, the Special Operations task force that received most of the credit for capturing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is the ‘unblinking eye’. I would also say that intelligence professionals such as yourselves are also an ‘unblinking eye’ that will eventually track down all the terrorist leaders that want to do us harm.

Providing real-time intelligence and imagery to our commanders and troops on the ground and to the pilots in the air is crucial to winning the Global War on Terror. I can tell you from the senior leader perspective that the work you do everyday is priceless.

There is no doubt that our Navy and Marine Corps are second to none; that the Air Force rules the skies; and that we have the most powerful Army in the world. Together, our Armed Forces stand alone in the world, providing a deterrent to rogue nations, or if needed, to be an overwhelming force to defeat any enemy on any battlefield.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.

I wish you the best of luck and Godspeed as you depart Fort Belvoir for your duty station following graduation today. God bless you and your families, God bless the United States Armed Forces, and God bless all of our deployed service members. Hooah!