From the Editor

This quarter’s issue has a range of articles focusing on the changing and divergent missions and operational requirements today’s Military Intelligence units have acquired and how they have adapted to the new environments and expectations. The Commando Perspective: DISE Operations in Support of OIF II discusses the organizational streamlining of the 2/10th Mountain Division’s DISE to better support the brigade commander’s intelligence needs. A 10th Mountain Division initiative in ES2 training is discussed in 10th Mountain (LI) Division ES2 Training: Fusing Language, Cultural Awareness, and Tactical Questioning for Dominant Battlespace Awareness. The new face of the U.S. Army Reserve’s intelligence assets is examined in The Military Intelligence Readiness Command. This unique organization tailors USAR intelligence resources by providing trained and ready Soldiers; teams and units, and state-of-the-art production facilities to meet commanders’ requirements. Allied officers are being assigned to the 650th MI Group (CI) converting it to a multinational unit. The article, 650th MI Group Pioneers Multinational Counterintelligence in NATO, offers a new model for the CI community. An MI battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division rises to a unique challenge in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in Task Force Crimson Dragon: The 313th Military Intelligence Battalion Deploys to Hurricane Katrina. Intelligence Support to the Special Forces Group: Time for Change proposes changes in the organization, recruiting, retention, and training at the SF group level to better support Group commanders and supported battalions. An article, China and the Future of Economic Warfare, derived from open sources discusses the complex economic environment of our world.

MIPB is now available online at Intelink-SBU as well as the University of Military Intelligence. Information on obtaining an account is inside this issue.

We would like to profile your unit in upcoming issues. Information on how to submit your unit’s information is inside this issue.

The MIPB Book Review program is up and running again. Check out our selection of books and how to submit a review at www.umi-online.us/mipb.

Sterilla A. Smith
Managing Editor
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The theme of this quarter’s MIPB is “Diversity”—not the normal use of the term diversity as it would pertain to population demographics—but a broader look at the “diverse” nature of the Military Intelligence (MI) mission. With this theme as a backdrop, I will discuss how the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) is transforming to better meet the challenges faced in the new contemporary operating environment. With the Army fully engaged in war, it is absolutely critical that our generating forces keep pace with the needs of the operational force, and reflect the realities faced by our soldiers operating across the globe.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is undergoing a great period of transformation and is changing to become more flexible, efficient, and adaptive to conditions faced in the current environment. As a critical part of this institutional adaptation, USAIC&FH is well postured to execute the transition to the functional Intelligence Center of Excellence (COE). In this context, we are the Army’s principal agent to synchronize the Army’s Intelligence related doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) efforts and to lead the efforts in working closely with the other centers to coordinate and integrate across the intelligence warfighting function. This function “includes those tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).” 1 We are prepared, as appropriate, to synchronize our efforts with the Joint and National ISR community to ensure Army operational intelligence requirements are fully integrated within the larger intelligence enterprise and to ensure we can operate in a Joint, inter-agency, and multi-national environment.

As we execute the planning for and transition to the COE structure, there are a number of issues that we will address to meet TRADOC’s guidance for the transformation and to execute in a manner consistent with the Chief of Staff of the Army’s intent. At the National, Joint, and sister service levels, ISR is the recognized doctrinal and conceptual foundation for the conduct of the intelligence function. As such, we will become TRADOC’s “one voice” when dealing with the National and Joint ISR community and we will coordinate with the other centers to develop an effective and efficient approach to synchronizing Army full spectrum ISR efforts. While not the proponent of all ISR assets, we are functionally prepared to take the initiative in conducting both lateral and horizontal integration of a number of multi-center intelligence and ISR related issues. This will provide a better synchronized and more effective integration of operations and intelligence and will be a significant step in eliminating the existing “stovepipes” in the current intelligence system. We will also assist in synchronizing critical intelligence issues that will facilitate Joint ISR integration and provide a more effective platform for improving the Army’s current and future intelligence capabilities.

As the Intelligence COE, one of our roles is to provide the focused and continuous horizontal coordination of Joint/National ISR issues between centers. We are also capable of acting as the TRADOC center for coordinating with the Joint and sister service communities on specific ISR DOTLMPF issues. Just as Fort Benning, as the Maneuver COE, will coordinate closely with Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Rucker, and Fort Sill, etc. for maneuver related issues; the Intelligence COE must work closely with and synchronize the efforts of the
I would like to first thank Major General Fast for her trust and confidence in my selection and for giving me this opportunity to serve in such an awesome capacity. It is both a privilege and an honor for me to assume the duties as the Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) and the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps. I proudly accept the responsibility inherent in this post.

I tell people I’m just a soldier, just like you, except that I have a different job with different responsibilities. I think I’m an extrovert, I like talking to people and I like communicating with people. The key to success, I believe, is good communication skills—sitting down with soldiers, talking and counseling. I’ve been doing that for many years and I love it.

It is a dynamic time to be in our Army and be a part of the MI profession. The MI Corps is currently participating in several initiatives as we transform to the Modular force: Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 33W (MI Systems Maintainer/Integrator) functions; Iraq/Afghanistan Transition team manning requirements; adjustments to additional skill identifiers (ASIs) courses; integration of lessons learned into our training; transition of UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) assets to the Aviation branch; and MI MOS issues.

Updates

**MOS 33W.** The 33W functional study is complete. The results of the study indicated that man-hours alone did not adequately support the required number of 33Ws to accomplish the mission. This is largely due to the non-standard equipment used in our organizations and the increase in integration tasks for this MOS. The concept of authorizing 33Ws by function is in development and will begin with the 288th MI Battalion design. The current authorization proposal based on functions performed in the 288th MI Battalion design is six 33Ws versus the one position authorized according to maintenance man-hours.

The MI and Aviation branches have agreed that MOS 33W Soldiers will continue to support the UAS maintenance requirement until such time as the MOS 15J (OH-58D Armament/Electrical/Avionics Systems Repairer) Soldiers are properly trained with the additional skill identifiers (ASIs) U2 (Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Repairer) and U3 (Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Repairer) to fill the required positions. Aviation branch is expected to assume 100 percent of the UAS maintenance mission in 2009.

**Iraq/Afghanistan Transition Team requirements.** The high personnel demand on several MOSs to fill the requirement for the Iraq and Afghanistan Transition teams. We continue to provide MI professionals to support the Iraq Transition Team mission. The majority of these positions are being filled by MOS 96B (Intelligence Analyst) Soldiers. Soldiers on the Transition team assignment have the option to either leave their families at their current station or send them to their home of record (similar to short tour criteria.)

**Adjustments to ASI courses.** Functional courses such as the ASAS Master Analyst Course (ASI 1F) are under review to make them more relevant in supporting MI capabilities; tactics, techniques, and procedures, and equipment utilized today and to determine which MOSs should attend the course. Keeping our training current and relevant is a never ending process. The 1F Course is no exception. We are looking for this course to evolve to include the needed skills to utilize the Distributed Common Ground Systems/Joint Intelligence
The Army is considering policy changes to the Warrant Officer (WO) accession program, moving the accession point from the current 12 year Active Federal Service (AFS) to 5 to 8 year AFS. The main intent of this initiative is to increase the WO applicant pool. This was a goal first recommended by the Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS) in 1985 and validated by every WO study since then. I understand that without context this action does not make sense and it could be an emotional issue for some. Whether there is agreement or not, it is very important that the reader understand the bigger overarching plan shaping the future of the Army WO cohort.

In this column, I will present the background and explain the impact of lowering the WO accession point to the 5 to 8 year AFS. Before continuing, I would like to make two observations up front:

- This is an Army wide policy change affecting the entire WO cohort across all branches and not just Military Intelligence (MI).
- Until the MI WO shortage problem is fixed, we will continue to accept applications from fully qualified noncommissioned officers (NCOs) up to the 12th year of AFS.

Why change?

The belief that the old accession guidelines seemed to work just fine is wrong. Unfortunately many prevailing opinions about WOs are based on out-of-date “Cold-War” era notions and not on current realities. Until recently NCOs with between 10 to 14 years in service were the primary source of candidates for the WO program. The reality is that there are not enough NCOs in this group to support the high demand for WOs. Failure to open the accessions pool to younger NCOs will exacerbate the shortages of officer technicians in our force.

Moreover, there is a prevailing opinion that younger NCOs do not have the experience to qualify for the WO program. Although each applicant must be evaluated on his or her own merit; as a general rule, the NCOs currently in the 5 to 8 year AFS category have deployed to combat, are more flexible, and can learn faster than the older generations. Because of this, the Army will make a conscious decision to trade experience for quality and thus provided a long-term solution to a persistent problem.

The main problem is that the Army has a shortage of technical service Chief Warrant Officer Fours (CW4s). A significant number of experienced technical service WOs retire before they are promoted to the rank of CW4. In fact, many may not even reach the rank of CW3 before they make the retirement decision. This remains true with the MI Corps where many of our WO Military Occupational Specialties suffer from severe and persistent shortage of CW4s.

An observation documented during the TWOS in 1985 was that the majority of Soldiers (commissioned officers, WOs, and NCOs) retire between 20 to 23 years in the service. This trend has been validated by every WO study since: The WO Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP), 1993; The WO Personnel Management Study (WOPMS), 1999; The Army Training and Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP), 2002, and The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), 2006. According to these studies, approximately 50
percent of the WO cohort retires during their 20th year with the majority of the remaining WOs retiring between 21 and 22 years. These numbers are dramatic and will probably not change in the foreseeable future. The reasons are many (second career, kids in college, want a change, etc).

To compound this issue (and the real root of the problem), technical WOs were being accessed around their 10th to 14th year of service. These two facts (retirement at 20 years and late accessions) combined to form an average technical WO life cycle of only 6 to 10 years. The TWOS recognized this problem and attempted to rectify it by adding the grade of CW5, creating a 30-year WO career lifecycle model, and by lowering the WO accession point goal to between 5 and eight years of service. While the new rank has indeed persuaded some to remain longer, the inventory of senior WOs has not been sufficient to meet the senior requirements. The Army will not grow a healthy WO cohort without changing this trend.

**What is changing?**

The long-term Army strategy is to lower the WO accession point to 5 to 8 years in service. Of course time-in-service waivers will continue to be considered for high quality applicants and special cases, but the majority of the applicants will be from the younger NCO group. Accomplishing this step should lead to a younger and deeper WO applicant pool, which will result in extending the WO lifecycle. The recommended lifecycle would offer newly accessed WOs the opportunity to become a CW4 prior to becoming eligible for retirement. It is the right thing to do in order to ensure the future health of the WO cohort.

In the short term, policy changes were introduced to entice more CW3s to remain in service and stabilize the exodus of these experienced officers until the long term solution was implemented. These changes include (but are not limited to):

- WO education redesign.
- WO pay initiatives.
- WO retention and accession bonuses.
- Alternate WO accession methodologies in shortage fields.
- Changes to WO promotion zones.

There has never been a higher demand for WOs. The Army realizes the important functions that the WO fulfills and has taken positive steps to ensure the survival of this specialized Officer group. The change of the WO accession point to the 5 to 8 year point is critical to the long term health of this Officer cohort. I know that the benefits of these changes will not be apparent for many years and that much work remains to be done. It is the right thing to do for our Army.

**References:**

Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS), Final Report, 1985.

“Remember the past but look to the future”
key stakeholders on ISR issues. USAIC&FH and the TcM Ground Sensors are currently the TRADOC cross-proponent and capabilities management leads institutionalizing the Army’s critical Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED) effort across the DOTLMPF and interfacing with our sister services and the Joint IED Defeat Task Force, and represent an existing model on which we can build our horizontal synchronization process.

USAIC&FH Critical Training Initiatives

We are integrating training efforts through the Joint and National Intelligence Community. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is a key focus area. Under direction of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, we established the HUMINT Training—Joint Center of Excellence (HT–JCOE) which provides HUMINT training to military and civilian personnel from all services. HT-JCOE also includes the Department of Defense Advanced HUMINT Source Operations Course (ASOC). Additional courses will be added to the HT-JCOE such as the Defense Strategic Debriefing Course, the Enhanced Analysis and Interrogation Training Course, and the Joint Interrogator Certification Course (JICC). The JICC trains Department of Defense military, civilian, and contract personnel to serve as certified interrogators in theater-level facilities.

Fort Huachuca’s establishment of the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) is another good example of our ability to horizontally and vertically integrate critical training initiatives. The TCC, designated as the TRADOC lead for Cultural Awareness Training, developed Cultural Awareness Training Support Packages for all levels of professional military education—Initial Military Training through the MI Captains Career Course—to begin implementation in fiscal year 2006. The TCC has also deployed the TRADOC classroom to the field by sending Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to support our operational Army. To date, the MTTs have trained over 10,000 Soldiers and Marines. Finally, the TCC is proud of its aggressive outreach program, actively partnering with a number of academic, private, defense, and governmental organizations specializing in Cultural Studies.

We’re in the midst of working with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and the U.S. Army Engineer School to develop a strategy for Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) that capitalizes on advanced technology and processes to realize a tactical to strategic GEOINT capability. The GEOINT Enterprise, based on the National Security Agency model, will benefit the warfighter with increased speed, context, accuracy, depth, and synchronization of intelligence. In anticipation, USAIC already has modified training in record time. GEOINT training now consists of an Imagery Analysis section working in an integrated collaborative Analysis and Control Element (ACE) environment while simultaneously exploiting Full Motion Video and Moving Target Indicator radar returns; cross-cueing multiple sensors (Unmanned Aerial System and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System), and writing reports with a Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) concept design where soldiers write digital reports and produce Imagery Derived Products.

Our Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JI-CTC) illustrates our capability to integrate tactical through National intelligence training efforts here at the Intelligence Center in line with our core competencies and functions. The JI-CTC provides MI Soldiers a realistic and tough training environment simulating conditions at the brigade and battalion level using a contemporary operating environment scenario. The focus is to provide Intelligence Soldiers the most realistic training possible prior to entering a Tactical Operations Center in a combat environment. We have recently designated the training conducted at the JI-CTC as the Capstone training event for all Intelligence Analysts (MOS 96B Skill Levels 10 to 40), Imagery Analysts, Imagery Ground Station operators, all MI NCOs attending ANCOC, and warrant officers, lieutenants, and captains attending their basic and specific career development training courses.

The recent integration of Joint Intelligence Operations Center/Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (JIOC/DCGS-A) into the training environment significantly improves this unique training opportunity, allowing students to use Analyst Notebook, ARC View GIS, and Pathfinder to gain experience on the most up-to-date analytical tools while participating in a Battlefield Simulation Exercise. To ensure this exercise remains current
and relevant, training is supported by the USAIC&FH Lessons Learned Team. The contemporary operating environment scenario used at JI-CTC is primarily focused at the brigade combat team and battalion level; however, we are increasing the number of intelligence disciplines that participate in the exercise.

**ISR Lessons Learned**

As the Intelligence COE, I believe we are in a position to enhance the unity of effort for ISR related Lessons Learned horizontally within the TRADOC COE system. Given the maturity and effectiveness of the USAIC&FH Lessons Learned (LL) process, the Intelligence COE provides TRADOC a ready capability to support and be responsive to the Operational Army in integrating Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF and OEF) ISR lessons learned. After action reports from OIF and OEF indicate a critical need for the Army to better understand, operationalize, and execute ISR in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Recent USAIC&FH LL team interviews highlighted the difficulty units experienced in effectively integrating all elements of ISR and exploiting the full spectrum ISR capabilities available. The findings support the assertion that the current force is organized and trained for conventional operations, particularly in its ISR doctrine and structure, and that it is not yet fully prepared for the full spectrum integration required for COIN. Overcoming these challenges should be addressed in a holistic manner and by a COE that has the charter to coordinate solutions addressing the full range of intelligence issues.

The establishment of Fort Huachuca as the Intelligence COE provides a great platform to better operationalize the intelligence warfighting function across the Army. The transition to the COE structure and the opportunities that this change provides reflects the direction that TRADOC is taking in addressing the Army’s full spectrum intelligence requirements for support to current combat operations and shapes the way that we will address future force design. This decision will greatly enhance the Army’s interactions with Joint and National agencies and with sister services. I believe that we can build on the solid branch foundations and address the requirements for developing a fully synchronized ISR effort. These efforts will result in more effective support to our operational forces conducting diverse missions in the current operating environment.

**ALWAYS OUT FRONT!**

**Endnote**

Center Operation Center (DCGS/JIOC). The ASAS Master Analyst Course will be renamed the Intelligence Master Analyst (IMAC) Course.

Lessons Learned. At Fort Huachuca several working groups and committees continue to discuss lessons learned from the field and how to better train and equip today's MI professionals. One such group is the GEOINT Cradle-to-Grave that is currently taking place. This group is looking at how MI contributes to GEOINT. Initial determinations from the working group’s efforts should be published in September/October of 2006.

Transition of UAS assets. As of 20 April 2006, the Army’s intelligence gathering UAS, previously known as the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), became part of the U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The Center is now the proponent for training of future UAS Operators; however, UAS training will remain at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. MOS 96U (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator) Soldiers will remain MI Soldiers and not transfer to Aviation branch until 30 September 2008.

MI MOS Issues. The MOS 97 Series is still in a transition period. The conversion of MOS 97B10, Counterintelligence, positions to 97E10, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector positions, effective 30 September 2006, may not meet all the mission requirements of a few organizations. The Capabilities Development and Integration (CDI) Directorate and the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) here at Fort Huachuca are reviewing the requirements and resources to possibly convert some of these positions back to MOS 97B at Skill Level 2. To assist in filling the over 300 percent growth in MOS 97E requirements, a temporary suspension of the language requirement was approved on 5 May 2006 for one year, and scheduled to be reviewed annually.

Leaders, continue to mentor your Soldiers and discuss re-enlistment options with them. MOS 97E is offering some of the best bonuses the Army has to offer in order to facilitate the retention of the best Soldiers. We need high quality 97E NCOs to stay and high quality NCOs to participate in the Bonus Extension and Retraining (BEAR) Program to reclassify into this fast moving MOS. We have a Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) of $150K ($25K for a year for a maximum of 6 years) request submitted and are awaiting a determination by the Headquarters, Department of the Army, G1.

The 98 Career Management Field (CMF) went through a major transformation on 1 October 2005. First, MOS 98C, Signals Intelligence Analyst, absorbed the Operational Electronic Intelligence (OPELINT) skill sets from MOS 98J. Soldiers formerly qualified in either of these MOSs must attend transition training in order to become MOS qualified as a “new” 98C. Second, MOS 98Y, Signals Collector/Analyst, was formed by merging 98J and 98K. MOS 98Y absorbed the Technical Electronic Intelligence (TECHELINT) skill sets from MOS 98J. Soldiers formerly qualified in either of these MOSs must attend transition training in order to become MOS 98Y, qualified. The resident transition courses are programmed to be available for Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011.

MG Fast approved INSCOM-proposed alternative transition training to assist in providing MOS qualification training. MOS 98C soldiers (former 98Cs that need OPELINT skills) can attend FUSE 1100 and SIGE3110DV to receive credit for transition training. 98Ys (Former 98Ks only) can attend MATH1030, SIGE2810 and Gale Lite System training to receive credit for transition training. MOS 98J Soldiers must attend resident courses for 98C and for 98Y. MOS 98GA will be deleted effective 1 October 2006, requiring Soldiers in that MOS to reclassify. It is our goal to maintain as many 98GAs in the MI community as possible. Leaders, be involved with mentoring and assisting these Soldiers.

Language Issues. There are a couple of language related issues we are currently working. An out-of-cycle Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCs) action adding intermediate and advanced language training to the lifecycle for all MOS 98GL (Cryptologic Communications Interceptor/Locator) Soldiers upon their first reenlistment within the MOS is being staffed at Fort Huachuca. The MI community is closely monitoring the new Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) 5 test results.
The MI Corps established MOS 09L (Interpreter/Translator) as an accessions MOS for all components on 9 June 2006. Analysis on proposed structure and lifecycle is ongoing. A 104 Soldier TDA has been established. The Army would like to start recruiting straight into the Active Component as early as 1 September 2006.

It is a time of patience and challenges. Soldiers, thank you for your daily contributions. NCOs, thank you for your leadership, mentorship, and professionalism. Officers and Warrant Officers, thank you for keeping the formations focused and the guidance to the short and long term missions. DOD civilians and contractors, thank you; without your assistance the total MI team would fall short. Together we all make up the MI Team; each Soldier, NCO, Officer, Warrant Officer, DOD civilian and contractor is an integral part of the profession and all of your contributions to the force have been absolutely superb.

SOLDIERS ARE OUR CREDENTIALS!

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF). Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians who have served in a U.S. Army Intelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, Futures Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (HOF), 110 Rhea Avenue, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7080, or call commercial (520) 533-1180, DSN 821-1180, or via email at OCMI@hua.army.mil.
The Commando Perspective: DISE Operations in Support of OIF II

by Captain Shayla D. Potter, First Lieutenant Molly Hurd, Chief Warrant Officer Two William E. Deruelle, and Master Sergeant Paul David Adkins

Mission

The mission of the Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) is to support intelligence requirements of the brigade commander under the direction of the brigade S2. Although a DISE is defined as a tailored intelligence support package which is digitally connected in real time to a non-deploying intelligence support base; its primary function is to supplement the brigade S2, providing additional intelligence capability to the brigade commander. This function is created under the brigade combat team (BCT) modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) as organic to the brigade S2 shop.

The 2 BCT, 10th (2/10th) Mountain Division DISE supported up to seventeen subordinate battalions including six Iraqi Army battalions and higher and adjacent unit staffs through Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D), and All-Source Intelligence (ASI). We also coordinated with the Division G2 staff and the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) for intelligence collection and support from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and established relationships with other government agencies (OGAs) operating within our battlespace.

The DISE, composed of 30 soldiers from the Military Intelligence (MI) company, is organized into four production cells—Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), CM&D, and ASI. The DISE was co-located with the Brigade S2X, the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operational Management Team (OMT) and the Transcription and Analysis Cell. The main functions for these cells include the following—

- Target development.
- Collection management and UAV operations.
- HUMINT team management.
- Threat group analysis.
- Geographical analysis.

- All-Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L) database management.

Requirements. Daily intelligence products created for the brigade commander include daily Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs), targeting and emerging intelligence updates, as well as patrol report Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) tracking. The DISE battle rhythm mirrored the Brigade headquarters and staff, with deadlines aligning with Brigade Update briefs (BUBs), Mission Analysis briefs, Contingency Operations briefs, Orders briefs, rehearsals and backbriefs.

Analysis. Mission Analysis and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) are major DISE responsibilities. Threat composition and disposition are key factors in IPB, presenting the most current and all-encompassing enemy picture to the commander. The DISE maintains an accurate enemy picture by fusing MI company collection, battalion S2 assessments and division G2 analysis. DISE personnel must know the tactical enemy as well as the strategic threat.

Communication. The DISE receives all intelligence product requirements via the brigade S2. The brigade S2 and DISE officer-in-charge (OIC) must effectively communicate and receive command intent to be successful. As tactical intelligence is extremely perishable, products at the brigade level tend to demand immediate action, not methodical analysis. Understanding and relaying command intent at the onset of production is imperative.

The brigade Targeting Officer also places requirements on the DISE, including initial report analysis and link diagram development. The Targeting Officer tracks and provides analysis on the locations, modus operandi, and activities of targeted individuals to the DISE in order to facilitate the identification of anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) battle and support zones. The DISE OIC, brigade S2, and Targeting Officer must synchronize coordination in order to most effectively resource and prioritize competing requirements.
Revising the DISE Organizational Structure

The DISE was originally structured using the ACE’s doctrinal template. The DISE consisted of five operationally independent multi-discipline intelligence cells. With limited manpower, this organizational structure restricted our capabilities and hindered our ability to efficiently monitor the future threat picture. See Figure 1.

Streamlining operations was a necessary step in effectively meeting the brigade commander’s needs. First, we identified the operational and support sections and reallocated assets from less active sections. The S2X and ASI were always busy. We augmented both S2X and ASI with additional manpower and equipment. We then synchronized the efforts of both sections in order to facilitate the targeting cell. See Figure 2.

The Common Ground Station (CGS) was very effective in addressing the counter Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) mission. It was used to determine active Point of Origin (POO) sites in rural areas or optimal air defense artillery sites. The shift into the urban terrain of the western Baghdad battlespace reduced the CGS’s role. It proved beneficial to cross-train our Common Ground Sensor Operators (MOS 96H) to Intelligence Analysts (96B). The remainder of 96Hs augmented the S2X section to process administrative paperwork for detainees.

Our SIGINT section was designed to merge the SIGINT efforts of three Prophet platoons, but with only one section, it essentially duplicated the single Prophet Control functions. We consolidated our SIGINT and TROJAN SPIRIT II (TS II) technical personnel into the Collection Management Section to allow seamless rotation during Environmental Leave and daily operations. As part of the Collection Management Section, the IMINT section’s primary duties shifted from solely producing and analyzing imagery still images to also monitoring UAV feeds.

In retrospect, the DISE OIC position should be filled by a seasoned captain or the MI company commander. See Figure 3. This would link the senior company-level intelligence officer with the brigade S2. The seasoned captain provides a more experienced perspective in properly employing intelligence assets on the battlefield to effectively answer the brigade commander’s intelligence gaps. The best option is to use the MI company commander. His role is then defined as the individual who is solely responsible for adjusting MI company assets to support the brigade commander’s PIRs. In the DISE, his ability to maintain control and direction of collected intelligence extracted from the battlefield will surely benefit the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS), now known as the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWF). Also, a senior OIC will facilitate smoother command and control lines between the brigade and company echelons. Furthermore, it will limit the possibility of asset misuse from improper or limited employment in various environments.

We determined that 22 soldiers would serve in the DISE platoon, as well as at least four in the OMT. By the time we redeployed, 30 soldiers and four civilians worked in the compound, including the Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) from Fort Meade, the S2X, one TS II general support contractor, one ASAS-L support contractor, and two to three Category 2 level linguists with clearances. Additionally, for approximately one month, the Prophet Control System and its four soldiers operated in the compound.
Civilian technical support maximized our combat manpower. In-house technical support allows analysts to concentrate on mission, as opposed to being mired in troubleshooting technical problems. The DISE depends on continuous connectivity with ground forces and higher intelligence elements, thus completing the connection between tactical and strategic intelligence. Maintenance of key IWF systems, like TS II and ASAS-L, is essential. These two systems required the most support to maintain connectivity and proper database synchronization. It is also recommended to have an in-house generator and systems specialists to quickly fix technical problems. The contractors contributed a large part to our success in this environment; our systems were rarely down except for required maintenance.

**Integration into the BCT Headquarters**

Proper integration into the BCT headquarters is a requirement for DISE success. Prior to deployment, the DISE OIC and the brigade S2 need to establish a good relationship and generate a plan to allow a seamless integration process. The brigade S2 and DISE OIC must construct a solid plan addressing the limitations of DISE assets, proper resourcing to fill identified gaps in manning or mission essential equipment, and identification of roles. What will the DISE provide to the fight? How will they help define the intelligence picture? Discussion points will also include DISE layout within the BCT Tactical Operations Center (TOC), asset relevance and usability, operational control of the DISE, allocation of MI company intelligence assets throughout the IWF, production requirements (i.e., daily update briefs, INTSUM production, etc), contractor support, and T-SCIF clearance and compartmented level of access. This is essential if the DISE is to fully achieve its mission.

The DISE’s exclusion from brigade TOC configuration plans, movement plans, facilities and support plans caused problems. The MI Company took the financial brunt of the responsibility for required resources. The DISE accounted for the majority of the company’s monetary expenditures, quickly exhausting a limited fund meant to support the entire company. For the duration of the mission, the DISE facility was a tent with a wooden floor built by DISE personnel, while the adjacent brigade TOC moved into a building with concrete sidewalks. Patios and porches were added as time passed. During the Pre-Deployment Site Survey or advanced echelon movement, ensure the following questions are addressed: How will the DISE be integrated into the brigade TOC configuration? Will there be a hardened facility or simply an empty lot? If the BCT TOC is a hard-built facility, will an extension be built to house the DISE?

**Technical Issues**

Perhaps the biggest obstacle our unit overcame was the two-week transformation from a General Support to a Direct Support MI company, while simultaneously preparing to deploy in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II and conducting a command post exercise. Having little initial guidance on DISE equipment requirements, we decided to secure a basic supply load for six months, based in large part on brigade S2 requirements and fully aware that supply channels in theater were notoriously slow, even with dedicated contractors.

We deployed with three 10,000 BTU stand-alone air conditioners. During initial operations in Kuwait these units were unable to cool even one Standardized Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) tent below 130 degrees during daylight hours. Consequently, we had to move two ASAS-L machines into a small corner in the brigade S2. At the end of the deployment, we operated two 60,000 BTU units and three 10,000 BTU stand-alones in the DISE, which kept the temperatures in the mid-80s. Our entry control point and MI Systems Maintainer/Integrator (MOS 33W) workspace SICPS each required a single 24,000 BTU wall unit.

Electricity was our most persistent logistical challenge. In Kuwait, all electricity was 220v and we deployed exclusively with 110v plugs and outlets. Our generators produced 110v power, partially solving this issue. However, with only one generator in Kuwait, it could not satisfy our automation and air conditioning requirements. 220v to 110v power converters were not available until four months later in Iraq. Uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) were vital to our operations as well, due to regular power outages and interruptions. These UPS, used with surge protectors, provided excellent protection against spikes and surges common to generators.
We owned three 110v 10 kilowatt generators, which we used to power our TS II, CGS system, and DISE tent. An additional generator would have allowed us to rotate generators for maintenance without affecting DISE operations. However, a regular maintenance pattern allowed the DISE to plan for scheduled outages, and we suffered no major losses of generators throughout the deployment.

We deployed with six ASAS-L systems, two laptops, two color printers, one black & white printer, one projector, one plotter, two desktops, three 300 gigabyte external hard drives and one complete Single Source Enclave (SSE). The ASAS-L systems supplied the ASI with five computers per shift. We dedicated one laptop for the DISE OIC and Fusion OIC, with the other allotted to CM&D. A single Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router network (NIPRNET) line provided access to open source reporting. The projector proved very useful as we briefed the brigade commander on a daily basis. Fortunately, we did not lose any bulbs as we had no spares for back-up.

External hard drives proved to be possibly our most important network asset. We built our internal shared drive entirely off one hard drive’s contents. We placed our whole year’s intelligence products on the hard drive, and backed it up by creating a platoon website on the INSCOM homepage. We stored FalconView™ imagery on another hard drive.

The IMINT section used the plotter and desktops. One major problem encountered regarding IMINT was the expiration of the RemoteView™ software license we used to access higher headquarters’ historical imagery databases. We received an initial software packet for the system, which offered a one-month trial period. We drew this software due to time constraints before our deployment. Unfortunately, by the time we began operating our TS II system, the software license expired and it took three months to acquire the update again.

One problem we never effectively solved was loss of our high-side email accounts. While this loss was not disastrous, it created occasional inconveniences when higher units produced Joint Worldwide Intelligence Community System (JWICS) traffic for us. To rectify this problem, we recommend one noncommissioned officer (NCO), preferably a SGT or CPL, be thoroughly briefed on JWICS procedures, email accounts, etc. In the rush to deploy, this aspect of DISE operations was neglected.

ASI Operations and Products

The responsibilities of the ASI consist primarily of mission analysis, IPB, targeting, and threat group analysis through the use of multiple intelligence disciplines. Cre-

Figure 4. Sample link diagram.
ating IPB on a daily basis to assess geopolitical, environmental, and threat influences on friendly forces, identification of non-doctrinal threat groups and AIF targets in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AOR) was crucial to multinational force (MNF) success in strike operations. Much like federal, state and local law enforcement agencies determine criminal networks; the ASI applied the same techniques in attempting to identify insurgent leaders, members and locations for counterinsurgency operations.

ASI Intelligence Analysts used the following tools to research the structure, capabilities, and disposition of AIF cells operating in the AOR: Analyst’s Notebook link diagrams, ASAS-L Entity Editor, GISA Pathfinder, Multimedia Message Handler (M3), INTELINK and FalconView. Research of infrastructure, names and locations was done using ASAS-L; Pathfinder and M3 were used for further development of HUMINT reporting in a link diagram format. See Figure 4.

The link diagram is a graphic depiction of research derived from these databases and is the foundation for threat group formulation. It is a 96B’s crew-served weapon for identifying the enemy order of battle (OB) in a country influenced by insurgent and terrorist networks. The ASI section merged the various sources and intelligence disciplines into link diagrams. Although the Counterintelligence Agents (MOS 97B) and HUMINT Collectors (MOS 97E) of the OMT are also able to support the creation of these link diagrams, the number of HUMINT personnel and resources available at brigade level does not make this feasible. The focus for HUMINT Collectors will be the management of Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT) and HUMINT collection efforts. Note: THT is now referred to as HUMINT Collection Team (HCT). Additionally, allowing the ASI 96Bs to create link diagrams is necessary for the analyst to become familiar with both the multitude of intelligence reporting and threat cells operating in the brigade AOR. We highly recommend that ASI 96Bs, coupled with the brigade Targeting Officer, be responsible for creating the link diagrams in order to accurately depict the entire spectrum of information throughout the targeting process.

In addition to link diagrams, another tool for analyzing the enemy OB is an AIF OB diagram, commonly used by Special Operations Forces and comparable to a doctrinal enemy line and block chart. This diagram, obtained through analysis of link diagrams, time event matrices, AIF situation templates and All Source Pattern Analysis Plot Sheets, is an excellent tool for the graphic depiction of enemy cell associations, battle damage assessment, composition and structure, and capabilities per unit area of operations. An example of how one may graphically

![Figure 5. AIF Order of Battle.](image-url)
depict cells is by using circles to represent command and control (C2) nodes, triangles for specialized cells such as kidnapping and assassinations, and squares for basic combat cells. Crossing out a particular cell capability indicates a neutralized or disrupted AIF cell. Associations between cells are displayed by solid lines for verified intelligence and by dotted lines for unconfirmed information. By comparing attack trends and AIF support zones portrayed on the AIF cell template, analysts will also better understand tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of a given threat organization. This analysis will further enhance predictive analysis on individual AIF cells and generate additional data for Time Event Matrices.

The diagram (see Figure 5) depicting an AIF cell template provides ground commanders with an articulate description of groups operating in their AOR. Commanders can use it to reference cell strength, attrition, and operating locations for future targeting purposes aimed at decreasing assessed threats in a specific sector. Adding analyst comments pertaining to recent cell activity and trends is optimal for situational understanding at all echelons throughout the intelligence community.

In support of identifying AIF networks and continuous updates to IPB products, ASI created an INTSUM and DISE update brief every 24 hours. Our INTSUM focused on tactical through strategic intelligence necessary to assist the brigade commander’s decisionmaking process. While we included actionable and emerging intelligence into the individual battalion’s section of the INTSUM; developing AIF TTPs, indicators and warning, and significant political events influencing the entire Brigade’s battlespace were included as well. We oriented the daily DISE Update brief to answer actionable PIR for the Targeting Officer, as well as implementing a daily AIF OB update section, which allowed division and subordinate battalions to maintain awareness of changes in cell structure, capability, strengths, attrition, and TTPs. The ASI inputs intelligence that is not yet actionable as emerging intelligence for the brigade staff’s situational awareness.

The Latest Time Information of Value is important to the INTSUM and DISE Update brief, as both products will determine how many and which subject matter experts (SMEs) you employ per twelve hour shift. At the shift change briefs, it is essential that the 96Bs communicate their assessments with each other in order to avoid repeated production and allow for cohesion and added depth in the INTSUM and Update briefs. The 2/10th Mountain DISE used one junior analyst per shift for the INTSUM, and one ASI NCO and a junior analyst during the night-shift for a morning DISE Update brief. Meanwhile, AIF OB, TTPs, and geopolitical SMEs assisted on individual products on an as-needed basis. In doing so, additional analysts were free to answer intelligence gaps for IPB, requests for information and AIF name queries in support of daily products.

**Conclusion**

Flexibility is essential, as the DISE will assume many roles. Establishing a clear delineation of duties between the DISE and brigade S2 will avoid redundancy or inconsistent analysis. Also, having a fluid organization structure will accommodate the competing demands placed on the DISE. For example, as operational pace increased, many S2 responsibilities such as IPB, current situation threat analysis, and battle tracking shifted to the DISE. A steady, predictable mission helps focus the analyst and allows them to become competent in the areas of their responsibility.

An effective personnel rotation plan minimizes the effects of loss of manpower during key production surges. Prioritizing tasks establishes the necessary focus on the most time-sensitive projects. Establishing a shift change optimal to mission and personnel alleviates unnecessary setbacks. Cross-training and rotation ensures each shift can handle the load while keeping analysts flexible in their tasks throughout the deployment. These, coupled with strong leadership, allowed the DISE to be very successful in its mission.

Finally, a strong working relationship between the DISE, brigade Targeting Officer, and brigade S2 is essential. As DISE OIC, one must understand the MI company’s capabilities in order to effectively assist the two parties in their mission. Truly understanding their mission by attending targeting meetings and brigade S2/S3 mission planning sessions will assure that DISE products are tailored to meet specific requirements and prioritized properly with the routine unit functions. This aids both the Targeting Officer and brigade S2 in finalizing their end products to answer the brigade commander’s information gaps. In short, the three are interconnected as each depends on the other to be successful — a team effort.
Captain Shayla D. Potter is currently assigned as the Battalion S2, 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division. Her previous duties include Company XO, Intelligence and Surveillance Platoon Leader, and 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain DISE OIC. She has deployed in support of both OEF II and OIF II. Captain Potter will attend the MI Captains Career Course at Fort Huachuca upon her return from Iraq. Captain Potter attended Purdue University, where she earned a BS degree in Information Systems Technology. A distinguished ROTC graduate, she received her commission in August 2001. Captain Potter can be contacted via email at shayla.potter@us.army.mil.

First Lieutenant Molly Hurd currently serves as the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division DISE OIC. She graduated from MI Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca in January 2004. 1LT Hurd received her commission from the U.S. Military Academy in May 2003. Past assignments include Battalion Intelligence Officer for the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division Forward Support Battalion. She can be contacted via email at molly.mckinnon@us.army.mil.

Chief Warrant Two William E Deruelle was an augmentee from the 311th MI Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) and served as the Fusion OIC for the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division DISE. He deployed to the Iraqi Theater of Operations following graduation from the Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Rucker, Alabama and WOBC at Fort Huachuca and has since redeployed. His previous assignments include service at U.S. Southern Command as a senior I&W Analyst. CW2 Deruelle is working towards a BS in Psychology. He can be contacted via email at William.Deruelle@us.army.mil.

Master Sergeant Paul David Adkins’ assignments include D Company, 2-18 Infantry Battalion, Fort Benning, Alabama; I-32 Infantry Battalion, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York; 1-63 ATS Regiment, Camp Coiner, Republic of Korea; as well as the Presidio of Monterey, Afghanistan (CJ2 Operations) and Iraq (2/10 Mountain Division DISE). He has earned a Bachelor’s Degree from Mercer University, Macon, Georgia and a Master’s Degree from Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

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Situation
On a patrol in eastern Afghanistan, a squad of U.S. Soldiers encounters a caravan of vehicles moving through the village streets. A small bus packed full of men and women sing and wave out the bus windows. A sharp crack of an automatic weapon breaks up the singing and a wave of cheers erupts from the procession. Next, a series of celebratory fire echoes in the streets as members of the procession point their AK-47 assault rifles towards the sky. The patrol stops the vehicles in an attempt to determine the source of the automatic weapon fire.

They realize the procession is a wedding ceremony and the members of the wedding party are firing their AK-47s in celebration of the event. The patrol leader has two options—

- Stop the wedding procession, detain those individuals firing the weapons, and inform the happy couple that their wedding procession is over.
- Stop the wedding procession, confiscate the AK-47s, and inform the wedding party that celebratory fire is dangerous and not allowed within the village, then wish the happy couple the best of luck in their wedding.

In this scenario, the second option would pass the cultural test because it is extremely rude to break up a wedding party in Afghan culture. Option two would leave the members of the wedding party with a good sense of understanding of the U.S. Soldiers’ mission in their village. Understanding the history, culture, and traditions of the inhabitants of the countries within the Army’s theater of operations is paramount to mission success. Positively influencing the people’s perception of the U.S. and its intentions starts with cultural understanding.

The 10th Mountain Division’s concept of Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) is nested within the Army’s concept and focuses on three critical areas to facilitate dominant battlespace awareness: cultural awareness, tactical questioning, and language immersion. The most sensitive sensor in the Army is the Soldier. The Soldier’s ability to understand the culture, the language, and the history of his surroundings sensitizes the Soldier to what he sees or hears and allows him to put new information into context.

In the scenario provided earlier, Soldiers properly trained in cultural awareness would choose Option two based on an understanding of Arabic traditions and customs. Properly analyzed information is essential to dissemination and limits poor decisions based on erroneous data.

This poster was developed by the 10th Mountain Division to illustrate the division’s ES2 concept.
Cultural Awareness

Now more than ever, the Army is focused on cultural awareness, and the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, is leading the way. Leadership at all levels places a high emphasis on understanding customs, traditions, history, and language of the people in the countries in which the 10th Mountain Division deploys. Currently, division leaders and Soldiers undergo cultural awareness training, leveraging the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) Program of Instruction, focused on the current theater of operations as well as professional reading provided by the division G2. The division recognizes the effect that cultural awareness has as a combat multiplier, and how proper education and respect for culture leads to mission success, especially in stability operations. Basic cultural awareness is one of the fundamental building blocks that helps develop the Soldier sensor. Cultural awareness, tactical questioning, and language immersion form our ES2 pyramid, the essence of a 10th Mountain Division Soldier.

Tactical Questioning

Tactical Questioning is the means by which a Soldier retrieves verbal information from the inhabitants of an area. This information is the first screening of raw data before analysis. Soldiers properly trained in tactical questioning perform two functions—they act as a sensor, gathering information using the 5Ws (who, what, when, where, why) and direct questioning; and they filter information through reporting to provide a more precise picture of the battlefield. For a Soldier trained in tactical questioning, cultural awareness is the prism that filters perception, bias, and language into relevant information to report. Without this basic understanding of the context from which the information originated, the Soldier would unknowingly report misinterpreted data. These reports could then lead to misinformed decisions that do not lead to mission success. Just as tactical questioning is the means by which Soldiers access verbal information, language is the tool to conducting successful tactical questioning.

Tiered Language Program

The 10th Mountain Division language program is a three-tiered system: the Command Language Program (CLP), non-linguist language training (deployment specific), and conversion language training. Using these three focused areas of language training, the division language program maintains its current linguist proficiency, improves its effectiveness on the battlefield, and conducts its mission more efficiently. The over-arching goal of the program is a full spectrum approach to language training encompassing maintenance for Army linguists, introduction training for small unit leaders for specific unit missions, and fully resourced courses designed to provide a qualified Army linguist in support of future mission requirements.

Tier I: Command Language Program. The Command Language Program provides brigade commanders with personnel proficient in a target foreign language to perform mission essential tasks critical to the successful accomplishment of Army missions. Currently, linguists train for four hours per week in their global language and four hours per week in their target language. In addition, they use Internet research to aid in their proficiency development. Linguists are required to complete the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) annually and must maintain the Army standard of a 2/2 proficiency rating or undergo a six-week remedial immersion training course provided by the language instructors. The command language program maintains the division’s current language proficiency.

Tier II: Non-linguist language training. The non-linguist language program gives our leaders and Soldiers a working knowledge of a language, but will only succeed with unit Commanders’ support. Currently, soldiers receive target language command and control (C2) cards, language survival guides, and platoons receive language and cultural CDs. Non-linguists, squad leaders and higher (at the battalion commanders’ discretion) attend, at a minimum, one cycle of language training in their target language. This cycle of training consists of two hours per week of language training for six weeks. At the end of the cycle, the student is evaluated on his ability to verbally use designated phrases and commands by the instructor. The students then achieve a qualified or unqualified status based on the evaluation. Battalion commanders determine if an unqualified Soldier needs to retrain. In addition, Mobile Training Devices for Area of Responsibility Target Language Skills provide recorders, headphones and laptops with language CDs for field use. Finally, language products for company areas provide units with number familiarization posters; C2 common phrases and slang posters; and basic vocabulary and military rank structure products for language refreshing.

Tier III: Linguist Conversion. The Linguist Conversion plan refers to the division’s shift in language focus in order to meet the changing needs of the Army and to conduct the mission more efficiently. Some Korean and Spanish linguists are currently learning Pashtu. MOS 97B, Counterintelligence Agent, Soldiers are learning Pashtu and are working toward a language identifier in preparation for upcoming operations in Oper-
The division’s emphasis on ensuring Soldiers are culturally aware, trained in tactical questioning, and language proficient led to the development of the Army’s first modern Language and Cultural Awareness Center (LCAC). At this facility, Soldiers enhance their skills in language and cultural awareness with detailed training by instructors with first-hand knowledge of each target country, simulation training on the ES2 Simulation developed by the Department of the Army G2 Modeling and Simulation Office, real time video feed through the Satellite Communications for Learning Network (SCOLA) from target countries and numerous reading materials found in the LCAC.

The LCAC is a 3,000 square foot building containing three classrooms for formal language training, a cultural awareness library, language library, and three offices for the four instructors and the CLP Manager. The classrooms are generic and seat up to 15 Soldiers per classroom. The LCAC is capable of training up to 45 Soldiers at one time in three classrooms. The classrooms are equipped with overhead projectors that can display SCOLA videos at the instructor’s direction. Currently, the LCAC features four instructors with Persian (Farsi), Arabic, Korean, and Pashtu languages. The Pashtu instructor is temporary, working in Tier III (Linguist Conversion). The language library offers over 17 languages and recorders for listening practice. Finally, the cultural awareness library is a source for cultural understanding with a large collection of historical, cultural, and political books available for the Soldiers. There is an expansive digital library that the Soldiers can research and use to develop training.

Conclusion

Whether it’s a patrol in Afghanistan that encounters a wedding procession with celebratory fire or a unit commander conducting negotiations with a local leader, our ES2 knowledge enhancement concept is the next step to ensuring relevant and timely information to the Army’s decisionmakers and fulfilling the Army’s diplomatic mission. Cultural awareness, language immersion and tactical questioning form critical elements of our ES2 pyramid and offer the foundation from which the 10th Mountain Division focuses its training. Our LCAC provides the venue for this training. The 10th Mountain Division understands the challenge to filter raw information through the eyes of the most sophisticated sensor—the Soldier. Fine tuning occurs on a continuous basis but begins during home station training focused on cultural awareness, language immersion, and tactical questioning where the leader and Soldier’s sensory perception can be honed to a razor’s edge.

Major General Lloyd J. Austin III, 10th Mountain Division (LI) and Fort Drum Commander, and Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey cut the ribbon to the Language and Cultural Awareness Center.

Inside the 10th Mountain Division (LI) Language and Cultural Awareness Center featuring the classrooms.

Captain James P. Milligan served with the 2-3 Field Artillery (FA) Battalion, 1st BCT, 1 Armored Division during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM ONE (OIF 1). He served as the battalion S2, 2-3 FA battalion for six months during OIF 1; prior to that as a platoon leader in C Company, 2-3 FA during OIF 1. Currently he is serving as the assistant G2 Training Officer in the 10th Mountain Division (LI). His military education includes the FA Officer Basic Course, the Military Intelligence (MI) Officer Training Course, and the MI Captain Career Course. Captain Milligan has a BS in Environmental Engineering from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.
Because of the challenges of the Global War on Terror, the U.S. Army is constantly looking to improve its capabilities through the use of new training methods, tactics, and organizations. With those goals in mind, the Army created the Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC), headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

The MIRC’s objective is to improve the readiness of Army Reserve MI by providing trained and ready Soldiers and units, according to Major General George Fay, Deputy Security Officer, Department of the Army. As a Reserve Officer with more than 35 years of experience and former Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Fay knows the training and readiness challenges facing Army Reserve intelligence. The MIRC was formed to meet those challenges, but how exactly will the MIRC accomplish its objective?

Colonel Dorothy Perkins, Chief, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, European Command, envisions the MIRC as “a command that completely manages the Army Reserve MI force; specifically, recruiting and training Soldiers, making units ready to deploy, and creating a force structure to allow Soldiers to grow, mature, be promoted, and assume more responsibilities.”

Prior to the MIRC’s existence, there was no organization solely responsible for recruiting and training Army Reserve MI Soldiers nor were there clear career paths for Soldiers to determine subsequent assignments for further professional development. The Soldier was responsible for finding a unit to be assigned to and determining, on his own, his next assignment if his present unit had no vacancies. The MIRC provides training and development opportunities for Soldiers in a more deliberate manner.

According to Perkins, “The MIRC can further influence the Active Component’s ability to access Army Reserve MI units and skillfully integrate them into the fight. In doing so, the MIRC may foster a greater understanding among supported commands of Army Reserve MI unit composition, availability, capability, and specific methods of obtaining MI Soldiers from the Army Reserve. In addition, there is a huge ability to leverage reach support through the MIRC’s five Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs) located throughout the United States.”

MIRC units are always “in the fight” and provide ongoing intelligence support to active Army units worldwide. During the Global War on Terror, some units deployed while others supported from ARISCs located throughout the United States. Although not deployed, these Soldiers provide valuable intelligence support to forward deployed units through the use of technology.

As Perkins put it, the MIRC will be “one-stop shopping” for Army Reserve intelligence. “The ability for units in the field to reach out and touch Army Reserve MI assets is more important than ever. Commanders in the field easily understand having a central point of contact to obtain Reserve MI support. The MIRC ensures the Army Reserve meets the warfighter’s needs for that support and determines the specific needs of the warfighter to meet intelligence strategies and requirements. Its existence has both an immediate and lasting impact on improved support to the warfighter.” The MIRC is already having a positive impact by establishing working relationships with the warfighter to improve intelligence support from the Army Reserve. The MIRC also identifies innovative ways to train Soldiers, given limited time and resources.
As the Army looks toward the future, how might the MIRC continue to have a positive impact? Fay sees the MIRC as “enabling the Army Reserve MI Force to have a stronger voice both in the Army Intelligence Community and broader national Intelligence Community. The MIRC will be able to conduct focused intelligence training and assignments for the entire Army Reserve MI Force. It will be more flexible to the ever changing needs and requirements of the Army.”

“With the increased emphasis on intelligence support, the MIRC will play a key role in responding to requirements, policy decisions, and changes that directly affect Army Reserve MI Soldiers. There is much work to be done, but the end result is trained intelligence Soldiers who will be ready when the nation calls.” Fay added.

Editor’s Note: For further details on the mission and organization of the MIRC go to MIPB’s FOUO article section.

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Intelligence Support to the Special Forces Group: Time for Change

“The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.”
First printed in the Summer 2005 issue of the Vanguard.

by Captain Charles Faint

“If Special Forces looks the same after the war on terrorism, someone will have failed.”

—Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, (USA, Ret.)

Operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have demonstrated the need for organizational changes within the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) at the Special Forces (SF) Group level in order to better support the Group Commanders and the needs of the supported battalions in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Fundamental changes in organization, recruiting, retention, and training are needed for the SF Group IBOS to evolve in order to better meet the challenges of a new operational environment, and to “provide sufficient intelligence” to Special Forces commanders.

Organization

“The organization of SF intelligence assets is according to operational and analytical needs.” Experiences in the GWOT show that the operational and analytical needs of the SF Groups have changed and persuasively underscores the fact that the IBOS should change to meet these needs. The first change needed is in the way the IBOS is organized within the SF Group. The current IBOS organization in an SF Group nearly mirrors that of a conventional pre-Transformation Army division wherein the IBOS at the division level is split between the division G2 section, the Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, and the unit-level S2 sections. Currently, SF Group MI assets are dispersed among three different levels within the Group, each with different organization, capabilities, priorities, and chains of command. These three levels (See Figure 1) are the Group S2 section, the Group MI Detachment (MID), and the individual battalion S2 sections, as doctrinally outlined in Chapter 3 of FM 3-05.102, Army Special Forces Intelligence, July 2001.
Although integrated by doctrine throughout the Group, each of these IBOS subcomponents in practice are completely independent of the others, with different missions, priorities, and chains of command. While well intentioned, this current organization has created a redundant and needlessly cumbersome system which has, at times, negatively affected intelligence support to the Group and diluted overall IBOS efficiency.

Maintaining intelligence assets under three different levels of support is not the most effective use of intelligence assets, a fact now recognized in the conventional force. Under the new transformation concept being implemented, the conventional division MI battalion is dissolved and its assets pushed down to the individual BCTs. This revolution in MI support recognizes the need to push intelligence systems and personnel down to the lowest level possible, while still retaining an MI package at the headquarters level that is robust enough to provide credible and effective intelligence oversight and direction to the overall intelligence effort in a general support capacity.

The Group S2 “…is the primary staff officer responsible for all aspects of intelligence, Counterintelligence (CI), and security support in garrison and while deployed,” but under the current Group modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), the only MI assets that the Group S2 section controls in garrison include those assets devoted to routine administrative functions such as physical security, passport control, and the Special Security Officer (SSO) duties. The Group MID controls all of the rest of the Group-level MI assets, and the Battalion S2s control MI assets at the battalion level. This creates a situation in which none of the intelligence assets in the MID or at the battalion level are subordinate to the Group S2 in any way during training and pre-mission preparation. Therefore, although the Group S2 is the staff officer with primary responsibility for the Group IBOS, his ability to influence the overall IBOS is curtailed by the current organization.

**FM 2-0, Intelligence**, specifies “establishing clean command and support relationships is fundamental in organizing for all operations,” but the current command and support relationships are anything but clean. The overwhelming bulk of MI assets in the Group reside in the Group MID, which is subordinate to the Group Support Company (GSC), whereas the Group S2 section is assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). The Group MID controls all of the special operations teams (SOTs) -A and -B (Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)), the SOT-Cs (non-doctrinal term used here to describe human intelligence collection teams), and the functions typically associated with the Secure Compartmentalized Intelligence Facility (SCIF), such as the Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) and All-Source Production Section (ASPS). Thus, the MID has oversight of and responsibility for the “tactical” level of MI (SOT-A/B/C) as well as the “operational - strategic” level (TCAE, SCIF, and ASPS) MI assets within the Group. What this means in practice is, that all of the personnel and equipment that the Group S2 needs to provide sufficient intelligence to the Group Commander during operations in both garrison and forward-deployed operations all reside in the MID. This is not an efficient organization.

The garrison organization is in stark contrast to the streamlined organization of the Group IBOS when it deploys forward. During combat operations in the GWOT, the SOT-A/B/Cs are split to provide direct support to the individual battalions in their forward operating bases, advanced operating bases, or even to individual operational detachments-alpha (ODAs). Moreover, all of the IBOS Soldiers not attached directly to the battalions fall directly under the Group S2 (see Figure 2). Placing the functions associated with the SCIF under the Group S2 both in garrison and in a forward operating environment and making the SOT-A/B/Cs organic to the individual battalions would facilitate teamwork and increase efficiency, but most importantly would transform the IBOS into a “train as you fight” organization.
The intelligence fight is a continuous one; whether deployed forward or in garrison operations, the IBOS provides intelligence support to operations across the SF spectrum. Indeed, “The Intelligence BOS is always engaged in supporting the commander in offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.” Therefore, the IBOS should be configured to provide continuous support by being organized “as you fight.” Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is a prime example of how the IBOS at the SF Group level must be ready to deploy at a moment’s notice to drive operations that bring the SF fight to the enemy.

The 2005 and 2006 SF Group MTOEs repair some of the problems inherent in the current organization by increasing the total number of SOT-A teams from six to ten, with three SOT-A teams going to each SF battalion and the tenth SOT-A becoming the Advanced SIGINT Collection Section at the MID level. Each SF Group will also pick up a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) and Sensor Exploitation Platoon in 2006. The Groups’ IBOS efforts would be further enhanced by the addition of a linguist platoon filled with military occupational specialty (MOS) 09L soldiers with language skills representative of their Group’s regional orientation.

SF Groups should also have an MI company, as opposed to the MID currently on the MTOE. An MI company whose commander had traditional command responsibilities to include maintenance, supply, and company-level Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) would remove those burdens from the Group Support Company commander. With three SOT-As at each battalion, the SCIF underneath the Group S2, and the MI company retaining control of the Group’s general support intelligence assets, such as the Advanced SIGINT section, UAVs, and 09Ls (when assigned or attached), the Group IBOS is organized optimally to support Special Forces operations. It is not necessary to have battalion level intelligence assets split between the battalion S2 and a battalion-level MID commander, as has been the case in the past. All IBOS in the battalions should be directly subordinate to the battalion S2. MIDs should not exist at the battalion level. If necessary, the battalion-level SOT-A/B/Cs can be organized as an MI platoon, with an MI lieutenant as its leader, and all other MI assets at the battalion level assigned to the battalion S2 section.

Closely related to the subject of organization, and also important to the Army-wide intelligence effort, is consistency of doctrine and terms within the Army community. The manuals researched for this article contained different terms for what are essentially the same functions in both the SF Group and the conventional MI community. For example, the terms TCAE and Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D), both familiar to those versed in SF intelligence doctrine, are antiquated in modern conventional intelligence doctrine, replaced by the terms “Analysis and Control Element (ACE)” and “Collection Management (CM),” respectively. Intelligence-related SF doctrine should reflect, to the maximum extent possible, the exact same terms and procedures as the conventional force. Figure Three below depicts a possible modernization of the IBOS at the SF Group level, using modern, conventional intelligence terms.

**Selection**

There exists within the Army a large pool of motivated, talented MI Soldiers who want to work in the Special Forces. However, there is no screening process to speak of with regard to support troops coming to Group. Assignments of MI soldiers to Group are made exclusively according to “needs of the Army” by MI Branch. SF has a tremendous reputation throughout the Army in general and within the MI community in particular, and should capitalize on this by conducting an aggressive recruiting campaign focusing on getting the best men and women we possibly can into the SF Groups. The desired end-state is that the best not only come to SF units, but stay here for a prolonged period of time.

A designated utilization tour after a favorable assessment, optimally three years, should be a precondition of service within a SF Group. With the amount of time and
money spent to ensure that SF soldiers are sufficiently competent mentally and physically to perform in a fluid environment, it seems intuitively obvious that the soldiers that support them should be equally trained and screened in order to provide the SF with the best support available.

With that in mind, the U.S. Army SF Command (USASFC) should initiate some sort of assessment process to screen potential recruits for suitability prior to them coming down on orders to Group. Other Special Operations Forces (SOF) organizations, such as the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, have an extensive and effective assessment process in place that helps screen who they accept into their organizations.

The screening/selection process does not need to be anything complicated. Appendix L of USASFC(A) 350-1, Component Training, spells out individual certification standards that every soldier in an SF Group needs to meet, and can be used as a guide to for the creation of an assessment. Initially, a prospective recruit’s records should be screened for previous experience and performance, and to ensure the individual has no limiting profiles or a history of UCMJ or discipline issues.

The physical portion of the selection would consist of a standard Army physical fitness test (with a minimum acceptable score of 210 with 70 points in each event); the Combat Water Survival Test (CWST) (pass or fail), and a 12-mile foot march (with a standard of 12 miles in three hours, with full combat equipment and a 35 pound load).

The final portion of the assessment should be a practical examination of the candidate’s ability to do a specific job within the Group. This may, for example, involve a briefing to the Group Commander or Group S2 for officer and senior NCO candidates, and a face-to-face interview and a hands-on equipment practical with representatives of the Group IBOS for the junior enlisted (See Figure 4 for an assessment flowchart). This selection process should be run under the purview of the USASFC G2 and can be conducted at the soldier’s home station, under the direction of USASFC G2 representatives sent to the location on temporary duty for that purpose. Alternately, IBOS representatives from the individual Groups can conduct the assessments on a rotating basis.

Training

Experiences in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and OEF demonstrate the necessity of training and equipping support soldiers to levels equitable to those they support. Many times, IBOS Soldiers in particular are called upon to supplement or to completely assume the duties of MOS 18 series soldiers. For example, IBOS Soldiers in the 5th SF Group have been called upon to serve in 18-series (Special Forces) coded positions as Company First Sergeant for a battalion support company, as well as company commander for the Group Support company during OIF. Moreover, SOT-As and SOT-Cs are frequently pushed down to the ODA level, and accompany teams on direct action missions. CI and HUMINT personnel and soldiers assigned to the MID as part of the Army’s 09L (Translator Aide) program also directly augment ODAs. These examples illustrate the need for IBOS Soldiers to cross train in areas that are traditionally 18-series specific.

While the SF Basic Combat Course-Support (SFBCCS) is a good start, 18-series specific training should also be considered as part of the training curriculum for IBOS Soldiers in every SF Group. Training that would benefit IBOS

Figure 4. Suggested Assessment Flowchart.
Soldiers includes the SF Advanced Urban Combat, the Special Operations Target Interdiction, and the Advanced Special Operations — Level Three Courses. In addition, due to the evolving nature of the support they provide to the ODAs, the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) — Level C (High Risk) course should be incorporated as a standard school for IBOS Soldiers assigned to SF Groups.

In the past, MOS 98G (Cryptologic Linguist) soldiers assigned to SOT-A teams were allowed to attend SF Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and the SF Qualification Course (SFQC), where they were trained as 18E (Special Forces Communications Sergeant). Serious consideration should be given to reinstitute this program, particularly as a re-enlistment incentive. This would give 98Gs, the IBOS soldiers who arguably work most closely with the ODAs, invaluable training and complete credibility with the ODAs they support. The time it will take to cross-train 98Gs as 18Es will be offset by repeated assignments to Group over their careers, as well as by increasing the lengths of those tours.

In addition to the training listed above, USASFC should work with applicable agencies to ensure that MOS specific training such as CI, Source Operations Course and DOD Strategic Debriefers Course (DSDB) are available at the times and in the number of quotas necessary to train the number of MTOE slots allocated for those special-series specific training cannot fail to result in a better trained, more highly motivated soldier, as well as improving the credibility of those soldiers when they interact with those they support. Such training is also closely tied to retention and esprit de corps.

Enlisted soldiers assigned to Special Operations units have the potential to be awarded the “S” identified added to their MOS. MI Branch should ensure that soldiers with the “S” identifier rotate between SOF and non-SOF assignments throughout their careers in order to spread their expertise across the Army’s IBOS.

Retirement

Another difficulty the Group IBOS faces is in the area of retention. We frequently lose high quality IBOS troops to other SOF organizations, promotions, or retirement shortly after they arrive at Group. Before accepting an individual into Group, he or she must understand that there is a minimum commitment of three years as a condition for being assigned to the unit.

A contributing factor to the retention issues within the IBOS involves the experience level of our company grade officers. Current trends show that the overwhelming majority of MI captains who are assigned to SF Groups are coming straight from the MI Captains Career Course (MICCC) in their very first MI assignment after previously serving in a different branch. Our battalion assistant S2s are all second lieutenants on their first assignment straight out of the MI Officer Basic Course.

In addition to the Captains’ lack of practical MI experience, one of the problems with accepting non-branch qualified (NBQ) captains into the Group is the simple fact that to get promoted, they have to get command; to get command, they will have to leave Group since the only command available is the Group MID, which by MTOE is filled by an MI major. Because the captains must leave Group to a command assignment, this creates a revolving door effect wherein we get NBQ captains straight from the advanced course who stay a year to 18 months and then have to leave to get into the queue for command. Their backfills are MI captains straight from the advanced course, who will shortly have to leave Group for command, and so on.

While we have been very fortunate recently with regard to the quality of our Battalion S2s, we cannot count on that trend to continue. All of the Battalion S2 positions and the Group MID should go to branch qualified captains. Some would argue that with the new MIDs opening in each SF battalion, the branch qualification issue is resolved. However, with no budget, no property book, no arms room, and no UCMJ authority, and with the battalion MID commander’s immediate rater not being a battalion commander, these positions should not count as “command time,” particularly when compared against the requirements and responsibilities of commands in other units.

The Group S2 assignment should go to a branch qualified major. If we continue to send NBQ captains to SF Groups, and if company or detachment command remains a requirement for branch qualification, USASFC should consider making all of the headquarters and support company assignments that are coded for 18A captains into 01A (non-branch specific) assignments to allow for branch qualification within the Group for not only MI
officers but other support branches as well. Battalion assistant S2s should be experienced first lieutenants with at least one previous MI assignment before Group. An excellent way to ensure this experience is a “lieutenants to Korea” program much like the one in place at the 75th Ranger Regiment. This would involve a lieutenant favorably assessing as previously explained, then being assigned to the Second Infantry Division for a year, with a follow-on assignment to an SF Group.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, IBOS support to the SF Groups is adequate, but not optimal. Fundamental changes in the areas of organization, recruiting, retention, and training are needed for the IBOS to adapt to the changing operational environment and to help guide the IBOS towards fulfilling its full potential. USASFC should seriously consider dissolving the MID at the Group level, implementing an assessment program to screen IBOS Soldiers prior to their assignment to an SF Group, and including IBOS Soldiers in 18 series specific training that would make them more valuable, relevant, and credible to the ODAs they support.

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**Endnotes**

2. **FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations**, June 2001; Special Forces Imperative #11 — “Provide Sufficient Intelligence.”
4. 5th Special Forces Group Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for 2005 and 2006.
6. Ibid., 1-2.

At the time of submission Captain Charles Faint was the battalion S2 for 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). His previous assignments include Platoon Leader, D Company, 1-327 Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air assault); Commander, D Company, 102nd MI Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division; Commander, MI Detachment, 5th SF Group (Airborne), and Commander, Group Support Company, 5th SF Group (Airborne). He is a graduate of Georgia Military College and Mercer University, and holds degrees in Engineering and Technical Communication from these institutions, respectively.

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Introduction

"Who could imagine, less than two years ago, that a French Counterintelligence (CI) officer would receive his new stripes from an American Colonel, in the presence of 15 nations? This international unit is an opportunity for us to share information, individual experiences, and to reinforce dialogue among our national agencies. More than that, it will protect our countries from terrorist attacks in Europe, the Balkans, and of course Iraq."

With these words, Major Luc Rollet of the French Army accepted promotion to Lieutenant Colonel on December 16, 2005 in the Headquarters of the 650th Military Intelligence (MI) Group at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium. Colonel John Z. Dillon II, 650th Military Intelligence (MI) Group Commander, presided at the ceremony, and placed the new rank on Rollet's shoulders.

No one in attendance could say for certain, but all suspected that it had been a very long time since an American officer had been invited to promote a French officer. Yet such activities may soon be the norm rather than the exception for the 650th MI Group. Lieutenant Colonel Rollet is one of 17 Allied officers currently assigned to the 650th MI Group, with more on the way.

First Steps Toward Transformation

From its creation as the CI agency supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) military command structure in Europe until early 2004, the 650th MI Group had consisted exclusively of U.S. Army military and civilian personnel. Directly subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the 650th MI Group, known within NATO as the Allied Command CI Activity, was trusted within the alliance as an "honest broker" in CI, working on behalf of NATO rather than any individual member nation. Still, the solely U.S. composition of the unit came to appear increasingly anachronistic as NATO, and the U.S. moved increasingly toward coalition warfare.

In the Spring of 2002, Colonel Richard T. Ellis, then serving as the 650th’s commander, took the podium at SHAPE’s annual CI and Security Conference to offer a bold vision for the Group’s future. Colonel Ellis proposed opening the unit to all NATO member nations, with each of the Allied nations invited to assign personnel to the 650th. The Initial response was enthusiastic, and the 650th’s leadership shortly thereafter launched formal staffing of the idea.

The proposal stipulated that the 650th MI Group provide workspace, all operational funding, and all computer and communications equipment. In return, each NATO member nation was invited to provide one trained CI agent, of any rank and capable of working in the English language, to serve as a fully integrated member of the unit. Rather than work primarily as liaison officers for their respective nations, Allied personnel would perform the same oper-
Conversion to a Multinational Unit

Once the formal staffing of the multinational proposal was underway, the 650th MI Group began building a new home for Region V, directly adjacent to the Group headquarters. The new Region V building was designed from the ground up as a multinational facility, with most work-
stations located in a single large room thus minimizing physical obstacles to internal communication and information sharing.

All workstations are wired for both the NATO Secret-level Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) network and an internal Local Area Network (LAN) on which all operational reports are written and stored. Separate offices for the Region’s Command Group, as well as an interview room, provide privacy for smaller meetings.

Even after the NAC’s approval of Allied participation in the 650th MI Group, some NATO members remained suspicious that the Group’s multinational Region V would be largely for show, with the 650th’s “real” work being conducted elsewhere. To alleviate those concerns and to emphasize that a dramatically new chapter in NATO CI had begun, Region V held an open house a few months after welcoming the first Allied agents into the unit. The invitees—members of the NATO CI community and the National Military Representatives from SHAPE—saw the Allied personnel working alongside their American counterparts with access to the same computer networks and the same operational files. The result was as hoped, within a year more than half of the NATO nations had assigned an agent to Region V or had made a firm commitment to participate in the near future.

At the same time, the 650th’s new Commander, Colonel Dillon, recognized that the time had already come to build upon Region V’s initial success in converting to a multinational unit. Shortly after assuming command in July 2004, Colonel Dillon announced that the 650th welcomed Allied participation in its two other subordinate headquarters—Region I, supporting NATO’s Joint Forces Command South in Naples, Italy and Region IV, supporting Joint Forces Command North in Brunssum, The Netherlands—as well as in the Group’s detachments supporting NATO’s out-of-area missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Poland and Hungary have recently assigned their second agents to the 650th in Brunssum and Naples, respectively, while Romania and The Netherlands have de-
ployed personnel to serve with the 650th in Afghanistan. In the near future, we expect to welcome an Allied agent to the Group’s Kosovo Detachment as well.

Unlike in the U.S. Army, many NATO nations have no enlisted CI agents, and some restrict CI work to field grade officers. Given these structural differences and the importance each nation would certainly place upon ensuring the success of their initial contributions to the multinational unit, the 650th expected from the outset that the structure would be rank heavy.

In fact, most nations have assigned Lieutenant Colonels to the 650th, with a few nations providing even more senior personnel. Region V’s plan to deal with the influx of senior personnel was to de-emphasize rank and treat all assigned personnel on a first name basis and work in civilian business attire. The result has been better than we had dared to hope, with every participant thus far firmly committed to the success of the multinational endeavor.

While rank has proven to be much less a problem than it might have been, two other issues have required careful attention: experience in the NATO environment and written English language skills. While some of the Allied personnel assigned to the 650th MI Group have lengthy experience in NATO assignments, even those individuals have required training in the 650th’s operational procedures. To help us meet that challenge, we designed our internal LAN to be as much a training tool as our operational backbone.

We created templates for all our standardized reports, so personnel unfamiliar with the formats do not have to start from a blank sheet of paper. We created self-paced training versions of our most commonly used security awareness briefings. With these, unit personnel can sit at their own workstations and not only review the briefings, but also learn the background information that will help them answer questions about the presentations. We also designed the network to maximize use of shared directories so that less experienced personnel can benefit from the work done by more experienced agents.

Since almost everything the unit does must ultimately be documented in some form of a written report, the widely differing English writing skills of the Allied personnel created new editing and proofreading requirements for the native English speakers. It was impractical to send someone to an intensive English course for the first several months of his assignment, so we recognized that we must accept gradual and incremental improvements in written English.

At the same time, we needed to be careful when editing reports written by non-native English speakers, so that we did not discourage their efforts. No one likes to see a final product that bears no resemblance to their first draft. To meet this challenge, we encouraged our native English speakers to work one-on-one as a “desk buddy” with a non-native speaker, talking through a report before the Allied agent tackles an initial draft. Even so, timely publication of a clearly-written report must sometimes take precedence over an English language training opportunity.

The Future

As the 650th MI Group expands the placement of Allied personnel throughout its three regional headquarters, and ultimately to the smaller detachments as well, a distinctly new picture of CI in NATO is beginning to emerge. While the Allied presence still constitutes only ten percent of the 650th’s strength, the additional commitment from the 25 Allied nations will greatly increase the 650th’s ability to support NATO personnel, facilities and activities. As NATO becomes more heavily engaged in out-of-area operations, the need for effective CI coverage—both in garrison and deployed locations—will only increase.

The 650th’s experience suggests that the major obstacles to greater Allied contributions to out-of-area missions are the start-up and overhead costs, particularly for facilities and automated data processing (ADP) support. Over the nearly three years that 650th MI Group personnel have deployed to Afghanistan in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul and the ten years that 650th MI Group personnel have deployed to the Balkans in support of NATO missions in Bosnia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo, we have consistently seen that most nations can support such missions with personnel far more readily than with infrastructure. The 650th’s ability to provide office space and ADP support removes that major obstacle and has been instrumental in our ability to attract Allied contributions to these missions.

As more NATO nations provide personnel to the 650th MI Group, and ideally come to see an assignment with the 650th as an essential element in the career progression of their CI personnel, we hope those nations will also see the value in adopting more common CI policies and procedures. Developing shared standards for the basics, such as report formats, may open the door for greater commonality among NATO nations on more important subjects such as the scope of an individual agent’s routine investigative authority.
The conversion of the 650th MI Group to a multinational unit offers a new model for the CI community. Even though the fundamental principle governing CI in NATO is that it is a national responsibility, the 650th MI Group is creating an environment where sharing CI information and working hand-in-hand with personnel from across the Alliance are simply accepted as routine business.

No nation stands alone against the threats we face today, and we are at our most vulnerable when we cannot bring ourselves to trust and work with our Allies. CI personnel are accustomed to asking themselves if the information they gain can be shared with Allied nations. The 650th MI Group wants to ask instead, “Why can’t we share this information if it will help our collective efforts?”

The 650th MI Group seeks senior, experienced personnel to be part of its team. The 650th’s agents routinely work with national-level CI and security personnel from 26 NATO member nations and have the opportunity to conduct multinational or combined CI operations, investigations, and collection in support of the SACEUR and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

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“Hour by hour, the situation on the ground is improving. Yet the enormity of the task requires more resources and more troops. Today I ordered the Department of Defense to deploy additional active duty forces to the region. Over the next 24 to 72 hours, more than 7,000 additional troops from the 82nd Airborne, from the 1st Cavalry, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force will arrive in the affected areas. These forces will be on the ground and operating under the direct command of General Russ Honore.”

—President George W. Bush, 3 September 2005

Introduction

As an integral part of the 82nd Airborne Division, America’s Strategic Response Force, the 313th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion answered the President’s call in September 2005 to aid in the Joint and Interagency effort in response to the devastation wreaked upon Louisiana by Hurricane Katrina. During Operation ALL AMERICAN ASSIST in support of Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina, the Paratroopers of the 313th MI Battalion demonstrated their flexible and adaptive nature while assisting in disaster relief operations. These Paratroopers epitomize the Chief of Staff of the Army’s vision of Pentathlete leaders capable of conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict.

While supporting operations in Louisiana, 24 percent of the battalion’s personnel were already deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan fighting the Global War on Terror. The story told below represents another chapter highlighting the most recent mission success of the battalion. Throughout its proud history, the 313th MI Battalion has served with distinction and proudly earned its place in history as the Army’s most decorated MI Battalion.

Five days after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, Louisiana, ground troops from the 313th MI Battalion were called on a moment’s notice to deploy to the New Orleans Airport to restore and maintain law and order and assist in the recovery and evacuation efforts. The battalion proudly served as an integral contributor to TF All American

Predeployment Operations

The key leadership of the battalion was alerted by the Division on Saturday, the 3rd of September, for the planned initial deployment of 82nd Airborne Division elements supporting JTF Katrina. After the stand-down of the initial mission on Saturday, they were again alerted on Sunday to participate in the division planning for the introduction of forces into Louisiana. It was not until the early morning hours of Monday, the 5th of September that the battalion received the order to deploy available forces as part of the division hurricane relief effort. On that Monday, the battalion advance party, consisting of 26 personnel, deployed to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) via strategic airlift. Two Amphibious Teams from the Long Range Surveillance Detachment deployed from Fort Bragg and were attached to the 307th Engineer Battalion upon arrival at the JOA to perform search and rescue operations. On the 7th, the Main Body departed Fort Bragg via vehicular road march, arriving at the JOA on the 9th following a 1,006 mile movement. By the 9th the battalion had 190 Soldiers, 73 tactical vehicles, and 31 generators on the ground prepared to support the humanitarian relief effort.

Situation

Following extensive reconnaissance, the battalion identified the Algiers District, where very little attention had been focused initially following the disaster, as an area where we could provide humanitarian assistance with the greatest immediate effect. The community, located on the west bank of the Mississippi River across from the flooded regions of the downtown and the famous French Quarter, received significant wind and rain damage but was not flooded. The neighborhood is predominantly lower income and many of the houses suffered significant damage due to age and poor construction. Streets, overpasses and highway on- and off-ramps where evacu-
ees had sought refuge were clogged with debris such as chairs, bins, luggage, and litter.

Operations

On the 8th of September, the Division G3 created JTF Crimson Dragon, comprised of the 313th's four deployed companies (C, D, E, and HSC), augmented by an engineer heavy equipment platoon of the 62nd Engineer Battalion from Fort Hood, Texas; a forty man contingent from the 4th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron, U.S. Air Force (USAF); two Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPTs) from the 4th PSYOP Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and two Medical Treatment Teams from C Company, 782nd Main Support Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division. The division identified our task to conduct Humanitarian Assistance Operations in the Algiers District of the Orleans Parish with the purpose of assisting the recovery efforts and providing relief to the local inhabitants. The effort in the Algiers District represented a truly successful joint and interagency endeavor. JTF Crimson Dragon worked hand-in-hand with local civil authorities to restore critical facilities and services and establish a civilian presence which accepted responsibility for critical infrastructure from federal forces. These authorities included the Deputy Director of the City Health Department, Dr. Robinson; the Chief of Urgent Care at Louisiana State University Medical Center; State Senator Derrick Sheppard; members of the local school board; local civilian medical care providers; and City Councilwoman Jacquelyn Clarkson.

TF Crimson Dragon conducted Humanitarian Assistance Operations in the Algiers District from 12 through 19 September 2005. During this period, TF Crimson Dragon accomplished the following:

- Cleared debris from 175 square blocks of residential and business areas, resulting in 37 Light-to-Medium Tactical Vehicle and 116 20-ton dump truck loads of debris.
- Cleared debris from nine local schools.
- Cleared debris from four municipal sites (two libraries and two health clinics).
- Established the first Medical Care Assistance Site (MCAS) with the assistance of the Division Surgeon, which saw 569 patients, immunizing 354 people, treating 239 sick, and filling 179 prescriptions. The medical professionals attached to the TF also made 218 house calls and provided an additional 40 immunizations.
- Cleaned, repaired, and expeditiously turned two health clinics (The Arthur Monday and Algiers Health Clinics) over to local doctors who saw an additional 366 patients on the first day of operation, the 19th of September. The USAF Civil Engineers inspected the structural integrity of each clinic prior to occupation and also secured a weather protective tarp to the roof of the Arthur Monday Clinic to ensure it provided a safe environment for medical treatment.
- Produced over 2000 leaflets (by the Division Effects Cell) which were distributed by TF Crimson Dragon Paratroopers and Soldiers of 1/5 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas to advertise the opening of the MCAS and subsequent opening of the two

Paratroopers from Delta Company, 313th MI Battalion pose for a company photo in the Algiers District that they helped clean; provide medical care, food and water; and reopen schools and medical clinics throughout the District.
civilian clinics. Additionally, our two TPTs used their loudspeaker systems to announce the availability of medical care throughout the neighborhoods of Algiers from 12 through 19 September.

- Distributed over 400 cases of water; 100 cases of meals ready to eat (MREs); 300 first aid kits; 64 personal hygiene kits; 800 sundry kits; 800 boxes of cleaning supplies; 100 boxes of clothes donated by the Israeli Government through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and a 40-foot trailer full of clothing and baby items donated by State Senator from District 3, Derrick Sheppard.

- Provided a presence in a dangerous neighborhood which led to a heightened sense of security.

- Provided hope to the local residents that the recovery effort would help to restore some semblance of the life they once had.

- CW3 Randy Ferguson, Senior Human Intelligence Technician in the ACE, served as the Liaison Officer to the New Orleans City Hall and provided continuous and valuable information regarding the restoration of civic services.

- Ten Paratroopers from the Battalion formed the DISE supporting the G2 and Division Command Group with situational awareness, route status, and current information on flood levels within the city.

During the course of operations, TF Crimson Dragon responded to a multitude of requests for assistance from local citizens. Highlights from these quick response missions include:

- Clearing debris from the yard of a disabled retired New Orleans police officer who was isolated in his home due to fallen trees.

- Responding to a report of a downed, live power line located directly adjacent to Landry High School, the site of the first MCAS. Through coordination with nearby linemen, the power line was rendered safe with no casualties.

- Notifying linemen to establish power at the home of an elderly diabetic who was unable to keep his insulin refrigerated.

During this period, the security posture of the Algiers District was so improved by the presence of Paratroopers that one resident remarked that he was able to sleep with his windows open at night for the first time in 25 years simply because he felt it safe enough to do so.

TF Crimson Dragon responded to numerous press inquiries while conducting operations in the Algiers District. These inquiries resulted in Paratrooper interviews and human interest stories with the local residents by ABC, CBS, NPR, MSNBC, 700 Club, USA and the USAF Combat Camera, BBC, the Miami Herald and the New Orleans Times-Picayune.

In addition to operations conducted by TF Crimson Dragon, the 313th MI Battalion’s organic Long Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD) conducted seven days of continuous boat search and rescue operations with two amphibious teams while attached to the 307th Engineer Battalion. The LRSD patrolled 500 city blocks and assisted the California Search and Rescue Task Force with the search of 150 attics looking for stranded survivors from the hurricane. These operations resulted in the evacuation of seven survivors and the geo-location of the remains of four citizens.

**Conclusion**

The rewards that the Paratroopers of the 313th MI Battalion and TF Crimson Dragon received were the smiles, waves, and often an embrace from the thankful citizens of the area. These Paratroopers contributed significantly to the restoration of hope in the Algiers District. The superior performance of duty made the lives of those affected by Hurricane Katrina better—and that is a noble achievement of which we are duly proud. Each and every day our Paratroopers demonstrated their flexibility, compassion, initiative, and complete dedication to get the job done, whatever that job was. There is something special about Paratroopers—we have always known that and now the residents of the Algiers District of Orleans Parish know that as well.

Paratroopers from Charlie Company, 313th MI Battalion assist a family in need to remove debris and a large tree that just missed the house of a local resident.
The Directorate of Doctrine, U. S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, is developing relevant doctrine that supports the Army’s Homeland Security mission and its two distinct but interrelated mission areas—Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS). Currently under development are FMI (Field Manual Interim) Intelligence Support to Homeland Security Operations and FM (Field Manual) Intelligence Support to Civil Support Operations. The Homeland Security doctrine is based upon Lessons Learned from domestic incidents (Hurricane Katrina, etc.) and our already developed Military Intelligence doctrine supporting Army and Joint Task Forces. This doctrine is designed to build upon the G2/S2 knowledge so that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations can support operations across the entire spectrum. Our writers are gathering and fusing information from the field from such units as the G2, 82nd Airborne Division, First Army, Army North (ARNORTH), and the Mississippi National Guard.

Lieutenant Colonel Greg Zellmer is currently the battalion commander of the 313th MI Battalion (now the 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division.) His past assignments include Deputy Commander, 525th MI Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps and Brigade S2, 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division. He holds an MA from the Naval War College, an MA from Boston University, and a BA from Notre Dame University.

Major Ed Box is currently the S3 of the 313th MI Battalion (now the 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division.) His past assignments include ACE Chief, 82nd Airborne Division and G2 TQ, Al Taqqadum, Iraq. He holds an MA in Human Resource Management from the University of San Francisco at Golden Gate and a BS in Business Administration from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

The following is a letter from Mr. and Mrs. Pervel of Algiers to LTC Zellmer, Commander TF Crimson Dragon:

We are writing to you from Algiers Point, New Orleans, residents who were trapped by the storm, surviving a harrowing 10 days in the aftermath. Captain Gorrie, 313th Airborne MI, and the men and women under his command have made their presence felt in our neighborhood. Our gratitude cannot be overstated.

After 10 sleepless days and nights the 313th stands watch over us as we rest. We are sure you fully appreciate what that means. In addition, the 313th has been clearing the debris in our neighborhood streets, even fallen trees in our own backyards nonetheless, helping us to get back to our feet.

In all sincerity, we have never met such fine, respectful, and professional young men and women. Their conduct has singularly restored our faith and morale. They are a credit to the uniform and the Nation.

Algiers Point will never forget.

Respectfully yours,

Vincent Pervel, Jenny Pervel (Miss “P”), Gregg Harris, Gareth Stubbs

Months after Hurricane Katrina and the floods that followed devastated New Orleans, the city continues the long process of recovery.

Editor’s Note: The 313th MI Battalion is now the 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division.
China and the Future of Economic Warfare

by Chief Warrant Officer Two James D. Higday

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense or the U.S. government.
Introduction
The future of warfare may not include missiles, armor, or aircraft, but may actually shift to economic weapons such as commercial shipping and the management of the ports that handle goods around the world. The world economy is completely dependent on shipping and the loading and unloading of goods to and from everywhere on the planet. What if the ships never made it to port? What if the companies running the ports around the world stopped loading and unloading merchandise, just for a few days? What impact would this have on the U.S. economy, let alone the world economy? The U.S. is becoming more and more dependent on goods from China. What if China decided it could utilize its goods to influence a political need? How much power could China have over U.S. policies and interests just by slowing the delivery of goods or the threat of a slow down?

The Panama Canal
On August 15, 1914, the SS Ancon became the first ship to transit the Panama Canal. Little did the crew know how important that crossing and the Panama Canal would become to the world's economy. A ship can now expect to cross from one ocean to another within 8 to 10 hours. This is a time saver compared to the two weeks it took a ship to go around the southern tip of South America before the Canal was built. Since that day ninety-one years ago, over 880,000 ships have transited the waterway. Upwards of 14,000 ships go through the Canal each year and shipping through the canal has increased 6.7 percent from 2004. The Panama Canal/Universal Measurement System (PC/UMS) tonnage was 266,916,576 and for the first time revenue from the canal operation exceeded one billion dollars. Today around 9,000 people are employed by the Panama Canal Authority. The Canal has paid for itself over the decades. Original construction costs reached approximately $375 million. This amount includes the $10 million paid to Panama and $40 million paid to the French company for the rights to the Canal.

In 1977, the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operations of the Panama Canal were signed by U.S. President Carter and Panamanian Chief of Government Torrijos, relinquishing U.S. control over the Canal (to include its military bases) by 2000 and guaranteeing the Canal's neutrality. Since 2000 the transition has gone well. The Panama Canal Authority (ACP) has done a superb job of running the canal. Shipping transits have increased as have much needed revenues. The ACP and the Panama Ports Company (PPC) have invested heavily in the modernization of the Canal and its waterways. The PPC is a subsidiary of the Hutchison Port Holdings Company (HPH) which is owned by the Hong Kong based multi-national Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL). Many Americans cried foul over the Panama Canal Treaty, but the envisioned scenarios of foreign control of the canal and all shipping operations have not come true, yet. Much of the fear was based on the contract signed by the HWL subsidiary PPC. The PPC won the 25 plus year contract through what many saw as a rigged bidding process. In the end, PPC paid ten times what the previous contractor paid for the rights to operate the stevedoring (loading and unloading of cargo) portion of the Canal operations.

HWL's PPC had come in only fourth in the bidding, after the Japanese firm Kawasaki/ITS, the U.S. firm Bechtel, and the Panamanian-American company, MIT. For exclusive control of the two ports, Balboa and Cristobal, PPC agreed to pay $22.5 million a year and Panama's Law Number 5 was passed on January 16, 1997 to confirm the deal. Law
Number 5 violates Article V of the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty which stipulates that only Panama “shall operate the Canal and maintain military forces, defense sites, and military installations within its national territory.” By giving PPC “priority” for its business operations, Article 2.11d of Law Number 5 also violates the treaty’s Article VI, which guarantees “expedited” and “head of line” passage for U.S. warships. Article 2.10c gives the PPC the “right” to operate piloting services, tugs and work boats, which translates into control of all the canal’s pilots. Article 2.10e grants the “right” to control the roads to strategic areas of the Canal, and Article 2.12a grants priority to all piers, including private piers. Article 2.8 gives the PPC the right “to transfer contract rights” to any third party “registered” in Panama. Those rights could be transferred to China, Cuba, Iran, or North Korea.

The PPC operates the ports of Balboa and Cristobal located at each end of the Canal. PPC is committed to transforming the two ports into major hubs to serve the Pacific and Atlantic trade routes. The PPC has invested $200 USD million into the Port of Balboa located on the Pacific side of the Canal. The port of Cristobal, on the Atlantic side, is a multi-purpose port equipped with 2,855 meters of quay for self-sustained operations of containerized cargo, general cargo, bulk and vehicles. A container freight station provides a range of supporting services to shipping line customers. Also a major cruise ship destination, PPC officially opened the Cristobal Cruise Terminal-Pier 6 in 2000.

The ACP controls the Panama Canal; however, Hutchison Whampoa Limited’s PPC can greatly affect the transitions of ships passing through the Panama Canal. Recent reporting indicates that the Panamanian government has decided not to charge PPC the $25 million dollars a year fee to operate the ports of Cristobal and Balboa. This would eliminate over a billion dollars in revenue to the Panamanian government over the 25 to 50 year contract. Panamanian government officials claim that because PPC and HPD have invested so heavily in the canal region they felt it was fair to stop charging the annual dues and additional fees generated by the contract. A report by Credit Suisse-First Boston estimated the losses to government coffers at several billion dollars, mainly because the contract modification represents a loss to the national treasury at a time when government revenues are “collapsing” and the public payroll is expanding, which in turn is likely to lower Panama’s bond rating and thus increase the interest rates on money that the nation government borrows.

Along with control of the Canal ports, PPC has options on all former U.S. military installations located in Panama. PPC is also ten percent owned by China Resources Enterprise with is the commercial arm of China Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation. In testimony given during the 1997 Special Investigation in Connection with the 1996 Federal Election Campaign China Resources Enterprise was named as an “agent of espionage: economic, military, and political for China.”

**HPH Worldwide Operations and COSCO**

Many Americans, to include several politicians, have voiced their concerns over what they consider the Chinese influence over Canal operations. Can PPC halt or delay shipping through the canal? The answer is yes. But the real danger is not within the Panama Canal operations and with a limited halt to operations, but with a worldwide halt to shipping and container operations which is heavily controlled by HWL’s HPH Company and the worldwide operations of the China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO). The worldwide operations and aspirations of HWL, COSCO, and these two corporation’s direct and indirect connections to the Chinese government are the true threat to the world economy, but most importantly to the U.S. economy.

The Panama Canal operations are just one piece in the puzzle when it come to deciphering possible intentions of HWL, HPH, COSCO, and the intentions and influence of the Chinese government over the world economy. A direct military attack on the U.S. from China would be met with a swift retaliation which could cause the collapse of Communist control over China. It is no secret that the government of China and Chinese military officials consider the U.S. an opponent on the world stage. Many reports state Chinese military officials expect future conflict with the U.S. However, China must find a way to eliminate the worldwide power of the U.S without itself being destroyed. This is where economic warfare comes into play.

The best tool the Chinese have at their hands is the control of merchandise not only from China, but through worldwide transportation of goods to the U.S., Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Americas. This is where HWL, her subsidiaries, and COSCO come into play.
HPH owns and operates ports and services to include 214 berths at 36 ports in 19 countries. This includes two ports at the Panama Canal; four in Mexico; two in South Korea; nine in China; four in Hong Kong; three in the United Kingdom; and two in the Netherlands; as well as ports in Freeport, Grand Bahamas; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Damman, Saudi Arabia; Thilawa, Myanmar; Willebroek, Belgium; Duisburg, Germany; Gdynia, Poland; Jakarta, Indonesia; KMT West Port, Malaysia; and Laen Chabang, Thailand. All of these ports are at major choke points for shipping. HPH failed in its bid to purchase the old Long Beach Naval Shipyard from the U.S. government. This would have given HPH unlimited access to the U.S.

The world of HPH covers a broad spectrum of port operations and related service companies spanning the entire globe. With operations and services ranging from container ports, mid-stream operations and river trade to cruise terminals, warehousing, haulage and e-commerce companies, HPH has become a key provider of comprehensive logistics services for the global supply chain. In the Bahamas, HPH and their partner, the Grand Bahamas Development Company (DEVCO), are co-owners of the Grand Bahamas International Airport. The airport has a 15,000 foot runway and can handle the largest aircraft in the world. DEVCO is also 50 percent owned by HPH. HPH subsidiaries and partners are heavily invested in the Grand Bahamas port facilities to include a resort hotel and extensive land holdings.

On April 27, 1961, COSCO was founded in Beijing, China. COSCO vessels service all ports owned and operated by HPH and carry cargo and containers from all over the world into the U.S. COSCO is a seventeen billion dollar a year company operating a fleet of some 600 vessels with an annual traffic volume of more that 270 million tons. As a global company with shipping and modern logistics as the core business, COSCO has hundreds of member unit and service networks, both at home and abroad. In China, COSCO’s wholly-owned subsidiaries in Guangzhou, Shanghai; Tianjin, Qingdao, Dalian, Xiamen, and Hong Kong own and operate various types of ocean shipping fleets for the shipment of containers, bulk carrier, oil tanker as well as specialized carriers. Abroad, with North America, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia, South Africa, and West Asia as lucrative markets linked by shipping routes, COSCO has formed a transnational operation network capable of reaching all major areas of the world. Ships and containers with the conspicuous “COSCO” logo are shuttling cargo among 1,300 ports in more that 160 countries and regions around the world.
the world. COSCO and HWL are partners in several ventures to include the COCSO-HIT (Hong Kong International Terminal) at Kwai Chung.

In 1995, a COSCO vessel, the Empress Phoenix, was boarded by U.S. Customs agents at the U.S. Port of Oakland. The agents seized a cargo of 2,000 AK-47 assault rifles destined for California street gangs. COSCO ships have long served as a vehicle for the transportation of strategic material to allies of Communist China in support of programs such as the development of ballistic missiles, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. British authorities once discovered 10 tons of ammonium perchlorate, a key component of ballistic missile fuel, on its way from Xian, China to Karachi, Pakistan on a COSCO ship. Other COSCO shipments include heavy artillery and ammunition from North Korea to Syria, as well as weapons and spare parts from North Korea and China to both Iran, and previously to Saddam’s Iraq. COSCO is also the Merchant Marine arm of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). HWL’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Li Ka-Shing is also heavily invested in COSCO. Make no mistake: HWL and COSCO are partners linked at the hip.

Li Ka-Shing

All of the information provided on HWL and HPH is courtesy of the HWL website, but what the website does not reveal is the involvement with AsiaSat, a company partly owned by the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). COSTIND is reportedly part owned by the Chinese Army. Li Ka-Shing, HWL’s CEO, assisted in raising funds for the purchase of a Hughes Satellite for AsiaSat along with the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). Li Ka-Shing reportedly owns one-third of AsiaSat.

A Rand corporation report on CITIC noted that the Beijing based investment firm has acted as a front for Poly Technologies Inc., an arms manufacturer owned directly by the Chinese army. “CITIC does enter into business partnerships with and provides logistical assistance to the PLA and defense-industrial companies like Poly,” noted the 1997 report. “Poly Technologies, Ltd. was founded in 1984, ostensibly as a subsidiary of CITIC, although it was later exposed to be the primary commercial arm of the PLA General Staff Department’s Equipment Sub-Department,” the report continues.
Many believe the 72 year old Shing will make a deal with anyone as long as he can profit. Some believe that he is partnered with the Communist government of China. The business world views him as one of the top managers in the world, and reportedly he has not failed in any business since starting HWL. All of this would fit well into any conspiracy theorists mind, but there is no direct evidence that Li Ka-Shing is anything but a great businessman. Most analysts would look at the situation this way—HWL is a publicly traded company, COSCO is a publicly traded company, and it is very doubtful that the stockholders would want the ships to stop mid-ocean or the ports to halt the stevedoring at the Panama Canal or any other port owned by HPH. In other words there is too much money being made all over the world for Li Ka-Shing or his companies to want to shut it down for the political needs of one government. So why all the fuss over this businessman and his association with the Chinese government?

Pieces of the Puzzle
HWL, COSCO, CITIC, COSTIND—All these are pieces in a puzzle. All of these pieces could come together if the Chinese government’s economic and political plans are derailed in any way. China’s economy is like a runaway freight train. If not controlled properly, it could overheat and crash. This could lead to the collapse of the Communist government. The key to this freight train is oil. Vast amounts of energy are needed to keep the Chinese economy moving forward. The oil needs of the Chinese economy are sapping reserves from the rest of the world. Oil prices are not up just because the oil companies want more profits.

It is basic supply and demand. China’s needs are driving prices up. The Washington Times reports that “China is so concerned about future energy needs that it is building up military forces and setting up bases along sea lanes from the Middle East to project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments. China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives.” Reportedly, the Washington Times obtained a copy of a report titled “Energy Futures in Asia.” The internal report stated that China is adopting a “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties stretching from the Middle East to southern China.”

Conclusion
China must protect the oil shipments at all costs and this is where economic warfare comes into play. If the U.S. puts up a naval blockade to stop oil shipments from reaching China because of conflict between China and Taiwan or for any other military reason, then China could watch its economy collapse and along with it, control over the country. If China strikes militarily, then we have a world war which would most likely lead to a collapse of the Chinese economy. China’s best weapon is economic warfare; it has influence over a vast majority of the goods that criss-cross the oceans. If the COSCO ships stopped mid-ocean, if the Panama Canal was blocked, and all the ports worldwide stopped loading and unloading containers, then the U.S. and the world economy would surely collapse. The end game is that the world could be held hostage by two companies who are very friendly with the Chinese government.

Endnotes
1. The two treaties can be read at http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/panama/pa_appnb.html.

CW2 James D. Higday has served in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. CW2 Higday has also served with the former Third U.S. Army Counter Terrorism Crisis Action Team, the former Sixth U.S. Army counter Drug Task Force, and with Naval Special Warfare. He holds a BA in Business and can be reached at james.d.higday@us.army.mil.
Introduction
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) has become a lead element for Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and has embraced the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) stewardship of GEOINT as its functional manager. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G2, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the U.S. Army Engineering Topographic Center (TEC) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia and the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri have also embraced NGA GEOINT stewardship. The intent is for all partners to bring to life the “space to mud” GEOINT enterprise. All partners are currently engaged with the USAIC&FH Cradle To Grave (C2G) study, assessing and resolving GEOINT impacts on Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF).

The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the HQDA G2 as the geospatial lead in May 2004, with TRADOC Program Integration Officer–Terrain Data and the U.S. Army Engineer Center at Fort Leonard Wood as Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S) lead. The USAIC&FH Commanding General, MG Barbara Fast, designated GEOINT as an intelligence discipline in February 2006. That set into motion many very fast-paced and simultaneous efforts to capitalize and further develop GEOINT. In early March 2006 with the CG’s guidance, the Deputy Commandant, Mr. Jerry V. Proctor and the USAIC&FH Senior IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) Advisor, CW4 Thomas R. Dostie, developed the USAIC&FH–NGA Engagement Plan. It was subsequently briefed to, and garnered support from, the senior managers of NGA, (including the former Director of NGA, Lieutenant General (Retired) Clapper) resulting in an evolving and extremely successful partnership. The U.S. Army was the first military service and Department of Defense (DOD) organization to fully embrace NGA stewardship of GEOINT, recognizing it as the GEOINT functional manager and supporting the creation of a GEOINT Enterprise system much like the NSA model. By March 29, 2006, the C2G completed a full DOTLMPF assessment of GEOINT impacts with goals to “identify, facilitate, and integrate solutions” within six months.

In early April 2006 the USAIC&FH-U.S. Army Engineer GEOINT memorandum of agreement (MOA) was drafted, in June 2006 the MOA was signed. An important part of the MOA was the agreed upon definition of GEOINT as: “Intelligence derived from the exploitation, analysis, and fusion of imagery with geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities in the battlespace. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial information.” The definition is important since many organizations and soldiers in the field thought that they could globally replace IMINT with GEOINT. IMINT will always remain a separate and distinct intelligence discipline but when combined with GI&S data (normally a terrain analysis function) or products then that item or function becomes GEOINT. GEOINT consists of Electro-Optical (EO); Advanced Geospatial Intelligence (AGI), also referred to as imagery-derived MASINT; Overhead Non-Imaging Infra-red (ONIR); Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR); Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S); Moving Target Indicator (MTI); Infrared (IR), and Full Motion Video (FMV).
The GEOINT Enterprise

Why embrace and help create the GEOINT Enterprise? As previously mentioned, both USAIC&FH (with HQDA G-2 approval) and NGA are both striving to create a GEOINT Enterprise based on the NSA model to primarily benefit the warfighter with increased speed, context, accuracy, depth, and synchronization of intelligence. There is much synergy to be gained from partnering with a National agency. NGA is the GEOINT Functional Manager, from the top down, complying with DOD Directive 5105.60 establishing NIMA (now NGA) as the Intelligence Community (IC) IMINT Functional Manager. This would ensure tactical information access, partnership, and sharing from the bottom up. For example, NGA is precluded by law from acquiring ground still-photography, but Army Military Intelligence (MI) Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2), etc. can acquire ground still-photography and allow NGA to access information which NGA is authorized to store, retrieve, manipulate, and exploit. Army MI could benefit with resources down to the last tactical mile to ensure fully functional GEOINT operations.

The GEOINT Enterprise would also ensure all partners operate under common standards, as directed by Joint Publication 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations, further ensuring information sharing, system compatibility, and interoperability called for in the Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) concept. Teaming of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) personnel would consolidate all ground component requirements and allow for enhanced and more efficient NGA/military response. Army could leverage NGA in order to enhance GEOINT with an extension of the NGA College (NGC) at Fort Huachuca with a goal (which is in the early exploratory stages) of having NGA designate Fort Huachuca training as the GEOINT Center of Excellence for the IC. More to follow on that subject in later issues.

MI and Engineer Partnership

The whole is more than the sum of MI plus Engineers. This partnership includes the two proponents working very closely together on all efforts (as we have for quite sometime now). For instance, both proponents are diligently working on forming GEOINT Cells in field units, especially brigade combat teams (BCTs), to have Imagery and Terrain Analysts working side-by-side to provide advanced GEOINT support for the warfighter. Engineer soldiers will have access to MI communications, fusing the many sources of intelligence to improve their products. MI soldiers will have great terrain tools to utilize in their efforts to support the commanders and individual soldiers in the field. Current projections for the BCT GEOINT Cell are four MOS 21U (Terrain Analyst) and up to eight MOS 96D/H (Imagery Analyst/Common Ground Station Operator) soldiers.

In case you missed it, the Digital Topographic Support System’s (DTSS) (the primary system used by Terrain Analysts) future requirements were all designated to be placed inside of the MI flagship system, the DCGS-A, by HQDA several years ago. Of course, MI re-
quests all terrain requirements from the Engineer proponent for inclusion inside the DCGS-A. So no matter what, Terrain Analysts (soon to be called Geospatial Analysts) will be working side-by-side not only with IMINT soldiers as called for in the GEOINT Cell structure but, in effect, with all MI soldiers working with DCGS-A.

GEOINT Training

The Intelligence Center has also reconfigured GEOINT training in record time to reflect what needs to be accomplished now. A Critical Task Site Selection Board (CTSSB) met in mid-December 2005 with over 75 IMINT soldiers from all over the world participating in an entire relook at all Critical Task List (CTL) skills needed for MOS 96D and 350G soldiers. Many new tasks such as FMV Imagery Exploitation, MTI exploitation, Imagery architecture tasks, etc. and corresponding supervisory tasks were added to the CTL. Normally it takes several months for senior leaders to read through and approve such dramatic changes. During that time the IMINT training sections taking the initiative, began revising training, acquiring equipment, and writing lesson plans and practical exercises prior to approval and had new training for the GEOINT Cells up and running by mid-January 2006. This training development and implementation was considerably sped up by utilizing and combining resources with the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JI-CTC). This is an excellent example of internal teaming across many company, battalion, brigade, and Intelligence School boundaries; all commanders supported this complex undertaking of a very short-notice project.

GEOINT Training now consists of an IMINT section working in an integrated and collaborative Analysis and Control Element (ACE) environment where students simultaneously exploit FMV and MTI radar returns, cross-cue multiple sensors such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), and produce digital reports including Imagery Derived Products (IDP) and video clips within the DCGS-A concept design. Students also learn basic UAS flight operations on Multiple User Simulation Environment (MUSE) systems to ensure they understand what our (now Aviation) UAS operators do and

![Figure 1. Components of GEOINT.](image-url)
their own roles when working together during a mission. Students learn how to employ the mIRC (Internet relay chat) function and voice communications with the secure Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) to ensure all means available are employed.

The training is geared towards Skill Level (SL) 10 but many tasks trained are at SL 20 (for which there is no course) and SL 30 which will soon have staff sergeants attending as part of their Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course Phase 2 training. Many SL 40 Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course students from three different MOSs (96D, 96H, 96U) have been trained and have given positive feedback including some that stated it was the best training they ever received in their entire careers. Warrant Officer UAV Technicians also stated the same about their training. Our Deputy Commandant for Training and the 11th MI Brigade Commander all support instructing soldiers in upper level skills above what may be their current rank since many will be placed in positions of responsibility sooner rather than later. Soon all 350Gs (Imagery Intelligence Technician) will attend the same training at JI-CTC as part of their Technical Certification course.

Beginning in October or November 2006, we will bring MOS 21U soldiers from Fort Belvoir to train in the GEOINT Cell. This is a first within the GEOINT community. So far our training has been observed by many senior NGA manage and analysts, including many NGC officials, and has been recognized as the leader in GEOINT training throughout the entire IC. NGA has started the push to begin the process of designating Fort Huachuca as the IC GEOINT Center of Excellence. Deploying NGA analysts will train with the GEOINT Cell prior to arriving in Theater where they will work with Army units. The Intelligence Center trains 668 IMINT commissioned officers, warrant officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers each year.

Final Thoughts

NGA will support USAIC in writing GEOINT doctrine but is emphasizing the need for the Army to coordinate all GEOINT doctrine products with the USMC to ensure that the total ground component requirements for doctrine agree. NGA is also requiring that U.S. Army GEOINT doctrine is sent to NGA so that it can be integrated in NGA's doctrine. In effect, NGA has outsourced parts of its own GEOINT doctrine development to USAIC. This is a great collaborative endeavor; sounds like a GEOINT Enterprise!

CW4 Dostie is the Senior Imagery Advisor to Senior Leadership at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He is a graduate of many advanced Imagery Analysis courses to include the Advanced Imagery Interpretation and Advanced Sensor Imagery Courses, Wiesbaden, Germany; the NATO Equipment Identification Course, Bergstrom AFB, Texas; The Defense Sensor and Imagery Applications Training Program (DSIATP), Goodfellow AFB, Texas; and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) Operator, Maintenance, and Supervisor Courses, Minneapolis, Minnesota and Scottsdale, Arizona. He also graduated and qualified as an inspector/escort in the On-Site Inspection Agency for the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the Conventional Force Reduction in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START). Assignments include tours at Palmerola Air Base, Honduras; the 2nd Infantry Division, Korea; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the United Nations Command (UNC), and the Combined Forces Command (CFC), Yongsan, Korea. CW4 Dostie can be reached at (520)538-4071 or at Thomas.dostie@us.army.mil.

- FM 2-0, Intelligence.
- FM 2-22.5, Imagery Intelligence.

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Transformation and Modularity provide the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps with opportunities to continue evolving as a ready and relevant Corps. This change provides us a chance to solve some of our issues with Enlisted Standards of Grade and to fine tune our MI Military Occupational Skills (MOS); to refine our practices on how we access our Warrant Officers, and to improve our Officer Professional Development Systems. The three major changes that are coming in Fiscal Year (FY) 06 are:

- Mergers, transfers, and deletions in several enlisted MOSs.
- Prerequisite changes in Warrant Officer Accessions.
- The functional realignment of our Officer branches along with a change from Branch Qualification to Key Developmental Assignments.

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) is dedicated to building a better Corps for you and will continue to give our best efforts to that end. OCMI offers the following information to help keep you current with any new actions that affect your career progression as well as to let you know what is going on in the Corps.

Enlisted Professional Development Opportunities

**Enlisted Promotions:** Congratulations to our senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) selected for appointment to Command Sergeant Major (CSM), selected for Sergeant Major (SGM), and selected for attendance at the U.S. Army’s Sergeants Major Academy. The board selected one MI professional for appointment to CSM and ten for promotion to the rank of SGM out of 109 Soldiers considered. The overall Army selection rate was 12.7 percent. An updated list of promotion topics and results for the Enlisted promotion board can be found online at the HRC website located at https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/select/enlisted.htm#cpi.

Looking down the road, the Army’s transformation to a Modular Force is expected to change the number of CSM and SGM positions. In comparing current Regular Army force to the approved six MI Battalion Modular Force of the future, our CSM positions go from 37 to 28 positions. However, when comparing the SGM positions, they go from 80 positions to 86 positions. Compared together there is only a net loss of three E9 positions.

**Standards of Grade:** Standards of Grade (SG) is a term frequently used in the Personnel Proponent business that is often misunderstood in its importance to the health of our Enlisted Corps. All enlisted MOSs are structured against a standard Army pyramid that provides sufficient Soldiers at each grade to feed promotions while accounting for normal attrition. Maintaining a healthy SG greatly assists or debilitates a healthy MOS. This is particularly true if the required MOS pyramid is significantly under strength at Skill Level (SL) 10—the base of the pyramid. The MOS will then likely experience long term fill challenges at the higher grade positions. The over-structure of grade requirements at SLs 20/30/40/ or 50 may contribute to rapid promotion rates, but not necessarily with NCOs who have the depth of experience expected. When a conflict of over-structured (Example: 40% over-structured at skill level 30) versus under-structured (Example: 10% under-structured at skill level 40) grade requirements occurs, then promotions to Sergeant First Class (SFC) will slow and could become stagnant.

SG guidance is found in **DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, 31 May 1999**, and provides the rules that drive the composition of a section. DA Pam 611-21 also provides valuable information specific to each MOS, including duty description by skill level, physical demands, MOS qualifications, and additional skill identifiers. As leaders, it is important that you understand both the enlisted pyramid and how SG drive the composition of a section and influence the health of your MOS. Ultimately, everyone wants a knowledgeable and proficient leader within their section. We must remember that part of leadership is teaching and mentoring Soldiers in an effort to create that Soldier—starting at SL 10.
**Upcoming Board Schedule:** The FY06 Enlisted Army Promotion Board schedule is as follows:

- SFC, 31 January to 24 February 2006
- CSM/SGM, 6 to 27 June 2006
- MSG, 3 to 26 October 2006

**Warrant Officer Professional Development Opportunities**

Many changes continue to occur within the Warrant Officer (WO) Corps. The increased demand for our technical skills and the chronic shortages affecting a number of MI WO MOSs has Chief of Staff of the Army visibility. Because of the senior leadership focus, a number of initiatives and solutions are being staffed to slow the negative impact shortages are having on the conduct of the war, on our officers, and on the Army’s transformation efforts. In the following paragraphs I will explain the status of some of these actions.

**Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) and Accessions Bonus:** The Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, asked that both CSRB and Accessions bonuses be established to help mitigate the shortages in MI WO numbers. These two bonus programs are intended to slow the exodus of senior WOs while, at the same time, encouraging technically proficient NCOs to apply for the program. Although it is a bit early to judge the effectiveness of these two programs, potentially they will have a significant impact on the Army’s effort to fix our persistent shortage problems. MOSs under consideration for the Accessions bonus are:

- 350F, All Source Analysis Technician
- 351L, Counterintelligence Technician
- 351M, Human Intelligence Technician
- 351Y, Area Intelligence Technician
- 352N, Traffic Analysis Technician
- 353T, IEW Systems Maintenance Technician

**Shortage of CW4s:** It is a well known fact that the majority of Soldiers (NCO, WO, Officer) retire between 20 and 23 years active federal service (AFS). There are many reasons for this trend but it is mostly to start a second career. Because MI NCOs are accessed into the WO program so late in their careers (between 11 and 12 years AFS), they are CW3s by the time they reach the 20 year retirement point. It is impossible to “grow” senior WOs by continuing to access so late. To remedy that trend we will be focusing the accession process on the younger NCOs with between 5 and 8 years AFS. I know that this has been a lofty goal in the past. However, it is becoming clear that, as a Corps, we must start implementing the Army Training and Leader Development Program (ATLDP). I understand that there are many concerns with accessing younger NCOs. The Vice Chief of Staff Army recognized this as well but went on to state during a meeting with CW5s, “A year of combat experience is worth three years of garrison experience.” You can expect to start seeing the results of this move starting with this year’s Accessions Boards.

**P-2 Profile:** Technically proficient MI NCOs with P-2 physical profiles may now submit a waiver request to attend Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS). Approval of this waiver is not automatic. The decision will continue to be heavily dependent on the nature to the P-2 profile and the NCOs ability to complete the physical requirements of schooling and the MOS. But, the door has been opened to allow otherwise fully qualified Soldiers to not let this stand in their way should they be interested in a WO career.

**Upcoming Warrant Officer Boards:** The opportunity to become a WO in MI has never been better. Those NCOs interested in becoming WOs should contact the WO Recruiting Team at http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/ for information. The FY06 WO Accessions Boards will be held during:

- January 2006
- March 2006
- July 2006
- September 2006

The next WO Promotion Board will be:

- CWO 3/4/5, 31 January to 24 February 2006
Officer Professional Development

**Officer Promotions:** MI Officer promotion rates for captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels are expected to remain high for the next couple of years. Nevertheless, understanding how the Army functions at the company and battalion levels is critical to an officer’s growth as a commissioned officer. And while much has been published recently about the changes that are being made to the officer career program under the Officer Professional Management System III, much still remains the same.

**Lieutenants:** Lieutenants must still demonstrate their leadership skills through troop leading and technical proficiency. However, it is not enough to be able to lead as an MI officer without also becoming fully knowledgeable of MI Systems.

**Captains:** Successful completion of the MI Officer Transition Course (MIOTC) for the branch detailed officer and the MI Captains Career Course (MICCC) for both detail and MI single-tracked officers is necessary. There is no longer a requirement for captains to complete 24 months in an MI coded position in addition to company/detachment command. However, captains must continue to aggressively seek the key developmental MI assignments and experience that will qualify them for promotion. Promotion boards will be placing greater emphasis on technical competence as demonstrated by successful completion of “core” MI assignments. The following positions are considered key developmental assignments for all MI captains: company/detachment command, Battalion S2, S2X, Collection Manager, Brigade Combat Team A/S2, and an assignment as a Combat Training Center observer/controller. The most crucial attribute of any officer selected for promotion remains performance but seeking the hard and challenging Intelligence jobs seems to be carrying more weight.

**Majors:** Majors will attend the resident Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Course. Upon completion of ILE, majors are still expected to aggressively prepare for and seek the skills and experience that will prepare them for duties as a lieutenant colonel. Majors, more than any other rank today, must experience continuous self-development in order to fully master all aspects of operations, including Joint and multinational operations. As stated earlier, skills and experience will drive an officer’s career path and future. The following are considered key developmental assignments for MI majors: ACE Chief, S2 of a Brigade Combat Team/Regiment/Group, Executive Officer or S3 of any Battalion/Brigade/Group, G2 Planner, Deputy G2, Joint Staff (35 coded position), and Army Staff (35 coded position).

**Functional Area (FA) 34 (Strategic Intelligence Officer):** FA 34 officers must complete or receive constructive credit for the Strategic Intelligence Officers Course (non-MI Officers), the Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP), and become Military Education Level (MEL) 4 and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 1 qualified. They are expected to be regional experts and must demonstrate an ability to perform analysis at the joint task force (JTF) to National level. They need to be able to build and shape intelligence networks from JTF to National level as well as to support counterterrorism and force protection operations.

**2nd and 3rd Quarter 2006 Officer Selection Boards:**
- Colonel Command, 10 to 20 January 2006
- Senior Service College (SSC), 4 to 28 April 2006
- Career Field Designation (CFD) (Year Group (YG) 1997 and 1998 (T)), 23 May to 16 June 2006
- CFD (YG 1999 and 2004 (T)), 12 to 29 September 06

**OCMI Points of Contact**

The point of contact (POC) for enlisted actions is SGM John Corley, readers may contact him via email at john.corley@us.army.mil. The POC for Warrant Officer actions is CW5 Prewitt-Diaz, readers may contact him via email at james.prewitt@us.army.mil. The POC for officer actions is Ms. Borghardt, readers may contact her via email at charlotte.borghardt@us.army.mil. Interested readers can reach the OCMI website at https://cms.portal.hua.army.mil/channels/OCMI/Webpage/index.htm. You will be able to find information on issues ranging from enlisted career field overviews to officer, WO, and civilian updates.

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*Lieutenant Colonel Earnest Bazem. Readers may contact him via email at earnest.bazemore@us.army.mil.*
Sent from a D.E. Stewart, care of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) (Portugal), War Department, Washington, D.C. Note the envelope was sent from Portugal to the U.S. with Portuguese stamps but is postmarked January 4, 1943, Washington, D.C. On the front of the envelope there is a box acknowledging the letter was “PASSED BY THEATER U.S. ARMY EXAMINER No. 63” with the censor’s initials.

The envelope is sealed at the left side with a label “OPENED BY ARMY U.S. EXAMINER No. ____.”

The enclosed letter written in Lisbon on December 10, 1942 mentions only personal matters about friends and family. It does instruct the recipient to address letters to Officer Stewart and to “... place no return address on it whatsoever, and write nothing else, except the above address...”

Mark Sommer holds a BA in Political Science from Yeshiva University and an MA in International Relations from Fairleigh Dickinson University. He teaches at Stevens Institute of Technology in the Humanities Department. His published works in the intelligence field include: “Getting the Message Through: Clandestine Mail and Postage Stamps”, MIPB, October – December, 1992 and “Undercover Addresses of World War II”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Fall 1993.
This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the Military Intelligence and Intelligence Communities (IC).

Articles about current operations and exercises; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and equipment and training are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical perspectives; problems and solutions; and short "quick tips" on better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change the way we operate.

When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the following into consideration:

- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 words, double-spaced with normal margins without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles.
- Although MIPB targets themes, you do not need to "write" to a theme.
- Please note that submissions become property of MIPB and may be released to other government agencies or nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request.

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- A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain OR that the accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified/FOUO. Once we receive your article, we will send you a sample form to be completed by your security personnel.
- A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published.
- Your article in MS Word. Do not use special document templates.
- A Public Affairs release if your installation or unit/agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.

- Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic. We need complete captions (the who, what, where, when, why, and how), photographer credits, and the author’s name on photos. Please do not embed graphics or photos within the article’s text, attach them as separate files such as.tif or .jpg. Please note where they should appear in the article.
- The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address, and phone numbers with the biography.

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Upcoming Themes and Deadlines

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The 138th Military Intelligence (MI) Company (JSTARS) traces its beginnings to the Army Security Agency (ASA) as a Radio Research Unit (RRU) operating in Vietnam. As part of the 224th Aviation Battalion (RR), 509th RR Group, the 138th ASA Company (Aviation) was constituted and activated as the 138th Aviation Company on June 1, 1966 at Da Nang, Vietnam in support of I Corps. The LEFT JAB (JU-21A) system aircraft were assigned to the company which also flew and operated the RU-8D and RU-21D WINEBOTTLE and CEFISH PERSON system aircraft. The only fixed-wing ASA airplane shot down in Vietnam with loss of life was a LEFT JAB JU-21A that was shot down on March 4, 1971. In addition to the LEFT JAB loss, the 138th suffered other losses. On December 29, 1967, an RU-8D assigned to the 138th crashed on takeoff killing Warrant Officer 1 Milton W. Smith and Warrant Officer 1 Jonathan P. Shaffer.

The unit was awarded a Meritorious Unit Commendation by the U. S. Navy for its support to the III Marine Amphibious Force from May 1, 1967 to July 31, 1969. A LEFT JAB aircraft from the 138th Aviation Company flew the last airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) mission in South Vietnam on February 16, 1973 in the vicinity of Pleiku, Vietnam.

The 138th Aviation Company was inactivated in Vietnam on March 1, 1973. Post-Vietnam, it became the 138th ASA Company (Aviation) at McCoy AFB, Orlando, Florida on April 15, 1974 and was assigned to the 81st U.S. Army Reserve Command. Subsequently, McCoy AFB became the Orlando International Airport where the unit operated seventeen RU-8D WINEBOTTLE aircraft until 1979. After a stint with the 156th RR Company at Fort Bliss, Texas, the two surviving JU-21A aircraft also followed the 138th to Florida where they were operated until the mid-1980s. Later, the unit acquired updated RU-21 A/B CEFIRM LEADER aircraft which were used until September 1993.

The 138th was awarded the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) Director’s Trophy in 1983. It was also awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) for its support of counter narcotic missions in the Caribbean from November 1989 to September 1990. In October 1990 the unit was activated for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as part of 201st MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade and received a Meritorious Unit Commendation for the period of November 1990 through May 1991.

After the CEFIRM LEADER System was retired in 1993, the unit transitioned to the RC-12G (nicknamed CRAZYHORSE), a platform that had been operated by Bravo Company, 204th MI Battalion (Low Intensity), in Honduras. The RC -12Gs were flown until 30 September 1998 when RC-12G Tail Number 23380 flew the last mission. The mission equipment for the three RC-12G aircraft was removed and the aircraft were ferried to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for retirement on October 12, 1998. RC-12G 23379 has since been flown to Fort Bliss, Texas where the 204th MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) will memorialize it. The U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona has acquired RC-12G 23372 for the same purpose. The third aircraft, 23380, remains in storage at Fort Sill.

Until September 16, 1994 the official name of the unit was the 138th ASA Company (Aviation), although now known by most as the 138th Aviation Company (Electronic Warfare). This made it the last unit still designated as an ASA unit. On September 16, 1994 the unit became the 138th MI Company (Aerial Exploitation). Formal inactivation of the unit occurred on April 10, 1999.

The unit was reactivated on September 18, 2004 as the 138th MI Company (JSTARS) at Robins AFB, Georgia. It is the only unit in the Army to fly on the E-8C, a Boeing 707 airframe that is part of the Joint STARS system. The 138th provides near real-time moving target indicator (MTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery to Army and Marine Corps units. The company has flown in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Soldiers from the 138th have been deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM consistently from the beginning of hostilities to the present.