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742d MI Battalion |

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Always Out Front

by Major General Barbara G. Fast
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In the last issue of **MIPB**, I wrote about the complexities we, as intelligence professionals, must account for in analyzing all of the varied aspects of the environment (to include cultural awareness), the threat, and the dynamics/effects of friendly operations within the operational environment. The importance of these factors is especially important in a stability and reconstruction operation with emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. We face many challenges beyond the intelligence analysis and cultural understanding complexities that I briefly touched on.



Continuing with this line of thought, TRADOC has recently made significant progress within emerging doctrine related to the intelligence warfighting function and the staff's requirements to address civil considerations throughout the operations process. By the time this article is published, TRADOC should have approved **FMI 5-0.1, The Operations Process**. From an intelligence perspective, three of the most important doctrinal changes in the manual pertain to how intelligence as a function includes civil considerations. This line of thought also coincides with the recent articulation of the concept of "complex environments" as a part of the Army Intelligence Campaign Plan.

FMI 5-01.5, The Operations Process

In many areas **FMI 5-0.1** integrates the Army's most recent experiences and lessons and bridges current doctrine in **FM 3-0, Operations**, **FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production**, **FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**, and **FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List** to emerging doctrine that is coming from the revision of **FM 3-0**. **FMI 5-0.1** is not intended to replace the body of current command and control (C2) doctrine; it expands C2 doctrine regarding decision making, assessment, and exercising C2 during execution. Currently, as a draft product the structure of the manual is—

- ❑ Chapter 1 discusses the Army's operational concept, introduces the warfighting functions, and provides a doctrinal position for integrating effects into the operations process.
- ❑ Chapter 2 provides doctrine for organizing C2 systems for operations based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC). It provides a taxonomy for command post (CP) structure and general guides for the role and functions of CPs and cells within CPs.
- ❑ Chapter 3 expands the operations process, including how several processes integrate during the planning, preparing, executing, and assessment activities of an operation. It reinforces the commander's role in exercising C2 and the staff's role in supporting the commander and subordinate commanders.
- ❑ Chapter 4 broadens the doctrine for exercising C2 during execution established in **FM 6-0**. It introduces the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process.
- ❑ Chapter 5 provides doctrine for assessment, including tactics, techniques, and procedures for assessing operations.
- ❑ Appendix A discusses each warfighting function.
- ❑ Appendix B expands doctrine on full spectrum operations, to include planning considerations for stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations.
- ❑ Appendix C expands the discussion of METT-TC analysis. It broadens the discussion of civil considerations to include adjusting the component parts of civil considerations.
- ❑ Appendix D describes how to think in terms of desired and undesired effects to help solve tactical problems. It provides doctrine for crafting mission and task statements that clearly describe the commander's intended effects.

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CSM Forum

by Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich
U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps



Training Intelligence in Today's Operating Environment

"I don't mean to sound perverse, but there is maybe a certain nostalgia for the old style of terrorism where there wasn't the threat of loss of life on a massive scale..."

—Bruce Hoffman,
RAND Corporate Chair and Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency



Today's intelligence analysts face enemies who are transnational, networked, well-funded, infinitely patient, sophisticated, disciplined, well trained, extremely tough to penetrate, unpredictable, totally ruthless, and extremely lethal. Perhaps most importantly, terrorists are completely unrestrained by our moral and legal considerations. In the "good old days" as Mr. Hoffman alludes to, terrorists did not want a lot of people dead — they wanted a lot of people watching. Now they want a lot of people dead, and there is no distinction between civilians and soldiers or between combatants and innocent children. It is vital that our Military Intelligence (MI) professionals understand the current threat and its associated terminology.

"Transnational" means without geographical boundaries — there are no real state borders or political restraints, the world is the terrorist's playground. Al Qaeda has a global network of trained operatives established in close to 100 countries. Al Qaeda (whose operatives are predominantly Sunni) also subcontracts work to other terrorist groups, including Shiite terrorist groups.

"Networked" means a flat, diffused, non-hierarchical structure. There is no apparent "boss" in the organization's architecture. The operational cells are also small and independent.

Terrorist organizations in the past often relied on state sponsors for funding, equipment, and logistical support. Estimates of Osama bin Laden's personal wealth range as high as \$200 million. He has managed to leverage his inheritance approximately \$50 million by investing in legitimate construction and agricultural businesses. Some Islamic charities and philanthropists have also contributed (wittingly and unwittingly) millions of dollars to Al Qaeda. Hawala, an ancient underground banking system which allows money transfers without money movement,

makes following the money trail particularly difficult.

Modern terrorists will wait for years to attack a target. Al Qaeda began casing targets in Nairobi as early as December 1993 for an attack that occurred on 7 August 1998. The first World Trade Center attack occurred in February 1993 and the follow-on attacks occurred 11 September 2001.

The sophistication behind the seemingly simplistic method of the 9/11 attacks could be easy to underestimate. For a small number of very determined, flight-trained, English-speaking terrorists armed only with box cutters to simultaneously transform four common means of conveyance into four very large "suicide bombs" targeting innocent civilians in strategic locations on American soil was unthinkable — at least for Americans. Almost none of these terrorists fit the "normal" profile; they were wealthy, well-educated young men with bright futures, not society's dispossessed.

The other characterizations I've made about our new enemies are self-explanatory and I could cite

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Technical Perspective

by Chief Warrant Officer Five James J. Prewitt-Diaz
U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps



I opened my last article by stating the obvious — change happens. Many developments have occurred to the Warrant Officer (WO) Corps recently. The increased demand for our technical and leadership skills and the critical shortages affecting a number of Military Intelligence WO Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) has the visibility of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA) and Secretary of the Army. Because of the senior leadership's focus, a number of initiatives and solutions are being staffed in order to mitigate the negative impact these shortages have on the conduct of the war, our officers, and the Army's transformation.

It is a fact that in past years Military Intelligence (MI) has consistently missed the WO accession goals. This condition has significantly increased technical leadership shortages in our units. The Army has recognized this and has enacted many initiatives to correct this situation. As a result there are many positive indicators that point to a reversal in WO shortages. The number of qualified noncommissioned officers (NCOs) applying for the MI WO program has increased. In FY 05, the MI Corps met its WO accession mission for the first time in recent years and this year we expect to meet or exceed last year's numbers. Although not an immediate fix to our shortages, it is a very good thing. I want to thank all of you who contributed to this achievement. The challenge is that we must sustain the recruiting effort for the next two years in order to provide a sufficient number of WOs to support our transforming Army. In the following paragraphs I will explain some of the ongoing initiatives that our leadership is considering in order to alleviate the shortage of WOs.

Direct Appointment Board

For the first time in our Army's history the Secretary of the Army approved a one-time only Department of



the Army (DA) centralized direct appointment board for MOS 351E. Direct appointments before 1984 were decentralized. This decision is by no means an optimal solution to the Army's shortage of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Technicians. The decision to convene the board was made based on immediate Army combat contingency needs for HUMINT-skilled officers. The board considered a pool of highly qualified 97E (HUMINT Collector) NCOs for their potential to become WOs. A number of these NCOs were selected and will be assigned to combat formations upon promotion to WO1.

If you have any of these directly appointed WO1s, please take the time and mentor them and set them on the path to success. *Remember*, these were highly qualified NCOs that, had they applied for WO, would have been selected. We plan to give them a short transition course while they are here at Fort Huachuca but that is about the only additional officer transition training they will receive.

Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB)

The United States Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) requested the DA G1 to approve CSRBs for senior MI WOs in shortage MOSs. The proposal received the support of the CSA and was approved in May of 2005. The MOSs benefiting from the bonus are 350F (All-Source Intelligence Technician), 351L (Counterintelligence Technician), and 351M (HUMINT Technician). We anticipate requesting additional MI WO specialties at a later date. This CSRB will help curve the drain of senior MI WOs while the Army develops options to fix our accessions and long-term retention challenge.

Warrant Officer Accession Bonus

Last fall, USAIC&FH requested accession bonuses for MI soldiers in shortage MOSs that apply for the WO

program and complete WOBC. The MOSs benefiting by the bonus are 350F, 351L, 351M, 352N (Traffic Analysis Technician), and 353T (IEW Maintenance Technician). This accession bonus will mitigate the loss of any reenlistment incentives that NCOs incur when volunteering for any of the officer programs and help attract high quality applicants to the MI WO ranks.

Warrant Officer Pay Reform

With a strong endorsement from the Secretary of the Army, a WO Pay Reform initiative was submitted to the DOD finance committee. This initiative is designed to correct the pay compression between the NCO and the WO pay scales. Although no official decision has been made to date, this action is being worked at the highest levels of DOD.

Shortage of CW4s

It is a known fact that the majority of soldiers (NCO, WO, Officer) retire between 20 and 23 years' active federal service (AFS). There are many reasons for this trend, but it is mostly to start a second career. Because MI NCOs are accessed into the WO program very late in their careers (with eleven to twelve years' AFS), most are CW3s by the time they reach the 20-year retirement point. It is very difficult to "grow" seniors by continuing to access so late.

There are several proposals being considered to correct this trend. Despite many arguments and demands for short-term solutions, the long-term fix is to focus the accession process on the younger NCO population (between 5 and 8 years' AFS). This conclusion was reached by the Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS) — 1984, the Army Development System (ADS) XXI — Warrant Officer Personnel Management System (WOPMS) Study (1999), and the Army Training And Leader Development Panel (ATLDP). I know that this has been a lofty goal in the past. However, it is becoming clear that as a Corps we must start implementing this to insure the long-term health of the WO contingent. I understand that there are many concerns with accessing younger NCOs. Get over it. This is necessary. During a briefing to the Vice CSA in April 2005, he recognized this concern but went to state, "A year of combat experience is worth three years of garrison experience. If you have a promising NCO who wants to be a WO, do not discourage him or her. Call me so we can discuss the requirements.

WOCS Redesign

There are changes coming to the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS). The course will change in order to give credit to NCOs that have already graduated from any of the NCOES courses. At the center of the WOCS transformation is that, starting in FY06, those NCOs who have completed the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) will have the opportunity to forgo the first two weeks of training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. NCOs selected to attend the new WOCS will be required to complete a common core course via distributive learning prior to joining their WOCS class. There are other major design changes in the planning phases as well. This is a significant shift in training methodology at Fort Rucker and is designed to encourage more NCOs to apply for the WO program, as well as provide them constructive credit for similar NCOES experiences. Please inform your soldiers, NCOs, WOs, and Officers of this change.

P-2 Profile

High quality NCOs may submit waiver requests for a P-2 profile which prohibits them from completing a standard Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) without alternate events and therefore, who today, cannot attend the WOCS course. Although approval is not automatic, this change in policy affords technically qualified NCOs with service related injuries (e.g., combat, Airborne or Air Assault operations, etc.) the opportunity to become WOs in our Army. If you have any questions regarding this option, call me since the details, procedures, and adjudications are made on a case-by-case basis.

Conclusion

In closing, I must point out that the opportunity to become a WO in MI has never been better. Those technically proficient NCOs interested in becoming MI Warrant Officers should immediately contact the Warrant Officer Recruiting team at <http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/> for current application information. I encourage all of

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One important change is the doctrinal alignment of the Army Battlefield Operating Systems with the Joint warfighting functions which includes the intelligence warfighting function. The intelligence warfighting function is described as the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. This function includes those tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The intelligence warfighting function is a flexible and adjustable architecture of procedures, personnel, organizations, and equipment that provides relevant information and products relating to the threat, civil populace, and environment to commanders. The personnel and organizations within the intelligence warfighting function conduct four primary tasks:

- Support to situational understanding.
- Support to strategic responsiveness.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
- Support to effects.

The Army's explicit doctrinal recognition of the role of intelligence in terms of civil considerations and the symbiotic nature of civil considerations, the environment, and the threat is an important step forward. Additionally, PIR now explicitly include requirements related to civil considerations. Finally, the manual standardizes a memory aid (ASCOPE) for civil considerations as the new standard all Army doctrine involving the different aspects of civil and cultural considerations. ASCOPE stands for—

- Areas.
- Structures.
- Capabilities.
- Organizations.
- People.
- Events.

In order to further move our intelligence doctrine forward in line with this new articulation (of what was already recognized as necessary), we are examining the body of our most recent and emerging intelligence doctrine in order to improve our doctrine and identify all doctrinal capability gaps. As we staff our draft doctrine, we need your focused participation in the review process in order to produce mature and sufficient doctrine.

The Civil Considerations Nexus

Just like any other staff task area (to include fighting ISR), civil considerations require a combined staff approach. The need to perform the myriad of staff actions that are necessary to account for civil considerations is even more complex than the requirement for the J2/G2/S2 sections to work with the rest of the staff to fight ISR. The entire staff must work together to share information, analyze civil considerations, and ensure adequate planning occurs. Staff stove-pipes (whether automated systems, databases, or analog processes and procedures) are unacceptable and are a disservice to the commander. Within these complex operations the J/G/S2 is critical to help the commander understand how to leverage the local population. I view leveraging the population as the subtle art of knowing how and when to combine positive, negative, and no actions that directly or indirectly influence the operational environment. Sometimes this involves the operational discipline necessary to prioritize long-term considerations over the temptation to take immediate actions and this must occur in operations where small unit operations are the dominate aspect of the overall operation.

Tactical Patience

The intelligence professional must ensure he is an integral part of the planning and staff control mechanism of current and future operations. Operations are not simple, particularly when fighting insurgents and terrorists in a complex environment (especially when exacerbated by dynamic cultural factors and regional perceptions). ISR is an operation, operations are ISR, and you have to fight for intelligence. Fighting ISR in complex environments, especially within larger urban areas necessitates using some less familiar collection assets like patrols, TCPs, convoys, MPs, civilian affairs, and PSYOPs. Opportunities to affect major centers of gravity and exploit enemy vulnerabilities are few and fleeting. Within current operations most of those opportunities are associated with the local population. We have to take the initiative and take the fight to the enemy. Sometimes that means either allowing certain intel-

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Significant Characteristics of the Urban Environment

by Michael A. Brake

The special considerations that must be taken into account in any operation in an urban environment go well beyond the uniqueness of the urban terrain. **JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations** identifies three distinguishing characteristics of the urban environment:

- Physical terrain,
- Population, and
- Infrastructure.

Similarly, **FM 3-06, Urban Operations**, identifies three characteristics of the urban environment:

- Terrain and weather,
- Society, and
- Infrastructure.

These characteristics (see Figure 1) provide a useful framework for intelligence personnel to begin to focus and organize the huge undertaking of providing intelligence support to operations in the urban environment. They should not be considered as separate entities but rather as interrelated entities. Understanding the interrelationship of these systems characteristics provides focus for the intelligence analyst and allows the commander a greater understanding of the urban area of operations.

This article will briefly discuss some of the many aspects of the socio-cultural and infrastructure characteristics of the urban environment. At the tactical level, these considerations can be extremely complex and require a structured, detailed analysis of large amounts of information.

Socio-cultural Characteristics

To effectively operate among the various population groups within an

urban environment and maintain their goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture. This understanding includes such aspects as their needs and values, history, religion, customs, politics, and social structure.

Failure to understand, respect, and, when possible, to follow local customs and societal norms can rapidly lead to an alienation of the population from U.S. forces and lead to the erosion of the legitimacy of the U.S. mission in the perception of the local population. Accommodating the social norms of an urban population is potentially one of the most influential factors in conducting operations in an urban environment.¹

A population group may be significant as a threat, an obstacle, a logistical support problem, or a source of information and support. The impact of the population on operations in an urban environment is often greater than that of the terrain. During the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process, it is important to analyze population density; population concentrations by ethnic, linguistic, tribal or clan, and other cultural distinctions; living conditions; political grievances and affiliations; educational levels; and attitudes towards friendly and enemy forces.

In order to be effective, military planners must understand and consider the social and cultural impacts resulting from military operations in the urban environment. Critical nodes such as culturally or socially significant sites (e.g., historical locations, monuments, museums, etc); people such as tribal leaders, leader of social movements, political leaders, and religious leaders; and customs must be recognized and considered when planning and conducting operations.




Figure 1. Characteristics of the Urban Environment.



and waste disposal, resources and material production, food distribution, medical facilities, local police or paramilitary units with law enforcement authority, firefighting units, and crisis management and civil defense structures.

The **transportation network** includes roads, railways, subways, bus systems, airports, waterways, and harbors. Securing air and seaports is imperative for follow-on forces and supplies, but there are many possible repercussions involved with securing all the transportation nodes and stopping or permitting all inter- and intra-city movement. Stopping transportation can have the greatest effect. While the U.S. mission may be immediately facilitated, critical needs of the non-combatant population could go unmet.

Key Components of Urban Infrastructure

The infrastructure of an urban environment consists of the basic resources, communications, support systems and industries upon which the population depends. The key elements that allow an urban area to function are also very significant to military operations, especially Stability Operations and Support Operations. The force that controls the water, electricity, telecommunications, medical facilities, and food production and distribution will virtually control the urban area. The infrastructure upon which an urban area depends may also provide human services and cultural and political structures that are critical beyond that urban area, perhaps for the entire nation.

Military planners must understand the functions and interrelationships of these components to assess how disruption and restoration of the infrastructure affects the population and, ultimately, the mission. To understand how the infrastructure of a city supports the population, it needs to be viewed as a system-of-systems. Each component affects the population, the normal operation of the city and the potential long-term success of military operations. By determining the critical nodes and vulnerabilities of an urban area, U.S. forces can delineate specific locations within the urban area that are vital to overall operations.

During Stability Operations and Support Operations, the maintenance of law and order (to include prisons) becomes vital to the welfare of the general population. Success in ensuring that law and order is maintained or reestablishing law and order will directly affect the general population's perceptions and possible support for U.S. operations.

Some of the key elements of urban infrastructure are transportation, communications, fuel, electricity, water

Communications play a vital role in many aspects of any urban environment. In modern cities, there are often complicated networks of landlines, radio relay stations, fiber optics, cellular service, and the Internet which provide a vast web of communications capabilities. Developing countries may have a significantly less technologically based communications infrastructure. In urban areas in those countries, information flow can depend on less sophisticated means such as couriers, graffiti, rumors and gossiping, and the local printed media. Even in countries with little communication infrastructure, radios, cell phones and satellite communications may be readily available. Understanding the communications infrastructure of an urban area is important because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the local population and the enemy.

All societies require **fuel**, such as wood, coal, oil, or natural gas for basic heating and cooking. Fuel is also needed for industrial production and is therefore vital to the economy. In fact, every sector of a city's infrastructure relies on fuel to some degree. Violence may result from fuel scarcity. From a tactical and operational perspective, protecting the urban area's fuel supplies prevents unnecessary hardship to the civilian population and, therefore, facilitates mission accomplishment. Refineries and pipelines that provide fuel for the urban area may not be located within the urban area. Fuel facilities are potential targets in an urban conflict. Enemy forces may target these facilities to erode support for the local authorities or U.S. military forces.

Electricity is vital to city populations. Electric companies provide a basic service supplying heat, power, and lighting. Because electricity cannot be stored in any sizable amount, damage to any portion of this utility will immediately affect the population. Electricity services are not always available or reliable in developing countries. Inter-

ruptions in service are common occurrences in many cities due to a variety of factors. Decayed infrastructure, sabotage, and conflict can disrupt electrical service. As a critical node of the overall city service sector, electrical facilities are potential targets in an urban conflict.

Water is an essential resource. As populations grow, demand for potable water increases. In some areas of the world, the supply of fresh water is inadequate to meet these demands. By 2025, between 2.7 and 3.5 billion people may live in water-deficient countries. In developed nations, water companies provide the population with clean water. In much of the developing world, no formal water authorities exist. Sewage, industrial waste, and pollution pose threats to the water supply. Deliberate acts of poisoning cannot be overlooked where access to the water supply is not controlled. U.S. forces may gain no marked tactical advantage by controlling this system, but its protection minimizes the population's hardship and thus contributes to overall mission success.

A buildup of garbage on city streets poses many hazards to include health threats and obstacles. Maintenance and restoration of urban **waste removal** to landfills can minimize this threat and improve the confidence of the civilian population in the U.S. mission.

Understanding the origination and storage sites of **resources** that maintain an urban population can be especially critical in Stability Operations and Support Operations. These sites may need to be secured against looting or attack by threat forces in order to maintain urban services and thereby retain and regain the confidence of the local population in the U.S. mission. Additionally, **military production sites** may need to be secured to prevent the population from gaining uncontrolled access to quantities of military equipment.

A basic humanitarian need of the local populace is food. During periods of conflict, food supplies in urban areas often become scarce. Maintaining and restoring normal **food distribution** channels in urban areas will help prevent a humanitarian disaster and greatly assist in maintaining and regaining the good will of the local population for U.S. forces. It may be impossible to immediately restore food distribution channels following a conflict, and U.S. forces may have to work with non-government organizations (NGOs) that specialize in providing these types of services. This may require U.S. forces to provide protection for NGO convoys and personnel in areas where conflict may still occur or be occurring.

While the health services infrastructure of most developed cities is advanced, **medical facilities** are deficient in many countries. International humanitarian organiza-

tions may represent the only viable medical care available. The rudimentary care provided in most developing world cities is not up to Western standards. Compounding this problem is the presence of deadly parasites and diseases. HIV can be particularly devastating in the urban centers of the developing world and therefore the local blood supply must be looked upon with great suspicion. Infectious disease, famine, and natural disasters can overwhelm a city's medical infrastructure and create immense suffering. Offering support to an existing medical system may augment the U.S. mission, as well as foster its legitimacy.

Local police, military units with police authority and missions, and firefighting units can be critical in maintaining public order. Their operations must be integrated with U.S. forces in U.S. forces-controlled areas to ensure that stability and security are restored or maintained. Additionally, the precinct structure of these organizations can also provide a good model for the delineation of unit boundaries with the urban area.

Local crisis management procedures and civil defense structures can aid U.S. forces in helping to care for non-combatants caught up in areas of ongoing or recent military operations. Additionally, the **crisis management and civil defense leadership** will often be local officials who may be able to provide structure to help restore or maintain security and local services in urban areas under U.S. forces control.

Conclusion

All of the factors of the significant characteristics of the urban environment discussed in this article will play a role regardless of the specific mission to which your unit is assigned. Focusing on the most critical aspects that are relevant in the specific urban environment in which you are operating and based on your mission is the challenge that you, as intelligence professionals, must master.



Endnotes

1. See Dr. George VanOtten's article "Culture Matters" in the January-March 2004 issue of MIPB for a discussion of societal norms and values.

Michael Brake, a USAIC&FH Doctrine Directorate writer, authored FMI 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Operations in the Urban Environment. He is currently mobilized for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Readers may contact him via E-mail at michael.brake@us.army.mil.

What Do We Mean by Urban Dominance?

by Major Michael P. Spears

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Falluja appears deserted to the Marines, suddenly an RPG explodes behind them, then another followed by sniper fire. Unable to silence an enemy they cannot see. Their superior firepower is checked by the insurgent's knowledge of the city. They know they will have to fight, block by block.

– Kevin Sites¹

In the next ten years, approximately 75 percent of the world will live in urban areas.² With its large population, complex environment and block-by-block asymmetric fight, it is easy to understand how the term, “urban dominance,” has entered the vocabulary of the Army’s military leaders. Is this simply another way to refer to urban operations? I believe the answer is no, but the lack of a definition creates confusion. It is much more than simply the application of overwhelming military force. It is both a force multiplier and a means of protection through the strength of our knowledge. Discussing the asymmetric threat Paul Wolfowitz said,

*We cannot wait for another Pearl Harbor or another September 11th...Even as we fight the war of today, we must invest in tomorrow....The agility that we need... depends on more than just technology....It is tied to changing our organizational designs and embracing new concepts...that in combination can produce a revolutionary increase in our military capability and redefine how war is fought.*³

I propose the following definition for urban dominance: **A full spectrum intelligence campaign using Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic power to create knowledge and the ability to decisively influence, deter and if necessary defeat any adversaries within the urban environment.**

This article explores how I arrived at this definition by reviewing the terms “urban operations” and “complex terrain,”

examining the impacts from Grozny, Chechnya, and using a discussion on urban dominance to demonstrate that the real issue is the fight for knowledge and need to operationalize intelligence.

Urban Operations and Complex Terrain

Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, defines “joint urban operations” as:

*all joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives within, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features.*⁴

This definition is similar to that for “military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT)” and strongly implies ground combat at the tactical level. I highlighted part of the table below, taken from **JP 3-06**, to indicate risk and if current doctrine supports operations. Calculation of the operational risk was performed using a simple risk analysis matrix in an attempt to quantify the complex nature of each environment. A numerical value from 1 to 3 was assigned (least is best) to each characteristic and results were summed as shown in the table. A significant

Characteristic	Urban	Desert	Jungle	Mountain
Number of Noncombatants	High (3)	Low (1)	Low (1)	Low (1)
Amount of Valuable Infrastructure	High (3)	Low (1)	Low (1)	Low (1)
Multi-Dimensional Battlespace	Yes (3)	No (1)	Some (2)	Yes (3)
Restrictive Rules of Engagement	Yes (3)	No (1)	No (1)	No (1)
Detection, Observation, Engagement Ranges	Short (3)	Long (1)	Short (3)	Medium (2)
Avenues of Approach	Many (3)	Many (3)	Few (1)	Few (1)
Freedom of Vehicular Movement	Low (3)	High (1)	Low (3)	Medium (2)
Communications Functionality	Degraded (3)	Fully Capable (1)	Degraded (3)	Degraded (3)
Logistical Requirements	High (3)	High (3)	High (3)	Medium (2)
Environment Supported by Current Doctrine	Low (3)	High (1)	Medium (2)	Medium (2)
Risk (least is best)	30	14	20	18

Table 1. Comparison of Operations in Urban Areas and Other Types of Environments.

issue or problem is indicated by bold font; clearly, we need to address our urban operations capabilities.


Below is another illustration from **JP 3-06** depicting the complex nature of the urban environment. The Australian Army also provides us a simple definition for complex terrain, “any terrain where weapons range exceeds its sensor range – in other words, troops cannot achieve unobstructed situational awareness to the maximum effective range of their weapons.”⁵

The Russians later commented that **their lack of knowledge** concerning historical, national, religious, geographical, meteorological, and physical or human factors **seriously influenced operations**. In some cases, they made serious errors when dealing with the Chechens. Once insulted or mistreated, Chechens became supporters or active fighters themselves.⁹ Because the urban battlespace is increasingly decisive we must know our enemy and the ground he fights on.¹⁰

Joint Vision 2020

“The Army’s ability to use information to dominate future battles will give the United States a new key to victory.” –William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, April 1997¹¹

“The overarching focus of this vision is full spectrum dominance – achieved through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.”¹² Dominant maneuver and precision engagement as they relate to urban dominance are really effects-based operations, intended to gain information, influence, destroy or capture critical nodes.



The Battle for Grozny

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory that is decided by a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition...is the height of inhumanity. What enables the wise sovereign and general to strike and conquer...is foreknowledge.
–The Art of War, Sun Tzu⁶

In the urban environment, close combat is unavoidable. The first Russian battle for Grozny, Chechnya, fought from late January 1994 until February 1995, sheds light on urban dominance requirements. Russian doctrine and systems – suited for open terrain – failed in the urban battlespace and did not detect robust Chechen defenses.⁷ In the first three days of fighting alone, Russian forces lost 77 percent of their tanks, 85 percent of their BMPs (armored personnel carriers), and 100 percent of their ZSU-23 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.⁸ The Chechens were able to hide assets by declaring areas as “pro-Russian” or noncommitted. There are many reasons for their failures, but the simple fact is that the Russians **did not know their enemy**.

Information though, is useful only when it produces superior knowledge and decisions, or “decision superiority” – better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an opponent can react, or in a non-combat situation, at a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish its mission.”¹³

A Discussion on Urban Dominance

In reality, the urban fight begins long before the first bullet goes downrange. “While defeating the enemy on the battlefield is critical...victory in the long-term war involves more than military engagements...it involves transforming nations and groups that harbor those [which] cannot and will not be reconciled with... the West’s existence as free societies.”¹⁴

Faced with the prospect of overwhelming military power, our opponents will try to level the playing field by retreating into the complex urban environment. There, identifying friend, foe, or neutral groups is extremely difficult. The possible mix of language, ethnicity, economic, religious, political, and social or cultural identities, ideological groups as well as tribal or clan affiliations is endless.

If any group is hostile, the possibility of injury to noncombatants significantly increases. Further, the use of military force has a very high risk of unintended consequences (second- or third-order effects) that may actually be counter-productive.¹⁵ Urban terrain forces our soldiers to fight block by block, building by building, floor by floor, serving as diplomats, peacekeepers and when necessary warfighters. So how do we support this fight?

The Fight for Knowledge

General Tommy R. Franks believes full dimensional protection, “begins with timely, high confidence early warning of terrorist planning and targeting... Efforts to improve performance in this area through improved analysis and information sharing are steps in the right direction, but more needs to be done. We need a dedicated, long-term effort with access to all terrorist-related information; both intelligence and law enforcement, leveraged by state-of-the-art Information Technology tools, to get in front of the next attack.”¹⁶

General Franks’ remarks are really about knowledge, and support the view that the sole purpose of some missions is to gather intelligence. The Army Intelligence Transformation Vision agrees, “The single greatest Objective Force enabler is Dominant Battlespace Knowledge – the knowledge projected to the commander by Army Intelligence.”¹⁷ However, military operations alone do not guarantee security, nor will knowledge if it is unavailable. We must gain political victories too.¹⁸

Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, in effect, told Congress the same thing testifying that “We are facing a turbulent and volatile world...populated by a number of highly adaptive adversaries including terrorist networks...it is impossible to predict with confidence what nation or entity could pose threats in 5, 10, or 20 years.... This places a heavy burden on intelligence. Detering, and if necessary confronting and defeating future adversaries...will require detailed understanding of their goals, motivations, history, networks, and relationships that is developed over a long period of time and to a level of detail that is far deeper than we can reach today.”¹⁹

This “requires an organization which can direct, task and coordinate all activities required to execute a comprehensive intelligence campaign plan.”²⁰

Discussing the way ahead, Dr. Cambone said “To fully realize the promise of robust Intelligence Campaign Planning, we have begun an intensive, long-term strategy for remodeling defense intelligence.... This effort focuses on ‘operationalizing

intelligence,’ transforming...intelligence into more than a supporting arm...but rather into a true joint operational capability.”²¹

During the same hearing, the Army G2, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander testified, that “currently, tactical units receive their intelligence through an echeloned structure: from national, to theater, to corps, to division, and so on.... Our vision is to implement a new approach...creating a dedicated structure to provide intelligence or tactical overwatch.”²²

A DOD assessment of Joint Urban Operations Science and Technology Programs identified nine required capabilities.²³ (**Note:** The order is the author’s opinion of criticality.)

- ❑ Comprehensive and in-depth understanding of all levels of the battlespace: cultural, political, religious, historical, demographic, economic, military, geographic, city’s population and its likely future actions and reactions.
- ❑ The ability to rapidly generate 3D, small scale, up-to-date digital maps of the urban battlespace that include subterranean features, interiors of key buildings, infrastructure systems, and activity levels.
- ❑ The need for timely gathering, processing, tailoring, and distribution of results to all levels (particularly down to small units or individuals).
- ❑ The ability to locate and identify enemy forces, including when they are in proximity to friendly forces or intermixed with civilians.
- ❑ The ability to discern enemy movement patterns, logistical methods, and intentions for both.
- ❑ The increased requirements for precision targeting in urban environments.
- ❑ The positioning, covertness, and vulnerability of sensors and platforms.
- ❑ The ability to do battle damage assessment (BDA) for attacks using nonlethal and nonkinetic means and weapons.
- ❑ New software and hardware tools that allow for rehearsal and the assessment of courses of action. These tools would use digital map information and updated intelligence information of Red, Blue, and White forces.

Joint Urban Warrior 2004 came to similar conclusions as the DOD assessment, adding that existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems were designed for conventional combat in open

areas, not for urban asymmetric operations.²⁴ Further, Urban Warrior echoed the call for a networked enterprise to disseminate relevant and timely intelligence.

Changing the Intelligence Business Model


Possibly the single-most transforming thing in our forces will not be a weapons system, but a set of interconnections and a substantially enhanced capability because of that awareness. — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, August 9, 2001.²⁵

“We would not send our pilots up without ensuring that they were digitally linked with the best, most relevant, actionable intelligence available.... But, today, we send our Soldiers into battle, unlinked and without dedicated intelligence support.” – Joint Urban Warrior 04 Executive Report.²⁶

At the 2004 annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), Lieutenant General William G. Boykin shared a bold concept to “operationalize intelligence” by creating Joint Intelligence Operations Commands (JIOCs) to lead the “Fight for Knowledge.” The JIOC integrates collectors, operators, analysts, and the tasking and management functions with operational planning and execution. In order to create knowledge, it directs and tasks Service and departmental intelligence capabilities to satisfy national, departmental, and theater needs.

Army Intelligence has several complementary initiatives to the JIOC. I will highlight only a few:

- ❑ **Project Foundry** will extend the full spectrum fight for knowledge by involving the entire Army military intelligence (MI) force in daily real-world operations in support of the national Intelligence Community. This ensures our tactical force is knowledgeable, technically trained, and well prepared for a wide range of operations.
- ❑ **Analytical Overwatch** uses theater resources to increase situational awareness by pushing tailored intelligence over a global network to tactical units and gives them access to pull knowledge by driving analysis in sanctuary via reach.
- ❑ **Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2)** aims to link soldiers with collection and reporting systems. Soldiers on the battlefield have constant access to vast amounts of data, but they cannot share it or get information they need without being connected to the network. The commander’s Digital Assistant enables ES2.
- ❑ Finally, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) **Information Dominance Center (IDC)** is pioneering processes and methodologies to share across the intelligence enterprise (national to tactical) timely situational awareness and analysis of complex networks of individuals and organizations. A direct “spin-off” from the IDC is Project Morning Calm, an all-inclusive intelligence initiative capable of rapidly sharing and visualizing intelligence and disparate data from the numerous collections systems and agencies, tactical through national.



The JIOC Concept

The fight for knowledge is about connecting the dots to achieve decisive results. In early May 1942, intercepted messages indicated the Japanese were preparing a major operation. On 13 May, another decoded intercept directed a Seaplane unit to prepare to move to “AF,” which intelligence believed was Midway. Naval Intelligence directed Midway to radio “in the clear” that their water desalination plant had failed. The Japanese intercepted the message and on 16 May, they radioed that “AF” was running short of water, confirming that Midway was the target. Further intercepts provided intelligence the date of the attack, 4 June. Using the knowledge from this intelligence operation Admiral Nimitz planned his attack and changed the course of the war.²⁷



A Soldier provides security for fellow Soldiers in Tall Afar, Iraq.

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Conclusion

The challenge is to convince our enemies from even considering an urban fight.²⁸ The vehicle "Urban Dominance" delivers near perfect knowledge precisely when it is needed.²⁹ Why must we relearn lessons from past wars – that all operations have a large intelligence component? Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski may have been thinking about urban dominance when he said, "Network-centric warfare is not about technology per se; it is an emerging theory of war...Power comes from a different place, it is used in different ways...achieves different effects...It is about how wars are fought...and how power is developed. During the industrial age, power came from mass. Now power tends to come from information, access and speed."³⁰

"America needs an 'integrated doctrine' that details what agency is in charge of the effort and how each agency interacts...focused on levels above DOD."³¹ Urban dominance applies that power to create detailed understanding and dominate battlespace knowledge across all four phases (peacetime engagement, crisis action, combat operations, stability operations and support operations). It is not simply another name for urban operations nor is it the MOUT related phrase "situational awareness in complex terrain." It is the realization that "intelligence is operations"; it begins in peacetime and extends indefinitely until we have no interest in the region.



Soldiers enter a house in Rawah, Iraq, where weapons are believed to be hidden.

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
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Soldiers prepare to enter a house in Muelhal, where insurgents are believed to be hiding.



Urban Operations: Defining the Environment

by Jack D. Kem (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired)

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction

Recent urban operations in An Najaf, Baghdad, and Fallujah have pointed to the importance of understanding urban environments and the unique challenges they pose for warfighting. This is especially true for intelligence professionals as they analyze urban areas. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for operations in the urban environment requires a different mindset and a different approach.

The intent of this article is to provide a summary of the different characteristics of the urban environment, followed by an analysis of the different approaches to conducting intelligence planning in urban environments. Both Army and Joint Doctrine provide an excellent review of the characteristics and considerations of the urban battlefield. Included in this analysis will be planning considerations, operational effects in urban environments, and additional considerations for urban operations.

Characteristics of the Urban Environment

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Handbook for Joint Urban Operations provides a variety of characteristics of urban environments.¹ These characteristics include:

- Rates of urbanization increases,
- Terrain, shores, and waterways challenges,
- Presence of noncombatants,
- Presence of civil government institutions,
- Presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
- Presence of local and international media,
- Potential sources of host nation support (labor, construction material, and medical supplies),
- Complex social, cultural, and governmental interaction that supports urban habitation, and
- Location of key transportation hubs.

A similar list of characteristics of urban environments has also been developed by Gerwehr and Glenn of

the Force Development and Technology Program at RAND's Arroyo Center.² These characteristics include:

- High number of noncombatants,
- High amount of valuable infrastructure,
- Presence of multidimensional battlespace,
- Restrictive rules of engagement (ROE),
- Short detection, observation, and engagement ranges,
- Many avenues of approach,
- Low freedom of movement and maneuver for mechanized forces,
- Degraded communications functionality, and
- High logistical requirements.

There are some obvious commonalities when these two lists are compared. The first is simply that there are a lot more people in urban environments, and within the population there will be a considerable number of noncombatants that must be considered. Other concerns that affect military operations include the presence of NGOs, the media, local governance, and cultural centers. From a terrain standpoint, the urban environment is dramatically different than rural areas due to dense road networks, communications infrastructure, waterways, and urban sprawl. Because of this dense infrastructure, there is decreased freedom of movement and maneuver, short detection, observation, and engagement ranges, and the need for more restrictive ROE. All of these considerations combined create greater logistical requirements to support both the population and military forces.

The **JCS Handbook for Urban Operations** also defines five essential characteristics of an urban area that should be considered for analysis.³ These interdependent characteristics are depicted in Figure 1.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, defines three characteristics of

urban environments, described as the “urban triad.”⁴ These three characteristics are considered to be “so intertwined as to be virtually inseparable.”




Figure 1. Urban characteristics should be viewed as interdependent, frequently overlapping parts of a non-linear whole.

- ❑ A complex manmade physical terrain superimposed on existing natural terrain and consisting of structures and facilities of various types.
- ❑ A population of significant size and density inhabiting, working in, and using the manmade and natural terrain.
- ❑ An infrastructure upon which the area depends that may also occupy manmade terrain and provides human services, and cultural and political structure for the urban area and often beyond; perhaps for the entire nation.

JP 3-06 continues by stating that the physical terrain, both natural and manmade, presents “significant challenges to military operations” — but the primary characteristic that makes urban operations fundamentally different is the impact of military operations on both the population and infrastructure. The three components of the “urban triad” create a “dynamic system-of-systems” that is composed of complex terrain, population, and infrastructure.⁵

Within the “urban triad,” there are nine “significant challenges” to modern urban operations.⁶ These challenges are—

- ❑ Cities reduce the advantages of the technological-superior force due to the challenges of terrain, degraded logistics, and the constraints posed by the ROE to protect civilians and infrastructure.

- ❑ Ground operations are manpower intensive because of the horizontal and vertical spaces of a city, as well as the need to secure cities building by building and room by room.
- ❑ Ground operations are decentralized because of the dispersal of units and the difficulties of command and control.
- ❑ Operations are time-consuming and usually take significantly longer than originally expected.
- ❑ Combat operations in urban areas result in large ratios of civilian to military casualties.
- ❑ Operations in urban areas are conducted under more restrictive constraints than operations elsewhere due to the presence of noncombatants and the need to preserve infrastructure.
- ❑ Physical terrain changes weapons and munitions effects because of target masking by structures. The

composition of buildings and surrounding structures will also change weapons effects.

- ❑ Logistic support requirements are different and often more demanding in urban areas due to increased ammunition expenditure and increased requirements for supplies.
- ❑ Urban areas provide advantages to defenders, insurgents, and terrorists, providing asymmetrical benefits to those who use the civilian population and infrastructure.

Planning Considerations in Joint Urban Operations



The Joint Chiefs of Staff Handbook for Joint Urban Operations provides a number of planning considerations when considering Urban Operations. These planning considerations are important for all planners, including Military Intelligence professionals, to consider prior to conducting operations in cities and urban areas.⁷ These planning considerations include—

- ❑ The **Characteristics of an Urban Area** as previously discussed.
- ❑ **Information/Intelligence Required for Joint Urban Operations**, including sources that include a combination of human, electronic, and archival data, as well as other nontraditional human resources available such as civil affairs (CA), psychologi-


cal operations (PSYOP), special operations forces (SOF) personnel, terrain analysts, military patrols, military engineers, NGOs, United Nations (UN) military observers, and others who may have direct contact with the indigenous population.

- ❑ **Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) in Joint Urban Operations**, considering some of the implications of urban operations, such as urban area features may impose communication limitations; urban infrastructure may offer opportunities to facilitate telecommunications; aerospace assets offer unique C4ISR capabilities; and SOF may be able to offer unique C4ISR capabilities.
- ❑ **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)** defense operations which present unique challenges in an urban area, including the decontamination of infrastructure, the decontamination and possible relocation of the civilian population, and the decontamination of joint forces.
- ❑ **Civil-Military Operations (CMO)** due to the increased importance of noncombatants and the likelihood of media presence during urban operations.
- ❑ **Public Affairs (PA)** due to the complex relationship among information, the public (international and domestic), and policy formulation in urban areas.
- ❑ **Interagency Communication and Coordination** to address needs that are beyond the capabilities of military forces; such coordination may include that with the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and a variety of NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.
- ❑ **Multinational Coalitions and Urban Operations** and the considerations of doctrinal, cultural, and language differences that challenge coordination of the mission and the ability to achieve unity of effort.
- ❑ **Operating as a Joint Team** in urban operations requires detailed planning, training, using the most appropriate combination of joint assets; and cooperating with all relevant military, government, and nongovernmental agencies.
- ❑ **Rules of Engagement (ROE)** considerations due to the proximity of forces, number and location of noncombatants, media presence, and other factors that can rapidly alter tactical and operational conditions.
- ❑ **Legal Issues** in urban operations are likely to involve significant legal issues, such as curfew,

evacuation, forced labor, civilian resistance, and protection or use of property.

- ❑ **Logistics in urban operations** includes the concept of sustainment to “push” supplies and material to employed units until the urban objective is secured, then transition to a “pull” concept whereby engaged units obtain required replenishment stocks from designated sources of supply, and finally, to transfer responsibilities to a logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) as soon as possible.

Analysis of Urban Environments



The challenge for intelligence professionals is to analyze all of the characteristics and considerations for urban operations and make sense of it all. There are two approaches that could be used for this analysis—an adapted IPB and the System-of-Systems Analysis (SoSA).

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The RAND study, *Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations*, addresses intelligence analysis in urban areas using the traditional IPB methodology. The general conclusion from the study was that while IPB was “a sound methodology for assessing the difficult operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations,” the “IPB tools, techniques, and assumptions need to be augmented and modified to accommodate the additional complexities posed by urbanized terrain.”⁸

Street Smart identifies a number of additional procedures for urban analysis that complements traditional IPB.⁹ These procedures include—

- ❑ Enhancing population analysis, including both demographic analysis and cultural intelligence.
- ❑ Developing population analysis to identify the characteristics of each population group and subgroup to determine how it will act and interact within the area of operations and associated area of interest.
- ❑ Paying greater attention to integrating the role of media and information operations and the tools, audiences, and messages when conducting IPB.
- ❑ Having a greater understanding of the perceptions of each of the population groups.
- ❑ Clearly defining and identifying threats and other influences based on each population group’s interests, intentions, and capabilities and the vulnerabilities of the friendly force.

- ❑ Investigating the relationships and interconnectivity between population elements, infrastructure, buildings, and the underlying terrain.
- ❑ Compiling a comprehensive set of urban adversary tactics in order to reduce the vulnerability of the friendly force to surprise.
- ❑ Including all relevant population groups and effects that reach beyond the typical action-reaction-counteraction approach to wargaming during COA development.

System-of-Systems Analysis. An additional approach to analysis that can be adapted for the urban environment is the SoSA. SoSA is a process that views an adversary as an interrelated system of PMESII systems (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information). SoSA attempts to identify, analyze, and relate the goals and objectives, organization, dependencies and inter-dependencies, external influences, strengths, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of the various systems. The objective is to determine the significance of each PMESII system and its various elements to the overall adversary system in order to assess the systemic vulnerability of the various elements and how we can exploit them to achieve desired effects.¹⁰

The SoSA approach is part of Operational Net Assessment (ONA), a process which is designed to synthesize large amounts of analyzed, fused information and convert it into actionable knowledge captured in a specifically designed database application, which functions as the ONA database and supports an Effects Based Operations (EBO) planning tool. ONA uses intelligence and information to enable the effects-based planning process and is an operations planning tool.¹¹ The methodology from ONA and SoSA that is particularly useful for urban operations is the analysis that relates the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information) components.

Operational Effects in Urban Environments

In addition to defining the characteristics of an urban area and addressing the considerations for urban areas, there are a number of effects that are unique to urban areas. The JCS *Handbook for Joint Urban Operations* defines five specific operational effects on urban areas.¹² These effects are—

- ❑ **Isolating an urban area.** Employing joint forces in a manner that isolates or cuts off an enemy

force inside an urban area from other enemy forces or allies.

- ❑ **Retaining an urban area.** A defensive action in which the fundamental objective is to prevent an urban area from falling under the political and/or military control of an adversary.
- ❑ **Containing an urban area.** Actions taken by joint forces to prevent an adversary's forces inside an urban area from breaking out.
- ❑ **Denying an urban area.** Defensive action taken outside the boundaries of an urban area in an effort to prevent approaching enemy forces from gaining control of the urban area.
- ❑ **Reducing an urban area.** Essentially an offensive action intended to eliminate an adversary's hold over all or part of an urban area.

It is critical to fully understand the specific effect that is desired in an urban environment. For example, it is obvious that there are completely different analytical requirements for a force that desires the effect of **isolating an urban area** from a force that desires the effect of **reducing an urban area**. The planning and execution of either of these two missions have significant implications for noncombatants, ROE, and the other characteristics and considerations of urban areas.

Additional Considerations for Urban Environments

An excellent study by the RAND Corporation entitled *Urban Battle Command in the 21st Century* suggests a number of additional considerations for urban environments.

These considerations provide a common sense checklist for intelligence analysts and operations personnel when planning for urban operations.¹³ These considerations are—

- ❑ Look deeper in time and beyond military considerations during the backward planning process.
- ❑ Consider second- and higher-order effects during planning and wargaming.
- ❑ Doctrine asks lower-echelon leaders to look two levels up. Higher-echelon commanders need to consider the limits and perspectives of same nation (and other) subordinate headquarters and units. Commanders at every echelon need to be conscious of the situation as it impacts those at higher, lower, adjacent, joint, multinational, and interagency levels.

- ❑ Account for the language, cultural, procedural, and other differences that will impede the tempo and level of understanding when dealing with some coalition member units and other agencies.
- ❑ Be aware that urban densities compress the operational area and can result in more incidents of fratricide.
- ❑ Get the ROE right as quickly as possible.
- ❑ See the forest *and* selected trees (focus both on individual points of particular mission importance and the bigger picture).

Analysis of urban operations should also closely examine the Principles of War – which are increasing in Joint Doctrine from the traditional nine (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity) to twelve Principles of War.¹⁴ The three “new” Principles of War (restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) have particular relevance to urban operations:

- ❑ **Restraint.** A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the desired end state.
- ❑ **Perseverance.** Prepare for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of the desired end state. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is a requirement for success.
- ❑ **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken as well as the will of the US public to support the actions. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to achieve the desired end state.¹⁵

Conclusion

The urban environment presents dramatically different characteristics and considerations for intelligence professionals. We would be wise to study carefully the lessons of urban warfare in the past – including Stalingrad, Hue, Mogadishu, Grozny, Jenin, and Fallujah. All of these battles have significance and are worthy of study. In 2002 Max Boot described in *The Savage Wars of Peace* how important this is for the U.S. Army:

The Marines know that the world is becoming heavily urbanized and realize they had better develop a strategy for urban warfare; otherwise they will suffer as heavily as the army did in Mogadishu. The army by contrast takes the approach that it doesn't “do” cities; it prefers to go around, rather than

through, urban areas. Just as in earlier days the army preferred not to “do” counterinsurgency.¹⁶

Our doctrine and practice – both in the U.S. Army and in the other services – has come a long way since 2002, but we still have a way to go. As military intelligence professionals, we have to lead the way. **Always Out Front!**

Doctrinal Note: You can find FMI 2-91.4, *Intelligence Support to Operations in the Urban Environment*, June 2005, on AKO under U.S. Army Organizations - Intelligence.



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Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes

A Stamp for the Bridge of Spies - Glienicke Bridge

by Mark Sommer

On January 22, 1998, Germany issued a set of stamps featuring bridges under the motto, "Bridges Bring People Together." One of the bridges, the Glienicke, was also known the "Bridge of Spies." At the northern end (West Berlin) of the bridge a sign warned, "You are leaving the American sector." Under the four-power agreements dividing up Berlin, it was reserved for Soviet and Allied military traffic.

In 1962, downed U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, walked past Soviet spy Rudolf Ahel while he walked north across the bridge. In 1985, twenty-five Western agents were traded on the bridge for four East Bloc spies imprisoned in the U.S.


Bridge crossings such as these were dramatized in the cinema. The drama was always intensified by having the spies exchanged at night with shadowy Soviet personnel lurking in the background. It seemed to take forever for the Western individual to come "in from the cold" as the Eastern individual went back south to the Iron Curtain. In fact the "walks" always took several suspenseful minutes even though these exchanges were almost always arranged ahead of time and were usually done in the daytime.

The original wooden bridge was part of the link between Potsdam and Berlin that Frederick William II developed into a weather resistant road in Prussia in 1795. Growing traffic made it necessary in 1834 to build a broader and more solid stone bridge.

The bridge became something of a bottleneck at the beginning of the 20th century and it was replaced by a broader and higher structure made of steel. Officially, the Bridge of Spies was supposed to be called the Kaiser Frederick Bridge, but most still call it the Glienicke Bridge.

The bridge was destroyed at the end of World War II and was rebuilt in 1949 by Brandenburg, the East German land that extends halfway into the river as a gesture toward German unity. Brandenburg even called it the Bridge of Unity.

Before the Berlin Wall was constructed, the East Germans closed the bridge on May 26, 1952 allowing only vehicles of the four occupying powers to pass. The day after the Berlin Wall fell, the checkpoints at both ends were taken away and thus the bridge became a "Bridge of Unity."



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COUNTERINSURGENCY 101

by Captain Brian Gellman and Captain Kyle Teamey



The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Despite a long history of fighting insurgencies, the U.S. military continues to struggle with this type of complex, “dirty” fight. Part of the problem is the lack of education within the military about the history of insurgencies, what an insurgency consists of, and how to fight them. The purpose of this article is to consolidate multiple sources of reference materials and field manuals in order to provide leaders with background information about insurgencies and to help them better understand the operational environment in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

It is important to note that counterinsurgency is not a new mission for the U.S. military. In fact, most of the

wars and conflicts the U.S. military has been involved in since the Declaration of Independence have been counterinsurgency or nation building. The United States itself began as an insurgent organization attempting to liberate itself from British rule.

From the early days of fighting the Barbary pirates of Northern Africa, to chasing Poncho Villa through Mexico and crushing Muslim insurgents in the Philippines, to establishing governments in the Caribbean and Central America, the U.S. military has always been involved in fighting insurgencies and other “irregular” wars. When thinking about insurgency, the Vietnam Conflict remains at the forefront of the American psyche. In that conflict,



- ❑ The U.S. Army defines an **insurgency** as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.¹
- ❑ The Army uses **irregular warfare** to refer to all types of unconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods. Irregular warfare includes unconventional tactics used by established governments in addition to those used by non-state groups.²
- ❑ Robert Taber, author of *War of the Flea*, defines **guerilla warfare** as a revolutionary war engaging a civilian population, or a significant part of the population, against military forces of established government authority.
- ❑ **Terrorism** can simply be defined as conducting actions that are intended to spread fear and intimidation to achieve a political gain.

One of the first things we must overcome is our inclination to use the words “insurgency,” “guerilla warfare,” and “terrorism” interchangeably. Insurgency is a subset of irregular warfare. This means insurgency is a more precise term than irregular warfare to describe the form of warfare used by non-state groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Al Qaeda (AQ), etc., against established governments. Guerilla warfare and terrorism are tactics of the insurgents. However, neither are required to conduct an insurgency. The goals of an insurgent are also achieved through subversion, coercion, assassination, sabotage, propaganda, and other tactics.

A better definition of insurgency is offered by Steven Metz and LTC Raymond Millen of the Strategic Studies Institute:

Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. It is used by those too weak to do otherwise.³

Think of this definition in the terms of an asymmetric threat. Assessing insurgents from the perspective of their capabilities and intent, one sees the insurgents' intent is to topple a government or expel an army, but their capabilities are extremely limited. They do not have the conventional military or political power to achieve their aims. Insurgents are, therefore, an asymmetric

failures to learn from our history, adapt our strategy and tactics to fight the insurgency, and act as a learning institution led to the defeat of U.S. forces. The intent of this article is to facilitate the learning process so we are not doomed to repeat our mistakes.

Defining Insurgency

The first step of solving any problem is to define the problem. In Iraq, we are fighting an insurgency, but what is an insurgency? Complicating the issue of defining insurgency is the fact that terms such as “irregular warfare,” “guerrilla warfare,” and “terrorism” are used interchangeably with insurgency. However, it is clear that these are very different terms.

threat trying to even the playing field against the more powerful military and/or political force. Tactics such as terrorism, guerilla warfare, subversion and propaganda are preferred methods of the inferior force because they increase survivability and long-term chances of success. They allow a relatively small insurgent force to harass or fix large military forces and spread instability over wide regions. Insurgents usually do not seek a Jominian decisive battle to annihilate their enemy. They attempt to outlast their opponent and build strength over time as they sap the finances, moral legitimacy, and logistical capabilities of a government or army.

According to Metz and Millen, insurgencies can be further broken down into two types: national and liberation. The Army definition of insurgency is primarily focused on national insurgency. In a national insurgency a minority (minority in regards to power base and resources, not necessarily popular support) is attempting to remove a current government from power or wants to secede. Examples include the American Civil War, the Basques (ETA) in Spain, and the Kurds (PKK) in Turkey. A national insurgency can be initiated with a popular uprising built around an ideology or promises of better life, or by a small minority within an apathetic population.

In contrast, a liberation insurgency is one in which insurgents seek to remove a foreign occupier in order to liberate their nation. This is the most difficult type of insurgency to counter because strategies that work against a national insurgency, such as proving the current regime can address the root causes of the conflict through reform, do not help to overcome the outsider status of the occupiers. What motivates the insurgents is not the lack of jobs or type of government, but resentment, hatred, and sometimes jealousy directed toward an occupier. Examples include the Soviet-Afghan War and the Palestinian insurgency.⁴

Historical Perspective

History is littered with examples of insurgencies that made significant contributions to helping the asymmetric threat compete with the more powerful, more resourceful force. Listed below are some significant examples that are still relevant today:

Space for Time. In 512 BC Darius commanded the Persian army, arguably the most powerful in the world. He invaded what is now Bulgaria in order to seize gold mines. The occupants of the region were a nomadic people known as the Scythians. The Scythians had no cities and lived in mobile communities, spending much of their time on horseback. Darius quickly overran Scythian lands. However, the Scythians began hit-and-run attacks

on Persian logistics trains and conducted a scorched earth campaign to deny the Persian army food. Darius was eventually forced to leave the region and narrowly avoided the destruction of his army.⁵

The tactic employed by the Scythians is what is known as “trading space for time.” It is commonly used by insurgents around the world. To increase their own survivability, insurgents will delay a decisive fight until a time and place of their choosing. Sometimes that moment will not occur for decades or even centuries, and the place isn’t necessarily a battlefield but may be a media scandal or coup d’etat.

Guerra de guerrillas, or guerrilla warfare, was coined by Napoleon’s army while garrisoned in Spain. Small groups of Spanish partisans used irregular tactics to resist the occupation. Spanish “guerillas” demonstrated that small units conducting hit-and-run attacks on their home terrain could significantly harass the largest and most organized army in the world.⁶

The Maoist Insurgency. The great innovator who brought insurgency into the 20th century was Mao Tse-tung. Mao envisioned a popular war fought by the peasants. He recognized that insurgencies are dynamic and must be tailored for the operating environment. He saw the need to organize the guerillas, focus their efforts, and coordinate their actions. Most importantly, Mao saw the power that could be generated by creating an army of the people.

Mao also understood the power of a liberation insurgency. He used the Japanese occupation to his advantage as a unifying force. After the removal of the Japanese during World War II, Mao used his reputation, connections and rapport fighting the Japanese to build his guerilla armies.

Mao’s plan to bring a Communist regime to China had three phases:

Phase 1 - Strategic Defensive: This is the initial phase, also called the incipient phase. The intent is to spread the government’s forces beyond their lines of communications by conducting hit-and-run attacks in remote regions. When the government commits forces to hunt down the guerillas, the guerillas conduct survivability moves and disperse to other remote regions. At the end of this phase, the government has overstretched its reach, guerillas are seasoned in combat, and are building numbers and obtaining resources.

Phase 2 - Equilibrium: This phase occurs when the government recognizes that it can no longer de-

stroy the guerillas; its only hope is to contain the insurgents. The intent of this phase is for guerillas to expand their revolutionary base (sanctuaries) and begin building a conventional army for future operations.

Phase 3 - General Offensive: Once the revolutionary army obtains enough conventional forces and armaments to attack the government's forces, the ground war begins.

Another significant contribution of Mao Tse-tung is the concept that the insurgent must move through the population as "a fish moves through the ocean." The insurgent must have total freedom of movement in the population, and this will only occur if the population offers support for the insurgency. Mao ordered his soldiers to treat the peasants with kindness and respect. He published a code of conduct for dealing with peasants and used it as a basis for winning the "hearts and minds" of the people.⁷

Latin American Revolutionaries. In 1969, Carlos Marighella wrote in his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla*:

The accusation of 'violence' or 'terrorism' no longer has the negative meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing; a new color. It does not divide, it does not discredit; on the contrary, it represents a center of attraction. Today, to be 'violent' or a 'terrorist' is a quality that ennobles any honorable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its atrocities.

Marighella did not invent terrorism. However, his book explained the rationale for conducting terrorist actions. The urban guerilla lived among the population and conducted hit-and-run attacks to demoralize security forces and to obtain weapons to sustain the fight. Marighella believed, like Mao, that the fight must be won with more conventional forces. The purpose of the urban guerilla was to fix security forces in the complex urban terrain of the cities, allowing insurgent forces to mass in the remote parts of the country.

One of Marighella's contemporaries was Che Guevara. Many of Che Guevara's philosophies were proven wrong, however, his aptly titled book, *Guerilla Warfare*, is widely read. Che believed that a true revolutionary does not wait until economic and political conditions are ripe for revolution. He believed that by establishing small groups of insurgents in remote regions of countries, he could "spark" feelings of revolution.

The Insurgency within Islam. Religious extremists such as Usama bin Laden (UBL) intend to reform the religion of Islam to their own interpretations. Unlike most other religious reformers, UBL believes it is his duty to use violence to achieve his goals and that any who opposes him should be killed. The reforms he is pursuing include removing secular governments from power and establishing the Koran as the primary legal document in the Islamic world. This is in direct conflict with many secular Muslim governments and, as a result, there is currently an insurgency raging within the Muslim World.⁸

Many of the preconditions for a national insurgency within a religion do not exist. Most secular governments are firmly in control, can provide basic services, and the culture does not lend itself to wholesale revolution. There are, however, circumstances and trends within the Islamic world that UBL has drawn upon. Many Islamic countries have poor economies, poor educational systems, and oppressive authoritarian leaders who allow the people very little say in government. In the Middle East, many governments have suppressed political dissent. However, they have allowed and in some cases encouraged, religious leaders to protest against the West. Dissatisfaction with home governments, the empowerment of religious radicals, and a tendency to blame all problems on the West has created a base of support from which UBL can draw followers.⁹

One can further trace back the roots of the insurgency within Islam to two previous insurgencies. One is the ongoing liberation insurgency being conducted by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The other was the liberation insurgency in Afghanistan that developed after the Soviet invasion in 1979. Both of these conflicts fueled the development of support networks for Islamic extremism. The Palestinian insurgency remains important because it helps support the propaganda and recruiting for UBL and those of his ilk. The legacy of Afghanistan cannot be underestimated because this is where many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of UBL's organization were developed. The eventual victory by the Afghans over the Soviets greatly emboldened UBL and other extremists and led them to believe they could defeat any armed force.

On September 11, 2001, UBL and his organization AQ, attacked the United States. This was not intended to be a decisive blow to the U.S., but instead a call to war, a rallying cry for the rest of the Muslim world. UBL's intent was to transform the success of the Soviet-Afghan War into a global liberation insurgency that freed the Islamic world from Western influences and secular regimes. By attacking the "Western Occupiers," UBL hopes to unite

the Muslim world against a common enemy, much like Mao Tse-tung used the Japanese occupation to unite his Chinese forces.

The lessons of past insurgents are well learned by UBL. Like Marighella, UBL made statements to justify his methods and the employed terrorism in support of his stated political goals. Like Che, UBL decided that he could set the conditions for the insurgency by attacking Western economic and political interests. Like Mao, UBL plans on spreading Western forces across the globe to drain our resources. Like the Scythians fighting the Persians or the Spanish partisans fighting the French, UBL does not intend to become decisively engaged with U.S. combat forces. Instead he replaced hit-and-run raids with suicide attacks where the life of one martyr can kill dozens and terrorize millions.

In addition to these classic strategies, UBL understands the usefulness of the media to communicate his message and the powerful effects of video. Images of mutilated U.S. troops in Somalia accomplished what an army could not do. By leveraging communications and transportation technologies, UBL's message and violence can reach a global audience. The 9/11 attacks, the attacks in Spain in 2004, and the July 2005 attacks in London demonstrate conclusively that a relatively small group of insurgents can alter global politics by combining modern technology with ancient tactics. UBL is attacking the center of gravity of American politics — the will of the American people. This is also one of the strategies used by insurgents within Iraq today.

The Insurgency in Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq is among the most complex in history. From the outside, the insurgency appears amorphous and vague, with very few discernible patterns, and without any true centralized chain of command. Part of the reason for this is that there is not one insurgency in Iraq, there are many.

Like the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets, the insurgents in Iraq come from various backgrounds and ideologies. Insurgents from the former regime are fighting to regain power. Sunni Islamic extremists are fighting because they believe it is their religious duty to violently resist coalition forces and to establish a theocratic state. Shia Islamic extremists also fought in the spring and summer of 2004 to expel coalition forces.

In addition to the political and religious dimensions of the insurgency, there is also a tribal nationalist dimension. Tribal groups sometimes fight the coalition in order to gain local political power, get vengeance for the death of a loved one, or liberate their country from coalition forces. There are also criminal networks that fight for money or support insurgent groups with weapons and other con-

triband. The varying motivations of the insurgents coupled with complex family, tribal, social, and professional ties between the insurgents make for a very intricate web of insurgent networks.

Although the insurgency in Iraq began as a liberation insurgency, it appears to be transforming into a national insurgency. The elections of January 2005 isolated the Sunni Arab population of the country and demonstrated that the vast majority of the active insurgents in Iraq are Sunni Arabs. Although transforming the Iraqi insurgency from one of liberation to that of a national insurgency has benefits, it could potentially spark a civil war between Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, and Kurdish factions.

The Iraqi insurgency resembles the Soviet-Afghan War in many ways: it is decentralized, there is a strong tribal and ethnic aspect, insurgents fight for many different reasons, and the insurgents use many of the TTPs employed in Afghanistan. As in the Afghan War, Iraqi insurgents have benefited from external support in arms, finances, fighters, and sanctuary. Like Afghanistan, Islamic radicals from around the world are coming to Iraq to fight what they believe to be a holy war against the U.S.-led coalition. The final similarity is that the only unifying goal of the insurgents is to expel coalition forces. If this goal were to be accomplished, the insurgents would fight one another for control of Iraq.

The two major differences between the Afghan War and the Iraqi insurgency are terrain and technology. Iraq lacks the complex terrain of Afghanistan, so insurgents have made extensive use of urban areas instead. In addition, modern communications allow the Iraqi insurgents to fight in a manner even more decentralized and more mobile than the Afghans. This resilient and flat hierarchy has led some writers such as Bruce Hoffman to postulate that the Iraqi insurgency is an example of a new form of insurgency referred to as “net war” for its reliance on communications technology.¹⁰

Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations

The individual and collective tasks required to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are not common in U.S. Army lesson plans for noncommissioned or officer education courses. Part of the reason is the Cold War mentality that if the Army can fight a high intensity conflict, the Army can fight any conflict. In addition, the demons of Vietnam still linger in our collective consciousness. As a result of the failure to adapt to COIN operations in Vietnam, the organizational culture of the Army preferred to avoid such “dirty” wars and kept the focus within the comfort level of World War II style maneuver warfare.

Doctrinal Answer

The current insurgency in Iraq peaked new interest in COIN and **FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations**, was published in September 2004. This manual, largely unknown by soldiers, states: “The overall mission of all military operations in support of counterinsurgency is to provide a safe and secure environment within which governmental institutions can address the concerns of the people.”¹¹

By stating that military operations support government institutions, it is implied that insurgency is primarily a political problem which requires a political solution. The governmental institutions which must address the concerns of the people belong to the host nation government.

It is often the goal of the insurgents to destabilize the government and intimidate the population in order to prevent them from supporting the government or military forces. As an intervention force, the U.S. military will often be called upon to provide a safe and secure environment in order to support a government. This is a means for us to begin to “separate the fish from the water.” Only after this is accomplished, can governmental actions finally defeat insurgent organizations.

FMI 3-07.22 further states that military operations in support of COIN fall into three broad categories:

- ❑ Civil-Military Operations (CMO) which are oriented towards the indigenous population.
- ❑ Combat operations, which are oriented towards the insurgent threat forces.
- ❑ Information Operations (IO) which, as described by the FMI, assures that the common operating picture is disseminated down to the lowest level and helps to shape the information environment in support of CMO and combat operations.

COIN Theory

Historically, there are two approaches to COIN that have had some success. One strategy is to bring overwhelming amounts of combat power into an area and brutally suppress the insurgency. This approach does sometimes work in the short-term, but it never addresses the underlying reasons for the insurgency. For this reason, the insurgency often recurs. If the host government is to maintain stability, it usually has to be brutal and authoritarian. This strategy does not fit U.S. goals or principles.

A second strategy, which can be referred to as the British model, relies on addressing the underlying reasons for the insurgency. These are usually

political, economic, and/or involve national identity. The British model acknowledges that resolving these issues often takes many years. The three broad principles of the British COIN model are—

- ❑ Minimal force.
- ❑ Civil-military cooperation.
- ❑ Tactical flexibility.

Minimal force at the strategic level means putting the emphasis on the political, economic, and social aspects of the insurgency and not attempting to accomplish everything through force. At the tactical level, it means the use of rules of engagement and that operations are conducted with a focus on the second- and third-order effects. Civil-military cooperation means that military forces work hand in hand with police, political leaders, local citizenry, economic advisors, etc. They share information with one another, they have a common strategy and goals, and all of this occurs at all levels from the theater down to the line company. This ensures unity of effort. Finally, tactical flexibility is extremely important because insurgencies are constantly changing. Tactical leaders require the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, or they cannot be effective.¹²

Further breaking down how to conduct COIN into simple terms is not an easy thing to do. It is especially difficult for the writer of doctrine who is required to keep it as general as possible so the field manual will apply to multiple situations. To be successful in COIN, our strategies and doctrine have to be as dynamic and reactive as the insurgents. Based on experience in Operation Iraqi



Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, build playground equipment at a local school yard in northern Baghdad.

Freedom (OIF) and research, here is the simplest way the authors can describe required tasks for successful COIN operations:

- ❑ Establish security and provide a safe environment.
- ❑ Improve and/or restore infrastructure.
- ❑ Support the host nation government.
- ❑ Conduct offensive operations against insurgents.
- ❑ Support economic development.

The tasks listed above are intended to allow us to address the underlying issues causing the insurgency while using combat power to directly fight the insurgents. The priority of the tasks will vary from place to place. It will



A Missouri National Guardsman from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers distributes school supplies to Iraqi children in Fallujah. The supplies were donated by students and faculty at an American middle school.

often be necessary to do most or all of the tasks simultaneously. In addition, it must be remembered that Information Operations are an ongoing part of all tasks and must be mutually supportive of the actions taken by the unit. After all, actions are information operations.

To put things in more conventional terms, conducting operations in support of these tasks allows you to engage the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield. In conventional warfare, the Army will simultaneously engage the enemy with direct fire, indirect fire, electronic attack, rotary-wing deep attack, and supporting air strikes. This paralyzes the enemy's decisionmaking capabilities, allows the Army to mass effects at the decisive point, and enables the seizing of key terrain. Counterinsurgency is obviously much different than conventional warfare. The key terrain is the civilian populace rather than a physical place on a map. As Mao discovered, whoever wins

the support of the civilian populace will win the war. "Seizing" this key terrain requires a different set of tools, but as in conventional warfare, attacking the enemy in multiple ways simultaneously will slow the enemy's ability to make decisions, reduce the enemy's logistical capabilities by separating him from his base of support, and enable us to "seize" the key terrain.

From Theory to Practical

Theory is great until you try to apply it. Counterinsurgency is often a slow, difficult effort where the rules are constantly changing. Insurgents are well-known for rapidly adapting to counterinsurgency efforts. Insurgents use an incredibly wide variety of TTPs to gain passive and/or active support from the populace. They will continuously find new ways to attack political leaders, security forces, and U.S. personnel. They will twist every action of U.S. forces into a piece of propaganda for their cause. This means that the counterinsurgency effort must be similarly flexible in its organization and TTPs. Another issue complicating matters is the requirement for synchronizing tactical and strategic actions to ensure unity of effort. Small unit leaders make decisions daily that can win or lose the war. One bad decision by a soldier can have negative effects on the strategic fight. Because of this, it is important to push counterinsurgency concepts down to the lowest level. There are many different steps that a command can take to accomplish this task while maintaining flexibility.

First, the command should encourage the unit to be a learning institution. In *The U.S. Army as Learning Institution*, Richard Downie defines organizational learning as a process by which an organization uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes. LTC John Nagl further defines a learning institution as an organization that has systems in place to accept bottom-up input, one where superiors can be questioned, theoretical thinking is encouraged, local doctrine is developed, local training centers are set up and the staff is small and responsive.¹³ Advances in Iraq, such as CavNet (now called MarneNet) are great examples of tactical units using information technology to rapidly disseminate lessons learned. In order to be successful in COIN, we must continue to improve our ability to learn and adapt at all echelons.

A means of ensuring unity of effort is the use of lines of operation. The counterinsurgency tasks explained above are essentially lines of operation. They are a set of tasks

that must be undertaken to reach a desired end state. Each line of operation is a broad concept that requires multiple subtasks. When a command publishes lines of operation with subtasks, the ground commander can then prioritize the efforts within his or her specific area of responsibility (AOR) and determine means of supporting each line. Within tactical units, the targeting process is often used as a means of ensuring that the actions of the unit support the lines of operation. The intent is that all of the thousands of operations ongoing in a theater are in support of the lines of operation, although the tactics used can vary greatly from location to location. In this way, strategic requirements are fused with tactical realities and the greatest amount of flexibility is available to commanders.

The COIN fight is above all one for control of a populace. This makes it a highly personal form of warfare for the soldier on the ground. Junior leaders will be routinely called upon to meet, negotiate with, train, and operate with members of indigenous security forces and local governments. Maintaining cultural awareness and developing rapport with these people is often more important than detaining insurgents. This means that Army leaders at all levels must make an effort to learn the culture in which they are operating. In addition, all soldiers must understand that although treating the locals well may not always win allies, treating them poorly will certainly create enemies. Mao enforced a set of standing orders describing how his insurgents should interact with the population. The same thing should be done for counterinsurgents. General George W. Casey recently announced standing orders for all troops in Iraq:

- Make security and safety your first priorities.
- Help the Iraqis win - don't win it for them.
- Treat the Iraqi people with dignity and respect. Learn and respect Iraqi customs and cultures.
- Maintain strict standards and iron discipline everyday. Risk assess every mission - no complacency!!
- Information saves lives - share it and protect it.
- Maintain your situational awareness at all times - this can be an unforgiving environment.
- Take care of your equipment and it will take care of you.
- Innovate and adapt - situations here don't lend themselves to cookie-cutter solutions.
- Focus on the enemy and be opportunistic.
- Be patient. Don't rush to failure.
- Take care of yourself and take care of each other.

April-June 2005

Conclusion

Insurgency is a type of warfare that has been around for millennia. Although the U.S. military has often ignored this form of warfare in both doctrine and training, we have fought more counterinsurgencies than we have "conventional" wars. This trend will continue and may further intensify in the 21st century. These wars place a premium on the leadership of noncommissioned officers and company grade leaders as well as staff work done at the brigade and below. Junior leaders are placed in difficult situations requiring political and economic skills for which they often have little training.

T.E. Lawrence famously wrote in *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* that fighting insurgents is "messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife." Although this form of warfare will never be easy, as leaders we must be innovative and make the best use of all the tools at our disposal. Once we recognize that insurgency is usually a political struggle for the control of a populace, we see that combat operations are not the sole means of addressing the problem. CMO and IO shape the battlefield by taking away popular support from insurgents, thereby making them more susceptible to combat operations. In effect, we have more tools available to us than previously supposed. It is a matter of using them appropriately. Rather than learning to eat soup with a knife, we must learn, through training and experience, to pick up the spoon.



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North Korean National Guerilla Strategies: Strategic Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Using the PMESII Model

by Daniel S. Burgess

“Guerilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.”

— Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerilla Warfare*

The purpose of this assessment is to provide an understanding of how a protracted guerilla war may be employed to embroil the U.S. in an unpopular and costly (both human and monetary) war so that a fractured North Korea could remain intact. The assessment does not cover all strategies (i.e., tactical and operational) but attempts to outline the overall strategic plan. The Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (**PMESII**) Model is a system-of-systems analytical approach to identify a potential adversary’s war-making capabilities. More specifically, I have used the PMESII model to identify strategies underpinning North Korean survival as a nation state when faced with almost certain conventional military defeat.

Background

The assessment begins with the assumption that either a desperate North Korea attacked the Republic of Korea (ROK) or that the U.S. decided that regime change was necessary. The results of the battle have the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in control of the fighting, having pushed into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) with forces poised in the vicinity of the Kaesong Heights. With conventional military defeat imminent and his regime about to collapse Kim Jong-Il (KJI) rallies the military and the population to begin an unconventional guerilla war.¹

KJI’s purpose in altering his strategy is to buy time, diminish support for the CFC offensive, and make the war more costly; thereby making the conflict unpopular. This strategy, combined with continuing propaganda efforts and working through third-party nations, will underpin his attempts at a diplomatic solution. His end state will be the cessation of hostilities and an intact North Korea.

Historic Perspective

From a historical perspective there is overwhelming evidence that North Koreans completely understand the nuances of guerilla warfare and are better prepared than most countries to execute such a strategy.

The North Korean guerilla experience was born in the early 1930s when a young Kim Sung-ju (later renamed Kim Il Sung) fought against Japanese forces in Manchu-

ria.² During this time, Kim gained valuable guerilla experience and began forging his political beliefs. Eventually, Kim would rise to the position of Sixth Division Commander, Second Army. That Kim Il Sung fought with the Chinese guerillas is important to note because it is here that he was taught Mao Tse-Tung's guerilla warfare strategies. Not only was he indoctrinated into Mao's guerilla mindset, but he survived to see the fruits of his strategies against the Japanese.

Kim learned to employ a variety of classic guerilla tactics. These tactics included deception, hostage taking, and small unit operations (usually using hit-and-run tactics). He realized that he was outnumbered and therefore split his ranks and used the mountainous topography of Korea to his benefit.

“The nature of his operation was such that the forces were divided into many small companies and detachments, constantly moving from one location to another in deep mountain forests and difficult to reach areas.”³

One of the keys to guerilla survival is the ability to resupply. Kim reverted to strong-arming the rich, attacking small supply trains, trading opium and ginseng for crops, and by sometimes threatening farmers. After several Japanese attempts to kill Kim, he finally retreated to the Soviet Union and received additional military training in 1941.⁴ After his stay in the Soviet Union, he was propelled into power by the Soviets; the North Korean Provisional People's Committee was established on 8 February 1946 and Kim Il Sung was appointed its chairman.

After the split between North and South Korea was solidified, Kim Il Sung concluded that a forceful reunification was the preferred method for bringing the two Koreas together. But before he tried a conventional approach, he attempted a more unconventional approach using guerilla forces.⁵

“From September 1949 to March 1950, Communist guerilla activities in the South were intensified, and two Communist leaders in the South, Kim Sam-yong and Yi Chu-ha, used guerillas sent from the north.”⁶

The use of guerilla forces was designed to incite a Communist revolt in the South, a much preferred method to an actual invasion. More than 3,000 guerilla forces were sent, including more than 600 graduates from the Kangdong Political Institute (a Communist indoctrination school). Fortunately, these activities were halted as most of the infiltrators were arrested. It does show that Kim Il Sung was still thinking of his military roots and the importance of guerilla warfare in North Korean military doctrine. But his attempts to use unconventional warfare ended there.

During the Eighth plenum (or general assembly) of the Worker's Party of Korea Central Committee in 1964, Kim-Il Sung pronounced his revised strategy for unification. This strategy involved the strengthening of three revolutionary forces: revolutionary forces of the north, revolutionary forces of the south, and international revolutionary forces.⁷ His reference to revolutionary forces translated into a call for subversive activities to organize and undermine the Park Chun Hee government. To some degree, this kind of activity continues in the ROK today. Certainly a case could be made that groups like ***HanJongry'un*** (Korean National Federation of General Student Assemblies) or ***Bum Dae Wi*** (Pan-National Countermeasures Committee) are somewhat extensions of unconventional warfare. These groups do not hide the fact that they are pro-North Korean and ultimately desire a unified Korea under Communist rule.

Today, one can also look at the emphasis in the Special Purpose Forces (SPF) in the Korean People's Army (KPA). As currently understood, the special operation force guerilla tactics were born from military doctrine and ideas of Mao Tse-Tung learned in Manchuria and the Korean War. Their strategy will consist of the use of both conventional and unconventional forces that provide mutual support. This is commonly referred to as a “Two Front” strategy or a form of a “mixed tactics strategy.”⁸

Still, there is more evidence that the DPRK understands and is committed to the use of unconventional warfare. Ever since the Armistice was signed, the North Koreans have continued to use unconventional forces attempting to undermine the ROK government. Examples include —

- ❑ Commando raids along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (1966 to 1971).
- ❑ The assassination attempt of Park Chung Hee (1968).
- ❑ A North Korean agent's attempt to assassinate President Park, killing the First Lady instead (1974).
- ❑ The discovery of infiltration tunnels (1974 to 1990).
- ❑ The Kwangju Incident (sometimes referred to as a massacre) and alleged ties to communist plots and assassins (1980).
- ❑ The attempted assassination of then president, Chun Doo Hwan by North Korean agents in Rangoon (1983).
- ❑ The bombing of the South Korean airliner Flight 858 (1987).
- ❑ The case of Kim Dong-Shik, an armed north Korean agent who infiltrated Puyo, South ChungJong Province (1995).
- ❑ The North Korean spy submarine (Sango) running aground off South Korea's east coast (1996).

These and other numerous other infiltrations and subversive attempts to undermine the ROK's sovereignty have continued over the past 50 years.

So what would be North Korea's response if they ever had to face the U.S. or CFC forces? They would most assuredly lose a conventional battle. Even if they employ all of their assets (e.g., nuclear, chemical, biological, missiles) they would eventually be defeated, and probably rather swiftly. So how would KJI respond if he knew that defeat was imminent?

Guerilla Strategies

The grand strategy of a protracted guerilla war would be to induce world opinion to pressure the combative nations to stop fighting and therefore retain control over North Korea. Within this grand strategy their plan would be to complicate any CFC efforts to win popularity among the masses and spread fear among those who may be tempted to support CFC efforts. The PMESII strategies are as follows —

Their strategy must be one of lightning war and speedy decision. If we can hold out three or more years, it will be most difficult for Japan to bear up under the strain.

—Mao Tse-Tung

Political

Guerilla efforts are designed to impact diplomatic solutions for retention of the status quo (i.e., two Koreas still exist). Prolonging the war effort and exacerbating both the human and economic costs associated with such an engagement will increase global political pressures to facilitate a cease-fire.

Externally, DPRK diplomacy will be limited because of its historic belligerence and lack of national respect on the world stage. The most likely diplomatic avenue will be directed through a third party nation, almost certainly China or Russia. Their diplomatic strategy will be aimed at convincing world opinion that:

- ❑ The war is harming regional and world economies.
- ❑ The U.S. is responsible for the war and they are the imperialistic aggressors.
- ❑ The rest of the world should intervene or possibly face regime change themselves because U.S. power left unchecked is a global danger.
- ❑ North Korea does not represent a threat to any nation.

Another major political player will be Japan. While Japan will, from the outset, be a staunch U.S. supporter, there are factions in Japan that will act to serve P'yongyang's interests. Overt acts such as organizing demonstrations, lobbying Japanese political leadership, and broadcasting support messages will attempt to influence Japan's support for a U.S. led regime change.

The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened.

—Mao Tse-Tung

Internally, the DPRK political strategy will be focused on the teachings of **Chu'che**⁹ to emotionally stir nationalism to continue the guerilla cause. Political leaders, more than likely local military leadership, must emerge to rally local populations to support the insurgency.

This critical task of spiritually unifying the people and the guerillas is one of the most important tasks in order for the insurgency to succeed.

Overall, their political strategies will be closely linked to their information strategies to ensure their political messages and themes are received both internally and externally.

Military

The KPA was originally trained and armed by the former Soviet Union. It used the Soviet model as its underlying doctrine with modifications to adapt to the Korean terrain and military structure. North Korean guerilla tactics are derived from the military principles of Mao Tse-Tung and later molded by the "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung. This zeal for guerilla proficiency became more prominent over time and by 1974 the slogan "to produce, study, and live with the guerilla system" was introduced to the North Korean people. The public was to apply this mindset in all activities, giving birth to sayings like: "the guerillas at work," "study like a guerilla," and the "guerilla lifestyle." This ideological fervor was renewed after the demise of the Soviet Union, the death of Kim Il Sung, and the current economic crisis. The range of threats that guerilla forces pose is often difficult to counter in traditional military ways.

These forces will be formed from a multitude of sources. These include organized paramilitary forces, disorganized units, stay-behinds, bypassed units, surviving special operations forces, party officials, criminals and civilians, and repatriated or escaped enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG), College Training Units, Red Youth Guard, and various security forces. They will quite literally "make war everywhere."¹⁰ Also complicating this factor will be the hostile terrain that defines so much of North Korea.



The key to survival of guerilla forces is the ability to find sanctuary and obtain food, water, and arms. Another key to their success is to maintain local support in order to successfully attack CFC assets and interests, deceive CFC forces as to their intent and locations, conduct resupply operations, and recruit new members.

This military strategy would prolong the conflict by avoiding direct engagements with CFC forces. This strategy would put constant pressure on CFC forces through the use of small-scale raids with an occasional larger scale attack, if possible; but generally with the use of hit-and-run

tactics, terrorist style vehicle bombings, and other traditional guerilla tactics. At the Fifth Korean Worker's Party (KWP) Congress in 1970, Kim Il Sung said:

Our country has many mountains, and rivers, and has long seacoasts. In the terrain of a country, such as ours, if one takes good advantage of this kind of terrain, carrying out mountain and night combat with skill, and correctly applying combinations of large scale and small scale warfare, regular and irregular combat, even in the case of an enemy who is armed to the fingertips with the latest military technology, we can do a good job of annihilating him. The special experience of the struggle for National Liberation in our country bear this out, and in the same manner, the Vietnam War of today also bears this out¹¹.

I simply had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet; that would have been fragmenting resources and exposing them to defeat in detail.

—General William C. Westmoreland

So as far back as 1970, the North Korean leadership understood the abilities to defeat technically superior forces using unconventional tactics. The North Korean leadership realizes that the insurgents in Iraq have complicated the U.S. resolve and caused international discourse. Because of their deep rooted Maoist beliefs, lessons learned from Vietnam and Iraq, and their inability to re-tool and modernize their own Army forces; the North Koreans will look at cheaper and more effective ways to defeat a superior force.¹²

Therefore, a guerilla strategy would be designed to disrupt offensive momentum, interdict resupply efforts, inflict casualties, and achieve political and psychological effects in order to set conditions for a favorable end state. This strategy means denying victory to CFC forces but not winning! Henry Kissinger once said that “the guerilla wins if it does not lose ... the conventional army loses if it does not win.” The essence of this strategy simply involves outlasting the CFC resolve.

Economic

Economically, the guerillas are dependent upon local populations for logistic and economic support. This support is closely linked to their political, social, and informational strategies. Maintaining psychological support of the local populations is absolutely critical. Once spiritual unification is attained between the guerillas and the people, economic aid will become much easier to obtain and will also enable the locals to take risks in aiding the guerillas. A major theme to convince locals to support the insurgency that has been on going for decades is that their economic plight is caused by the “American imperialists.”

In the case of guerilla groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.

—Mao Tse-Tung

In an effort to augment supplies, North Korean guerillas will target CFC supply routes, civil-military operations (CMO), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their intent would be to first sustain their efforts and then to use what is left to help influence local support with free handouts. They may also use buried or underground facilities or caches for untapped food and ammunition stocks.

The guerillas will need little, but may receive clandestine aid from countries wanting to see the U.S. fail. Whether they receive aid or not, the North Korean people are used to austere conditions and have experience in scavenging for sustenance without much assistance.

Social

The North Koreans are not fond of Americans. In fact, they are taught to hate and distrust America. The “American imperialists” are blamed for just about everything that goes wrong in their society. Their citizens are repeatedly told that America has its foot on the throat of North Korea. Because of America’s malicious treatment they are hungry, poor, and unable to improve human conditions. Most, or at least many, North Koreans truly believe

the negative stereotypes. But they are incapable of verifying whether these stereotypes are true or false because of their isolation. Because of this mindset, North Koreans are already socially prepared to be formidable guerrillas.

Chu'che, or the philosophy of self-reliance, permeates the North Korean culture and society. This philosophy is the guiding principal for all events in a north Korean's life. Chu'che is a "working class" struggle against capitalism and more specifically the U.S. (some could correctly argue that Japan is also in this category). Chu'che is a collective theory that was extracted from the Confucian ideals of collectivism and then applied to a political system. Chu'che denies individual freedoms but offers collective freedom from "invidious U.S. intentions." The ideology is borne out of necessity and historic fear of foreign occupation. Most assuredly, this historic fear of occupa-

tion will be used as a psychological theme to persuade local populations to support the guerilla activities. KJI stated that if "Chu'che is to be established in ideology, servility to big powers and all other outdated ideas should be opposed." The North Koreans have suffered greatly to uphold this framework and will be more than willing to defend it.

Therefore, the guerilla social strategy will depend on Chu'che. Actually the DPRK's social strategy to ensure successful and enthusiastic participation in conflict, whether it is conventional or unconventional, has been ongoing for the last fifty-one years. This social drum beat can be read daily in the Rodong Sinmum (the DPRK's official newspaper) and heard over DPRK's radio and television stations. The primary themes used in these media:



Figure 2. Kim presiding over the third session of the 11th Supreme People's Assembly, April 2005.

Exalt the greatness of KJI. "... the great leader Comrade Kim Jong-Il, the great of the greatest and the greatest of all great generals, who defends and glorifies my fatherland with his military-first revolutionary leadership".¹³

Damn the U.S. as an imperialist warmongering nation. "...It is based on the atrocious policy of aggression, which is aimed at eliminating our independent Republic at any cost, that the belligerent U.S. forces have defined our country as one of the 'outposts of tyranny' after they described it as part of an axis of evil."¹⁴

And extol the virtues of their superior ideology (Chu'che) while explaining that the principles of military-first politics will carry them to victory (Normally associated with the first theme). "Our fatherland is shining brilliantly as the invincible and ever-victorious fatherland of military-first politics under the wise leadership of the great leader Comrade Kim Jong-Il."¹⁵

Because of these few simple basic themes being hammered upon in their media, it is difficult for most North Koreans to really distinguish between DPRK's propaganda and reality. This kind of mass brain-wash-

The rank and file is usually much more primitive than we imagine. Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious. The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly...it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over.

—Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Propaganda Minister




Figure 3. Depiction of the North Vietnamese Model.

A represents the underground organization within the population in the villages and towns of the country. The cells are responsible for subversion, penetration, intimidation, terror, propaganda and sabotage, and for providing the guerilla units at **B**, **C**, and **D** with recruits, supplies and intelligence. **B** represents village guerilla units, initially of squad size, operating round their own villages and giving armed support to **A**. **C** represents regional guerilla units, initially of platoon strength, which are normally confined to their own districts. It is their task to support **A** offensively, by attacks on small police or military posts, by ambushing and by harassing government forces. It is also their task, defensively, to prevent government forces from regaining control over the population in their areas. **D** represents regular guerilla units which may start at company size and be built up to battalion and regimental strength. These are deployed initially in remoter areas where they can be safely trained and expanded, until a situation has been developed where they can accelerate the advance of the whole insurgent movement into the more populated areas of the country by carrying out attacks and ambushes against regular government forces. **From No Exit from Vietnam, Robert Thompson.**

ing is reminiscent of Hitler's Nazi regime. Because of the confused state of the North Korean people, the DPRK is socially primed for blind obedience to KJI, his ideas, and his reality.

Infrastructure

The guerilla's infrastructure will be hinged upon their ability to seek refuge in the towns and villages that traverse North Korea. In order to strategize their infrastructure, the guerilla forces will have to win the psychological war and reinforce the population's indoctrination. Defeating guerilla tactics is impossible without the assistance from the citizenry. In other words, their infrastructure strategy is merged with their information strategy to produce favorable pockets of support.

The guerilla's infrastructure should be similar to the model (See Figure 3 above) that the North Vietnamese used against the U.S.¹⁵

Support cells will reside within the local populations. Squad size units that operate in the vicinity of these local populations will provide support in terms of propaganda, arms, and sustenance. Regional units (platoon

strength) will in turn help attack and harass local police and military units to support local cells. Still larger units, company size and larger, will be used to conduct larger attacks at key locations and times. The key to the entire network are the cells at the local level. "If that is expanding like a virus within the body politic of the country then the guerilla units, which are the open manifestation of the disease, will be spreading and erupting all over the surface of the country." 17

Another infrastructure factor that would aid the guerilla forces is the series of underground facilities and caches. Peter Hayes, who has traveled to North Korea several times and is executive director of the Nautilus Institute, a Berkeley California "think tank", said, "As you travel around and look around, you see that what looked like a regular hill is actually a bunker. It takes a while for your eyes to adjust and to make the mental shift, but after a while, you realize that all of North Korea is an underground facility." Supporting Hayes' observation is Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., the author of three books on the North Korean military, who estimates the total number of underground facilities at 11,000 to 14,000. 18 Anyone who has visited the tunnels discovered along the DMZ can attest to the digging abilities, primitive as they may be, of the North Koreans. These underground facilities will permit the guerilla forces unique hiding places and advantages especially because of the particular ruggedness of the North Korean geography.

Information

The internal information strategy will be almost singly focused on the Chu'che doctrine to repel the invaders. The guerilla's information dissemination strategy will be limited. Traditional methods like television, the Internet, newspapers, and radio will be extremely restricted if available at all. The most likely information dissemination strategies will be by word-of-mouth, *ad hoc* billboarding and by common folk such as farmers or even children carrying leaflets or messages. Methods for gaining popular support will vary greatly. They will use bribes and gifts (e.g., food, money, valuables) to encourage informants to divulge information on CFC movements and activities. They may also threaten and coerce certain populations to support the resistance. Their information strategy will appeal to the collective nature of the Koreans and emphasize that sovereignty and independence from the imperialists is their mandate. Remember, the regime has had over fifty years to convince the North Korean people of the brutality and hatred of the U.S. and the "lap dogs" in the ROK. It will take months, if not years, for the people of North Korea to trust CFC forces. They will likely fault CFC for the devastation around them which will undoubtedly occur during the preceding months of war (just as coalition forces are experiencing in Iraq). Any insurgent movement will seek to exploit this situation to their advantage as part of their information strategy.

Included in their informational strategy will be the use of psychological operations (PSYOP). The themes and messages that will be used will be consistent with social themes but will empha-



Courtesy of Herb Friedman (SGM, Retired). Featured in "Communist PSYOP Against American Troops During the Korean War."

Figure 4. Actual PSYOP leaflet used during the Korean Conflict. The leaflet appeals for surrender.

size that the imperialist warmongers are now at their socialist door and will try to end this nirvana called the DPRK. The PSYOP teams will incite populace emotions and play to their sense of nationalism, honor and pride. They will instill hatred of the U.S. soldiers which will be fairly easy to accomplish since they live on a constant diet of how evil the Americans are already.

Another key to their information campaign will be the role that political leaders will play. It is fairly well known that guerilla success largely depends upon powerful political leaders who work to bring about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people; they must understand overarching goals and manipulate local leaders to push the guerilla strategy. If these leaders do not emerge, the guerilla campaign will ultimately falter because of a lack of population support.

It is highly likely for the guerilla PSYOP campaign to target U.S. soldiers or coalition partners. It is fairly easy to accomplish and inexpensive, especially if the North Koreans pre-print the messages, which is extremely likely (See Figure 4).

Their external information campaign will include appeals to other countries and organizations that the U.S. is the aggressor and that the conflict should end. China will be an important player as the North Korean government appeals to Beijing to stop the fighting and preserve the Communist buffer between CFC forces and the Chinese border. They will also appeal to the European Union (EU) to pressure the U.S. to stop the war.

It is also likely that the DPRK leadership will try to find or manufacture U.S. atrocities to prove to the world that the U.S. is the aggressor and an evil nation, even if it was North Korea that attacked first. These types of information campaigns do not necessarily have to come from within the DPRK. Computer hackers and web masters can be hired to proliferate information themes and propaganda through a variety of sources and methods.

Conclusion

No matter what conditions bring North Korean forces and the U.S. to war, it is an almost certainty that without help, the DPRK will lose the conventional conflict. Faced with a certain defeat, the North Korean leadership will decide to transform their forces capable of conducting a protracted guerilla war. Guerilla warfare has been a part of the North Korean military doctrine ever since Kim Il-Sung learned the art of this form of warfare from Mao Tse-Tung in the 1930s.

The purpose of this strategy is borne out of their history and proven tactics in other theaters of war (China, Vietnam, and Iraq). Politically, their strategy will be aimed at convincing world opinion that the war is harming regional and world economies. They will try to fix blame on the aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Their military strategy would be reminiscent of a Vietnam campaign combined with a few of the more successful Iraqi insurgent strategies. The guerillas will attempt to prolong conflict by avoiding direct engagements with CFC forces. Their tactics will include the use of small-scale raids, an occasional larger scale attack, use of hit-and-run tactics, terrorist style vehicle bombings, and other traditional guerilla methods.

Economically, the guerillas will remain dependent upon the local populace for logistic and economic support. They will exert constant pressure on CFC supply routes, CMOs, and NGOs. The guerillas will be able to sustain themselves with little but may need occasional support. They may even receive economic support from countries that want to see the U.S. fail. Their receipt of external support may not matter. North Koreans have gone without help for so long that they are very accustomed to scavenging for sustenance, especially if their underground caches are still intact. Their military tactics are successful at obtaining subsistence from NGO and CFC supply routes.

The cornerstone of their social strategy has been and will be based on Chu'che. Socially, the North Koreans are not fond of Americans. In fact, they are taught to hate and distrust America from the very beginning of their lives. This deep rooted hate is real, as the North Koreans have been fed a constant diet of anti-U.S. propaganda and they are too isolated to distinguish fact from fiction. This type of socialization is a perfect breeding ground for hate necessary to successfully conduct such a war.

The guerilla's infrastructure will be based on their ability to seek refuge in the towns and villages that traverse the rugged North Korean territory. Their ability to seek refuge undoubtedly will be linked to their informational

strategies that gain and maintain support for “the cause.” Their informational strategies must be both external and internal. Externally, they must portray the U.S. as the aggressor following an out-of-control foreign policy. They must appeal to other nations to stop the war so that economic ruin does not befall all of East Asia. Internally, they will continue to emphasize the concept Chu’che. They will also target CFC forces with propaganda leaflets in an attempt to cause friction among the ranks. This tactic will become more successful as the conflict matures.

These strategies will ultimately enable the DPRK regime to buy time, diminish support for the CFC offensive, and make the war more costly, unpopular, and lengthy. Their end state will be a fractured but existing North Korea. North Korea wins by not losing and the CFC forces lose if they do not win.



Endnotes

1. Although some guerilla forces may already exist internally to North Korea during conventional operations, this phase would include all forces to transition from conventional to unconventional warfare. Transitional (i.e., end of conventional hostilities to post hostilities) lessons learned from Iraq will not be lost on the North Koreans. The speed and ability of these forces to preserve manpower and weapons will be critical during the transition.
2. The fighting was actually carried out by the Chinese guerilla armies, as the Koreans had no organized resistance.
3. Dae-Sook Sue, *Kim Il Sung, The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 38.
4. *Ibid.*, 52.
5. The revolt was led by Kim Sam-yong and Yi Chu-ha.
6. *Ibid.*, 121.
7. *Ibid.*, 226.
8. James M. Minnich, *North Korean Tactics* (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and Staff College), 9.
9. North Korean society revolves around the “religion of Kim Il Sungism” and his chu’che ideology, North Korea’s own brand of Marxism-Leninism, national identity, and self-reliance. Kim’s “religion” and chu’che have supplanted Confucianism and other religious and philosophical beliefs such as Daoism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Ch’ndogyo. From http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/north-korea/all.html.
10. “We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people. We must strike the weak spots in the enemy’s flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength.” *On Guerilla Warfare*, Mao Tse-Tung
11. Joseph Bermudez Jr., *Armed Forces of North Korea* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), 10-11.
12. This may, in fact, be one of the reasons that the DPRK recently declared it is nuclear capable.
13. FBIS, “DPRK Radio Describes Nuclear Weapons Possession as ‘Guarantee for Peace,’” Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean, 9 April 2005.
14. FBIS, “DPRK Party Organ Urges US To Cancel Military Exercises To Show ‘Will To Coexist ’” Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (via Uriminjokkkiri Internet) in Korean 9 March 2005.

15. FBIS, "DPRK Radio Describes Nuclear Weapons Possession as 'Guarantee for Peace'."
16. Ibid., 33.
17. Demick, Barbara, "North Korea's Ace in the Hole." *Los Angeles Times*, 14 November 2003.

Dan Burgess (Major, U.S. Army, Retired) is currently a contractor in Mclean, Virginia. During his last overseas assignment in the Republic of Korea, he served as the Eighth U.S. Army Chief of Intelligence, Information Operations. Dan has served as an instructor at the Field Artillery School, Commander of a Field Artillery (FA) battery, Division Artillery S2, III Corps Targeting Officer, and Battalion S2 with both a light infantry battalion and an FA battalion. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration from the University of Central Oklahoma and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence degree from the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC). Readers may contact the author via E-mail at boris00701@yahoo.com and telephonically at (703) 489-3166 or (703) 489-5055.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT (Continued from page 2)

intelligence adequate time to mature (for example, HUMINT operations) or allowing certain enemy actions to unfold in order to be able to exploit the enemy through intelligence collection.

Adapting our Bedrock Processes

Targeting, intelligence synchronization (formerly collection management), and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield are as valid today as they were in the Cold War era. However, the focus is not on a large-scale industrial/military complex or large military formations; the more appropriate focus is on insurgent and terrorist cell structures and relationships, and the civil population, culture, and effects of current operations. Today's intelligence professional must be capable of assessing the population, culture, urban activities, and economic impacts and integrating those assessments into the different staff functions and products. The time-tested processes are the right tools for the staff to use to grapple with complexity.

Our challenge is to focus and train the intelligence warfighter for Phase IV operations. It is the most difficult aspect of our profession that we face. I challenge each of us to work together to come to grips with civil considerations and the other complex aspects of Phase IV operations. Your participation is critical to make sure our doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership development, personnel, and facilities are solutions to this problem set.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

CSM Forum (Continued from page 3)

numerous examples of their discipline, training, unpredictability, ruthlessness, and lethality. What is important is that our analysts know and understand the enemy so as not to underestimate them. We as MI professionals must convince policy makers and supported commanders that low-probability, high-payoff activity has to be seriously considered. Easily said, but definitely in the "hard to do" category. However, our Warrior Ethos and Soldier's Creed tell us to never quit and to never accept defeat.

I personally thank each and every one of you for what you all do as MI professionals for our MI Corps and the Army. Let's take care of each other, our soldiers and our families. You train hard, you die hard; you train easy, you die easy. Peace needs protection.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Technical Perspective (Continued from page 5)

you to redouble your recruiting efforts. If you have any questions as to whether an interested NCO meets the criteria, once again...call me.

Change happens, is not just a saying. Change is constant and necessary. We can drive it or get trampled by it. I need your help – please get involved.

"Remember the past but look to the future"

Proponent Notes

Career and Professional Development Updates

by Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Crockett
Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI)

The information is intended to help you catch up on any new actions that affect your career progression and to let you know what is going on in the world of professional development. Future articles will continue to focus on bringing you up to speed on the latest and greatest to help you make an informed decision on what is best for you in your current situation. As always thanks for all you do for the Army and Military Intelligence (MI). Please do not hesitate to call or write us if there is something we can do to assist you, your soldiers or your unit.

Enlisted Professional Development Opportunities

Sergeant E-5 Promotions. There is a major change coming in the way we select and promote soldiers to the rank of Sergeant E-5. The names of specialists (SPCs) in Star MOSs, if otherwise eligible, will be placed on the promotion standing list with 450 promotion points without having to appear in front of a promotion board. This change does not preclude the unit from continuing to board soldiers in the old way but does ensure that soldiers who are otherwise eligible are considered and promoted at the earliest possible date. This change affects not only the MI Corps, but also every other branch in the Army. Although the promotions are almost automatic, the soldier and the chain of command must continue to ensure that the soldier receives all the training that was mandatory in the past. This includes both unit and Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) training like the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC).

Promotion Board Preparation. You should not wait for the publishing of the Zone Message to update your records. When the board schedule shifted during the past two years, several soldiers were caught short. One of the big reasons for the shift in schedule was the exhausting of the published lists earlier than expected. Bottom line: Do not wait to put new items into your records.

Promotion Board MOS Package. Did you ever want to know what information the board members receive prior to the start of a centralized promotion board? Prior to every board, OCMI submits an information packet to the promotion board outlining MI MOS and life cycle considerations. After the board has convened and released the results, this same packet is posted on-line for your information and review at <https://cms.portal.hua.army.mil/channels/OCMI/Webpage/index.htm>. Soldiers are highly encouraged to review these packets in preparation for their own board and to provide feedback or questions to OCMI.

Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Professional Development Guide. Another good resource to help guide a soldier up the rank ladder is **DA PAM 600-25, NCO Professional Development Guide**. This guide provides insight to training and positions available to soldiers. While the pamphlet is currently under revision, the old pamphlet still provides much relevant information. It can be found on AKO at https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/epubs/600_Series_Collection_1.html.

Upcoming Enlisted Boards. Table 1 lists the updated centralized promotion board schedule.

Board	Dates	Target Release Date
FY05 CSM/SGM/SMC	01 Jun to 22 Jun 05	September 2005
FY06 MSG	04 Oct to 26 Oct 05	January 2006
FY06 SFC	31 Jan to 24 Feb 06	May 2006
FY06 CSM/SGM	06 Jun to 27 Jun 06	September 2006
FY07 MSG	03 Oct to 26 Oct 06	January 2007

Table 1. Updated Schedule for Centralized Promotion Boards

You can always find updated and promotion zone information posted at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/select/Enlisted.htm#ip>.

Warrant Officer Professional Development Opportunities

Many developments have occurred in the Warrant Officer (WO) Corps recently. The increased demand for our technical skills and the chronic shortages affecting a number of MI WO MOSs has Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) visibility. Because of the senior leadership focus, a number of initiatives and solutions are being staffed in order to stem the negative impact these shortages have on the conduct of the war, our officers, and the Army's transformation.

Direct Appointment Board. For the first time in our Army's history, the Secretary of the Army approved a one-time only centralized Department of the Army (DA) direct appointment board for MOS 351E (HUMINT Collection Technician). Direct appointments before 1984 were decentralized. This decision was based on immediate Army combat contingency needs for HUMINT skilled officers. The board considered a pool of highly qualified 97E (HUMINT Collector) NCOs and selected a number of them. The selected NCOs will be assigned to combat formations upon promotion. If the newly appointed WO1s are in a combat theater, they will remain with their units until their normal rotation occurs. If they are not in a combat theater, they will be assigned to deploying units. The selected officers will attend Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) before deploying or after completion of their current combat tour. If you have one of these directly appointed WO1s in your unit, please take the time and mentor them along the path to success. Remember, these are highly qualified NCOs who, had they applied for WO, would have certainly been selected without reservation. In reality, the only thing that they will miss will be the Warrant Officer Career Course (WOCC) experience at Fort Rucker.

Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB). Last fall the MI Corps asked the Army G1 to award CSRBs to senior MI WOs in several shortage MOSs. The proposal now has the support of the CSA and is currently at the Department of Defense (DOD) finance committee for approval and adjudication. We expect to see this action implemented by the fall of 2005. When approved, we anticipate that this will help curb the drain of senior MI WOs while the Army figures out how to meet our retention challenge.

Warrant Officer Pay Reform. With a strong endorsement from the Secretary of the Army and the CSA, the Army sent the WO Pay Reform initiative to the DOD finance committee. This initiative is designed to counter the pay compression between the NCO and the WO pay scales. We hope that it is processed by DOD in time to affect the 1 January 2006 pay raise. More on this later.

Shortage for Chief Warrant Officers Four (CW4s). It is an accepted fact that the majority of soldiers (NCOs, WOs, Officers) retire between 20 and 23 years' active federal service (AFS). There are many reasons for this trend but it is most often to start a second career. Because MI NCOs are accessed into the Warrant Officer program so late in the careers (11 to 12 years' AFS), they are CW3s by the time they reach the 20-year retirement point. It is, therefore, difficult to "grow" senior warrants by continuing to access after 10 years of service. There are two proposals being considered to correct this trend—one is a short-term fix (extra promotion board) and the other is long term (change in AFS level for accession).

- ❑ There is a distinct probability that we will have two promotion boards this year. The regular board will be conducted as scheduled in late spring. This board will consider CW2/3/4s for promotion as usual. **If approved**, a second board will be conducted sometime in the fall and will consider CW3s for promotion. It is hoped that this will help populate many of the current empty CW4 positions Army wide. The regular boards will resume the following year.
- ❑ The long-term approach would focus the accession process on the younger NCOs who have between five to eight years AFS. This has been a lofty goal in the past. However, it is becoming clear that as a Corps we must start implementing this Army Training and Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP) recommendation if we hope to stem the tide of early departures. There are many concerns with accessing younger NCOs. The Vice CSA recognized this but went on to state during a meeting with CW5s, "A year of combat experience is worth three years ofarrison experience." Note: If you have a promising young NCO who wants to be a WO, do not discourage him or her. Call me so we can discuss the requirements.

P-2 Profile. The MI Corps gained approval to start submitting waiver requests for those high quality and technically proficient NCOs who have a P-2 profile prohibiting them from completing a standard Army physical fitness test (APFT).

Completion of the standard APFT is a requirement to attend any TRADOC initial training. This action will afford technically qualified NCOs the opportunity to become WOs in our Army. If you have any questions regarding this change, call me since the details and procedures are still being worked out.

Upcoming WO Board Schedule. The opportunity to become a WO in MI has never been better. Those NCOs interested in becoming a WO should contact the Warrant Officer Recruiting team at <http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/> for information. The FY06 Warrant Officer Accession Board schedule is as follows:

- 16-20 May 05.
- 18-22 Jul 05.
- 19-23 Sep 05.

Officer Professional Development

Functional Area Designation (FAD). At about the six year mark, captains were previously issued a functional area. Starting with Cohort Year Group 1999, officers will no longer go before a FAD Board as captains. This change was a result of input from leaders across the Army who feel that this process no longer serves the Army's current needs. Few officers served in their FAs as captains and officers were given unrealistic expectations of serving in the FA in the future; therefore, the formal FAD process is deleted. Officers will still have the opportunity to make their preference on a future FA via the Assignment Interactive Module webpage which can be accessed through the HRC Web Site using your AKO authentication. This preference sheet will be used by functional area managers to determine who is interested in their respective functional areas.

The FAD should not be confused with Career Field Designation (CFD) that usually occurs at the same time as the Major's board. As stated above, the FAD occurred at the six year mark and meant very little. CFD is the formal process that determines who will actually leave MI for a functional area. Of note, very few MI officers are being allowed to move to a functional area given the current large MI requirement.

Selection Rates. Last year's Army selection rates were well above the historical norm:

- CPT - 92%.
- MAJ - 96.9%.
- Lieutenant Colonels (LTC) - 79%.

We expect to see these rates remain high for at least the next four to six years. This is the result of projected growth, current requirements, and high officer attrition rates across the Army. You may have noticed that the last Major's and Colonel's lists were exhausted much sooner than usual. Expect the same from the next lists. Future lists will not adhere to the previous process of spreading the promotions out over ten months. Many more on all lists will be promoted shortly after the lists are released. This will be based on actual field requirements and not a bureaucratic process.

Attrition Rates. Army officer attrition rates have almost doubled over the last year. The primary reason for company grade attrition is the amount of time the officers spend separated from their family. MI officer attrition rates have exceeded Army average in all ranks, except for lieutenant. Both MI and the Army share the same reason for this high percentage. The Army is looking at various incentives to alleviate this high number. OCMI has developed a survey for MI officers leaving active duty that should help us further refine any concerns.

Changes to DA PAM 600-3. The new **DA PAM 600-3, Officer Development and Career Management**, should be available by summer 2005. The changes in this rewrite will have a major impact on MI Officer professional development. The new developmental assignments reflect the new modularity structure. Additionally, with the need to maintain high selection rates across the Army and the changes in the pamphlet, MI Officers will see a larger selection of developmental positions to serve in without being at risk for promotion. The push is for a less command centric career and more emphasis on being an Intelligence Professional (S2, G2, J2, etc). There is also an increased emphasis on "jointness" for all ranks. Overall, the future for MI officers looks very healthy.

Upcoming Officer Selection Boards. The next LTC active Army promotion board is scheduled for 12 April through 12 May 2005, and the COL active Army promotion board is scheduled for 26 July through 19 August 2005.

(Continued on page 57)

Training the Corps

by John J. Craig

Army MI School Wants Your Opinion

As part of the ongoing effort to improve the relevance and utility of its intelligence training, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca's (USAIC&FH) Quality Assurance Office (QAO) is expanding and refining its survey initiatives. Currently, our survey efforts are focused on internal student assessments that gather *student* perceptions of what they have learned while training at Fort Huachuca. Beginning in the 2nd Quarter, Fiscal Year 2006 the Military Intelligence (MI) School will expand its external survey program, to capture the judgments of both the *MI leaders* and our own *recent graduates*. **Both the Leader Surveys and the Graduate Surveys will be built** around the tasks in the associated course Critical Task List with space for written comments. These surveys are designed to be concise, taking no more than five to seven minutes to complete.

In the past, MI leader input has been directly and individually solicited via email. However, since 9/11, the response rate has not been statistically significant. Next year, the QAO will tap the "captive" leader audience provided by students and conference attendees who regularly rotate through the MI Center and School. For example, the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) students will be surveyed regarding their satisfaction with the MI Skill Level 10 soldiers trained at USAIC&FH, and the Pre-Command Course (PCC) students will be queried about the captains who graduate from our MI Captains Career Course (MICCC).

As a complement to the student internal survey, the QAO will send an external follow-up survey to soldiers, NCOs, and officers approximately six to twelve months after they complete their training at USAIC&FH. These graduate surveys will be sent to their individual Army Knowledge Online (AKO) addresses which were collected when they were initially surveyed as students. Where student surveys capture only student perceptions of their ability to perform specified critical tasks, a graduate survey will inform our MI trainers about their real-world competence and experience.

The desired end state for all the various assessment measures—surveys, test scores, practical exercises (PEs), field training exercises (FTXs), situational training exercises (STXs), class evaluations, and after-action reviews (AARs)—is to give MI School leaders a 360 degree appraisal of the training that we conduct here at Fort Huachuca. The expanded external survey program will provide the final element for that honest and comprehensive view.

MI Corps Hall of Fame

2005 Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame


The 18th annual Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame (HOF) ceremony was held on 24 June 2005. During the ceremony, the Corps inducted five new members:

- ❑ Command Sergeant Major James A. Johnson (Retired).
- ❑ Major General John A. Leide (Retired).
- ❑ Colonel Thomas F. McCord (Retired).
- ❑ CW4 Dennis E. Renken (Retired).
- ❑ CW5 Rex A. Williams (Retired).

Command Sergeant Major James A. Johnson (U.S. Army, Retired)

CSM Johnson enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1965 and served a 17 month combat tour in Vietnam with the 2d Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division. He joined the Army in 1970 and was assigned to the 400th U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA) Special Operations Detachment, 1st Special Forces Group (SFG), Okinawa, Japan. In 1976 he went on to serve as Team Sergeant, 402nd U.S. ASA Special Operations Detachment, 10th SFG, Fort Devens, Massachusetts where he was part of the initial cadre that developed the concept of direct military intelligence (MI) support to the Special Forces.

In 1982, CSM Johnson served as Operations Sergeant, then as First Sergeant in the Support Battalion, U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg.



He then moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he served as a First Sergeant in the 519th MI Battalion, 525th MI Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps, from 1984 to 1987. He was then selected as the battalion Command Sergeant Major of the 3d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), Republic of Korea.



In 1989, CSM Johnson was selected as the Command Sergeant Major of the 111th MI Brigade at Fort Huachuca in charge of thousands of new MI Soldiers. He instituted a program that supported and monitored drill sergeants, resulting in a new level of professionalism and eliminating potential instances of trainee abuse. In preparation for Operation DESERT STORM, CSM Johnson established a training program to prepare the newly formed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Platoon for deployment to the theater of operations to support Fifth Corps. The Platoon received numerous operational commendations and returned to Fort Huachuca with no casualties. CSM Johnson was then selected for the position of the Command Sergeant Major, US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) and of the Military Intelligence Corps in 1991. Through his superb leadership, the professionalism of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) reached new heights throughout the Corps, as did the quality of care and training of our soldiers.

CSM Johnson was selected as the Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) in 1993. His unique ability to communicate effectively with soldiers and NCOs, to identify issues in their training or support, and to immediately initiate corrective actions enabled him to solve problems quickly and ensure soldiers always received the best possible support.

CSM Johnson retired in October 1995 and was selected for a position with the Army component of the Medina Regional Signals Operations Center (MRSOC), at Lackland AFB, Texas. From 1995 to 2003 he served as the Chief, Regional Technical Control and Analysis Cell and later as the Mission Director of a remoted signals mission, 314th MI Battalion, 116th MI Group. He is currently serving as Mission Director Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Fusion Cell/Senior SIGINT Advisor, 470th MI Group.

In 2002, CSM Johnson received the INSCOM Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement for his work in collection mission Swift Canopy which provided force protection to U.S. Army South personnel. This award goes to a non-supervisory individual who made the single greatest contribution to the operational effectiveness of INSCOM during the previous calendar year. He anticipated requirements and worked to fill gaps in intelligence collection that would have otherwise gone unsupported. He redesigned the process used by the MRSOC to manage tactical operations to create a more vibrant, responsive team that greatly improved tactical support to the Army's warfighters.

Major General John A. Leide (U.S. Army, Retired)

MG Leide was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at Georgetown University. After completing the Infantry Officer Basic course at Fort Benning in 1958, MG Leide served in a variety of assignments as an infantry lieutenant. Following his graduation from the Infantry Officer Advanced course, MG Leide assumed command of Bravo Company, 325th Airborne Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and led the company during U.S. operations in the Dominican Republic in 1965. He was then selected as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division. From 1966 to 1967, MG Leide commanded Charlie Company 2nd Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) during numerous combat operations throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

In 1968, MG Leide transferred from the Infantry Branch to the Military Intelligence Branch. He joined the Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, specializing in China. He served as Chief of the China, Korea, and Japan Branch, Special Research Detachment, based at the National Security Agency, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI). In 1969 MG Leide returned

to the Republic of Vietnam, first serving as Commander of the 101st MI Company, 101st Airborne Division and then as the Plans and Operations Officer, G2, 101st Airborne Division.

MG Leide returned to the U.S. and studied Chinese Mandarin at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in 1970. In 1972, he graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College; following graduation, he studied at the U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute School of Chinese Language and Area Studies in Taiwan. He was then selected to attend the Chinese Army Command and Staff College, the first and only American officer to have graduated from this course. Following his graduation, MG Leide assumed duties as Assistant Army Attaché in Hong Kong where he became a prolific report writer and the key liaison with the British Hong Kong Intelligence Service.

In 1978, MG Leide returned to Fort Bragg where he commanded the 1st Special Forces Battalion with responsibilities for Special Forces training, including the HALO and Scuba schools. He initiated new and forward-looking programs including a unique Survival, Escape and Evasion Course and the Special Forces Qualification

process. Following command, MG Leide became the G2 of the 82nd Airborne Division where he initiated new planning for Desert Warfare operations, which was later used to great advantage.

MG Leide next became the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), then served as Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 1982. In 1984, MG Leide assumed command of the 500th MI Group in Japan. He returned to the U.S. in 1986 and became the Director of Foreign Intelligence, OACSI at Headquarters,

Department of the Army. In 1988, MG Leide assumed duties as Defense and Army Attaché, in Beijing, Peoples' Republic of China (PRC). During this period, Chinese students began protests against the regime, the most notable occurring in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, and major Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) troop movements were ordered in response. His immediate and concurrent reports from the scene of the crisis went directly to national decision makers, including the President, Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directly influencing U.S. policy and actions.

MG Leide was selected as J2 of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1990 and served as General Schwartzkopf's Director for Intelligence in Operations



DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. General Schwartzkopf said that no commander in history had the intelligence support and picture of the enemy than he had during DESERT STORM and MG Leide led that effort. Upon leaving CENTCOM, MG Leide was assigned to the DIA where he reorganized a significant portion of the agency and assumed responsibility for three positions simultaneously: Director of the National Military Intelligence Collection Center, Director of the Central Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) Office, and the first director of the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS).

MG Leide retired from the US Army in 1995. He is currently working as a special advisor to critical programs in the operational and strategic Intelligence Community. He served as President of the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA) from 1995 until 1999 and is a Distinguished Speaker at the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) and a senior advisor to the Joint Military Attaché School, DIA, where he is a member of the Attache Hall of Fame.

Colonel Thomas F. McCord (U.S. Army, Retired)

COL McCord began his career with a number of diverse military assignments, including tactical level infantry combat in the Pacific theater in World War II. His first Army Intelligence assignment was in 1950 as a student at an Army Russian language school. He graduated sixth in a class of fifty-five and was chosen as a student for the Army's elite two-year Foreign Area Specialist Training Program in Russian Studies at Regensburg, Germany. In 1954, he served as an Operations and Case officer in Detachment 35, an intelligence collection unit based in Austria. He was involved in the debriefings of Soviet military personnel defectors and in other operations developing intelligence on the Soviet forces.

In 1956, he served as the principal U.S. Army Intelligence analyst, estimator and spokesperson in the preparation of U.S. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Soviet military capabilities, plans, and intentions. These NIEs were used to formulate U.S. national military and diplomatic plans and policies, and to develop our military capabilities during that period. In 1959, COL McCord commanded the key U.S. Army HUMINT collection and CI unit in Berlin, Germany, Berlin Station, 513th MI Group, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). His unit was

the first to report the impending construction of the Berlin Wall and continued to operate successfully behind the wall after construction was complete. His guidance and decisiveness regarding intelligence and CI operations against Soviet targets overcame the Soviets' efforts to limit Allied access into a free West Berlin.

COL McCord was selected to be the primary Defense Intelligence Estimator (DIE) on Soviet Ground Forces in 1963. In 1966, he became the Deputy Chief, U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to the Commander, Group Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) and was subsequently chosen by the Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR, to be Chief, USMLM, in 1967. By the end of this assignment, although still serving as a US Army Reserve (USAR) officer COL McCord was selected by the Department of the Army for promotion to the rank of Brigadier General. However, due to pressing family considerations, COL McCord had to request removal from the promotion list and retirement from Active Duty. At the time of his retirement he was serving with great success in a General Officer position—Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC). He retired 31 July 1969 as a Colonel (Promotable), Military Intelligence, Army of the United States (AUS).



In July 1970, COL McCord continued to serve in MI as the Senior Civilian Intelligence Operations Advisor and Assistant to the Commander, 500th MI Group, USARPAC, and later as the Senior Civilian Advisor, Special Intelligence Studies and Advisory Group, Headquarters U.S. Army Intelligence Command, Fort Holabird, Maryland. In 1973, he became the Chief, Security Branch, and later the Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Counterintelligence and Security, DIA, Department of Defense.

From 1975 until 1980, COL McCord took the unusual step of volunteering for a two-level civilian grade reduction in order to work as the Senior Interrogator, U.S. Army Element, Westport Center in Munich, Germany. Westport was a joint U.S. interagency HUMINT interrogation center managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. Under his leadership and expertise, his team documented an irrefutable body of evidence that U.S. intelligence had badly overestimated the combat capability of the Soviet ground forces for years. In his last position COL McCord was in charge of the Soviet émigré debriefing program under INSCOM at Fort Meade where his work played a vital role in the 1983 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet War Management.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Dennis E. Renken (U.S. Army, Retired)

CW4 Renken enlisted in the Army in 1972. After basic training and advanced individual training, he served as a Signal Security (SIGSEC) Specialist with Detachment Q, 201st ASA Company, in Grafenwoer, Germany, and Detachment O in Berlin, Germany from 1973 to 1976. He served as the Intelligence Assistant in the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) Poland from 1978 to 1980. After receiving Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 96B, Intelligence Analyst, he was assigned to the 312th MI Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division in 1980, where he was NCOIC of the Division All-Source Intelligence Center (ASIC).

CW4 Renken was appointed as a Warrant Officer, MOS 964A, Order of Battle Technician, in 1981, while attending the second class of the newly formed Senior Enlisted Intelligence Program (SEIP) at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington, DC. He transferred to the Post Graduate Intelligence Program (PGIP) upon appointment and graduated from as the distinguished graduate in 1982. He is believed to be the first US Army warrant officer to graduate from the PGIP.

In 1982, CW4 Renken was assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps ASIC at Fort Bragg where he supervised the Latin American team in the Corps ASIC and led the All-Source Analysis team that deployed to Grenada with the XVIII Airborne Corps "Jump TOC" for Operation URGENT FURY. CW4 Renken was then assigned as the Assistant Army Attaché and Operations Coordinator to the USDAO in Damascus, Syria, in 1984. He was cited by memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, for his reporting during one of the recurrent regional crises and was awarded the prestigious Director of Central Intelligence Exceptional Intelligence Collector Award from DCI Casey as well as the Defense Superior Service Medal for his contributions during his tour of duty in Syria.

CW4 Renken was the All-Source Analysis Technician for the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, NC in 1986. He provided intelligence support to special operations planners to support several classified operations in both CONUS and overseas locations. He deployed as a key liaison officer to Joint Task Force (JTF) South during the crisis in Panama in May 1989, and then as the key expert in enemy order of battle as a part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force that provided the primary command and control for special operations forces from all services engaged in Operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Throughout this period he was the command's subject matter expert on adversary



military and paramilitary forces' orders of battle and targeting with intensive focus on Latin America and the Middle East.

In 1990, CW4 Renken was assigned as the Chief of the Analytical Support Element of 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Airborne), also known as Delta Force. This position was highly

selective and had previously been filled only by field grade officers. During Operation DESERT STORM, CW4 Renken was the unit's senior analyst and leader of the deployed analytical cell, and also the assistant S2.

CW4 Renken was assigned as an All-Source Analysis Technician to the G2, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), Rheindahlen, Germany in 1994. The ARRC was preparing for a deployment to Bosnia and CW4 Renken was instrumental in preparing for the attachment of eleven National Intelligence Cells (NICs) from the allies, including a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) from the 66th MI Brigade. In 1996, CW4 Renken was assigned to the USAIC&FH as the Senior MI WO Course Manager. He retired in July 1997 after 25 years of service.

In 1997, CW4 Renken began his second career as a Department of the Army civilian intelligence analyst working in the CENTCOM Branch of the J2, JSOC. While focused on the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), he performed an operational deployment with a compartmented task force in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) AOR, serving as the project's principal analyst. In 2000, CW4 Renken was promoted and assumed duties as the Chief of the Branch providing direct support to special operations forces by planning and conducting several classified missions. As the Senior Analyst covering the CENTCOM region on 11 September 2001, Mr. Renken became the command's expert on the adversary and was selected for service as the Senior Analyst on a Joint Special Operations Task Force that deployed to the CENTCOM AOR in 2001. CW4 Renken was awarded the Department of the Army Meritorious Civilian Service Award for his service from 11 September 2001 to 17 October 2002.

CW4 Renken continued to lead the expanded CENTCOM Branch and directed the largest Crisis Action Center in the history of JSOC with representatives from multiple national intelligence agencies. He planned and

directed all-source analysis, including preparation and presentation of studies, target packages, briefings, and oral presentations, in support of the planning for Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1003v (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) and then deployed with Joint Special Operations Task Force 20 to the CENTCOM theater at the onset of hostilities. He served as the senior analyst and assisted assigned forces, the commander, and the staff in planning and preparing for a number of successful direct-action missions to include the recovery of U.S. military personnel held captive by Iraqi forces. For his contributions to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, he received the Army Superior Civilian Service Medal and the Knowlton Award. CW4 Renken retired from government service and is currently working for a major defense contractor. He recently finished a project on special operations for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

Chief Warrant Officer 5 Rex A. Williams (U.S. Army, Retired)

CW5 Williams enlisted in 1971 as an Imagery Analyst. He served in the 2nd MI Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance Support, Zweibrucken Air Force Base, Federal Republic of Germany, the 1st MI Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance Support at Fort Bragg; the 704th MI Detachment, Aerial Surveillance, Pyong Taek Korea; and in Directorate of Training Development, USAIC&FH.

In 1978, he was appointed an Imagery Intelligence WO and continued to work at USAIC&FH. In the Directorate of Combat Developments, he was the primary action officer for imaging systems to include UAVs, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), and all airborne radars. As a CW2 in the early 1980s, he performed the duties we now assign to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) Joint STARS.

CW5 Williams served as an All-Source Technician while assigned as the Chief, All Source Production Section, 2d Infantry Division, Republic of Korea in 1983. While leading an 11 person intelligence analysis section, he prepared intelligence estimates on North Korea and tailored threat assessments to support visiting dignitaries.

In 1984, he returned to the "home of MI" as the principal instructor for Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. In 1986, he returned to the

Pacific and led the daily operations of a 19 member inter-Service consolidated order of battle section supporting the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (PACOM). Under his mentorship, the section published intelligence products for the DIA to support over 8,000 theater wide targets. In 1989, CW5 Williams's section was awarded the Intelligence Producer of the Year award from DIA.

From 1990 to 1993, CW5 Williams was responsible for all Warrant Officer (WO) training conducted at USAIC&FH. In October 1993, CW5 Williams became the Chief of a 28 member Intelligence Production Branch, Joint Intelligence Center, (JIC), CENTCOM, at MacDill Air Force Base as the senior all-source intelligence analyst. His assessments were often used as the sole basis for making critical theater allocation decisions. He routinely identified gaps and developed the necessary HUMINT and SIGINT collection requirements for the command to negate the gaps.

In 1995, CW5 Williams was reassigned to the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) at Fort Huachuca

as the WO Professional Development Manager. Additionally, in 1999 he was appointed as the first Chief Warrant Officer of the MI Corps. During his tenure, he refined the role of the MI WO and reshaped the Corps for success in the 21st century. He orchestrated the professional development of over 2,000 MI WOs and provided both the vision and leadership necessary to ensure their success. His most significant contribution was his singular effort to develop a detailed set of Army wide WO accession and personnel management recommendations. These

recommendations were briefed throughout the Army and became the basis for a Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel action plan intended to tackle the Army's difficult WO recruiting challenges. CW5 Williams' active service culminated with his final assignment as the technical advisor to the Chief, Concepts Architectures and Requirements (CAR), in Combat Developments before his retirement in February 2003.

Today, his total dedication to the Army continues as a Department of the Army civilian in the Directorate of Combat Developments, USAIC&FH. In this current position, CW5 Williams is focused on the concepts, organizational designs, and technologies required to enable the current and future force.



MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF). Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians who have served in a U.S. Army Intelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, Futures Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (HOF), 110 Rhea Avenue, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7080, or call commercial (520) 533-1180, DSN 821-1180, or via E-mail at OCMI@hua.army.mil.

GET PUBLISHED, WIN
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TO THE CAUSE

For the 2006 General William E. DePuy Professional Military Writing Competition, **Military Review** seeks original essays on subjects of current concern to the U.S. Army. This contest is open to all. The Global War on Terror, evolving threats, force reform, insurgency/counterinsurgency, cultural awareness in military operations, tanks in urban combat, transitioning from combat to stability and support operations, ethical challenges in counterinsurgency, historical parallels to current operations, better ways to man the force—the possible topics are limitless. Winning papers will be carefully researched, analytically oriented critiques, proposals, or relevant case histories that show evidence of imaginative, even unconventional, thinking. Submissions should be 3,500 to 5,000 words.

First prize is featured publication in the May-June 2006 edition of **Military Review**, a \$500 honorarium, and a framed certificate. Second and third prizes offer publication in **Military Review**, a \$250 honorarium, and a certificate. Honorable mention designees will be given special consideration for publication and certificates.

Essays should be submitted with an enrollment form not later than 1 April 2006 to **Military Review**, ATTN: Competition, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or via email to milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil (Subject: Competition). For a copy of the enrollment form and additional information, visit **Military Review's** website at <http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/>.

Language Action

Explorations in the Somali Language

by Dr. Krystna Wachowicz

DLI Launches New DLPT Generation—DLPT 5: Measuring Language Capabilities in the 21st Century

by Natela A. Cutter

Intelligence Support to Homeland Security (HLS): Languages and Cultural Awareness

by Colonel Stephanie E. Hap

Explorations in the Somali Language

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Figure 1. Map of Somalia.

The Somali and Liberian Languages Trainer (SALLT) course, part of the series “Languages in Hot Spots,” is largely based on authentic, exclusive reports from areas of conflict. Our own photo journalist and videographer traveled to Somalia—the only country in the world without a government—as recently as December 2004. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) managed the design and corresponding language learning activities to prepare the student to function in real-world environments, particularly in hostile situations.

Our primary objective for SALLT is to create a self-study review course for military Level 2 or intermediate Somali-language speakers in reading and listening comprehension for sustainment, maintenance, and improvement of their language proficiency. The course may also serve as a supplement in a teacher-driven course or for homework assignments when a student is studying Somali in the classroom. Following current foreign-language instructional methodology, the course will also accommodate learners with different learning profiles, goals, and time constraints, allowing them to study at home or other locations of their choice.

Features

The SALLT Course has spontaneous, authentic language samples for listening comprehension, representing a broad range of speakers, varieties, and dialects spoken in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. The eastern and central dialects are well represented in the training to allow students to hear and train in understanding speech variation critical in comprehending nuances of language meaning.

Our native videographer captured live videos and photographs from the urban Mogadishu area and the countryside, showing the city and surrounding areas in decline. As a result, the Somali-language speaker not only trains in the language, but also receives current cultural information critical to meaningful interaction between soldiers and the populace.

The SALLT course also includes authentic broadcasts from Radio Benadir, the Somali Broadcasting Corporation (SBC), and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). In addition, the course has incorporated some materials representing “teacher talk” for teacher-student communication. These authentic listening materials are critical for maintaining listening-comprehension skills

required for voice intercept operators. These materials will be available on compact disk (CD) or through the Internet.

The target audience for these materials will be high-intermediate linguists who are working toward the advanced level. They may also be used by Level 1+ students, aspiring to attain the 2 and 2+ Levels. Some sections of the course represent the superior level called Level 3 on the government proficiency scale (Interagency Language Roundtable [ILR] scale). The course provides an equivalent of a ten-week quarter’s worth of credits in colleges and universities that adhere to the intensive language-learning approach or a semester of credit for those that follow the regular Monday-Wednesday-Friday or Tuesday-Thursday weekly schedules.

Basic Learning Blocks

Navigation. With a map as the center of the navigational course structure, the emphasis is on the geographical and social variation of the language. The focus is on the language varieties spoken in southern Somalia, particularly in the Mogadishu area. Samples of other related languages have been collected to illustrate the linguistic



Figure 2. Sample Exploration Transactions.



Figure 3. Sample Interactivity for the Transaction Explanation.

and ethnic complexity of the area and examine the roots of conflict.

Explorations, Assignments, and Activities. The course has ten Explorations, each typically consisting of four Assignments, with an average of four Activities each. The basic daily learning block is one Assignment designed to take an hour on average to complete. These Explorations depict **current conditions** and **cultural topics** in Somalia and include scenes such as—

- The experience of a young bodyguard working for a warlord.
- Natural disasters such as the recent tsunami.
- Bargaining in a market.
- The disastrous consequences of chewing Khaat (narcotic leaves).
- Women burdened with as many as fifteen children.
- Hospital scenes and conversations with doctors treating gunshot wounds.
- Inter-clan fighting.

Each Exploration contains interactive vocabulary presentations based on either animations or images, followed by reading and listening comprehension activities. Grammatical points for each Exploration are analyzed, presented, and practiced through Flash-based activities.

Students can find part of the course and future installments at <http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us>

under Somali or SALLT training. This is also the website for the MI Foreign Language Training Center.

We are looking for Somali speakers who would be interested in helping us to validate the course. Please contact us at (520) 538-1042 or peter.shaver@hua.army.mil if you wish to help validate the course or have problems or questions.

Editorial Board

The creators of the course include a team of native speakers, photo- and telejournalists, language instructors, librarians, linguists, environmental experts, and information technology professionals specializing in language courseware design.

The Primary Investigator and her staff thank the government language managers who provided guidance and expertise in language teaching under special circumstances.



Dr. Krystna Wachowicz, a linguist and professional course developer, designed this course in coordination with Pete Shaver, Director, MI Foreign Language Training Center (MIFLTC), and the 09L (Translator/Interpreter) Course Manager at USAIC&FH. Readers can reach him via E-mail at peter.shaver@us.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 538-1042 or DSN 879-1042.

DLI Launches New DLPT Generation-DLPT 5: Measuring Language Capabilities in the 21st Century

Reprinted from the Defense Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC)
website: <http://www.dliflc.edu/>

by Natela A. Cutter



Monterey, June 6, 2005 - The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California, in partnership with the Department of Defense (DOD), is about to launch the newest generation of the Defense Language Proficiency Test: DLPT 5. This system of tests, administered via computer, will gradually be implemented in as many as 31 languages over the next several years, say DLI and DOD testing experts.

The new DLPT 5 tests consist of computer delivered exams designed to assess the general language proficiency in reading and listening of native English speakers who have learned a foreign language. The tests are meant to measure how well a person can function in real-life situations in a foreign language according to well-defined linguistic tasks and assessment criteria.

“This method of assessing our foreign language capability is much more comprehensive, effective, and reliable than our previous foreign language testing efforts...” said Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S. Chu, in a DOD memorandum, issued 31 January 2005.

The main difference that examinees will notice between the DLPT IV and DLPT 5 is that the new tests have longer passages and may have more than one question per passage, in both listening and reading comprehension. When a reading passage is particularly long, one has to scroll downward to view all the text and questions. Just like the DLPT IV, the DLPT 5 scores are based on the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) guidelines, found at www.govtilr.org and test levels 0+ through 3.

For many languages the new DLPT 5 tests will also offer exams constructed to test proficiency levels from ILR level 3 through level 4, which will be used by select DOD agencies needing to assess language specialists at higher levels of proficiency.

Depending on the language, the DLPT 5 will have two different testing formats: Multiple Choice (MC) and the Constructed Response Test (CRT), in which examinees will type in short answers to the questions. The CRTs will be given in the less commonly taught languages, such as Hindi Dari, Pashto, and Albanian. Languages such as Russian, Arabic, Korean, Chinese, etc., will be tested in the MC test format. Figure 1 depicts a sample of the MC test format.




Figure 1. MC Format for Reading Comprehension.

The listening portion of both the MC and CRT tests will be composed of more authentic materials than in the past. Test developers have incorporated live radio and television broadcasts, telephone conversations, and voice mail as listening materials. In MC tests, examinees will listen to the passage only once for lower level questions, while questions at level 2 and above will be played twice. In CRT tests, all passages are played twice. The listening tests are expected to last approximately two hours. See Figure 2 for a print screen sample of the multiple choice listening comprehension.




Figure 2. MC Format for Listening Comprehension.

"People in the field are not going to slow down for your benefit," said Dr. Mika Hoffman, the dean of Test Development at DLIFLC, in reference to the change in the quality of the listening materials used on the test. Dr. Hoffman said that there may be static and background noise in some audio passages, just as in any outdoor public place.

The text types used are authentic sources: announcements and advertisements, phone calls, voicemail messages, news (print, TV, and radio), editorials, commentary, speeches, interviews, talk shows, debates, lectures, plays, TV series, and the like.

Content areas on the test are the same as previously used in the old paper-and-pencil DLPTs: military-security, science-technology, economic-political, cultural-social, and geography.

To prepare for the new exam, DLI test developers suggest that future examinees need to be exposed to authentic materials found on TV, radio, in newspapers and magazines, all of which can be accessed through the Internet. DLI has also developed an Internet site called www.LingNet.org and Global Language Online Support System (GLOSS), where materials and exercises in various languages are available, as well as texts in English on the geography and politics of the given nations. See Figure 3 for a print screen of the LingNet Homepage.

Experts recommend that examinees need to "Go beyond translation and think about what the writer or speaker really means," a notion which is continuously

stressed by DLI instructors and Military Language Instructors (MLI) in the classrooms.

"They (students) need to develop a cultural literacy which will enable them to not only read "between the lines," but also to anticipate what lies ahead because they will understand how people "tick" in a particular country," said DLI Assistant Commandant, Colonel Daniel Scott.

Some of the technical aspects of delivering the test via computer will actually enhance the examinees' ability to keep track of their responses and time left until the end of the test, and provide the examinees with the ability to return to questions left blank due to uncertainty. See Figure 4 for a print screen of the review answers.

Further down the road DLI test and software developers are working toward a computer adaptive design for future DLPTs with the ability to scramble questions or even change any given text. Test developers say that there will no




Figure 3. LingNet Homepage.




Figure 4. Test Delivery Systems Enhancements.

longer be a need for an A and B version of the exam, as they will be able to generate forms randomly. Consequently, the linguists will not be familiar with the test items from year-to-year.

Once the new DLPT 5 tests are implemented in the field, the DLI will convert the remaining older proficiency tests to the new computer format. Likewise, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is pushing to have all testing administered via computer in order to move away from the paper-and-pencil standard, according to COL Scott.

Tentative rollout dates for the DLPT 5 are the following:

- ❑ Available in October 2005: Albanian, Persian-Dari, Hindi, Pashto, Norwegian, and Urdu.
- ❑ Available in December 2005: Iraqi and Russian.
- ❑ Available in the first half of 2006: Chinese and Spanish.
- ❑ Other languages soon to be available: Egyptian, Levantine, Modern Standard Arabic, Persian-Farsi, Greek, Kurdish-Sorani, Turkish, Serbian-Croatian, and Japanese.

For more information on the rollout dates and Frequently Asked Questions, please visit www.monterey.army.mil and click on DLPT 5 under the Navigation links.



Ms. Natela A. Cutter is the Director for Alumni Relations Office at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, California. Readers may contact her via E-mail at Natela.Cutter@monterey.army.mil or by telephone at 831-242-7041 (Commercial) or 768-7041 (DSN).

Proponent Notes

(Continued from page 44)

OCMI Points of Contact

The point of contact (POC) for enlisted actions is SGM Mitchell; readers may contact him via E-mail at Maurice.mitchell@hua.army.mil. The POC for warrant officer actions is CW5 Prewitt-Diaz; readers may contact him via E-mail at james.prewitt-diaz@hua.army.mil. The POC for officer actions is Ms. Borghardt; readers may contact her via E-mail at charlotte.borghardt@hua.army.mil.

OCMI Website

Interested readers can reach the OCMI website at <https://cms.portal.hua.army.mil/channels/OCMI/Webpage/index.htm>. You will be able to find information on issues ranging from enlisted career field overviews to officer, warrant officer, and civilian updates.



Lieutenant Colonel Harvey L. Crockett is the Director, OCMI. Readers may contact him via E-mail at Harvey.crockett@hua.army.mil. Robert C. White, Jr., is the Deputy OCMI; you can reach him via E-mail at bob.whitejr@hua.army.mil.



Intelligence Support to Homeland Security (HLS): Languages and Cultural Awareness

by Colonel Stephanie E. Hap

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has forced many of the United States' "multi-agencies" to find immediate and cost-effective training solutions to instruct their employees in a wide variety of languages and associated nonverbal communicative gestures as well as fostering an awareness of the cultures associated with these languages. For purposes of this article, "multi-agencies" are non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies that include the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), police departments, and agencies within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

Instituting multiple training sites throughout the U.S. is not a likely or cost-effective solution. The White Paper from the 2004 National Language Conference and the DOD Language Transformation Roadmap propose a national vision that will become a baseline for change in the national foreign language education policy network. Multi-agencies, state and city employees, and first responders have recognized that foreign language training is invaluable to fighting the GWOT.

Background

The U.S. has large populations of immigrants and other native speakers who speak a multitude of languages that fall outside of the traditional Eurocentric language set of Spanish, German, French, and Latin that are still traditionally taught in the high school foreign language curriculum. These include but are not limited to Arabic, Farsi, Pushtu, Dari, Azerbaijani, Punjabi, Sindhi, Siarki,

Urdu, Kurdish, Baluchi, Turkish, and Bahasa Indonesia. All of these languages have various forms of dialects and some are unwritten. An Arabic speaker will speak a different dialect depending on his or her country (and perhaps region or province as well). People in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and the Gulf region of the Arabian Peninsula may not understand each other's spoken languages, but will generally understand the written forms.

The DOD attempts to fill personnel gaps for language speakers and translators/interpreters by sending military personnel to DOD language schools such as the Defense Language Institute (DLI), by hiring contractors, or by recruiting the desired language speakers from immigrant and native speaker populations whose loyalty and knowledge of military jargon and terms are often significantly—even dangerously—limited. For many non-DOD agencies, these options may not be available or cost effective. Accurate, effective and immediate communication is vital to the HLS mission, otherwise valuable intelligence may be lost. Agencies such as the Border Patrol, DEA, and local police forces have a daunting task of interviewing, documenting, searching, and detaining illegal border crossers, immigrants, and visitors as well as translating the verbal and written communications. Completing these tasks with foreign language qualified personnel will require long-term and expensive solutions. A long-term educational commitment is required starting in either the elementary or junior high school levels. These skills can be further polished by cultural immersion which emphasizes foreign travel or

by instituting realistic training environments within U.S. borders. Implementing language and cultural programs which will meet either federal or state educational guidelines and standards will drive up education costs.

Innovative Civilian Pilot Language Programs

The present and future integration of a foreign language curriculum to confront GWOT challenges will require years to accomplish. Teachers must be trained, tested, and certified. Books and teaching materials must be developed and approved. These are tedious tasks which cannot be completed overnight. Historically, budget constraints in the public educational system coupled with the lack of emphasis on teaching foreign languages in the U.S. culture have helped to rob the nation of a very valuable tool in fighting the war on terrorism. The lesson learned from teaching the traditional languages of Spanish, French, and German is that the country is hampered both by the current traditional U.S. school curriculum where foreign language instruction has all but disappeared in the past ten years from middle schools and the lack of qualified and certified teachers.

What better time than now for the U.S. educational system to invest in nontraditional language training beginning in the elementary grade levels and continuing through high school. There are already initiatives throughout the U.S. by Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and committees of parents, volunteers, and school administrators to fill the language gaps. Creative examples of pilot language programs exist in Virginia and Arizona.

Ten Virginia PTAs have set up before and after-school programs in the Arlington County area to nurture students at the elementary level. Funding has come from the PTAs and parents. The recognized benefits of early foreign language training are better accents, better recall, and the reading, vocabulary, and spelling skills which transfer to other academics such as English and additional languages. The goal is to continue language training through middle school and up to the high school level. The present U.S. standard is for the introduction of foreign languages into the curriculum at the high school level. Virginia was able to push this innovation based upon parent interest and cultural diversity.

Two years ago at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, a teacher for the Colonel Johnston Elementary School began the Huachuca Foreign Language Academy in response to a recognized need for foreign language instruction at the middle school and high school levels. In the first year, on a shoestring budget, she organized beginning level Arabic and Spanish classes. Like the volunteers and educators

in Virginia, she took advantage of the rich cultural diversity in the local area. Twenty students ages 12 to 16 attended the 8-week courses daily for 4 hours. Professionally trained native speaker instructors who used content based and interactive instructional methodologies taught these courses. The students were able to read, write, and speak at a basic level upon completion of the course.

A proposal to continue the program at Fort Huachuca and at several satellite locations was presented to the Arizona congress, DOD senior level offices, and local and state education department, resulting in accolades for the initiative, but not the required resources to continue the program. This critical initiative is one of many throughout the U.S. educational system that will lessen our current foreign language crisis and provide a critical pipeline of linguists for DOD, HLS, and other government agencies, if those who control the resources will support it.

Multi-Agencies Look to Military Skills Programs for Help

Recently, the regional office of the Arizona Border Patrol and members of DEA turned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) to help fill the gap in the availability of language training and sustainment. The Fort Huachuca Military Intelligence Foreign Language Training Center (MIFLTC) is collaborating with DLI to design, develop, and implement a two week Spanish acquisition course for ten local DEA agents. The DEA regional office has approved this initiative and will resource it. The purpose of the instruction is to enable the agents to conduct basic interviews and fill out related paperwork. Once the course is operational, the FBI, CBP, and other agencies will also participate.

While long being home to all levels and types of intelligence training, USAIC&FH has also become the DOD lead for cultural awareness training. The Intelligence Center's cultural awareness training can be found in its virtual university, the University of Military Intelligence (UMI). This online university meets the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mandate for the center to provide cost effective, life-long learning for all intelligence soldiers through distributive learning.

Conclusion

The U.S. military and civilian agencies involved in the Homeland Security mission have recognized that foreign language training and the resultant reading, listening, and speaking proficiencies are additional warfighting skills that must be integrated into operational and contingency planning. There is a common consensus that there is a language and cultural awareness gap. Responsible


leaders and agencies must establish a baseline of foreign language and cultural awareness training for our soldiers and first responders to effectively prosecute their assigned missions and, most importantly, protect the homeland from future intrusions resulting in disastrous consequences.



Acknowledgment: I wish to thank Mr. Pete Shaver for his contributions to this article.

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CSA's Focus Area 16: Actionable Intelligence

It's More Than *Urban* ...

by Brad Andrew

"It is darn hard to find a vacant lot to hold a war in . . . and in this new era of warfare, that's the last thing the enemy wants anyway."

— Patrick M. Hughes (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired)

The war in Iraq is being fought primarily in urban terrain. Gone are the days when the Army could bypass built-up areas to avoid getting bogged down in a difficult fight. Yet the challenge of Iraq and the future is more than mastering urban operations. Current and potential foes have studied us; becoming learning and adaptive opponents using asymmetrical strategies, tactics and tools to mitigate the Army's maneuver, targeting and standoff-fires advantages. While current operations in Iraq have focused on the urban fight, the Army must dominate in all types of **complex terrain**, anticipating evolving threat tactics, adaptations, and variations.

To address the broader challenge, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (CSA) recently established two new Focus Areas to address Irregular Challenges and Stability and Reconstruction Operations, as well as Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G3 and G2 co-led efforts to examine Complex Terrain and Cultural Awareness issues. As these initiatives progress, cross-fertilization and perhaps consolidation will occur. This article focuses on Complex Terrain.

Defining Complex Terrain

Currently there is no Army definition for Complex Terrain. The DA G2 working definition is:

Complex Terrain are those areas that severely restrict the Army's ability to engage adversaries at a time and place of its choosing due to natural or man-made topography, dense vegetation or civil populations, including urban, mountains, jungle, subterranean, littorals and swamps.

In some locales, such as the Philippines, all of these features can be present within a ten kilometer radius.

Differences in Complex Terrain

What is different in complex terrain? Situational understanding encompasses not only what is in front of

you, but also what is behind, above, and below you, with specific differences in these categories: Communications; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Time; and Lethality.

Communications

- ❑ The enemy has numerous communications capabilities available to employ in a tailored manner, avoiding the communications means most easily collected by our Cold War systems.
- ❑ Standard Blue Force communications may be degraded or neutralized by the physical environment.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

- ❑ With the "home court advantage," the enemy often uses ingenious, if sometimes less technically advanced, human-based intelligence collection. However, adaptive use of commercial technology must be anticipated.
- ❑ Blue Force sensors and other technology-based collection capabilities may be degraded or neutralized by the physical environment. HUMINT collection may be difficult to achieve among the native, often tribal population.

Time (The Fourth Dimension)

- ❑ The tempo may be excruciatingly slow, but killing happens at an accelerated pace and at close range (within 30 meters).
- ❑ Decision time is reduced from minutes to seconds.

Lethality

- ❑ Reduced lines of sight severely degrade situational awareness and engagement ranges.
- ❑ "One shot, one kill" scenarios are the norm – the enemy will not take the shot or detonate the improvised explosive device (IED) unless they believe they can kill you!

Heading Army Intelligence Initiatives

Army Intelligence is addressing the Complex Terrain challenge through the following initiatives. Leaders and soldiers must **fight for knowledge and intelligence** as an integral part of every operation. Gone are the days of waiting for intelligence in order to act. Sometimes operations will be conducted solely to gain intelligence. As part of this cultural change, the Army must provide the capability and inculcate a mindset that **Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2)** as they likely have the best local knowledge of the situation. Unfortunately, the same soldiers often have the worst global knowledge or understanding of impacting factors outside the local area of operations (AO). This must change: We do not accept latency in reporting threats to our pilots. The same standard needs to apply for our soldiers.

To accomplish this, the Army is **connecting the soldier to the network** and providing personal digital assistants (PDAs) that enable soldiers to digitize and input their reporting at the point of origin, as well as receive critical alerts and intelligence from operational and national level analysts. In addition, we are training soldiers to be better observers and reporters through the use of video-gaming technology such as the **Every Soldier a Sensor Simulation (ES3)** currently being used in basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.¹

The soon-to-be-realized **Joint Intelligence Operations Center-Iraq (JIOC-I)** will establish a network that enables collaboration and analysis, sensor tipping and cueing, and better national to tactical ISR integration leading to the realization of a **Tactical Overwatch** capability. The goal is to create a multidiscipline, all source fusion center that leverages national, theater, and tactical capabilities in support of maneuver brigades and battalions, and eventually down to the squad and individual soldier.

Two scientific and technical (S&T) efforts now supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM complex terrain operations are the Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) and the Persistent Surveillance and Dissemination System-of-Systems (PSDS2):

- PTDS is a persistent, wide field-of-view, aerostat-based surveillance system that can “slew-to-cue” elevated electro-optical and infrared optics from numerous air and ground sensors. PTDS geolocates and captures video and imagery of threat activity and allows near-real time dissemination. This G2 quick reaction capability first deployed in October 2004 and has been effective in responding to direct and indirect fire threats.

- PSDS2 links existing sensors within a selected AO to turn an avalanche of uncoordinated sensor data into one picture to enable rapid visualization and dissemination of actionable intelligence. Initial operational capability is projected for 30 May 2005.

In recognition of the critical role of Military Intelligence, the Army authorized an **increase of 9,000 soldiers** in the branch. In recognition of the critical role of HUMINT in complex environments, 3,000 will be HUMINT soldiers.

Lastly, the people and their culture are a critical feature, if not the key terrain, in a complex battlespace environment. The Army recognizes culturally literate soldiers understand cultural differences that impact military operations. The Army is examining **Cultural Awareness** issues that will affect military cultural education. Expect to see changes that will include cultural factors in the Army’s military education system from basic training through War College.

Staytuned.

“The Army does not currently dominate the complex terrain/urban battlespace.”

—TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, Military Operations: Force Operating Capabilities, 30 January 2003.




Endnotes

1. For ES3 access information E-mail Daniel.Ray@us.army.mil. For more information on the ES3 application, see Major Ray’s article “Every Soldier Is a Sensor (ES2) Simulation: Virtual Simulation Using Game Technology” in the January-March 2005 issue of **MIPB**.

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Professional Reader



Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era by Michael E. O'Hanlon

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2005), 148
pages, \$18.95, ISBN 0-8157-
6467-7

In his book, *Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era*, Michael O'Hanlon provides an insightful analysis of current and future requirements for the defense of the nation. Given the threat that international terrorism now poses to the security of the United States and the greater community of nations, as well as the tensions caused by North Korea and Iran in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the author believes that the United States must increase defense spending and the size of the active duty military by at least 40,000 Soldiers and Marines.

According to Mr. O'Hanlon, the United States is currently confronted with a plethora of potential threats that may require rapid responses in a variety of places throughout the world while it is at the same time, fully engaged in an active war against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. He believes that American forces will remain in Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. As a result of this multiplicity of missions, the American military faces difficult challenges relative to personnel and resources. Even so, the author does not view the future as particularly bleak. He points to the fact that for all practical intents and purposes, it is very unlikely that the United States will be forced to engage in a traditional war with another major world power. Moreover, despite considerable rhetoric to the contrary, the major world powers have been reasonably supportive of American efforts to defeat international terrorism.

Nevertheless, because the United States is unquestionably the premiere military power in the world and because American foreign policy is based on maintaining stability within the community of nations, it is necessary for the Armed Forces to be fully prepared to fight and win in several theaters at the same time. He notes that despite the fact that the American military budget is many times larger than any military expenditures reported by any other nation, when analyzed as a percentage of the total gross national product, the United States ranks third in military spending.

Whereas this book is not a particularly riveting reading experience, it is a solid source of information about the issues associated with national strategic defense planning. Moreover, the author makes a convincing case for sizable increases in the American military and the defense budget. His lucid approach to these controversial issues reinforces the notion that freedom is not free.



George A. Van Otten, Ph.D.
Dean 111th MI BDE



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