The year 2001 marks the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War. In the last decade, the Army has reviewed lessons learned in a number of contingencies and realized the need for transformation. In this issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, we examine the transformation from the top down, beginning with the transformation “vision,” a three-axis approach (interim force, legacy force, and the scientific and technical axis) to achieving the objective force structure. We examine Army Intelligence, the concepts and materiel aspects of the change, and finish with a look at transformation training and doctrine.

Our last issue introduced the transformation with four articles about one axis of this change, the interim units. Initiating the Interim Force is the creation of the first two initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington, based on reorganizing the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (ID), and then 1st Bde, 25th ID (Light). These two brigades are the first two of eight Active and Reserve Component brigades that will transform within the Army. The IBCT is a fundamentally new Army organization that will serve as a building block for the Army’s medium force able to fight in the operational environment of the near term.

Leading off this issue, Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), discusses how transforming organizations, equipment, doctrine, and training results in the provision of improved intelligence as part of the combined arms team. Captain Bob Davidson follows with “The Vision—Transformation of Our Cold War-Era Force,” outlining the vision of General Eric K. Shinseki (Army Chief of Staff) for our evolving Army and TRADOC’s (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) efforts to build and sustain the IBCTs. Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr., Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), specifically addresses the transformation of Army intelligence, and its goal to achieve situational dominance for Army decision-makers and combat commanders. In the article “Transforming the Army for the Next Century—The Future Is Here Today,” Majors Raul Escribano and Philip Logan look at why and how the Army is transforming as an organization and institution to remain relevant in the new century.

Next, Mr. Michael Powell takes a hard-line look at requirements, challenges, and opportunities that MI systems face during the Army’s transformation. Colonel Charles Atkins discusses the human dimension of transformation and relates how the IBCT reflects several major changes to our “thought patterns” toward support, integration, capabilities, and reach-back operations. COL Stephen Bond and CPT Gregory Young explain that the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), Common Ground Station (CGS), and Joint Services Workstation (JSWS) comprise a crucial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system for achieving information dominance and the “now battle” picture in the transformed Army.

Completing the features are four transformation-related training articles and an article presenting IBCT doctrine. Brigadier General Richard J. Quirk, III, shares his transformation training goals, and COL Gary Parrish expands on that training with his article outlining the USAIC&FH (specifically 112th MI Brigade ( Provisional)) plan for training all MI soldiers to meet all the Objective Force requirements. MAJ Patrick Daniel follows with “Transition Training—IBCT-1 Cadre and Cohort,” in which he discusses the challenges and lessons learned from the first IBCT’s transition training. COL Jerry Jones (U.S. Army, Retired) supports MAJ Daniel’s article with his detailed account of Kazar Fury, the capstone command post exercise (CPX) incorporated into IBCT-1 training. Finally, CPT Lee Goodman, Jr., uses discussion of current IBCT organization, operations, capabilities, and limitations to stimulate input for revision of the IBCT intelligence doctrine.

Colonel Stephen J. Bond and CPT Gregory H. Young are our Writers of the Quarter for October-December 2000 with their article “From the High Ground—CGS and JSWS.” Thanks to all of our authors for their great articles! Contributions like yours make MIPB the professional development forum for MI professionals.

How to Submit an Material to MIPB

MIPB is always seeking good articles on a variety of topics as well as action photographs of MI soldiers. Please see page 67 for some suggested topics and instructions on submitting your articles, photographs, and book reviews.
STAFF:

Commanding General
Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.
112th MI Brigade (Provisional)
Colonel Gary L. Parrish

Editor
Elizabeth A. McGovern

Contributing Editors
(Please see the box on page 66 for a list of the contributing editors and proofreaders.)

Art Director
Gregorio O. Figueroa, Jr.

Assistant Art Directors
Specialist Luis E. Espinal
Sergeant Richard S. Grimes

Administration
Cruz M. Martinez

Cover photographs:
Courtesy of the U.S. Army

Purpose:
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin quarterly under provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB disseminates material designed to enhance individuals' knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional developments in the MI Corps.

Submissions: Please send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiries to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail to elizabeth.mcgovern@hua.army.mil; or telephone (520) 538-1005 or DSN 879-1005.

Subscriptions: Subscription rates are $14.00 per year (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $17.50 per year (Foreign). Send changes of address and subscriptions (see page 32) to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. For further information, telephone (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015 or E-mail cruz.martinez@hua.army.mil.

Disclaimer: This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsement. We reserve the right to edit any submitted material.

FEATURES

2 MI Is Out Front in Army Transformation
by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

5 The Vision---Transformation of Our Cold War-Era Force
by Captain Robert S. Davidson, Jr.

9 The Transformation of Army Intelligence
by Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr.

12 Transforming the Army for the Next Century—
The Future Is Here Today!
by Major Raul E. Escribano and Major Philip J. Logan, AGR

18 Transformation, A Time of Change
by Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

19 MI Systems Transformation
by Michael W. Powell

23 Intelligence Transformation: Beyond Paradigm Shifts, Changes in Ethos
by Colonel Charles Atkins

26 A View From the High Ground—CGS and JSWS
by Colonel Stephen J. Bond and Captain Gregory H. Young

30 Training the MI Force for the Future
by Brigadier General Richard J. Quirk, III

33 Moving to a Digitized Center of Excellence
by Colonel Gary L. Parrish

34 Centerfold Photo Gallery

41 Transition Training—IBCT-1 Cadre and Cohort
by Major Patrick L. Daniel

45 The Kazar Fury Exercise for Training the Initial Brigade Combat Teams
by Colonel Jerry W. Jones (U.S.Army, Retired)

49 Doctrine for the Initial Brigade Combat Team
by Captain E. Lee Goodman, Jr.

64 Glossary of Acronyms Used in This Issue

DEPARTMENTS

53 Proponent Notes 68 Unit Profiles—IBCT-1: RSTA
59 TSM Notes Squadron Surveil. Troop
62 Quick Tips —IBCT-1: 209th MI Company
Back Cover 112th MI Brigade (Prov.)

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

ERIC K. SHINSEKEI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

0010801
This special issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) focuses on transformation. The Chief of Staff of the Army identified transformation as a crucial aspect of his vision. This Army transformation by design will make the Army a full spectrum, strategically relevant force. The Military Intelligence Corps plays a key role in Army Transformation. The basis for many of the initiatives that will move the Army to the objective force is an assumption of improved situational awareness, which includes an accurate and timely understanding of opponents, neutrals, weather, and terrain. Achievement of this increased level of situational awareness rests, in large measure, on our ability to deliver refined intelligence products across the force. This is an exciting time to be intelligence professionals and promises to move our Corps into an even closer membership in the combined arms team.

We often think of transformation as focusing on equipment. Although equipment is important, it is the human dimension—our soldiers and civilians—that will transform the Army. Transformation is a new way of doing our business, not simply a “tweaking” of our Cold War organizations, but rather a fundamental examination of what the MI Corps must accomplish as part of the combined arms team. In this issue of MIPB, we will discuss many aspects of transformation, but I would first like to set the stage.

Enabling and Integrated Intelligence

The MI Corps has primarily focused on providing “enabling” intelligence, which dealt mainly with the disposition and intentions of opponent formations. This intelligence is essential for conducting the military decisionmaking process and critical to a commander disposing and committing his formations. It is primarily a planning-focused activity. Once direct combat operations began within the “Red zone,” there was little direct intelligence contribution. Weapons system capabilities often provided the basis for mission effectiveness and stand off.

With changes in the operational environment, especially the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems and the requirement to deploy forces quickly over long distances, we must change the mission effectiveness equation. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) must become part of the overmatch ratio. ISR together with mobility, lethality, and survivability must be what guarantees overmatch during the close fight on the 21st century battlefield. In addition to “enabling” intelligence, we must provide “integrated” intelligence—that intelligence which is closely linked to the tactical operator engaged in the “Red zone” fight. These intelligence capabilities must be a part of the ongoing combat operation, not just support planning of the operation. Some examples of this approach are the—

- Provision of enemy situational awareness information directly to combat platforms by the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system.
- Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with manned Army Aviation helicopters.

Force Structure

The force structure of the MI Corps must support our mission. We need increased analysis, HUMINT, and imagery capabilities within our tactical organization. Additionally, we need to improve our ability to focus and integrate the myriad ISR capabilities.
capabilities available to a commander. These assets include a wide range of capabilities operated across the battlefield by both MI organizations and other battlefield functional areas such as Army Aviation, Special Operations Forces, Field Artillery, Chemical Corps, Engineers, and many others. This integration role has long been the function of the intelligence officer but in many cases, neither the personnel nor the equipment were available to accomplish the mission.

The varied nature of the future battlefield makes this integration mandatory.

The Reserve Component’s MI force structure—for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG)—must also transform. Crucial initiatives include the organization of additional, fully capable, divisional MI battalions in the ARNG and more effective support organizations in the USAR. The superb performance of ARNG and USAR soldiers in recent operations and contingencies underscores both the value of these professionals and the importance of proper structure and integration.

**Equipment and Personnel**

There is an equipment aspect to transformation. First, our equipment must get to the fight. All equipment must be C-130-transportable. We must integrate functions of various pieces of equipment to reduce tactical operations center (TOC) footprint and deployability issues. MI must develop and field sensors specifically aimed at the urban environment. Our automation systems—the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and the Army Battle Command System (ABCS)—must be able to share a common picture with all echelons and the joint and national intelligence community. They must also provide tools across the operational spectrum from stability and support operations, through small-scale contingencies, to high-intensity operations.

The key to successful transformation remains our soldiers and civilians. We must continue to develop their basic intelligence skills of analysis, collection, and integration. None of these initiatives in any way reduces the requirement for first-class individual intelligence skills capable of operating in the digital environment of the information age. Our military occupational specialty (MOS) structure needs critical examination to ensure it provides the commander with the expertise and flexibility to operate in the 21st century and also assures rewarding career opportunities for our soldiers. Strong leadership by our officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians will be required during this period of unprecedented change.

**Conclusion**

Our organizations, equipment, doctrine, and training will change, but the result will be the provision of improved intelligence as part of
the combined-arms team. It is important that we all understand the mission and environment of today's Army and move out to continue our tradition as the best intelligence service in the world.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1968. He received his commission following graduation as a Distinguished Graduate from the Field Artillery Officer Candidate School and his initial positions were in the 7th and 2d Infantry Divisions and command of an AIT (advanced individual training) company. His past intelligence and electronic warfare assignments included Field Station Augsburg; the Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces-Korea; the Department of the Army Staff; Deputy Chief for Intelligence, Special Technical Operations Division, J3, Joint Staff; and Associate Deputy Director for Operations (Military Support) at the National Security Agency (NSA) and Deputy Chief, Central Security Service (CSS). MG Thomas has served in many command positions including C Company (Guardrail), 15th MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation (AE)), 504th MI Brigade; 3d MI Battalion (AE), 501st MI Brigade; 111th MI Brigade (Training); U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He became the fifth Chief of the MI Corps in June 1998. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. MG Thomas is a Master Army Aviator rated in both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft and is a fixed-wing instructor pilot. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Wilkes College in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from the University of Southern California. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at john.thomas@hua.army.mil or telephonically at (520) 533-1140 or DSN 821-1140.

JCF-AWE on Employment of the Light Legacy Forces

This issue of MIPB focuses primarily on the Army transformation and developing the medium and objective forces but advances and changes continue in our legacy forces as well. Our first digital division, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), is preparing for major experimentation and training in early 2001.

Recently, MI tested new equipment and procedures as a part of the Joint Contingency Force-Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF-AWE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana. The AWE's focus was employment of a digitized, light infantry brigade task force (from the 10th Mountain Division (Light)) equipped and trained to execute contingency force operations. Some of the military intelligence objectives in this experiment were to—

- Improve the intelligence capabilities of the light contingency force.
- Determine which new systems or linkages improve ISR across the joint, mechanized, and light contingency force structure.
- Use new and emerging national and joint service capabilities to gain improved situational awareness of geographically distant objective areas.
- Expand the battlespace through the use of new sensors in order to improve situational awareness.

Photos courtesy of Captain George E. Lewis, III
by Captain Robert S. Davidson

The Vision: An Army force that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki, is calling on the Army to plan and assemble a future force based on these standards of strength and flexibility.

With the backing of senior military leaders and the nation’s highest civilian officials—and with a dependence on the capabilities of the U.S. science and technology community—the CSA and the Army have embarked on a mission to reshape the force to counter nontraditional threats more readily. It is an endeavor that the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has stressed “is not an experiment.”

The transformation is already underway with two brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington—3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, and 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light)—reorganizing to form the first two Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). The 3d Brigade, 2d ID, will convert first and expects to be an operational IBCT in 2001, at an estimated cost of $800 million. Plans call for up to six Active Component IBCTs, and at least one in the Reserve Component, to form during the next few years.1

Across a Broad Spectrum of Operations

TRADOC is designing the IBCTs as combined-arms forces prepared to take on missions ranging from stability and support operations to combat, though IBCTs as the first units of an Interim Force will not be early-entry units according to Major General Robert St. Onge, who recently finished a tour as the Army Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy. Rather, the brigades will fill the gap between early-entry forces and the stronger forces following.2

The Army force transformation (including the Interim Force and the Legacy Force that will coexist until we reach an Objective Force) is a response to the increased frequency of peacekeeping and other low-intensity missions, as well as personnel and equipment procurement challenges. A 25 May 2000 House Appropriations Committee report on the transformation stated that—

recent operations have clearly shown that, in the wake of a 40-percent reduction in personnel and a 37-percent reduction in buying power over the last decade, and a weapons acquisition process which has proved lacking in many respects, the Army cannot quickly deploy its heavy forces, and is not optimally equipped or organized to meet the changing demands placed on it in the post-Cold War era.3

The CSA has set a standard of 96 hours for an IBCT to deploy anywhere in the world for contingencies across a broad spectrum of operations. To meet that requirement, the IBCTs must deploy as quickly as the light infantry but possess the lethality of armor units.

Some have called the IBCT concept “infantry-centric” because the brigades’ main organizations are infantry battalions. Colonel Paul Melody, Director of Combined Arms Tactics and Doctrine for the U.S. Army Infantry School, noted that, “It has all the goodness of a light infantry brigade with all of the flexibility and communications and carrying advantage of mechanized infantry.”

A critical piece in establishing the IBCT as a strong, flexible force is the adoption of a new armored vehicle for the core infantry battalions. The IBCT is training with armored vehicles borrowed from Canada4 and other countries until it receives interim armored vehicles (IAVs).

In November 2000, the Army selected the eight-wheeled Light Armored Vehicle III (LAV III) as its IAV. The LAV III manufacturer, GM/GDLS Defense Group, projects deliveries to the IBCTs beginning third quarter, fiscal year 2002. The IAV will be lighter and more easily deployable than the M1 Abrams battle tank, and will serve as the primary armored vehicle for the Interim Force.
The IBCTs will also employ the advanced technology of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) digital communications system to improve command and control (C2). FBCB2 will link battlefield elements by using the Global Positioning System (GPS) to send and receive automatic position location reports and will send and receive C2 message traffic via digital over-the-air radio transmissions. The heart of FBCB2 is a system of small computers, either vehicle- or soldier-mounted, that provide communications. Those communications will move across a tactical internet, a network of radios and routers that will link FBCB2 platforms across units.5

While the Interim Force and follow-on Objective Force will rely heavily on science and technology (S&T) to provide force enablers, the true key to the organizations’ successes will remain the individual soldier. The Army must resource and train the forces to perform the broad range of missions that the CSA envisions for them.

Growing the Future Force

GEN Shinseki has taken the first step toward fully populating the future force with an initiative to fill all units completely by grade and skill. Because of the deployment and training challenges facing warfighting units, the Army will fill them first. According to the CSA—

we will man the divisions and armored cavalry regiments at 100 percent of authorizations by the end of FY00 (fiscal year 2000) and at 100 percent of MOS (military occupational specialty) and grade level authorizations by the second quarter of FY01.

Recognizing that not all units can reach a 100-percent work force immediately, GEN Shinseki noted that other TOE (table of organization and equipment) and then TDA (table of distribution and allowances) units will reach 100 percent in successive years.6

To prepare soldiers to serve and lead in the IBCTs, TRADOC is producing new doctrine and training techniques, according to TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, Major General James M. Dubik. As the primary proponent for developing doctrine for the Interim Force, the Infantry School Transition Team is working with its counterparts at TRADOC schools at Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Their goal is to ensure that the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developed for Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Military Intelligence (see page 49) soldiers form one coherent and viable package.

The IBCT’s intelligence and signal companies trained at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and Fort Gordon, Georgia, respectively. Their training concluded in September 2000, when company training was to begin at Fort Lewis. Brigade and battalion staff-level training also commenced at Fort Lewis in September.7

Doctrinal training is critical for MI soldiers who will serve in the IBCT because the Army has dramatically reconfigured the organization of MI elements supporting the brigade. Most significantly, the MI Company—a unit previously in the separate MI battalion of a division—will be organic to the brigade. In the IBCT, the company’s mission is to provide timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to the commander, staff, and subordinate elements. The company will accomplish its mission with sections focusing on ISR analysis, collection, planning, and execution. The IBCT MI company will also contribute a robust, tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) platoon.

In addition to the MI company, a Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron will fill a present void in most brigade structures, giving the IBCT an organic reconnaissance and surveillance asset. Three Ground Reconnaissance Troops and a Surveillance Troop will comprise the RSTA Squadron. The Surveillance Troop, commanded by an MI captain, will include an Aerial Reconnaissance Platoon, an NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) Reconnaissance Platoon, and a Ground Sensor Platoon.

While the Army’s immediate focus is on the IBCTs, it is important to note that they are only part of the near-term solution in the CSA’s proposed 12- to15-year, estimated 70-billion-dollar effort to transform our Cold War-era force. A Legacy Force will continue to operate at the same time as the Interim Force’s IBCTs while the Army forms the Objective Force—which is dependent on emerging technology. According to GEN Shinseki—

we will retain portions of the Army as we know it today—the Legacy Force—and modernize it through recapitalization and fielding of new, already-programmed equipment. Thus, the Legacy Force will maintain the capabilities we currently have, to maintain warfighting readiness, [and] retain our ability to execute the National Military Strategy as the transformation goes forward.

On the way to the Objective Force, with its focus on modernization and digitization, the Army’s least up-to-date forces will likely transition first. “The digitized corps (III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas) certainly won’t be the first that we would…transition to the objective force,” MG St. Ongé said. “We have to maintain a trained and
ready force today while we transition.”

Army leaders expect to stand up the Objective Force between 2008 and 2012. The plan is for the Legacy Force to transition to the Objective Force once the (S&T) community develops the advanced Objective Force equipment and it is ready for fielding. The Interim Force, because of its newer IAV and other modern equipment, will follow the legacy units. In the Objective Force, mechanized divisions will get lighter and more deployable while maintaining their current lethality and survivability. 8

Application of Technology

A future combat system (FCS) armored vehicle now under development is the cornerstone to arming the Objective Force. The Army sees it as a replacement for the 70-ton M1 Abrams tank, with the same lethality and survivability, but 50 tons lighter. Leaders are relying on scientists and technological experts to find solutions by 2003.

By the end of 2005 or in early 2006, we will have an FCS demonstration, according to Dr. Michael Andrews, the Army’s chief scientist. He noted that while there has been a demonstration of a gun smaller than 105 millimeters with the lethality of the Abrams main gun, “we have to take it to the next level.”

Active protection systems will likely enhance the survivability of the FCS. “We should have full active protection systems by the ’06 time period that could give us protection against both chemical and kinetic energy,” Dr. Andrews said. Other efforts under way to improve light force lethality and survivability center on advanced anti-armor systems and indirect fire systems.

The application of advanced technology in the Objective Force will extend beyond the FCS. Beginning with the first IBCT, and through the Objective Force, TRADOC says brigades will be fully internetted, giving a commander full access to organic reconnaissance and sensor capabilities as well as national sources to improve situational awareness. An intense focus on C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) will be a defining trait of the Objective Force.

Funding and Momentum

As optimistic and ambitious as the CSA’s vision is, and despite strong support from military and civilian leaders, there are some who are concerned that the proposed transformation is just another well-intended effort. In its report accompanying the House version of the 2001 Defense Appropriations Bill, the House Appropriations Committee stated—

Over the last decade, the Army has undertaken a variety of restructuring initiatives, large and small. They include such efforts as the advanced warfighting experiment process, “Force XXI,” digitization, the “Army of Excellence,” the “Army After Next,” and most recently, the “Strike Force headquarters” concept. Many of these initiatives have shown some promise, but have regrettably failed to generate sufficient impetus to bring about transforming change to the Army. None had sufficient momentum or budgetary priority to be completed as originally envisioned.

Despite its critical commentary, the House Committee did recommend funding the Army restructuring effort. In testimony to Congress, GEN Shinseki noted that “given current funding trends, we estimate that the Army has identified funding for approximately half of the additional costs associated with transformation.”

Fully transforming our force will depend on continued Congressional funding. It will also require a momentum that must come from all Army leaders—a continued vision and dedication to modernization that will carry us to a future force. As the CSA stressed to Congress, “We can transform today in a time of peace and prosperity. Or we can try to change tomorrow on the eve of the next war, when the window...
has closed, our perspective has narrowed, and our potential is limited by the press of time and the constraints of resources.”

Endnotes
2. Ibid.
4. The Canadian Light Armored Vehicle III in the title photograph is similar to those leased from Canada for development of Brigade Combat Team tactics and doctrine at Fort Lewis. As was noted above, the Army has chosen the LAV III as its IAV. The U.S. Army Communications–Electronics Command and three program executive offices will provide the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, called C4ISR. This photograph is courtesy of USACECOM.

Captain Bob Davidson is currently an MI Captains Career Course (MICCC) student at Fort Huachuca. His past assignments include service as Assistant Brigade S2, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division; G2 Operations Battle Captain, Multi-National Brigade–East (MNB-E); Task Force Falcon, Kosovo; Electronic Warfare Platoon Leader, D Company, 101st MI Battalion; and Counterintelligence Systems Officer, Plans and Operations Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR). CPT Davidson earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Journalism from Bowling Green State University. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at rsdavidson@bigfoot.com.

Recommended Reading Lists from the Center for Military History and General Eric K. Shinseki

Cadets, Soldiers, and Junior NCOs
Band of Brothers by Stephen Ambrose
The Long Grey Line by Rick Atkinson
The Greatest Generation by Tom Brokaw
This Kind of War by T. R. Fehrenbach
America’s First Battles by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft
A Concise History of the U.S. Army: 225 Years of Service by David W. Hogan, Jr.
The Face of Battle by John Keegan
We Were Soldiers Once and Young by Harold Moore and Joe Galloway
Once An Eagle by Anton Myer
The Killer Angels by Michael Shaara

Company Grade Officers and Junior NCOs
Citizen Soldiers by Stephen Ambrose
The War to End All Wars by Edward Coffman
The Soldier and the State by Samuel P. Huntington
Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War by Gerald F. Linderman
Company Commander by Charles B. MacDonald
Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War by S. L. A. Marshall
For the Common Defense by Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski
Certain Victory by Robert H. Scales, Jr.
General George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century by Mark A. Stoler
Buffalo Soldiers (Black Saber Chronicles) by Tom Willard

Field Grade Officers and Senior NCOs
East of Chosin by Roy Appleman
Army for Empire by Graham Cosmas
The Evolution of U.S. Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 by Robert Doughty
Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War by Antoine Henri Jomini
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt by Charles B. MacDonald
Battle Cry of Freedom by James McPherson
The Challenge of Command by Roger H. Nye
Summons of the Trumpet by Dave Palmer
Supplying War by Martin Van Creveld

Senior Leaders Above Brigade Level
On War by Carl von Clausewitz, edition by Paret and Howard
Command Decisions by Kent Greenfield
War in European History by Michael Howard
The Rise and Fall of Great Powers by Paul Kennedy
Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period by Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millet
Thinking in Time by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May
Makers of Modern Strategy by Peter Paret
An American Profession of Arms by William Skelton
On Strategy by Harry Summers
The Peloponnesian War by Thucydides

Purpose: To encourage habits of reading and reflection, sustain intellectual growth between attendance at the various formal institutional schools, facilitate self-development, and deepen soldiers’ appreciation of their military heritage.

“We can never spend too much time thinking about our profession. There is no better way to develop the sure knowledge and confidence required of America’s most demanding occupation than a disciplined, focused commitment to a personal course of reading and study.”

—General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief of Staff
by Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr.

Emerging world trends point to a period of unbounded strategic challenges, a wider range of threats, increased unpredictability, and a more complex range of operating environments that will challenge the United States at every level of intensity. Our country will require a world-class Army capable of rapid response and dominance across the entire spectrum of operations. A broad range of well-balanced, responsive land force capabilities, employed within a joint operational framework, will be critical to sustain land dominance. To meet this demand, the Army is transforming along three major, concurrent axes: Trained and Ready, Transforming the Operational Force, and Transforming the Institutional Army. This article provides some perspectives on the implications of Army transformation for the Military Intelligence Corps (see Figure 1).

Army Intelligence Transformation

The goal of Army Intelligence is to achieve situational dominance for Army decision-makers and warfighters. Key to this is information superiority that enables the seven operational characteristics of the Army Objective Force: responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. Situation-dominating results give commanders the ability to acquire, track, engage, and assess targets, thus dominating the battlefield environments and situations across the spectrum of conflict. Army Intelligence is already moving out on the path to achieve this. We are developing and employing a seamless architecture that provides an enhanced situational awareness through internetted command, control, communications, and computers (C4), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. These platforms provide commanders with a common view of the battlefield across all echelons while leveraging the capabilities of higher echelons through reach-back capabilities.

As the Army builds from the Initial to the Objective Force, Army Intelligence will apply lessons learned, incorporate available technology, and make essential changes in training and doctrine to ensure seamless support (see Figure 2) while accelerating investment and experimentation with new technologies that support Objective Force requirements. The Intelligence Objective Force will be capable of providing enhanced situational understanding, battlespace visualization, and information superiority through collaborative, interactive, integrated, and interoperable intelligence databases and networks. Army Intelligence achieves significant efficiencies operating within the Global Information Grid. Improved simulations will train intelligence soldiers anywhere, and collaborative analytical tools will give them access to regional and technical expertise anytime.

Enabling Transformation through S&T Investment and Technology Protection

ISR Modernization. As the Army begins to shape its future forces and capabilities under the Transformation Campaign Plan, advanced...
technology will serve as the crucial enabler for both achieving and maintaining combat overmatch for Army elements engaged against any adversary. Army ISR initiatives (see Figure 3) focus on migrating to fewer, but more capable, multidiscipline platforms with modular sensors, integrated processors and preprocessors, and global information access through the tactical info-sphere. Introduction of new technology will allow rapid analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence to ensure a common operational picture on a dispersed battlefield.

Future Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) payload upgrades will continue the trend toward a multidiscipline ISR approach. We will maximize the value-added potential of tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems by transitioning measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) capabilities from its scientific and technical (S&T) focus to operational and tactical intelligence applications in support of warfighters. Advanced technology also enables us to merge Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) and Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) into a single airborne platform, Aerial Common Sensor (ACS), improving the commander’s view of the battlefield despite diverse weather, foliage, and low-light conditions. Similarly, our numerous TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) systems will eventually integrate into a single system, the Distributed...
Common Ground System—Army (DCGS-A). DCGS-A will provide a multidiscipline, interoperable, common, open systems ISR and targeting architecture, and critical sensor-to-shooter links. Additionally, Army Intelligence continues to develop a computer network exploitation capability supporting both computer network attack and defense.

**Avoiding Technological Surprise.** With the need to exploit technology to shape future ISR capabilities comes the requirement to prevent that same technology from falling into the hands of potential adversaries. Traditionally, our technology-protection methodology centers around two axes: first, controlling the distribution and flow of technical information while securing Army laboratories and second, monitoring adversaries’ access to advanced technology and reporting on their capabilities to develop battlefield abilities that threaten U.S. interests and military forces.

Maintaining the Army’s technological edge in the future will demand a new, holistic approach to technology protection. This approach will continue to rely on traditional measures, but will also demand greater attention to adversary attempts to thwart U.S. technological superiority through denial, deception, and asymmetric means. Furthermore, we will have to focus significantly more attention on the exponential growth in technology itself, which—combined with the often cumbersome military research and development (R&D) and procurement processes—could result in military capabilities that are technologically obsolete within a few years of initial deployment. Finally, accompanying the challenges of traditional foreign disclosure programs will be the difficult task of managing the disclosure of advanced technology to allies and industry alike.

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) has charged the Army staff, with DA DCSINT (Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence) lead, to assess our current technology-protection strategy and to ensure that the Army is properly focusing on the critical technologies essential to achieving Objective Force R&D, acquisition, and procurement milestones. Crucial to success is our ability to synchronize the technology-protection programs and priorities across a variety of Army agencies and staffs. We must also assess our foreign disclosure programs to ensure that we maintain the right balance between the competing objectives of foreign military sales and technology protection. The realities of the global economy, and the technological and information revolutions that underpin it, will require great flexibility in Service and Department of Defense foreign disclosure policies. In spite of all this, the bottom line remains clear. The Army must ensure it maintains a combat overmatch capability against all potential adversaries.

**Conclusion**

In the future, the U.S. Army is likely to face adaptive enemies using advanced technology to attack us in asymmetric ways in increasingly complex situations and terrain. To ensure success, Army intelligence must provide ground commanders with—

- “360 degree” surveillance.
- Precision target identification, tracking, and battle damage assessment (BDA).
- Internetworked tactical communications and intelligence links that facilitate continuous access to joint and national capabilities.
- Support to command and control (C2) and information-protect, -attack, and -exploit, and full-spectrum force protection.

Army Intelligence recognizes the challenge posed by the changing nature of warfare. We are actively improving current capabilities to meet the evolving needs of today’s National Military Strategy while simultaneously developing new capabilities to meet the requirements of Joint Vision 2020 and the Army’s Transformation Plan.

Lieutenant General Noonan became the DA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) 17 July 2000. Commissioned through the Reserve Officers Training Program, his initial assignment following graduation from the Infantry and Military Intelligence Officer Basic Courses was as a IV Corps intelligence and operations advisor in Vietnam. His other staff positions include Brigade S2, 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (ID); Plans Officer and Manpower Management Analyst at Fort Devens, Massachusetts; Division Artillery S2 and Deputy Division G2, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Tactical Intelligence Officer, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); G2, 25th ID (Light), Schofield Barracks; Deputy Chief and Division Chief, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare/Command and Control Countermeasures, DA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS); Executive Officer to the DA DCSINT; DA DCSOPS, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); and the Director for Intelligence, J2, CENTCOM. LTG Noonan’s command assignments include company command at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Fort Devens, and Schofield Barracks; Commander, 125th MI Battalion; Commander, 513th MI Brigade; and Commanding General, INSCOM. His military schooling includes the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. LTG Noonan earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Government and International Relations from the University of Notre Dame and a Master of Business Administration degree from Western New England College. For more information, readers can contact COL Samborowski via E-mail at Leonard. Samborowski @hqda.army.mil.
Transforming the Army for the Next Century—
The Future Is Here Today!

by Majors Raul E. Escribano and Philip J. Logan

As the U.S. Army enters the 21st century, the one constant in our world is change. Advances in technology, emerging threats, and lessons learned from deployments around the world have led to the conclusion that the Army must change both its structure and institution to remain relevant in meeting the variety of requirements, missions, and threats we face. In this article, we look at why and how the Army is transforming as an organization and as an institution to remain relevant in the new century.

Why Must the Army Transform?

Technological advances have already and will continue to change the speed and dynamics with which we fight wars. Tools and skills unknown twenty years ago, such as internetted computer hardware and software, make information readily available to decision-makers at a rate unheard of in the past. Consequently, the ability to share information quickly in a collaborative and distributive manner will ultimately change how leaders plan and execute military missions. This ability to share information through internetted communications and increased situational understanding will ultimately affect the seven-step military decisionmaking process (MDMP), perhaps by performing some of the steps nearly simultaneously at multiple levels.

Experience has led to the conclusion that the Army must change its force structure. Deployments and operations in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo are just some examples of the locations in which the Army has served during the last two decades. They all have some characteristics in common; today we call them small-scale contingencies (SSCs). From our experience in these SSCs, we have learned that undoubtedly one key for succeeding in this type of environment is faster, more capable, and more deployable units.

As the new century unfolds, a variety of asymmetric threats has begun to emerge, and should continue to evolve rapidly. In the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact, the Army no longer strictly confronts “enemy orders of battle.” During the Cold War, the Army focused its forces and attention on places like the Fulda Gap and the Korean DMZ (demilitarized zone). Units and leaders had a perspective of a “linear” doctrinal enemy, and assumed the enemy would fight in set echeloned formations across international borders. Today, the Army rarely enjoys such templated situational awareness as it reacts to deployments throughout the world. Potential adversaries may not possess set organizations or doctrine. The accurate definition and identification of the “threat” is now much more difficult, and this complexity is presently the norm.

These emerging threats, coupled with new SSC environments and advances in technology, require the Army to have a more capable and responsive force to meet global contingency situations. Without a doubt, the 21st century Army’s relevancy will rest in responding effectively to crises.

How Did the Army Reach This Point?

For the U.S. Army, change has been a hallmark of its existence. During the previous century, redesigning the divisional structure of the Army took place at least eleven times, from the “Square Divisions” of the 1920s and 1930s to the Force XXI and EXFOR (experi-
mental force) of the 1990s. One or more factors drove each of these redesigns and reorganizations:

- Immediate threat from a peer competitor.
- Changes in the geopolitical landscape.
- Changes and development in science and technology (S&T).
- Personnel and financial considerations.
- Battlefield “lessons-learned.”

Consequently, the most recent decision to transform the Army did not come overnight. In fact, the Army’s transformation effort has been a developing concept for years. Since 1992, the Army has conducted multiple experiments and analyses that resulted in the need for a brigade combat team (BCT), capable of rapidly deploying in an SSC environment. These studies have identified the need for a force with enough combat power to accomplish missions throughout the low- to mid-range of the conflict spectrum. Lessons learned from the modern Louisiana Maneuvers in 1992, in conjunction with the Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), Force XXI, and the Army After Next, have led to the evolution of the current Interim BCT (IBCT) concept, the vanguard of the future “Objective Force.”

One cannot overstate the need to have units capable of deploying at short notice with sufficient lethal and nonlethal capabilities. The Army does not currently have a force that provides the regional commanders in chief (CINCs) with this capability. Special Operations and light forces are able to respond rapidly, but often lack the mobility and combat power to meet SSCs’ operational requirements. Heavy forces train to deploy to a major theater war (MTW), but both the light and heavy forces require significant tailoring and training to meet SSC requirements. As a result, the Army has routinely found itself modifying one of these two forces to meet the recent SSC environment. Hence, the Interim Brigade Combat Team concept was born.

The implementation of these units, which will habitually train to address the unique challenges of the SSC environment, will give the regional CINCs a force able to respond quickly to any contingency. The Army will configure a number of BCTs with currently available “off the shelf” technology and equipment to satisfy these requirements. Just as importantly, it will train soldiers and leaders in the doctrine and organizations that will become the Objective Force.

SSC—The “New” Operational Environment

The complex operational environments during the past twenty years have meant that the Army deployed forces to austere, undeveloped theaters with little or no logistic infrastructure. It appears that this will continue to be the typical operational environment for the Army beyond the near term. SSCs encompass the range of conflict between stability and support operations and MTWs. Many factors define this operational environment, but variety, speed, precision, and force may be the most dynamic ones the Army currently faces.

**Variety.** Variety refers to the many different threats and vast operational conditions U.S. soldiers will face. The days of confronting a clearly defined enemy are likely to end in the near term. Potential threats and capabilities include terrorist organizations, local police, paramilitary forces, criminals, and gangs ranging from organized conventional dismounted infantry units to single individuals with no specific alliance. In addition to conventional and unconventional armed forces, other parties such as civilians, and non-governmental and international organizations will be present in the area of operations. Another challenge is the operational conditions that affect maneuver. The force must be able to operate in multiple geographic and climatic environments, including deserts, woodlands, mountains, and most importantly, complex and urban terrain. All of these factors and more will shape the battlespace for the IBCT.

**Speed.** The speed at which forces deploy to any theater will be paramount. The sooner a force arrives on the objective with irresistible momentum, the faster that force will achieve decisive results. However, speed includes more than our
deploying rapidly to a theater. The presence of national and international media will affect all phases of an operation. The “Cable News Network Effect” focusing public attention on an existing or emerging situation may lead to a call for military action. Technology allows information to travel simultaneously to a global audience as we execute missions. During contingency operations, understanding the speed at which the media makes information available is crucial.

**Precision.** The Army must be precise while achieving desired results. Precision has become a critical aspect of all operations. The importance of minimizing friendly and coalition force casualties, collateral damage, and civilian casualties has always been important, but takes on increased urgency in the global information environment (GIE). Incidents such as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo conflict have immediate and lasting political effects. The precise and appropriate application of force, if required, will be critical across the full spectrum of conflict.

**Force.** If the United States commits forces, the Army’s ability to use force must be credible, and it must retain the ability to execute combat operations and destroy enemy forces it needed. As the Army continues the transformation process, it must never compromise the basic tenets that ensure combat readiness. The IBCT will continue the Army’s capability for credible, lethal, and precise combat power across the entire spectrum as it progresses toward the Objective Force.

**The Objective Force**

The end-state of the transformation effort will be the Objective Force—a responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force that achieves full-spectrum dominance. These seven core capabilities are what make this force unique. The Army expects to field the first objective force in approximately eight to ten years.

The transformation strategy has three efforts moving along parallel paths, to transform the Army in the future. First is the Army’s legacy force (top axis of Figure 1) consisting of all current Active and Reserve Component (RC) combat forces. These units will remain trained and ready as they always have, until the Army decides to transform them into the Objective Force. In other words, through recapitalization and modernization, these units will be the guarantors of peace during the initial transformation process.

In the center is the Objective Force. Within this force, we expect that S&T will develop equipment the Army will need in the future. The current thinking is that by a target date of 2003, S&T should be able to provide a concept and timelines for a capability to produce the weapons platforms and equipment needed for the Objective Force. The intent is to field advanced systems in propulsion, armor, armament, and communications networking that meet each of the seven core capabilities. Once the platforms and equipment are in production, the Army will then begin transforming its legacy force.

The primary purpose of the interim force (lower axis on Figure 1) is to develop the right doctrine and organization for the objective force by building an organization based on the current and expected future operational environment. The IBCT accomplishes several missions and it—

- Meets a near-term strategic requirement.
- Is operational across the spectrum of conflict.
- Serves as the “bridge” to the Objective Force.

Although primarily designed to operate in the mid-range of the spectrum, with augmentation the IBCT can respond to an MTW. The IBCT is not designed to fight by itself, but as a part of a division (perhaps the Interim Division or U.S. Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters. The commander, based on threat analysis, would determine which assets needed to augment the IBCT. It is addressed briefly in paragraph 19. It is important to understand some of the things the IBCT does not do: it is neither a forced entry organization nor a replacement for the U.S. Marine Corps and its established
missions. The break in the bottom axis of the figure is intentional. At some point in the transition process, the (S&T) effort may dictate that the interim effort is complete, and that all assets and efforts should push toward the center axis and the Objective Force.

To move toward this objective, the interim force began its transformation in December 1999 at Fort Lewis, Washington, with two initial brigade combat teams, the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, and the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light). In the second quarter, fiscal year 2000, they began training and fielding equipment using currently available off-the-shelf technology. These two brigades are just the first two of possibly eight interim brigades transforming within the Army.

The first IBCT should reach its initial operational capability (IOC) in early 2003. The second initial brigade combat team, 1/25th ID (L), will likely begin transforming sometime in 2001.

Transformation Context—New Ways of Thinking

Transforming the Army is more than just changing force structure and equipment: it entails transforming to a “new way of thinking.” Ultimately, it encompasses transfiguring both the operational and the institutional Army to function in a different context. The transformation will be from—

- Relatively known environment, enemy order of battle, and doctrine to relatively unknown conditions and types of threats.
- Adversary as combatants of a nation-state’s armed forces to an adversary who could also be a person, organization, agency, or situation that obstructs mission accomplishment.
- Forward-deployed pre-positioned equipment to rapid deployment with basic loads.
- A warfighter concept defined solely in terms of conventional combat to a warfighter defined in terms of full-spectrum operations.
- The mature theater with a developed infrastructure to a non-mature theater and an undeveloped infrastructure.
- “If you might need it, “take it with you” approach to “take what you need initially, the rest will follow as needed.”

ISR—The Critical Path

A critical aspect of the transformation is the brigade’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, (ISR) architecture. No longer will commanders have to make contact and develop the situation in order to have enough information to take decisive action. The ISR architecture, by design, allows IBCT leaders to enhance situational understanding, thus maneuvering forces for decisive action at the times and places of their choosing.

Access to joint- and national-level intelligence will be possible through the flow of digitally transmitted information. Organic communication systems will allow the brigade to “reach back” to sources of information within the Department of Defense as well as other government and non-governmental agencies, thus facilitating the exchange and flow of information. The collaborative and distributive intelligence capability will also facilitate near-simultaneous planning and execution at all levels, greatly reducing the amount of time required to gather the intelligence needed to conduct an operation. In brief, information gathered from all sources—whether military, governmental, commercial, or international—will undergo both
analysis and distribution in a collaborative environment.

The MI Company organic to the IBCT and the Surveillance Troop organic to the IBCT’s Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron will provide a robust intelligence capability never seen before at brigade level. The embedded human intelligence (HUMINT) capability will be greater than what an Army corps currently possesses. Additional IBCT intelligence capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), multiple sensor teams, and linkages to overhead platforms will also complement near-real- to real-time situational understanding.

The Network

The network referred to earlier is structured around the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) with multiple supporting systems operating digitally, designed to provide leaders with situational understanding. The importance of a functional network is the ability to internet communications and provide reach-back, thus reducing the footprint forward. However, there is more to the network.

Figure 2 depicts the way the network contributes to and balances six operational concepts—situational understanding, maneuver, fires and effects (lethal and non-lethal), maneuver sustainability, maneuver support, and protection.

Many have paid considerable attention to the type of vehicle that will transport the IBCT. Conceptually, the vehicle is not as important as what it represents: an enabler that allows soldiers to act and fight as an internetteted, networked, combined-arms team.

Leader Development and Learning

Perhaps the most far-reaching and important aspect of the transformation is the impact on the way the Army will have to develop its leaders (see Figure 3) and soldiers. Consequently, the Army will also refine its training methodology by developing the qualities and capabilities of new soldiers.

The Army’s challenge in the coming years is to stay the course while building new organizational habits as it continues to learn from the transformation process. The Army is currently in the Act Phase of the Learning Cycle (see Figure 4), pressing ahead with initiatives to meet the needs of the future.

It is also imperative to remember that this evolutionary process encompasses much more than merely transforming a few brigades at Fort Lewis or elsewhere. The current plans include transforming up to eight brigade combat teams (including at least one in the Army National Guard). The transformation is occurring not only in the operational force but in the institutional Army as well.

Figure 3. Development of Future Leaders.

Figure 4. The Army as a Learning Organization in a Continual Process Toward an Objective Force.
well. Units will learn much from the interim brigades as they help develop new doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); in this way, the Army will orient and refocus itself and apply lessons learned as it continues to transform.

As in any other institution, changing the way the Army operates will be difficult and may bring high anxiety. Nevertheless, with evolution comes opportunity—the opportunity to change the Army into a more effective and relevant force. This process will be historic. The soldier of the future will likely train, equip, and deploy in a manner much different than that of today, perhaps in ways unrecognizable to those of us now serving. One fact will remain constant: tomorrow’s soldiers must be as committed, tough, and proud as their predecessors. Years from now soldiers will look back and realize that although this transformation was hard, demanding, and difficult, it was worth every step.

Major Raul Escribano is currently with the Brigade Coordination Cell (BCC), C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) Element, Task Force for Transformation, with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Lewis. He received a Regular Army commission in Military Intelligence through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) as a Distinguished Military Graduate. MAJ Escribano’s past assignments include Battalion S2, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 8th Infantry Division (ID), Republic of Germany. Assigned to 1st ID at Fort Riley, Kansas, he served as a G2 Operations Officer during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, then Brigade S2 with the 2d Brigade, and Commander, Alpha Company, 101st MI Battalion. He served as the Deputy Chief, Central America Branch, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); Aide de Camp for the Deputy CINC, USSOUTHCOM, Panama; Chief for Intelligence Operations in support of the Drug Enforcement Agency with the U.S. Embassy Country Team in Lima, Peru; Joint Task Force (JTF) Operations Officer, I Corps; and most recently, Executive Officer, 502d MI Battalion, I Corps. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from the University of Puerto Rico and a Master of Administration degree from Central Michigan University. MAJ Escribano completed the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Readers can contact Major Raul Escribano via E-mail at escribanor@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (253) 966-3735 and DSN 347-3735.

Major Phil Logan, Active Guard and Reserve, is an Armor officer currently serving with the TRADOC BCC at Fort Lewis. His most recent assignment was as Team Leader for an Information Operations Field Support Team (FST) whose participation in the December 1999 25th ID (L) Warfighter Exercise “Tropic Lightning” marked the first operational deployment of an RC FST. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Journalism and received a commission as an Air Defense Artillery Second Lieutenant through the ROTC program at Marquette University, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Following assignments as a Vulcan and Stinger Platoon Leader, Battery Executive Officer, Battalion S3 Air, HAWK Battalion Tactical Missile Director, Brigade S3 Plans Officer, and Battalion S4, MAJ Logan commanded D Company, 1st Battalion, 303d Armor. He has served as the Military Counterdrug Liaison Officer to the Washington State Patrol, and commanded the 122d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Peacekeeping Mission in the former Yugoslavia, and in civil disturbances at Washington State University, the Makah Indian Reservation, and the Seattle World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference. MAJ Logan is a graduate of the Command and General Staff Officer Course, the Defense Information School, Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), the Armor Officer Advanced Course, and the Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic Course. He attended the Graduate School of Communications at the University of Washington where he earned a second bachelor’s degree in International Studies (Eastern Europe) and a Master of Arts degree in Communications; he is currently on sabbatical from their Ph.D. program in the School of Communications. Readers can reach MAJ Logan via E-mail at loganp@lewis.army.mil and by telephone at (253) 966-4187 and DSN 347-4187.

Notice to MICA Members

To improve our service to our readers, the MIPB office is taking over servicing of MI Corps Association members’ subscriptions effective with this issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Please notify us directly if your address changes or if you have any problem with receipt of your MIPB. You may subscribe to MIPB through MICA with a new membership or renewal, directly with us, or through the U.S. Superintendent of Documents. You may contact us about your subscription via E-mail at cruz.martinez@hua.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015. You can also reach us through our Internet website at http://usaic-huachuca.army.mil/mipb/mipbhome/welcome.htm.
Transformation, A Time of Change

by Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

The Army Transformation

Recently, we have heard much about transformation. Our Army is transforming, so too are the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and other major commands (MACOMs). Even our own Intelligence Center is transforming. The reason is simple: we must shed the “Cold War” mentality and ways of doing business in favor of those of a transformed force capable of putting a combat force anywhere in the world within 96 hours after liftoff. Although we have that capability now with our light forces, we must give our forces the lethality of our heavy units. As technology permits, we must reduce the separation between heavy and light forces. Recent history has shown us that in today’s environment, a contingency can quickly escalate from a humanitarian or peacekeeping effort to conflict within a matter of hours.

In the 20th century, we defined weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as nuclear, biological, and chemical—they were a powerful and enormous threat. However, building nuclear weapons require access to both rare and often unavailable raw and highly protected materials. Biological and chemical weapons programs tend to require large-scale activities. In addition, 21st century technologies are so powerful that they can generate whole new classes of abuses and accidents. Most dangerously, for the first time, these abuses are within the reach of individuals or small groups.

The Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) must be capable of conducting a full range of missions, from stability and support operations to combat. They must generate momentum for a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. We can no longer afford to take six months to get soldiers and equipment in place as we did in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The seven tenets of the objective force are responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable—this is what our force must become in order to remain deliberate and dominant.

We must find new and improved ways to educate and train our soldiers. The accelerated change of today’s environment is rapidly transforming the traditional methods. Traditional training methods are now giving way to digital, distributed, and virtual methods linked through networks and technology, reaching across time, space, cultures, and organizational boundaries.

At a recent conference, our Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, clearly stated the reason for our transformation. “The Army can do lots of things, but there is one thing it must do and that is defend this nation without fail.”

An Individual Transformation

As with the Army and its organizations, there comes a time when we as individuals must undergo some transformations as well. I will depart in January and will retire from active duty on 30 April 2001. My wife and I have enjoyed a career spanning more than 30 years. We have seen the world and its people, lived in war and peace, and shared good and bad experiences with the many soldiers and their families whom we have known. I have lived the life of a soldier and have been led and trained by great officers and NCOs. Their images and examples have served as both a driving force and inspiration throughout my career. Their tough, demanding, up-front leadership styles have influenced my life and love for the Army and its soldiers.

I have had the opportunity to lead and mentor some of the greatest NCOs that have served and will continue to serve our country. I have seen them grow and excel through their own efforts. I am as proud of them as if they were my own sons and daughters. As a Corps, the NCOs have never let me down. To each, I owe a personal debt.

I have led great soldiers. These soldiers have provided the real reason for my career. I have seen them excel, fail, and bounce back with an inconceivable will to win. I have experienced the closeness between leaders and soldiers, and the loss of fine soldiers—something I will never forget. To every soldier, I owe a personal debt.

I thank all of you for the tremendous support, mentorship, and friendship you have provided during the last three years, and urge you to give CSM Lawrence Haubrich the same assistance you have given me. I will never forget my time here at Fort Huachuca, and your support, which has meant a lot and made my job much easier.

As I leave the active Army, I want to express my personal appreciation for a great career. My thanks too, to my leaders for their confidence, direction, and support, and to my fellow NCOs for their performance, trust, and unique ability to guard my backside every time it was unprotected. To all of these, I dedicate my career.

Scott C. Chunn has successfully served as a soldier from 9 April 1971 to 30 April 2001. Readers can contact him via E-mail at scott.chunn@hua.army.mil.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!
MI Systems Transformation

by Michael W. Powell

The fast-paced Army transformation is creating challenges throughout the force—challenging our resources, time, soldiers, and our minds. It is also creating opportunities, revolutionary opportunities in the materiel acquisition and experimentation processes, which we have not experienced for decades.

The History—Changing the Way We Fight

The transformation process is not just limited to the more visible Interim Brigade and Interim Division initiatives that we are wrestling with day to day. It marks a fundamental change in our approach to the way we fight, and has a ripple effect through how we support and interface with joint forces, Army and service component commands, Reserve Component units, and the rest of the legacy Army forces. Why is this so? To understand the “why,” one must understand “what” transformation is about. At the heart of transformation are three essential themes: how and why we enter conflicts, the relevance of the data, and the criticality of integration and interoperability.

The paradigm of how and why we enter armed conflict has changed. We now recognize small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and stability and support operations not only as types of conflict, but as likely precursors to a major regional conflict. Our forces must enter a regional contingency lighter, faster, and with a smaller forward “footprint,” but with sufficient lethality to rapidly respond to a change in hostility without waiting for the arrival of the “main body.” This is the essence of the I-Brigade and I-Division initiatives. Understandably, new capabilities for SSCs and stability and support operations are receiving the priority of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army (DA), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and congressional requirements and funding mechanisms.

The relevance of data to the commander is paramount. Increased speed and space of maneuver have combined to create an environment in which commanders must see farther and think faster, with ever-increasing precision required as well. Technology has added to this challenge by providing a wealth of available information—some relevant, some not. It is our responsibility to streamline this information into relevant subjects and forms, so the commander can understand the battlespace from many dimensions.

Integration and interoperability are critical. Stand-alone capabilities translate to more “boxes,” people, and money—luxuries of resources and redundancy that we can no longer afford. Moreover, the need for integration and interoperability goes beyond just the MI force, drawing under one umbrella the entire intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. The power of integration and interoperability translates not only into a more flexible, responsive, and comprehensive intelligence capability, but also better use of the billion dollar investment in ISR as a whole, rather than major improvements in any one stand-alone or “stovepipe” capability.

MI Started “Transforming” Long Ago

Fortunately for MI, the “seeds” of our transformation process began years ago. The intelligence community realized that no one echelon or system can do it alone. Because MI is now inextricably linked from tactical through national levels and its orientation is becoming more joint and multiple component (multi-COMPO), it is imperative that we continue and intensify this “change” in all aspects of our MI force. All the above points that hold true for the Army transformation of today have been at the heart of change within our Corps since the 1991 MI Relook. Through the inception of such concepts as battlefield visualization, and through initiatives associated with the Intel XXI and Division Advanced Warfighting Experiments, good ideas have continued to evolve from experimentation in field units and in the labs. We have gone from good ideas to initial systems in the hands of soldiers in months, as opposed to the years it used to take.

MI has powerfully demonstrated its proven ability to—

- Share data, both horizontally and vertically.
- Scale capabilities from initial entry to full operations.
- Surge rapidly using all cross-echelon capabilities.
- Introduce and integrate new processing and collection means.
- Press the operational application of new technology while at the same time maintaining the relevance of data as well as thought and assessments to the commander.

Break any part of this aggregate and we greatly harm the future of MI, the commander’s understanding of the battlespace, and the success of future Army operations.

The Challenges

Idea competition. The transformation process has also stimulated
a new breed of ISR development competition among several branches of the Army. Recognizing the ability to see and understand the battlespace as a crucial operational multiplier, a ground swell of ISR ideas, experiments, and proposed organizational change have crept into all portions of the Army and joint thought processes. To cope and compete with these “good ideas” means that the MI systems-acquisition process must adopt a “business-like” model—or fail.

Maintaining relevance. Moore’s law suggests that reliance on the materiel acquisition process of old will not keep MI relevant to the commander of the future, because the acquisition and testing processes cannot keep pace with ever-changing technology. Moreover, because changes in technology drive doctrinal changes, the definition of “relevance” is constantly changing as well. Evidence of this can be seen in links to the Future Combat System, our ability to field an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), joint interoperability at the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) level, and ISR visualization.

The human factor. As we mature from stand-alone systems to a fully integrated and interoperable architecture, we must also redefine the skills and abilities required of our soldiers. While we will continue to need people skilled in specific disciplines, the number of these “specialists” needed will decrease as reach-back and collaboration permit centralization of analysis functions. The requirements for the “generalists”—those with the talent to assimilate and compile information and present it to the commander for a relevant, multidimensional understanding of the battlespace—are still undergoing definition, and we further redefine them with every new “good idea.” As unwieldy as our old materiel acquisition system is, the process of accessing, training, and providing intelligence soldiers to the field with the required skills to resource a transformed MI Corps may present an even greater challenge.

The Opportunities

Though painful at times, the pace of experimentation and change must continue, because the transformation process opens the door for revolutionary opportunities. Operational change has afforded us the chance to introduce ideas that have germinated at the field level, and are now undergoing integration not only into MI, but also throughout the force.

New Ideas So Far

The new ideas under consideration include additional abilities in ISR integration, a fully compatible MI sensor family, a combined intelligence architecture for better information flow, and a reduced forward footprint. We are also working on increasing equipment flexibility.

- **Sensors.** The movement is toward a fully compatible family of MI sensors that extends from ground (via microsensors, robotics, and larger wheeled vehicles), to air (both manned and unmanned), to space. In addition, there is a rebalancing taking place with our collectors, with more emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

- **Processing.** Development of a federated architecture linked cross-echelon will build on the power of an intelligence discipline. At the same time, this frees up data for more users, including cross-discipline and cross-branch users, and provides access down to maneuver battalion and company levels.
All Source Analysis System

- Army interoperability with the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)
- Joint interoperability with the Global Command and Control System 13 (GCCS-I3)
- ASAS-Light in a Windows® NT configuration for battalion operations
- MASINT workstation for INSCOM S&T applications
- CHATS and CHIMS...for the first time, we have applied technology to the HUMINT problem set

Common Ground Station (CGS)

- Combat aviation linkages (surveillance and reconnaissance integration)
- Imagery workstation to brigade (separate workstation, but joined with geospatial data from the Engineers)
- UAV TCS integration with CGS (multi-function box and reduced footprint)
- Graphic interface with ASAS

Pre-Processors

- Development of an S&IP architecture has quickly evolved into the DCGS-A architecture and migration path
- TES-Forward is a major success (will be integrated down to divisions and I-brigades)

Air

- Acquisition decision for UAV for maneuver brigade (Shadow 200)
- Sensor payload identification beyond EO/IR
- Family of UAV requirements from micros to a GS system
- TDL/TCDL commitment by Army to tactical units
- QUICKFIX capabilities directed by DA to go to UAV
- GRCS and ARL migration to ACS (impacts current GRCS and ARL improvements)

Ground

- Prophet-Ground on accelerated fielding, with associated legacy systems de-fielding
- Migration of Prophet-Ground to a multi-function, MASINT and SIGINT collection platform that integrates ground surveillance capabilities
- QRC integration into doctrine and budget
- CART fielding to units at the theater level (complimentary with tactical SIGINT)

Experimentation

- JISR ACTD to get at joint interoperability and visualization capabilities
- HUMINT ACTD to finally provide CI, interrogation, LRS, and SOF with some of the new collection, processing, and communications means available
- Microsensor and robotics experimentation
- Collection management and visualization tools given the demise of JCMT (we cannot wait to field a “good enough” capability to Army units)

Note: See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms.

Figure 1. Demonstrated and Planned Advances Due to Implementing New Ideas.
Reduced Forward Footprint. Achieving this goal mandates smaller systems, initial entry flexibility—translating to fewer single- and more multi-function boxes—and increased emphasis on reach-back and collaboration.

Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) and Special-Purpose-Built Systems would provide the ability to change rapidly to add sensor and processing capability to a deploying force based on survey of the operational region.

How The Ideas Have Grown Into Specific Changes

The true value of good ideas is only apparent when they become actual good capabilities. The best way to demonstrate the far-reaching effects of the current change is to examine them system by system. So along the lines of “sure, it looks good, but how does it run?”, Figure 1 shows some of the good ideas we have actually “test-driven.”

The Bottom Line

It must fit. As you can see, there is a tremendous amount of change taking place within the MI Corps—change we worked with agencies, joint elements, DA, TRADOC, and many field units. Gone are the days when we could develop a single capability without considering how it fits, how it interacts, how it communicates. We cannot risk fielding a capability that cannot operate within the larger joint architecture.

We cannot work alone because there is no single location for idea development or implementation. For MI to achieve true success in the future, it requires a federated approach toward ideas, people, and dollars. We are moving down a path that truly gives the Army of tomorrow a battlespace understanding of the adversary never before seen within the armed forces.

It is more than just the “thing.” The challenge will be in developing and maintaining a “One Vector, One Team, One Voice” approach when dealing with other than MI personnel. Without a unified approach, we tend to be “divided and conquered.” Unfortunately, when assessing a new idea, it is not as simple as looking at the added functionality of the “thing.” We must balance—

1. Requirements. Do we have it formally documented? Without this documentation, there is no authorization to spend dollars outside of the QRC lane.
2. Personnel resourcing issues. What are the military occupational specialties (MOSs), training complexities, recruiting and retention challenges, and—with today’s zero-growth force—who are the bill payers?
3. Architecture. Have we ensured both horizontal and vertical interoperability and integration, now and in the future?
4. Hand off. For the greater good of all MI units, what is the decision point to hand off experiments’ results to the larger acquisition process?

Any time we take our “eyes off the ball” on one or more of these points, I guarantee we will end up paying the price several years down the road. It would be easier to just “develop” ideas, without consideration for the critical second- and third-order effects. What is easier now, however, is not necessarily better in the future. If we fail to take any of these issues into account as we develop the objective MI force, we could end up with a different MI Corps capability entirely, one that may not be relevant to the rest of the force.

We are in exciting though sometimes frustrating times! Keep up the good work.

Endnote

1. Gordon Moore, cofounder of Intel Corporation, first noticed in 1965 that the number of transistors which can fit on a manufacturer’s die doubles approximately every year, effectively doubling processing speed.

Mike Powell serves as the Deputy for Futures at the home of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps, located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He oversees and integrates the actions of three critical activities: the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), the Battle Command Battle Lab–Huachuca, and the four TRADOC Systems Managers (TSMs). DCD has responsibility for the conceptual, organizational, and systems ideas for the future of MI, and for how MI interoperates at the Service, joint, and coalition levels. The Battle Command Battle Lab–Huachuca, which is the focal point for all MI technology insertion and experimentation, is also an important component of Futures. Finally, but perhaps most significant to commanders in the field, are the four TSMs charged with developing new equipment and fielding it to our soldiers. Recent changes within the MI Corps have broadened each of these activities to encompass the total MI Corps, both Active and Reserve Components (RC), through all echelons—tactical, operational, and strategic. Mr. Powell has been on the leading edge of creating change within the MI Corps. He has been a part of every major MI restructure in the last 15 years and has set the stage for future systems’ development. A few of his accomplishments include ISR integration and visualization, processor interoperability, Joint Analysis Center–Molesworth, tactical HUMINT enhancements, and development of realistic ISR simulations. Mr. Powell’s combined military and civilian federal service began 28 years ago as an intelligence analyst with the RC special forces and light forces. Mr. Powell entered the ranks of the Senior Executive Service in March 1999; he is one of six SES employees within the Intelligence Community and the only one in the western United States. He is a graduate of Arizona State University and the University of Phoenix, specializing in Business and Marketing. Readers may contact Mr. Powell via E-mail at michael.powell@hua.army.mil.
by Colonel Charles Atkins

We are well into implementing the “Army 2010” vision and achieving related transformation objectives. Army Intelligence transformation efforts are synchronized and essential to achieving the Army’s vision of “Soldiers on point for the Nation, transforming the most respected army in the world into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations.”

As the Intelligence Community transforms, we are experiencing changes that go beyond patterns, models, systems, and technologies. Concurrent with these changes, we are witnessing a fundamental examination of what underlies and actuates the character of who we are as intelligence professionals. We—the entire Intelligence Community—are transforming the “intelligence ethos.”

At first glance, this might sound hollow, but there is real substance to this change. The most recent doctrine in FM 3-0 (formerly FM 100-5), Operations, now recognizes information (this includes intelligence) as an element of combat power. The struggle for information superiority is now an enabling part of our operational paradigm. Furthermore, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is an interdependent contributor to achieving information superiority. Together, these changes further elevate the importance of intelligence and provide a significant challenge for intelligence professionals.

**The Human Dimension**

We are all familiar with the changes occurring in the nature of the threats to our operations. Our potential opponents will improve their military capabilities and tactics based on lessons learned as a result of observing U.S. military operations. They will use or threaten to use biotechnology, microelectronics, and information technologies to gain an advantage, “flank” our advanced systems, and negate our overmatch. The advantage we currently enjoy in information technology will decrease in the future because of cheaper and faster improvements in commercial technologies that cause information equality rather than superiority.
Widespread access to information and communications will characterize the global information environment—a truly transparent architecture. This will continue the trend toward the ability to know what is occurring around the world almost simultaneously. The combination of commercial availability and decreased cost of off-the-shelf reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) assets, including space-based systems, will allow potential opponents to maintain a robust ISR capability without the associated investment in research and development.

If this assessment of our future is accurate, how do we dominate the threat in full-spectrum operations? The answer lies in not only grappling with future technologies but also making a proportionate investment in our most valuable assets—our soldiers, civilians, and contractor personnel.

The Army has already recognized the need for changes in our operational paradigm and “warrior ethos” as acknowledged by the current transformation effort and as captured in the new doctrine in FM 3-0. Our ability to gain and to maintain intelligence overmatch in the expanding “Red zone” and at tactical and operational deep zones in any conflict underpins our operational overmatch. For us to meet this “tall order,” we can no longer see ourselves as simply supporters of combat operations; we must see ourselves rather as integrated members of the battle command team at every echelon. This role requires renewed self-awareness and preparedness.

**Our Evolving Ethos**

To achieve the desired end-state, we must look at ourselves in a new light and, at the same time, we should present ourselves in a new way. Several critical ideas for achieving this end-state should include—

- Mentally and doctrinally codifying intelligence as an integral part of all operations. This is especially important within the complex environments that have been present in recent operations. The basis of this change is successfully assessing and planning the future across the broad scope of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) to become truly integrated. This concept marks a subtle yet significant departure from the idea of “intelligence support” and intelligence as a combat support branch. We must thoroughly integrate intelligence with battle command in all aspects, at all echelons, in every instance.
- Clearly articulating (repeatedly, if necessary) the concept that the human dimension, to include continuous learning and career development, is the essential component of our branch. This idea should form the basis for our most fundamental value—investing in our professionals.
- Reinventing ourselves as adaptive analysts capable of successfully performing analysis against a threat using asymmetric means in a difficult and unique environment for which we may have never received any training. At the same time, we must integrate with and provide adequate intelligence for sophisticated information operations. In macro terms, we are the ultimate advocates for the threat (“Red” and “Gray”) and we must maintain a solid foundation of skills in order to succeed. We must be proficient and flexible enough to perform our core tasks (for example, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), situation development, and integration with targeting) to standard for any environment.
- Presenting intelligence and ISR integration as a part of every battlefield operating system (BOS) rather than just a part of the Intelligence BOS. In short, this means intelligence integrates Red- and Gray-focused assets within the battlespace.
- Integrating MI into decisive operations in the “Red zone” and enabling maneuver while out of contact.
- Changing our mindsets from depending on an “intelligence buildup” to performing intelligence readiness checks on a daily basis. This change will allow us to meet the requirements for strategic responsiveness through our preparations in garrison. Intelligence operations must become the norm in all intelligence units.

**The Beginning**

We have already started down the path to these changes through a number of different initiatives. During the development of the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), we have found some solutions that support a thorough integration of intelligence across the DTLOMS: new organizational designs, unique training, emerging doctrine, and new system combinations.
evolution required organizational changes to the structure of the IBCTs that have, in the past, separated intelligence from combined arms teams (reflecting intelligence support, not integration). This trend will continue as the Army migrates toward Objective Force 2010. The thorough integration of intelligence will certainly extend to the transformation of our divisions and corps.

The IBCT reflects several of the major changes to our patterns of thought—

- **Organic Support.** Unlike other units in the past, the MI Company is organic to the brigade rather than being in direct support of it. This organizational difference will truly integrate the MI company and will dedicate it to meeting the brigade’s requirements. The IBCT commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) drive all MI company operations. The MI company provides an ISR analysis and ISR integration capability to the IBCT S2 as well as executing tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.

- **ISR Integration.** There are both an ISR analysis platoon and ISR integration platoon to help the brigade S2 integrate, analyze, and plan ISR operations.

- **R&S Integration.** R&S in the IBCT does not mirror MI, cavalry, or scout organizations of the past. The Surveillance Troop and Reconnaissance Troops organic to the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron consist of an integrated mix of what previously were intelligence soldiers and systems and other R&S soldiers and systems. The surveillance troop is composed of the Aerial Reconnaissance Platoon, a Ground Sensor Platoon, and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Platoon. The integration extends to the unique teaming of collection systems—Prophet and ground surveillance systems—within the ground sensor platoon.

- **HUMINT Integration.** The integration of all HUMINT collection and counterintelligence (CI) operations in the area of responsibility (AOR) forms a good model for all future ISR operations. In order to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize all HUMINT collection and CI operations, the IBCT’s organization reflects a new element—the S2X. This allows the IBCT to provide focus, technical support, and technical control for all HUMINT and CI activities when many other teams may be performing operations within the IBCT’s AOR.

- **Embedded Capability.** Each reconnaissance troop has organic tactical HUMINT collectors that perform a limited HUMINT collection role (just tactical questioning and limited document exploitation). Each tactical HUMINT collector is a full member of a reconnaissance team. This example best illustrates the mindset of total ISR integration.

- **Reach-Back Operations.** We predicated IBCT intelligence operations on the ability to conduct reach-back operations to access intelligence across all echelons in support of tactical requirements for longer-term planning and complex analysis. Collaborative analysis through reach-back operations is a core quality of the intelligence architecture.

**Conclusion**

In the future, the spirit that motivates intelligence professionals should closely match the mindset of the IBCT ISR soldiers—intelligence soldiers on watch, integrated as part of the combined-arms team, enabling full-spectrum dominance across the full range of potential military operations. We MI professionals must see ourselves as essential members of the battle command team at every echelon. Viewing ourselves through these lenses takes us beyond previous combat support concepts and guides us to a mental state of total integration.

Colonel Chuck Atkins received his commission through the Officer’s Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is currently the Director of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. His important staff assignments include Flight Operations Officer, C Company (Aerial Exploitation), Fort Bliss, Texas; Executive Officer, B Company, 501st MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation); Chief, Systems Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS); Chief, Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) Instruction Branch, USAICS; Staff Officer, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; Assistant G2, Technical Intelligence, III Corps; Assistant G2, Operations, III Corps; and Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Army—South. Colonel Atkins commanded Headquarters Company, 3d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, and the 15th MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), 504th MI Brigade. His military education includes the following courses: U.S. Army Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced, General Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Officer, Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer, and U.S. Army Rotary- and Fixed-Wing Aviation. He also attended the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. COL Atkins earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Management from Park College, Parksville, Missouri, and a Master of Public Administration degree from Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at charles.atkins@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-2413 or DSN 821-2415.
by Colonel Stephen J. Bond
and Captain Gregory H. Young

Based on the vision of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki, for transforming the Army, we are undergoing massive change. The envisioned transformation will increase the Army’s responsiveness and deployability while becoming more agile, lethal, versatile, survivable, and sustainable. To achieve this transformation, three thrusts chart the course:

- The “Legacy Force” sustains and capitalizes on the strengths of our current, but heavy forces.
- We will simultaneously develop an “Interim Force” capable of dominating the spectrum of operations from peacetime engagements to war. This force centers on the designated Initial and Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).
- Ultimately, leveraging science and technology will transform the entire Army into a more capable “Objective Force.”

The fundamental principles in achieving these capabilities are to create a full-spectrum force that overmatches threat capabilities and achieves information dominance, capitalizing on the strengths of our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Military Intelligence’s flagship system achieves information dominance, overmatches threat capabilities and creates a full-spectrum force that achieves these capabilities are to these systems. The Common Ground Station is an evolution of the Joint STARS Ground Station Module (GSM) (see Figure 1). Used in support of actual operations in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991, the Interim Ground Station Module (IGSM) received and displayed moving target indicators (MTIs) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery from the Joint STARS E-8 aircraft. This system greatly enhanced the warfighting capabilities of the corps commanders and, as a system, Joint STARS became a “hero” of the Gulf War. As the system matured, we downsized and improved the ground stations. The platform for the initial systems, IGSM and the improved Medium GSM (MGSM), was a five-ton truck. Trained and proven in Operations Joint ENDEAVOR I and II in support of our forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 and 1995, the MGSMs were again a success in Kosovo in 1999’s Operation ALLIED FORCE.

Today’s Common Ground Station (see Figure 2) is HMMWV- (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) mounted and C-130-deployable. The Joint Services Workstation is an easily transported, containerized, stand-alone CGS workstation. The JSWSs were used extensively to support the 1999 Kosovo operations; exceptionally proficient XVIIIth Airborne Corps imagery ground station operators (military occupational specialty (MOS) 96H) ran many of the JSWSs.

Aside from becoming smaller and more deployable, the capabilities of the ground stations have made quantum leaps over the past ten years in terms of computer processing capabilities and linkages with other sensors. The CGS and JSWS of today receive MTI and SAR im-
agery not only from Joint STARS, but also the U-2R and the Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL). They can also receive and display imagery and video from a variety of other aerial platforms including the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) family of other aircraft, APACHE Longbow, and other systems. Through the current, three-channel Commander’s Tactical Terminal (CTT) or the new eight-channel Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT), the capability to receive, overlay, and display the signals intelligence (SIGINT) picture from intelligence broadcasts is also available to the system.

Inputs from the various collection platforms are managed by the 96H operators, who assist the commanders and staff to visualize and direct the “now battle” from the system’s workstations or within the tactical operations centers (TOCs) via remote workstations. Operators from the CGS and JSWS also feed the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) database and provide the “now battle” picture to the intelligence operational picture. They also provide targeting information to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). This now-battle picture can be displayed in TOCs, sent as updates, and input into the ASAS database, and designated targets can be sent to the AFATDS.

Supporting Legacy Force
The Common Ground Station has received rave reviews from commanders at corps level down to maneuver brigades. CGS is a supporting piece of the digitized Army Battle Command System (ABCS) force architecture in the Advanced Warfighting Experiments and Force XXI testing. III Corps and the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (4ID (M)) have relied on it extensively during testing, experiments, and at the National Training Center. The 4ID (M) is a visionary contributor to CGS tactics, techniques, and procedures, recently demonstrating APACHE Longbow’s ability to receive digital MTI updates while on deep attack missions. The 2d Infantry Division and 501st MI Brigade in the Republic of Korea employ CGS with its linkage to ARL on a daily basis for monitoring North Korean vehicle traffic. In this theater, CGS has already proven its worth as a valuable contributor to the U.S. Forces Korea indications and warning mission.

The Common Ground Station is currently undergoing fielding predominantly to MI battalions and companies from echelons above corps (EAC) down to armored cav-

---

**Figure 2.** CGS obtains information from the ISR sensors and platforms shown above. It can also rapidly overlay and import MTI, SAR, and SIGINT products, as well as other imagery.
ally regiments (ACRs). At EAC, MI brigades employ the system in support of their missions, while at corps and division, MI battalions provide the CGS to support both headquarters and maneuver units. At corps, two systems support the corps headquarters and one each at the fire support element (FSE), artillery brigade(s), and the aviation brigade. At division, two systems support the division headquarters, and one each for the maneuver brigades and the aviation brigade. Each ACR will receive one system at the MI company; the U.S. Army National Guard enhanced separate brigades (eSBs) will each receive one. The JSWS fielding will be to the Regional Unified Commands, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) elements, special operations forces (SOF), simulations centers, and battle labs.

Supporting the Initial Brigade Combat Teams

The conceptual employment for the IBCT spans the spectrum from military operations other than war (MOOTW) through conventional war. Organic to each IBCT will be one CGS and a crew of six 96H operators assigned to its MI company. The crew of the first IBCT completed its training at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in August and moved to Fort Lewis, Washington, to begin their collective training. The second IBCT cohort is slated to begin its training in the summer of 2001.

In the uncertain environments in which the IBCTs will operate, innovative visualization, sensor cueing, and analysis will yield decisive results. Using the CGS MTI capability, operators, analysts, staffs, and commanders can review the locations, direction, routes, and speed of movers over time in their areas of interest. MTI support could potentially distinguish refugee convoys from hostile forces—based on their speed, direction, routes, and terrain covered. Sudden and unexplained changes in civilian traffic patterns might indicate curfews, gas rationing, or a perceived imminent threat to the civilian population. In this context, the MTI data is obviously not targetable but requires confirmation by other sensors and analysis. The MTIs, however, can spur and focus the collection management process and cue other collection assets, such as Tactical UAVs or SIGINT collectors. The functionality and relevance of the CGS extends far be-
Beyond receiving and exploiting Joint STARS, U-2R, or ARL MTIs. The flexibility to cue a UAV, based on near-real-time MTIs or SIGINT, fundamentally enhances intelligence potency and timeliness in meeting commanders’ information requirements and reducing uncertainty.

The Future—Support to the Objective Force

As the Army transforms to the Objective Force, technology will continue to improve and so will the capabilities of the CGS and JSWS. Linkages and connectivity with our current suite of sensor platforms will expand to more and newer ISR systems and to those of our coalition partners. Target recognition and tracking enhancements in the systems will also improve.

In the near term, an Imagery Workstation–Brigade (IWS-B) tethered to a CGS will support the IBCTs. The IWS-B will contain advanced imagery-exploitation software to facilitate timely imagery analysis. Two imagery analysts (MOS 96D) will exploit imagery routed through the CGS from Joint STARS, UAVs, APACHE gun cameras, handheld digital cameras, and national agencies. CGS and the imagery workstation afford the ground maneuver brigade commanders an unprecedented ability to visualize their battlefields.

Projected CGS upgrades beginning this year will dramatically improve CGS hardware, software, communications, and simulation capabilities. We will upgrade the server, expand system memory, and add imagery exploitation software and information security software. In light of the still relatively small number of E-8C aircraft, the added simulation software and connectivity will expand training opportunities, even without live Joint STARS flights.

The increasingly close ties between the CGS and the Tactical UAV heralds unprecedented synergy, operational economy, and efficiencies. While we will continue to link CGS and the TUAV Ground Control Station in the near term, the long-term vision is to minimize the system’s collective footprint. By adding a UAV workstation to the CGS, UAV operators (MOS 96U) may work directly through a CGS, executing all required UAV-related tasks, except takeoffs and landings.

Looking beyond the next five to ten years, technology will improve, system components will become smaller, and the hardware and software will become more capable. Consequently, the processing capabilities and linkages of today’s CGS and JSWS will remain the now-battle link for combat elements to visualize the battlefield. This capability will migrate into a future system called the distributed Common Ground System—Army, proliferate below brigade level to battalion, company, platoon, and even to individual aircraft, combat vehicles, and soldiers on the battlefield.

Conclusion

The evolution of the Joint STARS ground stations into our current CGS and JSWS systems were ideas ahead of their time that easily support the Army Transformation initiative. The systems currently fielded are providing the picture of the now battle to our common operational picture with feeds from aerial and space-based sensors. They provide the view from the “high ground” and will ensure overmatching information dominance for the Legacy and Interim Forces. The requirements embedded in the current systems will endure. The Objective Force must have a decisive advantage of systems providing information dominance, thus enabling it to be more responsive, deployable, agile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.

Endnote

1. See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms used in this article.

Colonel Steve Bond recently assumed duties as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Manager for Joint STARS, the Common Ground Station, and the Joint Tactical Terminal. He has held significant MI command and staff positions in organizations from tactical through national levels. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and holds a Master of Arts degree in History from the University of Kansas. Readers can reach him via E-mail at bonds@hua.army.mil.

Captain Greg Young has extensive experience with the Joint STARS CGS. He is a recent MI Officer Advanced Course graduate and holds a Master of Arts degree in International Politics from the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently assigned to the 501st MI Brigade in Korea.
by Brigadier General Richard J. Quirk, III

The intelligence soldier of tomorrow will require a professional education; our traditional military training will not be sufficient. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) has begun to develop a career-long educational program that will produce the intelligence professionals that our nation will require. In the end, all MI leaders will have to execute that program for it to work.

Evolving Personnel Requirement

We have all seen the requirement emerge over the past years. The cries for men and women who can master large quantities of information and extract its meaning have increased with the loss of an easily templated opponent in the Soviet Bloc. During the same period, we have begun demanding a deeper technological understanding by our force (see Figure 1), because of the great variety of continuously changing hardware and software systems in use across the MI community.

With the advent of the information revolution, our electronic systems have gained enormous flexibility and potential for performance. All of this emerging potential in our systems has shown us again that our human capital—our soldiers and civilians—is the independent variable in future operations. They will employ our system of systems in unexpected and unbelievably productive ways, or they will fail to exploit the great potential of our systems and units. Antoine Henri Jomini once wrote that generals create the “Art of War” by the ways in which they build “combinations” from the tools and possibilities before them.1 In our future, there will be artists at many levels, making “art” by the combinations they put together in a collaborative way on the digital systems they operate.

Educating MI Soldiers

To make these soldiers the artists of systems, the artists of information, and most importantly, the masters of the Intelligence Art, we must educate them. Task-based training will no longer suffice.

With the dissolution of the single Soviet competitor, we have lost for a time the value of expertise on a given target or threat. In its place has emerged great value in the kinds of broader expertise that lead to versatility. This expertise, this breadth and depth to cover whatever emerges in the world, can come only from education.

We at USAIC are becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the idea that any critical task list for any military occupational specialty (MOS) can do justice to the magnitude of responsibilities that our soldiers will face in jobs that range from national to mud in their scopes. The professional education program that MI soldiers and civilians will require must be a continuous, career-long effort. The seemingly magical ability of the World War II officer corps to mobilize our industry so quickly and rejuvenate our Army was due in part to the professional educational programs of the 1930s. Today’s high tech, fast-moving world requires an all-Army effort, with even more rigor than did that previous inter-war experience. Each professional must take on his or her own education as a personal responsibility. However, the education of our MI professionals has become too important in the information age to leave to the individual, so we must unite Service-sponsored educational efforts with other education.

### Training the MI Force for the Future

Figure 1. The Expertise Required of MI Leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before 1990</th>
<th>Tomorrow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Bloc</td>
<td>Wide Range, Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plains of Western Europe</td>
<td>World Wide, all Varieties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB on Known Threat</td>
<td>Information Superiority over Unfamiliar Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional/Nuclear War</td>
<td>SASO, SSC, MTW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion/Brigade</td>
<td>Tactical/Joint/National/Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Tactical</td>
<td>Tactical/Joint/National/Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion S2 Staff</td>
<td>S2/ACE/JIC/Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Tactical/Operational/Strategic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms.
Managing Education

USAIC is laying a foundation for managing and contributing to the professional education of MI soldiers and civilians. The first challenge we have faced is that our classical methods of systems-engineering our training and our old instructional techniques might not apply well to the education program. We are studying other management models at present.

In the interest of developing higher cognitive levels and more flexibility in our graduates, we have already replaced our old, task-based instructional methodologies with a Constructivist approach. This approach teaches by placing the students in realistic situations and allowing them to learn by doing, with minimal intervention.

We are functionally redesigning our MOSs, and integrating educational experiences throughout careers to build breadth as well as depth in MI soldiers. In fact, we are inserting a civilian education path into each of these studies that enable noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to earn bachelor of arts or science degrees by their attendance at the Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) and a masters degree for those in designated positions. We very likely will specify certain degrees as meriting rewards. We have begun a pilot program which grants an associates degree to our 97B (Counterintelligence Agent) advanced individual training (AIT) graduates by the addition of a few low-cost, distance-learning college courses. Eventually, all of our AIT students will be eligible to obtain associates degrees in a similar way.

In order to recognize the need for change and to make that change quickly, USAIC is instituting an extensive system of field surveys and other assessment devices, tied to our customer base. These automated devices will, we believe, help us to discover opportunities ahead and to implement them quickly.

Training Tools

We are building web-based tools to provide more knowledge and skills to our soldiers regardless of their locations. Among those initiatives is “object-oriented doctrine,” which modularizes our doctrinal material, places it on the web, and connects it to standing operating procedures (SOPs); tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); lessons learned; and random ideas. This allows the soldiers to gain all germane information and skills, as they are required during an operation. This “chunky doctrine” will also serve as a nucleus for idea sharing on intelligence. From this nucleus will grow an extensive distance-learning infrastructure and many other tools for moving information and knowledge to those who need it.

We are also transforming the Intelligence Center, rapidly changing most of our courses from manual to digital conditions. The students will become fully familiar with the digital tactical operations center (TOC) and Intelligence Center and all of their electronic systems by training in mockups from the battalion to joint levels. They will gain sophisticated insights that will enable them to perform their work on any system they may find in the field. Leaders will learn how to integrate the systems at hand and how to adapt those systems to accomplish their tasks, often in new and different ways. We have more than 30 “plug and play” classrooms at the Intelligence Center now, allowing us to configure our classroom computers to serve as tactical systems or operations centers. You can read more about “the digitization of USAIC” in the article by Colonel Gary Parrish that follows.

More Cradle-to-Grave Evolution

We are reprogramming our NCO and warrant officer professional development courses to educate their students more broadly and more deeply as well. We may very well “track” our MOS technical training for some MOSs to other training or educational institutions that provide world-class instruction in the appropriate fields.

Perhaps the evolution of the Warrant Officer Corps will be most ex-
citing. Our MI warrant officer “cradle to grave” study, which delves deeply into the unique role of the MI warrant officers of the future, highlights the need for significant educational preparation if the warrant officer corps is to provide added value as the technicians of the future.

Editor’s Note: For more information on the cradle-to-grave assessments of Intelligence Center functional training, please see our July-September 1998 issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Intelligence Training XXI—Ready Now, and especially the philosophy and process article by Colonel George K. Gramer, Jr. You can find it on the Internet at http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/MIPB/mipbhome/welcome.htm.

Achieving the Goal

So, our internal courses are taking on an educational quality, and we are threading other forms of education into the careers of our soldiers. We are transforming USAIC in order to build an MI corps that can make its contribution to information superiority anywhere in the world, under any conditions. All MI leaders must support this move to increased education. Commanders should encourage, even demand, professional education and self-directed study programs. We will all have to lead by example, challenging ourselves and each other to rise to the intellectual and technological challenges of our business through study and discussion.

Endnotes


2. This “just in time” training may be available on-line, through software tutorials, or on-line through mentors.

Brigadier General (P) Richard J. Quirk, III, a native of Boston, Massachusetts, was commissioned into the U.S. Army’s Military Intelligence branch. Now the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Arizona, BG Quirk has served in numerous tactical and strategic assignments. He has participated in campaigns in the Republic of Vietnam, Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. He commanded the 511th MI Battalion, and the 525th MI Brigade, and served as S2, G2, and J2 in Berlin Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, and U.S. Southern Command. Readers may contact BG Quirk via E-mail at richard.quirk@hua.army.mil or telephonically at (520) 533-1141 or DSN 821-1141.
Moving to a Digitized Center of Excellence

by Colonel Gary L. Parrish

In order to achieve information superiority, the Army’s first modernization goal is to digitize the force.

—United States Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2000

Achieving information superiority underpins the intelligence community’s ability to share intelligence information and enables U.S. forces to undercut the enemy’s decision cycle while protecting our own. In keeping with the guidance of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Training Centers (not units in the field) must drive transformation of the force. Since intelligence is the cornerstone of information superiority, the U. S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) must be the institution that leads the Army in this transformation process. Collaborative and distributive intelligence collection, analysis, and presentation—executed digitally to develop an accurate common operational picture (COP) of the threat—are critical for the success of the other digital battlefield operating systems (BOSs).

Our emphasis in this transformation process is to change the conditions of the training conducted by the Intelligence Center, but not the standards or tasks.

To ensure our intelligence professionals are prepared to meet the challenges of the more complex environment of the future digital battlefield, we must begin to change the training philosophy and environment here at the Intelligence Center. To accomplish this, we need to begin immediately to transform the institution into one that builds MI soldiers and leaders who can perform and manage in a networked, digital, system-of-systems operational environment. Students graduating from the Intelligence Center’s courses must be prepared to operate in digital tactical operations centers (TOCs) from battalion to echelons-above-corps (EAC) levels and capable of adapting to the digital tools and intelligence automation in their units.

Phased Transformation of the Intelligence Center

The intent of the USAIC&FH Commanding General (CG), Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., is to rapidly phase in and integrate digital training into our courses of instruction, and transform the Intelligence Center into an automated center of excellence. The essential tasks during the initial phases of this transformation process are to—

- Transform the Center’s instructor base and teaching methodology.
- Upgrade the institution and facilities into a digital training and learning center capable of matriculating competent soldiers who are comfortable operating in a digitized environment.

Photographs courtesy of Gregorio O. Figueroa.

(Continued on page 37)
ARMY MI: OUT FROM

Training the IBCT-1 Cadre

1. Analysis Platoon soldiers in ASAS Reconnaissance Training. (Photo by Kenneth Pieper)
2. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Platoon soldiers during the capstone exercise Kazar Fury. (Photo by Kenneth Pieper)
3. White Cell officers during the Kazar Fury exercise. (Photo by Kenneth Pieper)
4. ISR Integration Platoon soldiers during the Kazar Fury exercise. (Photo by Kenneth Pieper)
5. 96U UAV pilot and mission payload operator during the Kazar Fury exercise. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
6. External Pilot (EP) controls for Hunter UAV. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
7. Hunter UAV in flight. (U.S. Army photo)
8. Flight-line crew preparing Hunter UAV for flight. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
9. Flight-line operations crew preparing Hunter UAV for flight. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
10. Ground Sensor Platoon soldier (96G) setting up the sensor equipment. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
11. Analysis Platoon soldier operating the TACAMO (Figueras). (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
12. Ground Sensor Platoon soldier (96G) setting up the sensor equipment. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
13. Ground Sensor Platoon soldier (96G) setting up the sensor equipment. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)
14. 96D ISR Integration Platoon soldier monitoring display system (AMDS). (Photo by Gregorio O.)
INT IN TRANSFORMATION

Remote Workstation (RWS) Block II

Intelligence (ISR) Integration
Command post exercise (CPX),

Kazan Fury CPX. (Photo by Kenneth

Kazan Fury. (Photo by Kenneth

operator in Ground Control Station.

UAV. (Photo by SPC Timothy J.

(UAV. (Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)

(UAV for takeoff at Black Tower

ISR) emplacing AN/PPS-5D. (Photo

RWS. (Photo by Gregorio O.

ISR) planning mission. (Photo by

6R) monitoring the Advanced

(Photo by SPC Timothy J. Belt)

controller monitors UAV Remote Video

. Figueroa)
Delivery of the Common Ground Station to IBCT-1 at Fort Lewis, Washington

1. The Common Ground Station enables MI soldiers to receive information from thousands of sources.
2. The Surveillance and Control Data Link (SCDL) antenna provides the CGS with a secure microwave capability.
3. Alan Sanchez, a contract employee, connects one of several radio systems in the CGS.
4. Alan Sanchez and John Cloud, employees of two contractor firms, install systems into the CGS.

Develop and provide “sustainment” training packages for our MI soldiers and leaders once they depart the Intelligence Center.

The Center’s transformation includes an immediate implementation of a new training methodology and instructor development program across the institution.

Our emphasis in this transformation process is to change the conditions of the training conducted by the Intelligence Center, but not the standards or tasks. The immediate goal was to begin converting to digital training, front-loaded in our curriculum, with the initial focus on changing the conditions of our Intelligence Analyst courses (military occupational specialty (MOS) 96B). To meet the CG’s intent, we initiated a four-phase operation in July of this year. The end-state of the Intelligence Center’s complete transformation is to have a digital center of excellence operational no later than January 2003.

The first phase of the transformation process (immediate action) started in July with changes in the way we taught some of the courses (conditions) within current resource constraints. The goal is to begin updating the blocks of instruction so that students will learn from the beginning of the course on the same intelligence systems and tools found at the units in the field. Wherever possible, we will automate all practical exercises (PEs) at the earliest opportunity, especially in our intelligence analyst and officer courses. The goal of this phase is immediate change in the analytical courses’ training methodology and conditions in the following courses.

- Apprentice intelligence analyst 96B10 course.
- Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) for 96B30.
- All-Source Intelligence Technician (MOS 350B) Warrant Officer Course.
- MI Officer Basic Course (MOBC).
- MI Captains Career Courses (MICCCs).
- Initial Brigade Combat Teams’ (IBCT) Cadre and Cohort training.

The second, currently ongoing phase of the Center’s transformation includes an immediate implementation of a new training methodology and instructor development program across the institution. The goal of this effort is to begin preparing and training digitally capable instructors and cadre immediately, to include changing the “mindset” of the instructor base. To accomplish this task, the Intelligence Center developed new training and certification courses before beginning training in the classroom.

The MI Corps established two 15-day All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) instructors’ certification courses and executed them to certify our instructors on the flagship system. Additionally, to build on the 15-day course, the October ASAS Master Analyst Course (AMAC) allocated more instructors’ slots.

Beginning in September, the Basic Instructor Training Course (BITC) will incorporate the use of automated “plug and play” classrooms. The BITC will completely revamp by January 2001, training instructors to build lessons, databases, and web pages using the plug-and-play classrooms. The instructor training and certification courses emphasize the digital resources fielded and training in the digital environment, and use a systems or network of systems approach. The staff and faculty will learn to build the databases and web pages needed to support their own blocks of instruction. The end-state of this phase is the transformation of the staff and faculty into...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current 96B30</th>
<th>Pilot (Jan 2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USASMA Common Core</td>
<td>USASMA Common Core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army OPS</td>
<td>RWS Instruction (Functions &amp; Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASO</td>
<td>(Integrated training with Info Engineering, ACE/ACT Configuration, Communications Architecture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>Intelligence Analyst Tasks on RWS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP CM &amp; TGT</td>
<td>(Brigade, Division, and TOC exercise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 days</td>
<td>12 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>9 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms.

Figure 1. Comparative Flows for 96B30 BNCOC.
a cadre of digitally-capable, certified instructors.

The subsequent phases of the plan will focus on completing the transformation of the Intelligence Center into a fully digitized training center of excellence. Near term conversion of blocks of instruction will be concurrent with the training development and implementation of other digitized courses during these latter phases. We will continue to change our other intelligence blocks of instruction, incorporating the digital classrooms and TOCs across the entire curriculum. As we upgrade facilities, we will integrate joint systems into exercises and build a model joint intelligence support element (JISE) configuration for this purpose. By January 2002, we envision completion of the course redesign for all courses taught by the Intelligence Center.

**Course Transformation**

**Intelligence Analyst (96B) Courses.** The immediate and most significant change in course design will occur in the 96B30 BNCOC taught by the Intelligence Center’s NCO Academy. The new 96B30 course, which begins in January 2001, will conduct nearly the entire program of instruction (POI) on the ASAS Remote Workstation (RWS) Block II system. This completely redesigned course will include 29 days of actual hands-on training with the RWS system, as compared to the three days of RWS training in the current 96B30 course (see Figure 1).

The NCO will “learn by doing” with each student encountering a series of dynamic, scenario-based training environments. The design of the scenarios will test the NCO’s ability to analyze and solve different problems using the military decision-making process (MDMP), intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the intelligence cycle, and the ASAS mission cycle. From the start, NCOs will learn and use information-engineering techniques and will doctrinally configure an ACE (analysis and control element) and an ACT (analysis and control team), to include the appropriate communications architectures. The last week of the course will test each NCO’s ability to produce relevant and timely intelligence products within a division ACE, brigade ACT, or battalion S2 section using the RWS Block II system.

Likewise, the 96B10 course is undergoing restructure to meet the needs of preparing apprentice-level analysts capable of operating in a digital environment. Although ASAS RWS instruction consists of two weeks of instruction, almost all of the automated instruction currently comes at the end of the course. By early next year, the 96B10 course will include at least 15 days of ASAS training in addition to full system integration into the course’s practical exercises. The goal is to incorporate ASAS training throughout the course, beginning with unclassified systems such as ASAS-Light and then transitioning training to ASAS RWS Block II later in the course.

**Commissioned Officers Courses.** MIOBC and MICCC course developers have already begun the transformation process of digitizing their courses of instruction. Currently, MIOBC trains three days on the ASAS-RWS and integrates...
the system into its six-day capstone, Brigade All-Source Intelligence Exercise (BASIX). The MI Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC) currently conducts 12 days of hands-on training on ASAS-RWS, ASAS-Single Source, and ASAS-All Source culminating in their employment on the course’s five-day ASAS Capstone Exercise. As a near-term “fix,” MIOBC classes will integrate ASAS-RWS Block II into the four-day Crisis-Action PE and the Brigade ACT PE. In the newly redesigned Career Course, the amount of practical exercise time using ASAS will double from that of the current course.

Since international officers attend both the MIOBC and MICCC, the development and integration of the ASAS-Light system into both blocks early next year will significantly increase the amount of automation training for all our officer students. In January 2001, the revamped MIOBC will conduct 48 days of systems training (RWS/ASAS-Light) in addition to another six days of training on system employment and intelligence architectures (see Figure 2). In February 2001, the Career Course will integrate ASAS-Light and Analyst Notebook3 in approximately 29 days of the POI before transitioning to RWS Block II for another 28 days during the latter phases of the course (see Figure 3).

**Facilities Transformation**

Key to changing the conditions in which we are to train the MI professionals of the 21st century is the transformation of the facilities in which the students will train. Focusing on 96B Intelligence Analyst training as the “center of gravity” for the near-term transformation efforts, Fort Huachuca’s Walker Hall will be the first Intelligence Center facility to undergo a major reengineering effort. With a completion date of 1 April 2001, we will transform Walker Hall into an RWS Block II collateral training complex, with eight plug-and-play classrooms and 20 modular, digitized “TOC” rooms.

The real centerpiece of our facilities upgrades will be the design and construction of these modular, digital “TOC” cells. The digital “TOC” cells and facilities will support Unclassified and Secret Collateral-level training and scenario-driven exercises for all intelligence courses taught at the Center. Initially, we will construct a brigade-size digital TOC facility that represents “what right looks like” to train our instructor base. As resources become available, we will build additional model TOCs to train our trainers and then students in how to set up and organize division and corps ACEs, to include the integration of the various multidiscipline feeds that build a COP. These feeds will include multiple “INTs” such as signals, human, and imagery intelligence (SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT, respectively). In the envisioned facilities, these model TOCs will eventually incorporate such capabilities as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFTADS), Common Ground Station (CGS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Ground Control Station (GCS), and the Maneuver Control System (MCS).

Under this same contract, the redesign of two large classrooms in Nicholson Hall will facilitate the use of 105 training systems configured with an ASAS-Light package. Primarily designed to handle the student load of the MICCCs, these facilities will also provide an automated, unclassified training environment for our Officer Transition Course (OTC) and the visiting international officers that we train. The modular configuration of these systems will allow the setup of the facilities in TOC fashion and their incorporation into a fully digitized Intelligence Support to Brigade Operations practical exercise during the MICCCs.

Rowe Hall remains one of the Center’s most automated and digitized training environments and its capabilities will expand during the initial phases of the transformation.
Over the next four months, we will upgrade two rooms to facilitate the building of a modular and fully digitized, model brigade TOC. During the initial phases, we will reconfigure several classrooms to permit hardware and software changes as we transition to training the students on the RWS Block II system.

Organizational Transformation

In order to enhance the Intelligence Center’s mission capabilities to accomplish the digitized training mission, it was imperative that we reconfigure to optimize and economize operations. Part of this reorganization was the activation of the 112th Military Intelligence Brigade (Provisional) on 28 July 2000. The activation of the 112th consolidated the 304th MI Battalion, 306th MI Battalion, B Company (MOBC) formerly of the 309th MI Battalion, and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy under one command.

This reorganization centralizes training responsibilities and optimizes operating efficiency by placing all MI officer, warrant officer, and senior NCO courses under one commander. In addition to focusing responsibility for all leader training and MI unit training support, the reorganization also consolidates the trainers for these courses with the doctrine writers and combat developers. The objective of this reorganization is to allow the commander to leverage and synchronize resources between the various courses and incorporate participation from all senior-level courses on externally sponsored training exercises with joint and Army headquarters.

The activation of the 112th MI Brigade (Provisional) reduces the redundancy of resources and follows the TRADOC model by consolidating leader training under one organization. The new, streamlined structure will allow us to train smarter, and will posture the U.S. Army’s Intelligence Center to meet our future training challenges.

The Future

This article highlights only some of the immediate and near-term changes we are making in the Intelligence Center as we begin to transform this institution into a digitized training center of excellence. The time to transform the Intelligence Center is now. To develop MI professionals that can contribute to the full spectrum of operations in the 21st century, we must modernize, convert, and transform the training institution immediately. We have a long way to go before this transformation process nears completion, but we feel confident that our institution is moving in the right direction. Remaining on a glide path to achieve the Intelligence Center’s strategic goals for the 2010-2015 timeframe will require close management of this transformation process.

As the Army continues evolving to the digitized force of 2010, MI must be out front of the transformation process. Change must begin first at the Intelligence Center if we are to continue to develop the intelligence soldiers and leaders who are capable of operating in the constantly changing strategic environments of the 21st century. We must build an MI force that is more capable and relevant to the Army, whether in stability and support operations or a major theater war (MTW). Implementing the Intelligence Center’s transformation strategy now will have far-reaching implications in the way our branch organizes, resources, equips, trains, and supports the force as it confronts future conflicts across the continuum of warfare. The challenges of the future are daunting, but we must begin today if we are to meet these challenges head-on. We have much to accomplish in the next few years, but our approach is sound and the way is clear.

Endnotes
1. The TAC (Teach, Advise, Counsel) block of instruction (Figure 2) sets aside time for the class TAC officer to impart knowledge, experience, and Army values to the lieutenants.
2. FAST (Figure 3) stands for Fundamentals of Analysis, Synthesis, and Threat.
3. The Analyst Notebook is a new link and pattern analysis tool.

Colonel Gary Parrish is currently Commander of the 112th MI Brigade (Provisional). In July 2001, he will take command of the 205th MI Brigade in Wiesbaden, Germany. He has served in a variety of intelligence command and staff positions during the past 22 years. In addition to commanding two MI companies, he commanded the 14th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB)) at Fort Lewis, Washington. His staff assignments included serving as an Infantry Battalion S2, Armor Brigade S2, 2d Armored Division; G2, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized); and Deputy I Corps G2. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, COL Parrish served as the Battalion S3 for the 511th MI Battalion (TEB), VII Corps. While the J2 Planner at U.S. Central Command, he deployed twice in support of military operations in Somalia, serving as a Joint Task Force J2 and later as the JISE Commander during Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE. He received his Bachelor of Business Administration degree from the University of North Florida and commission in the Infantry in March 1978. COL Parrish also holds a Master of Arts degree in Management from Webster University and a Master of Strategic Studies from the Air War College. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and Air War College. Readers can contact him via E-mail at gary.parrish@hua.army.mil or by telephone at (520) 533-2928 or DSN 821-2928.
by Major Patrick L. Daniel

Shortly after the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, made his historic speech to the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) convention in October 1999, individuals at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) began to wrestle with the task of training the MI soldiers assigned to the first Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT-1). Lieutenant Colonel Gus Greene led the intelligence organization and operation document development effort for the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD). The trainers picked up the concepts, hot off the press, and developed a plan to train the more than 200 MI soldiers of the IBCT.

Training Development

In February, we brought in a group of intelligence professionals from the field to assist in the development of IBCT training. The team leader was Major Jack Myers, the incoming Brigade S2 of the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (IBCT-1). The team consisted of human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and all-source sections. After several weeks of learning the organization and operation (O&O) concept as they developed the plan to train it, the individuals that comprised the team went their separate ways. The only training developers who stayed were the few individuals assigned to USAIC&FH. The initial plan that was left in their wake was a 15-week plan consisting of six weeks of cadre training for E-6s and above followed by nine weeks of cohort training for E-1s and above (see Figures 1 and 2). The concept was to train the cadre first and then use the cadre to train their soldiers during the initial cohort training. At the conclusion of the initial cohort training, the cadre and cohorts would participate in a capstone command post exercise (CPX) training event (Kazar Fury) and field training exercise (FTX) (Buffalo Soldier Challenge).

Personnel

Beginning in early January 2000, the Office of the Chief of MI (OCMI) began working with the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to identify the personnel for the IBCT and prepare them for travel to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The orders came with various reporting dates, generally 1 May for cadre and 12 June for cohort soldiers. Approximately 80 percent of the soldiers came from all points around the globe and 20 percent of the soldiers were local from USAIC&FH. Most of the soldiers coming from units outside Fort Huachuca were on temporary duty (TDY) and return orders with follow-on permanent changes of station (PCSs) reporting to Fort Lewis, Washington. At the start of cadre training, we had 45 percent of the cadre physically present for training and by the end of their training (4 weeks later), we had 80 percent of them in attendance. The story for cohort soldiers was much the same.

We eventually had better than 50 percent of the future IBCT-1 MI soldiers training together at Fort Huachuca.

From all the personnel issues, two major personnel challenges surfaced. First, only one of the 45 scheduled S2 personnel actually participated in the training. Second, the soldiers arrived at various times over the course of the training and it was very difficult to receive and inprocess new personnel while training their counterparts.

Training Resources and Equipment

Training a unit that does not yet officially exist with equipment not yet fielded can certainly be challenging. The TRADOC (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) Systems Managers (TSMs), the Project Managers (PMs), and DCD New Systems Training Office (NSTO) delivered most of the equipment to Fort Huachuca for training. We had to use AN/PRD-13s as surrogates for the Prophet Ground system and Hunter UAVs as the Tactical UAVs (TUAVs, Shadow 200) surrogates. We also used “white box” surrogates for the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Workstation (RWS). The Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) surro-
gate vehicle was the M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), which we used primarily for the Ground Sensor Platoon of the Surveillance Troop in the RSTA (reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition) Squadron.

For the Capstone CPX, we used a “plug and play” classroom in a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) where we fed Tactical Simulation (TACSIM) message traffic into a “white box” RWS architecture. This allowed us to conduct a sensitive compartmented information (SCI) level exercise using “real world” message traffic (slightly modified) imported from various INTELLINK sites. In addition, we fed numerous scripted HUMINT reports to the S2X through organic teams, and adjacent and higher HUMINT organizations. Finally, we built an extensive database that served as a “reach back” library of information and intelligence. Through RWS and the Counterintelligence/HUMINT Analysis Tool Set (CHATS), we created a collaborative and distributed analysis architecture. The analysts could collaborate with each other as well as with the higher and adjacent organizations replicated by a “white cell.”

We used the “plug and play” classroom again for the FTX capstone exercise. The “white box” RWS architecture served as the base architecture for both the ISR Analysis and ISR Integration Platoons. The HUMINT Platoon deployed its teams in the local area under the direction of the S2X. They used the CHATS for data access and report writing, and communicated with the S2X through the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). The RSTA Surveillance Troop deployed in the local training area in support of the ISR integration platoon’s brigade ISR plan.

The concept of using the cadre to train the cohort soldiers worked well. [Otherwise,] our training would have failed.

The collectors reported back to the surveillance troop CP using SINCGARS and the CP used SINCGARS to report to the MI company and brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC). We had a TROJAN Special-Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II or TS II (TROJAN SPIRIT II) with the surveillance troop and TROJAN Lite with the MI company and brigade TOC. The SINCGARS network served as the backup communications architecture. However, the TROJAN Lite was down for maintenance and we never established the TROJAN link.

We did deploy three AN/PRD-13s, one AN/PPS-5D Ground Surveillance Radar, the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System II (REMBASS II), and the TUAV surrogate for the FTX. All of these systems were fully operational and performed well over the course of the six-day FTX. The weather co-
The capstone CPX, Kazar Fury, was an outstanding exercise. The small-scale contingency (SSC) scenario was very well developed and extremely realistic. The developers, primarily Colonel Jerry Jones (U.S. Army, Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel Niel Garra, built a tremendous database of “real world” information and intelligence. The only problem with this training event was that the exercise was too advanced for the participating students. Because of the decision to cut some of the systems training (primarily RWS), the students did not receive sufficient systems training initially. Consequently, the students had a slow start in the exercise. Additionally, the students struggled with applying the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process in the SSC environment. Consequently, their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plans and operations suffered because the students based them on weak IPB. However, the students made incredible progress throughout the exercise.

The Buffalo Soldier Challenge FTX was a slower-paced exercise for the analysts, but it was very challenging for the collectors. The slower pace allowed the ISR analysis platoon and ISR integration platoon to work out the many TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) they developed in the preceding CPX. The pace was not at all slow for the collectors, however. The HUMINT teams, ground sensor teams, and UAV operators got a good workout pursuing the competent and wily opposing forces (OPFOR). The low-signature stability operations and support operations threat proved very challenging for the surveillance troop’s collectors.

Lessons Learned

Overall, the training of the IBCT-1 personnel went quite well and taught us much. Some specifics we will keep in mind as we develop the training for the IBCT-2 MI soldiers include—

Figure 3. Cadre Training Plan (IBCT-2).
Maintain continuity among the training developers and trainers.

Personnel must arrive at Fort Huachuca before the start of training.

S2 personnel must be involved in cadre training and the capstone exercise.

IPB and ISR in military operations other than war must be taught first.

We must fence systems training and prevent distracters at all costs.

We need trained, skilled role-players to conduct quality HUMINT training.

**IBCT-2 Cadre/Cohort Training**

We do not yet have a required delivery date (RDD) for the Fort Huachuca phase of IBCT-2 training. We estimate that it will be in mid-September, and therefore our cadre training will begin in mid-April 2001. Until then, we are addressing the lessons learned in our plan for IBCT-2 as personnel and budget constraints will allow. We have already hired five contract trainers and training developers, three of whom worked on some or all of the training for IBCT-1. We are working with the Fort Lewis I Corps G2, TRADOC BCC, and the leadership of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), to ensure that the S2s participate in the critical training (see Figures 3 and 4). We added one week of IPB and ISR training in stability and support operations early in the training. We also moved the Senior Leader Course to the end of the cohort training to eliminate the distraction during systems training. We are attempting to hire 18 role-players to support the HUMINT training. Presently, we are uncertain that our budget will accommodate the $150,000 price tag. Finally, we are working with the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) to identify the personnel requirements and work with the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to ensure IBCT soldiers are present for the start of cadre training.

We are working hard to improve the training for IBCT-2. As with IBCT-1, we need help from the MI community since there is no way that the 112th MI Brigade (Provisional) or USAIC&FH can execute this training alone. From the MI commander in the field facilitating the timely departure of a soldier destined for IBCT training to the TSMs and PMs providing the equipment, all are vitally important to the execution of this training. To train the intelligence soldiers who will serve in an IBCT, it takes an MI village.

---

**Endnote**

1. The title photograph shows the ISR Integration Platoon’s TROJAN SPIRIT team with contractor support.

2. See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms used in these figures.

Major Pat Daniel is the Brigade S3 of the 112th MI Brigade (Provisional) at Fort Huachuca. He was the Senior Trainer for the IBCT Cadre/Cohort Training conducted at Fort Huachuca from May through August 2000. MAJ Daniel is a graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS). His assignments included Tank Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, Battalion S4, Brigade S2, Company Commander, Intelligence Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and Tactical Intelligence Instructor/Trainer. He earned a two Bachelor degrees in Speech Communications and Psychology from the University of Arkansas, Little Rock. Readers can contact MAJ Daniel via E-mail at patrick.daniel@hua.army.mil or by telephone at (520) 533-4595 or DSN 821-4595.

---

Fort Huachuca’s garrison headquarters, Rodney Hall, on a snowy day.
By "intelligence" we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country—the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations. If we consider the actual basis for this information, however unreliable and transient it is, we soon realize that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins...What one can reasonably ask of an [intelligence] officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability. These are difficult enough to apply when plans are drafted in an office, far from the sphere of action; the task becomes infinitely harder in the thick of fighting itself, with reports streaming in. At such times one is lucky if their contradictions cancel each other out, and leave a kind of balance to be critically assessed....The commander must trust his judgment and stand like a rock on which the waves break in vain. It is not an easy thing to do.

—Carl von Clausewitz, On War

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) designed the scenario for the Kazar Fury exercise to ensure intelligence personnel of the first Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT-1) could create the situational awareness required for maneuver plans and operations. Clausewitz’s implied task, in which the intelligence officer strongly influences the decisions of a maneuver commander, was the cornerstone of the exercise. Creating a scenario to challenge intelligence personnel training for a small-scale contingency (SSC) is never easy. In this article, the scenario master offers an approach for use in a Constructivist training environment. The trainers thrust the IBCT personnel into an advanced scenario based on the Constructivist teaching philosophy—learning by doing.

The setting for the scenario was the fictitious country of Kazar, a “former” province in the Federal Republic of Slavia somewhere in Eastern Europe (see Figure 1). For centuries, ethnic diversity created the conditions for competition and conflict. With the dramatic changes in the early 1990s, economic competition and versions of democracy fueled ethnic policies that caused civil war. A few leaders from two ethnic lineages chose force of arms to achieve political and economic goals. Centuries-old ethnic laws took precedence over legislated laws. Western nations chose to intervene and stop the atrocities based on requests from one weaker ethnic group and with the approval of the United Nations (U.N.).

Developing The Scenario

A team of contractors, augmented with officers on casual status, expended approximately 20 work-weeks creating the database and scripted “injects” to drive scenario activities. Separate, but equally important, was the creation of databases and files in the simulations to fit the scenario. Two contract companies expended approximately 20 additional work-weeks setting the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) system and the Tactical Simulation (TACSIM) system for the Kazar Fury exercise.

The Intelligence Center’s training objectives guided the scripting process. The capstone objective was to design an exercise that set the desired conditions for intelligence to drive maneuver decisions.

Early in the scripting process, we decided to “morph” real-world intelligence products into our fictional scenario. While this decision reduced some of the workload, it moved the exercise into a real-world classified environment. Except for imagery products, we created all intelligence disciplines and media reports to provide the data and information from which the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Analysis Platoon and ISR Integration Platoon developed intelligence to drive the brigade commander’s decisions.

Figure 1. Locations of CJTF Kazar’s Major Units.

October-December 2000
Phase I (Predeployment: D-14 to D-4)

3d BCT, 2ID conducts planning and preparation for movement to Kazar. (This phase is executed without the simulation.)

Phase II (Early Entry Operations) D-3 to D+13

3d BCT, 2ID lands at three airfields, moves north, and secures the Kacanik Corridor in order to establish presence and facilitate passage of follow-on forces. Upon completing handoff of Kacanik Corridor control to 1st Bde, 1st ID, the 3d BCT main body moves north to secure lines of communication for 2d Bde, 1st ID, and 1/4 CAV, 1st ID, movement to their areas of operation. Upon completion of movement by 2d Bde and 1/4 CAV, 3d BCT occupies designated area of operations. (This phase is executed without the simulation.)

Phase III (Stability Operations) D+13 to TBD

3d BCT, 2ID conducts operations to create a safe and secure environment, which enables economic and political institutions to establish a democratic infrastructure. 3d BCT conducts operations to detect, identify, and neutralize the Skandian and Gordian paramilitary organizations, and transnational elements with objectives contradictory to U.N. objectives, deter conventional threats, and, if necessary, defeat a conventional attack.

Phase IV (Transfer of Authority to Coalition Peacekeeping Forces) – TBD

Phase V (Redeployment) – TBD

The friendly force setting included a combined joint task force (CJTF) comprising six ground maneuver elements (three U.S. brigades, one U.S. cavalry squadron, and two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) brigades). A U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) Command controlled the U.S. ground maneuver elements. The ARFOR commander was dual-hatted as the CJTF commander. The “White Cell” replicated U.S. theater and national elements, U.N. and NATO elements, adjacent units, the CJTF headquarters, and the ARFOR.

In addition to the order of battle on conventional forces, the scripting team created the “Gordian” and “Skandian” paramilitary forces, organized municipality overviews. Since the IBCT intelligence architecture is tactical human intelligence- (TAC HUMINT) heavy and the simulations do not provide HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) reporting, the scripters created a source-knowledge database. This database was used to create reporting from TAC HUMINT teams, allied HUMINT teams, theater assets, and national agency resources in the area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR).

We created a Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) website for Kazar Fury to replicate the ARFOR, theater, and national sites that the ISR analysis and integration platoons could access. Additionally, controllers encouraged the ISR analysis and integration platoons to search real-world databases for static information, such as terrain data. With contractor assistance, the scripters crafted more than one hundred SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) reports that were transmitted to All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Workstations (RWSs) using the Distribution Simulation Environment (DSE).

Phases of the Exercise

The scenario contained several distinct phases (see Figure 2). They included—

- A preparation phase set at Fort Lewis, Washington, when the Army alerts the IBCT for deployment. The preparation phase lasted approximately three duty days and covered the game period D-14 to D-4.
- Dynamic game play initiated using the DSE and JCATS to drive TACSIM at the beginning of the Stability Operations Phase. This phase lasted seven days and covered D+14 to D+20.
- A deployment phase replicated movement from Fort Lewis to the intermediate staging base (ISB) and into the IBCT’s area of operations (AO). It lasted approximately two days and covered D-3 to D+13.
- Dynamic game play initiated using the DSE and JCATS to drive TACSIM at the beginning of the Stability Operations Phase. This phase lasted seven days and covered D+14 to D+20.

The brigade S2 section, based on recommendations from the ISR integration platoon, arrayed their collection resources in the AOIR. The brigade executed collection based on priority intelligence requirements (PIR), collection emphasis messages, and daily taskings. The brigade Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)—acting as a surrogate for the Shadow 200 Tactical UAV—flew from the scenario’s airport. The ground sensor platoon deployed as three separate teams, the Prophet Ground system, the GSRs (ground surveillance radars), and REMBASS II (Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System II). The S2X divided the TAC HUMINT Platoon into three elements. The 1st and 3d Battalion Task Forces each received an operational management team (OMT) with two TAC HUMINT teams in direct support (DS). The remaining TAC HUMINT teams all collocated with the brigade; three were in general support while one was designated “GS reinforcing.”

During the preparation phase, information went to the brigade S2 and the ISR integration and ISR analysis platoons via the Kazar Fury website. As the exercise moved from Fort Lewis through the ISB into Kazar, the brigade S2, ISR integration platoon, and the ISR analysis platoon received information from the Kazar Fury website and the HUMINT and CI scripting cell, which...
included reports from the TAC HUMINT platoon. Upon initiation of the simulation (D+14), information went to the brigade S2 and the ISR integration and ISR analysis platoons from TACSIM driven by JCATS, DSE, the Kazar Fury website, and reports from the HUMINT and CI scripters. JCATS transmitted IBCT Blue situation reports and “Blue” SALUTE reports. DSE transmitted pre-scripted SALUTE reports. TACSIM created and transmitted reports from all the “technical” sensors in the battlespace, e.g., Prophet, UAVs, Advanced QUICKFIX, and TRQ-32 TEAMMATE.

We provided theater and national signals intelligence (SIGINT) products to the students via the Kazar Fury website. The HUMINT and CI scripters included soldiers from the TAC HUMINT platoon. Based on the PIR, specific order or request (SOR), and other guidance from the S2X, the TAC HUMINT platoon replicated meetings with human contacts. The TAC HUMINT platoon transmitted reports to the S2X via the SIPRNET using the CI/HUMINT Automation Tool Set (CHATS). Allied, theater, and national HUMINT and CI elements in the AOIR provided reports to the S2X, either in hard copy or via the SIPRNET. Additionally, the White Cell provided a daily intelligence summary (INTSUM) beginning at D+14, and scripted responses to IBCT requests for information (RFI).

Next Time

Based on the lessons learned and participant feedback, the design of the Capstone Exercise for the second IBCT (IBCT-2) will help the exercise certify that the surveillance troop, MI company, and TAC HUMINT soldiers “embedded” in the RSTA squadron are crucial components in IBCT-2. The objective of the IBCT Capstone Exercise is to conduct limited mission rehearsal and to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and training in the brigade combat teams (BCTs) for MI battlefield operating system (BOS) collective tasks and competencies in a near-realistic environment. The ultimate goal is to assure that the Intelligence BOS really influences leaders to make the correct decisions related to battle planning and battle execution.

The training objectives for the IBCT-2 Capstone Exercise are—

- S2s assure that intelligence affects battle planning, decision-making, and battle execution.
- Brigade rehearses mission planning and feedback between S2s, the MI company, and the RSTA squadron’s Surveillance Troop.
- ISR integration platoon rehearses the planning, technical control, and steerage for all collection assets in the AOIR.
- Surveillance troop plans, executes, and reports the results of collection missions.
- Surveillance troop rehearses TTP for interaction between the RSTA S2 and the MI company.
- RSTA squadron HUMINT soldiers, HUMINT teams, and OMTs plan, execute, and report the results of collection missions.
- OMTs rehearse the TTP for interaction with the S2X.
- ISR analysis platoon develops its ability to influence decisions.

Additional goals for the IBCT-2 exercise include—

- Identify TTP issues related to the development of intelligence products.
- Rehearse integration of single-source analysis into all-source products.
- Develop the briefing skills of leaders and junior soldiers.
- Identify TTP issues for the dynamic retasking of collection assets.
- Identify TTP issues related to split-based operations and intelligence support while the BCT is in transit.
- Identify TTP issues related to movement of the Intelligence BOS assets from the home station to the area of responsibility (AOR).

Based on IBCT-1 lessons learned during the Kazar Fury and Buffalo Soldier Challenge exercises, Figure 3 is a recommended schedule for IBCT-2’s Capstone Exercise. This figure shows the combination of the Kazar Fury and Buffalo Soldier Challenge exercises into one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
<th>Phase 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert and MDMP at Fort Lewis (D-14 to D-4).</td>
<td>Deployment from Fort Lewis through the ISB into the BCT’s AOR (D-3 to D+13).</td>
<td>Stability operations in AOR (D+14 to D+20).</td>
<td>Preparation for SLC and round-robin session.</td>
<td>Decision vignettes for SLC (D+21 &amp; D+22).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bde S2, RSTA S2, Bn S2s, Surveillance Troop, and MI Co in Rowe Hall, Fort Huachuca.</td>
<td>MI Co and Surveillance Troop conduct FTX, Bde S2, RSTA S2, and Bn S2s conduct CPX.</td>
<td>Bde S2, RSTA S2, Bn S2s MI Co and leaders from the Surveillance Troop conduct CPX.</td>
<td>MI Co and RSTA Squadron prepare and execute static displays and briefings.</td>
<td>Digitized vignettes for senior leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-hour game days</td>
<td>24-hour game days</td>
<td>12-hour game days</td>
<td>8-hour game days</td>
<td>8-hour game days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This figure combines Kazar Fury and Buffalo Soldier Challenge into one Capstone Exercise using the same scenario used for IBCT-1 training.

Figure 3. Recommended Schedule for the IBCT-2 Capstone Exercise.
capstone exercise using the same scenario. The philosophy is to build up to this exercise throughout cadre and cohort training. An essential aspect is the development of three or four viable scenarios used during both cadre and cohort training. Throughout the cycle, soldiers and leaders learn about the area, likely adversaries, and potential courses of action for each scenario. Participants begin the capstone exercise with knowledge of a building crisis in a specific region. Information provided on Game Days 1 and 2 (Phase 1) will focus the BCT intelligence architecture on specific events, and provide additional background information. The MI BOS moves through a military decision-making process (MDMP) on Game Days 3 through 5 (Phase 1). We will execute Phase 1 predominantly in Rowe Hall at Fort Huachuca.

Beginning on Day 6 (Phase 2), the surveillance troop and a major portion of the MI company execute an FTX to replicate ground movement from the ISB into the IBCT’s AOR. Except for the UAV, elements will physically move and remain overnight in field conditions, e.g., driving around the Huachuca Mountains. During this movement, the MI BOS will provide intelligence to the BCT and battalion commanders regarding movement and the situation in the AOR. (An aggressor force, HUMINT contacts, SIGINT targets, and UAV targets are required.) The brigade S2, RSTA squadron S2, battalion S2, and a portion of the MI company remain at Rowe Hall during Phase 2. JCATS, TACSIM, and DSE can support Phase 2. On Game Day 12, the exercise begins stability operations in the AOR. We will initiate dynamic game play using the DSE, with the JCATS driving TACSIM. This phase will last seven days and cover the period from D+14 to D+20.

On Game Day 19, we will conduct an after-action review (AAR) that covers the previous two weeks and sets the conditions for success in the Senior Leaders Course. Phase 4 prepares the Intelligence BOS for execution of the digitized vignettes used in Phase 5 for the IBCT senior leader training.

Conclusion

Two appropriate Army sayings come to mind that are applicable to Kazar Fury: “The first report is never right” and “No plan survives first contact.” We are looking beyond the first reports to determine what we must do to improve the exercise. The plans we created in April and May 2000 did not survive “first contact” in July and August. However, we are now moving forward to create a future iteration that will challenge the Intelligence BOS to influence battle planning and battle execution.

Endnotes

2. See the glossary on page 64 for expansion of the acronyms used in the figures.
3. Lessons Learned from the Intelligence BOS cadre and cohort training for IBCT-1 are under review. There are no final decisions regarding cadre and cohort training for IBCT-2. This section offers the author’s view of the training IBCT-2 could execute next time.
5. Buffalo Soldier Challenge was an FTX executed by the MI company and the RSTA squadron’s surveillance troop immediately following Kazar Fury. The leaders suggested that Buffalo Soldier Challenge precede Kazar Fury next time.

Colonel Jerry Jones retired from the Army on 30 May 2000. He began his career as an Armor officer with the 1st Armored Division (1 AD) at Fort Hood, Texas. After Vietnam, he participated in three REFORGERs with the “Big Red One,” and served with the 32d U.S. Army Air Defense Command (AADCOM); 1 AD, in Germany; special mission units in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) J5 in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM; and the Allied MI Battalion in Bosnia. COL Jones finished his Army career at Fort Huachuca as the Commander, INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support (ITRADS) Detachment. He was a 35F (HUMINT Officer) with significant 35E (Counterintelligence Officer) experience. He was also a strategist (suffix designation 6Z) and he served at echelons from tactical to national. He currently serves as a contractor with the USAIC&FH. Readers can contact COL Jones via E-mail at jerry.jones@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-6237 and DSN 821-6237.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Military Intelligence Corps accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF). Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

The MI Corps provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CDR (Mr. Chambers), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. You may also call commercial (520) 533-1178 or DSN 821-1178, or you may contact Mr. Jim Chambers via E-mail at james.chambers@hua.army.mil.
The mission of the IBCT intelligence system is to provide timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized ISR support to the brigade commander, staff, and subordinates...during the planning, preparation, and execution of multiple, simultaneous decisive actions on a distributed battlefield or area of operations (AO)
The RSTA squadron is the brigade’s primary source of combat information and targeting data. The squadron also provides the brigade with many reconnaissance and surveillance soldiers on the ground to help the brigade understand the operational environment in detail. This differs from the traditional scout focus primarily on threat forces. The brigade S2 integrates the ISR effort through the S3 (to include providing tasks to the RSTA squadron) and is supported by the ARFOR analysis and control element (ACE) or intelligence element in order to provide situational awareness and understanding in the AO.

The surveillance troop possesses an Air Reconnaissance Platoon, a Ground Sensor Platoon, and an NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Reconnaissance Platoon. The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) enable the squadron to expand its reconnaissance capability considerably while mitigating risk in the absence of rotary-based reconnaissance. The NBC reconnaissance platoon provides the brigade’s core capability for detection and early warning of chemical and radiological contaminants, plus some forms of biological agents.

The RSTA squadron closely integrates its operations with the activities of the infantry battalion’s reconnaissance platoons and other ISR assets managed at brigade level. The squadron operates by stealth throughout the brigade footprint, and employs HUMINT collection personnel (who perform very limited HUMINT collection) extensively throughout the AO to compensate for shortfalls in the existing sensor capabilities, which are more suited for open terrain and unit- or force-based threats.

**Task Organization**

Task organization allows the brigade to optimize the allocation and capabilities of its finite ISR assets based on METT-TC. For example, in a movement to contact, the brigade may direct the HUMINT platoon to reinforce the RSTA squadron with additional HUMINT collection teams to enhance its interrogation and document exploitation (DOCEX) capabilities. The brigade may also receive divisional or higher echelon ISR assets such as a UAV platoon from the division, an air cavalry troop from corps, and counterintelligence (CI) teams from corps or higher echelons when the scope of the mission exceeds the brigade’s organic capability.

**Operations**

The brigade conducts centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations characterized by rapid mobility, precision fires, maneuver, and decisive actions over extended, noncontiguous AOs dominated by complex terrain and urban settings. The planning and decentralized execution of these operations demands continuous tactical- and operational-level IPB to help commanders understand the context of emerging information and its relationship (cause and effect) within the overall framework of the mission and operations. The nature of the operational environment requires the brigade to have enhanced situational awareness in order to anticipate threat actions and identify opportunities for decisive employment of the brigade’s combat power. To enable precision maneuver and fires, the brigade’s targeting capability requires timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive targeting data, and intelligence on conventional and asymmetric threats to the brigade’s systems and organizations. In addition, entry operations (forced or permissive—based on the enemy’s reaction to the operation) require rapid and detailed IPB products, the ability to locate and engage mobile reserves as well as fire support systems, and situational awareness well beyond the close combat area.

**Capabilities and Limitations**

Inherent in any system are capabilities and limitations. The capabilities of the Initial Brigades will continue to improve as more technologically advanced sensors, processors, communications systems, and better-trained soldiers enter the force structure. Its limitations reflect the impact of force structure limitations, advances in adversaries’ technologies, and diverse operational environments in which the division must operate.

The IBCTs’ intelligence system provides some significant enhancements. These improved brigade capabilities include the following:

- The organic RSTA squadron improves the reconnaissance and security capability of the brigade.
- The MI elements supporting the brigade and the RSTA squadron improve the intelligence staff’s synchronization of ISR actions and access to intelligence organizations, products, and databases.
Plan and Direct
- Develop ISR tasks in accordance with the brigade’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and intent.
- Accept and integrate external ISR planning and execution elements to improve support to situational awareness and targeting.
- Synchronize and provide technical steerage to organic, supporting, and augmenting ISR assets into the brigade’s ISR effort.
- Conduct parallel planning while dynamically tracking and adjusting the overall collection effort for organic and supporting ISR resources.
- Provide near-real-time visibility on external collection resources and capabilities, and request support through the use of organic communications and processing systems.
- Maintain an intelligence communications and processing architecture with multi-level security that enables operations in joint and multinational environments using digital and analog communications systems.
- Conduct dynamic sensor steerage.
- Conduct effective requirements management.

Collect
- Provide an organic day and night, all weather, and terrain-independent capability to conduct and integrate multidiscipline reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).
- Leverage time-sensitive information and reporting from joint, interagency, multinational, and commercial collection resources.
- Direct the sensor payloads of organic and non-organic collection platforms.
- Collect weather information from military and commercial sources.
- Fuse vertical and horizontal combat information, targeting data, and intelligence from organic, supporting, joint, multinational, and interagency organizations.
- Receive and process broadcast downlinks from organic and theater assets.
- Maintain intelligence databases with multi-level security that safeguards the intelligence sources and permits authorized access to unprocessed data.
- Provide a capability to develop, transmit, and store graphic products with supporting data.

Process and Produce
- Develop the threat portion of the COP of the brigade AO and area of interest through the distributed analysis and fusion of combat information and multidiscipline intelligence using collaborative analytic, development, and visualization tools.
- Exchange the results of analysis, discuss issues with external regional experts, and develop a common understanding of the situation by fusing external collection and analysis products using collaborative tools like desktop video teleconferencing and electronic “white boards” resident on analyst workstations.
- Access, focus, and tailor the broader technical and analytic products from national and theater analytic centers to meet the brigade’s intelligence needs.
- Conduct continuous IPB and near-real-time all-source analysis of threat information. Access the information in order to support situational understanding, targeting, and force protection.
- Conduct trend and pattern analysis during IPB and target development, and also as a means of providing predictive intelligence support for future operations.
- Access—using organic communications and processing systems—existing databases, products, and analytic expertise resident in Service, joint, and national surveillance and reconnaissance resources. These split-based operations and “reach back” capabilities facilitate collaboration, task sharing, and access to higher echelon databases, as well as IPB products and focused analysis. Split-based operations provide the capability to have a portion of the ISR analytic element remain outside the operational area to support a command post or a command and control (C3) node.
- Leverage local and national weather analysis to produce tailored weather effects products in support of current and future operations.
- Provide dynamic targeting support through integration of organic, theater, joint, and national sensors.

Disseminate
- Possess secure, redundant, dedicated broad-bandwidth communications with a multi-level security capability that enable the exchange of analytic findings and meta-data (web information that facilitates web searches).
- Disseminate and collaborate between ISR elements internal and external to the brigade, in real time, over an expanded battlespace.
- Receive broadcast intelligence that provides indications, warning, and location information.
- Receive near-real-time updates on the weather, terrain, and threat activities from a supporting ACE during the deployment and entry operations. This includes the ability to receive threat situation displays, written updates, video, and imagery to support enroute mission planning and adjustments to the plan.
- Dynamically update the situation from sensors, collectors, and processors organic to the brigade that provide a higher degree of fidelity of the battlespace.
- Present the current threat situation and threat intent to facilitate situational understanding and support the presentation of the COP. The presentation uses the best mix of supporting information including imagery, video from UAV, or screen captures (meta-data) to reinforce the presented analysis.
- Provide near-real-time tools and products to support visualization of the brigade commander’s battlespace across all ISR capabilities from alert through deployment and execution to redeployment.

Figure 1. Some Specific IBCT Intelligence Capabilities.
All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) workstations at the brigade, battalions, and squadron facilitate the collaborative preparation and presentation of a common threat picture.

UAVs in the RSTA squadron extend the brigade commander’s view beyond the next hill, and optimize the employment of maneuver, aviation, and fire support assets to shape the battlefield in depth, day or night.

Dependence on non-organic elements results in some of the IBCTs’ limitations. Some of their specific limitations are—

- Distribution of ISR reports and products (imagery, overlays, webpages, etc.) requires a robust, high-capacity communications area network.
- Reliance on a higher headquarters for the development of IPB products that are full-dimensional, continuous, and in near-real time. It has the organic ability to tailor products to provide greater fidelity to meet the commander’s intent and the command’s information requirements.
- Reliance on a force pool of linguists to support requirements based on the operational environment. The Army must identify, train, and track these linguists; it will then place them on call for a period within 24-48 hours as the situation dictates. Linguistic requirements will include translation, as well as tactical HUMINT and signals intelligence (SIGINT) support.
- Inability to operate two UAV systems simultaneously, and a requirement that the brigade command post (CP) locate within 40 kilometers of the UAV flight track in order to receive the video downlink.

FM 34-80-2/ST, Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, is due in March 2001. The Doctrine Division intends this publication for use exclusively by the IBCTs that are “standing up” at Fort Lewis. Throughout the process of standing up the IBCTs, we will update the doctrine to reflect the lessons learned from the units’ initial training and combat training center (CTC) rotations. To keep up with the changes, visit the Doctrine Division homepage at http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/doctrine/dlb.htm. We ask the IBCTs to review and comment on the published IBCT doctrine by contacting Captain Lee Goodman via E-mail at edd.goodman@hua.army.mil.

Captain Lee Goodman is currently a Doctrine Writer in the MI Doctrine Division, Operational Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He is the point of contact for IBCT, information operations, and tactical and Cavalry intelligence issues. He has served in 3d Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 3d Squadron, 2d ACR before his assignment to USAIC&FH. CPT Goodman is a graduate of the Armor Officers Basic Course, the MI Officers Transition Course, and the MI Officers Advanced Course. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Mississippi State University. Readers may contact the author via the E-mail address above and by telephone at (520) 538-0971 or DSN 879-0971.

---

**ARMG O/C Augmentees Needed at JRTC in August**

The National Guard Bureau needs U.S. Army National Guard observer/controller (O/C) augmentees at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, from 1 through 15 August 2001. The ARNG augmentees would support JRTC Rotation 01-09 (27th Enhanced Separate Infantry Brigade (27th eSB), NY ARNG). The military intelligence soldiers needed are—

- 1 x CPT (35 D – All-Source Intelligence Officer)
- 3 x SFC (96B – Intelligence Analyst)
- 2 x SFC (98C – Signals Intelligence Analyst or 98G – Cryptologic Linguist)
- 1 x SSG (96R – Ground Surveillance Systems Operator)

The National Guard Bureau funds these tours as additional Annual Training. Augmentees’ travel and per diem expenses are included. Assist fellow Guardsmen and provide yourself a superior professional training experience. The 15-day rotation consists of a 5-day O/C Academy followed immediately by the 10-day unit rotation. This provides a wonderful opportunity to share valuable professional knowledge with others while taking home important lessons of your own. For more details, contact CPT John Wilson at (703) 607-9154, DSN 327-9154, or john.wilson@ngb.army.mil or CPT Garry Porter at (703) 607-7317, DSN 327-7317, or garry.porter@ngb.army.mil.
Change is “to make different,” “to make radically different: transform.” These are but a couple of the definitions for the process that we in the Army, and in the Military Intelligence Corps in particular, are undergoing. We are plotting a different position, course, or direction away from a Cold War mentality. New technology, new training models, and other sophisticated platforms that play important roles in reshaping the Total Force for the future are driving us to update our doctrine.

Future Conflicts
As the Army wrestles with modifying strategy to fight major theater wars (MTWs), we must ensure that our units are robust and flexible across the full operational spectrum. We must be capable of rapid transition from domestic disaster relief, civil disturbance control, peace or armistice, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), counterdrug, limited war, small-scale contingencies (SSCs), and stability operations and support operations. Consequently, it is crucial that we make these transitions at all echelons without suffering a significant loss in coverage or capability.

There is no question that our force is much smaller. Our operational tempo (OPTEMPO) has increased significantly, causing our current force structure to cope with the demands of protecting a myriad of national interests, defined and not yet defined, based on world events. For us to be a strategically responsive force that will enable combat commanders to achieve dominance across the full spectrum of operations, the Army and its MI soldiers must acquire and develop skills to perform in a multi-functional manner. This is not to say that all soldiers must be technically proficient in multiple military occupational specialties (MOSs). Rather, each one should be able to transition easily or apply other skills in addition to their primary MOSs. Information operations (IO) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) skills are prime examples.

Technology Applications
As the Army progresses into the 21st century, we can expect a multitude of battlefield challenges depending on the terrain, equipment, and tactics employed against us. Increased requirements in applying MASINT and IO respective to our given MOSs will enhance our capabilities to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and fight military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). The urban terrain environment will drive requirements for high-fidelity intelligence that in turn requires proximity to targets regardless of weather and day/night conditions. Incorporating MASINT skills and technology is a force multiplier spanning the entire electromagnetic spectrum. Although it is a unique intelligence discipline with singular capabilities that in the future could evolve into a separate MOS, MASINT provides a different dimension to the other intelligence disciplines of human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Likewise, we must produce a pipeline of well-educated information security specialists. As intelligence professionals, we must provide the ground commander with accurate and timely intelligence to ensure superior situational awareness. Timely intelligence is critical when operating in a rapidly transitioning environment such as urban warfare. As long as we can achieve and maintain information superiority, apply learned MASINT skills, and simultaneously execute our intelligence missions, we can expect success in effectively neutralizing and then dominating the enemy regardless of the environment. How do we get there from here?

Training
From a training standpoint, we must develop, test, and field new intelligence systems to stay abreast of and be able to counter the technological advances now available to rogue nations and terrorist groups. The systems we develop and field will require that our soldiers deviate from the traditional
one-skilled dimensionality and evolve into multi-skilled individuals. MI must lean toward consolidating like functions and integrate associated skills as a matter of routine. The MI soldier of the 21st century must possess a variety of unmatched technical and human skills to both support the combat commander and become an organic warfighting resource.

Our training philosophy must apply more soldier- and team-oriented training to improve MI soldiers’ effectiveness in a complex environment. As we transition to a digitized battlefield, so must the training transition. We must wean ourselves from such traditional teaching methodology as having intelligence analysts plot on paper maps using acetate and alcohol pens, for example. We should be analyzing electronic sensors and activity displayed on digitized maps in near-real time from intelligence gathering systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS), weather satellites, and more. As a result, our soldiers must—

- Receive training on traditional intelligence skills.
- Be capable of understanding complex sensing and processing technologies.
- Participate in live and simulated exercises to sustain their digital warfighting intelligence skills.

The 21st century MI soldier must transform with the future organizational design to meet the challenges and demands that potentially await us.

**IBCT**

The Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) provides a transformation-related example. The Army integrated a large, organic MI capability within the IBCT, specifically in the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron and the MI Company. RSTA squadron MI soldiers will provide supported ground commanders with immediate situational awareness. Lessons learned in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo all indicate reliance on HUMINT. Thus, the IBCT’s design includes an increased tactical HUMINT presence. The Armor Center Commanding General indicated that he wanted a HUMINT soldier in every squad and in every Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). Consequently, the Reconnaissance Troops have embedded HUMINT capabilities. The RSTA squadron also includes TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II (TROJAN SPIRIT II) and a Ground Sensor Platoon with REMBASS II (Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System II) and Prophet Ground.

Eventually, the objective force will have the multi-mode operator of the future embedded within the ground sensor platoon. This increase of soldiers with MOSs 96B, 97B, 97E, and 98H organic to the RSTA Squadron provides intelligence information directly to the RSTA S2. (These are intelligence analysts, counterintelligence (CI) agents, HUMINT collectors, and communications intercept/locators, respectively.) This increase in MI soldiers with these specialties attests to the change in the notion that intelligence not merely supports the operation, but is inherent to the battle as an organic member. MI soldiers must demonstrate not only their technical expertise within multisensor collection systems and CI and HUMINT tools, but also their soldier skills as well.

**Conclusion**

While the Army transforms into the 21st century objective force, and the Army Development Study Task Force XXI (ADS TF XXI) reviews the possibilities of optimizing MOSs throughout the Army, the MI Corps is considering how we, too, must transform within our own structure. We must strongly consider the possibility of combining MOSs with like skill sets, or possibly splitting skill sets from one MOS and incorporating them into two other MOSs. We are evolving with the introduction of new systems and advancing capabilities in order to produce a multi-systems operator. We will field the new Tactical UAV (Shadow 200) and Common Ground Station systems. MI soldiers have always played essential support roles, but with the Army transformation and multi-skilled dimensionality, the MI soldier is now a vital asset organic to the ground commander. The motto “Soldier First, MI Professional Second to None” certainly applies to our Transformation into the 21st century Army.

Sergeant Major Tony Moreno is currently the Sergeant Major, Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. His previous assignments include SGM, Training Development, 305th MI Battalion; Company First Sergeant in the 305th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade, and 721st MI Battalion; S3 Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) in Charge (NCOIC), 732d MI Battalion; Collection Management NCOIC, Army Regional Operations Facility (AROF)/National Security Agency; Plans NCO, 470th MI Group, Panama; and Morse Advisor, 3/7th Special Forces Group, Panama. SGM Moreno earned an Associate of Arts degree from the University of Maryland with a concentration in Psychology. His military education includes the First Sergeants Course, 25th Infantry Light Battle Staff Course, CK155 Cryptologic Skills for NCOS, and CY200 Senior Enlisted Cryptologic Course. Readers can contact SGM Moreno via E-mail at antonio.moreno@hua.army.mil or telephonically at (520) 533-1174 or DSN 821-1174 (FAX 821-1186).
The Military Intelligence Warrant Officer of the 21st Century

by Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex A. Williams

Changes in both the Army and Military Intelligence over the past 30 years have been dramatic. Only three decades ago we were embroiled in the Vietnam conflict while at the same time trying to ensure the containment of communism. Manual typewriters with onionskin carbon paper were the closest many of us got to automation. We accomplished dissemination of intelligence by typing forms using an optical character-reader (OCR) font that we took to the communications center for transmission. Our ability to get intelligence into the hands of our supported commanders was measured in hours or, depending on the product, sometimes days. Hard copy imagery from OV-1 Mohawks or RF-4Cs took hours to process through a photo lab before an imagery analyst could even view it. This was MI in the 1970s. It evolved in the 1980s with a larger budget and a focus on the Soviet Union and North Korea. Does anyone remember the multi-volume Soviet Battlefield Development Plan? Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herze-govina, and Kosovo simply were not on the screen in the 1980s. This short history gives a backdrop of how far and how fast we have evolved in MI. Most of our senior warrant officers are products of the 1970s and 1980s, and have witnessed these changes. The changes of the past 30 years were remarkably slow compared to the expected changes of the 21st century.

Our MI warrant officer management evolved along with the Army—perhaps more slowly than it should have. We continue to access warrant officers much the same as we have for decades. The major change in the mid-1980s was the shift from direct appointments to the requirement to attend the Warrant Officer Candidate School and the Warrant Officer Basic Course before the first assignment. With the merger of military occupational specialties 352D (Emitter Location/Identification Technician) and 352H (Morse Intercept Technician) into Communications Intercept/Locator Technician (352H) on 1 October 1999, we have only one less MI warrant military occupational specialty (MOS) than we have always had. The ability to adapt and embrace new missions and functions will be crucial to the future success of MI warrant officers. We must have a vision to keep our focus on operating in that environment.

Vision

MI warrant officers provide the technical leadership and advice to ensure successful intelligence support across the entire spectrum of operations. They focus on—

- Adapting to rapidly changing environments and technologies.
- Managing intelligence systems and processes.
- Integrating intelligence architectures and communications.
- Developing and maintaining the technical proficiency of their soldiers.

By keeping a steadfast focus on this vision, we can ensure the evolution of MI warrant officers to provide relevant support across all disciplines. As a young noncommissioned officer (NCO) once said to me as he noticed my hesitancy to use the All-Source Analysis System, “Chief, don’t make us drag you kicking and screaming into the 21st century.” His point was valid. Our warrant officers must embrace change and be the leaders in managing the integration into and operation of technological advances in our intelligence units. Warrant officers have always been the recognized technical experts; they must now add technological expertise to that resumé.

The MI warrant officers of 2010 will require all of the skill sets they need today to include communicative skills; tactical, technical, and technological skills; and a solid base of ethics and values. How will we train warrant officers to maintain their traditional roles as technicians and teach the adaptive skills necessary to support new organizations such as the Initial and Interim Brigades (I-Brigades)?

Training and Managing Warrant Officers

The Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), directed a review of all warrant officer training in the Intelligence Center to put emphasis on training the right skills at the right time. Emphasis on assignment-specific training will be critical to future success. The diversity of jobs we now expect MI warrant officers to perform does not lend itself to the “one size fits all” training strategy. To better focus training resources, USAIC&FH developed a pyramid of roles we expect warrant officers to fill (see Figure 1). Each level builds on those beneath. As warrant officers achieve CW5, they should be able to perform all of the roles in the pyramid.
The Army Development System XXI Task Force is addressing the overall training and management of warrant officers. Discipline-specific missions and training are a more difficult area to address. The intelligence-specific aspects are complex, with varying requirements for signals intelligence, human intelligence, counterintelligence, imagery intelligence, analysis, and maintenance. We must also integrate intelligence support to information operations (IO) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) into our training. Training warrant officers to keep pace with known and projected changes in structure, missions, and equipment will remain one of our biggest challenges.

Our training strategy also recognizes that warrant officers will be crucial leaders in the digitization of intelligence functions. Warrant officers must be at the forefront in developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures to make digitization a reality. It will be the warrant officers who will not only integrate digital processes into daily operations but will also be able to brief supported commanders from digital displays with the same ease they would have if they were briefing from maps with grease pencil markings. Operating in a digital environment requires a more thorough knowledge of the tools and the process. Automation does not make a poor analyst good, but it will make an excellent analyst better. This requires future MI warrant officers to have solid grounding in the automation aspects of their sections, and to have a firm grasp on intelligence architectures and operations. Once we achieve a comfort level operating in a digital environment, acetate and grease pencils will go the way of the manual typewriter and onionskin paper. As the technical and technological experts, warrant officers must make digitization their normal mode of operations.

To populate the objective force, there are three critical challenges we must address. They are—

- Maintain technical skills.
- Access new warrant officers.
- Retain senior warrant officers.

**Retain Senior Warrant Officers.** MI is having great difficulty filling senior warrant officer (SWO) positions. Future operations will have even greater need for this expertise. Retaining SWOs will continue to be a priority that requires additional emphasis. Based on the number of years that NCOs have completed when we currently access them as warrant officers, they have about a nine-year lifecycle as warrant officers. We need to increase that lifecycle to 14 or more years to help alleviate our SWO shortages. One way to increase that lifecycle is to develop criteria and training to reduce the number of years of service at accession.

**Conclusion**

MI warrant officers will continue to be an integral part of future organizations, with an ever-expanding role to provide the technical leadership needed to accomplish intelligence missions. The techni-
The Military Intelligence Officer in the 21st Century

by Charlotte I. Borghardt

As the Army transforms into the Army of the 21st century, Military Intelligence must also evolve. Our MI officers must be able to function in a network-centric warfare environment and be comfortable working with the digital technology revolutionizing the way we do business. MI officers must be able to understand the future battle environment, which will often be in complex urban terrain, and must have a better understanding of national-level intelligence assets and capabilities. Because of improved “reach back” capability, the officer must be able to synchronize multiple systems to ensure adequate coverage with all available intelligence systems. The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), training, and professional development of MI officers need transformation to create and maintain an MI Officer Corps capable of meeting these new demands.

One Last Look Back

The last thirty years saw many changes in both OPMS and the requirements for our officers. At one time, all officers were required to have a basic branch and an additional specialty but this proved to be cumbersome, and many officers never served in their additional specialties. The criteria for a normal career progression (formal training and command) made it difficult for the officer to be successful in both the basics and a specialty.

With advances in technology, the Army saw the need for both the traditional officers who can lead, command, and perform in their basic branches, and those officers who have a solid foundation in basic branch functions but focus on specific aspects of the Army like technology, information operations (IO), or strategic intelligence. Thus, the Army developed OPMS XXI to allow these officers to be competitive in either area and still meet the ever-changing demands of the Army.

The Future of the MI Officer Corps

The personnel requirements for our 21st century MI officers will include better management and assignments that allow them to meet the intelligence needs of commanders at every level. As the Army transforms into a more mobile, quick-moving digital force, traditional officer career paths must change to meet these challenges. OPMS XXI will satisfy both Total Army and joint requirements in this century, developing officers who expertly employ appropriate skills, knowledge, and attributes, inculcating behavior that reflects the Army values. This new system will balance the Army’s diverse personnel requirements while providing Army XXI with a tactically and technically competent officer corps. While warfighting remains the preeminent skill of the Army, the need for technological skills runs a close second.
Our MI officers now have the opportunity to remain on the traditional MI track, the Operations Career Field (OP CF) or specialize in another CF. A percentage of each officer year-group selected for promotion to Major will receive designation into other CFs. Officers who remain in the OP CF will serve in traditional branch assignments (S3s, executive officers (XOs), battalion and brigade commanders, etc.). They can expect to see more tactical assignments as the Army meets the “manning the force” directive of filling tactical units to 100-percent strength. They will serve more time in MI assignments than in branch immaterial jobs.

Traditional intelligence assignments will change as we implement the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). For example, a human intelligence (HUMINT) officer (area of concentration 35F) will be the single focal point for all counterintelligence- (CI) and HUMINT-associated matters in the area of responsibility. This staff officer will be responsible for coordinating and deconflicting CI and HUMINT activities with national agencies. While MI officers will fill the traditional positions (company command and platoon leader) in the Surveillance Troop of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, the XO will be an armor officer. This will integrate combat arms expertise within the MI unit.

MI officers designated for CFs other than the OP CF will serve in their previously designated functional areas (all officers receive a specific functional area designation during their fifth year of service). These officers will become world-class specialists serving in their designated functional areas only (with the chance of a few tours in immaterial positions). Some MI officers may migrate to other CFs, but because of the closely associated functions and technical nature of the jobs, many will opt to work in the IO CF. It is clear that MI expertise is necessary in these functional areas.

For many years, the MI Corps has struggled with a shortage of field grade officers. While we knew we had an obligation to ensure intelligence support for the combat commander, we also had the majority of the joint requirements. Many times, the joint world won out. We also saw the necessity to train and maintain a population of strategic intelligence specialists who are as proficient as their Navy and Air Force counterparts. The establishment of Functional Area 34, Strategic Intelligence Officer, will help solve both these problems. The creation of FA 34 and the resulting recoding of billets allow the Army to address its crucial shortage of field grade MI officers. The ability to assign other than MI branch officers into those echelons-above-corps (EAC) positions will enable the Army to fill more of its TOE (table of organization and equipment) intelligence billets while at the same time “growing” the joint and strategic intelligence officers it requires at EAC.

**Outlook**

The changes in officer personnel management will help the MI Officer Corps meet the challenges of the future. Our officers will be as comfortable in a fully digitized environment as they are in a general-purpose medium tent. They will be more flexible and adaptable to succeed in a constantly changing world environment and be adept at working in the Army of the future.

Charlotte Borghardt (Major, USAR, Retired) is an Intelligence Specialist in the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence, at Fort Huachuca. While on active duty, she served as a Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (SIGINT/EW) Officer with assignments at the Army Security Agency and 3d Armor Division. Ms. Borghardt earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in German at State University of New York at Oswego. Readers can contact her via E-mail at charlotte.borghardt@huarmy.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-1188 or DSN 821-1188.

---

**Worldwide Military Intelligence CSM/SGM Conference 2001**

The Worldwide Military Intelligence CSM/SGM Conference 2001 will meet at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, from 5 through 9 March 2001 in Fitch Auditorium, Alvarado Hall, from 0800-1700 daily. This year’s conference will include briefings and discussion on topics ranging from changes in MOS structure, National Cryptologic School and U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca training updates, the new Prophet collection system, the new Shadow 200 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, to a variety of language issues. There will be a special presentation to recognize the first winner of the CSM (Retired) Doug Russell award. There will also be a challenging sports event on Thursday afternoon, so bring your competitive spirit. The conference will culminate with an exchange of ideas between the conference attendees and several MI generals. For administrative details and updates, please visit the Conference website at http://huachuca.usaic.army.mil/CSMFolders/SGMConf2001/Main.htm or send an E-mail to timothy.carroll@huarmy.mil.
by Colonel William M. Knarr, Jr.

Initial Brigade Combat Team UAV Support

In line with the Army’s move to transform itself to a highly mobile, more rapidly deployable force to meet current and projected military needs, the first Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) was organized at Fort Lewis, Washington. The IBCT has begun to train and develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary to explore how it will meet the goals set forth by the Chief of Staff of the Army in October 2000. A key tenet of the IBCT concept is for the unit commanders to have the necessary organic intelligence assets to provide the critical information needed to enable the effective and optimum use of their forces. A vital piece in this concept is organic tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) support.

As the Shadow 200 TUAV is still in the materiel acquisition process, the Army has directed that the first IBCT (IBCT-1) receive the Hunter UAV as an interim solution for TUAV support. Delta Troop (the Brigade’s Reconnaissance Troop in the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron), 1/14th Cavalry Regiment (IBCT-1), at Fort Lewis has taken delivery of a TUAV-size slice of the Hunter baseline. Unit resourcing for the UAV Reconnaissance Platoon will consist of 17 military and 8 defense contractor personnel. They will operate and maintain the Hunter equipment from Gray Army Airfield, and provide UAV support to troops in training at both the Rainier Training Area, near Fort Lewis, and at the Yakima Training Center, near Yakima, Washington. The last of the unit’s personnel and equipment were in place by early September 2000, and will begin support to IBCT doctrine and TTP development in early fiscal year 2001.

JOTBS

In September 2000, the Army selected Fort Huachuca, Arizona, as the home for the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Operational Test Bed System (JOTBS). The JOTBS is a full-up, UAV test bed capability undergoing initial development, fielding, and operation under a partnership between the Program Executive Office for Strike Weapons and Unmanned Aviation (PEO-W) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The JOTBS combines UAVs (initially two Predator air vehicles), a Tactical Control System (TCS) UAV ground station, and maintenance, operations, technical, engineering, and JFCOM staff support to provide a mobile, self-contained UAV operating capability.

This unit will enable JFCOM to realize fully its role as the advocate for “jointness,” joint interoperability, and for joint force integration of UAV and TCS capabilities. The JOTBS will provide the joint commanders with an operational experimentation and test capability to develop the TCS so that it supports both Service UAV program needs and joint warfighting requirements. It will also serve as a tool for exploring new concepts, tactics, and procedures to assure maximization of UAV capabilities. The JOTBS will operate from Libby Army Airfield with flight operations beginning in February 2001.

TUAV Testing

The Army’s new Shadow 200 TUAV will begin testing soon at Fort Huachuca. The Shadow UAV system is undergoing two phases of developmental testing (DT). The first phase, designated Test Series 200 (TS-200), is a contractor test using the corporation’s own assets to prove out changes to the existing system that incorporate the capabilities required by the Army. The second phase, designated Test Series 300 (TS-300), will be under the direction of the Army TUAV Project Management Office. The contractor will also perform TS-300 testing, but will use the first Army-owned production Shadow system. TS-200 testing is currently ongoing at Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) in Maryland, while we plan for the TS-300 to take place at Fort Huachuca beginning in November 2000. The contractor wishes to complete the TS-200 testing at ATC; if inclement weather persists, an alternative is to move to Fort Huachuca for the remainder of the testing.

Colonel Bill Knarr is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Aerial Common Sensor (UAV/ACS). Readers may contact him via E-mail at william.knarr@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-2165 or DSN 821-2165. The TSM UAV/ACS Internet website is at http://huachuca-dcd.army.mil/tsmuav/tsmuav.htm.
Prophet’s Debut at the JCF-AWE

by Colonel Kevin C. Peterson

“The Prophet system is far better than the AN/TRQ-32 TEAMMATE in both operational capabilities and ease of use.” This was a common comment made by the soldiers of Alpha Company, 110th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, 10th Mountain Division (Light), during a critique of the Joint Contingency Force–Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF-AWE) exercise. After four months of operator training and field exercises, the soldiers of the 110th MI Battalion finally had the chance to deploy two Prophet Ground systems into the “Box” at the JCF-AWE. Throughout the exercise—conducted at Fort Polk, Louisiana, from 9 to 21 September 2000—the two Prophet systems remained fully operational and provided continuous force protection to the supported brigade commander.

The soldiers praised the increase in mobility that Prophet’s on-the-move (OTM) capability gave them. The operators masterfully employed a modified OTM technique while conducting electronic warfare support (ES) operations. During support to convoy operations, the Prophet teams moved with the supported columns, stopped at designated way points, raised the ES antenna, and conducted collection and direction-finding operations in support of the convoy. When the convoy moved, the Prophet teams lowered their antennas and moved out promptly with the columns. They also used the traditional Prophet OTM mode (antenna down) while supporting maneuver operations.

Observations

The 110th MI Battalion soldiers provided good insight on how to improve the operational effectiveness of the Prophet Ground system. They stated that their Transcription and Analysis (T&A) Section was overwhelmed while performing nodal analysis and line-of-bearing (LOB) plotting on Prophet information. They believe that to streamline this process and ensure rapid forwarding of Prophet products, additional automation is required in both the Prophet vehicles and the T&A sections. The operators presented some problems and recommended a few improvements for the system to increase operator proficiency. For example, the operator is cramped in the right-rear seat when operating the system with field gear, and the operators need pilots’ kneeboards so they can write while operating the system OTM.

The Prophet Ground system is a “new” system that departs from the older legacy systems’ concepts of operations. The unit leaders and staffs need to understand the nuances of Prophet employment fully to optimize the capabilities of the Prophet system.

The program has come a long way in two years. Prophet Ground Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) began in July 1999, using extensive off-the-shelf components and technology. The System Acceptance and First Article Tests were from May to July 2000. We will field three Prophet systems to each of the two Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) during fiscal year 2001. The Prophet system is critical to the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation program and has the capability for growth to meet its Objective Force requirements. The Prophet Ground’s successes at the JCF-AWE stand as a testament to everyone who has helped define the new signals intelligence paradigm to keep tactical SIGINT relevant today and into the future.

ASAS and the Initial Brigade Combat Team

by Colonel Jerry V. Proctor

As the equipment, personnel, and doctrinal training materials begin to assemble so that the first Brigade Combat Team (BCT) or Initial BCT (IBCT) can begin its collective training at Fort Lewis, Washington, emotions are running high. Since the Chief of Staff of Army (CSA) announced his vision for a transformed Army a year ago, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the U.S. Army Materiel Command, and U.S. Total Army Personnel Command have been working at a significantly accelerated pace to provide the first BCT with the right tools to ensure its success.

One of the tenets of the CSA’s instructions for the transformation brigade was that it was not to be an
experimentation test bed. However, within the organization and operation (O&O) plan and concept of operations (CONOP) are some required tasks that the “fielded” and even the “experimental” Army cannot perform. In order to satisfy these tasks, some developmental solutions (hardware, software, and doctrinal concepts) will likely be necessary.

How ASAS Fits Into This New Brigade

Today the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is a system of sub-systems. Whether you think of ASAS as being those all-source and single-source boxes resident inside the SCIF (sensitive compartmented information facility) or as the most prolific box, the ASAS Remote Workstation, you are only half correct. There are six ASAS sub-systems that support the IBCT—
- ASAS Remote Workstation (ASAS RWS).
- ASAS–Light (ASAS-L).
- Analysis and Control Team–Enclave (ACT-E).
- CI/HUMINT (counterintelligence and human intelligence) Automated Tool Set (CHATS).
- CI and Interrogation Operations Workstation.
- Individual Tactical Reporting Tool (ITRT).

The Box Counts

Within the first IBCT, “non-developmental” ASAS consists of 15 RWS and 16 CHATS systems. Additionally, there are two systems that should move to the “non-developmental” column soon, one ACT-E and six ASAS-Ls (a laptop designed for battalion S2s that acts like a mini-RWS). The ACT-E simplistically is a HMMWV- (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) mounted shelter containing two RWSs, some radios, and other communications equipment.

I will define the “developmental category” as any system that is not yet in or successfully through its operational test and evaluation and subsequent fielding decision, and therefore has not received a “stamp of approval.” Only two systems fit this category: the 44 ITRTs—that basically provide a “CI flavored” personal data companion (PDC)—and one CI and interrogation operations workstation. The CI and interrogation operations workstation is a heavy-duty HUMINT-analysis workstation allowing in-depth CI analysis.

Future articles will cover the actual functions of these systems. Suffice it to say that the All-Source Analysis System is well placed in the brigade of the future.

Colonel Jerry Proctor is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRA-DOC) System Manager (TSM) for ASAS. Readers can contact him via E-mail at jerry.proctor@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-3504 or DSN 821-3504. The Deputy TSM is Mr. Michael Strack; his E-mail address is mike.strack@hua.army.mil and his telephone number is (520) 533-3507 or DSN 821-3507. The TSM ASAS web-site is at http://www.tsmasas.army.mil/.

RC Assignments with JAC/JRISE in United Kingdom and OCONUS

The Joint Analysis Center/Joint Reserve Intelligence Support Element (JAC/JRISE) located in Atlanta, Georgia, is looking for Reserve Component (RC) branch-qualified military intelligence officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel. The specialties needed include—
- 35B Strategic Intelligence Officer
- 35D All-Source Intelligence Officer
- 350B All-Source Intelligence Technician
- 350D Imagery Intelligence Technician
- 96B Intelligence Analyst
- 96D Imagery Analyst

Applicants are required to have a current Top Secret security clearance with Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access and be qualified in these military occupational specialties. Unit members typically drill at Fort Gillem, Georgia, for inactive duty training (IDT), active duty for training (ADT), and annual training (AT). However, they also participate in mission work at the Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom and at other assignments outside the continental United States (OCONUS) on an as needed basis. In addition, this unit offers good training, challenging work (supporting real-world intelligence missions), flexible scheduling, and combined IDTs. Interested soldiers should contact Sergeant Campbell, the JAC/JRISE recruitment noncommissioned officer (NCO), at (404) 362.3151 or DSN 797.3151.
During its June 2000 Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotation in Hohenfels, Germany, the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Division, employed its Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT) (E Troop, 4th Cavalry), with remarkable success. As the Brigade TAC (forward tactical command post) S2, I was fortunate to benefit from the BRT’s collection efforts, and learned several lessons about deploying an organic brigade reconnaissance asset in cooperation with battalion task force (TF) scouts.

Formation of the BCT
The 2d BCT formed its BRT in January 1999, about six months before its deployment as the initial entry force into Kosovo. The Troop comprised two platoons of scouts (military occupational specialty 19D) led by Infantry or Armor lieutenants. Artillery Combat Observation and Lasing Teams (COLTs) often augmented the platoons for an additional target acquisition capability. The BCT has armed the BRT with .50 caliber M2 and lighter weapons, and the Troop conducts mounted movement using hard-backed HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles). Both Armor and Infantry captains have served as the Troop commanders.

Parallels with the RSTA Squadron Reconnaissance Troops
In both peacekeeping and combat scenarios, the BRT provides the BCT with an unprecedented organic reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) asset. One can draw parallels between the missions of the 2d BCT’s BRT and the Ground Reconnaissance Troops that will comprise three-quarters of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron in the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) now forming at Fort Lewis, Washington. The end-strength of the IBCT’s RSTA Squadron will obviously be much greater than that of a single troop.

Witnesses to combat training center (CTC) opposing force (OPFOR) use of Soviet-style multiple waves of reconnaissance can attest to their effectiveness in observing the battlefield. A U.S. heavy BCT armed with a BRT, or other organic R&S assets in addition to battalion TF scouts, can achieve similar layering effects resulting in exceptional reconnaissance of a brigade area of operations (AO).

Maximizing Effectiveness
At the CMTC, the 2d BCT found that its BRT was most effective when deployed several kilometers forward of the TF scouts in the brigade AO. Typical BRT targets in an adversary defense included obstacles under construction, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in deep-hide positions, and the adversary reserves, both antitank (AT) and tank. Interdiction of enemy engineer efforts proved most effective. During adversary attacks, the BRT deployed forward of the TF scouts to provide early warning of enemy reconnaissance and main body elements, handing them off to the scouts. While placing the BRT at somewhat greater risk of compromise, the BCT achieved great depth in its R&S fight.

While the BRT was most effective when deployed against deep targets, we learned that concentrating too many BRT teams deep could result in a “black hole” on the battlefield between the shallowest BRT elements and the deepest TF scout teams. Particularly during an enemy attack, elements that the BRT tracked and attempted to hand off to TF scouts could become “lost” and change direction, or drop dismounts undetected in the gap between the R&S echelons. We found that deploying both BRT and TF scout teams in depth is critical for continuous observation. Joint training of the BRT and TF scouts before deployment also improved their communication and coordinated observation of enemy elements.

Because the BRT deploys far forward in the brigade AO, early and quiet movement is crucial to the Troop’s preservation. The BCT sent the BRT forward as early as the “Division” (CMTC Commander, Operations Group (COG)) would allow—36 to 48 hours before the battle and up to 24 hours earlier than the TF scouts. While spending that much time in listening post and observation post (LP/OP) positions is taxing on the soldiers, it maximizes their observation of the battlefield and reduces their risk of exposure during infiltration.

Lessons Learned
We learned that rapid and quiet infiltration also increased BRT survivability. Whenever possible, the
platoons were air-inserted within a couple kilometers of their planned LP/OP sites. If the adversary did not find the teams on the landing zone (LZ), they most often survived the entire mission by using strict light and noise discipline. The BRT’s HMMWVs were useful only for taking teams to the vicinity of the line of departure (LD) since any deep vehicular movement, even using concealed trails at slow speed, tipped off the enemy to the teams’ locations. If airlift was not available, the BRT left its vehicles near the LD using camouflage, and moved on foot several kilometers to their LP/OPs. BRT use of vehicles in real-world missions would depend on the adversary’s collection capabilities.

When first using the BRT far forward in the brigade sector, most leaders were concerned about enemy elements finding the Troop’s teams. The teams reported observations but did not engage even soft targets or call for fire because of concerns that the OPFOR might find them. However, the BCT discovered that with careful selection of routes and LP/OP sites, enemy elements had great difficulty intercepting the BRT—even if it was more active. The value gained by the Troop’s destruction of adversary LP/OPs with direct fire and disrupting enemy obstacle construction or maneuver rehearsals with observed indirect fire was more significant than the loss of the few teams that the enemy engaged. Prompt casualty evacuation and “re-seed” of compromised Troop teams assured us sustained R&S operations.

Also worth noting is the fact that the command, control, and communications (C3) tying together the entire BCT R&S effort paved the way to success. A junior Infantry captain, a former scout platoon leader assigned to the brigade staff, served as Chief of Reconnaissance (COR). The COR executed the BCT R&S plan, coordinating with the brigade staff, BRT commander, TF S2s, and TF scout platoon leaders. He oversaw rehearsals and deconflicted movement and reporting during the R&S fight. The COR worked with the Fire Support Officer (FSO) to protect the teams from artillery by covering them with no-fire areas (NFAs) or critical friendly zones (CFZs)1 that allowed the BRT’s teams room for limited relocation of their LP/OPs when necessary. Because of his immersion in the R&S mission, the COR was also instrumental in assisting the BCT S2 section to develop the enemy picture.

Thanks to 1LT Kevin Kingsley, former Assistant S2 of the 2d BCT, 1st Infantry Division, and CPT Jim Moreno, former Assistant S2 of the 1-77 Armor Battalion, 2d BCT, for their contributions to this Quick Tip.

Endnote
1. See the article by Captain Andrew T. Johnson and Major John E. Della-Giustina in the July-September 2000 issue of MIPB for definitions of these terms if they are unfamiliar.

Captain Bob Davidson is currently an MI Captains Career Course (MICCC) student at Fort Huachuca. His past assignments include service as Assistant Brigade S2, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division; G2 Operations Battle Captain, Multi-National Brigade–East (MNB-E), Task Force Falcon, Kosovo; Electronic Warfare Platoon Leader, D Company, 101st MI Battalion; and Counterintelligence Systems Officer, Plans and Operations Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). CPT Davidson earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Journalism from Bowling Green State University. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at rsdavidson@bigfoot.com.

---

New Website for Future Leaders

CompanyCommand.com is a website dedicated to company-level leaders wanting to learn and share ideas on topics such as command philosophies, Army policies, leadership counseling, officer professional development (OPD), and professional reading programs. Eight staff and faculty officers at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, operate the website during off-duty hours without remuneration.

The website meets its goal to improve institutional knowledge at the company-level by facilitating lateral information flow and serving as a user-driven forum whereby former and current company commanders share ideas, products, and lessons learned with others. Majors Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, the site’s founders, commented that their sole purpose is helping leaders grow great units and soldiers.

CompanyCommand.com has a section organized by branch that links the experiences and competencies of former and current commanders. For example, it lists for the intelligence community some Military Intelligence contacts including three former MI company commanders who are volunteer mentors. The operators of the site plan to expand it with platoon leader tools for junior leaders.

Among the website’s other offerings are a “command tools” section with professional presentations, lessons learned, and stories. It also contains quizzes, after-action reviews, tactical scenarios, monthly updates, links to other military websites, and much more. Popularity of the site has increased since its debut in February 2000. The number of “hits” has increased from 11,114 to more than 600,000 as of 30 September.
### Glossary of Acronyms Used in This Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/I</td>
<td>Analysis/integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AADCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After-action review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCS</td>
<td>Army Battlefield Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Analysis and control element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Armored cavalry regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Aerial Common Sensor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Analysis and control team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>Army Development Study Task Force XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>Aerial exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEPDS</td>
<td>Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFATDS</td>
<td>Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>Advanced individual training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAC</td>
<td>ASAS Master Analyst Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOC</td>
<td>Advanced NCO Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOIR</td>
<td>Area of intelligence responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFOR</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARL</td>
<td>Airborne Reconnaissance Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>U.S. Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS</td>
<td>All-Source Analysis System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS-L</td>
<td>ASAS-Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>All-Source Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>All-Source Workstation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Aberdeen Test Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCCS</td>
<td>Army Tactical Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSA</td>
<td>Association of the U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWE</td>
<td>Advanced warfighting experiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASIX</td>
<td>Brigade All-Source Intelligence Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAS</td>
<td>Battlefield Automated System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCC</td>
<td>Brigade coordination cell; battlefield command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>Battlefield damage assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>Brigade, Bde–Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITC</td>
<td>Basic Instructor Training Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLOS</td>
<td>Beyond line of sight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNCOC</td>
<td>Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>Battlefield operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRT</td>
<td>Brigade reconnaissance troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, control, and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Combined Arms and Services Staff School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISR</td>
<td>Command, control, communications, and computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAV</td>
<td>Calvary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Circular error probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSO</td>
<td>Counterintelligence force protection source operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFZ</td>
<td>Critical friendly zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGS</td>
<td>Common Ground Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHATS</td>
<td>Counterintelligence/HUMINT Automated Tool Set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIMS</td>
<td>CI/HUMINT Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Collection management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Collection management officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Combat Maneuver Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Commander, operations group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLT</td>
<td>Combat Observation and Lazing Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOP</td>
<td>Contingency operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Chief of reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command post exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army; Corps support activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Central Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTT</td>
<td>Commander’s Tactical Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCD</td>
<td>Directorate of Combat Developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCGS-A</td>
<td>Distributed Common Ground System–Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSINT</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCEX</td>
<td>Documentation exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOIM</td>
<td>Directorate of Information Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Direct support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSE</td>
<td>Distribution simulation environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSN</td>
<td>Defense secure network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT</td>
<td>Developmental testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTLOMS</td>
<td>Doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, material, and soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Electronic attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Echelons above corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEFI</td>
<td>Essential elements of friendly information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMD</td>
<td>Engineering and manufacturing development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Electro-optical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Electronic support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>Enhanced separate brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXFOR</td>
<td>Experimental force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAIO</td>
<td>Field artillery intelligence officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Forward Area Support Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBCB2</td>
<td>Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Future combat system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLIR</td>
<td>Forward-looking infrared radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>Fire support element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>Fire support officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FST</td>
<td>Field support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIE</td>
<td>Global information environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRCS</td>
<td>Guardrail Common Sensor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSM</td>
<td>Ground Station Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSR</td>
<td>Ground Surveillance Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMVV</td>
<td>High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAV</td>
<td>Interim Armored Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>In accordance with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBCT</td>
<td>Initial brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBOS</td>
<td>Intelligence BOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEW</td>
<td>Intelligence and electronic warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Infantry division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDM</td>
<td>Improved Data Modem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGSM</td>
<td>Interim Ground Station Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFO</td>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTREP</td>
<td>Intelligence reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTS</td>
<td>Intelligence disciplines (e.g. IMINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTSUM</td>
<td>Intelligence summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>International organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>Intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Information requirements; Infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Intermediate staging base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDC</td>
<td>Intelligence support to division and corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITRADS</td>
<td>INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITRT</td>
<td>Individual Tactical Reporting Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWS-B</td>
<td>Imagery Workstation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAC</td>
<td>Joint Analysis Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCATS</td>
<td>Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCF AWE</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Force AWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCISO</td>
<td>Joint CI Staff Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDISS</td>
<td>Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCom</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JISE</td>
<td>Joint intelligence support element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMICS</td>
<td>JWICS Mobile Integrated Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint STARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOTBS</td>
<td>Joint Operational Test Bed System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSWS</td>
<td>Joint Services Workstation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTT</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWICS</td>
<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KF</td>
<td>Kazar Fury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIOWA-W</td>
<td>KIOWA Warrior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KL</td>
<td>Klieglight report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAV</td>
<td>Light Armored Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBA</td>
<td>APACHE Longbow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Line of departure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGSM</td>
<td>Light GSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIWA</td>
<td>U.S. Army Land Information Warfare Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOP</td>
<td>Line of bearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP/OP</td>
<td>Listening post/observation post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPU</td>
<td>Limited procurement urgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRS</td>
<td>Long-range surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>Landing zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACOM</td>
<td>Major command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINT</td>
<td>Measurement and signature intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCS</td>
<td>Maneuver Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>Military decisionmaking process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time available, and civilian considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGS</td>
<td>Magnetic grid system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGSM</td>
<td>Medium Ground Station Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICCC</td>
<td>MI Captains Career Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIOAC</td>
<td>MI Officer Advanced Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIOBC</td>
<td>MI Officer Basic Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPB</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military occupational specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUT</td>
<td>Military operations in urban terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAD</td>
<td>Mobile public affairs detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Multisensor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>Moving target indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified table of organization and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>Major theater war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAI</td>
<td>Named area of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAV</td>
<td>Navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, biological, and chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>NCO in charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant evacuation operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETT</td>
<td>New Equipment Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>No fire area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGIC</td>
<td>National Ground Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMA</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Intelligence Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSTO</td>
<td>New System Training Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;I</td>
<td>Operations and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;O</td>
<td>Organization and operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>Order of battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCMI</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCR</td>
<td>Optical character reader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMT</td>
<td>Operational management team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP CF</td>
<td>Operations career field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>Opposing forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPMS</td>
<td>Officer Personnel Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operations order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTP</td>
<td>Operations tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTC</td>
<td>Officer Transition Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTM</td>
<td>On the move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public affairs officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Permanent change of station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Personal Data Companion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Practical exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO-W</td>
<td>Program Executive Office for Strike Weapons and Unmanned Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Total Army Personnel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority intelligence requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLT</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QR</td>
<td>Quick-reaction capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;S</td>
<td>Reconnaissance and surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDD</td>
<td>Required delivery date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMBASS II</td>
<td>Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Requests for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSOC</td>
<td>Regional SIGINT Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSTA</td>
<td>Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTIP</td>
<td>Radar Technology Insertion Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWS</td>
<td>Remote Workstation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;T</td>
<td>Scientific and technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALUTE</td>
<td>Report; size, actions, location, uniforms, time, and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Synthetic-aperture radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASO</td>
<td>Stability and support operations [not an approved acronym]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>Sensitive compartmented information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIF</td>
<td>SCI facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Sample data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMA</td>
<td>Special Electronic Mission Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINCgars</td>
<td>Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary of Acronyms Used in This Issue (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIPERNET</td>
<td>Secure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR</td>
<td>Specific information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLC</td>
<td>Senior Leader’s Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOR</td>
<td>Special orders and requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Small-scale contingency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSE</td>
<td>Single-Source Enclave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STX</td>
<td>Student training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Situational understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>Senior warrant officer; Staff weather officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;A</td>
<td>Transcription and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/I</td>
<td>Tactical internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Teach, advise and counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSIM</td>
<td>Tactical Simulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>To be determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCDL</td>
<td>Tactical Common Datalink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCS</td>
<td>Temporary change of station; Theater communications System; Tactical control station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>Tables of Distribution and Allowances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDDS</td>
<td>Tactical Data Dissemination System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDL</td>
<td>Tactical Datalink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEB</td>
<td>Tactical exploitation battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENCAP</td>
<td>Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TES</td>
<td>Tactical engagement simulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGT</td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIBS</td>
<td>Tactical Information Broadcast System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>Tactical Leaders Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Tactical operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOCEX</td>
<td>TOC exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Table of organization and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOPS</td>
<td>Tactical Onboard Processing System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPC</td>
<td>Task performance capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIXS</td>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Exchange System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRRIP</td>
<td>Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>TS II–TROJAN SPIRIT (Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSM</td>
<td>TRADOC System Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUAV</td>
<td>Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Shadow 200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACECOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Communications–Electronics Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAICS</td>
<td>U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>U.S. Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEUR</td>
<td>U.S. Army, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASMA</td>
<td>U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHS</td>
<td>Video home system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO</td>
<td>Executive officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contributing Editors and Proofreaders

We thank the following officers for their many contributions to the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin for October-December 2000. They all worked in the MIPB Office while on casual status. We wish them all the best in their classes and their follow-on assignments!


Attention MICA Members MIPB Subscriptions through MICA

In its quarterly newsletter (4th Quarter 1999), The Vanguard, the MI Corps Association notified its members that they would only continue receive the published copy of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin if they returned a form by 1 March 2000. (This action was due to a price increase for MIPB to $10 and $12.50 foreign.) MICA sent us only 110 names for continued receipt of the published magazine effective with the April-June issue of MIPB. The rest of you may contact the MICA Administrator, Ms. Janet Klucsarits, via e-mail at corporate@isishq.com (include “MIPB Subscription” in the subject line) or you can call her at (520) 459-5012. Their website address is http://www.micorps.org. The mailing address is MICA, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020.

The Vanguard stated that MIPB is available on line; that fact appeared to be part of MICA’s justification for this action. MIPB is available at our website but our policy since 1995 has been to load an issue on the Internet when the printer mails the following issue. Thus, the Internet issues will not include the current one.

MICA is now charging $11.50 for MIPB subscriptions with MICA membership. If you wish to subscribe to the magazine directly rather than through MICA, you may contact Mrs. Cruz Martinez via E-mail at martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or by telephone at (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015; the fax number is (520) 538-1007 or DSN 879-1007. Her mailing address is Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), ATTN: ATZS-CLM (Martinez), Building 61730 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca AZ 85613-6000.

Our October-December 2000 issue of MIPB, “MI Out Front in Transformation,” will be a special issue devoted entirely to the transformation of the Army and MI’s part in that change. MICA members should contact the organization if they want copies of that issue.
How to Submit an Article to MIPB

Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could be about current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned, or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short “quick tip” on better use of equipment or personnel, or fast “work-arounds” for problems. Articles from the “hot spots” are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory to dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1000-2500 words (about 2-4 pages single-spaced text with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphics that enhance understanding of your topic. Quick tips should be 300-800 words. Put the “bottom line up front” and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, or William A. McIntosh’s Guide to Effective Writing.

When writing for MIPB, several stylistic pitfalls to avoid for a clearer, more forceful article are—

- **Maintain the active voice as much as possible.** Write, “The soldier performed the task” rather than “The task was performed by the soldier.”
- **Make your point.** Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing how good the system is, the reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.
- **Use the fewest words to state your points.** Write “Leaders must emphasize training” rather than “It is imperative for Military Intelligence professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues.”

Please send the article via E-mail to elizabeth.mcgovern@hua.army.mil or mail it (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-BDB (MIPB Editor), [expedited shipping: Bldg 61730, Room 102], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85363-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and do send the graphics separately if by E-mail). We can accept articles in Microsoft Office 97, Word 6.0, Word Perfect 6.0a, and ASCII and PowerPoint, Corel, and Adobe graphics. Please include with your article—

- A cover letter with your work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published. Please include your social security number (SSN) so that we can find you if you transfer, PCS, or ETS/retire before we publish your article; we will protect your SSN and make no other use of it. Also, indicate whether we may put your article on our Internet web site even if we do not publish it in the printed magazine.
- Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with adequate descriptions. Try to find good “action” photos that illustrate your article; photos and other graphics really enliven an article. We need complete captions for the photos (the who, what, where, when, why, and how); the photographer credits; and include the author’s name on photos. We can return photos if so requested—be sure to include an address to which you want the photos sent after we use them. We will gladly accept photos without articles too.
- A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain. (MIPB is available for sale by the Government Printing Office and posted on the Internet.)
- The full name of each author in the byline and a biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty position, other related assignments, civilian degrees (degree, school, major), and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, PGIP, etc.). (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. We will send you an acknowledgment that we received your article. We may notify you again when we get ready to run it. Please inform us of your current E-mail, telephone numbers, and postal addresses if you change jobs, move, or PCS. It can
Constituted in the regular Army on 2 February 1901 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1903 the 14th Cavalry Regiment had its baptism in fire during the insurgency campaign of the Philippines. Upon the successful completion of that campaign in 1906, the Regiment then returned to the United States and took up garrisons in the Pacific northwest, where it assumed peacetime duties. The Regiment returned to the Philippines in 1909.

Then in 1912, the Regiment served in the Mexican campaign, joining General Black Jack Pershing's expeditionary forces in the summer of 1916, chasing bandits throughout the dust and the heat of the Mexican plains. The Regiment then returned to Texas, where it patrolled the border until 1918, when it was called into service in Europe. The signing of the Armistice at Versailles occurred before the Regiment could cross the Atlantic, so it reassumed its border patrol mission.

In 1920, the 14th Cavalry Regiment moved to Iowa and served in a peacetime capacity for approximately two decades. In 1942, the Army inactivated the Regiment, and from its lineage came the 14th Armored Regiment. On 28 August 1944, the 14th Cavalry Group sailed for Europe, landed on Omaha Beach 30 September 1944, and pressed east. On 18 October, the unit split, with the 18th Squadron attached to the 2d Infantry Division, and the 32d Squadron attached to the 83d Infantry Division.

On 12 December 1944, the headquarters element regained its autonomy, and began guarding the Gap in Belgium. Then, on 16 December, its turrets rang as the 14th Cavalry Group received the full brunt of the German winter counteroffensive in the “Battle of the Bulge.” After two days of savage fighting, the unit reassembled at Viersmans, Belgium, and attached to the 7th Armored Division. On 23 December, the unit held the southern flank of the perimeter, and allowed friendly troops to withdraw. On 25 December, the unit re-equipped, attached to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, and moved back into the “Bulge” to push back the Nazi foe.

Constituted on 25 September 1950 in the United States Army as the 209th Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment, the unit activated in the Republic of Korea on 6 October 1950. It participated in a number of campaigns during the Korean War.

On 1 November 1954, the unit inactivated until 3 August 1961, when the U.S. Army redesignated it as the 209th Military Intelligence Detachment and activated it in Okinawa on 25 August 1961. The unit again inactivated on 25 June 1969. The Army reactivated the unit in the Republic of Korea on 1 January 1978 and redesignated the unit as the 209th MI Company in the ROK from 1 April 1983 until 16 October 1988, when it inactivated.

In line with the Army’s transformation, the unit reorganized and activated as part of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, on 15 September 2000. The unit's decorations include Meritorious Unit Commendations with streamers embroidered Korea 1952 and Korea 1952-53 and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.

The Company formed to support the Army’s first Interim Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The 209th MI Company is one of four separate companies underneath the IBCT organization. The 209th MI Company is the organic military intelligence analysis and integration management unit that directly supports the brigade S2. The mission of the 209th MI Company is to support the 3d BCT’s planning, preparation, and execution of multiple, simultaneous decisive actions across the distributed area of operations. It will serve as part of the brigade as it helps develop doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the up to eight total transformed BCTs. The 209th MI Company will then conduct intelligence analysis, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) integration, and
Cavalry Regiment

After the bloody and brutal fight in the Ardennes, the Regiment was assigned to the 3d U.S. Army, and ended the war near the Austrian border. After the Armistice, the Regiment reflagged as the 14th Constabulary Regiment in the U.S. Army of Occupation. The Regiment later redesignated as the 14th Cavalry Regiment in 1948, and served on the border, guarding freedom’s frontier to include the Fulda Gap, until the colors were casing in 1972.

The Army reactivated the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, on 15 September 2000 as the U.S. Army’s first Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron in the first Interim Brigade Combat Team, as part of the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division. Delta Troop is the squadron’s surveillance troop and this is the first time that a reconnaissance squadron has ever had embedded Military Intelligence assets. Equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles, ground surveillance sections, Prophet teams, and NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) reconnaissance squads, the troop provides the squadron with accurate and timely intelligence ensuring the squadron and brigade maintain information dominance within its theater of operation.

The shield is yellow in the color of the Cavalry and the bend is blue for the color of the uniform worn at the time of the Regiment’s formation. The kris (the knife) is for the Philippine (Moro) campaigns, and the rattlesnake is for the Mexican campaigns.

Suivez Moi (Follow Me)!

Human Intelligence Company

(IBCT), 2d Infantry Division

human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analysis in Korea with the 2d Infantry Division.

A silver-colored metal and enamel device, consisting of a black field with an Indian tomahawk in silver, thereon, with point to dexter, and blade charged with a blue fleur-de-lis; attached to the handle by blue bands, three blue feathers in fanned display to sinister and contained by a silver scroll bearing the motto “Second to None” in black letters denotes the 209th MI Company. Blue and white (silver) are associated with the Infantry. The tomahawk alludes to the American origin of the unit, as does the Indian head on the sleeve insignia. The fleur-de-lis symbolizes France, where the unit saw its first combat experience during World War I while the feathers denote the major conflicts in which the unit participated.

“First To Know!”
112th Military Intelligence Brigade (Provisional)

The crest of the 112th Military Intelligence Brigade is a silver-colored metal enamel device consisting of a yellow enameled demi-sun emitting five rays surmounted by a silver dagger, point up, beneath an oriental blue chevron bearing five stars. This is all within and below an arc segment of silver oak leaves and a red scroll inscribed with the motto “Strength Through Security” in silver letters. Oriental blue and silver are the colors traditionally associated with Military Intelligence. The sunburst further alludes to Intelligence and also suggests the location of the unit, the great southwest. The yellow (gold) sunburst symbolizes the worth of reliable intelligence. The five rays of the sunburst allude to the five regions of a former unit, and the chevron, a symbol for support, with the five stars, represents the five states that comprised its former area of operations. The ancient dagger signifies the dangers and silent covert nature of intelligence service. The oak leaves are symbolic of the strong and enduring resolution of the men and women of the unit, and the motto, “Strength Through Security,” portrays the goal of the successful intelligence organization.

Constituted 10 May 1946 in the Army of the United States as the 112th Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, the unit activated 21 May 1946 at Dallas, Texas. On 26 February 1952, the Army allotted the 112th CIC Detachment to the Regular Army. Redesignated as the 112th CIC Group on 1 August 1957 and again on 15 October 1966 as the 112th Military Intelligence Group, the Army inactivated the 112th on 30 June 1974 at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The Army redesignated the unit on 1 July 1987 as Headquarters, 112th Military Intelligence Brigade, transferred it to the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and concurrently activated it at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Headquarters, 112th MI Brigade, deactivated 30 January 1993 at Fort Devens.

The unit transitionally reactivated 28 July 2000 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, as the 112th MI Brigade (Prov). On 26 September 2000, it then reactivated as the 112th MI Brigade in a special ceremony in conjunction with the Army Worldwide Intelligence Conference at Fort Huachuca. The activation of the 112th consolidated the 304th MI Battalion, 306th MI Battalion, Noncommissioned Officer Academy, and B Company (MI Officer Basic Course) of the 309th MI Battalion under one command. The Brigade also absorbed the other functions of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca’s Directorate of Continuous Learning.

The mission of the 112th MI Brigade is to train and develop MI leaders and units that are warrior-focused and capable of leading and operating in networked, digital system-of-systems architectures throughout the entire operational continuum. The Brigade is home to nearly 1,500 students and permanent party instructors, training developers, and others support personnel.

Strength Through Security!