Rethinking the Application of Power in the 21st Century
by Douglas H. Dearth
The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, or the
Among First-World powers, there has emerged in recent
years a form of "Third-Wave War" to match the evolution of
"Third-Wave Societies." The hallmark of both is information. The
Tofflers' book, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st
Century, is a paean to the work of the U.S. military over the past
twenty years to essentially "reinvent" itself in these terms.1 The
evidence and effectiveness of this fundamental change was evident
to an extent during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991.
A Conflict of Decision Processes
Just as information is changing society, it is also changing
concepts of national security, the definitions and parameters of
battlespace, and the measurements of force. "Force" is becoming
less tangible and more dependent upon qualitative factors.
Battlespace is expanding greatly in terms of frontage, depth, and
altitude. Movement rates for forces, materiel, and ideas are
increasing; therefore, time is shrinking. War is becoming more a
conflict of decision processes, and success will be determined by
the "information differential" between forces and between
commanders. "Third-Wave War" is "Information War." These
"post-industrial war" operations must be not only "joint" and
"unified," but "holistic" and "simultaneous."2
What Is Information Warfare? Tom Rona, the probable originator of
the term, essentially would describe information warfare (IW) as a
"battle of decision systems."3 While something of a ground-breaking
concept, especially in the 1970s, this is essentially a technical
approach; from some perspectives, warfare has always been a
struggle between decision systems. Professor George Stein of the
Air University holds that the concept is broader. He said
"Information warfare, in its broader sense, is simply the use of
information to achieve our national objectives." Further, he says
that "Information warfare, in its essence, is about...the way
humans think and, more important, the way humans make decisions."4
The Tofflers would describe IW in broader terms: as "a new
'war-form."5 Their concept is that IW is a way of thinking about
war, warfare, and conflict. It is a different way of applying
In fact, part of the mystique and promise of IW is that it may be
broadly applied as part of a national policy designed to obviate
the need for traditional military involvement. In some ways, it is
political war beyond the bounds of diplomacy in which weapons are
intangible in appearance and very tangible in result. This is a new
breed of weapon which leaves neither a "smoking gun" nor plausible
trace. It is a weapon and a campaign which a head of state may
launche with or without the involvement of his military force
IW also constitutes an operating or conflict environment. The
attempt to "digitize the battlefield" currently under way in the
U.S. Army, on its face seems to be a limited technical approach to
the broader issue. It is not inappropriate; in fact, it is
necessary, and tacitly acknowledges that something is significantly
different in the arena of armed conflict. Others would describe IW
as simply "command and control warfare (C2W) by another name." It
is not. C2W is the tactical application of the much broader
phenomenon of IW.
The Department of Defense defines IW as
...actions taken to achieve information superiority by
affecting adversary information, Information-based processes,
information systems and computer-based networks, while defending
one's own information, information-based processes, information
systems, and computer-based networks.6
The current confusion about these concepts is further
exacerbated by the introduction of other new terms like "cyberwar,"
"netwar," and "knowledge war."7 All of these concepts are valid. It
is inescapable that there is something qualitatively different
about warfare in the information age.
Characteristics of Information War
Continuous, Simultaneous, Accelerated, and Non-linear. At the heart
of the IW concept is the idea of achieving military objectives with
an absolute minimum of force application and cost. Although this
has always been a warfighting objective, in the past the ability to
achieve this objective depended upon a number of variables, many of
which the potential or real enemy controlled.
With the information revolution, however, the minimum force or cost
objective becomes attainable by the side that has information
dominance. If we have continuous, real-time surveillance of a
potential adversary's military forces, we can simultaneously
position our forces to achieve and maintain an advantage. We may
deter or preclude adversary use of military force altogether by
communicating this advantage and our intentions, perhaps with
additional information like psychological operations and deception
routed through other channels to further complicate his decision
process. Even failing that, by maintaining more perfect knowledge
of enemy force disposition and positioning our forces accordingly
while denying the enemy knowledge of our disposition, we can
maximize the effectiveness of any force application, thus allowing
use of only as much force as is necessary to achieve our
objectives. In addition to maintaining the element of surprise,
because we immediately know the results of our application of force
on the enemy, we can accelerate our response to changes in enemy
activity and tailor our re-application of force to only those
critical nodes that require it.
By dominating the adversary's information systems, along with the
use of smart stand-off weapons, we will be able to impose our will
on the enemy without the costs associated with occupying his
territory. Rather than moving through a battlefield in a linear
fashion, we will continuously be able to select and neutralize
critical targets in a non-linear battlespace "just in time," thus
obviating the need for a large inventory of backup weaponry.
Instant Feedback. The ability to take the right action just in time
depends, of course, on feedback. Since the beginning of human
organization, decisionmakers have sought information about the
results of their decisions as soon as possible, so that if
corrective or reinforcing actions were required, they could be
taken while it was still possible to influence the course of events
set in motion by the initial decision. Until relatively recently in
our history, the ability to gain such information was limited by
many factors, but most especially by distance.
Electronic communication will change all this, particularly the
advent of communications satellites and high-capacity fiber-optic
cables. Decisionmakers can now remain "plugged in," not only
receiving instant feedback on the effects of their decisions, but
also using these same lines of communication to transmit new
decisions based on the feedback information.
The concept of instant feedback as it relates to IW is viewed in
the context of a closed system, whether the F-117 or the Army's
"digitized battlefield" envisioned in Force XXI. Instant feedback,
or something close to it, applies at all levels of decisionmaking.
While the media may not be responsible for the United States
"losing" the war in Vietnam, public reaction to the combat images
brought into our homes most assuredly influenced the decisions made
by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations on prosecution of the war.
During the Gulf War in a speech covered live by the Cable News
Network (CNN), Saddam Hussein called for a debate with President
Bush; within thirty minutes, President Bush held a press conference
to advise the world (and Saddam) that he had no intention of
participating in such a debate. Even in non-democratic societies,
both leadership and the general public are simultaneously aware of
the results of policy decisions via television news coverage.
The point here is that, as Professor Stein noted
the worldwide infosphere of television and broadcast
news...[will] shape the political context of the conflict. It will
define the new "battlespace." We face an "integrated battlefield,"
not in the usual sense of having a global positioning system (GPS)
receiver in every tank or cockpit, but in the Clausewitzian sense
that war is being integrated into the political almost
simultaneously with the battle.8
Under such conditions, the distinctions between the
tactical, operational, and strategic tend to blur into
insignificance. Like it or not, the actions of a single soldier,
caught by the international media, can potentially affect the
outcome of a conflict.
The problem with this, Stein points out, is that this media-created
world is a "fictive universe," not because the images are untrue,
but because they do not contain sufficient information to capture
the context and totality of the truth. The average "sound bite"
(actually a "video bite") on the news is somewhere between 8 and 12
seconds very little time to articulate a policy position. In a
perfect world, decisionmakers would have perfect instant feedback
on which to base subsequent policy decisions. In the real world,
the temptation to rely on timely fictive feedback, as opposed to
less timely but more fulsome feedback from intelligence or other
official sources, may prove to be overwhelming.
Blurred Levels of War. Information technology is increasingly
blurring the levels of war. Efforts at the tactical level of war at
which engagements and battles are fought for limited objectives are
aggregated at the operational level of war in the form of
campaigns. This process musters broader efforts over wider terrain
and space and time in a theater of operations. These in turn are
directed toward the achievement of national war goals at the
strategic level in theaters of war. These three levels of war
historically have been distinguished by the size of forces and
volume of resources employed, the breadth of terrain and space over
which forces deploy, and the time expended in the prosecution of
operations. There has been a realization, too, that these levels
Since at least the Napoleonic Era, the distinct military trends
have been toward larger and more varied kinds of forces employed
over increasingly broader terrain, space and distance, often with
the decision cycles of operations consuming decreasing periods of
time. Various aspects of information technology and IW provide the
prospects for significant change in certain of these trends:
Hence, the discernible distinctions among the levels
of war will be increasingly blurred; this will complicate the
nature of political and military planning and decisionmaking.
The "packaging" of IW into a division of labor that fits convenient
military doctrine and organization may be pass‚. The
smallest team of specialists, operating covertly under direct
civilian control and tasking, could apply strategic, operational,
or tactical IW tools against any level of an adversary's decision
system. Military knowledge and supervision need not necessarily be
a consideration in the planning, but may be significantly
influenced by the results.
Blurred Civil-Military Divisions. In a similar fashion and for the
same reasons, the Uptonian distinctions between the civilian and
military realms9 are being blurred. The Clauswitzian concept of the
trinity of "Army" (really "Armed Forces"), the "State," and the
"People" is more valid than ever on one level: in the information
age, the state and armed forces will no longer necessarily possess
a monopoly over the means of violence especially "information
violence." Further, national centers of gravity increasingly will
reside in the civil sector. These centers of gravity include the
national banking and finance industries and power generation and
distribution systems. The civil sector, in terms of production and
morale, has long been important to warfare. However, in an age when
production is measured more in terms of intangible knowledge than
tangible goods and the value of knowledge applies equally in both
the civil and military sectors, the distinction between the two
realms will blur even more. Further implications are that in the
future civilian infrastructure will be an even more prominent
target of attack than was the case in the industrial era, but it
cannot be defended by military forces.
War as Work: Third-Wave War. The basic characteristics of the new
"war-form" essentially mirror those in the civilian economy. As the
Tofflers observed, nations make war the way they make wealth. The
watch-words are information dominance and information assurance.
- Mechanisms of force continue to proliferate, but the size
of forces can decrease.
- Breadth of terrain and space and distance can continue to
grow to the physical limits of the planet and into space.
- Time will continue to shrink with the increase in the
speed with which and distance over which we can employ force.
These characteristics of IW will affect combat arms,
as well as combat service and combat service support functions,
most markedly in terms of intelligence, signals, transportation and
War as Improvisational Theater.11 In the future, we will be
operating in a very media-rich environment, where our military
actions will be broadcast instantaneously via worldwide television.
Think of the intelligence and operational security implications of
private-sector news media operating their own remote-sensing
imaging satellites, which certainly will happen within the decade.
Consequently, military commanders must be increasingly adept at
operating effectively in this environment. If we consider a
military operations plan (OPLAN) a script, the ensuing events will
increasingly resemble improvisational theater on a global stage
where reactions of a variety of audiences and critics can
ultimately determine the difference between success and failure in
a political, if not military, sense.
At Mogadishu, Somalia, SEALs reconnoitering the beach in the glare
of the lights of the assembled video cameras looked more silly than
formidable. It was an inauspicious beginning to what was to become
a well-intentioned but ultimately frustrating and futile military
exercise.12 Consider also the image of illiterate thugs on the docks
of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, who greeted U.S. and Canadian troops
aboard the USS Harlan County, waving their English-language
placards and shouting (for CNN's cameras) that Haiti would be
"another Somalia for America." We then watched as the Harlan County
steamed away, much to the consternation of the U.S. military
advance party waiting on the wharf. When the U.S. advance elements
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Implementation Force
(IFOR) entered Tuzla, Bosnia, they found themselves outnumbered by
the media at easily a ten-to-one ratio. Because the global
information infrastructure is nothing if not interactive,
commanders may find their OPLANs or "scripts" being rewritten as
they go along. The level of "script" adaptability may be a critical
predictor of success for military operations in the information
- Knowledge becomes the core of military power and the
central resource of destructivity, rather that pure brute force,
and "intangible values" more accurately determine the military
balance, rather than hardware.
- Decreasing the massing of forces requires increased
precision and more selectivity in the application of military
- Military "work" is more often dependent upon education
and expertise than traditional machismo and brute force;
information will become the nature of war. Innovation is
increasingly prized; improvisation replaces rote and routine.
- Organization becomes more fluid and less hierarchical.
Integration of all assets, forces, and services is essential.
- "Acceleration" characterizes operations at all levels
(not necessarily absolute speed, but speed relative to the enemy's
pace of decisionmaking and movement his "OODA-loop").10
Implications of Information Warfare
The United States and other Third-Wave societies are undergoing
changes in both the ends and means (but not the purpose) of war.
Despite these changes, it is highly unlikely that armed conflict
will totally disappear into cyberspace.
Proliferation of the Means of Conflict. The rigorous application of
information technology to warfare means, first of all, that there
will be a proliferation of the means of conflict. To the
traditional means of firepower and maneuver will be added the means
of attacking one's enemy ever more powerfully electronically. One
can not only attack his command and control (C2) systems with
destructive firepower, but with other destructive technological
means. Disinformation, rumor, and propaganda have long been means
of attack and these means are now enhanced. Some have speculated
that effective deception operations are no longer possible in the
age of satellite reconnaissance. The effectiveness of deception
depends upon available "channels" of information and the penchant
of one's opponent for self-deception. Hence, the possibilities for
successful deception operations have never been better.
Lethality versus Effectiveness. Electronic combat will potentially
enable a commander to inflict "effective neutralization" upon his
opponent without the necessity of physically destroying
infrastructure, forces, or people. Military professionals often
overlook the fact that the purpose of warfare is not "killing
people and breaking things." Those have been the mechanics of war,
not its purpose. The purpose of war is to inflict your will upon
your opponent. If one's will can be imposed modifying the
opponent's behavior or intent without widespread physical
destruction, the post-conflict possibilities for political
reconciliation and human progress may actually be enhanced. War in
the information age holds out at least the prospect of that
If this has validity, we now have the prospects of
fundamentally changing the way we conduct war and the desired ends.
The traditional ends of war were to destroy the opponents's forces
in the field, in the air, and on the seas; to destroy his
productive war capacity; to subdue his population; and to occupy
his capital. With the destruction or disabling of his C2 capability
and the ability to control the perceptions of his policy elites and
population, there is the possibility of working one's will upon the
opponent without necessarily wreaking physical havoc upon the
infrastructure and population of the enemy. The calculation can be
humanitarian or purely utilitarian in terms of preserving the
economic wherewithal to sustain a viable and productive society
with altered political aims.
Clausewitz and Anti-Clause-witz. Much of this analysis flies in the
face of traditional Industrial- age warfare. In the military
forces, there is an ingrained "Clausewitzian" value system, and we
have been raised within it. Much of the foregoing discussion
contradicts the Clausewitzian approach to warfare as taught in our
staff and war colleges. Clausewitz still has much to contribute to
military thinking, even in democratic societies. The trinity of
state, armed forces, and people is crucial, and its continued
importance cannot be over-emphasized, although his emphasis on
physical destruction and annihilation may be outdated. The
possibility of the decisive winning battle (at least in
peer-competitor warfare) could theoretically be resurrected. The
danger for "Third-Wave" societies is that the potential for success
in this regard may well rest with niche-competitors in asymmetrical
Time, Distance, and Speed. Since the early days of the industrial
age, time compression has increased, yet time has become more
important. Clocks for centuries had only hour hands; today, many
endeavors measure time in hundredths of seconds. Initially,
transportation technology drove this compression. There followed
the telephone and the facsimile machine, then television, which
introduced the added dimension of more vivid graphical images. More
recently, it has been the computer particularly the
microprocessor linked via local- and wide-area networks. Thus,
speed has increased ever more dramatically as a function of
distance. The result is that distance means less and, hence, time
The instant feedback provided by modern electronic communications
affects the political, cultural and social spheres as readily as it
does the commercial and military arenas. Recall President Bush's
near-real-time response to Saddam's challenge to a debate on global
television in 1990. By the same token, cultural and social trends
proliferate very quickly among the Third-Wave countries and to the
rest of the world. The global currency market now operates 24 hours
a day, and the stock and commodity positions are calculated
instantaneously. The U.S. Air Force's Air Tasking Order procedure
now demands a 24-hour turn-around against military targets.
Expectations. The result is not just efficiency the saving of time
and labor. It is that, but it is far more. It changes peoples'
expectations. They understand that they can know more about more
things with a lower expenditure of effort and faster; this
understanding turns to a want and then demand to know more, faster.
People's expectations also have changed by virtue of what they
know. Reading about events is different from viewing vastly more
life-like images on a screen. It is much more realistic, because
interpretation is easier. It requires less imagination, and at the
same time it fires the imagination. While people are drawn to the
vividness of the images, they can be repulsed by those same images.
The interpretation is more intense. Politically, the potent images
of starving Somali children, butchered Rwandans, or a bludgeoned
Los Angeles motorist virtually demand a prompt political response.
Generations of computer technology will progress in 18 to 24
months, rendering corporate and government management and
procurement policies laughable.
For the military, and government generally, the omnipresent and
seemingly omniscient global media mean that every decision and
action is immediately transparent to national and international
scrutiny. For now, even a single military casualty will be the
subject of immediate coverage and public scrutiny. The risks will
be hyper-sensitive decisionmaking and timid military leadership in
the face of fickle public emotions.
Erosion of State Sovereignty. Increasingly, the traditional
attributes of the nation-state are eroding, and much of this
erosion results from the influence of information technology. In
the age of information violence, the state will not be able to
dominate the means of force, nor will the state necessarily be able
to deter or defend against information attack. States also are no
longer the only or necessarily the most important actors in the
international arena. Increasingly, the non-state actors deal across
state boundaries with each other and with states on a nearly
independent footing. There is a general erosion of the concept of
sovereignty. While some of the nation-states are "failing" because
they cannot fulfill the basic traditional criteria of sovereignty,
mature and successful states also are witnessing a similar erosion
of traditional controls, largely as a result of the effects of
information technology. The state will not fade away. States will
remain as primary and important actors in the international arena,
but they will represent only one of many forms of political
organization, power, and interaction.14
Global Information. National control of information is tenuous if
it is possible at all. The same is true for IW. Moreover, the
global information infrastructure is becoming more ubiquitous every
day. With the multiplicity of media, access, and service-providers
comes a redundancy and survivability that challenges the notion of
denial and disruption of service. The threshold of the information
age saw the successful severing of Panamanian and later Iraqi
command, control and communications and telecommunications, but the
world has learned from these experiences. Aiding the learning
process has been a steady erosion in the acquisition and operating
costs of digital communications. Whether the threat is fire, flood,
or IW, systems developers continually add new tools to their
capabilities for assuring service via alternate routes and standby
Public Diplomacy. "Public diplomacy" is a term that refers
generally to those government activities designed to inform and
influence foreign publics. If traditional diplomacy is state to
state, public diplomacy is from state to the foreign populace.
Although not a new concept, it has taken on new importance over the
past decade as a result of the global communication explosion.
Moving beyond the traditional, usually defensive, concept of the
Public Information Office, the U.S. military has developed
mechanisms like the Military Information Support Team in Haiti and
the Combined Joint IFOR Information Task Force in Bosnia. The
intent of both is to aggressively pursue the public information
quotient in support of military operations.
Conflict in the Information Age
War, Conflict, and Force. All war and conflict will not change, but
in many cases it will. The purpose of war will not change from that
of imposing one's will on one's opponents. The nature of war,
however, will change considerably. In forces configured for IW, the
preference will be conflict dominated by the advanced nature of
decision systems and by more subtle means of waging war. These
forces configured for IW will have at their disposal a wider array
of the means of destruction, but the nature of those mechanisms
will result in proliferating the means of conflict. The traditional
means of firepower and maneuver will be augmented and perhaps in
the long run replaced by methods of attacking one's opponents with
electronic technological methods. The ultimate outcome of applying
those methods, however, will not necessarily be free of lethal
It is a common conceit of advanced nations and their armed forces
that they can impose their wills on the lesser powers and
relatively primitive forces through application of advanced
technological means. Painful historical experience since the late
19th century indicates just the opposite. "Low-intensity" conflict
(or the current concept of "operations other than war") is not a
"lesser case" of higher-order strategy and doctrine and the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that support them. Relatively
primitive forces will and do have access to sophisticated
technology, and they will know how to use it. Advanced technology
will be increasingly available. While such relatively sophisticated
concepts as "air-battle management," "air-land operations," and
"dominating maneuver" might be lost on them, there will be some
opponents who do understand "perception management" and
"information warfare" in its rudimentary sense.
Another conundrum will face sophisticated military forces:
the possible passage of what might be called "heroic warfare." If
the Tofflers are approximately correct that a hallmark of future
combat is "brains over brawn," a change will be required in the
selection, retention, development, and promotion of
"cyber-warriors" who attack the enemy and defend the nation by
means other than cold steel and hot lead. This possibility might
appeal more to a nation that shies from incurring combat
casualties; it likely will appeal less to their military
subcultures that intrinsically value blood sport, distance running,
and the machismo self-image.
The Social Impact of Information War. It is difficult for
democratic society to discern "good news" from the prospects of
war. If there is any good news to infer from the kind of warfare
likely to predominate in the 21st century, it might be the
prospects for reduced levels of physical and human destruction.
Among Third- Wave peer-competitors, at least, perhaps humankind
will be spared the tens of millions of civilian and military deaths
in World Wars I and II, and the prospects of thermonuclear
annihilation during the Cold War era.
It is equally difficult, however, to foresee the end of total war
in a world increasingly dominated by technology. In the future, it
might be possible for technologically sophisticated societies to
truly wage war against the very fabric of the opponent's
society and to do so digitally. For generations now, we have
witnessed indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations by
military forces. The world likely will not be spared the genocide
in Rwanda, the senseless waste in Liberia, or the
religio-ideological destruction of Afghanistan. In the future, it
may be increasingly difficult to detect the attacker and indeed
perhaps from what quarter and for what purpose. One could envision
a politico-military future in which irregular warfare might be
possible on an unprecedented scale. The targets (ours or theirs)
need not be physical infrastructure, but a nation's financial,
automated distribution, and communications systems.
A primary characteristic of the nation-state era has been state
monopoly of the means of violence. We surely are witnessing in both
Third-Wave/First- World and First-Wave/Third-World societies a
trend away from state monopoly of lethal violence. In a future
characterized by cyberwar, technology offers the prospect of
non-state possession in abundance of the "non-lethal" means of
1. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War:
Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1993).
2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. Owens,
"America's Information Edge," and Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in
Warfare," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March-April) 1996,
20-36 and 37-54, respectively.
3. While the pedigree is difficult to track, it
appears that Thomas P. Rona may have coined the term "information
war" as early as 1976 in a study written for Boeing Corporation,
entitled "Weapons Systems and Information War."
4. George J. Stein, "Information Warfare," in
Campen, Dearth, and Goodden (Editors), Cyberwar: Security,
Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age (Fairfax, VA:
AFCEA International Press, 1996), 175-183.
5. Toffler, particularly 81-85.
6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3210.01, 2 January 1996, p. 6. This rather labored
definition has replaced the more common-sense 1994 definition:
"actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of
national military strategy by affecting adversary information and
information systems while leveraging and protecting our information
and information systems."
7. See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,
Cyberwar Is Coming!, RAND P-7791, 1992; and Philippe Baumard,
"From Info War to Knowledge War: Preparing for the Paradigm Shift,"
in Campen, Dearth, and Goodden (editors), Cyberwar: Security,
Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age, 147-160.
8. Stein, 177.
9.The distinction between the realms espoused
by Major General Emory Upton. See Russell F. Weigley, The American
Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana Univ Press, 1973) 168-171, 221.
10. Toffler, 64-80. The orient, observe, decide,
and act (OODA) concept originated with U.S. Air Force Colonel John
Boyd in the 1970s.
11. Information Technologies and the Future of
Land Warfare, RAND Study DDR-659-A, February 1994 (draft).
12. This unfortunate incident was the fault of
neither the SEAL Team nor of the waiting journalists. U.S.
officials had informed the latter of the landing site. The SEALs
apparently did not know that U.S. forces would meet no hostile
resistance, and they were following "normal" procedures. The
oversight in proper coordination lay with senior planners, who
failed to grasp the importance of melding purely military concerns
and operations with public diplomacy requirements and activities.
13. RAND DDR-659-A.
14. The literature concerning this phenomenon
is voluminous. For one of the best discussions, see Walter B.
Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information
Revolution is Transforming Our World (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1992).
15. See Winn Schwartau, "Ethical Conundra of
Information Warfare," in Campen, Dearth, and Goodden (Eds),
Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information
Mr. Dearth teaches at the Joint Military Intelligence
Training Center. A veteran of 25 years in the intelligence
business, he has served on the Army War College faculty; as advisor
to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; and as Special
Assistant to the Executive Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency. Readers can reach Mr. Dearth via E-mail at dhdearth
@aol.com, and by telephone (202) 231-3290 and DSN 428-3290.