Co-Authored by Meggaen Neely, Communications Intern at the Federation of American Scientists

The U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals currently stand at more than 15 times the size of the total nuclear arsenals of all seven other nuclear weapons states combined. In a new report released by FAS, Trimming Nuclear Excess Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces, Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at FAS, argues that the U.S. and Russian nuclear arms reduction process needs to be revitalized by new treaties and unilateral initiatives to reduce nuclear force levels.

At a briefing  held on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC on December 14, 2012 Steve Pifer, Director of the Arms Control Initiative at the Brookings Institution, and Joe Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund, joined Kristensen in a discussion regarding U.S.-Russian nuclear dialogue.

While Kristensen noted the significant reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, he emphasized the need for further reductions, and expressed concerns at the growing impression  that  the U..S and Russia have shifted their focus to modernizing their nuclear forces and are investing in new nuclear weapon systems. Kristensen suggested that, “unless new unilateral reductions take place or significant arms control agreements are reached; large nuclear forces could be retained far into the future.”

While he alluded to the important role the New START Treaty has played in recent years, he also implied that the effect it has had on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces has remained limited, stating that, “the treaty only regulates a limited (but important) portion of the total forces, it has no direct effect on the number of nuclear warheads the two countries possess, and it does not require destruction of a single nuclear warhead.” Kristensen called upon the U.S. and Russia to revitalize the treaty through new treaties and unilateral initiatives by finding a better balance between modernization plans and their stated commitment towards nuclear disarmament.

Such action would comprise of the implementation of force reductions planned under the New START Treaty as soon as possible. Kristensen placed particular emphasis on the necessity in reducing the missile loading on each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and reducing the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). He suggested that this was a necessary action in order to decrease the current asymmetry between U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. U.S. nuclear forces have placed particular emphasis on “many delivery vehicles each with fewer warheads” while Russian nuclear forces have been characterized “by fewer delivery vehicles each carrying more warheads.” There are concerns that such asymmetry could lead to mistrust between the two countries and “drive worst-case planning and unnecessarily dynamic posturing that will complicate efforts to reduce nuclear weapons further.”

Pifer reaffirmed the need for bilateral action suggesting that the Obama administration “should pursue a New START II that would cut deployed strategic weapons from the New START level of 1,550 warheads apiece to 1,000.” Pifer placed less emphasis on unilateral reductions than Kristensen. Kristensen suggested that implementation of a new treaty that addresses non-deployed and non-strategic weapons will take a significant period of time to negotiate and that some unilateral reductions could help to reduce concerns about asymmetry and stability in the interim.

The full report can be read here.

Nuclear Arms Control Opportunities: An Agenda for Obama’s Second Term by Steven Pifer and Michael O’ Hanlon can be read here.

As tensions in the Middle East have grown, many have considered the impacts of U.S.-led actions against Iran. Yet, the focus remains on the damage to Iranian military and nuclear infrastructures. Mr. Charles Blair, Senior Fellow on the State and Non-State Threats at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the study’s director, and Mr. Mark Jansson, Special Projects Director at FAS, tackle a different question: how might U.S.-led action against Iran impact the global economy? FAS released a new report, Sanctions, Military Strikes, and Other Potential Actions Against Iran, at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC on November 16, 2012. The full report can be read here.

Experts participating at the report release include elicitation participant Dr. James Bartis, Senior Policy Researcher at RAND Corporation, Mr. Gary Ackerman, Director for Special Projects at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and Dr. David Jhirad, Director of the Energy, Resources, and Environment Program at SAIS.

The report is the culmination of an elicitation conducted at FAS, which involved a bipartisan group of experts in areas of national security, economics, energy markets, and financial markets. Elicitations are useful tools in situations “characterized by high levels of uncertainty and change, where there is an absence of sufficient empirical data.” Hence, the elicitation’s focus on Iran, a situation with no precedents in U.S. foreign policy, constant change in the political and economic climates, and uncertainty of how future actions could affect the situation.

Mr. Blair explained how the goal of this report is to start a conversation on a previously-unstudied question, which is odd given its importance in determining how the U.S. should proceed in Iran. Elicitation participants were given six scenarios to assess in terms of costs to the global economy (in U.S. dollars). These costs were limited to a 3-month period, a quarter for financial markets. This time frame is arbitrary though reasonable given the great uncertainty surrounding the situation in Iran. The six scenarios were:

1. Increasing pressure with sanctions on Iran
2. A blockade in the Persian Gulf
3. Surgical strikes in Iran, attacking only nuclear infrastructure
4. A comprehensive bombing campaign in Iran, attacking both military and nuclear infrastructure
5. A full-scale invasion of Iran
6. Unilateral good faith actions on the part of the U.S.

Mr. Jansson explained how compounded uncertainty accounts for the range in costs seen in each scenario. The elicitation participants described variables that would determine the costs. For example, in scenario one, the cost of increasing sanctions would reflect the impact on financial market losses, an increase in oil prices, and the costs of complying with the sanctions. The participants pointed to over 70 variables throughout the elicitation, indicating the enormous uncertainty of the U.S. taking action in Iran in terms of economic effects. With the full-scale invasion, the report estimated global economic costs equaling one trillion seven hundred billion dollars. That’s a lot of zeros.

Dr. Bartis remarked on his surprise at the great losses to the financial market. He mentioned that those with expertise in finance “pushed for the higher numbers” in assessing the cost in each scenario.

Interestingly, the report estimates a $60 billion benefit for scenario six, where the U.S. concedes by suspending sanctions and removing an air craft carrier from the Persian Gulf. Variables that were considered include a drop in oil prices and an increase in regional investments. However, the report indicates the participants’ skepticism that the U.S. will take these actions.

When “putting a price on war with Iran,” it seems the lesson is to proceed with enormous caution.

This report noted the great uncertainty when determining the global economic effects of potential U.S. actions against Iran. The authors explained that this report is an essential first step in beginning the conversation on potential policy decisions in Iran. The panelists concluded with hopes that others will build upon this report.

Co-authored by Stephanie Lee, Development Intern at the Federation of American Scientists

Fifty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, many assume that we have moved away from the prospect of a nuclear war. But that’s not the case, claims Dr. Martin Hellman, professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University and a nuclear security expert. On October 18, 2012, at a briefing hosted by the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC, Hellman discussed his paper, “Fifty Years After the Cuban Missile Crisis: Time to Stop Bluffing at Nuclear Poker,” which was published by FAS and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

Hellman argued that the U.S. took considerable risks during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and we continue to learn how close those risks brought us to a nuclear war.  On October 27, 1962, U.S. destroyers forced a Soviet submarine to surface near the quarantine line. Now, we know that the submarine carried a nuclear torpedo. Also, the U.S. considered invading Cuba. Yet, decision makers did not know that the Soviet Union had placed battlefield nuclear weapons in Cuba to deter, among other things, an invasion. What we should have learned, said Hellman citing Robert Kennedy, is “the importance of placing ourselves in another person’s shoes.”

However, the record shows that we have not followed this lesson. Hellman argued that the U.S. has not thought through certain foreign policy decisions with regard to America’s stated top priority: nonproliferation.

On December 26, 1979, one day after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that Afghanistan resistance included Pakistan’s exemption from America’s nonproliferation policy. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan developed a nuclear weapons capability. In 2003, President George H. W. Bush promised former Libyan President Moammar Gaddafi an “open path” to relations with the U.S. in exchange for giving up Libya’s weapons of mass destruction. During the Obama administration, NATO and the U.S. overthrew Gaddafi. Hellman argued that this sent a signal to North Korea that it made the right decision to maintain its nuclear program. Examples such as these, Hellman stated, indicate that the U.S. did not learn the lesson from the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Some policymakers have shifted focus to missile defense. Hellman pointed out that this, too, must follow Kennedy’s lesson.

Hellman stated that the missile defense system in Eastern Europe bears an uncanny resemblance to the set-up in Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President John F. Kennedy had placed nuclear-armed American missiles in Turkey in the spring of 1962. If we had taken Russia’s perspective into account, Hellman argued, we would have realized that it made sense for Russia to “hop the line” and stick missiles in Cuba. In the end, it didn’t matter if it was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Russia or a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) from Cuba.

Today, do our Eastern European allies unnecessarily provoke Russia while sitting beneath the U.S. defense umbrella? Hellman recommended that the U.S. “warn allies that our security agreements don’t cover them if they poke the Russian bear.” The same situation, Hellman explained, applies to the “Chinese dragon” and the Senkaku Islands. Hellman asked if the U.S. wanted to risk our homeland’s existence over these islands.

The problem, he argued, is that the United States has unquestioned conventional superiority. China and Russia don’t have the conventional forces to win a war with the U.S., and to save face, the conflict will likely escalate to include nuclear weapons. “Any war with China or Russia runs an unacceptably high risk of going nuclear,” said Hellman.

The conventional wisdom is that nuclear deterrence works. But, what happens if it doesn’t? Hellman said that, “If it doesn’t work perfectly, then it fails, and we’re dead. Can it work perfectly forever? That doesn’t seem reasonable.” At best, Hellman predicted that nuclear deterrence will work for only 1000 years.

Hellman reached this limit through a preliminary study using quantitative risk analysis. He called for Congress to fund a study to use quantitative risk analysis on the possibilities for failures in nuclear deterrence. The goal is to bring greater objectivity and move beyond the current debate. Risk analysis recommends an end state, Hellman explained, and he proposed that the end state be a “state of acceptable risk.” What is acceptable risk? That’s the first question to be answered by this research group.

This end state might not be the goal known as “Global Zero.” Hellman argued that we do not know if we can reach Global Zero, but it seems sensible to keep it as “the vision.” Then, we can see what options are available.

On this issue of nuclear policy, Hellman remarked that there is “bipartisan idiocy and bipartisan sanity.” However, both sides have a vested interest in making sure a nuclear weapon is not launched against the United States. Progress on this issue requires only “a couple of representatives to get this into an appropriations bill,” not a two-thirds majority in the Senate.

Today, U.S. policy on deterrence is to appear “irrational and vindictive” regarding threats to our interests. Hellman stated that this was a dangerous policy, especially when it involves nuclear weapons. One product of a study using quantitative risk analysis would be to rethink America’s nuclear force posture with, hopefully Hellman added, less reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons.