In a not very subtle sign of the times, the U.S. Army has produced a deck of playing cards featuring weaponry used or held by Iran in order to familiarize soldiers with Iran’s inventory of weapons and presumably to facilitate their recognition on the battlefield.
The Iran collection follows similar decks of playing cards illustrated with Chinese and Russian weapons.
Another set of U.S. Army playing cards featuring North Korean weapons systems is forthcoming.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefly published and then removed from public access a new edition of their official doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. But a public copy was preserved. See Joint Publication 3-72, Nuclear Operations, June 11, 2019.
The document presents an unclassified, mostly familiar overview of nuclear strategy, force structure, planning, targeting, command and control, and operations.
“Using nuclear weapons could create conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability,” according to one Strangelovian passage in the publication. “Specifically, the use of a nuclear weapon will fundamentally change the scope of a battle and create conditions that affect how commanders will prevail in conflict.”
The document might have gone unremarked, but after publishing it last week the Joint Chiefs deleted it from their public website. A notice there states that it (JP 3-72) is now only “available through JEL+” (the Joint Electronic Library), which is a restricted access site. A local copy remains publicly available on the FAS website.
The US Air Force last week updated its guidance on the command and control of nuclear weapons to include protection against electromagnetic pulse and cyber attack, among other changes. See Air Force Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), Air Force Instruction 13-550, April 16, 2019.
“This is a complete revision to the previous version of this instruction,” the new guidance states. “It revises the command relationships, roles and responsibilities, the governance structure, and addresses resourcing, architecture and configuration management, resilience, and assessments.”
“Resilience” here pertains particularly to “two of the most broadly applied challenges: hardening against the effects of electromagnetic pulse and threats in the cyberspace domain.” These topics were scarcely mentioned at all in the previous version of the Air Force Instruction that was issued in 2014, nor did the term resilience appear in the earlier document.
Several new classified directives on nuclear command and control have been issued in recent years (such as Presidential Policy Directive-35 and others) and their content is reflected at least indirectly and in part in the new unclassified USAF guidance.
A broader modernization of the nation’s entire nuclear command, control and communications system is underway at U.S. Strategic Command, costing a projected $77 billion over the coming decade. See “STRATCOM to design blueprint for nuclear command, control and communications” by Sandra Erwin, Space News, March 29, 2019.
Military contractors are such an integral part of U.S. military forces that “most military operations will include contracted support,” a newly updated Pentagon manual explains.
In fact, “While some limited-duration operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations, may use limited contracted support, all major operations will involve significant contracted support.”
Aside from their prominent role in logistics, contractors also provide linguist, signal and security services.
In some circumstances, contractors may even substitute for US military forces. “The use of contracted support as an alternative to deploying US forces may have other benefits, including minimizing the military footprint in the operational area, reducing force operational tempo, and improving domestic US political support or buy-in,” the manual said.
Contractors are considered indispensable, and they can sometimes be used to circumvent policy restrictions on military deployments. “The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning reductions, mission-specific force cap restrictions, and high operating tempo, means contracted support will augment military forces in most operations.”
Among the various types of military contractors are armed private security contractors (PSCs) that are used to guard personnel and facilities. “PSC-provided services, more than any other contracted service, can have a direct impact (sometimes a very negative impact) on civil-military aspects of the operation,” the Pentagon manual cautioned.
As a general matter, vigilant oversight is needed to ensure the integrity of the contracting process, since “the procurement of supplies and services in support of military operations can be prone to fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA), even more so in a foreign contingency where there are many contracts with local firms.” See Operational Contract Support, Joint Publication 4-10, March 4, 2019.
Military tacticians use deception to induce an opponent to act against his own interests, or to refrain from acting when it would be advantageous. The theory and techniques of military deception were detailed this week in a new Army publication for military planners that also implicitly illuminates the role of deception in other contexts.
In one form, deception may increase an adversary’s uncertainty so as to hinder decision-making. In another form, it may decrease uncertainty to encourage the adversary to make a decision that is mistaken.
“Ambiguity-increasing deception is designed to generate confusion and cause mental conflict in the enemy decision maker. Anticipated effects of ambiguity-increasing deception can include a delay to making a specific decision, operational paralysis, or the distribution of enemy forces to locations far away from the intended location of the friendly efforts,” the Army manual said.
Deceptive actions “can cause the target to delay a decision until it is too late to prevent friendly mission success. They can place the target in a dilemma for which no acceptable solution exists. They may even prevent the target from taking any action at all. This type of deception is typically successful with an indecisive decision maker who is known to avoid risk.”
On the other hand, “Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions manipulate and exploit an enemy decision maker’s pre-existing beliefs and bias through the intentional display of observables that reinforce and convince that decision maker that such pre-held beliefs are true. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions cause the enemy decision maker to be especially certain and very wrong… Planners often have success using these deceptions with strong-minded decision makers who are willing to accept a higher level of risk.”
Even deception has limits and rules, according to the Army. For one thing, the U.S. military is not supposed to deliberately practice deception against the U.S. government or the public.
“Deception activities, including planning efforts, are prohibited from explicitly or implicitly targeting, misleading, or attempting to influence the U.S. Government, U.S. Congress, the U.S. public, or the U.S. news media. Legal staff review all deception activities to eliminate, minimize, or mitigate the possibility that such influence might occur.”
Nor, according to international convention, should instruments of negotiation be abused as tools of deception.
“Flags of truce must not be used surreptitiously to obtain military information or merely to obtain time to affect a retreat or secure reinforcements, or to feign a surrender in order to surprise an enemy.”
See Army Support to Military Deception, Field Manual 3-13.4, 26 February 2019.
By its nature, the effectiveness of military deception depends on secrecy. Specific applications of military deception are addressed in classified publications such as DoD Instruction S-3604.01. The latest (2017) version of Joint Publication 3-13.4 on Military Deception is restricted in distribution.
But the new Army manual is unclassified and was published without restriction.
“The President does not need the concurrence of either his military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the launch of nuclear weapons,” the Congressional Research Service reminded readers last month in an updated “defense primer” on “Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.”
The CRS defense primer series consists of two-page introductions to a variety of basic military and intelligence topics. The primers do not generally present information that is altogether new to specialists, but they are a convenient way to increase national security literacy among non-specialist members of Congress and the public.
Recently updated items in the series include the following.
Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: U.S. Defense Industrial Base, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: Procurement, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: Information Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 18, 2018
Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 18, 2018
Defense Primer: President’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces, CRS In Focus, updated December 17, 2018
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Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.
The Special Counsel Investigation After the Attorney General’s Resignation, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 2, 2019
Government Expenditures on Defense Research and Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet, updated December 19, 2018
Executive Branch Ethics and Financial Conflicts of Interest: Disclosure, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 2, 2019
DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission–An Overview, CRS In Focus, updated December 19, 2018
New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China, CRS In Focus, December 17, 2018
Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies, updated December 19, 2018
The US Army has issued updated guidance on military funerals that notably emphasizes freedom of religion and individual choice.
“The Army requires the capability to provide RS [religious support] across austere and isolated locations which accommodates service members’ right to the free exercise of religion and supports resiliency efforts to sustain service members in combat.”
“RS is comprehensive because every individual personally defines what constitutes RS. While not every religious need of every Soldier can be met, chaplains and religious affairs specialists seek to meet as many needs as possible.”
“Due to the religious diversity of the nation and Army, all chaplains must know the funeral practices and religious requirements of various faith groups in the military.”
“Wherever they are conducted, and regardless of the tasks or order of events, military funerals and memorial events pay tribute to those who have honorably served the nation. Each final tribute draws from national, military, and religious traditions, not routinely nor impersonally, but profoundly and with compassion.”
See Religious Support to Funerals and Memorial Events, ATP 1-05.02, November 2018.
The U.S. Navy this month updated its regulations on the use of marine mammals — such as whales, dolphins, and seals — for national defense purposes. See Acquisition, Transport, Care, and Treatment of Navy Marine Mammals, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3900.41H, 10 October 2018.
The Navy policy on marine mammals follows a 1987 statute (10 USC 7524) under which the Secretary of Defense may authorize “the taking of not more than 25 marine mammals each year for national defense purposes.”
The term “take” in this context is ominously defined (in 16 USC 1362) as meaning “to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal.”
Dolphins and some other sea mammals can be trained to detect and track undersea objects, among other missions. See U.S. Navy Marine Mammal Program.
The Oceana environmental organization criticized the FY2019 defense authorization act for reducing legal protection for sea mammals.
The act “includes a harmful provision that weakens protections for marine mammals from the U.S. Navy’s use of high-intensity active sonar and underwater explosives,” the organization said.
The planning and execution of US Army information operations are the subject of a new Army manual for practitioners.
Information operations are activities that involve the use of information to support US and allied military objectives and/or to degrade adversary functions. The field of information operations includes military deception, cyberspace operations, and other sub-disciplines.
The first step is to characterize and assess the information environment.
Information Operations (IO) officers “identify human networks, groups, and subgroups that affiliate along religious, political, or cultural lines, including commonly held beliefs and local narratives.”
Once such networks are identified, information operators devise ways to influence, control or subvert them.
“IO officers focus their analysis on preferred means, methods, and venues that each social affiliation uses to interact and communicate and the ways each collectively constructs reality. Analysis examines biases, pressure points, general leanings, and proclivities, especially as they pertain to support or opposition of friendly and adversarial forces.”
SeeThe Conduct of Information Operations, ATP 3-13.1, October 4, 2018.
The implementation of arms control agreements by the Air Force is detailed in a newly updated directive.
The directive addresses Air Force obligations under New START, US-IAEA Safeguard Agreements, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention.
See Implementation of, and Compliance with, Treaties Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Air Force Instruction 16-608, September 7, 2018.
Air Force officials are directed to make certain that even their most tightly secured special access programs are in compliance with international obligations. But they are also required to protect information about such programs from “unnecessary or inadvertent” exposure during verification activities.