STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

A U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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The United States and its transatlantic Allies enter the 21st century as the strongest force for peace and freedom the world has ever known. By supporting democracy and freedom in places such as the former Yugoslavia, the people of Europe and North America have demonstrated the power of their shared values. In this report, the Department of Defense (DoD) outlines U.S. strategy to prepare ourselves and our Allies to meet 21st century challenges within the transatlantic community and to strengthen this community’s contribution to global security.

Our strategy to preserve the security and stability of the transatlantic community in the future is based on certain overarching principles and realities:

- **Transatlantic security is indivisible.** The United States has a permanent and vital national interest in preserving the security of our European and Canadian Allies. Conversely, our Allies in Europe recognize that their security is inextricably tied to that of North America. While there are many dimensions to the transatlantic security relationship, the presence of significant and highly capable U.S. military forces in Europe will remain, for the foreseeable future, a critical linchpin. Behind that presence stands the full array of U.S.-based conventional forces, America’s unsurpassed nuclear deterrent, our formidable economic power, and our demonstrated political will to defend democratic ideals and values.

- **The transatlantic community should include all of Europe, and multiple institutions and relationships will be necessary to unite that community.** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)—the leading pillars of this community—have enlarged their respective memberships in recent years. We are fully confident that they will enlarge again. Throughout these separate but mutually reinforcing enlargement processes, Americans and Europeans also must work together to strengthen cooperative security, economic,
and political relations with countries that, for a variety of reasons, might not become NATO or EU members in the next few years. Complementary American and European efforts will be particularly important to achieve stable, positive relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, since it is in our mutual interest to bring these countries steadily closer to Euro-Atlantic structures.

- The United States welcomes European efforts to increase their contribution to collective defense and crisis response operations within NATO and to build a capability to act militarily under the EU where NATO as a whole is not engaged. These efforts are part of Europe’s longstanding and natural trend toward greater cooperation and deeper union in economic, monetary, social, and political matters, a trend supported by the United States since the early post-World War II period. America’s leadership role has adjusted before to changes in Europe, and we are prepared to adapt ourselves in the future to work with stronger, more versatile, and more united European partners.

- To ensure transatlantic security in the future, the United States and its Allies must improve defense capabilities in the fields most relevant to modern warfare. Operation Allied Force reinforced the fact that we need more deployable, sustainable, interoperable and flexible forces to engage effectively in a wide variety of situations. The United States is already moving to address these requirements, and we look to the rest of NATO to do its share. This effort will not be cost-free. All Allies have the responsibility to match their rhetoric with real resources. In many cases this will require increased defense budgets as well as smarter spending and pooling of resources.

- In this era of globalization, America and Europe have common interests in dealing with security challenges on the periphery of the European continent and beyond that can have important ramifications for democracy and prosperity within our transatlantic community. Globalization and the information revolution bring enormous benefits to the transatlantic community, including its security structures, but they also increase its vulnerabilities. They
facilitate efforts by potential adversaries—both hostile states and increasingly sophisticated terrorists—to develop or acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the means to deliver them. Humanitarian disasters beyond Europe can have an important impact on transatlantic interest and require joint U.S.–European responses.

Looking ahead, we need to address several challenges:

- We must have international structures where countries within the transatlantic community work together to help build security and prevent conflict, deter and defend against any external threat, respond effectively to crises, and rebuild war-torn societies after the shooting stops. To meet tomorrow’s challenges we will need to adapt multiple existing structures—including transatlantic, regional, sub-regional, and bilateral arrangements—and, where necessary, create new ones.

- We must ensure that these international structures have the necessary capabilities to perform their missions. This is true not only for structures focused primarily on military cooperation, such as NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), but also for those structures best suited to mobilize diplomatic or other non-military assets (e.g., expert assistance to police and judiciary institutions, civilian teams to monitor human rights and elections, and targeted economic and humanitarian assistance) that will help shape the security situation in unstable regions.

- We must pay special attention to certain key regions adjacent to NATO. For example, destabilization in the Caucasus region, the area around Turkey, and the Mediterranean’s southern littoral could have huge consequences for transatlantic security. The transatlantic community as a whole must engage effectively to shape a more stable security environment in these key regions.

- Our future strategy must set a course for ensuring the long-term success of our significant crisis response operations currently underway in the Balkans. We also must better prepare the transatlantic community to conduct such operations, if necessary, in the future.
This report is intended to offer a clear vision of U.S. policy goals in building transatlantic cooperation as a continuing force for freedom. Working with the Congress and our Allies, we will vigorously pursue this comprehensive agenda to strengthen our international security in the years ahead.

William Cohen

Secretary Cohen introduces President Bill Clinton at the Pentagon as he prepares to sign the National Defense Authorization Act FY 2000, which provides for the first sustained increase in defense spending in 15 years.
The United States defines its “vital interests” as those interests of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. Chief among these are the physical security and territorial integrity of our nation and those of our Allies, and the protection of our critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack. In Europe these vital interests—and our enduring commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights, individual liberty, and the rule of law—are manifested in and defended by the NATO Alliance and the complex web of interlocking relationships and partnerships that define the architecture of European security in the 21st century.

**Democracy and Human Rights**

The promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights remain core objectives of U.S. national security strategy. Strong and vibrant democracies already exist in much of Europe. Thus, our efforts to further these objectives focus on those states that are making the difficult transition from closed to open societies. We seek to strengthen their commitment to human rights and enhance their capabilities to implement democratic reforms.

We are therefore working with Allies and Partners to institutionalize democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, and to integrate the states of that region into Euro-Atlantic structures. Such reforms can help avert or resolve problems that, if left unchecked, may lead to ethnic conflict and regional violence,
threatening the security of Allies and Partners. Our goal is to build and strengthen the pillars of civil society throughout Europe. By helping to build civil societies, we are building peace and prosperity, which helps to strengthen U.S. security. By joining the Western democratic family of nations, states that once lived under totalitarian or communist rule are today working to strengthen the forces of democracy and reform, enhancing security for the United States and all of Europe.

Our abiding commitment to human rights and democracy is not only the right thing to do, it is also in our own best national interests. Grave violations of human rights, in the Balkans or elsewhere, challenge our values and our security. The security of the Euro-Atlantic Community must spring from the consent of free peoples and must be built upon shared purposes and values that can be defended when the need arises. The United States, in concert with its Allies, may in some circumstances, where other measures have failed, use coercive measures, including military force, to counter grave violations of human rights.

The United States cannot be alone in protecting or promoting democratic values and human rights. European states and institutions, such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), play an increasingly important role through their political and cultural links with, and economic aid and technical assistance to, developing and newly industrialized countries. We need a strong partnership with Europe to meet challenges to our common values that no single country can cope with alone. In reaffirming our commitment to democracy and human rights, the United States will continue to make full use of every opportunity to help build a Europe that is undivided, democratic and free.

“America stands with Europe. Today, no less than 50 years ago, our destinies are joined. If Europe is at peace, America is more secure. If Europe prospers, America does as well. We . . . move to a logic of mutually beneficial interdependence, where each nation can grow stronger and more prosperous because of the success of its neighbors and friends. . .We seek a transatlantic partnership that is broad and open in scope, where the benefits and burdens are shared, where we seek a stable and peaceful future not only for ourselves, but for all the world.”

President Bill Clinton
Berlin, May 13, 1998
Economic Prosperity

Europe is an indispensable economic partner for the United States and will remain so in the 21st century. The EU is the our largest trading and investment partner. Two-way trade was valued at $507 billion in 1999. On the investment side, EU investments in the United States totaled more than $481 billion at the end of 1998, while the United States had more than $433 billion invested in the EU. These trade and investment ties account for an estimated 14 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. If the 15 member EU brings in as many as a dozen new members in the next several years, it will comprise the world’s largest single market, with some 500 million citizens and an economy significantly larger than our own.

We have an important interest in preserving and strengthening constructive economic relations within the transatlantic community. Increased European economic prosperity inevitably will expand two-way trade and investment flows with the United States. It also will contribute to European stability by creating a more positive environment for relatively new democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Economic growth and progress in democratic governance should help, in turn, to moderate ethnic and religious tensions that can lead to violent internal and international conflicts. In addition, improved economic performance can serve transatlantic security by increasing the resources available to governments for needed investments in defense capabilities. Finally, a strong transatlantic economy will be an engine of growth and development for the global economy, which is a necessary—albeit not sufficient—precondition for improving global security and stability.

Security

The United States seeks to shape a stable security environment that brings enduring peace to all of Europe. Such an environment is indispensable to the promotion of democracy and economic prosperity. The defense of North America remains inextricably tied to the defense of Europe. The United States tried and failed to isolate itself from the devastating wars in Europe during the 20th century, which were fought with weapons that are markedly primitive by today’s standards. We could not isolate ourselves at all from the catastrophic effects of an attack against Europe in the 21st century, especially if it involved weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). There is no better way to shape a stable security environment and prevent new lines of division or confrontation in Europe than to reach out to Central and Eastern European states anxious to be integrated fully into the political, economic, and security structures of the transatlantic community. For the same reason, we need to build increasingly positive relations with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the other independent and distinctive states that emerged from the former Soviet Union.

To safeguard U.S. national security, we must cooperate with Europe on issues that transcend our respective borders. The United States seeks to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means to deliver them, since such proliferation directly threatens our security and that of our Allies. No American effort to deal with the proliferation threat can succeed without the active cooperation of our Allies and other European states that produce and sell dual use materials and technologies that, in the wrong hands, can be used for hostile purposes.

In addition, the defense of U.S. territory, our citizens, and our economic well being depends upon free trade and access to strategic natural resources and international waters and airways. The U.S. military presence in Europe plays a critical role in protecting our economic interests, as well as facilitating U.S. military deployments for both crisis and non-crisis missions to assist allies and friends in neighboring regions. Without the basing and host nation support structures available to U.S. forces through our defense arrangements in Europe, protecting vital U.S. interests both within and outside Europe would be immeasurably more complex, demanding, and costly.
The key elements of U.S. defense strategy worldwide are:

- To *shape* the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests.
- To *respond*, if necessary, to the full spectrum of crises, from deterring aggression or coercion and conducting smaller-scale contingency operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars.
- To *prepare* now for an uncertain future through focused modernization efforts, pursuing the revolution in military affairs, and hedging against unlikely but significant future threats.

In the Euro-Atlantic region, we pursue our *shape, respond, and prepare* strategy through three mutually reinforcing layers of engagement centered on NATO, multilateral engagement with countries participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) and members of the EU, and bilateral engagement with individual Allies and Partners. Within each layer of engagement, U.S. military forces stationed in Europe play a key role in advancing our security objectives.

**NATO**

Although the United States maintains strong bilateral defense links with many countries around the world, in the Euro-Atlantic region we have committed ourselves to an *alliance of sovereign states* whose fundamental purpose is to protect the freedom and security of each and every member. NATO is a living, dynamic institution where U.S. military officers, diplomats, and civil servants work side-by-side with counterparts from 17 European states and Canada to

President Clinton thanks personnel deployed overseas in support of U.S. and NATO operations.
In April 1949, ten European nations, Canada, and the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. Since 1952, seven more European nations have joined the original twelve members of the Alliance. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.

Article 4 of the Treaty states that “(t)he Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” For this reason, NATO serves as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on issues that affect the vital interests of the member nations.

Article 5 contains the commitment of all Allies to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any Ally. It states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Article 10 of the Treaty leaves the door open for the accession of new members, who may be invited by unanimous agreement to accede to the Treaty. New members must be in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and contribute to the security of its member states.

Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, NATO has several key policy and decision-making institutions:

- The North Atlantic Council (NAC), made up of Permanent Representatives of the 19 members, is the principal decision-making authority of the Alliance. The NAC—which also meets at higher levels involving Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers—makes decisions based on consensus. The NAC selects a Secretary General who chairs its meetings and directs an international staff of civil servants and military experts.

- The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is normally composed of Permanent Representatives, but meets at the level of Defense Ministers at least twice a year. It deals with most defense matters and subjects related to collective defense planning. With the exception of France, all member countries are represented in the DPC.

- Defense Ministers of member countries participating in the DPC meet in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), where they discuss specific policy issues associated with Alliance nuclear forces.

- To assist and advise the NAC, DPC, and NPG on military matters, each member country names a senior military officer to serve as their national Military Representative to NATO. These representatives also form the Military Committee (MC), which is headed by an elected chairman who serves as the MC’s spokesman and representative and acts on its behalf in issuing guidance to the International Military Staff.

NATO’s integrated military structure is divided into two Strategic Commands. The headquarters of the Allied Command Europe—referred to as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)—is located near Mons, Belgium. SHAPE is responsible for the overall planning, direction, and conduct of all Alliance military activities within its command area (from the northern tip of Norway to Southern Europe, including the Mediterranean, and from the Atlantic coastline to the eastern border of Turkey). The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. SACLANT is responsible for safeguarding the Allies’ sea lanes of communication, supporting land and amphibious operations, and protecting the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based nuclear deterrent in his command area (from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa.)
The Strategic Concept envisages a larger, more capable and more flexible Alliance. It reaffirms NATO’s core function of collective defense, even as it expresses NATO’s willingness to respond to crises that arise from regional or ethnic conflicts.

In an effort to better prepare NATO internally to meet these challenges, the Strategic Concept provides guidance to NATO military authorities and tasks them to develop, through the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), military capabilities to carry out new missions and improve interoperability among NATO forces. The Strategic Concept also recognizes the importance of the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) as an essential element of Alliance adaptation that would foster a more effective European contribution to Alliance security.

The Strategic Concept addresses future external adaptation of the Alliance. It underscores, for example, the importance of NATO’s Partnerships with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region and recognizes the need for consultation and joint action. As part of a broader effort to enhance stability and sustain reform throughout Europe, the Strategic Concept reaffirms that NATO’s door remains open to future enlargement.

**Multilateral and Bilateral Engagement**

Complementing our engagement through NATO and other fora, the United States advances its *shape, respond, and prepare* objectives through diverse multilateral and bilateral security relations with Allies and Partners.

In close cooperation with its Allies, the United States plays a key role in several multilateral efforts to *shape* transatlantic security, build regional stability, and reduce the risk of conflict. Through PfP and its political component, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 26 states reaching from Ireland to Russia and Finland to Turkmenistan are developing increasingly transparent and cooperative relationships with NATO and with one another. Under NATO-sponsored PfP programs, several Partners are receiving multilateral support for needed defense reforms, which contribute to their development as viable democracies.

Cooperation with our Allies and Partners has contributed to our ability to *respond* to crises in Europe and beyond. Many of our Allies

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1 The Defense Capabilities Initiative is discussed more fully in Chapter III.
2 The Partnership for Peace is more fully discussed in Chapter IV.
have made military contributions to combined operations with U.S. forces undertaken throughout the world. In Europe, our Allies and Partners have assumed a large share of the responsibilities and burdens in peace support operations in the Balkans.

In the multilateral realm, smaller groupings, such as the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) and Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process, permit Allies and Partners to work together on practical, regional defense cooperation. Such multilateral engagement activities also prepare Partners to participate, when they so choose, in NATO-led or other international crisis response operations.

In the bilateral realm, the United States cooperates with individual Allies and Partners over a broad spectrum of activities, including military exercises, training, security assistance, and efforts to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons. To help build a basis for cooperation and guide the implementation of agreed programs, we conduct rigorous and regular bilateral working groups and staff talks with Allies and Partners. Our bilateral relations also include tailored security assistance and cooperation programs to provide certain Allies and Partners with requested training and equipment to help them meet their Alliance commitments or Partnership goals. With some Allies, the United States has basing or other access arrangements involving the presence of U.S. military forces on their territory. Such arrangements are vital to meeting our Alliance commitments.

Bilateral engagement with European Allies remains a necessary method to build consensus within NATO and address specific issues where NATO as a whole is not involved, or where other multilateral fora are found to be less effective. Certain Allies share broader interests with the United States in other regions—for example, in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Strong bilateral ties are indispensable in instances where the United States might join with one or more Ally to undertake military operations in a “coalition of the willing” outside NATO.

The United States seeks over the long term to achieve the greatest possible synergies between our multilateral and bilateral engagement strategies. Still, we remain sensitive to the legitimate political and security concerns of individual Allies, accept the fact that we cannot have identical relationships with each of them, and understand that we will not always agree with every Ally on issues of concern to us. That is the inherent nature and one of the greatest strengths of our Alliance of sovereign, democratic countries. Through complementary multilateral and bilateral approaches, we will build transatlantic security links that are strong, resilient, and able to ease the inevitable frictions—or even absorb the occasional shocks—in U.S. relations with Europe.
A fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy is that NATO will continue to be the anchor of American engagement in Europe. Therefore, we place a very high priority on working closely with our Allies to accomplish the goals set forth in the Strategic Concept. In particular, the goals of improving NATO’s defense capabilities, strengthening the “European pillar” of the Alliance, and preparing for further enlargement of its membership are mutually supportive approaches to strengthening transatlantic security in the 21st century.

Improving Defense Capabilities to Meet Today’s Threat... and Tomorrow’s

To be an effective military alliance, NATO must fulfill certain key functions. Specifically, it must understand the likely threats to the security of its members, decide on the capabilities needed to address those threats, and develop and field those capabilities through a combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts. This will remain a dynamic process, since the threats—and tools needed to meet them—change over time.

Over the past decade, the threat of direct invasion of NATO territory has decreased significantly while other types of threats (including regional conflicts on the periphery of NATO, proliferation of NBC weapons, and terrorist attack) have increased significantly. These emerging threats are further complicated by the fact that they could emanate from a variety of sources, in combination or alone, and at any time. In response, NATO forces and structures have begun to change in important ways, and NATO Allies have agreed that the Alliance will need new capabilities applicable to both Article 5 and non-Article 5 contingencies.
Secretary of Defense Cohen introduced the idea of focused improvement of defense capabilities at the June 1998 meeting of NATO defense ministers. He called attention to lessons learned from NATO’s experience in Bosnia, which suggested that future conflicts in Europe would place a premium on the ability to deploy troops and equipment to a crisis rapidly, often outside NATO territory, with little or no preexisting host nation support. In addition, the Allies have learned that when a military operation is conducted at a distance—even a relatively small distance—deficiencies in mobility, communications, and ability to sustain forces over an extended period of time can compromise mission goals. Secretary Cohen also reiterated that, in the face of NATO’s conventional military superiority, hostile states are looking to NBC weapons and increasingly long-range and accurate ballistic and cruise missiles to offset that superiority. NATO, therefore, needs to develop and field the capabilities, doctrine, and plans to deal effectively with these growing threats.

Further intra-Alliance consultations based on the idea proposed by Secretary Cohen resulted in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was launched by President Clinton and other Allied leaders at the Washington Summit. Specifically, Allies agreed to improve capabilities in five functional areas:

- **Deployability and mobility.** NATO must improve sealift, airlift, and reception facility assets necessary to get forces to the crisis area on short notice and deploy them rapidly within their operational sectors, even where local transportation infrastructure is marginal (as in the Balkans.)

- **Sustainability and logistics.** Once NATO commits forces, it must be able to sustain their operations—with equipment, materiel, and personnel—until the mission is completed. This will require, for example, modern asset tracking systems and a multinational joint logistic capability to ensure that all Allies have critical supplies when and where they need them.

- **Command and control information systems.** NATO urgently needs a common architecture and assets to ensure rapid, secure, effective, and deployable command and control among all its forces.
- **Effective engagement.** This category includes both weapons (e.g., precision-guided munitions that can operate in all weather, day or night) and electronic capabilities (e.g., systems to suppress enemy air defenses). These capabilities are necessary to achieve our military objectives as quickly as possible with the lowest possible risk to NATO forces and the lowest possible collateral damage.

- **Survivability of forces and infrastructures.** NATO forces must be better prepared to defend themselves and their facilities, and to maintain operational effectiveness in contingencies where the adversary (including terrorist groups) could use chemical or biological weapons and information warfare.

The need for effective implementation of the DCI was underscored by NATO’s experience in Operation Allied Force, which was underway during the Washington Summit.

On one hand, that operation was highly successful overall: NATO accomplished its mission through the most precise and lowest collateral damage air campaign in history, with no American or Allied combat casualties in 78 days of operations and over 38,000 combat-related aircraft sorties. The United States and its Allies were united in their strategy and determination to prevail. Operation Allied Force could not have been conducted without NATO and the air forces, infrastructure, transit rights, basing access, and political and diplomatic support provided by our Allies and Partners. Broadly speaking, other members of the Alliance contributed about the same or a greater share of their available aircraft for prosecuting the campaign as did the United States. They also contributed the bulk of the ground forces to help stabilize neighboring countries and to conduct humanitarian relief organizations.

On the other hand, Operation Allied Force highlighted some worrisome imbalances and shortfalls in Alliance capabilities. There was a significant gap between U.S. capabilities and those of our Allies in areas such as precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities. Because only a few of our Allies possessed or could employ precision munitions in sufficient numbers (or at all), the United States conducted the preponderance of the strike sorties during the early stages of the conflict. Over the course of the campaign, the United States conducted roughly two-thirds of all support sorties and half of all combat missions. The lack of fully interoperable communications equipment forced occasional reliance on non-secure methods that could have compromised operational security. Insufficient air mobility assets among our Allies contributed to the slow build-up of the NATO-led Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR) ground forces in
Kosovo once Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to NATO’s terms to end the conflict.

DCI implementation has made some noteworthy progress since the Washington Summit, especially in setting clearer priorities for, and improving coordination among, NATO’s defense-related bodies. The Allies have agreed on 58 tasks to improve specific capabilities. Most of these have been translated, within NATO’s ongoing defense planning process, into new “Force Goals”. Our goal is not to develop similar capabilities for every NATO member, since not every member needs or can afford the newest or best fighter aircraft, long-range tanker aircraft or surveillance systems. Rather, our goal is to provide NATO forces with compatible and complementary capabilities that meet our collective requirements.

As we encourage our Allies to improve their defense capabilities, we are also taking important steps to improve our own capabilities and reform our national policies to facilitate the sharing of technology. For example:

- We are augmenting or accelerating procurement in major areas identified by the DCI, such as strategic airlift (we will acquire 130-135 C-17 aircraft by 2006), ground surveillance (we will field an additional Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), electronic jamming (we will add a squadron of EA-6B electronic jamming aircraft), and precision guided munitions (we will purchase additional Tomahawk cruise missiles and accelerate procurement of precision guided bombs.) Overall, the United States has embarked on its largest sustained increase in defense spending in 15 years.

- We have provided commanders and staffs with policy, strategy, and doctrinal guidelines for the planning and execution of joint and multi-national military operations in NBC environments. The guidelines effect not only passive defense capabilities, such as medical capabilities, but also active defense and counterforce capabilities to enable U.S. military forces to survive, fight, and win in NBC-contaminated environments.

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3 Force Goals are part of NATO’s longstanding defense planning process. They represent an agreement by Allies to provide forces and capabilities requested by NATO’s Strategic Commands.
We also have begun implementation of the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI). Launched in May 2000, the DTSI will streamline our export control process, improve the ability of industry on both sides of the Atlantic to share critical technologies while reducing the risk of their diversion to potential adversaries, and improve the ability of our respective military forces to operate together across the range of Alliance missions.

The Alliance will not remain healthy if the United States is alone in this effort. At this point, the “jury is still out” on Europe’s willingness, as a whole, to follow through on all agreed DCI objectives. Several Allies have taken useful steps, including efforts to restructure their forces consistent with both DCI and NATO’s Strategic Concept. In addition, the United Kingdom, Canada and others have announced increases in defense spending, in real terms, over the next several years—the first such increases since the end of the Cold War. Still, many Allies have indicated that their current plans are to implement fully a disappointingly small number of Force Goals. Moreover, some Allies are headed in the wrong direction, either seriously considering or carrying out real reductions in defense spending.

This trend will have to be reversed.

The success of Allies in meeting DCI goals ultimately depends upon the provision of sufficient resources. Allies will need to make the necessary investments to field a 21st century force. Defense budgets always will be a function of national priorities, but they also must realistically address international challenges and the capabilities needed to address those challenges as an Alliance. In some areas, Allies’ military capabilities can be increased through innovative, more efficient, and better-coordinated use of resources. Resources for needed capabilities can be found, in some cases, through restructuring and reductions in military personnel. A number of mobility and logistics capabilities can be met through commercially available assets and off-the-shelf technology—for example, by harnessing commercial transport assets in an emergency for military airlift or sealift support. Joint procurement of certain defense equipment and technologies by a group of Allies is another promising approach, which the United States will continue to support.

For many Allies, however, smarter spending will not be enough. To meet the agreed DCI objectives, nations that reasonably can afford to do so will need to inject additional resources into their defense budgets. Through a combination of an effective DCI and force planning process, we will help assure our respective legislative bodies and publics that our
The European Union (EU) in brief

The European Union is the latest permutation in a process of European integration that began in the wake of World War II, when leaders of former Allied and Axis countries searched for an effective means to rebuild their shattered economies and prevent future wars. The United States consciously promoted this process by encouraging Western European states to cooperate among themselves as part of the Marshall Plan launched in 1947.

A first step toward achieving a united Europe occurred in 1951, when Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands created the European Coal and Steel Community to regulate coal and steel production. By 1958, “the Six” agreed to establish a European Economic Community (to bring about the free movement of goods, people, capital and services) and a European Atomic Energy Community (to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy). Under the treaties of Maastricht (which entered into force in 1993) and Amsterdam (which entered into force in 1999), the EU reformed and strengthened its institutions to include a single currency and European Central Bank (in which 11 of its 15 members currently participate), systematic cooperation on major foreign policy issues, and close cooperation on a range of justice, immigration, and social issues.

The EU is governed by a Parliament (directly elected in EU-wide elections, but with relatively limited legislative powers), the Commission (an EU “cabinet” of 20 Commissioners appointed by their respective governments and a President chosen by consensus), the Council of the EU (comprised of Ministers from member governments, it enacts EU laws based on proposals submitted by the Commission), the Court of Justice (the EU’s “Supreme Court”), and the Court of Auditors (overseeing the financial management of the EU budget).

In certain areas, such as agricultural policy and trade, EU members have “pooled” some of their sovereign powers, allowing the Union to negotiate directly with the United States and other countries. In other areas, including defense and security, members retain their sovereignty. Since the EU system is based on international treaties and not a Constitution, it remains an essentially “supranational” entity—not a “federalist” structure like the United States.

need for additional resources is well founded and that those additional resources will be well spent.

Strengthening the European Pillar

The DCI’s objective of improving Alliance military capabilities (and reducing the “capabilities gap” between the United States and the Allies) is closely linked to efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. It also is linked to the EU’s decision to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).4

The broad military goal of ESDP is for European Union members to establish a military capability to perform a range of crisis response operations either within a NATO framework or, in cases where NATO as a whole is not engaged, on their own. Whether engaged in a NATO-led or EU-led operation, European nations will still have only one set of forces and capabilities to deploy. Hence, our long-term objective is to nurture and sustain strong and mutually supportive links between NATO and the developing military crisis response capabilities within the EU.

The EU also plans, as part of ESDP, to build a civilian crisis response capability, to include the rapid deployment of 5,000 civilian police from EU states to crisis spots and assistance to local authorities in rebuilding effective judiciary and penal systems. Such a capability would be of tremendous long-term benefit to NATO or EU-led forces involved in post-conflict crisis response operations such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and KFOR.

The EU has made clear it has no intention for ESDP to challenge the core NATO mission of, or responsibility for, collective defense. Rather,

4 ESDI is a mechanism within NATO by which European Allies can gain access to NATO common assets and capabilities for operations led by the Western European Union. Its objective is the creation of a “European Pillar” within NATO. ESDP was foreshadowed by the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997. The Treaty calls for the progressive creation of a common European defense policy, which covers humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and the use of combat forces in crisis response. The Treaty does not call for creation of a European Army.
ESDP represents an acknowledgement by our European Allies that their economic and political success is not matched by their ability to respond to crises in their own backyard, such as the long-simmering Balkan conflicts, and that this situation needs to be addressed. It remains overwhelmingly likely that, in any situation where military involvement on a significant scale is justified and where there is a European consensus to undertake a military operation, the United States would support a NATO role and would be part of the operation. Conversely, it is highly unlikely that, in any such situation, Europe would ask the United States to step aside and not participate. Still, for some Europeans, ESDP also represents an “insurance policy” that would allow Europe to take independent action to deal with a non-Article 5 type of contingency in the unlikely event that the United States (or any other member of NATO) did not join a consensus for NATO action.

As a centerpiece of ESDP, EU leaders agreed in December 1999 to develop, by 2003, the ability to deploy a force of 50-60,000 troops within 60 days and to sustain that force for at least one year. To reach this objective (known as the EU’s “Headline Goal”), EU members will need significant new capabilities in the same five areas identified in the DCI. This coincidence of requirements should not be surprising, since 11 of the
15 EU members are members of NATO and every nation has but one defense budget and one set of forces. No European country, for example, would be in a position to purchase one set of airlift assets for NATO collective defense purposes or NATO-led crisis response operations and a separate set of assets for EU-led crisis response operations. The same holds true for communications and surveillance equipment, precision guided munitions, and so on. Simply put, it is clear that when it comes to building and maintaining real military capabilities, DCI stands to make a vital contribution to both ESDI, which seeks an improved European pillar within NATO, and ESDP, which seeks to foster a European capability to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged.

The United States actively supports an ESDP that will benefit Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. We recognize that development of a foreign and security policy for the EU is a natural, even an inevitable, part of the development of broader European integration. We agree with the EU that NATO remains the foundation of our collective defense of its members. Greater European military capabilities will make the Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden the United States now has to carry in every crisis, and make the U.S.-European relationship a more balanced partnership.

We seek a relationship that will benefit the current, and the potential future, members of both organizations—a relationship wherein NATO and EU efforts to strengthen European security are coherent and mutually reinforcing; where the autonomy and integrity of decision-making in both organizations are respected, with each organization dealing with the other on an equal footing; where both organizations place a high premium on transparency, close and frequent contacts on a wide range of levels, and on efforts that are complementary; and where there is no discrimination against any of the member states of either organization.

The path to a successful strengthening of the European pillar of transatlantic security may appear, on occasion, excessively long or needlessly contentious. Again, this should not be surprising, for NATO and the EU are very different organizations that do not have a long history of dialogue and interaction. The process of developing their new relationship

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**European Leaders on the Need for Enhanced European Capabilities**

“Our vision is clear. Europe must prepare to do more—to pull its weight. And it must develop capabilities in ways that support action in NATO as well as under European Union leadership. There is an expectation on both sides of the Atlantic that we will make real progress…We cannot afford to fail.” Geoffrey Hoon, British Minister of Defense, April 2000

“The problem is not too much America in NATO but too little Europe. Enhancing Europe’s ability to take action and assume responsibility means strengthening NATO as a whole and reorienting transatlantic cooperation towards the challenges of the future.” Rudolf Scharping, German Minister of Defense, November 1999

“Improvement of our national capabilities will be of significant benefit to the Alliance as well as to the European Union. The capacity to commit our forces will increase the Alliance’s and the United States’ spectrum of options…Taking up greater responsibilities as Europeans will enable us to act as collective partners in an Alliance of democratic countries.” Alain Richard, French Minister of Defense, February 2000

“The burden of dealing with European security crises should not fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the United States. We need to create a more balanced Alliance, with a stronger European input. Europe recognizes this, and is starting to do something about it.” Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, December 1999

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has only just begun, and we realize it will take time to complete. NATO can and should be flexible and generous in establishing such a relationship. Equally, the EU—a strong, confident, and vibrant institution that has accomplished so much in bringing Europeans toward an “ever closer union” in so many areas—can and should be flexible and generous in its approach.

NATO and the EU must work cooperatively to develop (and avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of) the military assets and capabilities required by both organizations. This cooperation should extend to the creation of a common, coherent, and collaborative defense planning review process, a complex area where NATO has proven tools and is willing and able to assist the EU in meeting its Headline Goal. The NATO-EU relationship will work best if close consultation takes place at many different levels—political and technical, formal and informal—with an emphasis on full transparency between the two. The right kind of links will serve the mutual interests of all NATO and EU members, since they will ensure that decisions about future military operations will meet the security objectives of both organizations without infringing on their respective, independent decision-making prerogatives.

We recognize that real cooperation requires a “two-way street.” For example, the four EU members who participate in PfP but are not members of the Alliance should have appropriate access to NATO’s defense planning arrangements and a role in the decision shaping of NATO-led crisis response operations. This will enhance their capability as Partners to act effectively alongside the 11 EU members who belong to the Alliance in an eventual EU-led crisis response contingency. Similarly, the six European Allies who currently are not members of the EU should be invited to participate, to the widest possible extent, in EU preparations to meet its Headline Goal and, eventually, in the deliberations that must take place before the EU takes a final decision on military action.

Once an EU decision has been taken to conduct an operation, non-EU European Allies contributing to the operation should participate in the decision shaping. This participation by the non-EU European Allies is justified on several grounds. They share security guarantees with the eleven NATO members of the EU (non-NATO members of the EU do not), contribute to common NATO assets that would be available to the EU, and likely would be willing to contribute their important national capabilities to EU military operations.

There would be no contradiction between the four non-NATO EU members gaining broad transparency into NATO defense planning and
the eight non-EU NATO members gaining reciprocal transparency into the EU Headline Goal process and these nations’ status outside NATO and the EU respectively. Simply put, our aim is to create a rational, cooperative, complementary NATO-EU approach to building security across the Euro-Atlantic community; it is not to bring four of the 15 EU members into NATO “through the backdoor” or to inject the six non-EU NATO members into the EU’s decision-making.

While Americans might debate specific policies toward Europe, a broad consensus exists in favor of a lasting U.S. political and military engagement in major issues affecting European security. Simply put, the notion that Europe must begin to prepare now for an eventual American “withdrawal” has no foundation in fact or in policy. Conversely, while some in Europe have voiced concern that America’s prominent role in the Alliance somehow inhibits Europe’s unity and political independence, most Europeans recognize that a “fortress Europe” is neither a safe nor realistic option. In the end, the improved European military capabilities that we seek to achieve through DCI, NATO force planning, ESDI and ESDP will strengthen the Alliance as a whole and the European pillar of transatlantic security in particular.

Enlargement

Enlargement is not a new concept for NATO. Since its creation in 1949, the Alliance has grown from 12 to 19 members in four rounds of enlargement, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. Moreover, as NATO’s leaders declared at the Washington Summit: “The three new members will not be the last.” In fact, the record demonstrates that with every new member, NATO has become stronger, and European stability has been enhanced.

Immediately upon their accession, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland demonstrated their “added value” to NATO with their support to Operation Allied Force and subsequent troop contributions to KFOR. They also have demonstrated in other ways that they take their NATO obligations seriously. Examples include their troop contributions to SFOR, their ongoing efforts to improve defense planning and implement defense reforms, their constructive participation in a range of NATO activities and deliberations, and their very positive role in enhancing NATO’s relationships with Partners, including the Russian Federation and Ukraine. While the newest members

President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic is greeted as a new member of NATO by Secretary Cohen and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton (right).
As a matter of principle, there are several reasons why further enlargement of NATO will benefit U.S. security interests and those of our Allies. Enlargement will:

- help to erase lines of division and grow the family of European nations committed to democratic institutions, individual liberty, rule of law, market economies, and settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; and

- demonstrate to Partners the potential benefits of reforming their civil and military institutions to be compatible with those of NATO members.

While the United States and its Allies are committed to an open door policy and eventual further enlargement, enlargement is not an end in itself. It is more important to ensure that enlargement contributes to our strategic objectives than to meet any arbitrary schedule. For this reason, NATO leaders agreed at the Washington Summit to review the enlargement question by 2002, and they endorsed a few key principles for considering requests for accession at that time. Specifically, they reaffirmed that all states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security and that no European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its history or geographic location. Thus, each aspirant will be evaluated on its merits.

The United States, for its part, has proceeded carefully at every stage of NATO enlargement over the past half century. This will be true in the future, as well, reflecting the seriousness of America’s commitment to collective defense, the profound implications of a decision to extend that commitment to additional European nations, and the very important role of the United States Congress—especially the Senate—in enlargement questions. The Senate has never rejected an Executive Branch proposal to enlarge the Alliance, thanks to the painstaking efforts taken by Democratic and Republican Administrations, Congressional leaders of both parties, and Allied governments to ensure that aspirants are truly ready for membership. Everyone—the United States, Allies and Partners—has an important interest in seeing that this remarkable example of bipartisan support for a strong transatlantic security link is preserved.

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5 Under the Constitution, a two-thirds affirmative vote of the Senate is required to give its advice and consent to ratification of a treaty or treaty amendment.
It follows, therefore, that an essential element of U.S. strategy will be to assist those countries that aspire to join NATO to become the strongest possible candidates for membership. For this reason, we will continue to support actively the Membership Action Plan (MAP) launched at the Washington Summit. Aspiring candidates must know that NATO membership will be founded upon the key principle of adherence to the democratic and other shared values of the Alliance, which are rooted in the notions of individual liberty, the rule of law and civilian control of military forces. Such values cannot be subject to change in the face of electoral cycles or changes in individual and party leadership. Toward this end, MAP offers aspirants a robust, structured list of voluntary activities designed to help them build their candidacies in five principal areas of interest to the Allies. These include:

- **Political and economic issues.** For example, aspirants are expected to settle ethnic disputes or territorial disputes by peaceful means, establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and promote stability and well-being through solid macro-economic policies.

- **Defense and military issues.** Aspirants need to be ready to provide forces and capabilities that contribute to collective defense and other Alliance missions.

- **Resource issues.** New members must commit sufficient budget resources to fund needed national capabilities and to participate at appropriate levels in NATO’s commonly funded activities.

- **Security issues.** New members need established safeguards and procedures to protect sensitive information in accordance with NATO standards.

- **Legal issues.** New members need, for example, to understand and implement all legal arrangements governing accession to and cooperation with NATO.

The MAP is a demanding process, and active participation in it—or, indeed, recognized progress in all of its categories—does not carry a guarantee of eventual membership. Aspirants understand that, under the North Atlantic Treaty, all Allies must agree to the accession of any new member.

Moreover, the MAP is one part of a larger process of U.S. and NATO outreach to Partners, which is described in the next chapter.

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6 The current NATO aspirants participating in the MAP are: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
The United States and its Allies can fully achieve the Washington Treaty’s objectives only through close partnership with other states across the European continent. For the foreseeable future, there will be no single transatlantic institution that meets the varied security requirements of North America and all of Europe. Therefore, our strategy calls for a multidimensional approach to building the “conditions of stability and well-being” noted in Article 2.

In practice, this means that there exists no single solution—no “one stop shopping”—available to U.S. policy makers to address the wide range of military, political, economic and other problems (e.g., transnational crime, ethnic conflict, violations of human rights, illegal immigration, environmental security) that directly or indirectly affect transatlantic security. In some cases, NATO will be best suited to take the lead in organizing and implementing multilateral efforts that promote stability and security across Europe—for example, through PfP and special relations between NATO, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. In many instances, however, the United States and Allies can work most effectively through bilateral or regional defense cooperation agreements or arrangements. In other cases, the EU, United Nations (UN), OSCE, or multilateral arms control agreements and nonproliferation regimes have important roles to play.

Moreover, the challenge of framing and executing a coherent and comprehensive transatlantic security policy likely will become more difficult in the coming years. Increasingly, the United States, Allies and Partners will need to work with a growing but loosely connected network of intergovernmental institutions, ad hoc “coalitions of the willing,” and non-governmental organizations. Getting this network to
operate more effectively—in effect, coaxing a disparate team of independent (and independent-minded) organizations and actors to pull in the same direction—will not be easy. Still, our goal should be to develop a comprehensive set of tools to prevent the outbreak of a crisis in the first place, manage it if our preventive efforts fail, and rebuild conflict-torn societies once the violent stage of the crisis has passed.

This chapter describes the principal “building blocks” of a transatlantic security network that reaches beyond the NATO Alliance.

**Partnership for Peace (PfP)**

For all countries in Europe that seek closer cooperation with NATO, PfP and the EAPC have provided multiple avenues for practical political-military cooperation and dialogue with the Alliance. These structures will continue to be of significant benefit not only to those Partners seeking future Alliance membership, but also to those seeking greater familiarity with NATO procedures in order to maximize prospects of successful cooperation with NATO. U.S. strategy looks to build upon these successes and strengthen PfP’s role as NATO’s principal means of political and military outreach to the rest of Europe.

PfP provides for a wide range of practical cooperation between the 19 NATO Allies and 26 PfP Partners. For example, NATO BI-SCs (Bi-Strategic Command bodies), ACLANT (Allied Command Atlantic), and SHAPE are now extending invitations to PfP nations for participation in regular NATO land, air and naval exercises. PfP also continues to prove its value by enabling aspiring members to build the interoperability necessary for possible NATO membership. PfP’s stipulations for consultations between the Alliance and Partners that feel a threat to their security also proved invaluable during NATO’s air campaign against Serbia.

Evidence of PfP’s practical, on-the-ground success has been the way it has helped prepare Partners to become more militarily capable to participate in NATO-led peacekeeping operations, such as SFOR and KFOR. Partners have made important contributions to both of these operations, which in turn have reduced the burden on the United States and other Allies. This new pattern of Partner involvement, whereby Partners have gained more experience and capabilities through their involvement with PfP structures and operations, has set an important precedent for future NATO-led crisis response operations.

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7 The complexity of this task is illustrated by the fact that an estimated 300 non-governmental organizations of various sizes and abilities have participated in humanitarian assistance efforts related to Kosovo.
The 1999 Washington Summit saw the strengthening of the NATO-Partner relationship and the further enhancement of PfP through the adoption of a package of measures called the “Enhanced and More Operational Partnership” (EMOP). This package contained four primary components: the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations; the Expanded and Adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP); the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC); and the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Program (TEEP). These elements, which are in various stages of implementation, are discussed in detail below.

**Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations.** The “Pol-Mil Framework” enhances the military and political role of Partners in the planning and execution of non-Article 5 crisis response operations. It allows for more active involvement in political consultations, decision making, operational planning, and command arrangements. By institutionalizing the scope and nature of contacts between the Alliance and various Partners through each phase of an unfolding crisis, the Framework is improving NATO’s ability to work with Partners on crisis response. The premier example is KFOR, where 15 Partners participate in the political guidance and oversight of KFOR in a “NATO+15” EAPC format.

**Expanded and Adapted PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP).** PARP is designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available for operations in conjunction with Alliance forces. The expanded PARP is increasingly modeled after the NATO defense planning process. Each cycle has been extended from two to six years (reflecting NATO’s process), and, just as defense ministers do for the Alliance’s defense planning, NATO and PARP defense ministers are to agree on Ministerial Guidance every two years, in order to provide strategic direction for the PARP. The first ever PARP Ministerial Guidance was developed last year, adopted at the December 1999 Ministerials, and applied in the establishment of Partnership Goals for PARP participants during Spring 2000.
Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). The OCC aims to improve the military capabilities and interoperability of Partner forces that are slated to participate in NATO-led PfP operations. The OCC will also enable NATO in future SFOR or KFOR-like scenarios to put together tailor-made force packages, which may include Partners, for mounting and sustaining such operations. The OCC provides for enhanced “peace-time working relationships” between Alliance and Partner forces and will help Partners enjoy a greater voice in PfP decision-making.

PfP Training and Education Enhancement Program (TEEP). TEEP is designed to ensure that training and educational aspects of the PfP keep pace with advances in other areas of the Partnership, focusing specifically on the achievements of interoperability. It also seeks to promote greater cooperation and dialogue among a wider set of defense and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.

Based on proposals by Secretary Cohen during the 1998 Defense Ministerials, President Clinton and his fellow Heads of State and Government at the 1999 Summit endorsed three initiatives for improving PfP education and training:

- **PfP Simulation Network (SIMNET).** SIMNET aims to expand training and lower costs. The Network allows Allied and Partner military command staffs to train together from remote sites via computer simulation. A SIMNET demonstration exercise (with a crisis response/humanitarian assistance scenario) was conducted during the NATO Summit. Simulation technology and practices were further developed at the VIKING ’99 simulation exercise hosted by Sweden in December 1999.

- **Consortium of Defense Academies & Security Studies Institutes.** The Consortium is dedicated to strengthening defense and military education through enhanced national and institutional cooperation. It achieves this by linking defense practitioners, scholars, and experts into networks that facilitate sharing of knowledge. The Consortium has extended the scope of PfP to include universities and non-governmental institutes in addition to governmental bodies. In the last two years, representatives from more than 200 organizations drawn from 45 nations have participated in the Consortium’s conferences and working group meetings.
PfP Training Centers: Designated training centers in Allied and Partner countries help enhance PfP activities, education, and cooperation. The goal is to develop a web of training centers, each dedicated to distinctive competence in one or more fields of activity related to the PfP Work Program. Examples of potential training activities include peacekeeping, defense resource management, and field training.

Within each of these areas, the United States will continue to encourage what has been a growing trend over recent years. Specifically, other Allies and Partners—large and small, those with strong economies and those with more limited means—are stepping forward to take a leadership role in organizing, financing, and implementing PfP regional training centers, exercises and simulation activities, and conferences and workshops. This trend has both practical and political benefits. It facilitates cooperation among defense structures that are closer in size, orientation, and experience to each other than to our own. It also demonstrates convincingly that PfP has taken root as a true transatlantic partnership with a committed and effective European pillar.

There exists no pre-ordained limit on future cooperation between NATO and Partners in any security-related area where they choose to work together. Thus, active participation in PfP programs can be equally attractive and important to those Partners who are NATO aspirants, those who wish to keep the membership option open, and those who, for various reasons, choose for now not to pursue membership. PfP’s unique flexibility, which allows Partners to exercise “self-differentiation” in their relationship with NATO, should ensure that it remains a worthy effort in and of itself for many years to come.

Southeastern Europe

Twice in the past five years, NATO has been obliged to take decisive action to arrest armed conflicts in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the stability of the Balkans is still precarious and threatened by ethnic hatred, revenge-seekers, and political uncertainty. However, this region is not condemned to be a crucible of war. To build a lasting peace in Southeastern Europe, the United States, its Allies, and Partners need to create positive forces that pull the countries of Southeastern Europe closer to each other and toward increasing integration with the successful economic, political, and security institutions of the transatlantic community.

Although we have successfully deployed military forces to the region and put a stop to ethnic cleansing, longer-term success will require greater
efforts to complement military power through the application of more robust economic and political mechanisms. In addition, because the military aspects of intervention do not end when the shooting stops, our security approach to the region must also focus on further enhancing the ability of NATO Allies and Partners to assist with political rebuilding and the normalization of civil society and other functions.

Specifically, we seek to work through the DCI and PfP to encourage the development of “enablers” for mission success—elements of force structure that assist with the normalization of civil society and help accelerate the return to civilian control. Such enablers can include: robust communications, control and intelligence capabilities to assist with the demands of multinational deployments; civil affairs and military police units to replace combat units once conflict has ended; and enhanced public affairs detachments, which can help handle the very high media presence initial operations generate.

Beyond these immediate force structure needs, other enablers include: highly trained personnel who have the language skills and cultural understanding to act as liaison with local communities and factions; and organizations that can address the immediate needs of the local populace, deal with displaced persons and refugees, coordinate humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction, and help re-establish a civilian police force and judicial system. Until these types of enablers are deployed, in place and working effectively, the intervention of military forces will not be enough to restore civil society—the absence of which will perpetuate the reasons for conflict, imperil the safety of our deployed military forces, and challenge our long-term security interests.

With these requirements in mind, our strategy to bring a lasting and real peace to Southeastern Europe draws upon four mutually supportive processes:

- **Stability Pact.** Launched in June 1999 by some three dozen countries and international institutions, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe represents a “grand bargain.” In return for a commitment by

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Participants in the Stability Pact include all of the Southeastern European countries (including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), plus the United States, European Union, Canada, Japan, Russian Federation, Turkey, and numerous international organizations (e.g., UN, NATO, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and OSCE).
countries in the region to continue political and economic reforms and increase cooperation with one another, countries outside the region and international organizations have pledged to assist the regional states to move steadily toward integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Under Stability Pact auspices, participating states and organizations have mobilized new resources and undertaken numerous projects aimed at fostering democratization, human rights, economic reconstruction and development, and fighting corruption. The Stability Pact also contributes to the security environment by mobilizing support for regional cooperation in areas such as border controls against illicit trafficking, destruction of small arms and light weapons, and retraining former military personnel for productive employment in the civilian economy.

- **NATO’s Southeastern Europe Initiative (SEEI).** Launched at the Washington Summit, the SEEI draws upon existing structures—in particular, the PfP and EAPC—and tailors a range of PfP-related activities to the specific needs of the region. For example, the SEEI facilitates cooperation between NATO and Partners in the region to meet the Partners’ security assistance requirements, improve the interoperability of Partner and NATO forces, promote regional transparency in defense matters through exchanges of military and civilian defense and foreign ministry officials, and address specific regional needs such as humanitarian de-mining. In addition, the SEEI provides a forum for NATO consultations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is not a PfP member. In the future, the SEEI could facilitate a greater interface between NATO and the Stability Pact, following the example of NATO’s contribution of technical expertise to a World Bank-funded project, endorsed by the Stability Pact, to retrain former Bulgarian and Romanian military personnel for civilian jobs.

- **Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM).** Begun in 1996, SEDM brings together senior defense leaders from four NATO Allies (the United States, Greece, Italy, Turkey) and six Partners (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia.) Although SEDM has no permanent structures—e.g., no founding charter or standing secretariat—its annual meetings at the level of ministers and their deputies have spawned a variety of consultations, exercises, and workshops that build effective cooperation among regional defense leaders and facilitate the interoperability of Partners’ forces with NATO.

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9 This was the case for Croatia, as well, before its accession to PfP in May 2000. Indeed, Croatia’s positive transition over the past year—its democratic elections, improved relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, unilateral commitment to accept returning refugees, and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia—is a hopeful sign of progress for the entire region. It also demonstrates the transforming power of PfP membership, which encourages nations to pursue reform efforts.
A leading symbol of SEDM’s contribution to regional security is the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE). The MPFSEE will be capable of fielding up to a brigade-level multilateral force for employment in regional conflict prevention and peace support operations. Its force structure, command and control, training, information and logistical structures will be broadly compatible with those of NATO. In addition, the MPFSEE will draw upon capabilities being developed under SEDM to mount regionally based responses to humanitarian crises, natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes), or other emergency contingencies. Examples of these capabilities are: the Crisis Information Network, a computer-based system that allows the SEDM countries to exchange planning data and coordinate multilateral emergency relief efforts; and the Engineer Task Force, on-call units of military engineers able to perform road, bridge, and rail repairs and conduct limited de-mining and unexploded ordnance clearing operations. The SEDM’s “can do” spirit exemplifies what the United States and its Allies want to encourage across the board—a growing pattern of cooperation on practical problem-solving and security-building steps that emanate from within Southeastern Europe.

Bilateral security cooperation and engagement. Complementing its active role in the Stability Pact, NATO SEEI, and SEDM, the United States employs a variety of bilateral tools aimed at improving the regional security environment. For example, DoD has worked closely with several Partners in the region to conduct defense assessments and meet critical shortfalls in training and equipment. Similarly, United States European Command (USEUCOM) has adjusted its exercise planning to support SEDM’s Engineer Task Force concept. These engagement activities will have over time a significant impact on improving the Southeastern European Partners’ capability to operate with NATO and other Partner forces, thereby relieving some of the burden on U.S. forces.

We welcome the triumph of democratic forces in Yugoslavia and the departure from power of Slobodan Milosevic. We are working with our Allies and Partners to help the Serbian people institute democratic reforms, rebuild their economy, and integrate their nation fully into the international community. Part of this process includes the lifting of

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10 The MPFSEE was established by a formal agreement signed at the SEDM ministerial in Skopje, Macedonia in September 1998. All SEDM countries joined the MPFSEE, except the United States and Slovenia, who have observer status at MPFSEE activities. The first headquarters of the MPFSEE’s military organization (known as the Southeastern Europe Brigade, or SEEBRIG) was activated in Plovdiv, Bulgaria in August 1999. The headquarters site and nationality of officers holding key SEEBRIG positions rotate among the participating countries according to an agreed schedule.

11 See also USEUCOM section in Chapter V.
international sanctions that have a direct impact upon the people and economy of Yugoslavia. We expect Milosevic to be held fully accountable for the alleged war crimes for which he has been indicted.

Meanwhile, the NATO-led KFOR will remain critical in the near-term to provide security for all the people of Kosovo. Without such security, the difficult tasks of economic reconstruction and building institutions of self-government cannot move forward. Similarly, the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina will contribute to maintaining the secure environment essential to meeting the objectives of the Dayton Agreement. As effective local institutions and a reduction in ethnic tensions take hold in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the requirements for a significant international military presence in both will be reduced. It would be imprudent to set an arbitrary deadline for such a reduction.

Engaging the Russian Federation

The United States, Allies and Partners share a vital interest in enabling the Russian Federation to become a stable, market-oriented democracy that is ruled by law, at peace with itself, and willing and able to contribute to and participate fully in the security and prosperity of Europe. The transatlantic community cannot be truly secure if its enormous nuclear-armed neighbor, with its rich human and natural resources, withdraws behind a new curtain of hostility and authoritarian rule or collapses economically.

Our ongoing sustained bilateral and multilateral engagement efforts with Russia in political, economic, and security matters must be continued if we are to reach our long-term objectives. Success on one front will help advance progress on the others. For example, by facilitating Russia in its effort to build a stronger economy through increased trade and investment relations with the United States and EU, we hope to create powerful incentives for improved political and security cooperation.

In the realm of security affairs, U.S. strategy toward the Russian Federation contains three major elements, which should be pursued in both bilateral and multilateral channels:

- First, we seek to minimize Russian perceptions of the United States and NATO as potential threats to Russia’s national security. Russian official pronouncements on military doctrine, which are based on such perceptions, have often appeared menacing, particularly to Russia’s neighbors. Such threat perceptions also have potentially damaging internal consequences.
Second, we seek to expand programs of practical cooperation with the Russian Federation on security-related issues. Through regular contact at many levels, we hope to develop relations wherein cooperation with the United States, Allies and Partners becomes a normal and highly valued activity for Russian military and defense officials.

Third, when Russia’s actions or policies raise serious concerns about its commitment to values important to the transatlantic and wider international communities, we will not remain silent. We want Russia to realize that negative behavior has negative consequences.

In the bilateral arena, the U.S. commitment to stabilizing reductions in each side’s strategic nuclear forces testifies to our desire not to return to the dangerous nuclear competition of the Cold War era. These reductions will be accompanied by nuclear-related confidence building measures (for example, the recent agreement to establish a joint U.S.-Russian center in Moscow to exchange information on ballistic missile launches) that demonstrate our desire to work with Russia to avoid possible misunderstandings. High-level consultations between American and Russian defense and military officials also serve as a primary vehicle to improve each side’s understanding of the other’s military doctrines and policies.

In the multilateral arena, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), established in 1997, is an important venue for consultations, cooperation and, wherever possible, consensus-building between the Alliance and Russia.

While we strive to reach a common understanding with Russia, we must also underscore that it is in Russia’s own national interest to broaden security-related cooperation with the United States, NATO and Partners. Here, as well, we have an excellent foundation upon which to build. For example, under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, the United States is enhancing and enlarging existing programs that over the past eight years have helped the Russians to: deactivate thousands of nuclear warheads; destroy hundreds of missiles, bombers and ballistic missile submarines; improve security of nuclear weapons and materials at dozens of sites; prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and associated capabilities; begin safe destruction of the world’s largest stocks of chemical weapons; and provide opportunities and inducements for thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists to participate in peaceful commercial and research activities. Several NATO and EU countries are engaged in related bilateral and multilateral efforts to assist Russia in dealing with the WMD-related legacy of the former Soviet Union.
Over time, we seek to develop new areas of cooperation where Russia can become an active contributor to transatlantic security. An important precedent in this regard has been established in the Balkans, where Russian military forces have worked well with NATO and Partner forces in SFOR and KFOR. As part of our strategy, we seek to improve our ability to cooperate with Russia in crisis response operations by arranging joint U.S.-Russian exercises and by cooperating with Russia on theater missile defense technologies.

An integral part of our strategy of engagement involves communicating our expectation that Russia will adhere to international norms and standards. While we acknowledge, for example, the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and its right and responsibility to protect its citizens against terrorism and criminal elements, Russia’s use of massive and indiscriminate force against Chechen civilians has raised serious questions about its commitment to international norms and particularly human rights. We will continue to urge the Russian government to pursue every avenue for a political solution to the conflict, including through a substantive dialogue with Chechen representatives.

In the final analysis, our ability to work with Russia to reduce Cold War arsenals, prevent the proliferation of WMD, and ease the transformation of its political, economic and social institutions toward more democratic and free market practices will depend heavily on decisions made by Russia. Because progress in each of these areas likely will be subject to occasional set backs, our long-term success is not assured. That said, taking a “wait-and-see” attitude toward Russia is not an option for Allies, Partners, or the United States.

Engagement with Ukraine

The United States seeks to help Ukraine preserve its independence and sovereignty, fulfill its legitimate security needs, and play a constructive role in regional political, military, and economic stability. Ukraine’s long border with Russia and the important and complex—albeit sometimes problematic—relations between them must be taken into account in our overall strategy toward Ukraine. However, we must keep in mind the important differences between the two and not base our policies toward one on the presumed reaction of the other. Indeed, we do not regard our relations with these countries as a “zero sum” game, wherein efforts to help Ukraine move closer to Euro-Atlantic structures must come at the expense of parallel efforts with Russia. If anything, the opposite is true: our efforts with each should be mutually reinforcing.
In the security realm, U.S. strategy focuses on helping Ukraine restructure its forces to make them increasingly interoperable with NATO and other Partners. In this regard we want to assist Ukraine in carrying out needed reforms of its defense establishment. These include the institutionalization and effective practice of civilian control over the military and greater openness in the military establishment as a whole. In addition, Ukraine’s defense establishment must be sized and resourced in a realistic manner that reflects a comprehensive assessment of Ukraine’s security environment and is consistent with its overall national priorities of economic reform and revitalization.

To achieve these goals, we are proceeding on a bilateral track that involves a range of activities agreed by USCINCEUR and the Ukrainian Chief of Defense that includes:

- Bringing together senior U.S. and Ukrainian commanders and their staffs to discuss issues such as the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the defense ministry and general staff in a manner that promotes effective civilian control.

- Providing military education and training enhancements for Ukrainian officers and non-commissioned officers. This includes Ukrainian participation in courses at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany and at Harvard University’s “Generals’ Program.” This also involves sending U.S. teams to Ukraine for short-term programs (e.g., on civil-military affairs, military medicine, and air defense) or bringing Ukrainian military personnel to the United States (e.g., for familiarization with U.S. military education methods and technologies.)

- Supporting Ukraine’s force contributions to SFOR and KFOR. Through joint planning and the conduct of live exercises, we are helping Ukraine to learn U.S. and NATO-compatible procedures and skills that will improve its capabilities to participate in such NATO-led crisis response operations. Under our State Partnership Program, U.S. National Guard units from California and Kansas conduct training and exercises on civil-military emergency preparedness with Ukrainian border troops, internal troops, and Ministry of Emergency units.

- Maintaining a Military Liaison Team in Kiev, with representatives from EUCOM and the National Guard State Partnership Program, to facilitate continuous dialogue and a robust military to military exchange program.

At the same time, the United States is working closely with Ukraine, under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, to strengthen cooperation in the area of non-proliferation. Our efforts include
improved training for border security and customs personnel and assistance to redirect the expertise of Ukrainian weapon scientists to work on peaceful scientific and engineering projects, such as improved safety and security for civilian nuclear installations and managing the environmental and health consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

Our bilateral efforts are complemented by those of NATO, which reached agreement with Ukraine in 1997 on a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. The Charter established a NATO-Ukraine Commission that meets at least twice a year for consultations on subjects such as peacekeeping, technical cooperation on armaments, economic and environmental aspects of defense-related activities, civil-military emergency planning, and combating terrorism and drug trafficking. The NATO-Ukraine relationship has also been enhanced considerably by the establishment of a NATO Information and Documentation Center as well as a Military Liaison Office in Kiev.

We also seek to encourage closer multilateral engagement between Ukraine and its regional neighbors. For example, Poland and Ukraine recently have formed a joint peacekeeping battalion, which has been deployed to KFOR. This unprecedented arrangement between a new NATO Ally and a Partner is a hopeful example of how the NATO enlargement process and PfP can work hand in hand to improve security and stability in Europe.

Ukraine, of course, must do its part. In particular, our efforts to assist Ukraine in its desire to move closer to integration with the transatlantic community will not succeed if its government is unable or unwilling to implement needed defense reforms and, more broadly, vital economic and political reforms to free up markets and combat corruption.

**The Baltic States**

The Baltic Sea region was spared the mass violence, repression, and economic free-fall that afflicted parts of Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the first decade of the post-Cold War era. After some 70 years of occupation by a totalitarian system, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania reclaimed their cherished independence and set their course squarely toward full integration in the political, economic, and security institutions of the transatlantic community.
Their progress to date has been very encouraging. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have become solid democracies with promising market-oriented economies, which have made them viable candidates for admission to the EU. In addition, they have demonstrated their commitment to promote stability and security in Northeast Europe and beyond in several ways:

- **National efforts.** A decade ago, all three countries were faced with building a defense establishment literally from scratch. Each has made important—albeit not identical—strides toward developing a comprehensive national military strategy, a defense force structure integrating regular and national guard/volunteer units, and training, infrastructure, and procurement programs to support that structure. Democratic and civilian control of the defense establishment is firmly rooted in all three governments.

- **Regional cooperation.** In 1994, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania formed the Baltic Battalion, a joint peacekeeping unit that has deployed three light infantry company rotations to SFOR. The three countries also have formed: a Baltic Naval Squadron, which enhances minesweeping and coastal defense capabilities in the Baltic Sea; a Baltic Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Center, with national radars and a regional center that shares and manages data needed for a comprehensive airspace picture; and the joint Baltic Defense College, which offers combined command and general staff training.

- **PfP-related activities.** Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been active participants in a wide range of PfP-related programs and exercises. As declared aspirants for NATO membership, they are fully engaged in the MAP process as well.

In recognition of the United States’ special relationship with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the four countries signed a Charter of Partnership in 1998. The Charter reaffirms, *inter alia*: our common commitments to a transatlantic community of free and democratic nations; America’s “real, profound and enduring interest in the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” of the Baltic states; and the Baltic states’ determination to promote the security, prosperity, and stability of the region, including through close and cooperative relations with their neighbors. The Charter also highlights our shared goal of “the full integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic political, economic, security, and defense institutions.”
Within the security and defense area, U.S. engagement with the Baltic states will continue to be multidimensional:

- **Bilateral mechanisms.** The DoD will work closely with each of the states to implement the recommendations of our defense assessments. This effort will be complemented by the Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Sales programs managed by the DoD, training and exercises conducted under USEUCOM auspices, and annual high-level bilateral working groups on defense issues.

- **Regional bodies.** Consistent with the Charter of Partnership’s emphasis on regional cooperation, the United States will continue to work closely with Allies and Partners in the region to support Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian defense efforts. The Baltic Security Assistance Coordination Group (BALTSEA)—consisting of the 3 Baltic states, the United States, and 13 other Allies and Partners—serves as the umbrella forum to provide the Baltic states advice on defense plans, coordinate efforts among security assistance providers, and assist in the implementation and oversight of the Baltic regional cooperative projects. Over time, BALTSEA’s role in helping to guide the regional projects will diminish as the Baltic states take on greater responsibility for their day-to-day planning and operation.

- **NATO/PfP.** Together with its Allies, the United States will continue to encourage the Baltic states to take full advantage of PfP activities and the MAP process. We will provide fair and straightforward feedback to the Baltic states on their MAP submissions, noting their accomplishments as well as areas where improved efforts will be necessary. As stated in the Charter, the United States supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO, and our efforts will be designed to help each of these countries become as strong a candidate as possible.

It is difficult to predict when a consensus will be reached within the Alliance to invite one or more of the Baltic States or other Partners to join. This ultimately will depend upon their respective efforts to prepare for the burdens and responsibilities of membership. On one point of particular importance to the Baltic states, the principles regarding enlargement adopted at the Washington Summit and reflected in the Charter of Partnership are clear: no non-NATO country will have a veto over Alliance decisions.
A number of international organizations contribute, in various ways, to building a more stable security environment across the European continent. As described earlier, the EU, for example, has provided the lion’s share of international assistance resources devoted to the reconstruction and revitalization of war-ravaged economies in the Balkans. The UN and several of its specialized agencies have played an important role in organizing and delivering humanitarian relief and assistance in civil administration to several Balkan countries.12 The intergovernmental Council of Europe promotes democratic governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law—three essential pillars for enduring security and stability—in its 41 member states, with a particular focus on cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The OSCE, a body of 54 states stretching eastward from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”, has a useful role in building security and stability in the transatlantic community. In the past few years, the OSCE has fielded dozens of advisor teams on short and longer-term missions across parts of Europe and Central Asia to monitor and promote respect for human rights and democratic processes (e.g., free and fair elections, media freedom, and the rule of law). OSCE representatives have facilitated the resolution of issues between participating states, as was the case in the successful closure and destruction of a major Russian radar station in Skrunda, Latvia. In Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, OSCE representatives have helped organize elections, mediated disputes among ethnic communities, and provided specialized assistance to improve local civilian administrations and police forces—all of which rendered important support to implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the security-building efforts of SFOR and KFOR. The OSCE also provides a significant forum wherein its members can be called to account for their failure to abide by international norms of behavior in the use of military force.

In the years to come, the United States will continue to support the development of the OSCE as an important and useful forum for European security, based on the Charter on European Security agreed at the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul. The Charter commits members inter alia to establish Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT). Full implementation of the REACT initiative will

12 Non-UN bodies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (based in Geneva, Switzerland) also have played an important role in humanitarian efforts in the Balkans.
make the OSCE more operational by giving it the capability to develop and deploy trained, professional civilian conflict prevention forces that can respond to and contain threats to peace on short notice, before the outbreak of large-scale violence and resultant mass refugee flows.

**Arms Control**

The United States and its NATO Allies will continue to have a shared interest in arms control regimes that enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with preserving Alliance capabilities for collective defense and other security-building missions. Among the arms control regimes applicable specifically to European territory, none is more central than the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Signed in November 1990 by the 16 members of NATO and 6 members of the Warsaw Pact, the CFE Treaty established equal East-West (i.e., “bloc-to-bloc”) limits on five key categories of conventional armaments—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. This approach was appropriate at the time, since it eliminated the Warsaw Pact’s longstanding and destabilizing numerical superiority in armor and artillery. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and break-up of the Soviet Union, those former Soviet states in the area covered by the Treaty (Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals) acceded to the CFE Treaty, which now covers 30 Treaty Parties.

The CFE Treaty’s accomplishments to date are remarkable. More than 70,000 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment have been destroyed, more than 3,500 intrusive on-site inspections have been conducted, and those inspections—along with the CFE Treaty’s detailed reporting requirements—have provided unprecedented transparency and predictability of military forces in Europe.

The CFE Adaptation Agreement signed in November 1999 updates the original CFE Treaty. Once it has been ratified and enters into force, the Adaptation Agreement will create a new, highly stable, transparent set of limitations on conventional forces and bring the CFE Treaty into line with today’s European security environment.

The CFE Final Act associated with the Adaptation Agreement contains several significant political commitments by Treaty Parties, including agreements on the complete withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Moldova and partial withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia. The Final Act also reaffirms Russia’s commitment to bring its equipment levels in the “flank” region, which includes the North
Caucasus (and Chechnya), back down below the “flank” limits set forth in the adapted Treaty. President Clinton has stated that he will only submit the Adaptation Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have been reduced to these levels, and Allies have taken similar positions.

In addition to the CFE Treaty, the United States will continue actively to support full implementation of, and compliance with, other arms control and Confidence Building Measures (CBM) regimes that help to build security and stability in Europe. These include:

- The Vienna Document, updated at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, which builds trust and enhances stability among OSCE members through various measures, such as inspections of military units, base visits, observation of exercises, and notifications of military deployments.

- The arms control and transparency provisions of the Dayton Agreement, which draw upon CFE Treaty and Vienna Document principles and practices, and are aimed at stabilizing reductions of military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the FRY.

- The Open Skies Treaty, which upon entry-into-force will allow the United States, Canada, and 25 European signatories to conduct reciprocal, unarmed observation flights over their entire territories to gather information about each other’s military forces and activities.
U.S. military forces continue to play critical roles in Europe. They are one of the essential instruments by which the United States makes manifest its continued commitment to the security of Europe. They underwrite America’s national strategy of engagement and protect vital interests and lines of communication in Europe and beyond. These stationed forces—combined with frequent temporary deployments of U.S.-based personnel for exercise, training, and crisis response purposes—ensure that the United States will always have the means to meet its treaty commitments to NATO. They also underscore our national will to deter or defeat aggression and prevail in crisis management operations, since we will not place our service members in harm’s way without giving them the means and authorities necessary to defend themselves and accomplish their assigned mission.

In addition to their role as security guarantors within Europe, U.S. military units based in Europe are often the first to react to emerging crises in Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. In their day-to-day non-crisis operations, our stationed forces play a key role in sustaining and improving bilateral security ties with, and the military capabilities of, both Allies and Partners.

**Shaping the Security Environment**

USEUCOM plays a vital role in shaping the international security environment. Through thousands of multilateral and bilateral engagement activities every year (ranging from field exercises and training missions to military education courses at the Marshall Center), USEUCOM helps Allies and Partners improve their military skills and capabilities. In conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USEUCOM has worked closely with several Partners in the region to conduct in-depth Defense Assessments and Defense Planning Exchanges. These assessments and exchanges assist the Partners in developing: a coherent national defense strategy compatible with those of NATO members; the force structure, personnel, and infrastructure systems necessary to
United States European Command in brief

The U.S. military presence in Europe is organized under the unified combatant command known as the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). Under the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), USEUCOM is responsible for planning and conducting all military operations and military engagement activities within an “Area of Responsibility” (AOR) that stretches from the North Cape of Norway to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa—an expanse of nearly 14 million square miles that includes 91 countries and territories and more than one billion people. Another 9 countries and territories fall within USEUCOM’s “area of interest,” because of possible USEUCOM participation in operations, including engagement exercises, involving those countries.

Since 1995, roughly 100,000 military personnel have been assigned to USEUCOM. This total necessarily has fluctuated as a result of operational requirements, including naval deployments. USEUCOM’s current forces include:

- **65,000 U.S. Army personnel.** Headquartered in Heidelberg, Germany, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) commands the Army’s major heavy combatant force in Europe, which includes 6 tank and 6 mechanized infantry battalions, 2 aviation brigades, artillery and other support units. In addition, USEUCOM maintains a quick reaction force, comprised of a light infantry battalion and aviation assets, as part of the Southern European Task Force headquartered in Vicenza, Italy.

- **34,000 U.S. Air Force personnel.** Headquartered in Ramstein, Germany, U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) has operational control over air assets based principally in Germany, the UK, Italy, and Turkey. These include combat aircraft for the full range of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, and “force multiplier” aircraft for air-to-air refueling, transport, and command, control, and surveillance.

- **22,000 U.S. Navy personnel.** Headquartered in London, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) commands more than 8,000 personnel stationed throughout the EUCOM AOR, and an additional 14,000 personnel who are forward deployed on more than 30 ships in the Mediterranean.

- **3900 U.S. Marine Corps personnel.** Headquartered in Boeblingen, Germany, U.S. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) provides forces to various joint task forces in the EUCOM AOR, including a Fleet Antiterrorism Support Team in Naples, Italy.

- **1400 U.S. Special Operations Forces.** Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) commands units based in Germany, Spain, and the UK, and provides USEUCOM with the capability to insert appropriate forces for any level of conflict/operation.

The precise nature of these engagement activities, however, must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate a diverse and evolving set of requirements and opportunities. For example, by virtue of their greater capabilities and continuing political, economic, or security ties to former overseas possessions, certain Allies might be more willing than others to cooperate with USEUCOM on Small Scale Contingency operations support that strategy; and a realistic time-phased plan to accomplish priority objectives within an affordable defense budget. Through the Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Sales programs managed by DoD, USEUCOM assists nations to meet critical shortfalls in training and equipment, and to focus on and improve the quality of life of their military personnel. Through its administration of Warsaw Initiative Funds, USEUCOM provides needed support to Partner countries that otherwise would not be able to participate in certain PfP activities and exercises.

USEUCOM’s engagement activities remain an important element of our long-term strategy to strengthen transatlantic security through building cooperative relationships between the United States and European militaries. They produce impressive dividends for a relatively modest investment in resources, and contribute directly to our ability to work effectively with Allies and Partners in military missions ranging from humanitarian relief to crisis response operations such as Kosovo.

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13USEUCOM’s engagement activities can significantly affect countries outside its AOR. For example, USEUCOM, working in coordination with Turkey (a NATO Ally), supports U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) engagement programs with states in the Central Asia region. For other examples of U.S. involvement in multilateral engagement efforts, see chapter V.
A Day in the Life of USEUCOM

A unified combatant command, USEUCOM’s mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in concert with the coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support NATO; to promote regional stability; and advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
within the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility outside Europe. Joint training exercises will serve to improve our capability to work together in such instances. They also will improve our Allies’ capabilities to act without U.S. combat or combat-support assistance, but in ways that still serve our common security interests. Similarly, some Partners will progress faster than others in accomplishing needed military reforms and restructuring. Our future engagement plans must be flexible enough to allow us to redirect resources, when necessary, to those who need them the most and have demonstrated an ability to use them most effectively.

Crisis Response and Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC) Operations

While maintaining its capability to fight and win a major conflict, USEUCOM must simultaneously adapt its forces to respond to the evolving security environment. In this regard, the future spectrum of USEUCOM operations likely will be just as wide-ranging as that of the past several years. For example, in its most significant combat operation to date, USEUCOM provided over 25,000 U.S. military personnel to support NATO’s Operation Allied Force (and related humanitarian efforts in Albania and Macedonia) during the 1999 conflict with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo. As of July 2000, USEUCOM provided some 5,700 of the 6,200 U.S. military personnel in KFOR and another 155 of the 4,600 U.S. military personnel in the ongoing SFOR mission in Bosnia. USEUCOM personnel also have played a key role in Operation Northern Watch, which enforces (with the cooperation of the UK and Turkey) the Northern No-Fly Zone over Iraq and monitors Iraqi compliance with applicable UN Security Council resolutions. Lastly, in Africa and the Middle East, USEUCOM personnel have been committed to a wide range of demanding and time-sensitive SSCs, including Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and humanitarian relief missions.14

The number of USEUCOM operations has increased by a factor of 20 over the past decade. An important goal of U.S. national security strategy is to reduce the number and scope of such operational commitments through a combination of crisis prevention tools and long-term diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian efforts. Hard experience and prudence dictate, however, that USEUCOM remain prepared to respond to such operational challenges when they do occur.

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14For specific examples, see Sub-Saharan Africa section.
At the same time, the anticipated continued demand for USEUCOM involvement in a range of crisis response and SSC operations does not mean that USEUCOM should develop two sets of forces—one to deal with collective defense and another to deal other contingencies. Many capabilities required for crisis response and SSC operations are similar or identical to those required for fighting and winning major theater wars. Moreover, because of the range and unpredictability of crisis response and SSC operations, U.S. forces must be multi-mission capable. This capability can be maintained only if our forces are equipped, trained, and led with multiple mission responsibilities in mind. Finally, given its unique and vital role in ensuring European defense and supporting U.S. force projection in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, USEUCOM must be capable of withdrawing from crisis response and SSC operations, reconstituting its forces, and then deploying to a major theater war within required timelines.

**Deterrence and Collective Defense**

USEUCOM’s readiness and capabilities will allow it to respond more quickly than U.S.-based conventional forces to any threat to, or from within, the region—thereby demonstrating America’s commitment to deter and, if necessary, defeat adversaries without ceding the loss of any NATO territory. Through its sustained peacetime engagement and regular exercises with Allied militaries, USEUCOM also will reinforce deterrence by warning any potential aggressor to expect to be confronted not just by the United States, but by the formidable additional capabilities of a large and effective Allied coalition.

U.S. conventional capabilities to deter and, if necessary, fight and win a major conflict in the European region do not depend solely on USEUCOM’s combat ready forces and their ability to fight in coalition with our Allies. USEUCOM’s command, control, communications, intelligence, and logistics infrastructure—including pre-positioned equipment and stocks on land and ships—can be and have been used to receive and deploy reinforcements rapidly from the United States. Our strategy calls for preserving and enhancing, where necessary, our ability to anticipate any crisis and to quickly reinforce and sustain additional forces in Europe. USEUCOM’s infrastructure also provides significant support to U.S. capabilities to fight and win a major theater war in Southwest Asia—as demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91.

In addition to its formidable conventional capabilities to respond to any aggression directed against NATO, the United States maintains
non-strategic nuclear weapons, under highly secure conditions, at storage sites in several NATO countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, in consultation with its Allies, has dramatically reduced the numbers and types of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. For example, all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles have been eliminated. Together with Allies, we also have modified the readiness criteria for forces with a nuclear role and terminated standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans.15

The fundamental purpose of U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe is—and will remain—to preserve peace and prevent coercion. They provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance, as well as linkage to U.S. strategic nuclear systems. They make the risks of aggression against NATO incalculable and unacceptable in a way that conventional forces alone cannot. The participation of non-nuclear Allies in NATO’s nuclear posture demonstrates Alliance solidarity, determination, and willingness to share the risks and responsibilities of collective defense. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by NATO are extremely remote, but prudent security planning dictates that we maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future.

15The UK and France maintain independent nuclear forces. Like the United States, they have reduced the size of their respective nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War.
Chapter VI
Improving Transatlantic Cooperation to Face Global Challenges

Just as America and Europe cannot remain secure and prosperous without one another, our transatlantic community cannot be secure and prosperous in isolation from the rest of the world. Globalization and the information revolution are proceeding at different speeds across the globe, but certain overall trends are clear and irreversible. Economic interdependence is growing, artificial barriers to the free dissemination of knowledge are falling, and constraints on international relations once imposed by time and distance are shrinking. These developments open new opportunities for cooperation between the United States and Europe to advance our shared interests beyond the Euro-Atlantic Community. But they also bring new risks and challenges to those interests that no nation can meet alone.

This chapter outlines U.S. strategy to work with Europe on global security issues. It also highlights specific regions where U.S.-European cooperation could be strengthened.

Security Threats Posed by Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Weapons

NBC weapons and their delivery systems pose a major threat to international security. Over 20 countries—several of which are virtually on Europe’s doorstep—already possess or are developing such weapons and/or delivery systems. The continued proliferation and potential use of NBC weapons directly threatens the United States, its Allies and friends, and could destabilize other regions of critical importance to us.

American military superiority cannot shield us completely from this threat. U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena will likely encourage potential adversaries to resort to asymmetric means for attacking U.S. forces and interests overseas and Americans at home. U.S. defense planners must assume that use of NBC weapons to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics is a likely condition of future warfare.
To address the NBC weapons threat, the United States pursues a multi-dimensional strategy. Each component of our strategy depends, to varying degrees, on close cooperation with our transatlantic Allies and Partners, backed up by active bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts. For example:

- **Export control regimes.** The United States has no monopoly on the development, application, and sale of “dual-use” equipment, technologies, and technical information. These are legitimate, even indispensable staples of our domestic economy and of international trade within and beyond the transatlantic community. However, a large and growing range of “dual-use” goods and expertise also are actively sought by proliferators for offensive weapons programs. Through international regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group, the United States works with a number of European and other states to limit the transfer of sensitive “dual-use” items to states posing a proliferation concern.

- **Arms control and international non-proliferation agreements.** The United States, its Allies and Partners (including Russia and Ukraine) play vital roles in several legally binding multinational agreements aimed, at least in part, at preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons. These include the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1972 Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention, and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Close cooperation among our Allies and Partners on a routine basis is required to ensure effective implementation of and compliance with existing agreements, and this will be the case as well for the 1994 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, once it enters into force. While our primary objective is to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons and their associated delivery systems, we recognize that prevention might not succeed in every case.

- **Deterrence.** The United States deters threats and potential threats to its national security, including those from NBC weapons states, by

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16Other examples of the need for close U.S.-European cooperation have involved the UN-mandated effort, which has been frustrated by Iraqi intransigence, to eliminate Iraq’s WMD capabilities and to prevent their re-emergence.
maintaining powerful nuclear and conventional forces. Those who would threaten America or its allies in Europe or elsewhere with NBC weapons should have no doubt that any attack on us would meet an overwhelming and devastating response. DoD also has undertaken a comprehensive program to equip, train, and prepare U.S. forces to prevail in conditions in which an adversary threatens to use or actually uses these weapons against our populations, territories, or military forces. This combination of offensive and defense capabilities both strengthens deterrence and ensures that we will prevail should deterrence fail.

As previously discussed, our Allies contribute—for example, through basing, infrastructure, and overflight and transit rights—to U.S. capabilities to project our forces, if necessary, beyond Europe. Moreover, the independent British and French nuclear forces play an important role in deterring any attack on their respective vital national interests. Our Allies and potential coalition partners also must be prepared to counter NBC threats or attacks to ensure that we maintain a cohesive political and military front during a crisis.

Since 1994, NATO’s Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) has broadened a consensus within NATO about NBC threats, identified concrete capabilities needed to counter those threats, and injected those requirements into NATO’s Force Planning process. The DGP is focused on improvement of the concepts, doctrine, training, and exercises needed for counterproliferation operations. Force Goals (including key areas agreed under the DCI) emphasize, *inter alia*, capabilities for biological and chemical weapons detection, identification, and warning; individual and collective protection equipment; and NBC-hardened automated and deployable command, control, and communication systems.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, Alliance leaders took increased note of the NBC threat and agreed, in response, that NATO capabilities, doctrine, training, and exercises must be improved to better deter and defend against the use of such weapons. In concert with the DCI, counterproliferation-related capabilities must be fielded and commensurate NBC defense doctrine, training, and exercises improved.

“We’ve made it very clear to Iraq and the rest of the world that if you should ever even contemplate using weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, any other type—against our forces, we will deliver a response (that is) overwhelming and devastating.”

*Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen at the National Press Club in March 1998*
As a result of the Washington Summit WMD Initiative, several complementary efforts are underway. NATO’s Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) has expanded its discussion of nonproliferation issues in support of the Alliance’s primary prevention goal. At NATO headquarters, there is a newly established WMD Center, comprised of political, defense, military, and intelligence experts, to integrate and coordinate intra-Alliance work on a wide range of NBC-related issues. Notably, work has begun on a data collection that will serve as a common resource for Alliance decision-making and will support cooperative means to respond to the use of NBC weapons against civilians.

The United States continues to work to enhance cooperative activities with our Allies, and we are extending these activities where appropriate to Partner countries. We complement these activities through bilateral programs of information exchange and technical cooperation with Allies. As we do so, the United States is likely to encounter differences with some nations over the assessment of capabilities and intentions of any given state of concern. We will do our best to prevent such disagreements from blocking needed improvements to Alliance capabilities.

**Ballistic Missile Defenses**

For America and Europe, the threat posed by ballistic missiles capable of delivering NBC weapons from several states of concern is substantial and increasing.

- Iran is buying and developing long-range missiles. It has flight tested a 1,300-km Shahab-3 missile and, within a decade, could test a missile capable of reaching all NATO territory and much of the United States. Iran has chemical weapons, and is seeking nuclear and biological capabilities.

- Before the Gulf War, Iraq had loaded chemical and biological weapons into missile warheads, and was close to achieving a nuclear capability. UN sanctions have slowed, but probably not stopped, Iraq’s efforts to produce NBC weapons and develop or buy long-range missiles to deliver them.

- Libya has chemical weapons capabilities and is trying, as well, to acquire long-range missiles.

- North Korea is building and selling long-range missiles and has assembled an arsenal with chemical, biological, and probably
nuclear capabilities. It has developed and may soon test the Taepo Dong 2 missile that could reach U.S. territory.

We project that all of the above states will have missile forces in the next 5 to 15 years that could be used to threaten the homelands of all NATO members.

**Theater Missile Defense (TMD)**

As part of broader efforts to enhance the security of the United States, Allied and coalition forces against ballistic missile strikes and to complement our counterproliferation strategy, the United States is pursuing opportunities for TMD cooperation with NATO Partners. The objectives of United States cooperative efforts are to provide effective missile defense for coalition forces in both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations against short to medium range missiles. In its Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed the risk posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles, and the Alliance reached general agreement on the framework for addressing these threats.

As part of NATO’s DCI, Allies agreed to develop Alliance forces that can respond with active and passive defenses from NBC attack. Allies further agreed that TMD is necessary for NATO’s deployed forces.

Several Allies currently field or will shortly acquire lower tier TMD systems. For example, Germany and the Netherlands both field the PAC-2 missile and naval forces of several Allies are considering cooperation with the United States to field maritime missile defenses. An important development in the operational TMD area was the creation in December 1999 of a trilateral U.S.-German-Dutch Extended Air Defense Task Force.

The Alliance is undertaking a feasibility analysis for a layered defense architecture. As the ballistic missile threat to Europe evolves in the direction of longer ranges, the Alliance will need to consider further measures of defense incorporating upper-tier TMD and/or a defense against longer-range missiles.

On a separate but complementary track, ongoing U.S. TMD cooperation with Russia is an excellent example of how cooperative approaches to dealing with new regional security challenges of mutual interest, such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles, can advance U.S. and transatlantic security interests.
National Missile Defense (NMD)

Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea do not need long-range missiles to intimidate their neighbors; they already have shorter-range missiles to do so. Instead, they want long-range missiles to coerce and threaten more distant countries in North America and Europe. They presumably believe that even a small number of missiles, against which we have no defense, could be enough to inhibit U.S. actions in support of our Allies or coalition partners in a crisis.

Based on our assessment of these trends, the United States has concluded that we must counter this threat before one of these states attempts to blackmail the United States from protecting its interests, including commitments to our Allies in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, the United States is developing a NMD system that would protect all 50 states from a limited attack of a few to a few tens of warheads.

NATO’s Strategic Concept recognizes that “(t)he Alliance’s defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missiles defenses.” As the U.S. NMD effort progresses, we need to continue close consultations with our Allies on relevant policy and technical issues.

Although Moscow argues to the contrary, the limited NMD system the United States is developing would not threaten the Russian strategic deterrent, which could overwhelm our defense even if Russian strategic forces were much lower than levels foreseen under existing U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction agreements. Moreover, the U.S. proposal to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty include measures of cooperation and transparency that would give Russia confidence that the NMD system was not being expanded beyond its limited scale.

China has a more modest nuclear force than Russia, but has a multi-faceted nuclear modernization program that predates NMD. Our NMD system is not designed to neutralize China’s strategic capabilities.

NMD is a complement to our policies of deterrence and prevention, not a substitute. We will continue to rely on diplomacy, arms control and traditional deterrence—the credible threat of an overwhelming and devastating response—to dissuade states of concern from attacking or coercing their neighbors or anyone else. But today, when a state of

17Similarly, the independent British and French nuclear deterrents would not be undermined by the NMD capabilities allowed under the U.S. proposal to modify the ABM Treaty.
concern might attempt to coerce the United States or its Allies, it is not prudent to rely exclusively on deterrence by overwhelming response, especially when we have the option of a limited, but effective defense.

The NMD we envisage would reinforce the credibility of U.S. security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole. Europe would not be more secure if the United States were less secure from a missile attack by a state of concern. An America that is less vulnerable to ballistic missile attack is more likely to defend Europe and common Western security interests than an America that is more vulnerable.

As consultations proceed with our Allies on NMD, we realize that Allies will continue to consider the appropriate role of missile defenses in their respective national security strategies. In keeping with the fundamental principle of the Alliance that the security of its members is indivisible, the United States is open to discussing possible cooperation with Allies on longer-range ballistic missile defense, just as we have with our discussions and cooperation in the area of TMD. As President Clinton said in May 2000, “every country that is part of a responsible international arms control and nonproliferation regime should have the benefit of this protection.”

In September 2000, President Clinton announced that while NMD was sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued development and testing, there was not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward with deployment. In making this decision, he considered the threat, the cost, technical feasibility and the impact on our national security of proceeding with NMD. The President’s decision will provide flexibility to a new administration and will preserve the option to deploy a national missile defense system in the 2006-2007 time frame.

“Non-Traditional” Transnational Threats

Terrorism, international crime, and illegal trade in fissile materials and other dangerous substances are prime examples of “non-traditional” transnational threats to the security of the transatlantic community and its citizens. These threats come in many forms. Terrorist groups might have nationalist, ethnic, or religious motivations—or a combination of these. Their means of terror range from conventional firearms and explosives to chemical, biological, and possibly radiological weapons, to “cyber” attacks on state- or privately-run information systems. Transnational criminal organizations based on trafficking in drugs and human beings are growing more diversified and sophisticated. The
lawless groups involved in these activities have no hesitation in taking major steps to disrupt existing political and economic structures for their own gain. In the end, their use of corruption and extortion undermines the integrity and effectiveness of governments, particularly in fragile democracies. Most victims of terrorism and transnational criminal organizations are civilians, but military and government personnel also are targets of deadly attack.

The United States, its Allies and Partners share important security interests in cooperating in the fight against terrorism and international crime in all its forms. Americans and Europeans alike are the targets—and victims—of these scourges. No government within the transatlantic community can properly defend and protect its citizens, whether at home or abroad, if those who would prey upon them enjoy safe havens or even protection from states beyond our common borders.

While our first line of defense relies heavily on civilian authorities—including intelligence agencies, national and local law enforcement, and civilian emergency response—military forces have unique capabilities to defend against and, if necessary, respond to attacks on our national interests by terrorists or others. Even so, military forces and infrastructure—and particularly deployed U.S. and Allied forces—can often become targets of terrorist attack, the most trenchant example being the attack against the USS Cole in Yemen. We will continue to work closely with our Allies and Partners to ensure that force protection remains a priority.

At the strategic level, we seek to ensure that the emerging threat of NBC terrorism and the proliferation of NBC materials and expertise are vigorously addressed. The 1999 Washington Summit provided an opportunity for NATO to set in motion concrete steps to strengthen its political will and military capabilities to deal with the threat of modern terrorism and NBC weapons.

NATO’s Strategic Concept acknowledged the threat such weapons pose to Allied territory and citizens and launched an effort, under the WMD Initiative, to strengthen common understanding about NBC issues, improve intelligence and information sharing, and integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to NBC proliferation. Although the United States remains a target for terrorism, we will not be intimidated, and we will not withdraw from our role in Europe or elsewhere in the world. We are upgrading security at home and overseas, at diplomatic posts and military installations worldwide. We remain steadfast in our determination to protect American citizens and diplomatic and military personnel, and we will continue to use all
necessary means to counter terrorism and hold terrorists accountable for their actions.

Building Security in Regions Beyond Europe

In contrast with the United States, European states—with a few notable exceptions—have not maintained military forces or engaged in large-scale military actions outside Europe since the end of World War II. Instead, European states, acting individually or within the EU, have concentrated almost exclusively on political and economic levers to advance their interests in regions outside Europe. The most notable exception in recent years has been the coalition effort that was assembled and, to a considerable degree, has been sustained in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Should this remain true indefinitely? The EU, after all, represents a powerful economic force and increasingly seeks to take joint action in foreign and security affairs. The United States, for its part, has neither the desire nor the capability to engage its military in every crisis response or humanitarian relief contingency that might arise anywhere in the world. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to find better ways for the American and European pillars of the transatlantic community to work together to strengthen security and stability in regions outside Europe.

Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Mediterranean Littoral

The United States and Europe share a number of common long-term interests in these strategic areas. These include maintaining uninterrupted access to regional energy resources, stemming the development and proliferation of NBC weapons, ensuring the success of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), and combating terrorism. In practice, the United States has worked with several European states to advance our common interests. Examples of this include: our multilateral efforts during the 1980s to end the Lebanese civil war; the 1990-91 international coalition to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the subsequent establishment of UN sanctions intended to destroy Iraq’s NBC capabilities and prevent their reconstitution; and arranging, at critical times, sensitive negotiations to advance a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Military cooperation in pursuit of stability in the Gulf has continued since the liberation of Kuwait. For example, at least ten NATO

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18France and the UK are the principal exceptions.
countries have participated in maritime interception operations for sanctions enforcement since then, and the UK and France have participated with the United States in patrolling the no-fly zones over Iraq in support of UN resolutions. Turkish support was indispensable to preventing a humanitarian disaster in northern Iraq in the wake of the Baghdad regime's repression of the people of the area. European states have also taken an active part in the multinational BRIGHT STAR exercise program conducted biennially with Egypt.

We have had differences with some of our Allies over specific aspects of each of these and other regional issues. In some cases, these reflect differences in our respective historical and cultural ties to countries in the region and our assessments of those countries’ capabilities and intentions. In other cases, differing economic interests (real or perceived) can influence debates over appropriate policies to address regional problems. Indeed, in the security sphere, we often find our cooperation hampered by intense competition for sales of defense equipment, sometimes to the detriment of regional interoperability.

Although it is unrealistic to expect that the United States and its European Allies will adopt identical policies toward this region anytime soon, we should seek to improve our cooperation and develop complementary efforts in key areas to meet common long-term interests. Specifically, we need to work in concert—through export controls, diplomatic and economic pressures, and (if necessary) the appropriate use of military force—to prevent the proliferation of NBC capabilities throughout the region. In the near term, these capabilities will pose a greater direct threat to European territory than to our own.

U.S.-European cooperation also is essential to build stronger support within the region for the MEPP. European states can play an important role in encouraging both sides to take the difficult but necessary steps to a just and lasting peace. Together, we should look for ways to apply our collective experience to lessen tensions, improve confidence, and build positive security relations among all parties in the Middle East. OSCE, CFE, and PfP all have elements that could serve as models for post-MEPP relations in the Middle East. In addition, the military and civilian crisis response capabilities that the EU seeks to build through ESDP could play a role in the implementation of eventual peace settlements between Israel and the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon.

We also need to seek ways to build bridges between the greater Middle East and the Euro-Atlantic Community. One forum for this already exists in the form of NATO’s “Mediterranean Dialogue,” encompassing Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco,
and Tunisia. To date, however, the press of other business in the Alliance has not allowed the Dialogue to receive the attention it requires. Both the Dialogue and less formal opportunities to link these two vital regions require increased effort.

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa is another region where the United States and Europe have a broad, common interest in promoting a stable security environment. Without basic security, several countries in the region will be unable to sustain their positive movement toward democratic government, respect for human rights, and economic development based on free markets. Meanwhile, countries still in the grip of authoritarian rule or mired in civil war and economic collapse will lose any hope of modernization or recovery. The plagues of environmental degradation, drug trafficking, support for international terrorism, highly infectious diseases such as HIV, and large-scale humanitarian disasters will intensify and expand across Africa. For many reasons—historical and cultural ties, the importance of African natural resources, humanitarian and national security concerns—the transatlantic community cannot turn its back on this region.

In fact, U.S. military forces have had to deploy to Sub-Saharan Africa several times in recent years. For example, we have supplied critical logistical support for humanitarian relief operations in Mozambique; conducted noncombatant evacuation or security operations for U.S. embassies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; and provided security, medical support and investigation services in Kenya and Tanzania after terrorists struck the U.S. embassies in 1998. Similarly, several European countries have deployed military forces, either on a national basis or within the context of UN-mandated operations, to safeguard their citizens, stabilize fragile democratic governments, or respond to humanitarian crises.

Nevertheless, the ever-increasing demands on U.S. military forces around the globe, combined with Europe’s preoccupation with the situation in the Balkans, likely will continue to limit our respective operational capacities and domestic political support for military deployments to Sub-Saharan Africa. The advantages of improved cooperation among the United States, Europe, and the sub-Saharan governments willing to work with us should be clear to all. We will continue to work closely with several Allies on specific projects, training programs, and exercises aimed at contributing more efficiently to building African capabilities to stabilize their security environment.
The United States and Europe share a strong interest in promoting stability and security in Asia. Both have extensive trade and investment ties with this enormous and dynamic region, and are aiming to strengthen their presence in Asian markets. The EU, for example, is the third largest trading partner—after Japan and the United States—of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Like the United States, the EU provides extensive economic assistance, through both governments and non-governmental organizations, to the region’s less developed members. Both the United States and EU seek to promote respect for human rights in Asia and advocate the gradual integration of China into the world economy together with the promotion of democracy and the rule of law. Both are concerned by the proliferation of NBC capabilities in and emanating from the region.

Unlike the United States, which maintains approximately 100,000 military personnel in the Asian-Pacific region and strong defense and military links to key countries such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, the EU has not been directly involved in security arrangements in Asia. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated that it can play a helpful role in improving the security environment. In the critical matter of relieving tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the EU contributes about $15 million annually to the Korea Energy Development Organization to buy heavy fuel oil for North Korea in support of international efforts to discourage that country’s development of nuclear weapons. The EU also has joined ASEAN and the United States in region-wide discussions to promote mutual understanding, transparency, and trust. In addition, several European countries have contributed military personnel to the UN-led peacekeeping operation in East Timor.

The United States would welcome a growing EU dialogue with Asian countries on security-related issues, including the need to prevent NBC proliferation, control the sale of ballistic missile technologies, and resolve outstanding territorial issues by peaceful means. U.S. cooperation with European nations during the East Timor crisis, when the United States provided logistical and other support for the deployment of European peacekeepers, is another example of how we can work productively together to respond to regional crises outside Europe. In addition, it is useful to note that some PfP nations are located in Central Asia, and their capitals are closer to the Pacific than to the Atlantic. Thus transatlantic cooperation can have a direct impact on essentially Asian nations.
The success of U.S. strategy for strengthening transatlantic security will depend in large measure on how we approach relations with our NATO Allies and Partners. Getting these relations right has not always been an easy task. Even during the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, NATO was at the center of heated—and sometimes very public—debates over military strategy, command structure, and “burdensharing.”

One explanation for this has been well understood since the founding of the Alliance: NATO’s unity ultimately rests on the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation, but sovereign and democratic states do not necessarily have identical interests in every security domain. Differences in geography, history, political culture and, of course, in military capabilities still count—and they always will. The United States, which has contributed far more resources and capabilities to NATO than any other single Ally, cannot be expected to act as if these differences did not exist and did not influence our policies. Nor can we expect our Allies to match our military power in every category or to act contrary to their perceived interests. The Alliance has proved so strong precisely because its members have not allowed their differences ever to rival, in scope or in depth, their shared interests.

A second explanation is less self-evident: in far too many instances, the substance of our transatlantic cooperation is overshadowed or even impeded by differences in tone. Americans, for example, frequently refer to their “leadership” of the Alliance. For many Americans, this concept is essentially an accurate reflection of objective facts—in particular, the real disparities in military capabilities between the United States and
our Allies. But for many Europeans, who in recent years have made important commitments on the ground to crisis response operations in the Balkans and have every reason to be proud of their strong, expanding economic and political links (as well as their rich cultures), “American leadership” has come to be understood, at best, as a somewhat outdated notion from the Cold War era or, at worst, a grating expression of a “dominating” or “overbearing” superpower.

What can or should be done to address this situation?

First, we must continue to set an example, by word and by deed, that convinces others to join efforts described in previous chapters to strengthen transatlantic security. If America does not demonstrate the political will and devote the resources necessary to sustain these efforts, it will be harder for Allies and Partners to do so.

Second, the watchwords of transatlantic security relations must remain “inclusion” and “cooperation,” not “competition” or “confrontation.” Historically, there have been very few instances when the United States has been at odds with Europe as a whole over a significant security policy issue. More often, we have disagreed with certain Allies or Partners over aspects of a particular policy and received either full or qualified support from others. In short, there are no grounds for portraying U.S.-European relations as an “us against them” dynamic.

Third, we must anticipate that as NATO and the EU enlarge, their internal decision-making processes will become more complex and possibly slower. While this should not be a problem in normal circumstances, it cannot be allowed to lead to paralysis in a crisis. We will work with all our Allies—and, where appropriate, Partners—to ensure that they have the fullest possible access to information necessary to participate meaningfully in transatlantic security deliberations and to take effective and timely collective action. This will require more, not less, contact between U.S. officials and their counterparts in national capitals as well as in NATO and EU headquarters in Brussels. In this context, and without prejudice to our special ties to larger Allies, we should not forget that smaller Allies frequently have made invaluable contributions to the Alliance. Indeed, several of these smaller Allies are pursuing joint and multilateral defense cooperation and acquisition programs that stand to increase their relative weight within the Alliance—a development that we will recognize and encourage.

Fourth, we must be straightforward in acknowledging that the United States—like every other country—reserves a right to act alone, or within a coalition of the willing, when our vital interests are at stake.
and an Alliance-wide consensus for action simply does not exist. We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when necessary, using our military might unilaterally. In practice, however, this has occurred very rarely. We see a broad and growing spectrum of issues that are important to our security and where close cooperation with our Allies and Partners is a requirement—not an option. While some foreign policy commentators on both sides of the Atlantic seem quick to level charges of American “unilateralist” or “isolationist” tendencies, the facts almost never support such claims—and we should not be reluctant to point this out.

Finally, while recognizing that America’s unique political, economic, and military strengths will continue to ensure a preponderant role for our country within the transatlantic community—and most Europeans accept and welcome this fact—we need to be prepared to share responsibility and leadership. Our self-interest will not be served by rhetoric or actions that encourage some Europeans to abdicate their security responsibilities and encourage others to affirm their “European identity” by weakening transatlantic bonds. Indeed, we seek to encourage greater leadership by Allies in areas—such as improvements in defense capabilities, outreach to Partners, and support for democratic values beyond the transatlantic community—that reinforce our common security.

In the 21st century, America can best achieve its long-term goals by doing more of what it does so well: acting resolutely—and always in a spirit of true partnership—as a catalyst, builder, symbol and defender of an ever-growing coalition of democratic, prosperous, and secure Euro-Atlantic states and peoples.