United States Department of State
Defense Trade Advisory Group
Minutes of the Plenary Session
May 16, 1997
East Auditorium
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
Partially Closed Meeting
Thursday, May 16, 1996
Loy Henderson Conference Room
U.S. Department of State
10:00 - 4:45 P.M.
To allow for discussion of classified information, the Department of State restricted attendance
at the afternoon briefings to DTAG members and government officials. A Federal Register notice
announced that the DTAG May 16, 1996 meeting would be partially closed to the public. As none
of the closed session speakers incorporated classified statements into their presentations, these
Minutes summarize the entire day's proceedings.
OPEN SESSIONS
REMARKS: Dr. Paul Kaminski
Paul Kaminski Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, argued that increased
defense cooperation can help resolve problems which have arisen in the post-cold war period.
After the Cold War, there have been major changes in regional conflicts, military requirements,
and economic relations among nations. Countries face limited defense budgets and a growing
number of regional conflicts requiring coalition interventions. Because decreased resources limit
U.S. involvement in coalition actions, partnerships with other nations have become more
important to achieve multilateral objectives. The United States continues to increase defense
cooperation with its allies in NATO and the Pacific. Advancing command and control
interoperability and mutual logistics support has the added benefit of encouraging better economic
cooperation.
Economic changes are especially apparent in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) nations. Financial
constraints prevent these countries from acquiring the necessary equipment to modernize their
armed forces. Since U.S. defense companies welcome additional sales opportunities for their
products, the United States has strong economic incentives to strengthen ties with the PFP.
Industry-to-government and industry-to-industry relations between the United States and PFP
nations have strengthened in recent years. Dr. Kaminski emphasized that while substantial
economic and interoperability benefits result from defense cooperation, there are also important
political reasons for collaboration: military and industrial ties comprise strong security relations.
DOD has taken action to facilitate collaborative efforts. It has changed its requirements for unique
military specifications. Second, it has reviewed its procurement policies to ensure that limited
resources are used most effectively to advance the national interest. DOD aims to obtain the best
value for U.S. funds and to avoid developing systems which already exist. Lastly, DOD is
working to remove bureaucratic barriers and streamlined procedures on international defense
cooperation. For example, a 1994 directive has shortened the review period for draft memoranda
of understanding (MOUs) from 130 days to 30 days.
DOD's Armaments Cooperation Security Committee (ACSC) has identified new opportunities for
cooperation. Three International Cooperative Oppurtunity Groups (ICOGs) have been established
since October 1995: the United States and its allies are developing lists of programs for
cooperation in major weapons systems, S&T; programs, and advanced concept technology
demonstrations. In addition, the ACSC is examining how Defense Cooperation Armaments
(DCA) resources in U.S. embassies can best be utilized in the post-Cold War era.
The NATO Cooperative RhD Program ensures that all partner nations get involved at the outset
of a development program. Under it contributions from our allies would match U.S. funds. In the
MY' 97 budget, the program was adjusted to place more emphasis on enhancing coalition
operations, including ways to reduce friendly fire incidents.
Dr. Kaminski concluded by discussing DOD's Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program. Other
nations have mechanisms for supporting their defense industries. Until now there was nothing
comparable in the United States, since by law the Export-Import Bank generally cannot finance
defense articles and services. The new program can issue up to $15 billion of loan guarantees,
would be supported entirely by users' fees, and would not duplicate FMS or commercial arms
transfer procedures. DOD Acquisition and Technology is developing the Defense Export Loan
Guarantee Program in consultation with other parts of DOD and other agencies.
During the discussion period, Dr. Kaminski was asked when the loan guarantee program would
become operational. He replied that various parts of DOD and other agencies are discussing how
the program will be implemented. Regarding offsets, he prefers a commercial model, noting that
teaming arrangements are set up all the time. Dr. Kaminski and his counterparts in NATO
countries agree that "Fortress Europe" would not be beneficial for either the United States or
Europe. In addition, progress is being made on bolstering defense cooperation outside of NATO:
at the recent U.S./Japan summit, agreements were reached on defense supplies. A general concern
is that some senior members of Congress who are knowledgeable about international defense
programs are leaving office. Dr. Kaminski tasked the DTAG Technical Working Group to
become a mechanism by which to keep up with technology improvements in key areas and with
reporting to him, and said that the Defense Science Board would brief the DTAG.
DTAG REPORTS: DTAG Officers
The March 1996 DTAG Quarterly Report is attached at end of these Minutes. It summarizes in
detail the accomplishments and ongoing activities of the DTAG Policy Working Group (PWG),
Regulatory Working Group (RWG), and Technical Working Group (TWG), and describes special
pro jects to which members of all three groups contributed. The DTAG officers augmented this
information with additional comments. Future PWG projects may include studies on facilitating
international arms cooperation, the policy and regulatory aspects of consolidation of the defense
industry, advanced aircraft sales, and U.S. arms transfer policy towards Southeast Asia and the
Middle East. The TWG is developing Terms of Reference for examining software source code,
teaming arrangements, and provisos on licenses. The DTAG Secretariat is working towards
establishing a DTAG Homepage on the internet.
U.S. ARMS TRANSFER POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL EUROPE, THE NEWLY
INDEPENDENT STATES, LATIN AMERICA AND ASEAN: Dr. Martha Harris
Deputy Assistant for Export Controls Martha C. Harris discussed evolving U.S. arms transfer
policy towards Central Europe, the New Independent States (NIS), Latin America, and ASEAN.
Political and economic changes in these countries have required the Administration to review
USG export policies towards these regions.
Until early 1995, the USG only considered case-by-case requests to export less advanced systems
to Central Europe and prohibited transfers of sophisticated lethal weapons systems. Over the last
several years, the CE countries have made significant progress in meeting our standards on
receiving U.S.-origin arms transfers. They have strengthened their security ties with the United
States, showing enthusiasm for the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and interest in joining established
European security and political institutions such as NATO. Second, the CE states have
implemented democratic and market reforms. They have installed democratically-elected leaders,
instituted parliaments and civilian control over their militaries, removed most price controls and
media restrictions, and redirected trade away from the former Soviet Union towards the West.
Last, CE countries have a good record overall on pursuing nonproliferation objectives. The Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania have progressed enough to become members
of the Wassenaar Arrangement. We continue to urge Bulgaria to declare or follow through on its
nonproliferation commitments and to improve its export control practices. Albania and the Baltics
have farther to go, but are beginning to make headway in establishing effective export and
retransfer controls.
These reforms have led the United States to revise its arms transfer policy towards Central
Europe. Since February 1995, there is no longer a presumption of denial for arms sales to all CE
states except the former Yugoslav Republics, which are under a UN arms embargo. All proposed
transfers of defense equipment--including sales of lethal items, coproduction or licensed
production of U.S.-origin systems, and requests to incorporate U.S. technology into
foreign-origin equipment--are considered on a case-by-case basis. The USG does not authorize
unlimited transfers. Instead, it scrutinizes each proposed sale according to set criteria, including
multilateral restraint, legitimate self-defense needs, regional stability, support of nonproliferation
regimes, and whether a nation has adequate retransfer restrictions.
In recent months, the United States has revised its arms transfer policy towards the Yugoslav
republics to make it consistent with United Nations actions, while continuing to take account of
important U.S. foreign policy concerns. In November 1995, the UN Security Council adopted a
resolution stipulating that the arms embargo against the former Yugoslav republics would be lifted
in phases. In December a peace agreement was signed.
On March 14, 1996. the UN arms embargo against the Yugoslav republics was partially lifted.
Because the embargo still stands on heavy weapons and their ammunition, tanks and armored
vehicles, landmines, and military aircraft and helicopters, U.S. manufacturers cannot export these
items at this time. The embargo on this equipment is scheduled to be lifted on June 14. The USG
is moving to bring the two non-combatant republics, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, into a U.S. legal and policy status consistent with the rest of Central Europe.
Specially tailored policies will continue to be applied to the three former combatants, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia-Montenegro.
CE governments want to acquire U.S.-origin items, but financial constraints have compelled them
to request mainly marketing licenses, advisory opinions, and price and availability data. These
countries will most likely not make significant purchases anytime soon. U.S. officials advise the
CE states to prioritize their purchases, so as to best use their limited resources to meet their
defense requirements.
Despite limited defense procurement funds, the CE states are determined to modernize their air
defense capabilities with U.S. advanced fighter aircraft. They are actively considering the F-16
and the F/A-18. The sale of F-16s and F/A-18s would represent a significant increase in the level
of technology which the United States is willing to give the CE nations. But since the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland already own limited numbers of Russian-built MiG-29s, sales of
F-16s and F-18s would not represent increased capabilities. The United States has agreed in
principle to transfer fighter aircraft to these three states.
Until recently U.S. defense manufacturers were not permitted, except under exceptional
circumstances, to sell their products to Russia and the other New Independent States (NIS).
These countries, and their predecessor the Soviet Union, have always been on the ITAR
proscribed list. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin began working at the 1993 Vancouver Summit to
reduce restrictions on U.S./Russian trade, on the condition that Russia would adopt responsible
defense trade policies. Russias status as one of the founding members of the Wassenaar
Arrangement was a major step towards fulfilling this condition. On April 3, Russia was removed
from the ITAR proscribed list. Although there is no longer a presumption of denial on exports of
defense articles and services to Russia, or on the import of such items from Russia, the USG will
continue to review applications on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the proposed transactions
are consistent with U.S. law and policy.
On a related note, the United States and Russia recently signed an agreement prohibiting Russia
from exporting firearms and ammunition attractive to criminals to the United States. Russia will be limited to exporting collector's items, Olympic-style target pistols, and rifles designed solely for
hunting or sporting purposes.
With regard to the other NIS states, the Department is currently reviewing their status on the
proscribed list, with the hope of removing some of them from the proscribed list soon.
The United States is convinced that meeting the legitimate defense needs of friendly Latin
American nations will advance both U.S. and Latin American interests. In February 1995, the
Peru-Ecuador border conflict led the United States to suspend munitions exports to those
countries. When they ended hostilities and made progress towards resolving the dispute, the
Administration lifted its embargo for non-lethal items in May 1995 and for lethal items in
November 1995. Although we have returned to considering transfers of lethal weapons on a
case-by-case basis, we prohibit transfers of sophisticated weapons systems which would upset the
regional balance of power, and continue to urge Peru and Ecuador to limit their arms purchases.
The USG reviews export requests to Guatemala on a case-by-case basis, but closely scrutinizes
proposed transfers of lethal equipment because of human rights concerns. Although democratic
governance was restored to Hiti nearly two years ago, the United States maintains an arms
embargo because of concerns about street violence.
These examples illustrate that Latin America's nascent democracies have adopted democratic
principles after enduring oppressive military rule and human rights abuses. Civilians continue to
try to gain control of their militaries and halt human rights violations. This suggests that Latin
American nations are more likely to be undermined by instability within the region and drug
trafficking than by external military threats. U.S. arms transfers to the region should therefore not
upset the existing military balance, should contribute to reducing the more probable threats of
regional conflicts and narcotics, and should support these nations' goal of controlling their defense
spending. For these reasons, the United States hesitates to introduce advanced weaponry into
Latin America. The USG would review proposed transfers of advanced systems to determine how
they would affect the regions military balance.
In Southeast Asia, the United States is primarily concerned with maintaining regional stability. We
aim to meet the legitimate defense needs of ASEAN countries while not introducing new
capabilities into the region. F-18 technology has been releaseable to ASEAN nations since 1988.
Malaysians purchase of F/A-18s, notified to the Congress in May 1993, is the first sale of this
aircraft to an ASEAN country. Thailand selected the F/A-18 in an international competition which
included Russian and French planes, and last January we notified the Congress of the sale. The
Department is in the process of reviewing a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) for F-18s to
Thailand. Thailand is interested in acquiring AMRAAM missiles to meet its security needs, and as
a treaty ally, the United States is committed to supporting those needs. We are discussing various
options within the context of our nonproliferation concerns and arms transfer policies. Our major
concern is that we not be the first to introduce this new sophisticated weapons system into the
region.
The USG continues to review requests to export strategic tankers to ASEAN nations on a
case-by-case basis. The USG would only authorize transfers which would not destabilize the
region and which meet a clearly defined defensive or operational need. In March 1995, Dr. Davis
made an exceptional approval under this policy for Singapore. Two U.S. companies were allowed
to market jet powered, boom-configured air-refueling tankers in Singapore, with the proviso that
this would not be permitted for any other ASEAN country. Singapore required such tankers
because of its unique operational and training requirements, including participation in distant joint
exercises. These marketing efforts have not yet led to a sale. With the Commerce Department's
concurrence, the Department of State recently approved Singapore's request for two to four KC-135R tankers through excess defense articles (EDA) channels.
The United States has significant commercial, political, and security interests in Indonesia, but
human rights concerns have caused us to deny requests to export small arms and lethal crowd
control items. The USG closely scrutinize requests for non-lethal items applicable to crowd
control or police work.
During the question period, DTAG members asked whether the State Department would
reconsider its restraint policy on advanced aircraft sales to Latin America, in light of reports that
Peru has signed a contract to purchase MiG-29s. Hugh Hamilton, Director of the Office of Export
Control Policy (PM/ATEC), replied that it is important to clarify who is making this request. He
noted that as of the date of the DTAG plenary meeting, no civilian government in Latin America
has yet requested advanced aircraft or weapons systems. When asked how the United States
would respond to Taiwan's desire to upgrade its naval forces, Dr. Harris replied that the United
States would continue transferring certain systems within existing policy guidelines. The United
States has offered the F-16s meant for Pakistan to Indonesia, and although it has been decided
that Pakistan will be partially reimbursed, the terms of the entire deal have not been finalized.
When asked how the USG applied human rights criteria to arms transfer decisions, Dr. Harris
responded that because each situation presents unique concerns, the criteria is applied differently
for each case. Hugh Hamilton added that when human rights abuses occur, it is gratifying that in
most cases no U.S. equipment is involved.
U.S./ALLIED DEFENSE COOPERATION: Embassy Representatives
Brigadier General Dov Shefi, Director of the Israeli Embassy's Defense Industry Cooperation and
Exports Office, noted that Israel has missions in New York and Washington focusing on defense
trade. Their activities involve $1.8 million in purchases, representing 30% of Israelis defense
budget. His office promotes joint ventures and Israeli defense industry activities, developing and
implementing MOUs and maintaining liaison with Department of State export control officials.
Israel's SIBAT is responsible for overseeing the country's export control system and policies. An
Israeli defense firm requires a permit from SIBAT before entering into negotiations. SIBAT
always issues export licenses with retransfer prohibitions to prevent unauthorized diversions. A
special emphasis is put on assuring a U.S. prior approval, in accordance with U.S. laws and
regulations, whenever U.S. items or technologies are involved. General Shefi provided written
material on controls over Israeli defense exports.
Haim Barzilay, General Shefi's Deputy Director, discussed the U.S./Israeli Defense Industrial
Cooperation MOU. This MOU, which was signed in 1987 and which will be renewed next year, is
an umbrella agreement which presently contains five annexes. Projects under the Procurement
Annex include a Cobra-type helicopter sights, air-to-ground missile, night vision goggles, and
armor protection. The ARROW project is also developed under the provisions of the MOU. The
goal of the Test and Evaluation Annex is to achieve maximum standardization for such
procedures. The Government Quality Assurances Services Annex has been successful, with
DOD/OSD requesting that DOD projects in Israel be provided with quality assurances services.
The last annex on Mechanisms for Procuring Qualified Products from Qualified Manufacturers is
in the initial stage of implementation. The MOU agreement implements the principle of reciprocity
in all its Annexes. It was also indicated that restrictions on solicitations in the U.S, provide the
main difficulty for better cooperation.
Simon Webb, Minister of Defense Materiel from the U.K. Embassy, focused on three aspects of
U.S./UK cooperation which can be improved: advancing interoperability, more rapid license
processing, and a more equitable trade in defense goods. Regarding interoperability, our two
countries should cooperate not just because of economic advantages, but because we share
common political objectives. The two nations participate in joint military efforts, most recently in
the Gulf, Turkey, and Bosnia. These and other joint endeavors show that problems on
interoperability and combat identification need to be addressed.
The United States and UK strongly support the Wassenaar Arrangement and condemn arms sales
to pariah states, but wish to provide defense articles and services quickly to friends and allies.
Although the Office of Defense Trade Controls has made substantial improvements towards
reducing license processing times, difficult cases continue to be time-consuming. These cases
often involve extraterritoriality -- when a piece of equipment consists of components from several
U.S. sources -- or may be subject to the National Disclosure Policy.
Mr. Webb urged that the United States consider additional defense purchases from the UK. The
fact that the UK has spent millions on U.S. defense equipment has been unpopular within the UK
and throughout Europe. The existence of numerous joint U.S./UK projects disproves the
widespread perception in the UK that the United States is a closed market. Nevertheless, this
misconception has produced pressure for the UK to close its markets towards the United States.
It should be noted, however, that the trade balance between the United States and the UK is
favorable towards the UK.
Major General Sven-Olof Hokborg, Defense and Air Attache for Defense Cooperation, and Lars
Bjerde appeared from the Swedish Embassy. For a relatively small country, Sweden procures a
significant amount of U.S.-origin defense items. Sweden's defense budget has shrunk by 10%, and
to compensate for this, the country hopes to increase interoperability among military forces
friendly to Sweden. An MOU is in place for U.S.-Swedish defense cooperation. Priorities include
developing industry-to-industry contacts, getting munitions export licenses approved quickly, and
resolving problems of extraterritoriality. Following the practice of commercial industries, the
Swedish defense industry has committed resources to explore market possibilities. Webb and
Hokborg recommended establishing ITAR regulations to address defense cooperation on special
programs, to be approved under criteria of "project licenses."
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: Stephen Geis
Stephen Geis of PM/ATEC reported that there has been little progress for six months on rewriting
the Export Administration Act (EAA). The State Department's main objections involve the bill's
provisions on terrorism. The bill's sponsor, Congressman Toby Roth, successfully avoided
sequesterial referral of the bill to the House National Security Committee. While prospects for
passage by the House are good, the EAA's fate in the Senate is less clear. Although emergency
powers granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) take away
some of the incentive to reform the EAA, the desire to pass a new bill prevails throughout the
Administration.
JET ENGINE HOT SECTIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES: Rose Biancaniello
Rose Biancaniello of the Office of Defense Trade Controls summarize the Presidents March 14,
1996 announcement on jet engine hot sections and communications satellites. While the
Department of State will retain control over hot section technologies which have military
applications, commercial hot section technologies for commercial aircraft will be controlled under
Commerce's Commodity Control List (CCL). Commercial communications satellites (comsats)
would also fall under Commerce's dual-use controls, even if they contain U.S. Munitions List
(USA) components or technologies. The munitions spares and technologies themselves will
remain subject to State Department licensing authority. This announcement provides for improved
interagency review procedures, It does not decontrol combats, but rather clarifies which agency
has jurisdiction over specific items and technologies. Draft regulations on how State and
Commerce will implement these decisions are in the interagency review process. Agencies will
have to fulfill Arms Export Control Act (AECA) notification requirements on removing items
from the USML, and will need to establish new foreign policy controls.
THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: Eric D. Newsom
Eric Newsom, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, and Cliff
Johnson of Under Secretary Lynn Davis' staff discussed progress towards establishing the
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies. The Arrangement will provide a forum for governments to collectively consider
how munitions and dual-use transfers affect their international and regional security interests. It
will complement and reinforce, rather than duplicate, existing nonproliferation regimes. A key
objective of Wassenaar is to level the playing field on export reporting and transparency. The
United States, which has some of the most rigorous export reporting requirements, hopes to bring
a similar level of transparency to the export activities of regime partners.
During the Arrangement's first plenary meeting in Vienna on April 2-3, 1996, Russia did not
agree to the text of the regime's initial elements negotiated at the Hague in December 1995.
Because Russia refused to join the consensus of the other participant nations on this issue, the
meeting was suspended. The United States and other nations are convinced that transparency or
information sharing is central to the Wassenaar Arrangement, and is disappointed that Russia was
unwilling to abide by this. The plenary reconvenes in July, with the goals of finalizing the initial
elements, plans for the Secretariat in Vienna, control lists, and information exchange procedures
by unanimous consent.
Despite the results of the April meeting, the United States remains convinced that Wassenaar can
contribute to peace and security in the post-Cola War period. During the Cold War, COCOM
sought to maintain the West's strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and its allies by
prohibiting virtually all advanced weaponry and technology exports to Communist countries.
Although East-West tensions have diminished, new threats have arisen. A major threat is the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WED), which led the United States and other
nations to institute the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSO), Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), and Australia Group (AG). The Wassenaar Arrangement is intended to augment these
multilateral nonproliferation regimes.
Membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement is open to any country which meets the membership
criteria. A country must be a producer/exporter of arms or industrial equipment; must adhere to
key arms control and nonproliferation treaties; and must have effective export controls. Most
importantly, a country must have national policies preventing transfers of weapons and sensitive
dual-use items to pariah states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. At the April 1996
plenary, it was decided that Argentina, Romania, and South Korea met the criteria for admission
into the regime. Their participation brings the number of regime members to thirty-one.
The Wassenaar Arrangement will help prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms through
several methods of information sharing. Governments will share information on potentially
destabilizing activities, including clandestine projects, dubious acquisitions trends, and sensitive
dual-use transfers to states outside the regime. Wassenaar members will share information on over
a hundred dual-use items and technologies, including machine tools, computers, and
telecommunications equipment. They have agree to notify non-participating states about denials
of items on this list on both a case-by-case basis and an aggregate and periodic basis.
All Wassenaar members except Russia accept the "no undercut" provision: if a member state
authorizes a sensitive dual-use list transfer, and another regime member had previously denied a
similar transfer, the country granting authority to export should notify Wassenaar members. For
the notification to serve its purpose, it must occur soon after the government gives approval or
issues a license. This would allow other regime members to object to an unacceptable transfer,
and for the country allowing the export to reconsider its position before any deliveries take place.
Although each country has discretion to implement its export decisions, it is hoped that the ''no
undercut provision" will encourage common and consistent export policies and eliminate
inadvertent undercuts.
At the last plenary, Russia recommended giving notification after the transfer has occurred. This
would allow a country to use the information from a regime partner on a denied sale to arrange
essentially the same sale, without telling the other partners until after the actual delivery. This
proposal, finish only Russia supported, would substantially weaken the regime.
Arms transfers will be made more transparent through a detailed weapons list which will provide
information twice a year. The list will initially consist of the categories of major weapons systems
used for the CFE Treaty and the U.N. Arms Register, but will be revised to include the weapons
of modern warfare. For both armaments and dual-use articles, governments will have the option
of requesting additional information through diplomatic channels. These measures on information
sharing are intended to encourage Wassenaar members to exercise restraint in transferring items
to regions of potential instability, notably the Middle East and South Asia, and to avoid
introducing new and potentially destabilizing capabilities into particular regions.
Like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime, the
Wassenaar Arrangement is based on national controls: each member will control items according
to its own laws and regulations. Wassenaar is not directed against particular states, will not
interfere with legitimate transfers, and wild not prevent countries from making purchases for
legitimate self-defense needs. Instead, it focuses on states whose actions are destabilizing for
other nations or harmful to their own peoples.
As members have drawn up munitions and sensitive dual-use lists in order to control unauthorized
transfers and retransfers of these goods, the Arrangement precludes license-free trade. Member
states have agreed to exercise extreme vigilance on a special sensitive list of dual-use articles and
technologies. These items can potentially make major contributions to WMD development and
proliferation.
While the United States is pleased with the progress so far, it is our position that the Wassenaar
Arrangement does not go far enough to encourage transparency, restraint, and accountability in
arms transfers. Some member countries opposed comprehensive information sharing, even
through diplomatic channels, principally for commercial reasons. The United states found little
support for its position of requiring prior notification of transfers. And because some members
resisted targeting specific regions or countries, the USG could not obtain agreement that
information sharing would be focused on individual countries or regions of concern.
Consequently, at the outset information sharing will take place on a global basis. It is hoped that
the Wassenaar Arrangement will be operational by this fall, but much depends on whether Russia
will accept the same responsibilities as the other regime partners.
During the question period, DAS Newsom and Cliff Johnson elaborated on Russian objections to
Wassenaar's "no undercut" provision. They noted that India was not a major arms producer and
thus did not meet that criteria for joining the regime. In conclusion, they noted that Wassenaar
members are taking measures to prevent confidential and proprietary business information from
being disseminated: countries will use aggregate categories to report on their arms and dual-use
sales.
Attachments:
DTAG 5/16/96 Plenary Meeting Attendees.
DTAG--Quarterly Report March 1996
Embassy of Israeli presentation on defense export controls.
DTAG Officers
William Schneider, International Planning Services, DTAG Chair
Mona Hazera, Northrop-Grumman, DTAG Vice-Chair
Jerry Eiler, Northrop-Grumman, DTAG RWG Chair
Mike Richey, Litton Industries, DTAG TWG Chair
Policy Working Group (PWG)
Burt Bacheller, McDonnell Douglas
Dean Bartles, Olin Ordnance
Robert Beach, R.K. Beach & Associates
Vincent DeCain, NOMOS Corporation
Jacob Goodwin, Export Capital Inc.
Joel Johnson, Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
Robert Martin, Motorola
Saphanie Neuman, Columbia University
Henry Sechler, General Dynamics
Anna Stout, American League for Exports and Security Assistance (ALESA)
Douglass Wood, Textron/Cessna
Regulatory Working Group (RWG)
David Calabrese, Electronics Industries Association (EIA)
Giovanna Cinelli, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay
Richard Colton, consultant
Debi Davis, TRW
Patrick Donovan, Honeywell
Richard Gogolkiewicz, General Dynamics
Beth Johnson, Teledyne
Henry Lavery, Security Assistance International, Inc.
Robert Lee, Communications & Power Industries
Stuart Quigg, Q International Ltd.
Vicki Ralston, Lockheed Martin
George Rao, Allied Signal Aerospace
Tom Reed, Rockwell International
Paula Reynolds, Allison Engine Company, Inc.
Paul Seymour, Smiths Industries
Joy Speicher, TRW
Catherine Thornberry, Export Procedures Company
Technical Working Group (TWG)
Phillip Avruch, COMSAT Corp.
Tom Becker, Sundstrand
Michael Delia, AAI Corp.
John Zopecky, Pratt & Whitney
James Matchett, GE Aircraft Engines
Douglas McCormac, TRW
Duncan Reynard, Space Systems/Loral
William Schmieder, Lockheed Martin
Ray Thorkildsen, Valentec
|