27 FEBRUARY 2002




Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, I thank you for this opportunity to testify on security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Incidents and action drove the year 2001 for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).  In February, USS Greeneville collided with and sank the Japanese fisheries training vessel Ehime Maru, resulting in the loss of nine Japanese lives.  Soon after, a Chinese fighter jet collided with one of our EP-3s, resulting in the loss of the Chinese pilot and the detention of our crew on Hainan Island for 11 days.  During this time, seven USPACOM personnel from Joint Task Force–Full Accounting died in a helicopter crash in Vietnam.  Then came the terrorist attacks of 11 September.  We have gone on the offensive against terrorism while sustaining our readiness, improving the readiness of regional forces to contribute to coalition operations, and transforming the capabilities of our forces.  The men and women of USPACOM have been busy.

     We cannot provide adequate protection to our citizens and our forces while only playing defense.  Since 11 September, combating terrorism on U.S. territory and throughout the Asia-Pacific region has been USPACOM’s top priority.  We are succeeding, largely as a result of cooperation among many nations.

     Countering terrorism has accelerated security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, but has not fundamentally altered the region’s security challenges.  A secure, peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region remains very much in the interests of America and the world.  An uncertain Asia will present crises and dangers.  We continue to base our power and influence on our values, economic vibrancy, our desire to be a partner in this critical region, and our forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces of USPACOM.

     Overall, we are in better shape than we were a year ago.  We have gone on the offensive against terror organizations we did not know the name of a year ago.  Although there are persistent deficiencies, particularly in facilities upkeep and replenishment of precision weapons, our readiness is on its way to a satisfactory level.  If we can maintain our momentum, the future is bright for the U.S. Pacific Command. 


International Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region


The terrorist threat in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) consists primarily of local groups with links to al-Qaida that are hostile to the United States and our friends.  These groups have plotted attacks against American forces, embassies, and other citizens, and have provided transit assistance to al-Qaida members.  Our understanding of the threat has increased greatly since 11 September, as we brought more intelligence resources to bear and shared intelligence with other countries.  Jemaah Islamiyah, which has plotted against U.S. and other nations’ citizens, vessels and facilities in Singapore, is one group of concern.  The Governments of Singapore and Malaysia moved quickly against this al-Qaida-linked group.  Continued vigilance, actions such as this, and enhanced cooperation among governments, will keep terrorists on the run and root them out over time.

At present, no “Afghanistans” – sanctuaries for active terrorist organizations with governments fully supporting them – exist in this Area of Responsibility (AOR).  Governments throughout the region fundamentally support the campaign against international terrorism.  Each country in the region faces different circumstances and unique challenges, and each has varying capabilities in contributing to the international war on terrorism.  Domestic political considerations are factors in countries such as Indonesia and Bangladesh.  However, nations in this region are cooperating with the United States in many different ways, and this cooperation is succeeding against international terrorism.

We have actively engaged our regional partners to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan.  Our Asia-Pacific allies and regional partners have condemned the terrorist attacks of 11 September, and many are contributing resources.  We appreciate the many military contributions of our allies and regional partners, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea. 

Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty immediately following 11 September for the first time in the 50-year history of this treaty.  In addition to its ongoing naval contribution to Maritime Interdiction Operations supporting UN Security Council Resolutions against Iraq, Australia provided additional ships to the Arabian Gulf and aircraft to Diego Garcia.  Australia was one of our first allies to deploy ground troops to Afghanistan.  New Zealand has provided a contingent of its Special Air Service for operations as well.

 The Government of Japan has implemented major policy and legislative changes to allow Japan to provide force protection and logistical support to U.S. installations in Japan.  The Japan Air Self Defense Force has flown relief missions to Pakistan and lift missions for our forces in the USPACOM AOR.  For the first time since World War II, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force is at sea far from Japanese waters, providing fuel and other support to coalition naval forces.

     The Republic of Korea (ROK) is providing air and naval logistic support to OEF.  Several other countries [c1] have given overflight rights and seaport and airport access to our aircraft and ships.

The bottom line is that our previous bilateral and regional cooperation with the countries of the APR has paid off in valuable cooperation with regard to the war on terrorism.

Antiterrorism Efforts – Defense

USPACOM’s Force Protection Program has effectively protected our armed forces and supported civilian authorities throughout the Asia-Pacific region since the 11 September terrorist attacks.  We activated Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) to counter the threat and accelerated the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program.

JRACs integrate the defensive measures by all the military units in the same location – Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Japan and Korea.  In addition, they coordinate Department of Defense (DoD) efforts with federal, state, and local agencies.  JRACs have written and exercised plans and are fielding the Area Security Operations Command and Control (ASOCC) system.  Over the past year, we have made significant progress identifying and protecting critical infrastructure by making CIP part of all major exercises and using JRACs to protect critical assets.  We are also accelerating the fielding of the Pacific Mobile Emergency Radio System in Hawaii and Alaska to improve coordination efforts between civilian authorities and their JRAC counterparts.   USPACOM’s JRACs and CIP program are widely recognized as the model for interagency coordination, combined scenario-based training events, and unprecedented cooperation and information sharing.

     Following the attack on the USS Cole, USPACOM began a full reassessment of vulnerabilities at foreign ports we visit.  We have established plans and increased deployable security measures at all these ports.  To date, we have completed 25 force protection memoranda of agreement (MOA) with U.S. embassies, including MOAs with embassies in India, Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and China.  These agreements clearly delineate U.S. responsibilities for all our military forces in Asia-Pacific countries.

A major challenge is to sustain these intense efforts over the long-term.  Substantial resources are required to maintain higher Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) that will be a way of life for many years to come.

As long as we are engaged around the world, terrorists will look for soft spots for further attacks.  On every deployment, every exercise and especially now at home stations, force protection is an essential mission.

Counter-terrorism – Offense

     USPACOM forces – USS Kitty Hawk, John C. Stennis, and Carl Vinson battlegroups, patrol aircraft, and USS PELELIU Amphibious Ready Group with the 15th and 13th Marine Expeditionary Units – played major roles in the successful Afghanistan campaigns.  At the same time, we have gone on the offensive in the Pacific region. 

We have already deployed personnel to U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and India to better integrate our operations with interagency country teams.  We have established a Directorate for Counter-Terrorism to fuse all sources of intelligence, to plan and coordinate operations, and to begin true interagency integration across the region.  We have sent equipment and an assistance team to the Philippines.  Our Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) has rapidly improved its support to the counter-terrorism mission.  Analytical depth and breadth of the terrorism threat in the AOR has significantly improved, with increased collection, analysis, and reporting in this area.

To build coalition support for our offensive efforts since 11 September, I have visited the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Singapore, Japan and Korea, and met with each country’s U.S. ambassador, and key senior government and military leaders to discuss our intentions, and how their support can help.  The response to our plan has been positive, and we are building capability to act with other countries against terrorism.

     We continue to foster interagency participation in our planning and operations.  While our counter-terrorism cell includes a Joint Interagency Coordination Group to seamlessly interconnect with the national architecture as it is established, a Joint Interagency Task Force with direct tasking authority that transcends agency stovepipes would be a more effective organization.

USPACOM Requirements for the War against Terrorism


Legislation mandating a 15 percent headquarters manpower reduction over 3 years was passed before 11 September.  As we launched the war on terrorism, we brought additional Reserve Component (RC) personnel on board to handle the increased workload.  On 12 October 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense waived the FY01 10 percent headquarters manpower reduction.  As long as the war on terrorism continues, there will be more requirements for intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and planning officers on USPACOM combatant headquarters staffs.

The war on terrorism has created new manpower requirements.  Over 5,000 additional billets are needed to address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism, and counter-terrorism missions throughout USPACOM.  Examples of additional manpower requirements include increased shore and harbor security patrols in response to enhanced Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs), additional teams to assess security of foreign ports and airfields we visit, and around-the-clock manning of JRACs and crisis action teams.  We are working to address these manning and management challenges from within existing endstrength levels.

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CBT RIF)


Funding obtained through CBT RIF continues to play a major role in addressing emergent requirements.  This initiative provides the geographic CINCs additional avenues for resourcing against emerging threats.  Some examples of USPACOM funded CBT RIF projects include weapons/metal detectors and explosive vapor detectors for Marine Corps Base Okinawa and blast mitigation windows for Yongsan Base in Korea.  USPACOM received $3.95 million in CBT RIF funding in FY01.  USPACOM received nearly $3.9 million more in the first allocation of FY02 funding, including $850,000 for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).  However, USPACOM still has over 1,070 unfunded Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) projects totaling nearly $1.5 billion to achieve full compliance with current standards.  Service funding will meet some of these requirements, but the CBT RIF program fills the gaps.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)


            FMF is an essential tool for our allies and partners to improve their capabilities against international terrorist groups and their supporters.  A detailed discussion of FMF funding requirements, with particular emphasis on FMF for the Philippines, is included at pages 34-35.



Australia remains America’s oldest ally in the Asia-Pacific region.  Last year we celebrated the 50th anniversary of our defense treaty.  Australia’s steadfast support has been a key facet of our counter-terrorism campaign in the Asia-Pacific region.

Australian armed forces remain in the lead role in East Timor and in the shaping of East Timor’s new defense force.  In addition, Australia maintains an important presence in Papua New Guinea, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, ensuring peace and security in these problematic areas.  The Australian government has been active in promoting the return of democracy in Fiji and security and peaceful development throughout the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

Our relationship with Australia is mature and as strong as it has ever been.  USPACOM works hard through bilateral and multilateral fora to keep the ANZUS Treaty relationship with Australia healthy and looking forward.  We are currently conducting a strategic top-down interoperability study with Australia’s armed forces.  It will return great long-term dividends in acquisition, information technology, operations, research and development, and further strengthening the relationship with this trusted ally.


Japan hosts nearly 41,000 U.S. armed forces personnel and 14,000 additional sailors afloat with the Seventh Fleet.  It contributes $4.57 billion in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally.  These forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces are key to the U.S. commitment to defend American interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region.  The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and fundamental to regional security and peaceful development.

Over the past year, Japan and the United States have made steady progress in strengthening our alliance.  We signed the first bilateral defense plan under the 1997 revised Defense Guidelines.  It incorporates additional Japanese support for U.S. operations, and opens new areas for defense cooperation.

     After 11 September, Japan passed historic legislation to assist U.S. combat operations.  For the first time since World War II, Japan sent its Self-Defense Force (JSDF) overseas to support a combat operation and work with other countries in a U.S.-led coalition.

JSDF roles and capabilities are evolving to meet future challenges.  In addition to Japan's military contribution in support of OEF, the JSDF will deploy a 700-member engineer battalion to East Timor in March 2002, and will continue to provide a 45-man transportation unit as part of the Golan Heights UN Disengagement Observer Force.  The JSDF has also worked closely with USPACOM components in restructuring bilateral exercises to develop skills for humanitarian assistance; search and rescue; non-combatant evacuation; consequence management for chemical, biological and nuclear incidents; and complex contingency operations likely to occur in the future.  I am also encouraged by the increased attention the JSDF is giving to cooperating with regional armed forces – the ROK in particular.

We successfully completed the search and recovery effort on the Ehime Maru last October with the recovery of eight out of nine missing crewmembers.  The U.S. Navy’s intense efforts and our two nations’ exceptional cooperation overcame the effects of the tragedy, and even strengthened the ties between our two countries in many areas.

We continue to work to be good neighbors on our bases in Japan.  Japan closed the industrial waste incinerator next to the U.S. Naval Air Facility Atsugi, ending an environmental hazard.  Because of steady progress made under the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), a relocation site for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been selected in northern Okinawa, and detailed discussions have begun over the type and scale of the facility.

     Japan's timely, meaningful and visible contribution to the campaign against terrorism is a new stage in our alliance relations.  This lynchpin relationship is vital for security and peaceful development in Asia.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

Encouraging events on the Korean Peninsula in 2000 appeared to indicate a new era.  However, progress stalled last year.  Since March 2001, the North has canceled events and refused to meet regularly with the ROK.  At the same time, North Korea’s “military-first” policy remains.  Its training cycles in 2001 were at normal levels, but the ongoing 2002 winter training cycle has featured unusual corps-level activity.  North Korea continues to maintain more than 60 percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).  The North remains a formidable force that we must guard against and deter.

During 2001, the U.S. and the ROK successfully negotiated several important alliance issues.  Our military relationship is on a stronger footing every year.

The Special Measures Agreement (SMA), once completed, will significantly increase contributions to the maintenance of U.S. troops on the Peninsula.  Under the SMA, the ROK will cover 50 percent of the non-personnel stationing costs for U.S. forces by 2004.  The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has also reached a tentative agreement with the ROK government on a Land Partnership Plan (LPP) that will consolidate U.S. force presence.  The plan will reduce the number of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 26 while enhancing training and combined warfighting capability.  Commander USFK and the ROK Ministry of National Defense have agreed to review the 1990 agreement to relocate Yongsan Army Garrison, the home of USFK, from its location in downtown Seoul.

We must continue to enhance the quality of life for our troops and their families stationed in Korea.  The ROK provides critical Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) support.  However, HNFC, coupled with the current level of U.S. Military Construction (MILCON) funding, is inadequate.  Many of the facilities, including unaccompanied personnel housing and family housing, are of Korean War vintage.  Personnel live in inadequate barracks, apartments, even Quonset huts and “temporary” Vietnam-era buildings that we have maintained at increasing cost as age, infestation, and Pacific weather have taken their toll.  The FY03 funding shortfall for facility construction and modernization across Korea is estimated at $315 million.  Congressional support of MILCON funding for Korea in the FY01 supplemental and FY02 MILCON Appropriations bills was sorely needed and very appreciated.  We seek your continued support for MILCON and sustainment, restoration and maintenance funding as provided in the President’s FY03 budget.

The ROK increasingly contributes to regional security by deploying over 400 troops to the peacekeeping mission in East Timor, in addition to its other peacekeeping commitments in Western Sahara, the Republic of Georgia, Cyprus and the India-Pakistan border region.  ROK forces participate in exercises such as RIMPAC (a major, multilateral naval exercise), PACIFIC REACH (a submarine rescue exercise also involving naval forces from Japan, Singapore and the United States), and COPE THUNDER (a multilateral air exercise in Alaska).  Most recently, the ROK and USCINCPAC co-hosted a Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) workshop in Korea.  Hosting an exercise with over 20 non-U.S. participants, including Japan, was a significant first for the ROK.

Following the 11 September tragedy, the ROK aggressively supported our efforts to combat terrorism.  They have dispatched forces to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, currently deploying four C-130 aircraft, a naval tank landing ship (LST) and a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) unit.  The ROK has also sent liaison officers to the headquarters of USCINCPAC and Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command to coordinate ROK government support for the Afghan campaign and continuing war. The ROK has worked closely with USFK to fully ensure the highest levels of protection of U.S. forces on the Peninsula.  This is in addition to the $45 million pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

By joining the coalition to combat global terrorism and participating in peacekeeping missions and USPACOM’s regional exercises and cooperative initiatives, the ROK plays a very positive role in the region.  Although there has been little or no substantive progress toward normalization and reunification of the Peninsula, the United States and the ROK have strengthened our alliance, and the ROK has continued its contribution to regional security.


Our relationship with the Republic of the Philippines (RP), a long-time U.S. ally, had major developments last year.  The RP continued to be a strong partner in regional security initiatives – hosting various conferences, the annual bilateral BALIKATAN exercise linked to the regional TEAM CHALLENGE exercise, and numerous Joint Combined Exchanges for Training (JCETs).

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are challenged by budgetary constraints, logistical problems and a lack of adequately trained personnel.  These factors hamper the AFP's ability to deal with internal insurgent groups, like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that also has ties to al-Qaida and poses a threat to Americans.

President Arroyo has championed Philippine and regional support for the international counter-terrorism campaign.  During her November 2001 visit to the United States to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Treaty, she and President Bush agreed that the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States, and the terrorist activities of the ASG (which now holds Filipino and American hostages in the Southern Philippines), underscore the urgency of ensuring that the two countries maintain a robust defense partnership into the 21st century.  The two leaders agreed to strengthen the military alliance on a sustained basis, through increased training, exercises, and other joint activities.  Finally, they declared that the American and Filipino people stand together in the global campaign against terrorism.

USPACOM has deployed a Joint Task Force (JTF) to the Southern Philippines and has organized a substantial program to improve the maintenance of AFP equipment.  The JTF package includes: a training/advisory team of Special Operations ground, naval and air personnel to train the AFP from their Southern Command Headquarters potentially down through company level.  Training will focus on effective counter-terrorism campaign planning, intelligence/operations fusion, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil-military operations (CMO) and field tactics.  Additionally, civil affairs (CA), maintenance, medical, and other support personnel round out the Special Forces team. 

The JTF initial deployment of advisors was approved during implementation planning in January 2002.  The recently concluded Terms of Reference (TOR) provided both governments with the necessary framework for executing our deployment to the Philippines.

The war against the ASG will not be won by military operations alone.  Improvements in law enforcement, intelligence, economics, business, information, media, academia, community leadership and religion will have enduring and important roles in the battle.  A solid, sustainable socio-economic program by the Government of the Philippines in the affected areas is also essential.  USPACOM is working on a civil affairs assessment to support the JTF operation.  Our training, assistance, and maintenance package will improve the AFP’s CT capabilities.  Continued U.S. support to the Philippines through the FMF program is critical to the success of the AFP’s campaign against terror.


Thailand is one of the nations in Asia most committed to building regional approaches to the future challenges of counter-terrorism (CT), counter-drug (CD) interdiction, peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian assistance (HA), and other transnational concerns.  The TEAM CHALLENGE multilateral training event to improve multinational capability/interoperability is held in Thailand.

Thailand has taken a leading role in Southeast Asia in support of peacekeeping operations (PKO) by maintaining battalion strength forces in East Timor and again supplying the UN military commander there.  Thailand has also sponsored several multilateral PKO seminars.  We have supported humanitarian demining in Thailand and are transferring that program to Thailand in FY02.  USPACOM continues to respond to Thailand's request for U.S. assistance to the Royal Thai Army in combating drug traffic across the Burma-Thai border.  Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) is the standing task force for all CD issues in the theater and has the lead in training, equipment, and organizational coordination initiatives to assist the Thais with their CD mission. Full funding of FY02/03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Thailand is critical to our efforts to help Thailand sustain its CD and PKO over the next 2 years.

Since 11 September, Thailand has coordinated fully with the United States in combating terrorism by supplying access to Thai military facilities, granting overflight permission, making formal public statements of support, and cooperating in information sharing and in investigation of terrorists using Thailand for a transit point and for other support.  During a December 2001 trip to Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Thaksin offered the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Thai security contributions to multilateral presence in Afghanistan.

Our effective military-to-military cooperation with Thailand meets the security concerns of both our countries.  Our attention to Thai political and military priorities supports our ability to call for access to military facilities.  Thailand will continue to be our key ally in Southeast Asia.


The March 2001 completion of the deep-draft pier at Changi Naval Base, constructed entirely at Singapore’s expense, will support continued U.S. presence in the region for many years to come.  USS Kitty Hawk was the first aircraft carrier to berth pierside at Changi.  Though not a formal treaty ally, Singapore is a solid security partner in the Asia-Pacific region, a vocal proponent for U.S. access, and strong supporter of U.S. counter-terrorist efforts.  Additionally, Singapore supports and hosts many significant multilateral activities.  Last year, it hosted Exercise PACIFIC REACH, participated in Exercise COBRA GOLD and numerous anti-piracy regional conferences, and hosted a Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) regional Mine Counter-Mine exercise. 

Singapore seeks greater interoperability with the U.S. armed forces.  It views high technology and advanced hardware as a deterrent and is increasing its cooperation with the United States in several projects.  Singapore participated with Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and is active in other developments such as the Joint Mission Force (JMF) and Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN).

Singapore has worked against terrorist groups in the country who were targeting U.S. interests.  Immediately following the 11 September attacks, Singapore was unwavering in its support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, allowing our aircraft to use its airfields and increasing protection to vital shipping in the Strait of Malacca.

Singapore’s arrest of 13 al-Qaida-linked terrorists in December led to additional arrests in Malaysia and the Philippines in January.  Information sharing between these countries provided unprecedented insights into the al-Qaida network in the Asia-Pacific region.

Singapore has rapidly matured into a solid regional partner in a strategic location. 


            U.S. military relations with India have greatly expanded over the past year.  India offered rapid and valuable assistance to the United States in conducting military operations in Afghanistan.  USPACOM officers have met with their Indian counterparts and agreed on programs and exercises for the next 6-18 months.  The primary areas of cooperation focus on peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, special operations training and naval activities. 

We are closely following India’s current confrontation with Pakistan.  Throughout our interaction with our Indian counterparts, we continually stress the importance of a peaceful negotiated long-term solution to the Kashmir issue.

India and the United States have many common interests and our growing military cooperation will support this increasingly important security relationship.


Indonesia continues to go through a complete transition toward a modern democracy and a market economy.  A key factor influencing Indonesia’s political transformation and the prospects for its stability and unity are the Armed Forces of Indonesia, or TNI.

Military reform made some progress last year, but more remains to be done, especially in the areas of accountability and professional conduct.  Separatist and sectarian violence in Aceh, the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, and inadequate TNI resources and capabilities have slowed the momentum of reform.  TNI’s future course is central to Indonesia’s development and important to U.S. interests in combating terrorism, maintaining freedom of navigation on important trade lanes, and supporting regional security.

The Indonesian government has condemned terrorism and approved overflights of U.S. aircraft supporting the war on terrorism.  It has improved security for our citizens and the U.S. embassy in Jakarta.  However, Indonesia’s very geography makes it vulnerable to terrorist penetration.  With many challenges on its plate, and diminishing resources, Indonesia’s security apparatus does not have full control of its borders.  Moreover, Indonesia has not aggressively investigated domestic elements that are sympathetic to the aims of al-Qaida.  We need to strengthen cooperation with Indonesia on terrorism.  Current restrictions on our interaction with the TNI limit our effectiveness.  However, the newly established Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program may offer us a valuable tool to provide TNI mid-grade officers non-lethal training focused on counter-terrorism and combating transnational threats.  We look forward to exploring this possibility with the Congress.

USPACOM activities with TNI include inviting some officers to multilateral conferences, subject matter information exchanges, senior officer visits, and the annual naval Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise focusing on humanitarian assistance and anti-piracy.  CARAT 2002 will now include a counter-terrorism element. 

A responsible, developing Indonesia is key to the security and development of the Southeast Asia region; it is in our interest to help ensure the security of this important country.

East Timor

East Timor is preparing for independence in May of this year.  UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) support has been successful in assisting and guiding East Timor toward independence.  USPACOM forces in U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET) played a vital role in supporting this monumental international effort.  USGET has provided a significant U.S. presence, vital civic actions, humanitarian assistance, and regular ship visits.  Today, East Timor is generally secure from the militias, and ready to face the challenges of a democracy.

After East Timor’s independence, USPACOM will transition from civic action orientation in East Timor to a more traditional military cooperation program.  This program will support an international effort, led by Australia, to further develop the East Timor Defense Force into a viable self-defense force.


Many important political, economic, and military developments occurred in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) last year, and Chinese actions affected U.S. military relations with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 

Last year’s military exercises in the PRC showed a measurable increase in quality, as the PLA continued to modernize its forces, with an emphasis on integrating ground, air and naval forces into a viable joint capability, and on creating a more professional officer and noncommissioned officer cadre.  In addition to basic maritime combat skills, the 2001 exercises demonstrated efforts to conduct joint amphibious operations combined with missile and air strikes against key targets, such as airfields, naval ports and command centers.

China continued to build and exercise its force of short-range ballistic missiles ranging Taiwan.  It still seeks to develop a range of military options to influence and intimidate Taiwan, and has not abandoned the option of using force to resolve Taiwan’s status.

Across the Strait, Taiwan’s armed forces continue to restructure and modernize.  They are reorganizing and modernizing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).  The U.S. government last year approved the sale of naval, ground and air equipment to maintain Taiwan’s sufficient defense in the near term.  Taiwan still needs to focus on developing and modernizing C4ISR, integrated air and sea defense, and the ability to integrate its armed forces to conduct effective joint operations.

The PLA is still years away from the capability to take and hold Taiwan.  Continued improvements in Taiwan’s capabilities and development of USPACOM capabilities will be necessary to maintain sufficient defense.

The April 2001 EP-3 crisis was eventually resolved – the crew and airplane returned.  However, the aggressive behavior of the Chinese pilot who caused the collision and the detention of the crew for 11 days damaged China’s relations with the United States.

Military-to-military relations are resuming slowly, and in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act.  It is in the interests of the United States to interact with the PLA to address common interests, such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, counterdrug, counterpiracy, and humanitarian assistance.  These interactions should be reciprocal and transparent and serve to reduce misunderstandings and the risk of miscalculations on both sides.


Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues progress on the fullest possible accounting of Americans unaccounted-for as a result of the war in Southeast Asia.

The risks of this noble mission were sadly underscored by the helicopter crash on 7 April 2001.  Seven American service members and nine Vietnamese tragically died in Quang Binh Province, Vietnam, while conducting advance work for the 65th Joint Field Activity (JFA).  We may never know the exact details of the accident, but a report by the U.S. investigator indicated that deteriorating weather conditions, poor visibility, and pilot error were factors.  This tragic incident was a deep loss for USPACOM, the task force, and the American and Vietnamese people.

During FY01, JTF-FA conducted nine JFAs - three in Vietnam, five in Laos, and one in Cambodia where 211 cases were investigated and 37 sites excavated.  One JFA in Vietnam was canceled due to the tragic helicopter crash.  JTF-FA continues to maintain its pace of operations in FY02, with 10 JFAs scheduled - 4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia.

Last year, 44 sets of remains were identified and returned to their loved ones.  JTF-FA recovered and repatriated 27 remains still to be identified, but believed to be Americans unaccounted-for (16 from Vietnam, 10 from Laos, and 1 from Cambodia).

We remain committed to obtaining the fullest possible accounting of Americans still missing in Southeast Asia and to the return of all recoverable remains.  We seek continual support for funding of this mission.


Theater Security Cooperation Overview

     Ready forces are the foundation for USPACOM’s cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region.  They reassure our friends and partners, and dissuade our potential enemies.  During 2001, we maintained a strong program of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) designed to maintain coalition warfighting skills for deterrence, and build regional coalition capabilities to carry out common missions, from peacekeeping through combating terrorism.

     The three primary goals of TSC - influence, access, and competent coalition partners – led to an active program that proved its worth after 11 September. All countries in the Asia-Pacific region declared support for the global war on terrorism, and contributed in many ways.

Seminars, simulations and multilateral exercises are inexpensive and powerful ways to develop the capabilities to work effectively -- as coalitions in complex contingencies (such as East Timor); as partners in countering terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and piracy; in managing the consequences of chemical, biological or nuclear attacks, natural disasters and accidents; in evacuating citizens caught in the path of violence; in search and rescue of mariners and airmen in distress; and in providing humanitarian assistance.  TSC develops a cadre of competent coalition partners able to contribute when called upon.

     Such a call came 11 September.  Under the banner of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, many of our partners in enhanced regional cooperation stepped forward to make significant contributions to the emerging OEF coalition.  We have also focused on building long-term, strategic relationships necessary to plan and execute the protracted theater campaigns to eradicate terrorism.  Many of our efforts with key allies and friends, such as Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, are expanding on strong foundations nurtured by TSC to improve our counter-terrorism capabilities.  With other strategic nations in our theater, such as India, the events of 11 September are the catalyst for accelerating more meaningful military-to-military contact and cooperation.  Finally, many nations, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma, have offered varying levels of support and cooperation to the global campaign against terrorism.  Their proposed contributions and offers, although perhaps not strategically significant, forecast meaningful regional cooperation on a threat that affects all Asia-Pacific nations.

We will continue to cultivate and maintain the necessary operational access and coalition cooperation (diplomatic/financial/military) to plan and execute current and future operations.  For all these purposes, USPACOM should maintain a baseline of multilateral conferences and International Military Education and Training (IMET) for every country.

Coalition Exercises

TEAM CHALLENGE 2002 links the multilateral COBRA GOLD exercise in Thailand with the bilateral BALIKATAN in the Philippines to address bilateral and multilateral training objectives, and to improve the readiness of regional armed forces to contribute to multilateral operations.  Singapore will participate again this year alongside Thai and U.S. forces in COBRA GOLD.  Observer nations (with an eye toward possible participation in future years) will include Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, France, ROK, Mongolia, Russia, China, India, Cambodia, Tonga and Sri Lanka; Vietnam has been invited.  In TEAM CHALLENGE, we will exercise elements from the full spectrum of missions that our combined forces may be called upon to do together, from complex contingencies to humanitarian assistance.  TEAM CHALLENGE continues to be our largest multilateral exercise in theater, while serving as our premier Combined Joint Task Force training exercise.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

IMET is the cornerstone of our Theater Security Cooperation Program.  It provides education opportunities for personnel from foreign armed forces to study U.S. military doctrine and to observe U.S. commitment to the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values.  It is the best means for promoting professionalism within foreign armed forces, and exposing foreign armed forces to the principle of a military responsive to civilian control.  IMET is an effective tool for assisting armed forces to develop in ways that meet their own and U.S. objectives.  Indonesia is a case in point, where officers from the Indonesian armed forces have not attended professional U.S. military education courses since 1992, with an attendant loss of U.S. influence on an entire generation of Indonesian company/ field grade officers.

Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program


The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program complements the IMET program.  DoD funding will be used to send foreign military officers to U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal education.  This program will provide the regional CINCs with additional flexibility in executing our security cooperation strategies, and it will have an immediate and positive impact in encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional cooperation in addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

FMF for acquiring U.S. military articles, services and training enables key friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities and improve their potential contributions as a coalition partner.  In response to our original FY02 FMF request, three USPACOM countries were granted FMF funds: Mongolia ($2 million), the Philippines ($19 million), and [c2] East Timor ($1 million), which gains its independence 20 May of this year.

To prosecute the global war on terrorism, it is in the U.S. interest to provide equipment to select countries facing threats.  The administration is reviewing potential threats and options. 

Philippines FMF Maintenance Program

The Philippines FMF Maintenance Program is the foundation for effective security assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their campaign against terror.  We are in the first year of a 5-year, $68 million FMF plan to sustain critical AFP military capability while promoting clear and positive actions to correct budgetary and logistics deficiencies.  We have developed courses of action to improve AFP readiness rates for specific systems such as C-130 aircraft, UH-1 helicopters, 2 1/2-ton trucks, and 78-foot Fast Patrol Craft.  We have also developed a statement of work to implement contractor management assistance and ways to track improvements in readiness rates.  Full funding over the 5-year program will enable the AFP to sustain higher readiness levels for key weapons systems. This funding is essential for the AFP to achieve a self-sustaining capability.

As the efforts in the Philippines evolve, possible opportunities to maximize effectiveness of counter terrorism operations may require additional resources.  FY03 FMF funding for the Republic of the Philippines Maintenance Program remains key to achieving one of our long-term goals of improving AFP readiness. 

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)

EIPC programs promote standards for peacekeeping doctrine, training, and education at the institutional level.  In FY01, five USPACOM countries (Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines and Thailand) received a total of $2.227 million to achieve this goal.  In FY02, we hope to add Fiji, Madagascar, Tonga and India to this list.  While EIPC programs are not as visible as IMET or FMF grants, EIPC plays a key role in developing host country self-sufficiency to train its forces to be effective players in worldwide peacekeeping efforts. 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)

NADR funding supports U.S. efforts to reduce threats posed by international terrorists, landmines, and stockpiles of excess weapons, as well as by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their associated technologies.  We have received limited funds in the past, primarily for demining activities in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, India and Vietnam.  Our war against terrorism could benefit by any expansion of these programs.  We will work closely with U.S. Country Teams to ensure we use these limited funds wisely.

Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA)

OHDACA appropriation provides the critical ability to respond to humanitarian needs in the Asia-Pacific region and is the primary source of DoD financing for foreign disaster assistance, demining, excess property donations and other humanitarian projects.  While other federal agencies also have responsibilities to respond to man-made and natural disasters, armed forces are frequently called upon first.  Additionally, our annual assistance programs provide important access to some countries where other means of security cooperation are inappropriate.  These non-threatening programs demonstrate the peacetime capabilities of DoD to our Pacific neighbors without impacting readiness.  Approved FY02/03 Humanitarian Assistance requirements for construction projects and property donations total approximately $5.1 million.

East Timor Defense Force (ETDF)- Logistics System/East Timor Engineer Plan

The U.S. armed forces continue to conduct operations in East Timor by providing liaison officers, engineers and humanitarian assistance during ship visits.  FY02 engineering priorities include water plant, electrical system, and health clinic projects.  The State Department programmed $4.8 million in FMF funds in FY01-03 to assist in developing the East Timor Defense Forces (ETDF) logistics support system and to conduct training to develop the skills necessary for self-sufficiency.  We will need to look at avenues to provide the ETDF the support they need to provide for their own security.  There should be no haven for terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region, in countries with histories old or new.

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS)

The APCSS regional study, conference, and research center continues to do great work.  Graduates from its 3-month executive course total 764 from 41 countries, including Pakistan.  I meet many of the outstanding graduates when I travel, and all are convinced that the regional approach works.

Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI)


     The APRI program increases USPACOM access, regional readiness and U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region.  APRI funding supports a wide range of exercises, programs, and training symposiums such as Exercise TEAM CHALLENGE, the PACIFIC REACH multi-national submarine rescue exercise, the annual multilateral Chiefs of Defense conference, and search and rescue and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief exercises.

Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN)

Funded by the APRI program, APAN provides information exchange throughout the region that directly supports Theater Security Cooperation.  It functions as an interactive Web-based network that is attracting ever-widening attention and participation.  APAN’s membership has grown from about 300 users from 17 countries in June 2000 to more than 4,000 self-registered users (by 1 January 2002) from every country in the Pacific region except Burma and North Korea.  APAN has also attracted users from over 20 other countries outside the region.  The Web site supports regional exercises and conferences, and provides information resources to functional areas such as peacekeeping operations, disaster management and counter-terrorism.  More importantly, it has been a catalyst to the creation of multinational information-based relationships and collaboration.  Since APAN’s operational capabilities and information are entirely unclassified, they are available to government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are important as participants in complex humanitarian emergencies and as partners in any combined military effort.  After 11 September, APAN began a commercially secured Web site for Hawaii’s Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) effort, a multi-agency effort comprising 17 federal state and local agencies in Hawaii responsible for critical infrastructure.  APAN is working with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a similar commercially secured operational network capability for multinational collaboration in the Northwest Pacific and with the Department of State for similar collaborative sites to support ASEAN Regional Forum Confidence-Building Measures in Counter-Terrorism and possibly Maritime Security.  Part of the international experience of 11 September has been overcoming resistance to new operating methods and information-based relationships.  APAN has encouraged regional countries and United Nations organizations and NGOs to use and contribute to building experience in network centric operations that will pay off in future multinational force operations.

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Program

The MPAT Program, also funded through APRI, brings together expert military planners from nations with Asia-Pacific interests that can rapidly augment a multinational force headquarters.  Using standardized skills, they would plan and execute coalition operations in response to small-scale contingencies in the region.  Through a series of workshops and planning exercises, MPAT members have developed a knowledge base of the various national crisis-action-planning procedures in the Asia-Pacific region and strong working relationships with each other.  MPAT members have also begun developing common crisis-action planning procedures that any lead nation could use during a crisis.

We have successfully completed three MPAT workshops each involving over 25 countries, co-hosted by the Philippines, Thailand, and Korea respectively.  We have also completed six concept and standard operating procedures (SOP) workshops.  The strength of the MPAT program lies in its ability to foster the development of a consensus on multinational responses to crises in a region with only a strong bilateral tradition.

The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE)

COE plays an important role in our pursuit of key strategic objectives in USPACOM.  COE engages countries in the Asia-Pacific region, builds burden-sharing relationships among our friends and allies, and prepares U.S. forces to perform effectively in complex contingencies.  COE’s mission in disaster management, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations offers a low profile tool to engage civilian and military communities throughout the theater that might otherwise be hesitant to work with us.  COE’s support of our peace operations capacity building efforts in the Asia-Pacific region have helped improve capabilities in the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Malaysia.  Finally, by promoting broader collaboration among non-traditional partners, COE contributes to the creation of an environment less hospitable to terrorism.




The war on terrorism along with ongoing commitments throughout the Asia-Pacific region place heavy pressures on our troops and their families.  It is especially important today, that our young men and women in uniform feel the support of our country.  The quality of life (QoL) initiatives included in the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act are welcome and let our people know their elected representatives value their hard work and sacrifices.

     Thank you for supporting the Administration’s request for the largest pay raise in two decades.  Competitive pay is essential to attract and retain the highly skilled personnel critical to our national defense.

     There are areas where compensation has failed to keep up with the times.  For example, most American families today own two cars for parents’ jobs, school, and children's extracurricular activities.  This is a necessity, not a luxury.  At present, our military families are only allowed to transport one vehicle when transferred to and from overseas duty stations in the United States.  Developing programs to meet the needs of today’s military families will go a long way toward improving retention.

Another much-needed improvement is reducing Permanent Change of Station (PCS) out of pocket expenses.  We calculate the average military family pays $1700 above reimbursements when moving to Hawaii.  Legislation like that in the FY02 Defense Authorization Act, to increase partial reimbursement of mandatory pet quarantine fees incurred by members transferred to various overseas locations within and outside the United States, helps reduce this financial burden.  The removal of entitlement limits that previously excluded junior personnel from receiving proper reimbursement for expenses incurred during their first PCS move is also a standout.  Even a seemingly small gesture, like helping our volunteer Reserve or Guard members deal with excess accrued leave as they move from hot spot to hot spot, sends a message that we care.

In past conflicts, Reserve Component (RC) personnel have mobilized to serve in and around combat zones.  For the war on terrorism, we have mobilized thousands of reservists and guardsmen to protect our military bases and civilian facilities like airports.  The President has clearly stated that the war on terrorism will continue for years.  RC support will be a vital part of the war effort.  In USPACOM, our reservists have done a magnificent job.  The flexibility and support of their employers has been a key element of this successful mobilization. 

We need to reexamine RC polices and programs to sustain the war on terrorism over the long term.  Cold War-era regulations and public laws still sometimes prevent RCs from providing the responsive and flexible capability they are so eager to deliver. 

I applaud the efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff to push for improvements to law, policy, and regulations.  I support ways not only to increase funding but also to modernize the rules that govern RC support.  To do this, we need more full-time support to perform tasks like managing manning documents, pre-screening medical records before recall, and providing support at the locations where the RC personnel are frequently mobilized.

While we are fortunate to have many eager and talented volunteers willing to make sacrifices to serve their country in times of crisis, I am concerned about the long-term impact of reliance on recalled reserve augmentation forces.  Given the nature of our protracted war on terrorism, we need to take a hard look at active duty force levels required in the next 5-10 years to combat terrorism, because now is the time to make recruitment and force authorization adjustments.

State of Housing, Family Support

Military family housing remains one of our top QOL priorities. We are working to replace or renovate substandard military family housing by 2007.  Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) will meet this goal with their current master plans and programs.  We must continue to restore and increase funding to ensure that our military family housing is safe, modern, and secure.  Congressional efforts last year resulted in a welcome and much needed increase in attention to overseas MILCON in USPACOM.  I applaud your efforts to fix the grossly inadequate housing in Korea and other deficiencies throughout the AOR.  There is still so much to do.

     People are our most important resource.  Recognition, adequate compensation, and housing are the foundation of a decent quality of life for our people and their families.

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Funding


The second important component of readiness is sufficient operations and maintenance funding for training and maintaining equipment. 

Last year I testified that with regard to our funding for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) “news is not positive” and, “accordingly the readiness of our component commands is not expected to reflect any significant increase this fiscal year.”  I am happy to report this year, due to supplemental funding, our readiness picture is more optimistic. 

Funding for training and maintenance across Service components has been adequate to keep units trained and their equipment in good repair.  This readiness was proved in combat as USPACOM carrier battlegroups (CVBGs), amphibious ready groups (ARGs), and marine expeditionary units (MEUs) deployed on short notice to Afghanistan and were effective in combat immediately.

Let me highlight my current readiness concerns.

Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)

Ongoing support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) has significantly reduced the already limited worldwide stocks of precision munitions across all services, especially the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).  The President’s FY03 budget request contains aggressive programs to restore inventories to adequate levels.  Sustained funding to restore/increase PGMs stockage levels to support the spectrum of military operations – counter-terrorism (CT) operations, small-scale contingencies (SSCs), major theater wars (MTWs), training/testing expenditures, theater positioning and combat-sustainment requirements – must remain a priority.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Aircraft

Our AOR requires more ISR aircraft coverage to meet operational demand.  While I cannot provide exact numbers in this forum, our collection rates of required intelligence information is dangerously low.  Recent funding of ISR aircraft as part of the counter-terrorism (CT) supplemental will help, but this projected increase must be realized in increased surveillance units in this theater.  New aircraft must also be developed to replace aging ISR assets.  The projected retirement of aircraft over the out years puts at risk Service commitments to maintain a minimum number of operational ISR aircraft. 

Aircraft Readiness

Mission Capable (MC) rates for Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)/ Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) aircraft and cannibalization of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) aircraft continue to be major readiness concerns in USPACOM.  Availability of repair parts is a significant contributor to aircraft readiness shortfalls.  Although funding for repair parts for Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft has improved in the past two years, shortages still exist, causing cannibalizations on PACAF aircraft and crossdecking/temporary equipment loans in PACFLT.  Of PACAF aircraft tracked from January to December 2001, 80 percent did not meet the aircraft standard for cannibalization rates. 

Infrastructure, Logistics Inventories, and Related Support

The final component of readiness is infrastructure, logistics inventories, and related support.  This component still requires attention.

Facilities: Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM)

The combined effects of aging facilities and years of under funding have produced an enormous backlog of restoration and replacement projects.  The current recapitalization backlog was caused by a combination of factors.  Funding intended for facilities sustainment has often been diverted.  When bases closed in the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii, SRM funds were not redistributed for remaining facilities but were reduced as part of the “peace dividend.”  Rising utility costs and higher costs to accomplish base-operating support by contract further reduced funds available for SRM.  As a result of inadequate funding, bases, camps, posts and stations across the Asia-Pacific region are shabby and deteriorating to a point we can no longer ignore.  Our people deserve much better than this; they deserve to live and work in a quality environment.

At current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) funding levels, the $5.3 billion USPACOM recapitalization backlog will nearly double over the FYDP.  USPACOM requires an additional $8.4 billion over the FYDP to eliminate the backlog and prevent future backlog growth through proper sustainment.

SRM funding shortfalls not only affect quality of life, but also impact readiness, operation plan (OPLAN) execution, retention, and force protection.  Unfunded backlog projects affect OPLAN execution in Korea, Guam and Wake Island.  Without additional funding, recapitalization backlogs will continue to grow if we do not realign or close any installations or facilities, and will further deteriorate, jeopardizing critical functions throughout USPACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).

New Pacific Command Headquarters

Construction on the Nimitz-MacArthur Pacific Command Center at Camp Smith is underway and going vertical.  Completion is scheduled for December 2003.  We appreciate the restoration of $3 million included in the FY02 MILCON Appropriations Act to fund critical design elements, including antiterrorism force protection (ATFP) and information security requirements.  Unfortunately, this funding was reduced by over $400,000 due to an across-the-board reduction of all FY02 MILCON funding, creating an unexpected shortfall just as critical ATFP and information technology security requirements are being addressed.

Pacific Security Analysis Complex (PSAC) MILCON04

USPACOM needs a single shared intelligence complex on Oahu, Hawaii, that optimizes the missions and operations of both Kunia Regional Security Operations Center (KRSOC) and the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC).  The current KRSOC is obsolete.  The facility was built in 1945, and the last major renovation occurred in 1979.  Current estimates for necessary renovations to ensure a 30-year continued use exceed $185 million, with annual operating costs of approximately $8 million.  Construction costs for a new KRSOC facility, incorporating Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA) Pearl Harbor and NCPAC, are currently estimated at $220 million, with annual operating costs of $6 million.  Additional savings in renovation costs to NSGA Pearl Harbor and NCPAC are estimated at $9 million.  Thus, it would be less costly in the long term to build the new facility.

The JICPAC theater intelligence production facility has force protection vulnerabilities due to its location on a main civilian thoroughfare.  Co-locating with KRSOC would lead to savings of roughly $30 million over 4 years in JICPAC operating costs, and enhance fusion of all-source intelligence.  The PSAC presents an unprecedented opportunity for immediate in-depth collaboration between the premier signals intelligence and production centers.

USPACOM Simulation Center MILCON04

Increasing exercise activity, training complexities, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) modernization have outgrown USPACOM's exercise simulation infrastructure and support capabilities.   This deficiency significantly reduces the ability to train USCINCPAC and Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders in crisis action readiness procedures; degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with friends in the region; and contributes to increased operating tempo (OPTEMPO), training time and associated costs for USPACOM forces before responding to contingencies.  The current facility does not support future technologies or meet force-protection requirements.   The planned state-of-the-art simulation center will link with simulation centers throughout the Asia-Pacific region to train joint integrated forces, rehearse mission requirements, provide commanders with quick-reaction combat analyses, and exploit information from open sources.   It will transform USPACOM through the use of advanced simulations, collaborative tools, and C4I systems in joint experiments.

Wake Island Airfield Funding

Wake Island remains critical for support of strategic deployment of forces for major theater wars (MTWs).  The funding in the Air Force program is the first year of a multi-year program that must be maintained to ensure availability of this critical asset to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Mobility Infrastructure and Strategic Lift (C-17/C-5) Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program

USPACOM depends on continued funding of the programmed C-17 aircraft buy and the C-5 aircraft Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program and Avionics Modernization Program.  Equally important are our efforts to exploit advanced sealift technology to reduce our dependency on premium airlift.  Over the past year, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has been testing and evaluating off-island deployments using a leased High Speed Vessel (HSV).  Initial analysis of the HSV suggests considerable cost savings while significantly reducing in-transit deployment time for Marine forces.  Based on these encouraging initial returns, we are pursuing the HSV as a theater-lift asset in USPACOM.

Real world operations in other theaters are impacting USPACOM’s exercise program.  We are beginning to face regular shortages of airlift and aerial tankage.  This, in turn, makes it more difficult to train soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that we are depending on to execute ongoing operations.  For example, to send the 3rd Wing to Red Flag to prepare them for deployment to Operation Southern Watch, we will need to contract civilian airlift at a cost of approximately $1.1 million.  The original budget was $250,000 using KC-10.   Overall, the PACAF exercise program has been cut $734,000 and the JCS exercise program was cut $1.2 million.  Successful achievement of combat readiness training will hinge largely on sufficient funding for exercises.


The events of 11 September have introduced additional requirements on our already heavily tasked national and tactical intelligence systems.  The demand for precise and timely intelligence has never been greater, including in-depth understanding of long-term potential adversaries, regional hotspots, and transnational threats – terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

National and tactical SIGINT systems must be modernized to meet the advances in global telecommunications technology.  National Security Agency (NSA) and Service SIGINT capabilities are key to our daily operations and the execution of OPLANs and contingencies in the USPACOM AOR.  They must be funded to continue modernizing tactical SIGINT collection capabilities against both modernized militaries and terrorists.  Funding is also needed to replace the Kunia Regional Security Operations Center (KRSOC) and accompanying land-based collection architecture.

Our support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has exacerbated our peacetime shortage of intelligence collection aircraft.  While additional aircraft are in the pipeline, we still need more in the inventory to help us reach and maintain our longstanding minimum theater requirements, and we need them soon.  We encourage development of a follow-on to current manned aircraft and await availability of high altitude, long dwell, unmanned aerial vehicles.  We must also upgrade the collection equipment on the aircraft.  This is especially true for SIGINT, where existing collection equipment is ineffective against modern communication technology.  Similar land and maritime collection capabilities also need upgrades.  USPACOM fully supports integrated, joint development of the next generation signals collection tools, along with further consolidation of funding to hasten this event.  Extra aircraft and new collection tools are meaningless, though, if we lack trained personnel to exploit the information.  The existing shortage of linguists has worsened due to the war on terrorism.  We now face regional languages and dialects never considered important before 11 September.

Imagery Analysis

Requirements for imagery continue to grow.  New platforms are producing an increasing flow of data, but our ability to exploit this data has not kept pace.  We are doing well on the Tasking portion of the Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED) of imagery, but insufficient communications and lack of imagery analysts hamper the remaining aspects of the process.  Additional funding is needed to realize the full potential of this intelligence source.  USPACOM still requires a robust theater-level intelligence gathering capability against the entire threat spectrum. 

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4) Capabilities

Information technology (IT) continues to influence warfare at every turn.  C4 is the unsung workhorse of any operation, requiring 24 hours a day/7 days a week reliable, timely and uncorrupted service.  As evidenced by the world’s recent response to terrorist events, the need for information sharing between service, joint, and coalition partners, as well as local, state, and federal organizations, has increased exponentially.  This requirement places a strain on an already antiquated and stressed communications network.  Since C4 encompasses a wide spectrum, I will focus on three primary areas of continued need: 1) an end-to-end communications infrastructure, 2) information assurance, and 3) interoperability.

First, the end-to-end communications enterprise provides the foundation to electronically link garrison and forward-deployed forces to commanders at all levels.  USPACOM’s vast AOR, mostly separated by ocean and encompassing countries with under-developed C4 infrastructures, requires forces to rely heavily on satellite communications (SATCOM).  We continue to make great strides in many of the SATCOM programs and I thank you for your continued support.  However, aging equipment and specifically, limited Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM capacity over this AOR, is fast becoming a factor in my ability to command and control forces.  With the recent terrorist attacks and our ongoing efforts to root out terrorism as a whole, SATCOM connectivity to our highly specialized forces is more critical than ever before.  The new challenge is to ensure that critical SATCOM upgrades, the fielding of new satellite programs, and the launching of new satellites remain on track to replace the aging fleets currently orbiting the earth in support of warfighters.

As an inseparable partner with the space segment, we must inject similar technology advances into the base, post, camp, and station infrastructures.  In the Pacific Theater, we still operate on cables and wiring installed as far back as the 1960s.  These cables are no longer dependable.  Coupling this condition with the ever-increasing user requirements for more and more information, we must quickly modernize to support the growing bandwidth and increased speed requirements of our intelligence gatherers, planners and warfighters.  Information is truly a force multiplier.

Our second focus area is information assurance (IA).  How we protect our sensitive information from potential adversaries while providing access to, and sharing it with, our coalition partners is probably the toughest challenge we face in today’s C4 environment.

Although we have made significant strides to improve IA in USPACOM, we are far from 100 percent protected.  Cyber warfare never rests.  Our USPACOM networks continue to receive daily cyber probes and potentially dangerous virus and hacker attacks.  They can occur at any time and any place in the theater and the consequences can be severe, if we are not on guard around the clock.  The payback for IA is not always as easily recognizable as with the production of new airplanes, ships, or tanks.  You cannot touch and feel information protection, but a loss of critical or time-sensitive information, or a denial of service, can be far more detrimental to national security than any single weapon system.  An example of the heavy IA investment needed for additional hardware is the protection afforded by current cryptographic equipment to secure networks for command and control of daily operations.  Replacement parts for this aging equipment are difficult to obtain - a limiting factor as technology increases the speed, connectivity, and capacity of our networks.  Cryptographic modernization programs are essential to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. Government cryptographic inventory.  For example, airline flight schedules and blueprints of our embassies are simply tidbits of information.  But, that information in the wrong hands may improve the enemies’ chances of producing devastating results as evidenced by recent terrorist incidents.

Ongoing IA improvements will require a continued heavy investment in equipment, training and technically skilled people.  I ask for your support as we strive to implement a “defense in depth” posture into our daily information operations.

The third C4 area is interoperability.  The events of 11 September have caused us to concentrate hard on interoperability, especially with civilian and coalition partners in support of global counter-terrorism efforts.  We must reassess our processes in these areas.

I firmly believe we must revamp our acquisition system, especially in the area of IT.  Long-term replacement programs are detached at an early stage from the dynamic reality of operations and warfare.  They emerge decades later with new systems that are better than what they replace, but not as good as what they could or should be in meeting the needs of the warfighter.

Our system does not put engineers together with the operators to fix real operational problems, deal with real war plan deficiencies and emerging threats, or take advantage of real opportunities.  The current system, which drives the actions of the detached bureaucracy of requirements writers, contracting officers and program managers, is only tenuously connected to what our forces need to operate and fight better.

We must integrate the engineers with the operators in a spiral development approach in which we build a little, test a little, and then build a little more.  Let them see firsthand the interoperability problems that exist between civilian, joint and coalition organizations.  For example, our Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders use service variants of our Global Command and Control System (GCCS), because the joint version is not as capable as the service variant and is not fully fielded across the theater.  As another example, the land mobile radio systems that our police and fire departments use are not interoperable with our military systems.  These incompatibilities prevent key personnel from sharing critical information in a timely fashion, and could easily lead to catastrophic results.

We can address many of these interoperability issues by using this spiral development approach, and putting engineers in the field during joint exercises, training maneuvers and technology demonstrations.  Initially, this approach comes with an increased cost until we can identify capabilities in programs that we do not need.  But the timely and increased operational capabilities provided to the warfighter as result of it more than justify the initial expense.

Maintaining our leading edge in C4 technology, assuring our critical information and improving interoperability with our coalition partners are essential to protecting American security interests in the 21st century.  Our command is working hard to mitigate these limitations; however, we need increased C4 funding to maintain the operational edge over our adversaries.

Multiple Theater War Sustainment Issues (Harvest Eagle, APS-4)

Refurbishment and reconstitution of Air Force Harvest Eagle bare base assets are key to both current operations plans (OPLANs) and USPACOM operations in support of the global war on terrorism.  Harvest Eagle’s tent-based housing modules allow forward-deployed or reinforcing units to establish airfield operations where local infrastructure is austere or lacking.  Degraded before their use in current operations, our deployable bare-base assets capacity will continue to be a limiting factor to executing OPLANs and contingencies without fully funding refurbishment and reconstitution.

Shortfalls in pre-positioned equipment and supplies to support combat operations in the Korean Theater of Operations are also of major concern.  The Army maintains a strategic inventory of sustainment supplies as part of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS).  These stocks sustain forward-deployed and initial follow-on ground forces, and include major end items such as engines, repair parts, medical supplies, packaged petroleum products, barrier/construction materials, operations rations, and clothing required to sustain combat operations.

Additionally, we have significant shortfalls in Army APS-4 Sustainment Stocks designated to replace projected combat losses, especially critical during the early stages of a major theater war (MTW) on the Korean Peninsula.  Within these sustainment stocks, Class VII (Major End Items) and Class IX (Repair Parts) have the most serious shortfalls.  Finally, less than 30 percent of Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology chemical protection suits (to support operations in a nuclear, chemical, biological environment) are available in sustainment stocks.  The combination of these shortfalls degrades our ability to conduct sustained combat operations on the Korean Peninsula.


Our enemies and potential enemies are working hard to develop ways to defeat the U.S. Armed Forces.  We cannot allow our current military dominance to lead to complacency and future defeat.  Force transformation is a priority at USPACOM.  We have made rapid progress over the past year in developing Joint Mission Force capabilities, in our Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and in aligning force transformation with our Joint Training and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plans.  Experimenting as we exercise and operate is becoming routine.  Individual commanders are also making advances through their own initiatives, with service and USPACOM support.  Examples include the High Speed Vessel (HSV) that Marine forces on Okinawa have leased to make movement within the theater faster at less expense and the development of numerous networking and decision support capabilities.  We continue to work closely with U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the executive agent for joint force experimentation, and are increasing the involvement of allies and coalition partners to enhance interoperability and combined force capabilities as we transform U.S. forces. 

Joint Mission Force (JMF) Objectives

The objectives of USPACOM’s JMF concept are to enhance the speed of action, precision, and mission effectiveness of Theater Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Our vision is to create a seamless Joint/Combined Pacific Theater response force capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions, from a complex contingency through humanitarian assistance (HA), and serving as the leading edge during a major war.  This transformation effort has moved from its concept development in war games to implementation in exercises that enhance our ability to rapidly form and deploy a JTF. 

Through the JMF concept, Battle Staff Rosters supported by service components now provide tailored on-call augmentation for key billets at USPACOM’s designated JTF headquarters.  These staffs are trained to provide the performance of a Standing JTF Headquarters, without incurring the overhead of a separate organization.  Command relationships for designated JTF and component commands are already established and rehearsed to enable rapid activation and deployment.

Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) baseline requirements have also been established and are routinely tested in our command and control exercise program to ensure our ability to establish a common operating picture and theater network for collaborative planning.  Our JTFs now use newly published CD-ROM based and Web-accessible standard operating procedures (SOPs) internally linked with checklists and templates.  Information management serves as the foundation for the SOP, and is supported by a standardized JTF Web site that facilitates Web-centric information pull.  Our primary JTFs now train to assigned missions with packaged, mission-oriented training standards, including new tasks designed to examine draft doctrine linked to technology, for integrated and synchronized fires and maneuver. 

The current focus for transforming JTF capabilities are in the areas of joint fire and maneuver, battle space situational awareness and the common operational and tactical pictures, coalition force integration, force protection, and rapid JTF formation. 

Based on 3 years of development, the JMF concept is our prototype standing JTF Headquarters.  JMF provides greater flexibility for multiple crises, capitalizes on component core competencies, requires no additional manpower, and allows for normal service rotations and deployments.

During Exercise KERNEL BLITZ (EXPERIMENTAL) in June 2001, we demonstrated Wide Area Relay Network (WARNET) technologies in the Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) ACTD.  Our follow-on JTF WARNET initiative will provide our JTFs with organic, wireless, and secure connectivity for planning and execution at the tactical level.  The JTF WARNET communications network, associated applications, and interfaces support joint forces across a widely distributed battlespace to provide real-time and near real-time command and control (C2), collaboration, common tactical picture and joint fires across service boundaries.  Under the technical leadership of the Office of Naval Research with substantial funding support from OSD, JTF WARNET development continues for prototype deployment with operational forces in 2004.

Coalition Involvement in Joint Mission Force (JMF) Efforts

Our JMF concept is an essential part of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC).  To improve regional readiness for coalition operations, we are developing a Multinational Force (MNF) SOP tailored from the JTF SOP we built last year.  This more generic document will include broad operational considerations that our multinational partners can readily implement when one acts as the lead nation with the United States serving in a support role.  The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) serves as the instrument for MNF SOP development.  The MPAT conducts collaborative development of the document over the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) and at workshops in the region.  Joint Experimentation with coalition partners is coordinated in bilateral venues such as the Annual Staff Talks with Singapore and Australia.  This spring, USPACOM will fully involve coalition partners by hosting a Coalition Transformation Workshop as part of our annual ACTD conference.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Joint Experimentation Program (JEP)

Our JTFJEP focuses on transforming JTF operations and is fully coordinated with the JEP of USJFCOM.  Our JTFJEP includes technology insertion experiments during exercises to advance our practice of JTF operations, both in the U.S. and coalition venues. 

This year we have planned two major experiments.  The first experiment will occur as part of our command and control exercise (C2X) series where we train for rapid formation of a JTF.  Our C2Xs over the past year made significant advances in sharing common procedures and a common operational picture (COP) among JTF subordinate commanders, and in collaborative planning.  We will experiment next with advanced capabilities to manage and control information flow on the JTF networks, and incorporate advanced fires management capabilities.  Our second experiment will be in a coalition environment during Exercise COBRA GOLD with Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia.  By experimenting as we exercise, we provide a continuous series of field-tested warfighting improvements in joint and combined operations before we make key procurement decisions.

Advanced Technology Development

I am a strong supporter of USPACOM’s Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).  They provide important near-term joint and combined warfighting capabilities.  Since I last spoke with you, USPACOM has been awarded six new ACTDs, bringing the number of ACTDs involving USPACOM to 18, more than any other major command.  Almost all our service Component Commanders, designated JTF Commanders, Subordinate Unified Commanders, and each of my Staff Directors have responsibility for executing one or more ACTDs.  USPACOM forces are involved in transformation across the theater.

Our six new ACTDs will provide new operational and tactical capabilities.

-        The Micro Air Vehicle ACTD will provide small units enhanced situational awareness using miniaturized sensors on a man-portable unmanned air vehicle. 

-        The Language and Speech Exploitation Resources ACTD will reduce language barriers and improve coalition operations by providing a tool to automatically translate languages. 

-        The Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal - Knowledge Technology Operations Demonstration ACTD will provide Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams in the field with a portable, rapidly updateable, computerized database for safely disarming explosive devices in the field. 

-        The SPARTAN ACTD will provide enhanced battlespace awareness and increased force protection for surface and subsurface operations, by demonstrating the capabilities of unmanned surface vessels with modular sensor packages.  SPARTAN is also the leading candidate for an improved TSC initiative involving co-development of advanced capabilities with coalition partners.  The Singapore Armed Forces are interested in co-developing this system with us. 

-        The Thermobaric Weapon ACTD provides a standoff weapon for attacking tunnels and underground facilities.  This program potentially provides two to three times the lethality over currently fielded penetrating weapons. 

-        The Signals Intelligence Processing ACTD provides improved capabilities to collect and process signals.

Coalition Theater Logistics

In parallel with transforming our forces, we must also bring along coalition partners.  Last year, I testified that, thanks to your strong support, we were starting work on our Coalition Theater Logistics ACTD. 

This is an important initiative, co-sponsored by Australia, to demonstrate how coalition logistics information can be exchanged at the national, operational and tactical levels.  Over the last year, we’ve finalized operational requirements; signed a project arrangement with Australia that leverages technology from both countries, and embarked on a technical development program that puts us on the brink of providing a coalition force with a breakthrough capability - plan and execute coalition force deployment through selective information exchange between existing national logistics information systems.  Continued support will ensure that we achieve all our objectives. 

We have also partnered with Thailand and are beginning discussions with Singapore, Korea, and Japan to partner with them during future phases of ACTD development.  In parallel with transforming our forces, we must also bring along coalition partners.

Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID)

USPACOM is the designated-host Commander in Chief for the FY02 and FY03 execution of the Joint Staff J6I-sponsored JWID.  Despite numerous other interoperability and transformation initiatives in progress, JWID has exceptional potential to address the real and near-term command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) interoperability challenges facing joint and coalition operations.  Working with the U.S. Marine Corps, this year’s lead service, USPACOM has broadened the scope of challenges being investigated, focused the operational environment underpinning JWID to simulate demands of current military operations, expanded the list of countries participating to include Pacific Rim countries for the first time, and introduced warfighter rigor in executing the demonstration period and assessment of proposed technology solutions.

U.S. industry and government activities have responded to the call for interoperability solutions that span the C2 spectrum from strategic to tactical and that embrace new approaches to challenges in the situational awareness, common operating picture, decision support, collaboration, logistics, multi-lingual, joint and coalition fires, multi-level security, and medical arenas.  For the first time, there will be incipient focus on support for humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief enablers.  Due to success in our JMF program, USPACOM has introduced a Combined Task Force Web-portal interface for organizing, visualizing, and transferring the products produced by various JWID demonstrations and interoperability trials.

We have also made a concerted effort to enhance the understanding and participation by other Commanders in Chief to ensure that the results from JWID will deliver solutions to the C4ISR challenges that each of them confront in routine and contingency operations.

Multi-Domain Dissemination System (MDDS)

An unresolved challenge of furthering coalition readiness in the Pacific is the problem of multi-level security.  Our intelligence-sharing relationships with our theater partners vary from country to country.  Therefore, completely separate structures for passing classified information are required to interoperate with each individual country.  To meet this requirement, developing and accrediting multi-level security technology, such as the MDDS, remain a high-interest item in USPACOM.  Such technology and capability is imperative toward fully realizing our engagement strategy for any Pacific coalition force.


In summary, the forward deployed and forward-stationed forces of the U.S. Pacific Command are making a difference in promoting American interests in security and peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region.  We are relentlessly pursuing terrorists that threaten American citizens and interests.  With a sustained effort and support of regional partners, we will succeed in rooting them out.  U.S. Pacific Command’s priorities remain readiness, regional (theater) security cooperation, and transforming U.S. forces to achieve a revolution in military affairs.  The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command appreciate this opportunity to tell their story and the support that you give them.

 [c1]OSD/ISA/AP (LTC Kim, 703-695-1190) change/deletion.  Rationale: ““All three countries consider support for OEF to be a sensitive issue that should not be discussed openly.”


 [c2]OSD/ISA/AP (LTC Kim, 703-695-1190) deletion.  Rationale: “Mentioning Thailand’s FMF in this sentence as a response to FY02 FMF request gives false impression that State Dept. approved the request.  FMF was restored after CINCPAC made a direct appeal to the SAC.  This statement may not be well received by State Dept.  In addition, it is ISA/AP’s understanding that the actual amount was $2.3M, not $1.3M.”