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No. 28 (15 February 1995)

In this Issue:


The Director of Naval Intelligence warned last May that "theoverall technical threat and lethality of arms still being exportedhave never been higher." Surplus arms production here and abroadhas crea ted a buyers' market, allowing customers to demand andreceive top-of-the-line systems previously off limits~such as F-15Eand Tu-22M `Backfire' bombers, modern diesel submarines and super-sonic, sea-skimming anti-ship missiles.

In the past, for security and arms control reasons, the UnitedStates generally exported older, less capable systems, a generationremoved from those used by U.S. forces. Now, domestic econom-ic/political considerations increasingly drive modern weapons ontothe market.

In some c ases, policymakers use exports to maintain productionlines of very sophisticated weapons which the Pentagon is finishedbuying (see next page). The dangers of such exports~arms races andwarfare abroad~are overlooked to maintain jobs and (excess) arms-indus trial capacity here. In other cases, policymakers sell newweapons abroad to lower procurement costs for U.S. forces.

At the same time, however, defense and intelligence officialsrepeatedly cite weapons proliferation as a threat to U.S. security(see p. 3). And, completing the circle, the military services andindustry now justify development and production of next-generationweapons on the basis of arms being acquired by Third World nations,including U.S. systems. In lobbying Congress for production funds for its F-22 fighter, Lockheed cites the widespread proliferationof very capable combat aircraft, like the Russian MiG-29 and theAmerican-made F-15 and F-16.

Negotiated arms export controls among the handful of majorproducers would provide an alternativ e to the ceaseless spiral ofhigher tech armament here and abroad. Unfortunately, the ClintonAdministration's (still) on-going review of conventional armsexport policy appears unlikely to call for multilateral exportrestrictions of weaponry deemed dangerou s and destabilizing.


U.S. law prohibits the transfer of nuclear, biological andchemical weapons, but only a few types of "conventional" weaponsare barred. There is no master list of weapons which the U.S.government will not ex port. Rather, the question is considered onan ad hoc basis, as sales are proposed either by the buyer or thearms manufacturer. The government's decision is based on aninteragency review and the policy criteria for the particularcountry or region under con sideration. Following are the fewweapon-specific export restrictions which are mandated inlegislation, regulations or policy.

---Ballistic/Cruise Missiles Amendments in 1990 to the Arms ExportControl Act and the Export Administration Act prohibit exp orts ofballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 300 km and a payloadof 500 kg or more to any country which is not an adherent to theMissile Technology Control Regime. With the exception of on-goingsales of submarine-launched ICBMs to Britain, the Uni ted States hasunilaterally refrained from exporting all ballistic missiles since1975.

---Anti-personnel Landmines Congress imposed a one-year,unilateral moratorium on U.S. exports of anti-personnel landminesin the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorizatio n Act. The followingyear, Congress extended the moratorium for three more years.

---Stinger Missiles Since 1987, annual foreign aid appropriationshave restricted sales of shoulder-launched Stinger anti-aircraftmissiles to all countries adjacent to the Persian Gulf, exceptBahrain. The President may waive the restriction if no other"appropriate" U.S. missile is available; if the missiles are neededto counter an immediate threat; or, if the missiles would protectU.S. personnel or facilities. The Presiden t has approved Stingersfor Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

---Napalm According to the Security Assistance ManagementManual~the Defense Security Assistance Agency's how-to manual forgovernment-to-government Foreign Military Sales~napalm, as well asnapalm thicke ners, dispensers and fuses "will not be providedthrough FMS [Foreign Military Sales] or on a commercial basis. Thegovernment "generally discourages" sales of incendiary items andriot control agents.

---DU Ammunition Until recently, depleted uranium (D U) tankammunition could be exported only to NATO and "major non-NATO"allies. Since 1988, annual foreign aid appropriations billsspecifically restricted sales to Persian Gulf countries. In July1994, however, President Clinton waived the prohibition for Sau diArabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, proclaiming that "it is in [U.S.]national security interests" to sell these countries DU ammunitionfor U.S.-supplied M-1A2 and M-60 tanks.


The following U.S. production lines are now o r will soon beproducing military equipment solely for export.

F-15E `Strike Eagle' fighter-bomber (McDonnell Douglas Aerospace,St. Louis, MO) The U.S. Air Force and McDonnell Douglas failed toget a three-year purchase of 18 F-15Es included in the f iscal year1996 budget. Planes for Saudi Arabia, now being built, and forIsrael will keep the St. Louis line busy until 1999.

F-16 `Fighting Falcon' fighter jet (Lockheed Fort Worth, FortWorth, TX) Lockheed is finishing some old Pentagon orders, but t heline will soon be open for export only. 1,686 F-16s have been soldabroad, with 554 yet to be delivered as of 30 September 1993. Usersinclude Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia,Israel, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakis tan,Portugal, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.

M-1A2 `Abrams' main battle tank (General Dynamics Land Systems,Sterling Heights, MI and Lima, OH) The Army will spend more than$1.2 billion over the next three years to upgrade M-1 ta nks to theM-1A2 configuration. New tanks are being built for export only:Kuwait has 265 M-1A2s on order and Saudi Arabia 315.

AH-64 `Apache' attack helicopter (McDonnell Douglas HelicopterCompany, Mesa, AZ) Congress bought 6 AH-64As in FY 1995 notrequ ested by the Army, in order to bridge a production gap until`Longbow' upgrades begin. no more significant purchases of newhardware. Users include Egypt, Greece, Israel, South Korea, Kuwait,Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

MIM-107 `Patriot' ai r defense missile (Raytheon Corp., Bedford,MA) The U.S. Army is no longer buying the Patriot. 2,301 have beensold abroad, with 1,356 yet to be delivered as of 30 September1993. Users include Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, SaudiArabia and Taiwan .

MIM-23 `Hawk' air defense missile (Raytheon Corp., Andover, MA) The U.S. Army is no longer buying the Hawk. 6,971 have been soldabroad, with 99 yet to be delivered as of 30 September 1993. Usersinclude Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greec e, Iran,Italy, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway, SaudiArabia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and the UAE.

M-113 armored vehicles (FMC Corporation, San Jose, CA; and GeneralMotors) The U.S. Army plans to upgrade seven M-113 variantsthrough at least 1999. The M-113 production line was restarted in1993 to build armored vehicles for Kuwait. More than 85,000 M-113vehicles were produced between 1960 and 1992. Thirty-five variantsare used by more than forty countries.

Type 209 diesel-electric submarines (Ingalls Shipbuilding,Pascagoula, MS) The U.S. Navy operates only nuclear-powered subma-rines. Egypt wants to buy two German Type 209 diesel-electricsubmarines with U.S. Foreign Military Financing funds. The sale isrestricted to U.S. companie s. Ingalls will establish a productionline under license from the German firm HDW.


To capture recent big-ticket sales of combat aircraft to theMiddle East, American manufacturers (and the U.S. government) u ppedthe technological ante dramatically.

In September 1992, the Bush Administration and Congress ap-proved the export of 48 McDonnell Douglas (MD) F-15E `Strike Ea-gles' to Saudi Arabia. The was the first time the bomber~which candeliver twelve t ons of bombs 1,000 miles~had been exported to anynation. Only two years earlier, the plane was rushed into servicewith the U.S. Air Force (USAF) for the Gulf War, where it was usedon hundreds of deep-strike raids.

The Saudi planes will be less capable than USAF F-15Es: theywill carry less ordnance and will not have AMRAAM or HARM missiles;the radar will have half the channels and a lower resolution.Nevertheless, this was the most sophisticated combat aircraft theUnited States had ever exported...until a year and a half later,when the Clinton Administration and Congress agreed to give Israel21 F-15Es with greater capabilities.

In competition for this $2 billion deal, Lockheed put forwardan "enhanced strategic" version of its popular F-16 fighter. Th e F-16ES would have a reduced radar signature, conformal fuel tanks,internal navigation and targeting gear and an unrefuelled combatrange of 1,000 miles.

Since the U.S. government gave its blessing to exports ofthese advanced aircraft, MD and Lockheed are anticipating furthersales. James Caldwell, who led the "Jobs Now" lobbying campaign insupport of the pioneering Saudi F-15E sale, was promoted lastOctober to Vice President and "General Manager of F-15 New Busi-ness."

MD and Lockheed are now compe ting to provide 20-80 long-rangeattack planes to the United Arab Emirates. (Other contenders arethe French Mirage 2000-5, the British `Tornado' and variants ofRussia's Su-27.) Such a sale could bankroll development of eitherthe next generation F-15 or F-1 6. MD is proposing to sell animproved F-15E with a bigger wing, 40 percent more fuel, internalLANTIRN navigation and targeting equipment, increased weaponscarriage and a reduced radar signature. Lockheed is offering tobuild either the F-16ES, or a plane b ased on the experimental F-16XL. This "stealthy" F-16 would have a large delta wing and nohorizontal tail surfaces.

Clinton Admin. watch


"We also track the proliferation of advanced conventional weaponsand technology , a growing military threat as unprecedented numbersof sophisticated weapons systems are offered for sale on the worldmarket. Especially troubling is the proliferation of technologiesand expertise in areas such as sensors, materials, and propulsionin supp orting the development and modernization of weapons systems.Apart from the capability of some advanced conventional weapons todeliver weapons of mass destruction, such weapons have thepotential to significantly alter military balances, and disruptU.S. mil itary operations and cause significant U.S. casualties."

---R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence before theSenate Select Intelligence Committee, 10 January 1995


"[W]hile we tend to focus on current an d future high technology bigticket items, its important to remember that the world is alreadyawash in weapon systems. These range from the relatively simplesmall arms and mines, to more advanced hand held surface to airmissiles, to increasingly advanced a nti ship cruise missiles. Anycountry with hard currency can and will get these systems. Andwhile they won't lead to military defeat of U.S. forces, theycertainly hold out the prospect of casualties. As we have seen inthe past, this can have both a major i mpact on force planning forpeacekeeping operations and a significant domestic political impacton their conduct."

---Lt.Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of the DefenseIntelligence Agency, before the Senate Select Intel. Committee, 10January 1995


On 23 January President Clinton signed an Executive Order creatinga five-member "Presidential Advisory Board on Arms ProliferationPolicy." Section 1601 of the fiscal year 1994 defense authorizationact ( P.L. 103-160) required the President to establish such a bodyby 15 December 1993.

That law, sponsored by Rep. John Kasich (R-OH), directed thePresident to empanel a commission of independent experts to study"(1) the factors that contribute to the prol iferation of strategicand advanced conventional military weapons ... and (2) the policyoptions that are available to the United States to inhibit suchproliferation." A report from the panel~due by 1 June 1994~ wasintended to facilitate and complement the Administration'sinterminable review of conventional arms transfer policy (see ASMNo. 27 p. 5). The report was to have considered several specificfactors (see box).

In contrast to the law, the January Executive Order merely says the"Board shall advise the President on implementation of UnitedStates conventional arms transfer policy, other issues related toarms proliferation policy, and on other matters deemed appropriateby the President." No specific mention is made of a study, nor ofa due date for a s tudy; the order does say that the Board willterminate 30 days after the President submits a final report of theBoard to Congress.

On 31 January the White House released the names of the advisoryboard members. As had been expected, Janne Nolan, an arms controlexpert at the Brookings Institution, will chair the panel. She willbe joined by Paul Warnke and Ronald Lehman II, both former direc-tors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Carter and BushAdministrations respectively). Other board members a re Edward R.Jayne II, a former McDonnell Douglas Corp. executive, and David E.McGiffert, Undersecretary of the Army from 1965-1969 and AssistantSecretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during theCarter Administration.


In January, Secretary of Defense William Perry met with top offi-cials in Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and India to reaffirm militaryrelations. Assistant Secretary of Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs Joseph Nye and Assistant Secr etary of State RobinL. Raphel accompanied Perry.

While in the Middle East, Perry said that President Clinton willask the Congress to maintain current levels of military andeconomic aid to Israel ($3 billion annually) and to Egypt ($2.1billion annually ) when he sends his fiscal year 1996 budget toCongress in early February.

Asked about recent reports of illegal Israeli transfers of U.S.technology to China, Perry said he had "no basis" to confirm thecharges but said they were being investigated by a joint committeecreated several years ago to handle such issues. Israeli PrimeMinister Yitzhak Rabin pledged to keep U.S. technology secure andadded that Israel was not "stupid enough to risk what we get fromthe United States by even the slightest temptati on to sell some-thing."

Discussions in Pakistan involved peacekeeping issues, undeliveredAmerican F-16 aircraft and the just-revived U.S.-Pakistani Consul-tative Group. The Group has not met since 1990, when most U.S. armssales and military assistance ended (see ASM No. 27 p. 1). TheGroup will handle what Perry called "problems that exist in oursecurity relations"....[N]umber one on that list is going to be theproblem of the F-16s." Secretary Perry said that the U.S. DefenseSecurity Assistance Agency w ill "assist in finding another buyer"for the aircraft.

In India, Secretary Perry and Indian Minister of State for DefenseMallikarjun signed an "agreed minute on defense relations." Thememorandum provides for increased contacts between the two militaryo rganizations as well as joint military training exercises "atprogressively higher levels of scale and sophistication." Finally,the two countries expressed the hope of "expansion of cooperativedefense research and production activities, in accordance with thelaws, policies and agreements of each country" including "mutualprotection of classified information.

Attacks `Pressler Amendment'

Three weeks after visiting Pakistan, Secretary Perry criticized the1985 "Pressler Amendment" as a "blunt instrument" that has failedto restrain nuclear proliferation in south Asia. (The provisionprohibits military aid or arms sales to Pakistan unless thePresident can certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear bomb.)"I saw no evidence that it had increased our influe nce or leveragein Pakistan," Perry told the Foreign Policy Association on 31January. On "the contrary, I saw ample evidence that it hasundermined the influence we formerly had there." Perry said that"the weakening of Pakistan's conventional forces which r esultedfrom this amendment has led Pakistani leaders to conclude that anuclear capability is even more important to maintaining thesecurity of their country." Sanctions like the Pressler Amendment"could even help push them into an unfettered arms race," s aidPerry. (The close U.S. military relationship with Pakistan prior tothe invocation of the amendment in 1990 was also intended to, andfailed to, dissuade Pakistani officials from building a nuclearbomb.)


In mid-January the Justice Department declassified its latestinvestigation into alleged U.S. military support for Iraq duringthe 1980s (see ASM No. 22 p. 2).

Investigators found no evidence "that U.S. agencies or officialsillegally armed Iraq or that crimes were committed through barter-ing of CCC commodities for military equipment." Official U.S.policy at the time permitted exports of most dual-use items, whilebarring exports of military equipment (with the exception of com-munications equipment and a single pistol for Saddam Hussein).According to the report, the Reagan Administration repeatedlyconsidered increasing military aid to Iraq for its war with Iran,but Iraqi requests for U.S. military equipment were turned down in1986, 1987 and 1988.

J ustice Department investigators "produced no evidence of weaponstransfers to Iraq by or on behalf of the CIA." However, the CIA wasunable to produce some relevant records, due to hyper-compartment-alization of data. According to the report, "In one instan ce, ittook the CIA two months to identify the intended recipient countryof weapons shipped at the CIA's request."

Around the same time the Justice Department absolved the governmentof any wrong-doing, a former National Security Council officialfiled a n affidavit in a Florida lawsuit asserting that the CIAsecretly facilitated the sale of cluster bombs by Chilean armsmanufacturer Carlos Cardoen to Iraq in the mid-1980s (see box p. 5and New York Times 5 February 1995).

Source: "BNL Taskforce~Final Rep ort" and "Addendum", report to theAttorney General, Department of Justice, dated 21 October 1994,released publicly 17 January 1995


In December the Commerce Department enacted regulations requirin gU.S. companies to report annually on offset agreements associatedwith military sales (see ASM No. 18 p. 2).

Offsets are side agreements which sweeten arms deals forpurchasers. They typically include coproduction or licensedproduction of U.S. weapon s ystems, foreign subcontracting, overseasinvestment, technology transfer, countertrade, and/or buybackarrangements.

Congress established the reporting requirement in the DefenseProduction Act Amendments of 1992 in order to assess the impact ofoffsets o n U.S. employment, trade, industrial competitiveness andmilitary preparedness. Arms manufacturers opposed the law; publica-tion of information on offsets undermines industry's claims aboutthe economic benefits of arms sales.

The new regulations (effect ive 2 December 1994) require industry toprovide the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration(BXA) with certain information on offset deals worth $5 million ormore. Offsets entered into during the preceding year must bereported to BXA by 15 Ju ne. (Initial reports for 1993 are due by 15March 1995.) The rule, which will primarily affect large contrac-tors, is not expected to pose a heavy burden, since firms engagedin offsets must already prepare periodic reports on theirfulfillment.

Based on industry's submissions, Commerce will then prepare anannual (publicly-available) report to Congress on the effects ofoffsets. The regulations prohibit BXA from releasing disaggregatedinformation on offsets to the public unless the company providingthe in formation specifically authorizes the release. Commerce willsend the first report, covering offsets during 1993-1994, to Con-gress in December 1995.

Meanwhile, the State Department has still not drafted regulationsto implement a related measure enacted into law last April (see ASMNo. 26 p. 6). That law requires companies to inform Congress ofoffsets under negotiation at the time Congress is notified ofproposed Foreign Military Sales or commercial sales licenses.

Source: Federal Register, 2 December 1994 pp. 61796-8


Lockheed pleads guilty to Egyptian bribery

In January, Lockheed copped a guilty plea and agreed to a fine ofnearly $25 million for violating the 1977 Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct. A federal grand jury in Atlanta ind icted Lockheed AeronauticalSystems Company and two company executives in June 1994 for givinga $1 million bribe to an Egyptian parliamentarian in 1989. Thebribe was an effort to influence the $79 million sale of three C-130 transport planes. Lockheed init ially denied any wrongdoing andsaid it would "vigorously defend itself against the charges."Following the indictment, the State Department announced it woulddeny arms export licenses to Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company.Exceptions to this policy may b e made "on a case-by-case basis," at the discretion of the Office of Defense Trade Controls. The banwill not affect other Lockheed divisions, such as Lockheed FortWorth, which manufactures the ubiquitous F-16 fighter.

Sources: Federal Register 12 Octobe r 1994, p. 51653-4; Wall StreetJournal, 20 January 1995

G.E. pleads guilty to Egyptian bribery

In the 1980s, General Electric's radar division paid a $2.75million bribe to an Egyptian middleman in order win a $124 millionradar sale. GE used Foreign Military Financing ~U.S. taxpayerfunds~provided to Egypt to make the bribe.

On 23 December, the Justice Department fined Martin Marietta, whichbought the GE division in 1993, $5.87 million for the offense.Former GE engineer, Zia Hak brought the case up under the FalseClaims Act. Hak will receive 15-25 percent of the fine received.

Sources: Baltimore Sun, 24 December 1994, p. C16; Washington Post,28 December 1994, p. F2

Teledyne fined for illegal exports

In January, Teledyne Inc., which has pa id more than $145 million infines, penalties and other settlements for illegal businesspractices, pleaded guilty and agreed to a fine of $13 million forexporting zirconium to Chile in violation of the Arms ExportControl Act. In May 1993 and July 1994, gra nd juries in Miami andWashington, respectively, indicted Teledyne on charges that thecompany sold 130 tons of zirconium to Industrias Cardoen between1982 and 1989. The zirconium was used in the production of 24,000cluster bombs, 10,000 of which Cardoen ex ported to Iraq. Teledynemaintains that the government was aware, and tacitly approved ofits actions.

Sources: Washington Post & Los Angeles Times, 27 January 1995

New Legislation Introduced

CODE OF CONDUCT At a Capitol Hill press conference on 1February, a half dozen legislators gathered to introduce the "Codeof Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1995" (S.326/H.R.772). Thebill, introduced by Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and Sen. MarkHatf ield (R-OR), is nearly identical to a bill they introduced lastCongress. The measure would prohibit U.S. arms exports to anycountry that is undemocratic, abuses human rights, is engaged inaggression, or does not participate in the U.N. Register of Conven- tional Arms. The act contains a Presidential exemption, but Con-gress must pass a law accepting the waiver before exports may bemade.

The bill already has 80 cosponsors in the House of Representatives.Two of the cosponsors~Rep. Sam Farr (D-CA) and Jerr old Nadler (D-NY)~joined Rep. McKinney in introducing the measure. Senators ByronDorgan (D-ND) and Dale Bumpers (D-AK) were also present for thekick-off. Each of the Members made impassioned statements about theimpact of arms exports, the commercializatio n of the trade and thefact that U.S. taxpayers are increasingly being asked to subsidizeexports.

Senator Hatfield, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,said the Congress has a choice between "life destroying or lifeenhancing policies." "We must address the moral, as well as theeconomic and political issues," he said. He intends to bring thelegislation up for a floor vote this year.

EAA REWRITE On 4 January Toby Roth (R-WI), Chairman of the HouseInternational Relations Subcommittee on International EconomicPolicy and Trade, introduced H.R.361, the Export Administration Actof 1995. The bill, which is similar to H.R.3412 which Roth intro-duced last year, would rewrite the 1979 Export Administration Act(EAA) governing "dual-use" exports ( technologies with civilian aswell as military applications).

The Subcommittee appears eager to pass the bill, which will easecontrols on dual-use exports. Ranking minority member Sam Gejdenson(D-CT), called Roth's new bill "well balanced and reasoned." ButGejdenson, the only member to raise national security concerns,added, almost as a disclaimer, that liberalizing the EAA may harmU.S. national security.

With the urging of industry, many Members of Congress opposeunilateral export controls, which the y view as unfairly punishingU.S. business. Their approach would hold U.S. export controlshostage to the behavior of other countries and, therefore, preventthe U.S. from leading by example.

NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT This bill, H.R.7, is pa rt ofthe Republican "Contract with America." The bill would direct thePentagon to deploy national and mobile missile defenses at "theearliest possible date." It would also expand NATO to includePoland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic by 1999 an dpossibly Ukraine and the Baltics after that. Costs incurred (itwould be necessary to supply arms to these countries so that theywould be interoperable with NATO forces) would be paid for by moneyin the Economic Support Fund and the Nonproliferation andDi sarmament Fund.

In addition, the bill would restrict U.S. participation in U.N.peacekeeping operations (PKOs). It would bar the use of Pentagonfunds to pay for U.N. PKOs (unless specifically authorized by theCongress to do so) and limit contributions for internationalpeacekeeping activities to 25 percent (the United States currentlypays 31.7 percent of each PKO). The bill would forbid U.S. troopsfrom serving under "a foreign national acting on behalf of theUnited Nations" unless the President justifie s such actions toCongress.

The act would prohibit U.S. contributions to U.N. PKOs altogetherunless the Secretary of State determines that U.S. industry hasbeen given "opportunities to provide equipment, services andmaterial for peacekeeping mission act ivities equivalent to thosebeing given to foreign manufacturers."

Defense Secretary William Perry denounced the bill in late January,maintaining that the bill "usurps the responsibilities" of theSecretary's office. If members found him "incapable or un willing tomeet those responsibilities," Perry continued, "you should ask meto step down."

PEACE POWERS ACT Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS)introduced the "Peace Powers Act" (S.5) on 4 January. The billwould supplant the War Powers Act of 1973 . Under that law, thePresident must get Congressional approval within sixty days of adecision to deploy troops in combat. Dole's bill would extend thedeadline to six months. Like H.R.7, the bill would also forbidforeign nationals from commanding U.S. troo ps in U.N. PKOs. APresidential waiver of this law would require Congressional ap-proval.


During December and January, the Administration notified Congressof the following leases and transfers of Excess Defense Articles(EDA) to the developing world. The Pentagon may deliver theequipment 30 days after notification.


Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (report to theHouse and Senate Foreign Relations Cmte. by the State Department),US GPO: February 1995.

Credit Reform: U.S. Needs Better Method for Estimating Cost ofForei gn Loans and Guarantees, General Accounting Office [NSIAD/GGD-95-31], December 1994, 76 pp.

Current and Projected National Security Threats to the UnitedStates and Its Interests Abroad (hearing before the Senate SelectIntelligence Cmte., 25 January 199 4), US GPO: 1994.

Defense Trade News, Vol. 5 No. 3, U.S. Department of State, Bureauof Politico-Military Affairs, July-October 1994, 40 pp.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related ProgramAppropriations, Fiscal Year 1995 (hearing before th e ForeignOperations Subcmte. of the Senate Appropriations Cmte.), US GPO:1994, 1128 pp.

Gun Violence: Do Stolen Military Parts Play a Role? (hearing beforethe Senate Governmental Affairs Cmte., 18 November 1993), US GPO:1994, 43 pp.

Implementation o f Lessons Learned From the Persian Gulf Conflict(joint hearing before the Coalition Defense and Reinforcing ForcesSubcmte. and the Military Readiness and Defense InfrastructureSubcmte. of the Senate Armed Services Cmte., 18 April 1994), USGPO: 1994, 83 pp .

International Narcotics Control and United States Foreign Policy:A Compilation of Laws, Treaties, Executive Documents, and RelatedMaterials (CRS report prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Cmte.,December 1994), US GPO: 1994, 734 pp.

Internationa l Terrorism: A Compilation of Major Laws, Treaties,Agreements, and Executive Documents, report prepared by theCongressional Research Service for the House Foreign Affairs Cmte.,US GPO: December 1994, 1155 pp.

Middle East Peace and Other Vital Interest s (hearing before theHouse Foreign Affairs Cmte., 29 July 1994), US GPO: 1994, 47 pp.

Military Offsets (hearing before the Commerce, Consumer Protectionand Competitiveness Subcmte. of the House Energy and CommerceCmte., 22 June 1994), US GPO: 1994, 36 pp.

"North Korea: Military Relations With the Middle East," CRS Reportfor Congress [94-754F], Kenneth Katzman and Rinn-Sup Shinn, 27September 1994, 19 pp.

Overseas Presence: Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic Posts, GeneralAccounting Office [NSIAD-95-50FS] , December 1994, 70 pp. [Containsinformation on overseas arms sales bureaucracy.]

Rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Fiscal Year 1995Foreign Assistance Request, Part II (hearings before the Europe andMiddle East Subcmte. of the House For eign Affairs Cmte., March andApril 1994), US GPO: 1994, 589 pp.

United Nations Peace Operations (hearing before the CoalitionDefense and Reinforcing Forces Subcmte. of the Senate ArmedServices Cmte., 12 May 1994), US GPO: 1994, 83 pp.

U.S. Policy To ward Haiti (hearing before the Western HemisphereSubcmte. of the Senate Foreign Relations Cmte., 8 March 1994), USGPO: 1994, 140 pp.

Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade, Office ofNaval Intelligence, undated, 18 pp. [Covers sub progra ms of non-U.S. allies only.]

TO GET THESE REPORTS... You can obtain Congressional reports and hearings for free throughthe Congressional Committee or Subcommittee which issued them, orfor a small charge, through the Government Printing Office [(202)783 -3238]. To order (free) GAO reports, phone (202) 512-6000.Request (free) CRS reports through your Congressional Representa-tive's office.

Danger! Mines!

At a press conference on 27 January, Secretary of State WarrenChristopher released the second a nnual report to Congress on HiddenKillers: The Global Landmine Crisis. The report is based on datawhich overseas U.S. embassy personnel gathered from foreignofficials and medical authorities, as well as private and interna-tional organizations. It discuss es:

---the scope and nature of the landmine problem
---regional and country case studies
---the impact on refugees, peacekeeping and development
---demining activities by international and private groups
---the military history and uses of landmines
---U.S. policy on landmine control and demining

The report estimates that between 65 and 110 million mines litterat least 62 nations. While 80,000 mines were cleared in 1993, some2.5 million more were sewn. The 1993 report guessed that 150 peoplewere killed or maimed by landmines each week; this year's reportestimates 500 mine-related deaths and injuries per week (theincrease is attributed to increased attention and reporting).

Appendices provide technical details about various ant i-personnellandmines and de-mining equipment and list contacts and resourcesfor further information.

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