Arms Sales Monitor #18, January 1993

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(Issue No. 18, January 1993)


October saw passage and enactment of the FY93 foreign aid appropriation
bill, the defense authorization and appropriation bills and the Defense
Production Act amendments. New military expenditure reporting
requirements were established, a one-year moratorium on US exports of
land mines was enacted, and $1.77 billion was appropriated for arms
industry conversion. 

Military Assistance

On 5 October, the House adopted the $26.3 billion foreign aid
appropriation bill by a 312-105 vote. The Senate passed it the same day
with a voice vote, and President Bush signed the measure into law (PL
102-391) the next day. The bill appropriates $3.3 billion in Foreign
Military Financing grant military aid and concessional loans for
weapons purchases, nearly $700 million less than in FY92.

Israel will receive $1.8 billion of this total, in grant aid, to be
disbursed within 30 days of enactment of the bill. Of this, up to $150
million may be used to fund research and development in the United
States, and $475 million can be used for procurement of Israeli-made
weapons and services. The bill also mandates that $200 million worth of
US weapons be pre-positioned in Israel.

Egypt will receive $1.3 billion of the FY93 grant aid, bringing the
total for Israel and Egypt to $3.1 billion, which leaves about $350
million for all others. Morocco will receive $40 million in grant aid.
El Salvador is to receive $11 million in grant military aid, "only for
non-lethal items for maintenance, sustainment, restructuring, and
reduction and only in strict accordance with ... the Salvadoran Peace
Breaking with recent past tradition, all military aid for Greece,
Turkey and Portugal will be on a low-interest loan basis, with the
principal amount of direct loans not to exceed $450 million for Turkey,
$315 million for Greece and $90 million for Portugal. 

$42.5 million was appropriated for International Military Education and
Training (IMET). Cutting the entire $2.3 million requested by the
Administration, Indonesia is barred from receiving IMET because of its
massacre of civilians in East Timor in October 1991. 

Zaire, Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Guatemala, Peru and Malawi are
prohibited by the bill from receiving any US military aid. No money
from the foreign aid bill may be used to aid Cuba, Iraq, Libya,
Vietnam, Iran or Syria, or any country whose elected head of government
is deposed by an act of the military (coup or decree). Thailand, which
had a military coup in February 1991, is affected by this provision.
Jordan cannot receive any military or economic aid until the President
certifies to Congress that Jordan has taken steps to advance the Middle
East peace process and is in compliance with UN Security Council
sanctions against Iraq (see page 5).

Military Expenditure Data Required

The foreign aid appropriation bill amends Section 116(d) of the Foreign
Assistance Act so that the annual country reports on human rights
required under the section must now include "a description of the
military expenditures of each country receiving United States foreign
assistance, and the efforts each country is making to reduce those

In addition, the conferees note in their report on the bill (House
Report 102-1011) that they "expect the Secretary of the Treasury to
instruct the United States executive director to each international
financial institution ... to vigorously advocate and promote policies
... to encourage developing countries to significantly reduce military
and military-related expenditures and increase resources for primary
health care and basic education." 

Foreign Aid to Former Soviet Union

The foreign aid bill allocates $417 million in economic aid for former
Soviet republics. Eligibility for this money is restricted to
governments that establish "responsible policies and practices
regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons." These
funds are also conditioned on movement toward the withdrawal of all
Russian and CIS troops from the Baltic states. 

A provision in the Senate version of the bill, sponsored by Sen. Jesse
Helms, would have made this money (other than humanitarian aid)
conditional on an end to sales by Russia of any weapons or related
services to Iran. Instead, as resolved in the Conference Committee,
"the President shall report to the appropriate congressional committees
[Foreign Affairs/Relations] that the United States has entered into
serious and substantive discussion with Russia to reduce exports of
sophisticated conventional weapons to Iran and to prevent sales to Iran
of any destabilizing numbers and types of such weapons." The first such
certification is due by 5 February; otherwise, the President is
directed to end all US assistance other than humanitarian aid (defined
as food, clothing and medicine) to Russia. 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy in South Asia

The foreign aid appropriation bill adds a new section on "Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Policy in South Asia" to the Foreign Assistance Act.
The measure encourages the President to pursue regionally negotiated
nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, with the ultimate goal being
concurrent accession by Pakistan and India to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

By 1 April 1993, and every six months thereafter, the President must
report to the Appropriations Committees, the Speaker of the House and
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on nuclear
proliferation in South Asia, "including efforts taken by the United
States to achieve a regional agreement on nuclear non-proliferation,
and including a comprehensive list of the obstacles to concluding such
a regional agreement." 

Within six months of enactment, the President must also report on the
nuclear and ballistic missile programs of China, Pakistan and India,
including, but not limited to, whether that country possesses a nuclear
explosive device or all of the components necessary for one; a report
on the status of each country's missile development program, including
foreign assistance to the program, and foreign sales of missiles or
missile components to the country and steps which the US has taken in
response to such sales; and whether that country has agreed to and is
adhering to peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements.

Arms for Bosnia?

Asserting that the federated states of Serbia and Montenegro have a
large supply of military equipment and ammunition (including more than
1,000 battle tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces), and that
the UN arms embargo sustains the military advantage in favor of the
aggressor, the foreign aid bill calls for the UN to exempt
Bosnia-Herzegovina from the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.
Section 599D of the bill provides the funding authority for the
President to grant up to $50 million of defense articles to Bosnia from
US military stocks in FY93, if the UN arms embargo against
Bosnia-Herzegovina is lifted, and if the President certifies that the
transfer of such goods "would assist that nation in self-defense and
thereby promote the security and stability of the region."  US allies
must also be prepared to join in such a military assistance effort. The
bill in no way compels the President to provide such aid.

Defense Production Amendments Codify Offset Policy

In late October President Bush signed the Defense Production Act
Amendments of 1992 into law (PL 102-558). In addition to reauthorizing
the lapsed Defense Production Act, many measures related to the
defense-industrial base and, therefore, to US arms production and sales
capacity are contained in the act. 

Of particular interest, section 123 codifies and enacts the "Policy on
Offsets in Military Exports" enunciated by President Bush on 16 April
1990. Offsets---such as licensed production, co-production or
subcontractor production arrangements---are side deals that an arms
manufacturer uses to induce foreign buyers to choose its product over
its competitor's product. Many developing countries require that
weapons purchases be accompanied by some technology transfer offsets in
order to assist in the creation of an indigenous arms industry.

The 1990 Bush policy statement noted that offsets for military exports
are inefficient and distort the market, but, so as not to interfere
with US arms sales competitiveness, did not seek to limit them. Under
the policy, though, no agency of the US government may "encourage,
finance, enter directly into, or commit US firms to any offset
arrangement." At the National Security Council's urging, however, the
President may encourage or restrict offsets, or use government funds to
finance offsets.  

The act calls for the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to consult with foreign governments on limiting the
negative effects of offsets in arms sales. It mandates an annual report
by the Commerce Department on the impact of offsets on defense
preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment and trade, but not
national security. The findings of these reports are to be used in
bilateral and multilateral negotiations aimed at limiting offsets.

Foreign Ownership of Defense Contractors Curtailed

A provision in the FY93 DOD authorization bill (section 835) prohibits
the purchase of certain US defense companies by a foreign government or
its agent, "unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that
such sale would not pose a significant risk of diversion of sensitive
US defense technology to a foreign firm or government and would not
otherwise harm US national security interests." Only prime contractors
which had a total of $500 million or more in DOD or DOE contracts
during the previous fiscal year, and companies working on classified
programs, are affected. 

The measure was spurred by Thomson-CSF's attempt to purchase LTV
Corporation's missile business in April 1992 (see ASM no. 15 p. 1 for
background). Thomson is partially owned by the French government.

Mideast Threat Assessment Due

Section 1331 of the DOD authorization bill requires that the
Secretaries of Defense and State, together with the director of the
CIA, submit a report to Congress on the United States' strategic
posture in the Middle East by 1 February. The report is to include: US
plans for ensuring Israel's military technological superiority over
potential threats; the state of strategic cooperation between the US
and Israel; a military threat assessment describing the overall threat
to US strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, to Israel, to Egypt, and
to the Gulf Cooperation Council states; and an assessment of the threat
to the US and to regional US allies due to the proliferation of
long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. 


Due along with the FY94 Defense Department budget submission is a
report to Congress assessing the UN Secretary General's June 1992
report on "Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping." In
particular, the DOD report is to consider whether the US should fund UN
peace keeping operations out of the national defense budget, rather
than the State Department budget as is currently the case. The report
is also to consider whether the US should keep equipment specified by
the Secretary General available for immediate sale, loan or donation to
the UN and/or transport UN troops and equipment as needed cheaply or
for free. The report is called for by Section 1342 of the DOD
authorization bill.  

For FY93, $27.166 million is appropriated in the foreign aid bill for
peace keeping operations. $300 million is authorized in the DOD bill,
but none is appropriated.

Ban on Landmine Exports Passes

Section 1365 of the Pentagon authorization bill makes it the policy of
the US government to seek "verifiable international agreements
prohibiting the sale, transfer or export and further limiting the use,
production, possession, and deployment of anti-personnel landmines." It
is the sense of Congress that the President should seek through an
international agreement to prohibit the sale, transfer or export of
such landmines. For one year, the Act, bans the sale, financing or
licensing of any landmine exports.  

Pursuant to the above law, the State Department placed a notice in the
Federal Register stating that "all licenses, approvals, sales or
transfers of landmines specifically designed for anti-personnel use,
regardless of method of delivery, are suspended until further notice.
Additionally, all existing authorizations for the sale, export or
transfer of such defense articles are revoked until further notice." 

The DOD authorization bill also mandates---six months after
enactment---an assessment of international landmine clearing efforts in
situations where war refugees are attempting to be repatriated; an
analysis of the specific types of mines in the various countries and
the availability and suitability of technology for disposing of those
mines; and an evaluation of the "desirability, feasibility and
potential cost of United States assistance on either a unilateral or
multilateral basis" in mine clearing.  

Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992

Title XVI of the DOD authorization act extends the Iraq Sanctions Act
of 1990 (PL 101-513) to Iran, making it US policy "to oppose, and
urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any
transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology ... [that] could
materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical,
biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons." The bill further mandates that "If any person
transfers or retransfers goods or technology so as to contribute
knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq ... to acquire
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons," for
a period of two years the US government cannot do business with the
sanctioned person and all export licenses will be denied. If a foreign
government is found to be culpable, the business prohibition and export
prohibition will be applied to the government, all foreign and military
aid will be cut off for one year, and all coproduction and
codevelopment agreements suspended for one year.

"Advanced conventional weapons" are defined to include long-range
precision guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low
observability aircraft, "advanced military aircraft," military
satellites, electromagnetic weapons, laser weapons, advanced command,
control and communications systems, electronic warfare systems, or
intelligence collections systems that "the President determines
destabilize the military balance or enhance offensive capabilities in
destabilizing ways." 

Defense Conversion Measures Funded

The defense authorization act authorizes $1.5 billion for a variety of
defense-to-civilian conversion programs, and Title VII of the defense
appropriations act provides $1.77 billion in funding for such measures
in FY93. The money appropriated is targeted toward defense industry and
technology base initiatives, community adjustment and assistance
programs, and personnel assistance, with the majority ($870 million)
going to technology base initiatives.

Ambiguous Air Show Policy Passed

Legislation limiting taxpayer support for US contractors selling arms
overseas was passed as Section 1083 of the DOD authorization bill (see
ASM no. 17 p. 3 for background). The measure requires the US defense
industry to reimburse the Pentagon for the cost of transporting
Pentagon-owned equipment to international arms bazaars, all costs for
military personnel accompanying the equipment and any other
"miscellaneous incremental costs" which would not otherwise have
occurred. However, if transporting the equipment to the air show meets
"training requirements that would otherwise have to be met," industry
would not be required to pay the cost incurred. Under the legislation,
industry would not be required to lease the equipment at fair market
value, nor to insure the equipment.   

The military services cannot participate in international marketing
shows unless the Secretary of Defense submits a report 45 days before
the opening of the show detailing why participation in the show is in
US national security interests, explaining the arms control impact of
promoting sales of the weapons, and estimating the cost of

Department of Defense cooperation with US industry at air shows has
been under contention since 1991, when the Pentagon assisted industry
at the Paris Air Show and subsequent shows by supplying aircraft and
military personnel---in some cases at no cost to industry. Most
recently, the US treasury gave US arms industry a $161,700 subsidy for
showing nine military aircraft and helicopters at the Farnborough Air
Show in September. 

Recoupment Fees Being Rolled Back 

The Senate version of the FY93 DOD appropriation bill contained a
provision, deleted in conference, which would have reconfirmed that
research and development recoupment fees must be charged on sales of
major military equipment. At the same time, the bill would have
mandated that these funds revert to the Pentagon RDT&E account, rather
than into the Treasury general fund account as is presently done. The
Senate also sought to reduce Pentagon RDT&E funding by $178 million,
the amount which the Pentagon has estimated it will recover through
recoupment fees on foreign military sales in fiscal year 1993.

The Pentagon recovers government-funded research and development costs
for weapon systems through recoupment fees on foreign military sales.
As it now stands, any non-NATO country buying "major military
equipment" in a government-to-government deal must pay such a fee,
which can be as much as 5 percent of the cost of the weapon system. (No
recoupment fees are mandated on direct commercial sales.) But defense
industry and Bush Administration officials have recently sought to
repeal recoupment---Section 21(e)(2) of the Arms Export Control
Act---on the grounds that it hurts US arms sales competitiveness by
increasing the price. 

In June, the Bush Administration dropped recoupment fees on all sales
of non-major military equipment. No amendment to the legislation was
necessary to do so. Efforts to end all recoupment fees are likely in
the 103rd Congress. 


Israeli Compensation for Saudi Sales   

26 September---The White House announces that it will transfer an
unspecified number of AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Black Hawk multipurpose
(combat, assault and transport) helicopters to Israel, in an effort to
compensate for the US sale to Saudi Arabia of 72 F-15 aircraft
announced earlier in the month (see ASM no. 17). The helicopters will
be provided under a 1990 Congressional provision that allows Israel to
receive up to $700 million worth of now-excess US defense articles from
the NATO theater. 

The White House also announces that some further (unspecified) military
equipment would be forward-positioned in Israel. In 1991 Congress
authorized the pre-positioning of up to $300 million worth of US
weaponry in that country, and according to a Washington Post account,
the US already has placed about $100 million of military equipment
there. The Post speculates that the new equipment includes air-to-air
missiles and Patriot missiles.  

US and Taiwan Formalize F-16 Deal

12 November----Taiwanese and US government officials sign a letter of
offer and agreement (LOA) for the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters
.  Six days later the two
governments sign an LOA for approximately 180 engines, spares and
support equipment. Pratt & Whitney will supply $1 billion worth of
F11-PW-220 engines for the F-16 aircraft, with delivery scheduled for
the last quarter of 1996 through 2000 . Congress was notified of the $5.8 billion aircraft sale on 14
September (see ASM no. 17). 

In early January, Taiwanese legislators threatened to block the deal
unless Taiwan received some F-16 production technology. Ting Shouchung,
described as "a top lawmaker in the Parliament's defense committee,"
said "It would be unthinkable and ridiculous if we did not have an
offset agreement to manufacture parts" for the F-16 .  Licensing production to Taiwan would be ironic, as
the sale was approved in September largely as a (US) jobs issue.

Meanwhile, the US sought to discourage Taiwan from purchasing 60 Mirage
2000-5 fighters, worth $2.6 billion, from France, surrealistically
claiming that the purchase would destabilize the region and encourage
China to buy more arms . Taiwan went
ahead and bought the French planes. 

Poor Saudis   

18 November----Defense Daily reports that Saudi Arabia has asked the US
to withhold delivery and attempt to resell nine already-paid-for
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) manufactured by Loral
Corporation. The deal was part of a $68 million MLRS package, including
300 rockets, announced in September 1990. Due apparently to cash flow
shortages, Saudi Arabia also has not yet finalized several weapons
purchases already notified to and passed by Congress, including 465
M1A2 tanks and 72 F-15 aircraft.  

US and Singapore Formalize F-16 Deal

20 November----US and Singapore government officials sign an LOA for
the $310 million sale of 11 General Dynamics' F-16 A/B fighters. These
11 aircraft will join the eight F-16s purchased by the Singapore Air
Force in the late 1980s.    The
sale was presented to Congress in June.

Long-Awaited Turkey Helicopter Contract Signed

8 December----Sikorsky Aircraft and the government of Turkey sign a
contract for a $1.1 billion sale and coproduction agreement for 95
Black Hawk helicopters. Forty-five will be bought off the shelf, with
transfers beginning immediately; the remaining 50 will be co-produced
in Turkey.

Financing for this arms sale will be arranged by the Export-Import
Bank, as agreed on a one-time-only basis in 1990.  

Massive Armor Sale to Kuwait

5 January---With no time to waste, the outgoing Bush Administration
notifies Congress on its first day in session of the Army's intention
to sell $4.5 billion worth of armor and artillery to Kuwait. The
announcement of the sale of 256 M1A2 Abrams tanks was anticipated, as
General Dynamics beat out Vickers Defence Systems, the British
manufacturer of the Challenger 2 tank, in October for the
highly-publicized Kuwait armor sale.  

In addition to the tanks, the deal includes 46 M88 tank recovery
vehicles, 125 M113 armored personnel carriers, 30 M1064 mortar
carriers, 1,178 machine guns, 967 SINCGARS radios, 132 M998 troop and
cargo carriers, trucks, ammunition and other supporting equipment. 

See ASM no. 17 p. 4 for background on the M1A2 sale.


CBO Explores How to Limit Mideast Arms

In September, the Congressional Budget Office released an excellent
85-page report on Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle
East. The report opens by noting that US military force and procurement
decisions are now driven by the size and capabilities of Third World
forces, rather than the Soviet military. Therefore, continuing to arm
developing countries, especially in regions of greatest strategic
interest---such as the Middle East---does not seem smart. The report
outlines in greater detail than has been done elsewhere how an arms
export control regime (rather than a transparency regime) might be
configured, exploring both qualitative and quantitative limits on arms
exports to the region. It assesses the military and economic costs of
the various options. 

To obtain a copy, call (202) 226-2809.

State Department Soft on Jordan?

1 October---Appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East, Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of
State for Near East Affairs, says that since June Jordan's enforcement
of UN trade sanctions against Iraq has "tightened significantly. The
Jordanian military has assumed an important role in the effort and Iraq
has received correspondingly fewer embargoed goods through Jordan."

Congress has heard this before, and they are skeptical. In September,
the GAO reported (in GAO/NSIAD-92-343) that the State Department
"inaccurately described the timing and scope of their actions to halt
military assistance to Jordan" during Operation Desert Storm. The State
Department told Congress that as of 2 August 1990 the department had
placed a hold on the approval of new LOAs for Jordan. However, between
2 August and 4 October 1990, 12 new LOAs were approved. A ban on
transfers of military goods was not implemented until 7 March
1991---after the war had already ended.  

Not taking the State Department's word for it this time, the FY93
foreign aid appropriation bill barred aid to Jordan "unless the
President determines and so certifies to the Congress that (1) Jordan
has taken steps to advance the peace process in the Middle East, (2)
Jordan is in compliance with United Nations Security Council sanctions
against Iraq, and (3) that such assistance is in the national interest
of the United States."

Senate Gets Moving on "Iraq-gate"

After more than two years of House-side activity on the Iraq/Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) scandal, the Senate finally gets into the
act in October, undoubtedly spurred to action by the impending
Presidential election and by the trial of a BNL-Atlanta employee
accused of single-handedly perpetrating the Bank's fraud. The Senate
Intelligence, Agriculture and Judiciary Committees each request that
the Attorney General appoint an Independent Counsel to investigate
their concerns that high ranking officials of the Justice Department,
the FBI and the CIA obstructed justice by withholding or falsifying
information on the issue. In December the Attorney General rejects
their requests.

On 27 October the Senate Banking Committee, with jurisdiction over
exports administered by the Commerce Department, hears three panels on
past US exports of dual-use technologies to Iraq prior to its invasion
of Kuwait. 

Specifically to be addressed, Chairman Donald Riegle says, are whether
US exports strengthened Iraq's military capabilities and whether the
Administration has accurately disclosed the degree to which its
licensing policy toward Iraq strengthened that country's military
capabilities. The Chairman's opening statement outlines the history of
Congressional involvement and government obfuscation, annexing several
declassified inter- and intra-agency memos on US policy toward Iraq.
The memos show that the US continued licensing dual-use equipment to
Iraq even after intelligence reports warned Bush Administration
officials that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, and developing ballistic missiles. 

House Banking Committee Chairman Henry Gonzalez releases a sheaf of
papers with his prepared testimony, including a declassified portion of
NSD 26 (the now-infamous 1989 Presidential memo which said "The United
States Government should propose economic and political incentives for
Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with
Iraq"); also letters from the State Department to Congressional
committees investigating US exports to Iraq, and relevant interagency
correspondence, including the 25 July 1990 memo from Secretary of State
Baker to Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher requesting (one week before it
invaded Kuwait) that additional controls be placed on dual-use exports
to Iraq, given its "extraordinarily aggressive weapons proliferation

Also testifying: Congressman Doug Barnard, Kenneth Timmerman (author of
The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq), David Kay (leader of three
UN/IAEA inspections in Iraq), Gary Milholin (Director, Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms), and Henry Rowan (Chairman, Inductotherm
Industries, Inc.).  

Timmerman suggests several reforms to the US export licensing and
control system, including: ending Commerce's export licensing role and
establishing an independent Export Control Agency, directly subordinate
to the White House; subjecting export licenses for countries of
proliferation concern to mandatory DOD and Customs Service review;
encouraging Russia, China, and other non-Western exporters of military
technology to become partners in the establishment of multilateral
proliferation guidelines and helping them set up effective export

Export Controls on Some Comsats Eased

23 October---Effective today, many military and non-military
communication satellites are moved from the export licensing
jurisdiction of the State Department's US Munitions List (USML) to the
Commerce Department's Commerce Control List (CCL). Satellites
incorporating certain advanced technologies, as well as technology for
the design, development, and production of communication satellites,
will remain on the USML. The move consummates a 16 November 1990
Executive Order directing the removal of items on COCOM's dual-use list
from the USML, unless "significant US national security interests would
be jeopardized." A validated license must be obtained from the Commerce
Department for exports of satellites now on the CCL to all countries,
except Canada.  

Spy Satellite Sales Possible

17 November---A State Department spokesman says that the Department is
"carefully examining" the possible sale to the United Arab Emirates of
a photo reconnaissance satellite with resolution of one meter, far
better than current remote-sensing spacecraft, but not as good as US
spy satellites. The deal is worth $100-500 million. Spain and South
Korea are also reportedly seeking to buy spy satellites from the US.

Proponents of such sales claim that if we don't sell, France, Russia or
China might make the sale instead. (Currently only the US, Russia and
China have operational spy satellites; France, Britain, Italy, Spain,
Israel and India are trying to develop them. So far none have shown any
intention of selling satellites.) Proponents also claim that the
proliferation of reconnaissance satellites would benefit peace and
stability by enhancing openness. 

Opponents of such sales say they would facilitate precise targeting of
conventional or nuclear weapons, and, therefore, they call for an
international ban on reconnaissance satellite sales. The decision
awaits the Clinton administration.  

The FY93 Pentagon authorization bill requires the Secretary of Defense
to submit a report to Congress on "the foreign development of,
acquisition of, or access to satellites with capabilities for military
applications and the implications of such development, acquisition or
access for the United States." The report is to include: a description
of current Third World satellite capabilities and the projected threat
posed to US; a description of plans for an anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons "to counter the global proliferation of satellites with
capability for military applications"; a review of other measures the
US could take to counter the proliferation of such satellites; the
likelihood of Third World countries developing or obtaining an
effective ASAT weapon; an assessment of the US need for an ASAT weapon.
The report is to be unclassified and is due to Congress six months
after the bill is enacted into law [23 April].


Aid to El Salvador: Slow Progress in Developing a National Civilian
Police (GAO/NSIAD-92-338) 22 September 1992.

Aircraft Sales to Foreign Governments to Fund Radar Procurement
(GAO/NSIAD-93-24) October 1992.

Arms Restraint Policy (hearing held by the Arms Control and
Europe/Middle East Subcommittees on 24 March 1992) USGPO: 1992, 114 pp.

Army Focus 1992: The Army in Transformation, Department of the Army
(annual publication), September 1992, 37 pp. 

Army Inventory: Problems Managing Excess Supplies as the Army Draws
Down in Europe (GAO/NSIAD-92-273) September 1992.

Conventional Arms Sales Policy in the Middle East (hearings held by the
Arms Control and Europe/Middle East Subcommittees of the HFAC on 26
June and 25 July 1991) USGPO: December 1992.

The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela
(GAO/NSIAD-92-226) June 1992, 26 pp. 

Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1992-93 (Part 5),
Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, USGPO: 1992.

Jobs and US Aerospace (hearing before the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade, HFAC, 6 August 1992) USGPO: 1992, 51 pp.

Jordan: Suspension of US Military Assistance During Gulf Crisis
(GAO/NSIAD-92-343) September 1992, 19 pp.

Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle East, A CBO Study, by
Michael O'Hanlon, Victoria Farrell and Steven Glazerman, September
1992, 85 pp.

1992 Joint Military Net Assessment (Joint Chiefs of Staff) 21 August

Operation Desert Storm: Disposal and Sale of Excess Items
(GAO/NSIAD-93-18FS) October 1992, 20 pp.

Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Materiel During
Redeployment (GAO/NSIAD-92-258) September 1992, 20 pp.

Operation Desert Storm: No Evidence That Foreign Suppliers Refused to
Support War Effort (GAO/NSIAD-92-234) September 1992, 20 pp.

Pricing and Billing of the F-16 for Foreign Military Sales Customers,
report by the DOD Inspector General, 30 September 1992.

Proliferation Watch (produced by the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs) Vol. 3 No. 4, 12 pp.

Security Assistance: Observations on Post-Cold War Program Changes
(GAO/NSIAD-92-248) 30 September 1992.

United Nations: US Participation in Peacekeeping Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-92-247) 9 September 1992, 70 pp.

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