Arms Sales Monitor #9-10

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(Issue No. 9-10 , November-December 1991)

                            The Year in Review

  You most likely began receiving this bulletin without any
warning or justification last March; the Gulf War had just ended,
and a great deal of attention was being focused on the
international arms trade and its role in bringing about that war.
Our goal in producing and distributing the ASM was -and remains-
to help channel this attention into concrete action to prevent
further third world military build-ups, and there-by reduce the
justification for continued large US military budgets. We strive
to do this by reporting on the Bush administration's arms sales,
and arms sales policies, as presented to Congress in reports and
testimony, and also by recounting Congress' relevant actions:
legislation, hearings, and rhetoric, noting courageous stands and
exposing hypocritical ones. 

  Much has happened in the nine months since we began
publication--yet little has changed. More hearings were held and
more legislation was introduced in the first session of the 102nd
Congress concerning arms sales and the proliferation of missiles
and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons than in any other
year: A Congressional Research Service report in July catalogued
more than 30 relevant bills that were pending, the most notable
and far-reaching of which was the moratorium on arms sales to the
Middle East championed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
However, at the close of the first session, few of these measures
had passed. The moratorium  was weakened at every stage of the
legislative process, and the resulting language, as passed in the
State Department authorizing bill (PL 102-138), mandates simply
that the administration continue the process of dialogue it
started last summer with the four other major weapons sellers
(see ASM No. 7-8).

  There were, however, some notable successes. A chemical weapons
sanction bill was passed and signed into law (see p. 5), and out
of the many good measures introduced last year, a bill that would
punish companies aiding in nuclear proliferation is likely to be
passed this year. Further, the anticipated $15 billion "Phase II"
sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia did not occur last year. The
administration obviously did not feel confident that the sale
would receive Congressional approval. And the arms
industry-administration plan for amending the Export-Import
Bank's by-laws to permit Bank financing of weapons exports was
beaten back.

  While the administration flatly opposed Congressional calls for
a moratorium on American arms sales, intense Congressional
pressure no doubt influenced the administration to embark on the
five-power talks to establish common guidelines and to promote
consultation and openness in their arms sales to the Middle East.
These talks, however, are not aimed at restraint--at least not of
US arms transfers. 

  At the same time, the administration aggressively supported US
arms sales--as demonstrated by the proposed EXIM Bank financing
scheme, government sponsorship of a large trade delegation to the
Paris Air Show and stepped up assistance to arms marketers at US
embassies abroad. It paid off. And 1991, while not seeing the
massive Saudi sales expected, was a good year for the arms
business, too. See the box below. 
      (Note: Box not produced online)

  In defense of the above, and other sales, Assistant Secretary
of State Richard Clarke explained last summer that, "It is not US
arms transfers that have been the problem in the Middle East's
becoming over-armed and falling into wars. Patriots to Israel,
AWACS to Saudi Arabia, M-60s to Egypt, F-16s to Bahrain, I-Hawks
to the UAE. They have not been the problem. No Middle East state
with which the United States had an on-going military
relationship at the time has been an aggressor. It was not Kuwait
that invaded Iraq. It was not Tunisia that attacked Libya. We
have such relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. They are not the
problem...." From this carefully-worded statement, the
administration's operative assumption seems to be that US arms
transfers cannot possibly fuel perceptions of insecurity in
neighboring states, and thus perpetuate arms races. 

Sales in progress

1 November  The Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative
Affairs notifies Congress of the administration's intention to
license the commercial sale of "major defense equipment" to Saudi
Arabia (license no. DTC-38-91). November 91, p. H9042>

1 November  The State Department proposes to license the sale to
Malaysia of major military equipment under a commercial license
(no. DTC-48-91).  

1 November  The DSAA notifies Congress of its intention to sell
20 AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships along with 446 "Hellfire"
missiles and eight spare Hellfire launchers plus two spare
target/night vision systems, three spare EG T700-701 engines,
5,520 70mm rockets, chaff and dispensers and forward area
refueling equipment to Greece for $505 million. The deal is to be
administered by the Army. Other Apache customers are Israel,
Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the United States Army. 

1 November  Congress is notified of another proposed sale to
Greece, this one for 16 Harpoon missiles, 64 Standard missiles,
56 Mk. 48 Mod 5 Torpedoes, and 10,000 rounds of 127mm ammunition.
The $100 million deal is to be administered by the Navy. 

5 November  McDonnell Douglas Vice President Robert Trice
announces at the Dubai air show that Saudi Arabia has placed an
order for 72 F-15 fighter aircraft,  a $4-5 billion deal. Trice
says that the Saudis had told the administration on 1 November of
their desire to buy the 72 Eagles, but that notification is
reportedly classified.  Both the Pentagon and the State
Department are dismayed by this premature announcement, which
McDonnell Douglas leaked in an effort to keep its F-15 production
line open past 1993, when it is slated to close unless major
sales are finalized soon. As Trice would not have made this
announcement with-out Saudi approval, the leak is seen as an
indication of Saudi impatience with the slow pace of action on
weapons purchases the Kingdom wants to make.

Senators Howard Metzenbaum and Bob Packwood respond quickly: two
weeks after Trice's announcement they have collected 67 Senate
signatures on a letter expressing "profound anxiety that such a
shipment of arms may be contemplated" while the peace talks
continue. On 22 November, Metzenbaum announces that the Saudi
Ambassador had assured him that "his country has no intention of
pressing forward with plans to purchase 72 F-15 planes at this

5 November  The State Department notifies Congress of its
intention to license the export of major military equipment to
Egypt under a commercial license (no. DTC-44-91). 

5 November  The State Department transmits notification of a
proposed commercial license for the export of major military
equipment to Saudi Arabia (license no. DTC-41-91).  

6 November  The State Department transmits notification of a
proposed license for the export of commercially licensed major
military equipment to Mexico (license no. DTC-1-92).  

13 November  The State Department sends Congress a Memorandum of
Justification for the Presidential Determination "regarding the
drawdown of defense articles and services for Mexico."  

14 November  The Pentagon gives informal, 20-day
"pre-notification" of a proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of 14
Patriot fire units and 758 missiles for a price of $3.3 billion.
The Saudis reportedly want 26 Patriot batteries total. As part of
a $7.3 billion weapons sale in October 1990, Saudi Arabia bought
6 fire units and nearly 400 missiles. In addition, 7 Patriot
batteries were transferred to Saudi Arabia in mid-September 1991,
allegedly due to increased fears of an Iraqi missile attack. 

14 November  The President notifies Congress of the continuing
threat to US national security and foreign policy posed by the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and of his
extension, through the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, of the lapsed Export Administration Act.    The "emergency" arose when the President
vetoed the legislation that Congress had passed in November 1990
to reauthorize the Export Administration Act, because he felt
that the sanctions to be invoked in the case of chemical weapons
proliferation or use interfered with his presidential

14 November  The Pentagon notifies Congress of the Air Force's
intention to sell Turkey 350 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, for
use on its F-16 aircraft, plus service and logistics assistance
for a price of $60 million.   

18 November  The DSAA transmits notification of the Army's
proposed LOA to the Coordination Counciul for North American
Affairs (Taiwan) for defense articles and services.  

4 December  The Under Secretary of State for International
Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, has determined, pursuant
to section 73 of the AECA (which pertains to implementation of
the MTCR guidelines), that a foreign corporation or government
has exported MTCR-controlled technologies. The administration,
however, has concluded that publication of the finding would be
harmful to the national security interests of the United States.
This might be the formal public notification of Israel's
complicity in South Africa's missile proliferation activities
which was reported in the press in October (see ASM No. 7-8). 

5 December  Formal notification for the sale of 14 Patriot fire
units, 758 missiles, 14 radar sets and control stations and 75
launching stations is presented to Congress today. 

6 December  President Bush notifies Congress that, effective
today, he is ending the US embargo on arms transfers to
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, mandated by the FAA, that has
been in place since 1961. In each of the three cases, President
Bush declares that the provision of weapons to the East European
governments would "strengthen the security of the United States
and promote world peace." Left in place are prohibitions on
weapons sales to Bulgaria and Romania, although these, too, are
reportedly under review.  

30 December  A rule published in the Federal Register declares
that the republics of the former USSR, including the Baltic
states, remain "controlled" destinations for exports from the US
of a wide range of technologies with potential strategic military
applications. Special export licenses will be granted by the
Commerce Department only if they, the Pentagon and the State
Department determine that export of a particular item will not
jeopardize US national security interests.  

Speeches, letters, etc.

7 November  The FY91 defense authorization act--PL 101-510
(Section 825)--requires that the Department of Defense, with
input from the Commerce Department, submit an annual report on
the defense industrial base. An interim report was forwarded to
Congress in March 1991, and today the final report is sent to the
HASC and SASC. The report calls for the unprecedented inclusion
of defense company executives in defining long-term R&D and
investment priorities and strategies for the Pentagon (full
citation, p. 6).

7 November  House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John
Dingell sends a letter to an Israeli Ministry of Defense
official, notifying him that the Ministry's 250-person, New
York-based, arms purchasing office that administers Israel's FMS
credits is under investigation by Dingell's committee. The
investigation was inspired in large part by the "Dotan
affair"--the scandal named for the Israeli AF Brig. Gen. who was
sentenced in March by an Israeli court for bribery and corruption
in soliciting kick-backs from General Electric and conspiring to
embezzle some of the US supplied FMS funds. (The US gives Israel
$1.8 billion per year in FMS grant monies for procurement of US-
and Israeli-produced weapons.)  The committee's probe is to
provide a wide review of the mission's buying activities and its
contact with US companies. It will also assess the Ministry's
role in the US foreign military assistance program.  

18 November  President Bush transmits to Congress the
administration's report on Iraqi compliance with the UN Security
Council resolutions required by PL 102-1.  

19 November  Making a plug for S.3-09, the Nonproliferation and
Arms Transfer Control Act that he introduced last January [see
ASM no. 1 (March 1991)], Sen. John McCain says that to make the
Gulf War victory a lasting one, the US must "make every possible
effort to ensure that no hostile or aggressive state again arises
with the capacity to threaten the region or world peace." The way
to do that is to ensure that "key allies" like Israel continue to
receive weapons as desired, but that "key threats" like Iran,
Iraq, Libya and Syria "do not make major further additions to
their vast arsenals."

In order to assess the existing threat, he asked the CRS to make
an unclassified survey of the flow of arms to the Middle East
from 2 August 1990 to 1 November 1991. He finds the CRS' findings
disturbing, because they show that "Iraq is the only potential
aggressor state in the Middle East that is shut off from the flow
of arms. ... [D]eadly arms transfers continue to states who are
still aggressive and terrorist in character."

To rectify the situation, he recommends the following four
measures: 1) keep up the flow of grant military assistance and
arms sales to Israel; 2) maintain the designation of Syria, Iran
and Libya as "terrorist states"; 3) make international arms
control agreements a top priority, but "bearing in mind that the
problem is not all states in the region, but aggressor-terrorist
states like Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria"; and 4) adopt S.309,
which he says would "use the power of the American economy to
sanction those who sell weapons and technology to the above named

26 November  Sen. Bob Graham introduces two bills on US arms
transfers, one of which would change the 30 calendar-day
notification requirement for arms sales proposed to countries
other than NATO-members and major non-NATO allies (Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, Israel, and South Korea) to 30 in-session days.
He says that thirty calendar days does not give Congress enough
time to consider sensitive sales, noting that the administration
sent Congress a proposal for a $365 million sale to Saudi Arabia
of bombs and missiles  just before Congress' August recess.
"Those of us not on the oversight committees [Foreign Relations
and Foreign Affairs] simply did not have appropriate time to
carefully consider this sale. The American people are precluded
from any understanding of the rationale of this sale." 

The administration justified the August weapons sale to Saudi
Arabia "by suggesting that `Saudi Arabia needs to replenish
inventories expended during Operation Desert Storm.'" He says
that Congress needs to be asking, and needs answers to, a number
of questions in order to make informed decisions: 

* What were the regional weapons inventories before the war?
* What portion of those inventories were used during the war?
* How much military hardware did the US leave in Saudi Arabia? 
* What are our overall strategic objectives in selling military
hardware in the Middle East since the end of the war?
* How are arms sales advancing our interests?

Graham notes that the US has contracted to transfer about $7.5
billion worth of arms to the Middle East since last Spring
(although it is actually a much higher sum--see p. 1). "I accept
that dollar value in and of itself does not present a complete
picture of each sale," he notes. "But dollar value is certainly
one important indicator of what is happening here." 

"We need a long-term strategy and clear definition of our goals.
The United States has a historic opportunity to change the way we
and other major arms suppliers do business in this volatile
region. We must not squander that opportunity." He introduces
legislation (S.2097--see p. 6) that would require the
administration to report to Congress how each sale it proposes to
the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula would affect the regional
military balance, as well the sale's impact on multilateral
efforts at regional arms control.  

Notes from some hearings

6 November  The HFAC Western Hemisphere subcommittee hears
testimony on legislation that would transfer US military
assistance money into a reconstruction fund. Former Ambassador to
El Salvador Edwin Corr testifies, along with representatives of
several non-governmental organizations: Michael Posner (Lawyer's
Committee for Human Rights); Heather Foote (Unitarian
Universalist Service Committee); and Alex Wilde (WOLA). Several
other NGOs submit testimony. 

     North Korean Nukes

21 November  The HFAC Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee
holds a hearing on North Korea's nuclear program. In his opening
statement, Chairman Solarz hails the recent announcements by
President Bush (that the US is withdrawing all tactical nuclear
weapons) and by South Korean President Roh (that South Korea
would neither seek nuclear weapons nor allow positioning of
nuclear weapons on its territory). He says, "While I certainly
hope that the North responds to these two bold and far-reaching
initiatives by agreeing to terminate its nuclear program and
permitting international safeguards of its nuclear facilities, it
is far from clear that the North will actually do so." He
outlines four policy options which could be pursued if North
Korea does not open up to international inspection its nuclear
facilities: 1) do nothing; 2) encourage or permit South Korea to
acquire its own nuclear weapons capability; 3) pursue a global
sanctions regime against the North; and/or 4) take some military
action against North Korea's nuclear facilities.

Former Commander-in-Chief of UN forces and ROK-US Combined Forces
Command in South Korea Gen. John Wickham (ret.), former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, and Han Sung-Joo of the Korea
University provide expert testimony.

     Send in the Troops?

Prof. Han says: "The critical issue is not whether Pyongyang will
sign an IAEA safeguards agreement, as I think it will offer to
do, but how an effective inspection can be enforced and North
Korea's nuclear program stopped. The North Korean nuclear program
must not and cannot be allowed to proceed. Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) is not a viable option. Neither is the use of
military force an acceptable option at this time." He continues,
"Those of us who live on the Korean peninsula know how fragile
the peace there is, and hence are concerned that any hasty action
on the part of the United States or the Republic of South Korea
could bring about a situation that it is intended to prevent." He
notes that Japan and China both have a great deal of leverage
with North Korea; "Japan is doing its part by refusing to provide
economic assistance to North Korea unless it stops its nuclear

Richard Perle asserts that the IAEA cannot possibly stop the
North Korean nuclear program, and, furthermore, acceptance by
North Korea of IAEA safeguards would hinder US military options.
The use of force is the only option that can succeed, he argues,
and it is needed soon. Gen. Wickham disagrees, saying that since
we don't yet have a full intelligence reading of the situation,
it would be unwise to contemplate a military solution now.

Solarz asks the panelists whether they think sanctions could
work; Perle says "no," sanctions failed in Iraq and its "absurd"
to think they could succeed in North Korea. Wickham says "yes,
possibly," since North Korea is heavily dependent on imports from
China for food and oil.

     North Korean Nukes II

25 November  The Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the SFRC holds a hearing on North Korea's nuclear weapons
program. Alan Cranston presides, and several nuclear
proliferation and North Korean experts testify.

Jeremy Stone (President of the Federation of American Scientists)
travelled to North Korea in October. He provides a detailed
account of the political and economic situation there and makes
20 concrete policy recommendations for dealing with North Korea's
nuclear aspirations. He notes that the international community
has not adopted sanctions against nuclear proliferators in other
cases (Israel, India, Pakistan) and says that if the DPRK's
failure to fulfill its NPT obligations becomes the basis for
international action against it, the North might simply withdraw
from the NPT. Therefore, he suggests that the continuing state of
"no war, no peace" between the North and South be the basis for

Stone also says: "I do not believe that the United States has the
standing, or the right, to threaten military action against the
DPRK over this issue, or to assist others in doing so. ... But I
would support going beyond diplomatic and political pressures to
economic embargoes or boycotts, so serious is the matter. And for
the DPRK, with its economic problems, such pressures are threats
to its continuation. They need foreign oil and food and hard

Leonard Spector (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
outlines the history of North Korea's nuclear program and recent
diplomatic maneuvers by the US and ROK to frustrate North Korea's
nuclear ambitions. Spector warns against a military strike on the
nuclear facility at Yongbyon, saying that Israel's attack on
Iraq's Osirak facility in 1981 is not a valid model of
comparison: "while Iraq was unable to retaliate against Israel in
1981, North Korea could strike back heavily against South Korea
in the event of an attack against Yongbyon by American and/or
South Korean forces." North Korea could do this most readily by
targeting its Scud missiles on Seoul.

Joseph Churba (International Security Council) and Gary Milhollin
(Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) also testify.

     CIA Chief Gates Gives Threat Assessment

10 December  CIA Director Robert Gates testifies before the HASC
on the situation in the Soviet Union and on the other "threats"
now driving US military planning. He says that conflict between
the former Republics in the disintegrating Soviet Union and the
accelerating world-wide proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons pose the greatest danger to the United States'
and international security. He says: "Over the next decade we
expect chemical-tipped, mobile short-range missiles to become
wide-spread from North Africa through South Asia," but he notes
that aside from Soviet and allied forces, only China now has the
ability to attack US territory with missiles.  

Legislation passed and pending

     Conditioning China's MFN Status on Non-proliferation

The United States-China Act of 1991 conference bill (H.R.2212) is
weaker than either the previous House or Senate bills. In it, the
policy guidance conditioning a continuation of China's most
favored nation trade (MFN) status on, among other things,
restraint in its arms sales, is softened to a sense of Congress
statement. According to the bill, the President cannot recommend
the continuation of China's MFN this June, for a one-year period,
if China has not "made overall significant progress" in curbing
its weapons proliferation practices. This would include ceasing
activities prohibited by the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and the Australia Group. Also, China would have to "take clear
and unequivocal steps to assure that the PRC is not assisting and
will not assist any non-nuclear state, directly or indirectly, in
acquiring nuclear explosive devises or materials and components
for such devices."

Under the "Definitions" clause of the legislation, "significant
progress" in its arms export policies cannot be said to have
occurred, specifically, if after 26 November 91 China transfers
to Syria or Iran "ballistic missile or missile launchers for the
weapons systems known as the M-9 or M-11" or "material,
equipment, or technology which would contribute significantly to
the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device."  

The bill was passed in the House on 26 November by an
overwhelming 409-21 vote; it awaits action in the Senate. The
administration maintains that it will veto any bill that places
conditions on China's MFN status.

     Stronger CBW Sanctions Bill Becomes Law

The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991 (H.R.3409), was written into title III of
H.R.1724, a bill containing unrelated trade and unemployment
compensation measures. This bill supersedes the CBW sanctions
contained in the just-passed State Department authorization bill
(H.R.1415), and adds import bans against companies that have
aided in proliferation of these types of weapons. The bill
prohibits the US government from contracting for any goods with
such firms. It was passed by both houses on 26 November and
signed into law on 4 December as PL 102-182.  

     Ballistic Missile, Nuclear, Chemicaland Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation Support Act of 1991

This bill, S.2124, was introduced by Sen. Dale Bumpers on 27
November and referred to the SFRC. Partially redundant to the
above CBW sanctions, it would prohibit for a period of ten years
the importation into the US or its territories any goods produced
or provided by companies that the President certifies have
"knowingly participated in the Iraqi or North Korean programs to
develop ballistic missiles or nuclear, chemical or biological

This measure had been amended to the "General Provisions" section
of the FY92 defense appropriations bill, but was reluctantly
dropped in conference due to jurisdictional disputes. In noting
their strong support for the intent of such a provision, the
conferees called on the President to provide in both a classified
and an unclassified version a report to the HASC and SASC
assessing "the contribution that [western] companies made to
Iraq's NBC and ballistic missile capabilities and a listing of
these companies. The companies should include those that provided
financial services, transportation, and other essential services
as well as hardware and software support."  

     Resolutions calling for end to IMET aid to Indonesia

On 14 November, both chambers of Congress introduced resolutions
condemning the Indonesian army's slaughter two days previously of
50-150 peaceful demonstrators in occupied East Timor and calling
for, in the case of the Senate version (S.Con.Res.77), an
immediate suspension of US supplied International Military
Educational Training (IMET) funds to the Indonesian government.
The House version (H.Con.Res.240) would make the provision of
IMET funds conditional on the Indonesian government "conducting a
thorough and impartial investigation of these killings and
prosecuting those responsible for them." On 27 November the House
sought to amend the Senate bill by substituting the text of its
bill, but the Senate disagreed. The matter awaits action after
Congress resumes work on 21 January.

From 1979 to 1988, $540 million worth of US weaponry was sold to
Indonesia; US supplied M-16s were reportedly used in the November

     Byrd Still Trying to Link Arms Sales To War Debt

H.J.Res. 157, the emergency supplemental appropriation bill which
provides $4.1 billion to cover further Operation Desert Storm
expenses, bans arms sales to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia until those
countries make good on their war bills. The ban enters into
effect 120 days after enactment of the bill. As originally
sponsored by Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Byrd, the
provision would have stopped cold any arms sales to Kuwat or
Saudi Arabia presented to Congress by the administration on or
after 2 August 1990, until the two countries pay their remaining
$3.3 billion in outstanding pledges. Byrd passed a similar
provision in last spring's Desert Storm Supplemental Budget Bill,
but the administration, and Congress themselves, have ignored it,
citing a differing interpretation of the law. This version leaves
less room for ambiguity, but the "effective 120 days after
enact ment" clause was amended to it by Sen. Edward Kennedy, thus
allowing those sales already negotiated to proceed. Kennedy says
his amendment will prevent thousands of defense contractor
layoffs that would result from the cancellation of $10 billion in
already negotiated and approved sales with the two countries. The
bill was passed by both houses in November.  

     Cascading Bill Passes

On 27 November, the House and Senate passed H.R.3807, the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act of 1991.
The bill amends the AECA to allow the President to transfer
tanks, artillery and armored combat vehicles to NATO countries in
conjunction with the implementation of the Conventional Forces in
Europe treaty. The bill was supported by the administration, the
Pentagon, NATO and Sen. Joseph Biden. Said Biden: "This
implementing legislation for the CFE Treaty is designed to
minimize the impact of the treaty on United States equipment in
Europe. If we pass this legislation, the United States will not
be required to destroy any tanks or other equipment as a result
of the treaty. ... Without this legislation, the United States
would be required to dismantle according to treaty procedures
about 2,000 battle tanks, 400 armored vehicles, and 100 artillery
pieces." Destroying these weapons, he says, would cost $40
million. Instead, this legislation would transfer the arms--for
free--to the southern flank NATO countries: Turkey, Greece, Spain
and Portugal.   It was signed into
law on 12 December as PL 102-228.

     `October Surprise' Resolutions

Resolutions introduced in each house (S.R.198 and H.R.258) would
authorize money for investigations into the "October surprise"
theory that the Reagan/Bush campaign team entered into secret
negotiations with revolutionary Iran, with a possible promise of
arms to Iran if the hostages' release was delayed until after the
election. Congress is partisanly divided on the issue. The House
adjourned on 27 November without discussion of the resolution;
the Senate resolution was stalled on 22 November when there were
insufficient votes to end a Republican-led filibuster and bring a
vote on the issue. The resolutions will possibly be pursued in
1992, or instead, a cheaper investigation, under the standing
authority of the Middle East subcommittees of the HFAC and SFRC
might be undertaken. 

     S.2096 Introduced

Introduced by Sen. Bob Graham on 26 November, this bill would
extend the Congressional review period for proposed arms sales to
30 days during which Congress is in session, rather than 30
calendar days. While members of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Relations Committees might not feel this is a necessary measure,
since the executive branch routinely provides more than the 30
days notice required, members not on the oversight committees are
left in the dark. The bill was referred to the Foreign Relations

     S.2097 Introduced

Also introduced by Sen. Graham on 26 November, this bill would
require more detailed justification of US weapons sales to
Persian Gulf states than is currently required. Specifically,
with any sales notification, the administration would be required
to provide the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees
with an analysis of: the military balance in the region,
including the nature of the threat facing the recipient of the
arms; the recipient's "legitimate defensive requirements
including current inventories of major defense articles"; how the
sale affects multilateral efforts at regional arms control; how
the sale affects bilateral security agreements; and the extent to
which the proposed sale is necessary to replenish stocks expended
in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. These reports would be provided
in both classified and unclassified form. 

Recent congressional publications

America and Europe Creating an Arms Suppliers' Cartel (hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs, 23
April 91) USGPO stock no. 552-070-11567-6: 1991.

Cuba in a Changing World: The United States-Soviet-Cuba Triangle
(hearing of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee and the
Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee of the HFAC on 30 April
and 11 & 31 July 91) USGPO: 1991.

The Impact of the Persian Gulf War and the Decline of the Soviet
Union on How the United States Does its Defense Business (hearing
of the House Armed Services Committee on 27 Feb; 4,8,12,19 March;
12,16,22,25,2-6,30 April; 1 May and 12 June 91) USGPO: 1992.

     Middle East Arms Supply: Recent Control Initiatives (CRS
Issue Brief Order Code No. IB91113), Alfred B. Prados, 10
December 91.

Middle East Arms Transfer Policy (hearing of the Senate  Foreign
Relations Committee on 6 June 91) USGPO stock no.
552-070-11463-7: 1991.

Near East Arms Transfers: August 2, 1990 - November 1, 1991, CRS
Report for Congress (order no. 91-839F), Richard Grimmett et al.,
2 December 91. 

Post-Invasion Panama: Status of Democracy and the Civilian
Casualties Controversy (hearing of the House Foreign Affairs
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee 17 & 30 July 91) USGPO stock no.
552-070-11562-5: 1991.

Proliferation Watch (Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs),
vol. 2 no. 4  (July-August 1991), 12 pp.

Report to Congress on the Defense Industrial Base (Department of
Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition) November

Soviet Military Conversion (hearing of the Senate Armed Services
Committee on 19 September 91) USGPO: 1991.

Status of 1990 Bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement and
Multilateral Negotiations on Chemical Weapons Ban (hearing of the
Senate foreign Relations Committee on 22 May 91) USGPO stock no.
552-070-11511-1: 1991.

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