Zero Ballistic Missiles and the Third World

By Lora Lumpe

Published in Arms Control, Volume 14, number 1, April 1994.

Following the Iraqi Scud attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War, ballistic missile proliferation - particularly in con- junction with actual or potential nuclear weapons capabilities - has emerged as a central US security concern. Some commentators suggest that developing countries may soon be able to strike the continental United States,1 and such fears have become the primary public justification for the development of strategic anti-missile systems.

Testifying before the Senate in January 1992, however, the Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, stated that ‘only China and the Commonwealth of Independent States have the missile capability to reach US territory directly’. (Although unlikely, French and British SLBMs could strike the continental US, too.) 'We do not expect in- creased risk to US territory from the special weapons of other countries - in a conventional military sense - for at least another decade', he continued.2 Gordon Oehler, the director of the CIA's new non-proliferation centre, added that those countries thought most likely to develop ICBMs in the next decade are 'not any of the major Third World countries that we're interested in' for political reasons. Without naming names, he went on to say that these are the 'countries with the more advanced space-launch vehicle programmes'3 - that is, Israel, India and Brazil, none of which the United States considers particularly worrisome politically.

In fact, the threat to the continental United States from a ballistic missile attack originating in the Third World has been vastly overstated. Virtually all ballistic missile capabilities in developing countries consist of short-range Scud missiles. Of the 27 current or recent ballistic missile states in the world,4 ten deploy only Scud range and quality missiles: that is, a 300 km range, single stage, liquid-fuelled rocket with a circular error probable of 900 1,000 metres. Some Third World countries have embarked on missile upgrade or development programmer, and are working on advances such as inertial guidance, solid fuel and multi-staging. The CIA testimony indicates, however, that it will take at least a decade before a politically hostile state may develop an ICBM capability.

The response to the current ballistic missile threat to US security is an export control/proliferation management regime, along with a search for a 'technical fix' in the form of anti-missile systems. This article suggests why this response is inadequate to the task. Instead, I advocate a novel and non-discriminatory approach: a complete, world-wide ban on ballistic missiles of all ranges. This approach has many benefits, not the least of which is an effective response to the threat posed by existing and future ballistic missile capabilities in the Third World that meets not just US security concerns but also those of countries that are now directly exposed to the possibility of missile attack.

The Management Approach

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), initiated in 1987 with seven members, has grown to include 23 Western industrialized countries.5 Several additional countries - including Russia, China and Israel - have pledged to abide by MTCR export guidelines, but for various reasons (including reportedly concerns about the inadequacy of their export controls and the sensitivity of sharing intelligence with them) have not been invited to become formal members.6

MTCR members and adherents pledge to abide by common export guidelines on missile-relevant technologies and missiles themselves. MTCR 'Category I' covers 'Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space-launch vehicles, sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km',7 as well as complete sub-systems usable in those weapons and production facilities for them. Adherents to the MTCR are to attach a 'strong presumption to deny' such exports; how ever, if a binding government-to-government assurance is obtained that the technology will not be used in a military ballistic missile, transfers of I these items are permitted. 'Category II' items, export of which are to be considered on the basis of proliferation concerns, include propulsion 5 components, propellants, structural materials, flight instruments and flight control systems, among others.

While the MTCR has gone a long way toward creating a norm against ballistic missile proliferation among suppliers, and has been effective in slowing and reportedly even in ending some missile programmes,8 it has several shortcomings. First, the goal of the regime is ambiguous: as first articulated the intention was to prevent the development and deployment of nuclear-capable missiles, determined to be those capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a distance of 300 km. However, as the regime has evolved, its goal has seemingly grown to one of preventing the spread of all ballistic missiles. At the same time, the regime seems to have acquired the goal of preventing developing countries from gaining access to space through independent space-launch programmer. A fact sheet on the MTCR issued by the US government in 1987 states that the guidelines 'are not designed to impede national space programs or inter- national cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems'.9 The problem is that any space-launch vehicle (SLY) programme could by definition contribute to the development of a ballistic missile that could conceivably deliver a nuclear payload.

This ambiguity is compounded by the fact that the agreement is not a treaty, but rather a set of guidelines that are implemented by each member/adherent through national legislation. Thus the regime is subject to differing interpretations of its restrictions and varying levels of compliance. For example, the legislation implementing the regime in the US export control system draws no distinction between space-launch vehicles and weapons payload launchers. This was evident in the case of the Russian space agency's sale of a cryogenic rocket booster to the Indian Space Research Organization in May 1992. The United States considered the export of this technology to be prohibited under the terms of the MTCR, although India had provided necessary assurances to Russia that the booster was for use in its space programme. Nevertheless, the State Department termed the sale a clear violation of the MTCR, and US export law necessitated that sanctions against the two countries be invoked.10 No other MTCR member or adherent has denounced this transaction as a violation or applied sanctions.

The imposition of sanctions against Russia for the cryogenic booster sale angered Russian military hard-liners, who already complained that Russia was deferring too much to American arms control policy. If cash- starved Russia cannot make sales of legitimate civilian space technology, it may be propelled to make less discriminate and more covert sales of surplus weaponry. The sanctions are also costly to US commercial aerospace and electronics industries. The Indian Space Research Organization and Glavkosmos, the Russian space agency, are both in- eligible to buy space-related technology from US industry for two years, costing US industry at least $50 million annually. While this is a small portion of the $5 billion in space-related commerce expected for American industry in 1992,11 the chilling effect on the market for US industry could prove a much greater loss. Such loose application of sanctions may also undercut necessary industry support for the goal of containing ballistic missile proliferation.12

A third problem with the MTCR is its restriction on membership. All countries are free to implement the MTCR export controls,13 but not all are able to become members of the regime. Although the guidelines do not explicitly say so, transfers of the listed, restricted technologies are permitted to MTCR members and adherents. Theoretically, then, any country could claim to be an adherent to the regime and restrict its exports of missile technologies, in order to be eligible to import missile technologies from other countries. But, under the State Department's interpretation of the US implementing law, only countries that sign a bilateral agreement with the United States are considered 'adherents'. Thus only developing countries that the US decides may become an adherent (like Israel) - and therefore eligible to make missiles - may import relevant technologies for space-launch programmer. This discrimination within the Third World between 'good proliferators' and 'bad proliferators' does little to help make the MTCR and its goals acceptable among the 'bad proliferators'.

Fourth, the MTCR fails to take into account the particular industrial capabilities of recipient countries. In the case of the cryogenic booster sale from Russia, India was not gaining any new, militarily significant capability. The booster employs liquid hydrogen fuel, which is non- storable and must be loaded at super-cool temperatures, making it extremely difficult and expensive to maintain ready for launch. Because of this difficulty, no nation has ever used a hydrogen-fuelled rocket engine in a ballistic missile. Liquid oxygen was used in early US and Soviet ICBMs, and it would be reasonable to oppose this transfer if it was feared that India could obtain some significant technical advantage due to the similarity of the two types of engine. But India already has experience with hypergolic fuels from previous work with France on liquid-fuelled Viking rockets.14 The French Minister for Research and Technology reportedly defended past proposed sales of cryogenic SLV technology to India, as well as Brazil, by saying the two countries already have 'the necessary expertise to develop these on their own. It is only a problem of time and money.15

Fifth, given the short distances separating borders and cities in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, the MTCR parameters limiting missiles of 500 kg/300 km or more are not inclusive enough to provide real security benefits to countries in these regions. This threshold omits the 120 km range SS-21 in the Syrian arsenal and the 110 km range Lance in the Israeli arsenals.16 In recognition of this, lowering the threshold was discussed but not agreed to at a plenary meeting of the MTCR in Washington in November 1991. In January 1993, the members revised the MTCR guidelines, extending the scope of the regime to 'control of all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction17 - effectively missiles, rockets or artillery of any range. Furthermore, the Bush administration sought agreement by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to forgo sales of missiles below the MTCR ranges to the Middle East.18 Sixth, the MTCR also fails address the already existing ballistic missile arsenals in Third World countries. Although the regime may be successful in forestalling development of missiles that can strike the United States directly, missiles already in place can strike US allies and over- seas bases and, indeed, this is one of the major arguments for deployment of space-based weapons in a global anti-missile system.

Probably the greatest weakness of the MTCR is that it is only a sup- pliers' cartel and does nothing to address the demand for missiles, born of regional political tension and local arms races. The developing world views the effort with suspicion and hostility; many see an attempt by the developed countries to hinder their entry into peaceful space activities. Like the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the MTCR is seen as another discriminatory regime in which the North is allowed a certain category of weaponry and the South is not.

Given the weaknesses of the current approach, the rising concern about missile proliferation and the opportunities afforded by end of the Cold War, what other measures could be taken to prevent the further development and deployment of ballistic missiles?

A Global INF Regime?

One idea, first suggested by Kenneth Adelman and Kathleen Bailey, would be to open up the bilateral US-Soviet Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) for signature by other countries.19 The internationalization of the INF Treaty, which bans ground-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, would offer a non-discriminatory approach to ballistic missile proliferation in the narrow sense that everyone would give up missiles of this class. However, nearly all of the systems currently deployed by developing countries would fall below the 500 km limit covered by the treaty. The ubiquitous Scud-B, for example, would not be included, nor would the SS-21, Lance, Israeli Jericho I, or Chinese M-9 or M-11 systems. In the Middle East, only the Israeli Jericho II, the Saudi CSS-2, the Indian Agni (under development), and Iraqi missiles (which are now being destroyed in any case) would be covered. A regime that left their adversaries' missiles in place would most likely be unacceptable to the Israelis and Saudis.

In September 1991 President Bush unilaterally pledged to eliminate the US world-wide arsenal of short-range nuclear ballistic missiles, apledge since reciprocated by Russia, which now controls the entire stock of Soviet non-strategic nuclear forces. Agreement by Russia and former Warsaw Pact as well as NATO countries also to eliminate their short range missiles (110-500 km), and inclusion of developing countries in a short-range plus intermediate-range missile ban agreement, could pro- duce a more palatable and certainly a more meaningful regime. But such a regime would still leave open the possibility, however slim, of Third World countries developing and deploying missiles above the 5,500 km INF ceiling, approaching ranges that could strike the continental United States.20 Also, some ballistic missile programmer are driven, in part, by arms races or tension with countries that possess ICBMs, as in India's concern with China.

Finally, there are both costs and questions associated with verifying an international INF (or an expanded-range INF) agreement. Unlike the bilateral agreement, an international agreement would require an international and impartial inspectorate to oversee implementation and verification. This would not be a cheap or easy proposition. A similar international verification agency would also be needed to implement a Zero Ballistic Missiles agreement, but the greater benefits of such a regime would better justify the cost. There would also be significant questions about whether the agreement could be verified, since some testing (for strategic-range missiles) would still be allowed.

Going to Zero

Continued maintenance of missiles by the five declared nuclear powers, while attempting to deny them to developing countries, simply makes missiles appear all that much more valuable in terms of international prestige, if not actual military utility. According to a study by Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control, demand for ballistic missiles appears in many cases to be driven more by | prestige considerations than by military capabilities (which are fairly limited). 'Such motives may be strongly enhanced by the simplistic, albeit compelling, view of ballistic missiles as the visible symbol of superpower might and, thus, the object of emulation.21 As with the multilateral, non-discriminatory Chemical Weapons Convention just completed, total disavowal of ballistic missiles by the major powers is most likely a necessary precondition for renunciation of missiles by regional powers such as India, Israel, and Iran.

At the October 1986 Reykjavik summit, President Reagan proposed the complete elimination of US and Soviet ballistic missiles - the 'fast fliers', as he called them. Reagan's plan called for a fifty per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals within five years and complete elimination of strategic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) within ten years, returning the two superpowers to a bomber-based nuclear deterrent. The idea - known as 'zero ballistic missiles' or IBM - was greeted enthusiastically by First Secretary Gorbachev, and was also supported by such notable hard-liners as Paul Nitze, Fred Ikl, Richard Perle and Kenneth Adelman. However, differences on research and development of strategic defences derailed the proposal at that time.22

The Reykjavik proposition was put forward without reference to Britain, France and China, nor to incipient missile states. Indeed, in 1986, the spread of ballistic missile capabilities to more countries was just emerging as a serious security concern to the West. Seven years later, with the Cold War ended, the strategic benefits of IBM are still compelling: decreasing the possibility of accidental nuclear warfare, reducing fears of pre-emption and pressures for escalation of any hostilities.23 Equally important, a global ban on all ballistic missiles down to a very short range (e.g. 100 km), that permitted the unimpeded but verified development of indigenous space-launch capabilities by members to the regime, could be the best way to stop the proliferation of long-range missiles. Such a regime would not equalize the global military imbalance; the United States and Russia, in particular, would retain massive conventional superiority as well as still sizeable nuclear capabilities. But the developing world would gain some palpable security benefits through IBM. While ballistic missiles have been thought of primarily as deterrents in the superpower context, in the developing world they have a recent history of extensive counter-city use, mainly as weapons of terror and attrition.24 IBM would immediately improve the security environment of many countries by eliminating costly and destabilizing regional missile races. If the ban extended down to missiles with a range of 100 km/500 kg payload, the benefits would be even greater, as deployed short-range (yet often 'strategic') systems would be eliminated. Certain developing countries would also be relieved of anxiety about US and Russian ICBMs being re-targeted on them.25 The entire world would benefit by decreasing the chance of accidental or intentional nuclear war. A IBM regime would also alleviate the perceived need for space-based anti-missile systems, lessening global tensions and freeing up vast resources that would be spent to develop and deploy such systems.

A regime that permits the development and maintenance of in- dependent space-launch capabilities while banning globally the possession of military ballistic missiles poses some verification challenges (further discussed below). However, overcoming these challenges would likely be easier than convincing countries that they have no legitimate space aspirations. Moreover, if affordable launch services, unimpeded access to satellite imagery, and other forms of cooperation were available, most developing countries undoubtedly would forgo the expense of developing an indigenous launch capability. The international commercial space-launch industry is extremely competitive. Currently only seven countries and one European consortium have operational space-launch capabilities.26 To avoid waste and redundancy, these countries should actively explore among themselves and with non-SLV countries alternatives for international space co- operation, including an international launch service.

However, it is doubtful whether the countries currently possessing SLVs are prepared to satisfy the space needs of all developing countries. Internationalization of space-launches and the formation of a world space agency may be desirable but may not yet be politically feasible. When asked in September 1992 if he saw a need for a world space organization, Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, the Director of the office of Outer Space Affairs at the UN, said 'No.... this is very far down the line'.27 Development of space technology also provides an avenue for achieving the sort of political, economic, technological and military prestige that is usually only gained through the development of high-tech weaponry. Thus while it might be preferable for resource-poor developing countries to forgo development of an independent space-launch capability, a few are unlikely to do so.

Gaining access to dual-use materials for SLV programmes from the developed world would be an incentive for these few developing countries to sign on to a zero ballistic missile regime. Coordinated ex- port restrictions like those of the MTCR would at some point be phased out against countries abiding by a IBM regime.28 This would be especially beneficial to India and Brazil, both of whom have been denied technology for their space programmes because of fears about ballistic missile proliferation. Removal of MTCR export controls would not mean that any country would be compelled to sell technology to an SLV programme, but it would mean that treaty signatories would not be able to punish other signatories for transferring space-relevant technology to third-party signatories.

Verification Issues

Verifying compliance with a ballistic missile ban, while politically challenging, would be no less feasible than verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention or with NPT obligations. Satellite and aircraft reconnaissance could be used to verify that no missiles are deployed at fixed-site launch pads. Verifying the absence of mobile missiles would be more difficult; however, it is probable that the permanent five members of the UN Security Council who have in the past sold missiles to Third World countries maintain accurate records of the number of launchers and missiles sold. Some base-line figures of missiles and launchers liable for dismantlement should therefore exist.

Development of a new missile cannot be kept secret. As then CIA Director William Webster acknowledged in May 1989 that 'the status of missile development programs is less difficult to track than nuclear weapons development. New missile systems must be tested thoroughly and in the open'.29 Flight testing is essential and is unavoidably observable - and becomes more easily observable the longer the range of the missile. US early warning satellites, which reportedly tracked all of the Iraqi Scud launches during the Gulf War, could reliably determine whether missiles were or were not being flight tested.

But ballistic missiles and space-launchers are nearly identical.30 It is therefore possible that testing could be conducted under the guise of an SLY programme, with the intention later to produce and deploy missiles. However, SLVs and ballistic missiles can be distinguished by differences in trajectory, rocket size, guidance, propulsion, launch facilities and infrastructure and, of course, payload.31 Warhead technology-and especially the presence of ablative or other heat shielding materials - is probably the most obvious discrepancy between the two vehicles. SLVs, except for a few specific missions, such as manned flights, do not have heat protected nose cones, as their payload is not re-entering the earth's atmosphere with the expended launcher.32 Distinguishing between SLVs and missiles would be simplest if the regime provided for pre-launch inspection, yet detection of a covert missile programme should be possible even without such provisions.33

For verifying destruction of missiles, safeguarding dual use materials, and inspecting and observing space-launches, an international inspectorate would most likely have to be created. This body could also promote regional missile disarmament in pursuit of IBM and explore verification options for all aspects of a IBM regime. For instance, this body could decide whether conversion of decommissioned ICBMs to SLVs would be permitted and how this would be verified.34

Getting to Zero

At their June 1992 summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Bush agreed to START-II cuts that addressed both the Russians' desire to cut sub- marine-based ballistic missile weapons and the US desire to cut multiple-warhead land-based weapons to an interim ceiling of around 4,000 warheads. The cuts are to be accomplished within the seven-year START implementation period, and by 2003 both sides are to have reduced to a total of 3,000-3,500 warheads each, with all MIRVed ICBMs to be eliminated and SLBM warheads to be reduced to no more than 1,750 on each side.

These reductions bring the two countries down to levels where reciprocity from the other nuclear powers can begin to be expected.35 A IBM approach would reorient future superpower strategic cuts away from counting-warheads and toward counting missiles and launchers. To initiate sulfa regime, the US and Russia might announce further (per- haps Upper cent) 'post-START-II' strategic cuts and invite the other throb declared nuclear powers to join them. Ballistic missiles of each type deployed and stockpiled could be halved, with the warheads dismantled and the launchers and missiles destroyed (unless agreement was reached that they could be converted to SLVs). Of course, other forms of delivery, including cruise missiles and bombers, must be subject to ceilings to prevent their being built up in place of the ballistic missiles that are eliminated.

The 50 per cent reduction need not take long; when President Reagan put forward the idea at Reykjavik in 1986, his proposal called for a 50 per cent reduction within five years and total elimination of the US and Soviet missile stockpiles within ten years. While these cuts are being realized (concomitant with START and START-II cuts), the US and Russia should promote a global consensus banning ballistic missiles as weapons delivery vehicles. They could make their further reduction, and eventual elimination of all ballistic missiles, contingent on missile reductions from other states with ballistic missiles and pledges of ballistic missile non-proliferation from countries that do not possess them. Regional missile disarmament negotiations could be facilitated by Russia and the United States. The first steps would be to take a sounding of which countries in principle are willing to disavow ballistic missiles, to discover their concerns about the proposal, and to address those concerns. Janne Nolan has suggested an 'International Missile Conference', analogous to the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons held in January 1989, where countries could air their views on missile proliferation restrictions and international space co-operation schemes.36 Such a forum would provide an excellent opportunity for the superpowers to propose the elimination of all ballistic missiles.

Over 160 countries today do not deploy ballistic missiles, and could be expected to sign a missile ban right away. Entire regions of the world currently remain free of deployed ballistic missiles and apparently free of intentions to deploy them. These regions include South and Central America, sub-Saharan Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa), Australasia and Antarctica.37 Third World missile proliferation is fairly well localized on the Korean peninsula, on the Indian subcontinent and, most intractably, in the Middle East. It is in these regions that IBM is most needed, and perhaps most difficult to envision. In each of the regions where proliferation is occurring, confidence building measures on route to IBM agreement could first implemented. Such measures might include pre-notification of missile flight tests and inspection of missile production or deployment facilities. There follows a brief examination of the three regional missile races, and an examination of the feasibility of missile disarmament in each case.

Middle East Missile Roll-Back

In late 1988 the State Department began exploring missile control in the Middle East through separate talks with the Egyptian and Israeli governments. Under discussion, reportedly, were small confidence- building steps such as advance notice of missile flight tests and possibly 'no first use’ pledges that could lay the groundwork for farther-reaching steps in the future.38 Nothing more was reported of these efforts until 1991. In his policy pronouncement on Mideast arms control on 29 May of that year, President Bush called for a halt to further acquisition, production and testing of ballistic missiles of any range by states in the region, leading to 'the ultimate elimination of such missiles from their arsenals'.39 At a subsequent meeting of the permanent five UN Security Council members in Paris, the world's other major military powers endorsed this proposal. Principally, their support will take the form of increased vigilance on export controls of related technologies and, presumably, a reaffirmed pledge by all five not to sell any further missiles to the region.

Whether there is any support from within the region for the plan re- mains uncertain. No country has yet specifically embraced this one component of the President's arms control package, but many states have endorsed other, related measures. In general, Israel advocates limits on conventional arms transfers to the region, while the Arab states prefer to deal with unconventional weapons (notably nuclear) first. Because of their historical use as delivery vehicles for nuclear pay-loads, and because of their relationship to conventional air force capabilities, ballistic missiles fall into a grey area and so missile disarmament might be acceptable to both sides as a first step. Indeed, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has vigorously endorsed a plan for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which calls on all Middle Eastern countries to announce their commitment to 'deal effectively and honestly with matters involving the delivery systems of various weapons of mass destruction'.40

During a background press briefing on the President's Mideast arms control plan, an unnamed 'senior official' explained why the administration was optimistic about the possibility of a missile roll-back in the region: 'We've got an environment where you've just had an awful war; where you've had an awful image of the future; where you've got a lot of proposals out there; where you've got a coalition of potential suppliers that have shown an ability to work together; where you had countries in the region working together in unprecedented ways. It seems to all of us [in the administration] that this is certainly a situation worth ex ploring'.41 Furthermore, the official said that the countries of the region with whom the administration consulted after the war were encouraging on the prospects of such a plan.

Israeli acceptance of such a plan would be a mandatory first step. Having endured 39 missile launches during the 1991 Gulf War, the Israeli public would likely be supportive of a missile disarmament regime. Israel has been, and remains, very worried about the delivery of unconventional - especially chemical - payloads via Arab missiles, and, as the Gulf War demonstrated, ATBM systems cannot provide complete protection.42 Missiles are part of Israel's deterrence structure, and the Jericho I is believed to be a delivery means for at least some of Israel's nuclear weapons.43 But Israel also has a potent air force and would not need ballistic missiles to provide a credible means of delivery for its nuclear weapons. Given that Israel also possesses a highly effective air defense system, a move away from ballistic missiles toward air-breathing threats only should be comforting to Israel.

A negotiated ban on missiles would seem to serve the Arab states' and Iran's security interests as well. Many of the non-Israeli missiles in the Middle East threaten not just Israel, but other Islamic states as well, and the inaccuracy of most of the deployed missiles means that they primarily threaten civilian population centres. Iranian, Iraqi and Saudi, as well as Israeli, civilians have all come under indiscriminate attack by ~ - 'Muslim missiles' in the past decade. The Middle East peace talks, initiated in Madrid in October 1991, have established a multilateral arms control working group. Regional IBM could be discussed in this forum and might provide an issue where all sides' interests converge. Even if some countries in the region might not accept such an agreement, regional missile disarmament could still be effective. For example, if Libya refused to join the regime, this decision would immediately affect only Algeria and Egypt, since Libya currently only has 300 km range Scud missiles. Political and military assurances could be pledged in support of Algeria and Egypt (or any country against whom missiles are used or threatened), including perhaps the provision ATBMs.

Averting an Indian-Pakistani Missile Race

India began pursuing a civilian space-launch capability in the mid-1970s and has used some of its space-launch vehicle technology in a military missile programme. The two-stage, 2,400 km range Agni - first tested in May 1989 - uses, as its first stage, the solid-fuel booster motor of the SLY-3 satellite launch vehicle.44 India first tested the 240 km range Prithvi in 1989, and has tested this system several times since. This short range system was expected to be deployed by now, but, testifying in January 1992, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency said that both Pakistan and India 'may deploy short-range ballistic missiles by the end of the decade',45 making it seem unlikely that the longer-range Agni will be deployed for quite some time, if at all. In fact, it has been described by Indian officials as a 'technology demonstrator', a demonstration undoubtedly aimed at Beijing as much as Islamabad. With the Agni launch, India joined the ranks of the US, CIS, UK, France, China and Israel, as the only countries to have built a missile of such long range.

In early 1989 Pakistan reportedly tested two short range missile systems, Hatf-I and Hatf-II. Pakistan claimed at the time that these were indigenously developed with some Chinese assistance, but it is now believed that they were French-supplied rockets.46 Pakistan does have some indigenous missile activity, and its space agency, SUPARCO, is working toward a space-launch vehicle. In mid-1991 some missile technology controlled under the MTCR was transferred from China to Pakistan, resulting in the imposition of sanctions by the United States against the Chinese and Pakistani companies and government agencies involved.47 In November 1992 China reportedly transferred 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan.48 As of May 1993, however, the State Department refused to validate the allegations, saying no determination of whether a transfer in violation of the MTCR, US law, or Chinese obligations had yet been made.

Both Pakistan and India are believed to be 'nuclear capable' on short notice. Robert Gates testified in January 1992 that the CIA has 'no reason to believe that either India or Pakistan maintains assembled or deployed nuclear bombs'. He said that both countries have all of the parts or can make the parts on very short notice. 'But we believe that they would not want to assemble them for safety reasons'.49 It has been reported that Pakistan has converted some of its F-16s for nuclear- weapons delivery; on this, Gates testified that the CIA has 'information that suggests that they're clearly interested in enhancing the ability of the F-16 to deliver [nuclear] weapons safely'.50 India, too, has dozens of aircraft suitable for nuclear bomb delivery.

The main source of tension between Pakistan and India is the disputed territory of Kashmir. Aligned with India after the break-up of the two countries, Pakistan and India have fought three wars over the state, which is 64 per cent Muslim. A major recent flare-up occurred in April 1992, almost leading to war. Negotiations over the issue are ongoing, but it remains a volatile situation. Nevertheless, some progress has recently been made. In December 1990, the two agreed to resume high-level weekly contacts between their militaries and to finalize an agreement on pre-notification of military exercises.51 In January 1991 they ratified a treaty banning attacks on both countries' nuclear installations.52 Further, in August 1992, India and Pakistan signed a bilateral treaty forswearing the development, production, acquisition or use of chemical weapons.

An agreement to forgo a costly ballistic missile race would seem to be in the interests of both India and Pakistan; both countries have per capita GNPs of under $350. Pakistan has been seeking bilateral discussions with India to address missile proliferation in South Asia,53 and it has proposed a meeting on regional arms control, especially nuclear arms control, to include India, Pakistan, China, the US and Russia. All have agreed to attend such a meeting but India, which claims that given the global reach of nuclear weapons, they should be discussed only in a global context.54

India and China have recently improved relations as well. The two countries recently agreed to establish confidence-building and crisis- response measures, such as hot-line communication links between their militaries and greater openness in military operations.55 India's acceptance of a IBM regime would clearly be linked to Chinese acceptance. Since the majority of China's strategic nuclear deterrent is missile- based, Chinese acceptance might be difficult to obtain initially. But, as Alton Frye put it: 'China would face a clear choice: either accept the advantages to its own security of the Russo-American initiative and join the process, or keep its missiles and continue to face two vastly superior missile forces'.56 In addition, Beijing would have to factor in a likely near-term ballistic missile threat from India.

Ballistic Missile Disarmament on the Korean Peninsula

Currently North Korea most likely deploys only the 300 km range Scud missiles which it received from Egypt, as well as some slightly extended- range Scud clones which it now produces. According to a number of sources, North Korea is refining the Scud to increase its range to about 600 kilometres and to improve its guidance system, although no technical details are available.57 In its first flight test, in May 1990, the extended-range missile blew up on the launch pad.58 It has apparently not yet been successfully flight tested. In December 1992 Robert Gates stated that 'Pyongyang is not far from having a much larger missile for sale - one with a range of at least 1,000 km. We also believe that North Korea may be developing an even longer range missile'.59 However, no flight tests of a missile anywhere near this range have been reported in the press.

North Korea's currently deployed Scud missiles already permit strikes on most of South Korea. Joseph Bermudez writes that 'of the 109 active air fields/bases within the ROK, 48 are within the operational range of FROG-5 [50 km range artillery rocket] and 91 are within operational Scud-B range' of the forward-based missiles.60 An enhanced-range Scud might be able to hit the remaining strategic rear area military targets in the southern end of the peninsula, while a 1,000 km North Korean missile would put Japan, China and part of Siberia within striking distance. Reports of North Korea's nuclear programme make such missile developments highly worrisome to those countries. Allegations that North Korea is selling its Scud missiles to countries in the Middle East, as well as helping some countries establish their own production facilities, add to the desirability of obtaining North Korean agreement to missile disarmament.

Through reverse-engineering of US-supplied Nike-Hercules surface- to-air missiles, South Korea produced the 240 km 'Korean SSM', a two-stage, solid fuel, surface-to-surface missile. Seoul has also announced plans for an ambitious space-launch programme. The Congressional Re- search Service reported in 1988 that a launch vehicle was to be tested by 1991 (it never was), with the launch of a 1,100 lb. satellite by 1996.61 While this early date is unlikely, South Korea is a technically advanced industrializing country and is developing a military aerospace industry through licensed production of the American F-16. It had a GNP of over $210 billion last year (compared to an estimated $30 billion for North Korea), and could likely produce fairly sophisticated ballistic missiles if it chose to do so.

Until recently, relations between the two Koreas had been improving markedly. In December 1991 they signed both an agreement on 'Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation', and a 'Joins Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula'. Under the agreements, each side commits not to 'test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use' nuclear weapons.62 These agreements entered into force on 19 February 1992, but the verification mechanisms were not worked out. The two sides also agreed to establish a North-South Joint Military Commission to 'discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reductions . . . including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and certificationhereof'.63 They also agreed to hold further talks aimed at national reconciliation, and are carrying out exchanges in the sciences, sports and art. The Agreement also calls on the two sides to 'permit free correspondence, reunions and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives and ... promote the voluntary reunion of divided families'. In a lengthy interview, out-going South Korean President Rob Tae Woo said in September 1992 that tensions on the peninsula were greatly reduced, and that South Korea's recent normalization of relations with China and Russia (further isolating North Korea) improved prospects for unification.64

Ties between the two countries, however, took a sudden turn for the worse in late 1992 over the alleged North Korean nuclear weapons programme. In early May 1992 Pyongyang made a declaration of its nuclear materials holdings and nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in order to negotiate an effective safeguards agreement under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In November technicians discovered discrepancies which indicated that the North had actually separated more plutonium than it had declared. Although the IAEA has thus far uncovered no evidence to indicate that North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon, some experts fear that the North may have separated the five to ten kilograms necessary for the construction of an atomic bomb. Because of these fears and discrepancies, as well as intelligence information provided by the CIA, the IAEA now wants to inspect two undeclared sites which are suspected of being covert waste storage facilities. Pyongyang refused to allow the inspections and in- stead, in early March, opted to withdraw from the NPT, a process which takes six months to effect. At the time of writing, representatives from the United States are meeting with officials from North Korea in Beijing, attempting to persuade the North to reverse its decision to withdraw, and to allow full IAEA inspections. Obviously the establishment of a ballistic missile-free peninsula hinges on a satisfactory resolution of this ongoing crisis.


Given this regional progress, one may question whether a global IBM regime is needed. But because certain of the regional ballistic missile aspirants are engaged in arms races with the declared nuclear powers, a purely regional approach would probably not work. India is not likely to agree to IBM unless China is involved, and Pakistan would not likely agree if India did not. And if Pakistan did not agree, Israel (in light of / Pakistan's alleged 'Islamic bomb') might not join a Mideast IBM. And so on.

By itself, a ballistic missile capability is far less dangerous than a nuclear weapons capability. Ballistic missiles do, however, heighten the danger by radically reducing decision-making time and increasing fears of a sudden attack. Currently, few countries in the world deploy nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, and only a handful have intercontinental range missiles. But more ICBM countries can be expected to emerge in the coming decades, and the Third World countries closest to developing long-range missiles and SLVs also have nuclear weapons. While these countries (Israel and India) may not be politically very worrisome to the United States, deployment of long-range nuclear missiles by them is bound to increase the anxiety and insecurity of many other countries.

Currently, the preferred strategy of the US government to prevent or at least forestall this eventuality is a missile technology export control regime and research and development of anti-missile systems. Such a system, rather than providing global security, may actually increase global anxiety and tension. A global ballistic missile disarmament regime, co-operatively engaging the developing world in the disarmament process, providing demonstrable security benefits, and not seeking to obstruct legitimate civilian space efforts, provides a more promising solution to the missile proliferation threat posed to those countries and to the United States.

To achieve IBM, the United States and Russia must restructure future strategic cuts away from warhead reductions and toward missile reductions. They must announce a substantial bilateral missile force cut beyond the recent 'START-II' agreement, while making the complete elimination of their ballistic missiles contingent on agreement by the other missile states to join in going to zero. The superpowers could jump-start the process by initiating a treaty of declared intent and opening it for signature, or by holding a global conference in which participants engaged in regional missile races would be asked to declare that if their adversary (or adversaries) would get rid of its (their) missiles, they would do likewise.

Elimination of ballistic missiles, while not a solution to all of the world's security problems, provides a good interim goal for further nuclear reductions. Dismantlement of all the five declared nuclear powers' nuclear missiles would constitute large-scale nuclear disarmament and a clear demonstration of good faith. At the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, where the signatories will decide whether to extend the treaty, and beyond, such measures will be needed to persuade today's non-nuclear states that their long-term goal should be to live in a nuclear-free world, not to join the club.


1. For example, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, has argued in favour of developing an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, claiming that the US will not 'remain safe from long-range ballistic missiles launched .. . deliberately by a third world country'. Sam Nunn, 'Needed: An ABM Defence', New York Times, 31 July 1991, p. A19. ,

2. Prepared testimony of Robert Gates, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 15 Jan. 1992, p. 3

3. Testimony of Gordon Oehler before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (Washington: Federal News Services, 15 Jan 1992).

4. Of the approximately 180 nation-states in the world today, only eight - the United States, France, Britain, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine - deploy inter-continental range ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Of these, three (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) have pledged to eliminate or transfer these missiles. Four additional countries deploy or have until recently deployed intermediate range (500-5,500 km) ballistic missiles: Bulgaria (500 km), Czechoslovakia (500 km), Israel (1,450 km), and Saudi Arabia (1,850 km). North Korea is reported to be working on a 600-1,000 km range missile, but no successful flight tests of it have been reported. India has twice flight tested a 2,400 km range missile, the Agni. Iraq previously deployed 600 km and possibly 800 km extended-range Scud missiles. These missiles have now been destroyed by the UN Special Commission implementing the Gulf War cease-fire agreement. Fifteen other countries deploy or have until recently deployed short range ballistic missiles (110 500 km). These are: Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Of these fifteen, six are European countries that have already demobilized their short-range Lance, Scud. SS-21 and SS-23 missiles. Of the remaining nine - all of which are developing countries - four deploy only Scud missiles transferred from the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s and have no known indigenous missile production capability or intent. The remaining five countries also imported Scud or other short-range missiles and are now producing them or attempting to do so. See Lora Lumpe, Lisbeth Groniund and David C. Wright, 'Third World Missiles Fall Short'. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 48, No. 2 (March 1992), p. 32.

5. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

6. In 1990 the Soviet Union agreed to abide by the MTCR export guidelines. At least four of the former Soviet republics - including Russia - are interested in becoming formal members of the MTCR. and 'have asked [the US] to send out a team to tell them what they have to do to qualify' for membership. Transcript of remarks by Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 Dec. 1991, pp. 5-2 and 6-1. As of December 1992. none had become members. The Chinese are apparently not slated to become full members of the MTCR either, although during former Secretary of State James Baker's trip to China in November 1991 the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reportedly said that 'Chine intends to abide by the standards and interpretations of the Missile Technology Control Regime when making technological transfers, on the condition that the United States lift the three sanctions it placed on China on 16 June 1991'. Zhongguo Xinwen She, 21 Nov. 91, reprinted in Foreign Information Broadcasting Service (FBIS), China: Daily Report, No. 91-225, p. 1. This condition was met by the Bush administration in February 1992 after the Chinese government put its pledge down in writing. In September 1992, in waiving further satellite export sanctions as part of this agreement, the State Department reported: 'The Administration has carefully monitored Chinese compliance [with its missile export control pledge] and concludes that Chinese behavior is consistent with its obligations'. Statement by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, 11 Sept. 1992. Israel announced in the autumn of 1991 that it would adhere to the MTCR export guidelines beginning on 1 January 1992. This adherence was urged by Washington in exchange for the US not applying sanctions against Israel for missile proliferation activities involving South Africa. The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Knesset approved amendments to Israel's relevant legislation (the Control of Commodities and Services Order) to implement Israel's adherence to MTCR export guidelines on 24 December 1991. No other approval is required to make the decision effective. See Davar 25 Dec. 1991, reprinted in FBIS, Near East: Daily Report, No. 91-251, p. 19; and Wall Street Journal, 26 Dec. 91, p. 4. According to State Department testimony before Congress in March 1992, a dialogue with East European countries, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil about membership to the regime has begun. State Department testimony the following month stated that Argentina now observes 'MTCR-equivalent controls'. Testimony of Richard Clarke before the Joint Economic Committee, 13 March 1992. At the last meeting of the MTCR, on 8 March in Canberra, Australia, both Argentina and Hungary were invited to become members. US Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, 25 March 1993.

7. Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 'Summary of the Equipment and Technology Annex', 16 April 1987, p. 3.

8. For example, the joint Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor missile programme.

9. 'Missile Technology Control Regime: Fact Sheet to Accompany Public Announcement', White House Office of the Press Secretary, 16 April 1987, p.1

10. Federal Register, 18 May 1992, pp. 21143-4 and Federal Register, 19 May 1992, p. 21319.

11. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 29 June 1992, p. 68.

12. A better approach for controlling exports of missile- or space-launch relevant technology was outlined in a major study of export controls released by the National Academy of Sciences in 1991. The report recommended that the US avoid unilateral application of export controls and focus on destinations of the greatest proliferation concern - countries that violate some norms of conduct. 'In order to be effective, proliferation controls must be focused only on narrowly proscribed military activities or items that are required directly for weapons systems and must include, to the ex- tent practicable, verifiable end-use assurances. Lacking such specificity, efforts to control exports of proliferation-related technologies create a risk . . . [off imposing significant economic costs that may be disproportionate to their effectiveness'. Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of US National Security Export Controls, Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy, Executive Summary: Finding Common Ground, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1991, pp. 234.

13. The 'Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Fact Sheet', undated. but re- leased by the State Department following the November 1991 MTCR plenary meeting in Washington DC, notes that 'the Guidelines are open to all nations to implement, and all governments are encouraged to do so'.

14. Dan Revelle, 'US Muscle Misses the Mark', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov. 1992, pp. 10-11, 44.

15. 'French Cryogenic Technology for GSLV', The Hindu, 30 Oct. 1989 cited in Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1991), p. 127.

16. A better standard might be any projectile following a ballistic trajectory for the majority of its flight with a range of 100 km or greater with a 500 kg payload.

17. 'Revisions to MTCR Guidelines', released on 7 January 1993 by US Department of State.

18. Prepared testimony of Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittees on Arms Control and Europe/ Middle East, 24 March 1992.

19.Kenneth Adelman, 'Curing Missile Measles', Washington Times, 17 April 1989, p. D1 and 'How to Limit Everybody's Missiles', New York Times, 7 April 1991; Kathleen C. Bailey, 'Rushing to Build Missiles', Washington Post, 6 April 1990, p. A15 and 'Can Missile Proliferation be Reversed?', Orbis, Vol. 35 No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 5-14.

20.The continental United States is roughly 8,000-10,000 km from the Middle East and 8,000 km from the Korean peninsula.

21. Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation, p. 162

22. For more on the proposal at Reykjavik, see Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era (New York: Touchstone, 1992, pp. 155-209. For analyses of the proposal at the time, see Richard Perle, 'Reykjavik as a Watershed in US-Soviet Arms Control', Thomas C. Schelling, 'Abolition of Ballistic Missiles', Leon Sloss, 'A World Without Ballistic Missiles', and Randall Forsberg, 'Abolishing Ballistic Missiles', in International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 175-96.

23. See Sidney D. Drell, 'Science and National Security', Occasional Paper, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992; F.A.S. Public Interest Reporl, May/June 1992; Sidney D. Drell, 'Abolishing Long-range Nuclear Missiles', Issues in Science and Technology, (Spring 1992), pp. 34-5; and Alton Frye, 'Zero Ballistic Missiles', Foreign Policy, No. 88 (Fall 1992), pp. 3-20.

24. The presence of hundreds of ballistic missiles in the Middle East has not deterred war or the use of these missiles. In fact, only Afghanistan and the Middle East have seen ballistic missile warfare since Germany fired V-2 missiles in World War 11. Over a thousand Scud missiles have been fired in the 1973 October War, the intense missile warfare in the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghan civil war and the recent war over Kuwait. This pattern of missile use is especially ominous when considering the possible proliferation of mass destruction payloads. It is not clear that such unconventionally armed missiles will be effective as deterrents, and not be used, eventually.

25. A report leaked to the press in January suggested that in the post Cold War, 'every reasonable adversary'- some presumably in the developing world - should be targeted with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. R. Jeffrey Smith, 'US Urged to Cut 50% of A-Arms', Washington Post, 6 Jan. 1992, p. A1.

26. The United States, CIS, Italy, China, Japan, Israel, India and the European Space Agency. Brazil is working to attain such a capability but is not projected to do so for several years. 27. Space News, 7-13 Sept. 1992, p. 22.

28. In the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, just completed, the 'Australia Group' chemical weapon-relevant export controls will initially be left in place, but their continued application will be reviewed as the treaty is implemented. Some pro- vision would have to be made under IBM to maintain the MTCR export controls that restrict the transfer of cruise missiles and related technologies to developing countries.

29. Prepared testimony of William Webster, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 18 May 1989.

30. A recent paper prepared for the SDI Organization notes the potential ballistic missile threats to the US posed by these launch vehicles: 'Those nations with access to space launch vehicles can readily convert the vehicles into ICBMs. Certain countries may be willing to sell or transfer their space launch vehicles to other states for legitimate space purposes, such as communications, surveillance and scientific exploration; once sold, these vehicles may be used for weapons purposes . . . The increasing avail- ability of space launch vehicles and space launch services could result in the ability of certain Third World countries to threaten the continental United States with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical or biological payloads in the mid to late 1900s [sicl. Although these threats will be limited to a few ICBMs - probably 10 or less - with very poor accuracies, they could be an effective deterrent to desired US actions or they could be used as terrorist weapons. These potential threats should be taken into account in OPALS planning. Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate, 'OPALS and Foreign Space Launch Vehicle Capabilities', Science Applications International Corporation, prepared under SDIO contract no. 84-91-C-0012, p. 18.

31. See Jurgen Scheffran, 'Dual Use of Missiles and Space Technologies', in Gotz Neu- neck and Otfried Ischebeck (eds.), Missile Technologies, Proliferation, and Concepts for Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993).

32. Dr Phillip Morrison, in F.A.S. Public Interest Report (May/June 1992), p. 12.

33. For more on verification issues, see Frye, 'Zero Ballistic Missiles', pp. 12-17.

34. Russia is currently proposing to convert SS-25 and SS-18s into SLVs. Ironically, the SDIO has even suggested that Russian SS-18s might be used to launch 'Brilliant Pebbles' - part of OPALS - into orbit. Conversion in the US space industry is highly controversial. Most companies, fearing lost revenues (and jobs and industrial base capacity) oppose the idea; however, Martin Marietta currently has a œ660 million contract to refurbish 14 US Titan II to SLVs. This work includes modifying the for- ward end of the second stage to accommodate 10 foot fairings of varying lengths; refurbishing the liquid fuel engines; upgrading the inertial guidance and developing new command, destruct and telemetry systems. One reworked Titan has already flown. The cost per missile is $47 million. Aerospace America, May 1992, pp. 15-16.

35. In the past, Britain, France and China have each said that they would reduce their nuclear weapons forces only after Washington and Moscow reduced their nuclear forces by some substantial, but unspecified, amount. In response to cuts announced in 1991 and 1992, however, China declared that before it will join them, the US and Russia must first 'cut their nuclear arsenal to China's level'. Zhang Ping, 'State lauds disarming proposals', cited in John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, 'China's Ballistic Missile Programmes', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 39. Britain and France currently deploy all of their strategic nuclear forces on ballistic missiles. IBM would therefore imply renunciation of their strategic nuclear deter- rents or a reconfiguration of their forces. Currently Britain plans to continue with the procurement of US Trident nuclear submarines, having ordered its fourth in July 1992. Under pressure from the United States, it is likely that Britain would reconsider its position. France has canceled its short-range Hads nuclear missile and will eliminate its Pluton missiles, and further evolution of the French position is not in- conceivable. China is believed to have eight nuclear ICBMs, 12 nuclear SLBMs, about 60 nuclear IRBMs and 120 H-6 medium-range strategic bombers with about 240 nuclear bombs. See IISS, The Military Balance 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1992), p. 236. As part of a IBM arrangement, China could be permitted to acquire a more credible strategic bomber force, perhaps by buying Russian bombers.

36. Janne Nolan, Trappings of Power (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 165

37. A ban on the deployment of ballistic missiles in South America was recently pro- posed by Peru. (UN General Assembly A1461397)

38. 'US Presses Mideast Missile Talks', Washington Post, 28 Dec. 1988, p. 15.

39. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'Fact Sheet on Middle East Arms Control Initiative', 29 May 1991, p.2

40. MENA (Cairo), 5 Aug. 1991, reprinted in FBIS, Near East: Daily Report, No. 91-151, p. 20.

41. White House background briefing on President Bush's Middle East Arms Control Initiative, Released by the Office of the Press Secretary, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 29 May 1991.

42. Some have questioned whether Patriot provided any protection from Scud launches. or even increased the danger and physical damage. See Theodore A. Postal, 'Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot', International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter l99V92), pp. 119-71.

43. 'Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems Handbook - Free World', DST-lOOH-283-89, July 1989, p. 20.

44. Gary Milhollin, 'India's Missiles - With a Little Help from Our Friends', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45, No. 9 (Nov. 1989), p. 35 l

45. Prepared testimony of Lt. Gen. James Clapper before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 Jan. 1992, p. 13.

46. Aaron Karp, 'Ballistic Missile Proliferation', in SIPRI Yearbook 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 341.

47. Federal Register, 17 July 91, p. 32601.

48. Jim Mann, 'China Said to Sell Pakistan New Missiles', Los Angeles Times, 4 Dec. 1991; R. Jeffrey Smith, 'China Said to Sell Arms To Pakistan', Washington Post, 4 Dec. 91, p. A10.

49. Testimony of Robert Gates, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 15 Jan. 1992.

50. Ibid.

51. Steve Coll, 'India, Pakistan Agree on Treaty', Washington Post, 21 Dec. 1990.

52. Although it had been signed in 1988, lists of protected sites - nuclear power and re- search facilities, uranium enrichment plants and other related facilities - were first exchanged in Jan. 1992.

53. FBIS, Near East: Daily Report, no. 92-108, pp. 42-3.

54. 'We don't want a meeting in which three powers outside the region tell us what to do', the Indian Foreign Secretary said in March 1992. Gus Constantine, 'India Ready to Discuss Nuclear Arms Control with US'. Washington Times, 11 March 1992.

55. Brahma Chellaney, 'India-China Border Tensions Easing', Washington Times, 11 August 1992, p. A8.

56. Frye, 'Zero Ballistic Missiles', p. 9.

57. Karp, 'Ballistic Missile Proliferation', p. 319; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., 'New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme', Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review. August 1990, p. 343.

58. Bill Gertz, 'North Korean Missile Apparently Blows Up', Washington Times, 5 July 1990.

59. Robert Gates, 'Weapons Proliferation: The Most Dangerous Challenge for American Intelligence', prepared remarks for the Costmock Club, Sacramento, 15 Dec. 1992, p. 16.

60. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., 'Korean People's Army NBC Capabilities', Statement for the Record before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 9 Feb. 1989, p. 16.

61. Shucy et al., Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, CRS Report for Congress, Oct. 1988, p. 82.

62. 'Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula', CD/1147, 25 March 92.

63. 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North', CDtl147, 25 March 1992.

64. David E. Sanger, 'North Korea's A-Bomb Plans Seem Less Certain', New York Times, 18 Sept. 1992; Don Oberdorfer, 'S. Korean Sees Better Chance at Unification', Washington Post, 22 Sept. 1992 p. A16.

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