Proposal For a Zero Ballistic Missile Regime

By J. Jerome Holton, Lora Lumpe, and Jeremy J. Stone

1993 Science and International Security Anthology AAAS: Washington, 1993 pp. 379-396.

When nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles entered the strategic armories of the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s, people of the world recognized the added dimension of global insecurity that they presented. Impossible to recall, quick to target, vulnerable to preemption, and later equipped with multiple warheads, the missiles were cause for nightmares.

A global ban on ballistic missiles would roll back the nuclear context to one akin to the bomber-based forces of the 1950s. This would dramatically increase decision-making time and thus crisis stability, it would further enhance global security by removing the threat of accidental launch of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and it would provide an interim stage upon which further nuclear disarmament could proceed.

In the 1990s, a confluence of events makes conceivable such large-scale missile disarmament. In addition to the end of the Cold War--which makes the superpower missiles ever more irrelevant and missile disarmament ever more feasible--there is a growing fear among the major powers of Third World missiles.1 Meanwhile, the alternatives to missile disarmament look less desirable. The current approach to curbing missile proliferation, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), is a sellers' cartel, which cannot reliably contain missile and space technology for long. And anti- missile systems, which continue to be developed as a hedge against the failure of the MTCR and against accidental launch of Russian or other missiles, would be much costlier and less reliable than a global regime banning missiles.

Meanwhile, in much of the Third World there is a readiness to forgo costly regional ballistic missile arms races if the great powers would eliminate their own ballistic missiles and withdraw any threat of ballistic missiles against the regions involved.

Accordingly, this chapter proposes a reorientation of great- power disarmament toward eliminating ballistic missiles, rather than warheads. This approach would encourage an interactive process of world disarmament, in which willingness by the Third World to forgo ballistic missiles would be combined synergistically with actions by the global military powers toward the joint goal of zero ballistic missiles (ZBM).2 Unlike past and current bilateral strategic cuts, a ZBM regime would also include the United Kingdom, France, and China.

The proposed regime would ultimately eliminate both land- and sea-based ballistic missiles with ranges in excess of 100 km that are used as delivery vehicles for weapon payloads. A ZBM regime would not discriminate between "haves" and "have-nots"; instead it would have as its central goal the transformation of all states into "have-nots."


Like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) process, ZBM would employ a bandwagon approach. Many of the world's 180 sovereign states would commit themselves early to forgo offensive ballistic missiles on a unilateral basis. Other states, such as those in Latin America, would pledge to forgo offensive ballistic missiles on a regional basis.

Unlike the discriminatory NPT regime, which permits existing nuclear powers to retain nuclear weapons, to start this process, the United States, Russia, and other ballistic missile states would have to agree to eliminate their ballistic missiles. And, indeed, this elimination of great-power ballistic missiles is a key goal of the process, of benefit to all concerned.

In sum, the proposal imagines a four-stage process:

  • Stage I--Good-Faith Initiative Contingent on Worldwide Agreement in Principle: The United States and Russia agree to make substantial cuts in the number of deployed missiles beyond that mandated by START II and to do so on an accelerated schedule, contingent upon a suitable global consensus to negotiate a collection of ballistic-missile-free zones covering the entire globe.
  • Stage II--Conference Generates Consensus: An international missile conference (analogous to the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons held in January 1989) would air the concerns of all interested countries with regard to missile proliferation, export restrictions, and international space cooperation. The conference would produce an accord conveying the intent of its signatories to negotiate, and participate in, regional ballistic-missile-free zones.

Only after a suitable number of countries in every world region, including the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and other major missile states, had ratified the accord would the United States and Russia be committed to implement their good-faith Initiative.

  • Stage III--ZBM Zone Creation: In this stage, the ZBM regime would be designed and the ballistic-missile-free zones negotiated. An international agency for ballistic missile disarmament would be created to supervise the ZBM process and to provide technical and diplomatic assistance to states.
  • Stage IV--Ballistic Missile Disarmament: In this stage, all states would move, on various schedules, to ZBM capability. States with major missile capability, such as China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, would be required, according to the terms of the accord negotiation in stage II, to eliminate all ballistic missiles not later than an agreed-upon period of years beyond the completion of the final regional ballistic-missile-free zone.

Periodic five-year conferences would be held to review and synchronize the world missile disarmament process.

This accord would need to cover three types of states:

  • zero-capability states, that is, those which have not deployed military ballistic missiles and have no intention to do so;
  • regional states, that is, those which are embroiled in local tensions and arms races that prevent their unilateral renunciation of military ballistic missiles, but which would participate in regional missile-free zones; and
  • global powers, that is, those which, by virtue of their deployed missile capability, can threaten any point on the globe.

The most serious threats of missile proliferation are fairly well localized in three regions: the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the Korean peninsula, and the Indian subcontinent. In each of these and other regions, an individual ZBM zone would be negotiated by the regional states. The resulting zone treaty would allow the countries of the region to satisfy their regional security concerns. Additional- ly, the global powers would sign protocols to these regional treaties, pledging not to use ballistic missiles against states within the regions.


We do not underestimate the difficulties of completing the regional negotiating process; neither do we find these difficulties in- surmountable. Confidence-building measures already under way could be used as stepping-stones toward creating ZBM regional zones. Such measures might be expanded to include prior notification or limits of missile flight tests and inspection of missile production or deployment facilities.

South Asia

Tensions in South Asia have been high for decades, due partly to the Chinese annexation of Tibet in the 1950s and to territorial disputes among China, India, and Pakistan. Any South Asian ZBM zone would thus have to include China. Tensions between India and Pakistan have increased over the last decade, edging dangerously close to a nuclear exchange in 1991. Within the past few years, however, the two have undertaken a series of confidence-and security-building measures, including advance notification of military exercises, establishment of hot lines, exchange of military visitors, a bilateral chemical weapons agreement, and a pledge not to attack declared nuclear facilities.

Especially relevant, India’s security community has recently discusses proposals for a regional ballistic missile ban, and Pakistan’s foreign ministry calling for the creation of U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for the creation of a ZBM zone in South Asia this fall.3 The proposal here engages China simultaneously on the level of the global power negotiations and in the design and participation in a South Asian ZBM zone to satisfy the security concerns of India and Pakistan.

Middle East and Persian Gulf

A regional missile ban has been discussed widely in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf since the late 1980s and is supported by the United States, Israel, and, perhaps, Egypt.4 In his policy pronouncement on Mideast arms control on 29 May 1991, President Bush called for a halt to further acquisition, production, and testing of ballistic missiles of any range by states in the region, leading to "the ultimate elimination of such missiles from their arsenals." In January 1993, Israel proposed that "all countries of the region ... construct a mutually verifiable zone, free of surface-to-surface missiles and of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons."5 Egypt, which has long supported a similar goal through the "Mubarak Plan" for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, reportedly sought to discuss bilaterally the Israeli proposal.6

The inaccuracy of most of the deployed missiles means that they primarily threaten civilian population centers. Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi, as well as, Israeli, civilians have all come under indiscriminate missile attack in the past decade, thus likely increasing public support for such a ban. Further improving prospects for a ban is the fact that Iraq and Libya--two of the most worrisome ballistic missile states from the U.S. perspective--are currently under U.N. arms embargoes, and therefore unable to purchase missiles or related technologies.7

Northeast Asia

There is enormous concern in China, Japan, and South Korea about North Korean nuclear and missile developments. Although a regional ZBM zone is not currently forthcoming, such an agreement is conceivable with the passing of Kim ll Sung.

Moreover, underlying the prospects of regional success are certain premises which, over time, will manifest themselves. First, states will recognize that if they wish to maintain threats of mass destruction under this regime, they can maintain them with _ bombers, which currently provide a more likely means of delivery for nuclear weapons by developing countries than do missiles. Second, the leadership of states will change with time (for example, in North Korea), and new leadership may prove more receptive to the offers and pressures the world can apply regarding ballistic missile disarmament. In time, and with proper orchestration, even stalwart holdouts can be assimilated into the world consensus and process. Last, a ZBM regime directly and actively involves Third World states in the preclusion of further ballistic missile deployments in their respective regions; it shifts to them part of the burden and responsibility of treaty verification and creates the political basis to allow Third World countries to pursue safeguarded space launch programs. Politically, this is a more stable basis for arresting missile proliferation than the present cartel approach.

While these regional efforts are taking hold, the global powers would proceed with their initial 50 percent reduction of ballistic missile inventories. The numbers of missiles of each type deployed and stockpiled would be halved, with the launchers and missiles destroyed. Other delivery vehicles, including cruise missiles and bombers, might be subject to ceilings to prevent their being built up in place of the ballistic missiles that are eliminated.

The global powers would synchronize the destruction of their remaining missile inventories with, and make it contingent upon, the complete elimination of ballistic missiles from within the regional zones.

While many states, and some regions, could be signed up immediately, others, such as the Middle East, will present challenges which might take decades to resolve. Even after a quarter century, the NPT process is not yet complete. But the NPT process has been successful in slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons far beyond the expectations of analysts in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. A ZBM process might be similarly useful, even if not completed for a long time.


To ensure that permitted space-launch vehicle programs do not harbor a small number of prohibited offensive ballistic missiles,8 a high degree of transparency, inspection, and cooperation will be required. For verifying destruction of missiles, safeguarding dual- use materials, orchestrating information exchange, and inspecting and observing space launches, an international inspectorate would have to be created. This body would explore verification options for all aspects of a ZBM regime. For instance, this body could decide whether conversion of decommissioned ICBMs to space launchers would be permitted, and how this would be verified.9

By evaluating the launch facilities and infrastructure, booster production rates, rocket size and configuration, guidance, propulsion, telemetry data, and payload, the inspectorate would achieve a high level of confidence in distinguishing between ballistic missiles and space launchers.10 Warhead technology--and especially the presence of ablative or other heat-shielding materials--is probably the most obvious discrepancy between the two vehicles. Space-launch vehicles, other than those for manned flights, do not have heat-protected nose cones, because their payload is not intended to reenter the earth's atmosphere with the expended launcher.11

Distinguishing between space launchers and missiles would be simplest if the regime provided for prelaunch inspection, yet detection of a covert missile program should be possible even without such provisions.12

Satellite and aircraft reconnaissance could be used reliably to verify that no missiles are deployed at fixed-site launch pads. Verifying the absence of mobile missiles is more difficult; however, since Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. government has redoubled efforts to enhance its capability to locate mobile missiles. Further- more, it is probable that the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council, which have in the past sold missiles to Third World countries, maintain accurate records of the number of launchers and missiles sold. Therefore, some baseline figures for most missiles and launchers liable for dismantlement probably exist.

Development of a new missile cannot be kept secret. As then CIA director William Webster acknowledged in May 1989, "The status of missile development programs is less difficult to track than nuclear weapons development. New missile systems must be tested thoroughly and in the open...."13 Flight-testing is essential and is unavoidably observable--and it becomes more easily observable the longer the range of the missile. U.S. early warning satellites, which reportedly tracked all of the Iraqi Scud launches during the Gulf War, could reliably determine whether missiles were or were not being flight-tested.


In contrast to the ZBM solution to missile proliferation, the current approach attempts only to manage for a time the further spread of missiles and associated technologies while developing antimissile systems.14 Initiated in 1987 with seven members, the MTCR has grown to include twenty-three Western industrialized countries.15

Argentina and Hungary have been invited and have applied - for MTCR membership. Several additional countries--including Russia, China, and Israel--have pledged to abide by MTCR export guidelines.

MTCR members and adherents pledge to restrict transfers of "complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500-kilogram [kg] payload to a range of at least 300 km,"16 as well as complete weapons-use- able subsystems and associated production facilities. Revisions to the guidelines in 1993 ban the transfer of any delivery vehicle (other than manned aircraft) believed to be intended for delivery of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon.17

While the MTCR has gone a long way toward creating a norm against ballistic missile proliferation and has been effective in slowing and reportedly even in ending some missile programs,18 it has several shortcomings.

Given the short distances separating borders and cities in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia, the MTCR parameters limiting missiles with payloads of 500 kg or more and ranges of 300 km or more are not inclusive enough to provide real security benefits to countries in these regions. Neither does the MTCR address the already existing ballistic missile arsenals in Third World countries. Although the MTCR may be successful in forestalling development of missiles that can strike the United States directly, missiles already deployed can strike U.S. allies and overseas bases, and, indeed, this is the major argument for deployment of ballistic missile defenses.

By contrast, under a ZBM approach, the developing world would gain some palpable security benefits; ZBM, if achieved, would dramatically improve the security environment by eliminating all missiles with range greater than 100 km and by preventing costly, destabilizing regional missile races. The process of ZBM would also dispel the specter of Third World countries being included in the targeting calculus of the global powers.

Further, the MTCR regime seems to have acquired the goal of preventing developing countries from gaining access to space through indigenous space launch programs. The MTCR guidelines reputedly "are not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.''19 Unfortunately, since any space launch program could contribute to a ballistic missile capable of delivering a weapon of mass destruction, developing-country space programs are being thwarted.

A ZBM approach would not prohibit international space cooperation or indigenous development of space-launch vehicles by parties to the regime, thus leaving open an avenue for scientific and technical development through space programs. With ballistic missiles removed from global arsenals, export restrictions on dual- use components and technologies could be relaxed for adherents, allowing those few countries seeking indigenous space launch capability to achieve their goals through international cooperation and monitoring.

Another problem arises from the fact that the MTCR is not a treaty, but rather a set of guidelines which are implemented by each member or adherent through that country's national policies, resulting in asymmetrical guideline enforcement. The United States, for example, is the only MTCR member which has imposed sanctions against countries for exporting or importing restricted components and technologies.20 In a major study on export controls in 1991, the National Academy of Sciences recommended that the United States avoid such unilateral application of export controls. "Export controls must be focused only on narrowly proscribed military activities or items that are required directly for weapons systems and must include, to the extent practicable, verifiable end-use assurances. Lacking such specificity, efforts to control exports of proliferation-related technologies create a risk… [of] imposing significant economic costs that may be disproportionate to their effective- ness.''21 A ZBM approach would allow for intrusive end-use verification of dual-use technologies.

Probably the greatest weakness of the MTCR is the flawed premise upon which the regime is based: technology denial as a long-term solution to proliferation concerns. Supplier cartels do nothing to address the demand for missiles, which is born of regional political tension and local arms races. The developing world views the MTCR with suspicion and hostility; through it they see an attempt by the developed countries to bar their entry into peaceful space activities. Like the NPT, the MTCR is seen as another discriminatory regime in which the North is allowed possession of a certain category of weaponry, and the South is not.


The idea of internationalizing the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) has been suggested as another possible approach to curbing missile proliferation.22 Such a treaty would be nondiscriminatory in the narrow sense that everyone would give up missiles of this class. However, nearly all of the systems currently deployed by developing countries would fall below the 500- to 5,000-km range covered by INF. The ubiquitous Scud-B, for example, would not be included, nor would the SS-21, Lance, or Jericho I systems. In the Middle East, only the Israeli Jericho II, the Saudi CSS-2, the Indian Agni (under development), North Korean missiles under development, and Iraqi missiles (which are now being destroyed anyway) would be covered. A regime that leaves their adversaries' missiles in place would most likely be unacceptable to the Israelis and Saudis.

In September 1991 President Bush unilaterally pledged to eliminate the U.S. worldwide arsenal of short-range nuclear ballistic missiles, a pledge since reciprocated by Russia, which now controls the entire stock of Soviet nonstrategic nuclear forces. Agreement by former Warsaw Pact countries and NATO countries to eliminate their short-range missiles (110 to 500 km) and inclusion of developing countries in a short-range plus intermediate-range missile ban agreement could produce a more palatable and certainly a more meaningful regime. But such a regime would still leave open the possibility, however slim, of Third World countries developing and deploying missiles above the 5,000-km INF ceiling, approaching ranges that could strike the continental United States.23 Also, a few developing-country ballistic missile programs are driven, in part, by arms races or tension with ICBM-possessing countries, for example, India's concern with China.

The bilateral INF was verified by the U. S. On-site Inspection Agency and an analogous Soviet agency. If the INF (or an expanded- range INF) were opened up to multilateral adherence, an international, impartial, IAEA-like inspectorate would be necessary to oversee implementation and verification. This would not be a cheap or easy proposition. A similar international verification agency would also be needed to implement ZBM, but the greater benefits of such a regime would better justify the cost.


By radically reducing decision-making time and increasing fears of sudden attack, ballistic missiles have long heightened the already immense danger posed by nuclear weapons. During the Cold War this danger was tolerated in the name of deterrence; with the end of the Cold War, however, these missiles have no clear mission.24 In 1993, it is persistently reported that the U.S. Navy is considering back fitting some Trident II D-5 missiles with conventional warheads, to meet the alleged need for a capability to destroy underground command and communication bunkers in developing countries. The D-5 was to have been targeted primarily on the hardened SS-18 silos, which are now scheduled to be eliminated under START II.25 Rear Admiral Thomas Ryan, the director of the Navy's submarine warfare division, argues that such a system is needed as a credible deterrent to developing countries.26 According to Ryan, research and development funds would be needed for the development of an accurate conventional warhead for the Trident, capable of taking out a bunker, which would require accuracy within 15 to 20 feet.27

Targeting Third World countries, or threatening to do so, would increase incentives for some countries to build or buy missiles to deter external interference in their affairs. Thus, in searching for a new mission for their missiles, great power policies may actually promote proliferation.

The preferred strategy of the U.S. government to prevent or at least forestall the further spread of ballistic missiles is a missile technology export control regime, which, because it is a discriminatory regime, has little support in the developing world.

Conversely, disavowal of ballistic missiles by the global powers would serve to delegitimize missiles as symbols of military, technical, economic, and political prestige. A global ballistic missile disarmament regime, cooperatively engaging the developing world in the disarmament process, providing demonstrable security benefits, and not seeking to obstruct legitimate civilian space efforts, would provide a more promising solution to the missile proliferation threat posed to those countries and to the United States.

Dismantlement of all the eight declared nuclear powers' missiles would constitute very large-scale disarmament and a clear demonstration of the good faith called for by the NPT. At the 1995 NPT review conference, where the signatories will decide whether to extend the treaty, and beyond, readiness to pursue such far- reaching measures will be needed to persuade today's nonnuclear states to remain nonnuclear.

To pursue ZBM, the United States and Russia must restructure future strategic cuts away from warhead reductions and toward missile reductions. According to this ZBM proposal, the United States and Russia would jump-start the process by initiating a treaty of declared intent and opening it for signature, perhaps by holding a global conference in which participants engaged in regional missile races would be asked to agree that if their adversary (or adversaries) would get rid of its (their) missiles, they would do likewise. The United States and Russia would announce a substantial missile force cut beyond the maximum missile launcher levels permitted under START II.28 contingent on global consensus to negotiate regional ballistic-missile-free zones. The complete elimination of their remaining ballistic missiles would proceed in parallel with global missile disarmament.

Verifying compliance with a ballistic missile ban, while politically challenging, would be no less feasible than verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, just completed, or with NPT obligations. With national technical means, transparency, and multilateral cooperation, on both a regional and a global scale, achieving ZBM is largely a question of mobilizing the requisite political will.

The most important goal of ZBM--not to be lost sight of in discussions in the Third World context--would be the removal of the enormous threat to the developed world posed by existing ballistic missiles in China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. ZBM is not just a device of the developed world to persuade the developing world to forgo ballistic missile arms races. On the contrary, the elimination of ballistic missiles will make the developed states safer from one another-and safe from threats from Third World ballistic missiles, as well.


1. Of the twenty-Bight ballistic missile states in the world, ten deploy only Scud-class missiles: that is, 300-kilometer [km]-range, single stage, liquid-fueled rockets with circular error probables of 900 to 1,000 meters. Some Third World countries have, however, embarked on missile upgrade or development programs focused on acquiring inertial guidance, solid fuel, and multistaging technologies. CIA testimony in January 1992 stated that those developing countries with advanced space launch programs (Brazil, India, and Israel) might be able to develop ICBMs in the next decade.

Currently, eight countries--the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan--deploy ICBMs or SLBMs.

Four additional countries deploy or have until recently deployed intermediate-range (500 to 5,500 km) ballistic missiles: Bulgaria (500 km), Czechoslovakia (500 km), Israel (1,450 km), and Saudi Arabia (1,850 ; km). North Korea is reported to be working on a 1,000-km-range missile, but the missile has not been flight-tested successfully to anywhere near that range. India has flight-tested a 2,400-km- range missile, the Agni, twice. Iraq previously deployed 600-km and possibly 800-km extended-range Scud missiles. These missiles have now been destroyed by the U.N. Special Commission implementing the Persian Gulf War cease-fire agreement, and Iraq is prohibited from obtaining missiles with a range of greater than 150 km.

Fifteen other countries deploy or have until recently deployed short- range ballistic missiles (110 to 500 km). These countries are Afghanistan, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Libya, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Korea, Syria, and Yemen. India will deploy its 250-kilometer Prithvi in 1993. Of these fifteen, six are European countries that have already demobilized or will shortly demobilize their short-range Lance, Scud, SS-21, and SS-22 missiles. Of the remaining nine--all of which are developing countries--four deploy only Scud missiles transferred from the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s and have no known indigenous missile production capability or intent. The remaining five also imported Scud or other short-range missiles and are now producing them or attempting to do so. (Lore Lumpe, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David C. Wright, "Third World Missiles Fall Short," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1992, p. 32.)

2. President Reagan put forward the idea of "zero ballistic missiles" at his summit with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986. His proposal called for a 50 percent reduction within five years and total elimination of the U. S. and Soviet missile stockpiles within ten years For more on the Reagan proposal, see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York Scribners, 1993), and Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era (New York: Touchstone, 1992), 155-209. For analyses of the proposal at the time, see Richard Perle, "Reykjavik as a Watershed in US.-Soviet Arms Control," Thomas C Schelling, "Abolition of Ballistic Missiles," Leon Sloss," A World Without Ballistic Missiles," and Randall Forsberg, "Abolishing Ballistic Missiles" in International Security, Vol. 12, No 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 175-196.

3. Private communication from Niaz A. Naik, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islambad, Pakistan, to Jerome Holton, 4 July 1993, Federation of American Scientists.

4. In the late 1988 the State Department began exploring missile control in the Middle East through separate talks with the Egyptian and Israeli government. Under discussion, reportedly, were small confidence-building steps, such as advance notice of missile flight tests and possibility "no first use" pledges that could lay the groundwork for farther-reaching steps in the future. ("US Presses Mideast Missile Talks," Washington Post, 28 December 1988, p. 15).

5. Address by the foreign minister of Israel, Shimon Peres, at the signing of the CWC, 13 January 1993.

6. Ha'aretz, 8 February 1993, in FBIS-NES-93~24, p. 41.

7. For more on the feasibility of regional ZBM, see Lora Lumpe, "Zero Ballistic Missiles and the Third World," Arms Control 14, no. 1 (April 1993): 218-223, for more on regional ZBM.

8 A recent paper prepared for the SDIO notes the potential ballistic missile threats to the United States posed by space-launch vehicles:

Those nations with access to space launch vehicles can readily convert the vehicles into ICBMs. Certain countries may be willing to sell or transfer their space launch vehicles to other states for legitimate space purposes, such as communications, surveillance and scientific exploration; once sold, these vehicles may be used for weapons purposes....

The increasing availability of space launch vehicles and space launch services could result in the ability of certain Third World countries to threaten the continental United States with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical or biological payloads in the mid to late l900s [sic]. Although these threats will be limited to a few ICBMs--probably 10 or less--with very poor accuracies, they could be an effective deterrent to desired U.S. actions or they could be used as terrorist weapons. These potential threats should be taken into account in OPALS planning.

(Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate, "OPALS and Foreign Space Launch Vehicle Capabilities." [Science Applications International Corp., prepared under SDIO contract 891-C-0012] 18 )

9. Conversion of ICBMs to space launchers is highly controversial in the U.S. space industry. Most companies, fearing lost revenues (and jobs and industrial base capacity), oppose the idea; however, the Martin Marietta Corporation currently has a $660 million contract to refurbish fourteen U.S. Titan Bs to space launchers. This work includes modifying the forward end of the second stage to accommodate ten foot fairings of various lengths, refurbishing the liquid-fuel engines, up grading the inertial guidance, and developing new command, destruct, and telemetry systems. One reworked Titan has already flown. The cost per missile is $47 million. (Aerospace America, May 1992, pp. 1-16.)

10. See Jurgen Scheffran, "Dual Use of Missiles and Space Technologies," and Peter D. Zimmerman, "Bronze Medal Technology and Demand- Side Controls on Missile Proliferation," in Missile Technologies, Prolifera- tion and Conceptsfor Arms Control, eds., Gotz Neuneck and Otfried Ischebeck, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993).

11. Phillip Morrison, in F.A.S. Public Interest Report, May/June 1992, p. 12.

12. See Alton Frye, "Zero Ballistic Missiles," Foreign Policy, no. 88 (Fall 1992):12-17, for more on verification issues.

13. Testimony of William Webster before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 18 May 1989.

14. The Clinton administration requested $3.8 billion for missile defenses in its fiscal year 1994 Pentagon budget.

15. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 16 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, "Summary of the Equipment and Technology Annex," 16 April 1987, p. 3.

17. "Revisions to MTCR Guidelines," undated, but released on 7 January 1993, available from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

18. For example, the joint Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor missile program.

19. "Revisions to MTCR Guidelines."

20. Since 1991, the United States has imposed import and export sanctions against companies or government agencies in China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, and Syria for missile proliferation activities.

21. Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls, Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy, Executive Summary: Finding Common Ground (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991), 2~24.

22. See Kenneth Adelman, "Curing Missile Measles," Washington Times, 17 April 1989, p. D1, and "How to Limit Everybody's Missiles," New York Times, 7 April 1991; Kathleen C. Bailey, "Rushing to Build Missiles," Washington Post, 6 April 1990, p. A15, and "Can Missile Proliferation Be Reversed?," Orbis, 35, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 5-14.

23. The continental United States is roughly 8,000 to 10,000 km from the Middle East and 8,000 km from the Korean peninsula.

24. In an effort to justify continued maintenance and modernization of these forces, retasking missiles to Third World targets is reportedly under discussion. A report leaked to the press in January 1992 suggested that in the post Cold War era, "every reasonable adversary"-- some adversaries presumably in the developing world--should be targeted with nuclear and non-nuclear strategic weapons. (R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Urged to Cut 50% of A-Arms," Washington Post, 6 January I992,p 1)

25. Robert Holzer and George Leopold, "U.S. Navy Girds for New Threats," Defense News, 8-14 March 1993, pp. 1, 28.

26. Rear Admiral Ryan refers to his new strategy as "strategic conventional deterrence." Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Targets Conventional Deterrence," Defense News, 1~16 May 1993, p. 6

27. "Navy Offers Submarines for Conventional Deterrence," Defense Daily, 21 May 1993, p. 295.

28. START II is structured in terms of warhead ceilings, but it does eliminate several types of ICBMs and SLBMs entirely. Upon completion of START II, the United States will be limited to 2,228 warheads, currently intended for deployment on 932 missiles (500 Minuteman II, 192 Trident C-4, and 240 Trident D-5). The former Soviet republics will be limited to 2,248 warheads, currently intended for deployment on 880 missiles (504 SS-25, 112 SS-N-23, 120 SS-N-20, and 192 SS-N-18).

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