International Military Education and Training (IMET)


Definition and Purpose || Structure and Process || Types of Training and Schools || Data ||Recent Legislation || Concerns || Links and Resources || References

"We do not fully appreciate how IMET and similar programs impart American values to the recipients in foreign militaries, both directly and indirectly. The stability we saw in military forces around the world during [the] recent radical decrease in defense budgets would have resulted in coups which today never materialized, in part because of the learned respect for civilian control of the military."[1]  

Eric D. Newsom, former assistant secretary of State for political-military affairs

"I think we should be out of the business of training [foreign military personnel]. You can't teach democracy at the end of a bayonet"[2]

Rep. Joseph Moakley

Definition and Purpose


Contrary to popular usage, the acronym IMET does not refer to the entire U.S. foreign military training program.  IMET, along with Foreign Military Sales, the Professional Military Exchange (PME) program and Unit Exchange, comprise the U.S. Security Assistance Training Program (SATP)[3] . More specifically, IMET is a grant program established by Congress as part of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.  IMET grants enable foreign military personnel from countries that are financially incapable of paying for training under the Foreign Assistance Act to take courses from the 2000 offered annually at approximately 150 U.S. military schools across the country, receive observer or on-the-job training, and/or receive orientation tours.   Finally, the Coast Guard offers IMET recipients the opportunity to learn maritime-related skills[4]. 

Courses made available to IMET grant recipients are divided into two main categories: Professional Military Education and technical training. PME is designed to prepare recipients for leadership positions, while technical training courses equip students with the skills required to operate specific weapons systems, or fulfill the demands of a specific military occupational specialty[5].  A third category, E-IMET, is taken up below.  Courses offered to foreign students range from swimming to psychological operations to using specific U.S.-manufactured weapons systems.  The knowledge and experience gained through course work is supplemented by information programs managed by the Department of Defense, which consist of activities that expose students to American society, institutions, ideas, and values.[6] 


As specified in Section 2347b of the Foreign Assistance Act, the original intent of Congress in establishing the IMET program was to:

The Department of Defense (DoD), which is the primary implementing body of the IMET program, uses similar language when describing its objectives and priorities. The DoD' s objectives, as listed in the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), are four fold, to:

DoD literature also emphasizes the importance of offering trainings that:

Like other forms of security assistance, IMET is also used to reward countries that do the United States' bidding or as a stick to punish wayward or abusive regimes or militaries[8].  On occasion, the U.S. uses this leverage to champion human rights and democracy. For example, the Clinton Administration responded to former Nigerian dictator General Ibrahim Babangida's annulment of the June 1993 presidential elections by terminating that country's $450,000 IMET program and expelling the five Nigerian military officers receiving military training at the time [9]. Similarly, after the November 1991 Dili massacre in which 273 people were murdered by the Indonesian military the U.S. cut off IMET assistance to Jakarta  [10].

Too often, however, concerns about human rights and democracy take a back seat to immediate strategic interests, as evidenced most recently by George W. Bush's strategy of rewarding states that cooperate with the U.S. in its 'War on Terror' with security assistance.  The Musharraf regime's poor human rights record, nuclear weapons program, and anti-democratic practices place it among the most flagrant violators of U.S. security assistance eligibility criteria [11] Despite these concerns, the Bush Administration elected to waive restrictions on foreign assistance to Pakistan both as a reward for siding with the Americans in their military campaign against the Taliban, and to ensure its continued support of U.S. operations in the region. Included in the subsequent aid package is $1 million in IMET assistance for FY 2002 and FY 2003. Despite their atrocious human rights records, the Central Asian countries that lent support to the U.S. during Operation Enduring Freedom, including Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, are also slated to receive significant IMET assistance. While the urgency of the crisis in Afghanistan may have warranted close collaboration with anti-democratic and repressive regimes, such blatant disregard for the values underlying these restrictions on security assistance is likely to erode respect for, and thus the influence of, these restrictions.

In short, IMET is designed to accomplish two primary goals.  The first is to help strengthen foreign militaries through the provision of skills (and exposure to values) that are necessary for the proper functioning of a civilian controlled, apolitical, and professional military.  Secondly, IMET is an 'instrument of influence' through which the U.S. shapes the doctrine, operating procedures, values, choice in weaponry of foreign militaries, and occasionally the policies of the recipient governments.   Foreign students - many of whom will occupy the upper echelons of their country's military and political institutions - are taught infantry tactics and operations by American instructors, learn how to operate and maintain American weapons systems, and establish ties with American officers.  The resulting doctrinal and operational commonalities, and institutional and individual ties that form between the U.S. armed forces and their foreign counterparts, lead to more interaction and thus, in theory, to stronger relations between the two militaries.  Additionally, the U.S. government claims that more interaction translates into more U.S. access to foreign military facilities and bases, which in turn allows the U.S. to establish a military presence in more regions and facilitates the use of military force, or the threat of military force, to address regional threats.  

After interviewing representatives of the Defense Department, U.S. Army and the U.S. European Command, Rand Analyst William McCoy arrived at a similar conclusion. "Military officers," asserts McCoy, "believe that the primary reason the United States trains foreign military personnel is to establish military-to-military relationships that may be useful in times of crises [and] gives the United States a certain freedom of action in other countries, whether through overflight rights or basing agreements." [12]

While IMET may indeed improve ties between the U.S. and foreign militaries, too often it is the foreign civilian population that pays the price of this strategic benefit.  During the Cold War, for example, the people of Latin America suffered immensely under the brutal and antidemocratic rule of U.S.-supported regimes, the ranks of which were often filled by graduates of U.S. training programs. Despite their flagrant disregard for human rights and democratic values, these regimes continued to receive American aid, largely for strategic reasons (i.e. the U.S. feared Soviet encroachment into its sphere of influence). The results were disastrous.  The Argentine military, for example, received $10.6 million in IMET assistance from 1962 to 1976.  After deposing the Peronist government in 1976, the military regime "disappeared" between 9,000 and 30,000 people during its "dirty war" against leftists [13]. In the 1990's, the Clinton Administration bankrolled military training for several Sub Saharan regimes, including Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, that were guilty not only of human rights abuses against their own people but also of exploiting and exacerbating the regional war fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  The most notorious of the bunch, Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, received consistent IMET assistance throughout the 1990's despite the regime's anti-democratic, brutal and internationally aggressive policies.  In 1998, the government deployed troops to the DRC, fueling a conflict that turned the Congo into an "...all-purpose African battlefield" [14]. A year later the State Department conceded in its own annual human rights report that Mugabe's human rights record had "worsened significantly" since its last report, citing an intensification of government efforts to silence journalists; killings, torture and beatings committed by police and security forces; and efforts to distort the political process to favor the ruling party [15] Yet the aid from Washington kept coming. In Fiscal Year 2001, the U.S. provided $186,830 in IMET assistance to train 124 members of the Zimbabwean military  [16], both honing the combat skills of a military engaged in a regionally destabilizing civil war and conferring a sense of legitimacy to a clearly illegitimate regime. 

These cases illustrate what happens when "exposure to U.S. values" fails to have the effects toted by proponents of military training, and the U.S. government fails to use the leverage provided by the aid to stop the abuses.

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In 1990, Congressionally approved amendments to section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act that expanded the focus of the IMET program to include teaching professional level management skills, improving the efficacy of military and judicial systems and strengthening military codes of conduct[17].  The amendment, entitled Expanded IMET, also opened up the IMET program to civilian personnel working on military matters, those serving in one of the non-defense ministries, and civil sector employees.  In order for civilians to qualify, the training must  

  • contribute to responsible defense resource management,

  • foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military,

  • contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, or improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights. 22 U.S.C 2347

E-IMET is also viewed as a potential solution to the problem of how to deal with abusive, but strategically or militarily important, regimes.  IMET proponents argue that denying training to militaries from countries with poor human rights records comes at a cost in terms of lost influence and access, which policy makers and the military believe is often crucial in times of crisis. In 1998, Senator Sam Brownback argued that U.S. efforts to deal with the crisis in South Asia resulting from the Pakistani coup, nuclear testing, and the deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan were crippled by their lack of access to Pakistani military leaders, to whom IMET funding had been cut earlier as part of a counter-proliferation strategy.  "If these restrictions had not been in place," asserted Brownback, "our military leaders could easily have contacted [Pakistan's military leaders] on a personal basis."[18]  As a Leahy aide pointed out, E-IMET allows the United States to maintain those military-to-military relations with states like Pakistan that do not qualify for combat training[19]. 

Examples of E-IMET courses include Advanced Management Program Course (AMP), Civil Military Operations, Democratic Sustainment, Civil Affairs, Law of War and Military Accounting.  For a complete list of courses and schools, see the Expanded IMET Handbook.

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Structure and Process


Both the State Department and the Defense Department have a role in the management and implementation of the IMET program.  The DoD's Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA) works with the various military departments and the unified military commands to implement the program.  Within the DSCA, the Policy and Plans Division of the Policy, Plans and Program Directorate is charged with managing the IMET and E-IMET programs.  The State Department and Congress work together to determine funding levels for individual recipient countries and the "political advisability" of providing training to specific countries[20], which are included in the Department of State's International Affairs Budget. Chapter two of the Joint Security Assistance Training regulation contains a complete summary of the division of responsibility for IMET, and the Security Assistance Training Program more generally.  Guidelines for implementation are contained in the JSAT regulation and the SAMM.


The Process

The initial steps of the process by which countries gain access to the IMET program are coordinated by the local Security Assistance Organization (SAO), which consists of U.S. military personnel assigned to embassies to field such requests, provide pertinent information (i.e. specifics about the training programs, their goals, and funding levels), and work with the host government to develop and submit the request[21]. 


Requests are submitted yearly at the annual Training Program Management Reviews (TPMRs) at which the SAOs submit a budget for the next fiscal year.  Requests for training received between conferences are sent directly to the office of the relevant military service[22] (if it is routine) or to the DSCA (if it is unusual).   All requests must conform to the procedures described in the JSAT Regulation and the DoD's Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)[23]. 

According to the DSCA, all IMET applicants are screened rigorously for health problems, human rights violations, and other potential problems [24] .  If an applicant satisfies all screening requirements, an Invitational Travel Order (ITO) [25] is issued.  Once they arrive in the United States, each new International Military Student (IMS) is assigned an International Military Student Officer (ISMO), who is responsible for coordinating logistics associated with the student's arrival, monitoring their academic progress, and arranging Department of Defense Informational Program (DoDIP) activities, which seek to expose foreign military students to American culture, values and institutions[26]. 

The goals of the IMET program are also accomplished by sending Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to the host country.  MTTs are small units (8-12 members) comprised of U.S. military and civilian personnel that spend up to 6 months providing training or assessing the training needs of the host country.  MTT assignments may not overlap fiscal years and are limited to 179 days.  Trainings that last longer than six months are handled by Field Training Services (FTS) teams, which undertake assignments that can last up to one year.  Requests for trainings that last longer than one year must be approved by the Unified Command[27].  E-IMET training abroad is carried out by Mobile Education Teams (METs). 

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Types of Training and Schools

Types of Training

English Language Training - As specified in chapter 3 of the JSAT Regulation, all International Military Students must achieve a degree of English language proficiency before they can take courses at most of the U.S. training institutions. The Defense English Language Program was created to oversee English language training programs utilized by IMSs to acquire these language skills.  MTTs, language training detachments, training for language instructors and various teaching aides are available to foreign governments interested in setting up in-country training[28].

Flying Training - includes instruction on how to fly fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.  Compared to other forms of training, flying training is costly and thus most of it is provided via FMS instead of through IMET programs[29]

Observation/Familiarization Training - allows students who are unable or prohibited from engaging in classroom exercises to learn specific skills through observation instead. The DISAM greenbook on international training management uses the example of medical training.  Foreign medical personnel unable to practice medicine in the U.S. because of licensing requirements are able nonetheless to study with U.S. medical professionals by limiting their participation to simple observation[30].

On-The-Job/Qualification Training (OJT) - allows students to hone and develop the skills they acquire in the classroom in a real world setting[31]. 

Orientation Tours (OT) - are brief (no longer than 14 days) programs aimed it providing distinguished visitors and future leaders with an overview of various elements of the U.S. military (e.g. doctrine, facilities, equipment, operations).  IMET funding cannot be used to fund OTs for cadets or individuals of a rank equivalent to, or higher than, U.S. Chief of Staff[32]. 

Professional Military Education - provides leadership training to officers at every level of their professional development.  While there are no special restrictions placed on courses for new and mid-level international officers, senior officers must be invited by one of the military services to attend the war or command colleges.  Examples include International Officer Logistics Preparation Training, Infantry Officer Basic Training, and International Officer Intelligence Advance Training[33]

Technical training - Focuses on developing a specific skill or set of skills necessary for operating a particular weapon system, or to perform required functions within a military operational specialty. [34].



The schools that provide training to IMET recipients are divided into the following three categories:


Professional Military Education (PME) Programs provide courses designed to teach officers specific skills that enhance their leadership abilities[35].


English Language Training is provided primarily by the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC).   In addition to providing resident language training to IMET recipients studying in this country, the DLIELC also works with foreign governments to improve their own English language training programs[36].

Senior Service Schools offer courses on "service/national security policy" and the "politico-military aspects of defense" to senior foreign military officers and civilians.  The Senior Service Schools are the National War College, which is part of the National Defense University, and the Service War Colleges (Army, Navy and Air War Colleges)[37].

Additionally, separate schools and programs are tasked with implementing the various components the E-IMET program:


The Naval Justice School offers courses focusing on "the fundamental principles of military justice, civil and administrative law, and procedure, with practical application of those principles to the problems inevitably arising within every command." [38]

The Center for Civil-Military Relations provides host countries with a five-day course, normally taught abroad, that focuses on addressing the inherent conflict between civilian and military institutions in democracies.  The course focuses on this natural tension and the various strategies for ensuring effective civilian control over military institutions. Specific topics covered during the course include the process of promoting officers, the respective roles of the legislators and military officials in the defense budgeting process, and handling disputes between civilian officials and military officers.[39]

Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI) offers a multi-disciplinary program designed to develop and strengthen the analytical and decision-making skills of mid- and upper-level officials responsible for managing defense resources.  Each program incorporates elements of Management Theory, Economic Reasoning, and Quantitative Reasoning.   While the programs are normally taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, the Institute also occasionally teaches them overseas and elsewhere in the United States. [40]

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FY 1995

FY 1996

FY 1997

FY 1998

FY 1999

FY 2000

FY 2001

FY 2002

FY 2003(Requested)











No. of Countries










No. of Students










Sources: Department of Security Assistance Management
State Depart. International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request
Executive Office Budget Request for Security Assistance FY2003

Recent Legislative Developments

  • International Military Education and Training Accountability Act (S. 647)  - Introduced on 29 March 2001 by Senators Feingold (D-WI) and Chafee (R-RI), the Act seeks to increase transparency and accountability by requiring that the State and Defense Departments be more forthcoming with information about the human rights records of IMET alumni.  The provisions of the bill require that the State Department include a comprehensive listing of all human rights violations committed by IMET recipients.  Similarly, the Defense Department would have to include that information in their database of IMET trainees.[41]   A comparable bill, the Foreign Military Training Responsibility Act (H.R. 1594) was introduced in the House by Rep. John Moakley (D-MA).  Rep.  James McGovern (D-MA) became the first sponsor of the bill following Rep. Moakley's passing in May of 2001.  The bill was referred to the House International Relations and Armed Services Committees on 26 April 2001, and the Department of Defense requested an executive comment on 9 May 2001.

  • The most recent legislative attempt to close the School of the Americas, now called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC), was introduced by Rep. McGovern on 10 May 2001.  HR 1810 would revoke the statutory authority of the WHISC and calls for the establishment of a joint task force to review assess the training provided to Latin American militaries.  The Department of Defense requested an executive comment on 29 May 2001.

    IMET's Ignominious Past

    School of the Americas (SOA) Among the most egregious, and best-known, human rights abusers trained by the United States are the graduates of the SOA.The Army school that eventually became the SOA was founded in 1946 to provide U.S. students with technical training.  While the number of Latin American students was initially limited, over the following decade, they increasingly replaced their American counterparts in the school's classrooms.   So dramatic was this shift in focus that English language instruction was eliminated in 1956, and Spanish became the official language of newly named School of the Americas in 1963 [42].   The school was located in Panama until 1984, when it was moved to the United States (Fort Benning, GA) in accordance with provisions in the Panama Canal Treaty.  Throughout the 1990's, the SOA was the target of a broad-based, grassroots campaign to end military training for human rights abusers, which prompted the authors of a 1995 study commissioned by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to recommend that the school be renamed to shed its negative image[43].  In 2000, the SOA was "closed", reopening on January 17, 2001 under a new name: the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation [44]. 

    Citing both what and whom it taught, opponents contend that the SOA contributed to the decades of human rights abuses suffered by Central and South Americans at the hands of abusive militaries and security apparatus.  Indeed, many of the most notorious Latin American human rights violators passed through the doors of the SOA, including CPT Eduardo Ernesto Alfonso Avila, who ordered the assassination  of El Salvador's Archbishop Oscar Romero (among others), and MAJ Armando Azmitia Melara, who was implicated in several Salvadoran massacres including those at El Mozote and Lake Suchitlan[45].  The non-governmental organization SOA Watch maintains a list of several hundred Latin American SOA graduates accused of crimes ranging from corruption to torture, assassinations and coup attempts.

    Defenders of the school argue that the graduates guilty of such offenses are a small percentage of all alumni and that exposure to U.S. values and institutions ultimately contributed to the democratization of the recipient countries and the subordination of their militaries to civilian oversight.  "To portray their atypical conduct as the norm or to imply that U.S. Army schooling encourages, teaches, or supports inhuman behavior and nondemocratic values," asserts one  author, "is not only incorrect and unfair but intellectually dishonest." [46]

    The release of training manuals used at the SOA from 1987 until 1991 that "taught tactics that come right of a Soviet gulag," according to Representative Joseph Kennedy, confirmed that critics' concerns were not groundless.  The manuals instructed students on the "neutralization" of "personality targets" that include "governmental officials, political leaders and members of the infrastructure."    Other sections advocated the use of beatings, imprisonment and the jailing of family members as tools of coercion.  Finally, the manuals recommended that government agents view " all the organizations as possible guerilla sympathizers." [47]  The Pentagon later called these sections of the manuals "mistakes" but also absolved those responsible for these sections of any wrongdoing by declaring that since any violations of Department of Defense policies were not deliberate, "further investigation to assess individual responsibility is not required." [48]

    For the past decade, the SOA has been working to clean up its image.  In 1990, it began requiring that all courses include a 4-hour human rights component, consisting of instruction on the laws of war, democratization, and civilian control of the armed forces.   It also added new classes to its curriculum that address the abuses of its alumni, including one on democratic sustainment and another on civil-military relations [49].  Despite these changes, critics continue to call for its closure, citing both the steady stream of human rights abuses committed by recent graduates and the negative message sent by the continued operation of an institution so pivotal to the epidemic of human rights abuses that plagued Latin America during much of the School's history.

    IMET and Human Rights: Current Concerns
    While some steps have been taken to reduce the likelihood that IMET training will be used by human rights abusers and repressive forces to oppress their own people, the U.S. continues to provide training to militaries later implicated in gross human rights violations and/or antidemocratic behavior.  Apologists for the IMET program point out that better screening of applicants and more classroom focus on human rights, civil-military relations, and the laws of war represent real improvements.   Some proponents go so far as to claim that the grant program, which provides exposure to U.S. culture, values and institutions, contributes to the democratization of participating countries.

    Assertions of the beneficience of military training are dubious at best for two reasons.  First, only a handful of training institutions have integrated human rights instruction into their curriculum. Secondly, cases of individual and institutional disregard for human rights and democracy continue to crop up in countries participating in the IMET program, casting doubt on claims that IMET training has a significant and consistent effect on the mentality and values of its students.  Examples are legion:

    • the Indonesian military, which aided and abetted the 1999 terror campaign conducted by the East Timorese militias, received steady E-IMET training in the years leading up to the elections.

    • Individual graduates of the former SOA continue to make headlines for their abusive or antidemocratic activities despite the incorporation of mandatory human rights training into the curricula. Sprinkled throughout the SOA Watch's "Notorious Graduates" list are individuals who were trained at the SOA after the human rights instruction requirement was added.

    • Collusion between the military and the brutal paramilitaries [50] persists in Colombia despite years of IMET assistance. From FY 1989 through FY 1998, the U.S. government provided over $12.5 million in IMET alone to the Colombian military [51] .

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      Links and Resources


      Center for International Policy publishes Just the Facts, an annual summary and analysis of U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America, which includes extensive information and data on U.S. training programs. While the site focuses primarily on Latin America, it is also contains links to more general sources of information on military training, including IMET.

      School of the Americas Watch is a non-governmental organization dedicated to closing down the School of the Americas through nonviolent demonstrations and legislative action. Their website features a complete list of SOA graduates, SOA teaching manuals and updates on current legislative initiatives.

      The World Policy Institute's Arms Trade Resource Center has published several studies focusing on U.S. military training, most of which are available online.


      Defense Acquisition Deskbook's list of courses

      Expanded IMET Handbook

      Congressional Research Service

      • U.S. Army School of the Americas: Background and Congressional Concerns, 14 pages, Updated April 16, 2001, Order No.: RL30532.
      • International Military Education and Training Program, 6 pages, March 20, 2000, Order No.: RS20506.
      • Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, 23 pages, January 26, 1999, Order No.: RL30034.

      Defense Department

      DISAM Text, Chapter 22 

      Joint Security Assistance Training Regulation (JSAT)

      Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), Chapter 10;

      International Training Management Web Page

      International Training Web Sites

      State Department

      Lincoln Bloomfield, "Over 100 Nations Benefit from U.S. Military Training, Education," 9 December 2004.

      US General Accounting Office Reports
      (Warning: many of the reports are large pdf files and therefore may take a long time to load)

      • School of the Americas: U.S. Military Training for Latin American Countries, Washington, D.C.:GAO, August 22, 1996, ReportNSIAD-96-178

      • Security Assistance: Observations on Post-Cold War Program Changes, Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 1992, Report NSIAD-92-248.

      • Security Assistance: Shooting Incident in East Timor, Indonesia, Washington, D.C.:GAO, February 18, 1992, ReportNSIAD-92-132FS.

      • El Salvador: Accountability for U.S. Military and Economic Aid, Washington, D.C.:GAO, September 1990, ReportNSIAD-90-132.

      • Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program, Washington, D.C.:GAO,, June 14, 1990, Report NSIAD-90-215BR.

      • Security Assistance: Reporting of Program Content Changes, Washington, D.C.:GAO, May 22, 1990, ReportNSIAD-90-115.

      • Foreign Aid: Accountability and Control Over U.S. Assistance to Indonesia, Washington, D.C.:GAO, August 19, 1987, Report NSIAD-87-187.

      • Liberia: Problems in Accountability and Control over U.S. Assistance, Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 1987, ReportNSIAD-87-86BR.


      Air Force

      Home Page:

      US Army

      Home Page:

      Schools: located on the SATFA's web site at:

      US Coast Guard

      Home Page:

      US Coast Guard International Training Handbook

      US Marine Corps

      Home Page:

      Training Activities

      US Navy

      Home Page: http://www.NAVY.MIL/

      Training Catalogue:

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      [1] Pomper, Miles A. "Battle Lines Keep Shifting Over Foreign Military Training", Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 29 January 2000.


      [3]Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Joint Security Assistance Training Regulation (JSAT), Chapter 1, section 4, (AR 12-15/SECNAVINST 4950.4A/AFI 16-105),  ONLINE, 5 June 2000,  Defense Department, Available:

      [4] U.S. Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Washington, D.C., Fiscal Year 1999, p. 1009.

      [5] Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Professional Military Education (PME), ONLINE, Defense Department, Available:

      [6]Congressional Presentation, p. 1009.

      [7] Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperaiton Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), ONLINE, DSCA, Available:

      [8] Pomper, "Battle Lines..."

      [9]"U.S. announces new steps aimed at Nigerian military regime," United Press International, 22 July 1993.

      [10] While U.S. officials did comply with the ban on IMET assistance to Indonesia, it continued to provide the Indonesians with Joint Combined Exchange Training (East Timor Action Network, "Background on East Timor and U.S. Policy", ONLINE, May 2000, Available: For more information on the Dili Massacre, visit the East Timor Action Network website.

      [11] According the State Department's own Country Reports on Human Rights Practices the human rights record of the current regime, which seized power from a democratically elected government in 1999, is "poor" and was guilty of "numerous serious abuses" in 2000. The regime's recent antidemocratic behavior, its ongoing development of its nuclear program and the continued tension between Pakistan and India also remain concerns. While Musharraf's January 2002 pledge to hold general elections in October 2002 is a step in the right direction, his plan to remain president and the commander of the military (the most powerful national institution) is likely to be an impediment to the full restoration of democracy in Pakistan (Munir Ahmad, "Signaling the end of military rule in Pakistan, Musharraf calls for legislative elections this fall," Associated Press, 24 January 2002).

      [12] William H. McCoy, Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S. IMET Training and its Role in Internal Defense and Development: A Rand Note (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), p. 3.

      [13] "Argentine judge seeking to question Kissinger about Plan Condor", AP Worldstream, 10 August 2001, archived at

      [14] State Department Human Rights Report 1999.

      [15] Philip Gourevich, "FORSAKEN; Congo seems less a nation than a battlefield for countless African armies", The New Yorker, 25 September 2000, p. 53.

      [16] Bureau of Political Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress, ONLINE: State Department Available: [15 March 2002].

      [17] General Accounting Office, Observation on Post-Cold War Program Changes, Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 1992, Report NSAID-92-248, p. 19.

      [18] Pomper, "Battle Lines..."

      [19] Ibid.

      [20]Clarke, Duncan L., Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 21.

      [21] Interview with DSCA employee.

      [22] Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard International Training Handbook, 9th edition, ONLINE, USCG, Available:

      [23] Ibid.

      [24] FAS Interview with a DSCA official (August 2001).

      [25] As defined by the Coast Guard, an ITO is the controlling document for authorized training, conditions, and priviledges, and is used to provide recognition of the military or equivalent civilian status of the student. (United States Coast Guard, International Training Handbook).

      [26] United States Coast Guard, International Training Handbook.

      [27] Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, Disam Greenbook -The Management of  Security Assistance, Chapter 22, ONLINE, June 2000, Available:

      [28] Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Joint Security Assistance Training Regulation, chapter 3.

      [29] Disam Greenbook, Chapter 22.

      [30] Ibid.

      [31] Ibid.

      [32] Department of Defense, Security Assistance Management Manual.

      [33] DSCA, Professional Military Education (PME)

      [34] Disam Greenbook, Chapter 22.

      [35]List and description of schools provided by Richard F. Grimmit, "International Military Education and Training Program," CRS Report for Congress, 25 October 1996, p. 2 unless otherwise noted.

      [36] Ibid.

      [37] Ibid.

      [38] Naval Justice School, ONLINE, available at: [4 August 2001].

      [39] Center for Civil-Military Relations, ONLINE, available at: [4 August 2001].

      [40] Defense Resources Management Institute, ONLINE, available at: [4 August 2001].

      [41] "Feingold Introduces IMET Accountability Act," Press Release, ONLINE, 29 March 2001, Senator Feingold's office, Available: [29 July 2001].

      [42] General Accounting Office, School of the Americas: U.S. Military Training for Latin American Countries, ONLINE, GAO, August 1996, Available:

      [43] Ibid., p. 14.

      [44] Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, The Institute: History, ONLINE, available:, [28 July 2001].

      [45] SOA Watch, Notorious Graduates: El Salvador", ONLINE, available: [31 August 2001].

      [46] Cope, John A.,International Military Education and Training: An Assessment, McNair Paper 44 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995),  p. 22.

      [47] Lisa Haugaard, "Torture 101," In These Times, 14 October 1996, archived at

      [48] SOA Watch, Pentagon Investigation Concludes that Techniques in SOA Mauals were "Mistakes", ONLINE, available: [23 July 2001].

      [49] GAO, School of the Americas,

      [50] For details on Colombia. s failure to sever the links between its military forces and the paramilitaries, see 11 July 2001 Senate testimony by Jose Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch Americas Division, available at

      [51] Defense Security Cooperation Agency,Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts, Washington, D.C., September 1998, pp. 99-100.