Mr. Jeff Donarski  
Federation of American Scientists  
Suite 209  
1717 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Donarski:

This responds to your March 3, 1998, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request received in our office March 6, 1998.

The enclosed document is provided as responsive to your request.

No fees have been assessed in this instance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

H. J. McIntyre  
Director

Enclosure:  
As stated
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


It also responds to Senate Committee on Armed Services Report 105-29, which requested a report on CJCS/CINC exercises planned over the future year defense program (FY 1998 through FY 2003). The report provides detailed information on these exercises for FY 1998 through FY 2000 and notes that their status for FY 2001 through FY 2003 is expected to continue substantially unchanged from the FY 2000 program.

Section I of this report notes the information requested by Congress, describes certain data elements in the report, and cites DOD actions to reduce personnel tempo demands caused by exercise programs.

Section II provides analysis and trends in these programs in terms of numbers of exercises, man-day expenditures, and training value.

Section III describes these exercise programs and provides assessments by the combatant commands and the Military Services on the ability of the Services to support these programs, the benefits of military-to-military relationships, and options to reduce effects on personnel tempo. Other factors that generate demands on personnel tempo are also discussed.

Section IV, provided separately, contains classified information. It provides detailed data on individual exercises in these programs over fiscal years 1995 through 2000.

These exercise programs are the means by which the combatant commanders conduct joint training and engagement. They provide excellent training opportunities for Service participants and enhance US ability to shape the international security environment. Military-to-military relationships are a key element of these programs and are of significant value to the combatant commands and Military Services in assessing foreign capabilities and improving interoperability. The Military Services recognize the importance of these programs and are committed to meeting essential requirements.

Program management and execution actions undertaken since the Quadrennial Defense Review in May 1997 have made significant changes to date (e.g., a 29 percent reduction in the number of exercises and a 21 percent reduction in man-days devoted to exercise participation). These trends are expected to
continue in accordance with the Chairman's guidance. Actions taken include reducing the number, scope, duration, and participation levels for specific exercises; combining, integrating, and linking exercises across combatant command and Military Service lines; and placing greater emphasis on staff and headquarters exercises, simulations, and improved communications and computer technologies to reduce personnel demands. The Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Military Services are all participating in these efforts.

Training value of these exercises is rated highly by the combatant commands and the Military Services. The combatant commands consider that 94-95 percent of man-day participation in exercises provides good to major training value in support of wartime mission and readiness. The Military Services consider that 89 percent of their participation offers good or major training value.

Exercises involving foreign military forces were assessed by the combatant commands as providing good to major training value for foreign forces in 96 percent of these exercises.

The primary intent of these exercise programs is joint training, not regional engagement. Joint training is the focus of 65 percent of these exercises and uses 77 percent of the Service man-days devoted to joint exercises.

The capabilities of the Military Services to support essential requirements are impacted by budget and force structure reductions and other demands such as operational deployments and contingency operations. They can adequately support essential requirements; but the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Military Services must continue pursuing options to reduce impacts of exercise programs on personnel tempo.

Joint exercise programs have been significantly reduced both in terms of numbers of exercises and personnel involvement. The actions that have effected these reductions are continuing, and further reductions are projected. The principal focus of these exercises is joint training, and they provide excellent training opportunities for US forces. Joint exercise programs are viewed by the combatant commands and the Military Services as one factor in overall personnel tempo demands. Other factors include contingency operations, home station training, Service exercises, and forward presence deployments.
SECTION I. BACKGROUND

A. Purpose


(2) Information in this report also responds to a request from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) for a report on CJCS and CINC exercises planned over the future year defense program (FY 1998 through FY 2003). Information was requested on number of exercises planned, costs, sponsoring CINC or other entity, number of military personnel involved together with their units, and training value. Changes and reductions in exercise programs through FY 2000 are described in this report. It is anticipated that the program will not change substantially in FY 2001 through FY 2003. No additional insight is now available regarding FY 2001 through FY 2003. Thus, this report responds to both the Section 331 SASC requests.

B. Report Structure. This report contains an Executive Summary and four sections.

(1) Section I provides the report purpose, notes information requested by Congress, describes data elements related to essential tasks and unit participation in exercises, and notes ongoing DOD actions to reduce personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) caused by exercise programs.

(2) Section II provides analysis and trends in these exercise programs for FY 1995 through FY 2000. This section describes status and trends in numbers of exercises, man-day expenditures, and training value.

(3) Section III describes the CJCS and CINC exercise programs and the PfP and CTR programs and contains narrative assessments by the combatant commands and the Military Services on the programs and exercises. These assessments address the ability of the Military Services to support exercise programs, the benefits of military-to-military relationships, and potential options to reduce the affects of these exercises on PERSTEMPO. Section III also notes other factors, outside these exercise programs, that affect PERSTEMPO.

(4) Section IV contains classified information and is provided separately. It contains detailed data on individual CJCS, CINC, PfP, and CTR exercises.
These data files are compiled by sponsoring command and are sequenced alphabetically by exercise name and fiscal year. A glossary of acronyms and definitions follows Section IV.

C. Congressional Request. The request for a report on military exercises in the House Report centered on the impact of these exercise programs on PERSTEMPO, the relationships between cost and training value, and whether excessive resources were expended on regional engagement rather than joint training. Information was requested on name, type, description, duration of exercises; participating units, percentage of mission essential tasks performed; costs; exercise priority; training value; and foreign military participation. Specific data on these subjects are provided in Sections II and IV.

(1) For purposes of this report, the data in Sections II and IV equate unit exercise participation to a specific Military Service, and numbers of personnel involved are provided. Data is not available to give a further breakdown among the Services that would identify specific units, particularly when some participation is at the level of teams, detachments, or a subelement of a unit.

(2) The Mission Essential Task List (METL), or equivalent Service document, is a key component of training and exercises. Opportunities to train to these requirements are available in any training event or exercise. However, data is not included regarding what portions of a METL, or equivalent, are addressed in any exercise noted in this report. Percentage of METL tasks accomplished in an exercise is not a meaningful indicator. For example, the accomplishment of only one or two of a unit's mission essential tasks in an exercise does not necessarily mean that exercise was unproductive. Further, variances in scope and level of Service participation in the context of overall exercise objectives and scenario preclude determination of the percentage of METL training accomplished. A particular exercise may afford significantly different training opportunities for the different Service participants. For example, an exercise may present opportunities for Air Force units to train to many tasks, while participating Army units may have only limited training opportunities. However, Army participation may be critical to enabling significant training opportunities for the Air Force units in a joint environment. Thus the overall picture for task-oriented training opportunities varies among the Military Services within exercise programs.

D. DoD Guidance and Assessment. The May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addressed the question of exercise demands on PERSTEMPO. The QDR asked CINCs to reduce exercise man-days from FY 1996 levels by 15 percent by FY 1998. Further, the CINCs and Services were asked to pursue additional reductions. Actions to meet these goals have been taken and are continuing. This reduction program is well under way. The results are reflected in Sections II and IV. Initial assessment is that significant reductions
in man-days devoted to exercises have been accomplished and that further reductions over FY 1998 to FY 2000 will be forthcoming. Additionally, examination of the data contained in Sections II and IV indicates that the bulk of these exercises is devoted to training, not regional engagement, and provide good training value to the Service participants. Data also demonstrates that both joint training and engagement exercises provide good training value to Service participants.
SECTION II. TRENDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Introduction. This section provides trends and analysis in the CJCS, CINC, PIP, and CTR exercise programs for fiscal years 1995 through 2000. It describes status and trends in numbers and types of exercises, man-day and funds expenditures, and training value in a series of graphic displays and provides an assessment and conclusions regarding these exercise programs as they affect PERSTEMPO. As noted above, this issue was addressed by the QDR in May 1997, and action was directed to reduce man-days devoted to exercise programs from FY 1996 levels by 15 percent by FY 1998. Actions have been taken and are continuing, as noted in Section III below, to meet these goals.

B. Data Displays. A series of graphic data displays follow that depict PERSTEMPO demands in man-days, by Military Service and CINC; assessments by the CINCs and the Military Services of the training value of these exercise programs; a profile of reductions in man-day requirements, by Service, over FY 1995 through FY 2000; relative weight and value of joint training or engagement exercises; and a profile of the numbers of exercises planned over FY 1995 through FY 2000. These graphic displays are based on the individual exercise data sheets in Section IV.

(1) It should be noted that a change in USCINCSO and USCINCACOM areas of responsibility (AORs) was effective on 1 June 1997. The area of the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Island nations and European possessions in these waters, and nearby areas of the Atlantic Ocean were transferred from USCINCACOM to USCINCSO. This change in AOR carried with it changes in responsibility for certain exercises. This change affects trends in numbers of exercises and related PERSTEMPO for these CINCs.

(2) Trends in numbers of exercises and related PERSTEMPO are also affected by the fact that some exercises take place on a biennial basis. This may cause trend lines to show peaks and valleys from year-to-year, particularly when some of these biennial exercises are very significant in terms of scope and numbers of participants. Examples are such large-scale exercises as USCENTCOM Exercise BRIGHT STAR that takes place in even-numbered years, and USPACOM Exercise TANDEM THRUST that takes place in odd-numbered years.

(3) Man-days of exercise participation are used as the prime indicator of PERSTEMPO demands on the force. This indicates how many personnel were involved in the exercise and for how long.
(4) The following chart depicts the relative demands, in terms of man-days, generated by the joint exercise programs of the regional combatant commands.

MAN-DAY DISTRIBUTION FY 95 - 00

All Others (2%)
CENTCOM (15%)
PACOM (29%)
SOUTHCOM (9%)
USACOM (26%)
EUCOM (19%)

(5) While all the Military Services participate in CJCS and CINC-sponsored exercise programs, the Navy and the Army provide the largest support in terms of man-days. The relative demands on the Services is depicted below. It should be noted that Navy and Marine participation is provided principally by forces already deployed under the Global Naval Force Presence Policy.

Service Man-days FY 95 -00:
Total: 33.6 Million

Air Force
(11%)
Marines
(10%)
Army
(28%)
Navy
(51%)
(6) Training value is a major concern to CJCS, the CINCs, and the Military Services. Assessments of the training value of each exercise to the Services were made in terms of major training value in support of wartime mission and readiness, good training value, or little or no training value based on mission essential tasks. The following graphic displays the aggregate rating by all Services, and also individual Service ratings for all exercises conducted from FY 1995 to date. The Services rated 82 percent of the exercises as providing major or good training value.
(7) Service assessments of training value were also determined by weighing the valuations by the number of man-days spent in the exercises. In terms of man-day expenditures for exercise participation, 94 percent of man-days were devoted to exercises rated as providing major or good training value. The following graphic depicts the aggregate valuation for all Services and also individual Service valuations. The Navy and the Army, as the major participants in exercises, rated training value as major or good for 98 percent and 93 percent, respectively, based on weighing by man-days of participation.
(8) CINC assessments of the joint training value of exercises indicated that 96 percent of all exercises were rated as providing major or good training value. When ratings were weighted by man-days of participation, 95 percent were rated as providing major or good training value. These ratings are depicted below.

(9) In the case of exercises with foreign countries, the CINCs assess the training value to the countries involved and the extent to which the exercises enhance the readiness of US and foreign forces. PfP and CTR exercises are also included in these assessments. The training value assessments of the CINCs are displayed below based on numbers of exercises and US man-day involvement. Major or good training value was obtained from 96 percent of the exercises and 95 percent of the US man-day participation.
(10) With respect to whether the primary intent of exercises is for joint training or regional engagement, the data show that 65 percent of the exercises and 77 percent of the US man-day participation, over FY 1995 through FY 2000, were or will be in exercises whose primary intent is joint training.

![Number of Exercises](image1.png)

Number of Exercises
468 (35%)

Joint Training
Regional Engagement

852 (65%)

![Number of Mandays](image2.png)

Number of Mandays
7.7 Million (23%)

![Joint Training Exercises](image3.png)

Joint Training Exercises (77% of Mandays)

180 (11%)

![Regional Engagement Exercises](image4.png)

Regional Engagement Exercises (23% of Mandays)

282 (36%)

263 (34%)

228 (30%)

(11) Assessments of the Military Services of the training value of joint training and regional engagement exercises, weighted by Service man-days of participation are shown below. The Military Services rated joint training exercises as providing major or good training value 89 percent of the time. Regional engagement exercises were rated as providing major or good training value 64 percent of the time.

![Joint Training Exercises](image5.png)

Joint Training Exercises (77% of Mandays)

887 (55%)

![Regional Engagement Exercises](image6.png)

Regional Engagement Exercises (23% of Mandays)

560 (34%)
(12) Actions have been taken and are continuing to reduce the demands of exercise participation on PERSTEMPO. In addition to the 21 percent reductions already made over FY 1996, FY 1997, and FY 1998, further reductions by FY 2000 are being pursued. The trend in PERSTEMPO man-day reductions in exercise programs is depicted below.

**QDR: MAY 97**
- Joint exercises will be reduced by 15 percent in man-days
- CINCs and Service exercises will pursue additional reductions

![Graph showing reductions in millions of man-days](image)

(13) As depicted below, the total number of exercises planned has also decreased.

**NUMBER OF EXERCISES PLANNED**

![Graph showing reductions in number of exercises](image)
(14) PfP and CTR exercises are only a small subset of the CJCS Exercise Program. The number and trend of PfP exercises is displayed below. CTR exercises are an even smaller portion of the total program with a total of eight such exercises conducted or planned over the reporting period.

**FY 95 - 00 PfP Exercises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Number of Exercises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Assessment and Conclusions. Joint exercise programs are a part of PERSTEMPO requirements. The CINCs and the Military Services support these programs and believe they provide valuable training opportunities for the man-days devoted to participation. The majority of exercises and US participation support joint training, not regional engagement. With respect to regional engagement exercises, they provide significant training opportunities to foreign forces and are critical to the geographic CINC's strategy. The Military Services view the majority of these exercises as providing major or good training value to US forces. A variety of initiatives have been taken and are continuing to reduce the PERSTEMPO demands of joint exercise programs. Significant reductions (21 percent in man-day requirements and 29 percent in numbers of exercises) have been accomplished from FY 1996 to FY 1998, and additional reductions are planned from FY 1998 to FY 2000. Joint exercise programs are the principal means for the CINC to conduct joint training and engagement. They provide excellent training opportunities for participating units from the Military Services and foreign nations, and enhance US ability to shape the international security environment.
SECTION III. UNIFIED COMMAND AND SERVICE ASSESSMENTS

A. General. This section provides a brief overview of the CJCS Exercise Program (CEP), the PfP program, and the CTR program. It continues with assessments by the combatant commands and the Services that address the ability of the Services to support these exercise programs, the benefits of military-to-military relationships, and potential options to reduce PERSTEMPO. Other factors that affect PERSTEMPO are also described, and a summary assessment is provided.

(1) CEP. The CEP is a component of the CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program and includes both CJCS-sponsored and CINC-sponsored exercises. These exercises are the Chairman's principal vehicles for achieving joint and multinational training. They improve our capabilities to implement war plans and meet treaty obligations. The exercises within the CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program provide an opportunity to stress strategic transportation and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems and evaluate their readiness and supportability across the full range of military operations.

(a) CJCS-Sponsored Exercises. CJCS-sponsored exercises make up only a small portion of the total exercise program - less than one percent. They are developed for training audiences at the Joint Staff and National Command Authorities (NCA) level and typically focus on national level joint tasks. Type exercises include: (1) an annual major Command Post Exercise (CPX) involving the Joint Staff, Military Services, combatant commands, and combat support agencies, with participation solicited from the NCA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Federal civil departments and agencies; (2) a series of short-duration seminars, briefings, wargames and mini-CPXs that are narrowly focused on training senior decision makers and their staffs on key action procedures; (3) No-Notice Interoperability Exercises, normally two per year, that focus on C4I and interoperability issues, and (4) an annual NATO Crisis Management Exercise designed to practice and test procedures for NATO crisis management response with emphasis on response options, the NATO Precautionary System, and generation of forces with associated rules of engagement.

(b) CINC-Sponsored Exercises. CINC-sponsored exercises and training events make up the vast majority of joint exercises within the CJCS Joint Exercise and Training Program. They are planned, scheduled, and executed by the combatant commands. Planning and scheduling is done at conferences attended by the Joint Staff, Services, and supporting agencies to eliminate redundancies. These exercises and training events are designed to ensure that Service forces can operate in both joint and multinational environments. These exercises and training activities include CPX and computer-assisted exercises

III-1
(CAX), and range in scope from small unit deployments through full scale field training exercises. They are the principal means available to the combatant commands to train and maintain joint readiness and to further CINC regional engagement goals in support of national strategy.

(2) PfP. NATO's PfP process, a US Post-Cold War Initiative, was launched at the January 1994 NATO Summit. The purpose is to develop strong candidates for NATO membership, build strong ties with countries that do not join NATO, and assist emerging democracies. Currently, 27 states have joined PfP with the majority comprising Eastern European states and Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. One element in the PfP process is to encourage joint planning, training, and military exercises with NATO forces. In support of this goal, the PfP process focuses on improving partner capabilities to participate in peace support operations, peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and emergency preparedness in the context of a NATO-led Combined Joint Task Force. Financial assistance to 21 PfP partners is provided by the US from DOD Operations and Maintenance funds. These funds cover such activities as transportation and consumables for PfP exercises; support for PfP conferences, seminars, and training activities; transportation and handling costs for provision of excess defense articles to partners; and costs for partners to attend DOD familiarization tours and information exchanges. NATO has scheduled over 250 combined and joint exercises since 1995. PfP exercises sponsored by the United States are a small subset of the CEP. USACOM and USEUCOM sponsor and support US and partner nation participation in PfP exercises.

(3) CTR. The CTR program was initiated by Congress in November 1991 to reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of mass destruction held in the former Soviet Union. Through the CTR program, the Department of Defense provides assistance to the eligible states of the former Soviet Union to promote denuclearization and demilitarization and to reduce the threat of weapons proliferation. One element of the program is to expand defense and military contacts between the United States and the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. These contacts are intended to assist in developing democratic and civilian control of military establishments and restructuring and downsizing defense capabilities to better accord with the needs of the NIS. The development of long-term institutional relationships will contribute to improving substantive professional dialogue on defense and military issues, in addition to denuclearization and nonproliferation activities. Joint exercises are a very small part of the overall CTR program and exercises conducted under this umbrella are a subset of the CEP.
B. Ability of the Military Services to Support Exercise Programs

(1) Army. The Army recognizes the important role of these exercise programs and is committed to support their essential requirements. Supporting CJCS and CINC-sponsored exercises and the PfP and CTR programs has become increasingly challenging in recent years as a result of force drawdown, budget adjustments, and increased requirements for engagement with other nations following collapse of the bipolar geopolitical environment. The Army has been especially challenged to meet the requirements of these programs when participation in contingency operations has significantly increased, such as initial force deployments to Bosnia. The training time required by any Army unit to sustain readiness is relatively fixed. Unit commanders use available training days to build and sustain unit proficiency. CJCS, CINC-sponsored, PfP, and CTR exercises offer opportunities to accomplish training, but these exercises are not always focused primarily on unit needs. Furthermore, these exercises are not always the most efficient training events for units. For example, a joint exercise may provide excellent training value to a Joint Task Force Headquarters but may not have adequate resources and focus to provide similar value at the unit level. For these reasons, Army unit commanders must take care that these exercises do not displace so much mission essential training that unit readiness is jeopardized. In the total training and operational environment, the Army is no longer able to support unconstrained CJCS, CINC-sponsored, PfP, and CTR exercise programs. However, the ongoing management practices and initiatives described in paragraph D below will enable the Army to adequately support these programs.

(2) Navy. The Navy is able to execute all the requirements for these exercise programs. The current required participation level is accurate. As the Services continue to refine their force levels and budgets in the future, it is important to make corresponding adjustments in exercise participation requirements. For example, the Navy relies on a reserve augmentation to fill critical command post billets. Reductions in the FY 1998 CJCS Transportation Funds for strategic lift have caused Naval Component Commanders to absorb strategic lift costs in order to maintain vital reserve participation. In the PfP program, Commander, US Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR) is the Navy's primary executive agent. USNAVEUR is able to meet all requirements for the PfP program using available deployed naval assets in theater. As with the CJCS and CINC-sponsored exercises, it is important to monitor and adjust participation requirements as force levels and budgets change. There is no role for Navy units in the CTR program.

ability to meet all exercise requirements. Significant decreases, as a result of congressional marks and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)-mandated reductions, have lessened the size, scope, and funding level of Air Force participation in these exercise programs. The ability of the Air Force to meet the requirements of these programs will not be fully known until both the budget and exercise programs stabilize. The Air Force expects that reductions in the exercise program, in conjunction with budget reductions, will allow the requirements of each of the exercise programs to be met in the future. Air Force major commands will work closely with their respective CINCs to maximize training benefits to the Air Force while fulfilling the CINC’s regional strategy and joint training plan.

(4) Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has the ability to execute all stated requirements of the CJCS, CINC-sponsored, PIP, and CTR programs. As new requirements are announced and old requirements change, The Marine Corps studies costs, tempo, and level of effort as elements of feasibility to support. Fiscal constraints are the greatest challenge to full execution of these programs. Several cost-cutting measures (e.g., use of distributed simulations, reduced mission essential task list focus, combining exercises, etc.) were implemented to achieve the programs’ and combatant commanders’ current goals, desires, and objectives.

(a) Funding reductions (e.g., the commercial ticket program, CJCS Transportation Funds, and O&M funds, etc.) and elimination of the Increased Use Program (known as CINC’s matching funds) for reserve integration restrain the Marine Corps’ ability to execute. Any further reduction in funding will result in degradation in the Marine component’s ability to meet the CINC’s mission essential tasks.

(b) Tempo management is a recurring challenge to the Marine Corps in executing these programs. The last few years has shown a shift from unit field exercises to staff training and CFXs. This trend has lowered troop and unit tempo and joint transportation costs, but increased staff training exercise tempo and O&M expenditures in the form of temporary additional duty. “Staff tempo” is approaching the point of exceeding components’ and major subordinate command headquarters’ ability to support their multiple combatant commanders. Marine Forces Pacific (MarForPac) supports USCINCPAC, USCINCCENT, and U.S. Forces, Korea; while Marine Forces Atlantic (MarForLant) supports USCINCACOM, USCINCEUR, and USCINCSO. Marine Forces Reserves (MarForRes) augments both MarForPac and MarForLant.

(c) Increased staff tempo is a problem for Marine Corps support of joint exercises. This increase can be attributed to staffing levels at component and warfighting headquarters and efforts to reduce the size of headquarters,
reduced funding for reserve participation and augmentation, and redundant training exercise requirements for a single component headquarters as it supports multiple combatant commanders. The competition for funds and forces is becoming increasingly severe and demands greater cooperation among combatant commands to deconflict requirements. Taken individually, each combatant commander’s program is appropriate. However, taken as a whole from the component commanders’ perspective, the training audience is being over-trained in the current austere environment.

(d) Recent trends have forced the Marine components to adapt to numerous internal and external constraints. Imposing further limitations or unrealistic expectations in any of the areas discussed above would decrease the Marine Corps’ ability to execute the current exercise program.

(5) Summary. The Services note that they can currently support the CJCS, CINC-sponsored, PfP, and CTR exercise programs but they face constraints and uncertainties in the areas of funding (CJCS Exercise and Transportation funds, and Service O&M funds) and force structure as these factors interact with planned exercise programs. This situation is further compounded by other demands such as contingency operations and deployments, Service requirements for unit training, and the need to engage with other nations in the pursuit of strategic goals. All note the need to correlate funding projections with exercise programs and ensure that sufficient time is available to the Military Services for service-specific training to maintain readiness. Actions have been taken to reduce demands and reorient or combine exercises, as described in paragraph D below, and these actions will continue to be pursued. The views expressed by the Services highlight the need for firm guidance and specific commitments in the areas of funding and exercise planning.

C. Benefits of Military-to-Military Relationships

(1) Strategic Concepts. The National Security and Military Strategies are based on the concepts of shape, respond and prepare now. They build on the premise that the United States will remain globally engaged to shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to US interests and global security. They emphasize that our Armed Forces must respond to the full spectrum of crises in order to protect our national interests. They further state that as we pursue shaping and responding activities, we must also take steps to prepare now for an uncertain future.

(2) Benefits. Joint Exercises, the CTR program, and PfP program focus on the shape and prepare portions of the national-level strategies and, at the same time, enhance our ability to respond to any crises. These and other military-to-military activities strengthen and reassure friends and allies of the US commitments while promoting stability and deterring aggression by
diminishing threats to peace. They provide avenues for peaceful resolution of conflicts before they can escalate and demonstrate the proper role of military organizations in democratic societies. These activities enhance the degree of cooperation and interoperability between US forces, current and potential military partners, resulting in increased burdensharing for future conflicts. Contacts developed as a result of such activities are highly beneficial, as the US experience during operations in Bosnia revealed.

(a) Although formal alliances are difficult to forecast, the foundations for future coalitions can be laid today by accessing and nurturing key regional partners. Military-to-military contacts pave the way for new partnerships and open lines of communications in regions where none had previously existed. Coordinated activities with such partners do enhance US ability to shape the strategic environment.

(b) Military-to-military relationships provide access to regions where the United States does not have a full-time presence. Exercise related construction, along with associated pre-positioning, also provide tangible evidence of the US commitment to a region and can facilitate subsequent US deployments in response to crises. Access gives the ability to respond with the tools necessary to fight and win.

(c) The Army views these relationships as directly contributing to its ability to support the National Military Strategy. They allow our soldiers to apply the constraints of regional infrastructure to operational problems and expose other military forces to the professional skills of the US Army. Exercises with other armies provide practice in coalition operations; require the planning, rehearsal, or actual conduct of deployment operations; and enable sharing doctrine and procedures for both warfare and operations other than war with likely security partners. Military-to-military relationships and exercises thus contribute to improving interoperability with foreign military forces.

(d) The Navy views military-to-military relationships and contacts as providing three distinct benefits. First, fully supportive of the provisions of the QDR and Joint Vision 2010, they provide important reassurances to allies about US commitments around the world, especially in those more volatile areas of the world. Second, they offer valuable interactive opportunities with our allies, providing critical assessments of the capabilities and limitations. Third, they afford the Navy access to excellent training facilities such as air-to-ground missile ranges in Israel, thus enabling attainment of specific Navy training requirements.

(e) The Air Force derives significant benefits from military-to-military relationships. Combined warfighting readiness, contingency operations,
regional alliances, treaties, CINC regional strategies, and demonstration of US
resolve to allies all benefit from enhanced military-to-military relationships.
These contacts enable the Air Force to establish productive working
relationships with other countries. Relationships enhanced through military-
to-military contacts during exercises prove invaluable to the Air Force during
operations other than war, in the employment of operation plans or concept
plans, and during deployments for actual contingency operations.

(f) The Marine Corps sees benefits from these relationships at three
levels. Primary benefits derived by the Marine Corps is at operational-level
staffs. These benefits include: critical data to planners in review of war plans,
opportunities to understand capabilities of allies who may be coalition partners
during war, and opportunities to develop command and control architecture
with allies to improve interoperability. For individual Marines, such contacts
and exercises are excellent opportunities to refine and demonstrate individual
skills. The general consensus of providing commands is that individual
Marines return from these exercises with a sense of accomplishment and
enhanced professional job satisfaction. Foreign military forces, on exposure to
US forces and capabilities, are often encouraged to model their weapons,
tactics, and organization after their US counterparts; and to take action to
improve their warfighting capabilities. Actions on these lines also contribute to
improving interoperability with US forces.

(3) Summary. Military-to-military relationships are and must remain a
crucial element in the US national security calculus. These activities are
proactive tools the United States uses to shape the strategic landscape in
support of national security objectives. Inexpensive, compared to most defense
initiatives, they promise exceptional leverage under the theory that spending
small amounts on shaping the strategic environment up front can reduce the
need to spend large amounts on warfighting later.

D. Options to Reduce Impacts on PERSTEMPO. Tempo is a measure of the
pace of peacetime activities of the force. A broad assessment of our current
tempo is that we are doing more operations with a smaller force. Unchecked,
this condition may impact both near-term and long-term readiness concerns.
In the long-term, increased PERSTEMPO has its greatest impact on our people
by negatively impacting quality of life and jeopardizing efforts to attract and
retain quality people. It also contributes to accelerated wear on equipment.
Both these impacts result in overall lower readiness. Although joint training
requirements account for only a small portion of the overall tempo for Active
forces, efforts to relieve the effects on tempo caused by exercise programs are
well under way.

(1) Current Guidance. As noted earlier, the QDR initiated actions to
reduce man-days devoted to exercises by 15 percent from FY 1996 levels by FY
1998. Actions to meet this goal are being pursued. The Military Services and the combatant commands have also examined the impact of joint and Service training and exercise requirements on tempo and initiated action to reduce these impacts.

(2) Management Approaches. The Joint Staff and the CINCs hold annual exercise scheduling conferences involving the Military Services to coordinate exercise programs. These conferences are placing greater emphasis on reviewing exercise programs to eliminate redundancies and excessive demands, and to look for efficiencies across CINC and Service lines. Positive results have been obtained, and this process will continue with greater emphasis.

(3) Actions to Reduce Tempo. A variety of actions have already been undertaken by the Joint Staff, CINCs, and Military Services to reduce tempo generated by exercises. These actions are noted below. Continued emphasis on these actions should further reduce tempo demands and also cause improvements in training opportunities for the amount of resources expended. Projected decreases in funding levels and force structure contribute to the need to pursue these efficiencies.

- Reduce the overall number of exercises and the duration and number of participants in specific exercises. As displayed in Sections II and IV, these actions have already been taken. They are continuing actions and will influence results of future Joint Staff and CINC annual exercise scheduling conferences.

- Use deployed forces and in-theater forces for exercise participation in lieu of forces from the Continental United States (CONUS) or other overseas theaters. The Navy and Marine Corps make maximum use of deployed forces for exercise participation thus avoiding additional tempo demands on their forces. USCENTCOM makes significant use of in-theater forces for their exercise programs to save funding costs and preclude additional tempo demands.

- Take action to combine, link, or integrate exercises across CINC and Service lines using common scenarios and mutually supporting objectives; and reschedule or combine small exercises into one exercise that can provide wider training opportunities for a larger audience. For example, NORAD Exercises VIGILANT GUARDIAN and AMALGAM WARRIOR were integrated with USSTRATCOM Exercise GLOBAL GUARDIAN in FY 1997 and FY 1998, and this initiative is also planned for FY 1999 and beyond. USSTRATCOM has modified its Exercise GLOBAL GUARDIAN to incorporate Service training requirements and events. Such actions improve exercise programs at reduced costs in manpower and funding.
• Make greater use of CPX, CAX, and distributed models and simulations as alternatives to Field Training Exercises (FTX). These actions are also under way and reduce the demand for larger numbers of units and personnel associated with FTX. These training vehicles are particularly well suited for joint training of staffs and headquarters elements.

• Increase the use of allied nations and contractor support to reduce demand for US combat support and combat service support forces.

• Use Reserve component (RC) forces, where possible, in lieu of Active component (AC) forces. This action reduces tempo demands on AC forces and provides enhanced training opportunities for RC forces. USSOUTHCOM makes major use of RC forces for exercise participation and training during these units' annual active duty periods.

• Monitor and manage unit deployment demands. The Army has adopted procedures, as noted below, to monitor deployments and meet requirements by sharing the deployment load.

• The Army relies on participation in Joint Staff and CINC scheduling conferences to help manage man-day requirements in joint exercises. Participation allows the Army to "sound off" when exercise requirements for forces and funding cannot be fully supported or when required planning lead-times are not being met. Adequate planning lead-time is essential if unit leaders are to manage unit deployment loads. Additionally, the Army will rely on input to CINC engagement plans to provide visibility of all the international activities within a CINC's AOR. Such visibility should help ensure that only a supportable level of activities is conducted. Furthermore, the Army has adopted procedures to monitor the impact of all deployments -- whether for Army training, joint exercises, or operational deployments. Unit commanders track the number of days that their unit deploys, helping to identify when the unit exceeds the Army goal of no more than 120 days of deployment overnight each year. Ideally, these procedures will enable the Army to more easily meet exercise requirements and balance tempo demands.

• The Navy notes that CJCS and CINC-sponsored exercise requirements are filled largely by deployed units satisfying the Global Naval Force Presence Policy or by Forward Deployed Naval Forces.
Therefore, the impact on PERSTEMPO from exercise programs is negligible. When such exercises are conducted in or near CONUS, they are coordinated and scheduled concurrently with Navy training requirements to maximize efficiencies and economy of force.

- The Air Force is pursuing restructuring, realigning, combining, and eliminating exercise activities and support. Restructuring involves changing forces involved in an exercise. For example, in USCENTCOM Exercise BRIGHT STAR 98, participation of Air Force fighter aircraft was replaced by Naval fighters operating from an in-theater carrier, which eliminated the need to deploy Air Force aircraft while providing already deployed Naval personnel valuable training. Realigning is accomplished by changing deployment, employment, or redeployment dates to enable participation in multiple exercises by a given unit or personnel. Combining enables exercises to meet multiple training objectives during a single deployment. For example, USTRANSCOM Exercise TURBO CHALLENGE was executed in conjunction with USPACOM Exercise RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION in FY 1997. In FY 1998, USTRANSCOM will execute this exercise in conjunction with USCENTCOM Exercise INTERNAL LOOK. Combining exercises in this manner allows Air Force personnel to accomplish several different training objectives during a single deployment.

- The Marine Corps supports efforts to reduce exercise tempo through exercise reductions, exercise combination and alignment, and improved training focus and lessons learned through the Joint Training System. Greater use of distributed simulations and communications offers the potential to reduce staff tempo demands. Joint Staff and CINC scheduling conferences must focus on “requirements based” exercise programs within and between the combatant commands. Concepts such as granting credit to theater components for meeting common exercise requirements in another combatant command’s exercise or even a Service exercise and allowing theater components to prioritize combatant command exercise participation levels based on demonstrated abilities should be examined as a means to reduce tempo.

(4) Summary. High tempo affects the peacetime readiness of our Armed Forces. The Department of Defense takes this situation very seriously. Tempo management processes and actions described above are under way today and have resulted in decreases in tempo. Continued emphasis on these processes and actions is expected to yield further decreases in tempo while affording valuable joint training opportunities.
E. Other Factors Affecting PERSTEMPO. The general view of the CINCs and the Military Services is that deployments and troop rotations, Service training programs and exercises, and contingency operations such as short-notice deployments to Southwest Asia in response to Iraqi actions make much higher demands on the force than exercise programs. It should be noted that PERSTEMPO demands do not fall equally across total Service end strengths. Some units and personnel are not deployable and thus cannot support these demands. Some units and personnel, characterized as low-density/high-demand assets (e.g., reconnaissance and battlefield management platforms, electronic combat aircraft, Patriot missile units, and USSOCOM), must meet very high PERSTEMPO demands. Actions under way to alleviate this situation include increased use of Reserve Component forces, contractors, and allied support; the training of more aircrews; use of substitute capabilities such as Air Expeditionary Forces in lieu of carrier assets in Southwest Asia; and global sourcing to ensure the largest deployable pool of assets is available to balance the workload. These actions also have application to participation in joint exercises and training.

F. Summary. Actions taken to date have significantly reduced tempo demands caused by joint exercises and training events. Emphasis on this concern will continue, as will actions to reduce tempo while affording needed joint training opportunities. The Military Services recognize the importance of supporting these programs but are concerned over the impact of funding and force structure constraints. Management oversight via the exercise scheduling and coordination process will address these concerns and ensure that joint exercise and training requirements are in accord with Service capabilities. Continued pursuit of military-to-military relationships supports the National Security and Military Strategies. These relationships support CINC regional strategies and benefit the Military Services by increasing cooperation and interoperability with the military forces of other nations. They also afford access to and knowledge of other nations with whom the United States has no formal military or alliance commitments. The consensus view of the CINCs and the Military Services is that while joint training and exercise programs contribute to total tempo demands; contingency operations, and other training and operational requirements (e.g., Service training programs, deployments, and troop rotations) make more significant tempo demands. This relative weighting of tempo requirements is expected to continue even with reductions in joint training and exercise programs.
SECTION IV. EXERCISE REPORTS

This section contains detailed data on individual exercises. Some of these files are classified. They are compiled by sponsoring command and are sequenced alphabetically by exercise name and by fiscal year. Data fields contained in these exercise reports are described below:

- **Exercise Data** - contains exercise name and type, primary intent (training or engagement), sponsoring command, fiscal year, duration of the exercise, and relative priority within the sponsoring command's exercise program.

- **Participants** - displays number of participants by Military Service and provides rating of training value by Services and the CINC.

- **Cost** - displays, in millions, incremental costs to the Services and costs in terms of CJCS exercise funds and PfP and CTR funds.

- **Foreign Military Involvement** - displays foreign country and Military Service participation and provides sponsoring CINC's assessment of training value to these forces.

- **Description** - notes type of exercise.

- **Objectives** - describes the objectives of the exercise.

- **Comments** - explanatory remarks, as necessary, provided by the sponsoring command.

- **Classification** - denotes the security classification of the individual data file.
# GLOSSARY

1. **Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAX</td>
<td>computer assisted exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>CJCS Exercise Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCNORAD</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>command post exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>field training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MarForLant</td>
<td>Marine Forces Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MarForPac</td>
<td>Marine Forces Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MarForRes</td>
<td>Marine Forces Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>Newly Independent States (of the former Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operations and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSTEMPO</td>
<td>personnel tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Service Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACOM</td>
<td>US Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>US Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>US Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCIN CACOM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCIN CENT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>US Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSO</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINSPACE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Space Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINSOC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSTRAT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCTRANS</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>US European Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Definitions. The following definitions apply in the context of this report.

CJCS Exercise Transportation Funding - Funding for transportation costs of US forces participating in designated Chairman-sponsored and CINC exercises. Includes sea and air transportation, port handling, and inland transportation.

CJCS Exercise Related Construction Funding - Funding for construction requirements incident to exercises conducted under the CJCS Exercise Program.

Engagement - Peacetime military engagement encompasses all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. The focus of engagement is to draw nations into activity so that they feel that they are a partner to the regional security environment and have a role in how it is being shaped.

Exercise - A military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a multinational, joint, or single-Service exercise.

Incremental Funding - Exercise funding provided by the Military Services and USSOCOM for consumable supplies, per diem, non-aviation fuel, and communications incident to exercise support and participation. The Military Services also fund CJCS Exercise Program costs incurred by the CINC staffs.
Incremental funding does not include other items funded in Service accounts such as flying hours, steaming days, and OPTEMPO miles.

Joint Exercise - Exercise based on joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures that train and evaluate joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to requirements established by joint force commanders to accomplish their assigned mission(s).

Joint Training - Military training based on joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to operational requirements deemed necessary by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. NOTE: Deviations from these criteria may be made at the discretion of the respective combatant commander. For instance, regional exercises focused on such CINC priorities as coalition building, overseas presence and access, demonstrating national resolve, and visible support for allies/coalition partners could be included in the CINC Joint Training Plan.

Multinational Exercise - Exercise that trains and evaluates US and other nations' forces or staffs to respond to requirements established by multinational force commanders to accomplish their assigned mission(s).

Partnership for Peace (PfP) funding - Warsaw Initiative Funds that pay for partner nation participation in PfP programs.

Service Training - Military training based on Service policy and doctrine to prepare individuals and interoperable units. Service training includes basic, technical, operational, and component-sponsored interoperability training in response to operational requirements deemed necessary by the combatant commanders to execute assigned missions.

Training Value - A numerical rating of the training value of an exercise to the Military Service, CINC, and foreign nation participating in the exercise, as below:

3 - Provides major training value in support of wartime mission and readiness.

2 - Provides good training value in support of wartime mission and readiness.

1 - Little or no training value.