Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 And 1999


(House of Representatives - June 10, 1997)

[Congressional Record: Pages H3618-H3626]


AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MS. MCKINNEY

Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is the amendment one of those specifically listed in the order of the House of June 5, 1997?

Ms. McKINNEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Ms. McKinney:

At the end of the bill add the following (and conform the table of contents accordingly):

DIVISION C--ARMS TRANSFERS CODE OF CONDUCT

TITLE XX--ARMS TRANSFERS CODE OF CONDUCT

SEC. 2001. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the `Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1997'.

SEC. 2002. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) Approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75 percent civilians, died as a result of civil and international wars fought with conventional weapons during the 45 years of the cold war, demonstrating that conventional weapons can in fact be weapons of mass destruction.

(2) Conflict has actually increased in the post cold war era, with 30 major armed conflicts in progress during 1995.

(3) War is both a human tragedy and an ongoing economic disaster affecting the entire world, including the United States and its economy, because it decimates both local investment and potential export markets.

(4) International trade in conventional weapons increases the risk and impact of war in an already over-militarized world, creating far more costs than benefits for the United States economy through increased United States defense and foreign assistance spending and reduced demand for United States civilian exports.

(5) The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms can be an effective first step in support of limitations on the supply of conventional weapons to developing countries and compliance with its reporting requirements by a foreign government can be an integral tool in determining the worthiness of such government for the receipt of United States military assistance and arms transfers.

(6) It is in the national security and economic interests of the United States to reduce dramatically the $840,000,000,000 that all countries spend on armed forces every year, $191,000,000,000 of which is spent by developing countries, an amount equivalent to 4 times the total bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance such countries receive every year.

(7) According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States supplies more conventional weapons to developing countries than all other countries combined, averaging $11,889,000,000 a year in agreements to supply such weapons to developing countries for the six years since the end of the cold war, 58 percent higher than the $7,515,000,000 a year in such agreements for the six years prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

(8) Since the end of the cold war, 84 percent of United States arms transfers have been to developing countries are to countries with an undemocratic form of government whose citizens, according to the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices do not have the ability to peaceably change their form of government.

(9) Although a goal of United States foreign policy should be to work with foreign governments and international organizations to reduce militarization and dictatorship and therefore prevent conflicts before they arise, during 4 recent deployments of United States Armed Forces--to the Republic of Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti-- such Armed Forces faced conventional weapons that had been provided or financed by the United States to undemocratic governments.

(10) The proliferation of conventional arms and conflicts around the globe are multilateral problems, and the fact that the United States has emerged as the world's primary seller of conventional weapons, combined with the world leadership role of the United States, signifies that the United States is in a position to seek multilateral restraints on the competition for and transfers of conventional weapons.

(11) The Congress has the constitutional responsibility to participate with the executive branch in decisions to provide military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign government, and in the formulation of a policy designed to reduce dramatically the level of international militarization.

(12) A decision to provide military assistance and arms transfers to a government that is undemocratic, does not adequately protect human rights, is currently engaged in acts of armed aggression, or is not fully participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, should require a higher level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide such assistance and arms transfers to a government to which these conditions do not apply.

SEC. 2003. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this title is to provide clear policy guidelines and congressional responsibility for determining the eligibility of foreign governments to be considered for United States military assistance and arms transfers.

SEC. 2004. PROHIBITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

(a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), beginning on and after October 1, 1998, United States military assistance and arms transfers may not be provided to a foreign government for a fiscal year unless the President certifies to the Congress for that fiscal year that such government meets the following requirements:

(1) Promotes democracy.--Such government--

(A) was chosen by and permits free and fair elections;

(B) promotes civilian control of the military and security forces and has civilian institutions controlling the policy, operation, and spending of all law enforcement and security institutions, as well as the armed forces;

(C) promotes the rule of law, equality before the law, and respect for individual and minority rights, including freedom to speak, publish, associate, and organize; and

(D) promotes the strengthening of political, legislative, and civil institutions of democracy, as well as autonomous institutions to monitor the conduct of public officials and to combat corruption.

(2) Respects human rights.--Such government--

(A) does not engage in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including--

(i) extra judicial or arbitrary executions;

(ii) disappearances;

(iii) torture or severe mistreatment;

(iv) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;

(v) systematic official discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or political affiliation; and

(vi) grave breaches of international laws of war or equivalent violations of the laws of war in internal conflicts;

(B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and prosecutes those responsible for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights;

(C) permits access on a regular basis to political prisoners by international humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross;

(D) promotes the independence of the judiciary and other official bodies that oversee the protection of human rights;

(E) does not impede the free functioning of domestic and international human rights organizations; and

(F) provides access on a regular basis to humanitarian organizations in situations of conflict or famine.

(3) Not engaged in certain acts of armed aggression.--Such government is not currently engaged in acts of armed aggression in violation of international law.

(4) Full participation in U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.--Such government is fully participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

(b) Requirement for Continuing Compliance.--Any certification with respect to a foreign government for a fiscal year under subsection (a) shall cease to be effective for that fiscal year if the President certifies to the Congress that such government has not continued to comply with the requirements contained in paragraphs (1) through (4) of such subsection.

(c) Exemptions.--

(1) In general.--The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a foreign government for a fiscal year if--

(A) subject to paragraph (2), the President submits a request for an exemption to the Congress containing a determination that it is in the national security interest of the United States to provide military assistance and arms transfers to such government; or

(B) the President determines that an emergency exists under which it is vital to the interest of the United States to provide military assistance and arms transfers to such government.

(2) Disapproval.--A request for an exemption to provide military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign government shall not take effect, or shall cease to be effective, if a law is enacted disapproving such request.

(d) Notifications to Congress.--

(1) In general.--The President shall submit to the Congress initial certifications under subsection (a) and requests for exemptions under subsection (c)(1)(A) in conjunction with the submission of the annual request for enactment of authorizations and appropriations for foreign assistance programs for a fiscal year and shall, where appropriate, submit additional or amended certifications and requests for exemptions at any time thereafter in the fiscal year.

(2) Determination with respect to emergency situations.-- The President, when, in his determination, it is not contrary to the national interest to do so, shall submit to the Congress at the earliest possible date reports containing determinations with respect to emergencies under subsection (c)(1)(B). Each such report shall contain a description of--

(A) the nature of the emergency;

(B) the type of military assistance and arms transfers provided to the foreign government; and

(C) the cost to the United States of such assistance and arms transfers.

SEC. 2005. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate should hold hearings on--

(1) controversial certifications submitted under section 2004(a);

(2) all requests for exemptions submitted under section 2004(c)(1)(A); and

(3) all determinations with respect to emergencies under section 2004(c)(1)(B).

SEC. 2006. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS DEFINED.

For purposes of this title, the terms `United States military assistance and arms transfers' and `military assistance and arms transfers' mean--

(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance), including the transfer of excess defense articles under section 516 of that Act;

(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military education and training); or

(3) the transfer of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act (excluding any transfer or other assistance under section 23 of such Act), including defense articles and defense services licensed or approved for export under section 38 of that Act.

Ms. McKINNEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized for 8 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I am very proud to offer the McKinney-Rohrabacher amendment, which I believe is a significant enhancement to the legislation we are now considering, the State Department authorization bill.

This is no longer a controversial amendment. Significant compromise and change have been incorporated into this new version of the Arms Trade Code of Conduct that I am introducing today. In the first version of the bill, the President would certify countries at the beginning of each fiscal year that comply with the code of conduct. If the President wanted to sell weapons to a noncomplying government, then the President would have to come to Congress requesting an exemption and have that exemption approved by a vote in Congress.

The administration and some Members of Congress felt this gave too much authority to Congress and deprived the President of his ability to make foreign policy. In the spirit of compromise, we have stripped the original bill of this language and now all that remains are the underlying values that motivated this bill in the first place, and that is that the United States ought not be in the business of supplying weapons to dictators.

Gone is the automatic trigger that some objected to. And so now the piece of legislation before us asks us to make the fundamental assertion of what we stand for in the world and whose side we are on. Is it that the United States of America that speaks eloquently on the subject of respect for human rights and democracy and democratic traditions is only paying lip service to these ideals when confronted with a hungry client wanting our advanced technology only to enhance their ability to torture and abuse their own population? Or do we stand with those people around the world who are victims of the world's tyrants, who have no voice in the international arena and who only have the conscience of the world to help them?

This legislation helps to give the United States a conscience for the leaders around the world who do not have one. This legislation helps to give a voice to those people around the world who cannot speak out in their own countries. And finally, this legislation puts the international behavior of the United States in sync with our words, our beliefs, and our fundamental values.

Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I cannot say it any better than our CIA director. The issue before the Congress today is a national security issue and a moral issue. Seldom are we given such a stark opportunity to be on the right side of both issues.

The Arms Trade Code of Conduct is just such an opportunity.

I ask my colleagues to vote for this amendment and let us be known by the values we espouse and not the weapons of oppression that we supply.

Mr. Chairman, U.S. weapons are currently being used in 39 of the world's current 42 ethnic and territorial conflicts.

In the past 4 years, 85 percent of U.S. arms sales to the Third World have gone to undemocratic governments. The United States is responsible for 44 percent of all weapons deliveries in the world. The United States is unqualifiedly the arms dealer to the world, and the merchant for death to the world's dictators.

Language requiring Congress to approve an arms sale to a dictator before it's been made has been modified to give the President an automatic waiver for national security purposes which Congress could block after extensive debate.

A total of 453 American soldiers have been killed by armies strengthened by our own weapons and military training:

Iraq, Saddam Hussein; Panama, Manuel Noriega; Somalia, Siad Barre, and Haiti, the Duvalier family.

In fiscal year 1994 $7 billion of taxpayer money went to subsidize U.S. arms exports. In fiscal year 1995, that figure jumped to $7.6 billion. After agricultural price supports, this represents the largest subsidy program for business in the entire Federal budget--Welfare for Weapons dealers.

Our Government employs nearly 6,500 full time personnel to promote and service foreign arms sales by U.S. companies.

U.S. subsidies for arms transfers are scheduled to increase. The international market for U.S. arms is estimated to be around $12 to $16 billion per year. Therefore, our foreign customers aren't even paying for the weapons that they get. And more than half of U.S. weapons sales will be paid for by the U.S. taxpayers.

In 1995, subsidies for arms exports accounted for over 50 percent of U.S. bilateral aid and more than 39 percent of total U.S. foreign aid. the emphasis on promoting weapons exports has come at the expense of programs designed to promote economic development and social welfare in these recipient nations. I'd much rather see us exporting tractors and seeds to dictators than guns and bullets.

The American arms trade policy is killing our citizens, destroying worldwide democracy, and sending us spiraling down a path of economic ruin.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower said, `There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends.' We must help to stop the arms trade boomerang. Over 300 organizations support the No Arms to Dictators Code of Conduct. Among these organizations are: Vietnam Veterans Of America Foundation, Young Women's Christian Association--the YMCA--of America, and Bread of the World, and organizations of the Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic churches.

I would like to thank the hundreds of volunteers who have put thousands of hours into making the U.S. Code of Conduct our law.

Each of us must be concerned about what happens when we sell weapons to dictators.

I urge my colleagues to support the Arms Trade Code of Conduct.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment, the Arms Transfer Code of Conduct, and it will be the first major reform of U.S. arms transfer policy in almost two decades.

The code of conduct highlights guiding principles on human rights and democracy, which I believe are important to America's leadership role in the post-cold war era. This amendment would help stem the flow of U.S. weapons to countries that brutalize their own people.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

First of all, I would like to congratulate the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney] on fighting the leadership on this issue. This is not a left-wing issue. This is not a right-wing issue. I am very proud to be here today to stand with Cynthia McKinney and all the rest of my colleagues who support this moral code of conduct for the United States of America.

In the post-cold war, the code of conduct is totally consistent with America's traditions and America's principles. In the long-term, it will not only serve the interest of human freedom, but it will also serve our national security and international stability requirements as well.

During the cold war, compromises were necessary. These were compromises that we had to make with nondemocratic regimes because we were defending against even larger gangsters and thugs who wanted to destroy the United States of

America and the free world. Today, we should stand for freedom and democracy and we should insist that this be a basis for any relation that we have with other countries and other governments.

I served Ronald Reagan in the White House, who altered a fundamental tactic that was being used during the cold war. Before Ronald Reagan, the U.S. Government was always anti-Communist. But during Ronald Reagan's term of office, he changed our position to being profreedom. Today we should continue Ronald Reagan's successful profreedom policy by pulling back from shipping arms to dictatorships and making sure that we are on the side of the people rather than on the side of the oppressors in those countries where dictatorships exist. This will be in the long-term interest of the United States.

This was, in this policy that Ronald Reagan articulated during the 1980's, is what ended the cold war. It was not the fact that we had more missiles and more guns, although we did increase our weapons. It was the fact that America began to realistically and seriously talk about the promotion of democracy in the world. And in the end, the people who lived under tyranny hammered away at their walls and pulled those walls down and united themselves with the good and decent and democratic countries of the world.

This amendment will in fact strengthen American foreign policy by empowering our diplomats to tell the military dictators that they should liberalize their policies, respect human rights, and join the family of democratic nations, or we will not be their friend and we will not provide them weapons to repress their own people.

What does selling weapons to dictatorships really mean? It means that we will give weapons to people who thwart democratic elections, oppress their people, and then we will expect their people to pay us back. Well, is that not something to be proud of. That is something we can no longer accept in the United States of America. The cold war is over. It is time for us to have a new code of conduct that puts democracy and human rights ahead of a fast buck in selling weapons to the dictators around the world who repress people and violate the very principles which this country is supposed to be all about.

What will the people of the world think about us if we adopt this kind of type of code of conduct? Well, they will know that we are on their side and not the side of the thugs and gangsters who hold power in too much of the world today.

Our Founding Fathers believed that America would be and should be the beacon of liberty, of hope and justice to the whole world. That was our strength. That is what the Founding Fathers believed in. That is what America is supposed to be all about.

It is not that we are the toughest guy in the world and have the most weapons, but we can count on the friendship of good and decent people all over the world. That is where America's strength is. That is the type of world we are trying to build.

America's strength was not in that we were allied with dictatorships.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the new code of conduct for weapons sales, and I commend the gentlewoman from Georgia

[Ms. McKinney] for exceptional leadership on this, as well as the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher] for his, as well.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

(Mr. McGovern asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise in support of the McKinney amendment.

Mr. Chairman I rise today in support of the amendment offered by the gentlelady from Georgia [Ms. McKinney]. I want to thank her for the leadership she has taken on this very important issue to establish a code of conduct on U.S. arms transfers.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is the world's undisputed political leader. We are also the undisputed leader in arms exports, shipping more arms abroad than all other countries combined. If we are to set a standard that establishes a pro-democracy, pro-human rights criteria for arms transfers, U.S. leadership is crucial. If the United States sets a standard, then our Government can challenge others to adhere to similar standards. When the United States has led the way in the past--such as in the control of ballistic missiles--other nations soon followed.

Simply put, Mr. Chairman, this code of conduct would declare, clearly and unambiguously, that the United States will no longer play the dangerous game of putting dangerous weapons in the hands of dangerous governments. The United States will no longer fuel regional arms races. And the United States will no longer be associated with repression and international weapons proliferation.

The code of conduct that would be established by approving this amendment is very simple. For a country to be eligible to receive U.S. weapons, they must meet four criteria. They must: First, be a democratic form of government; second, respect the basic human rights of their citizens; third, refrain from aggression against other nations; and fourth, fully participate in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. These criteria are all primary tenets of U.S. past and present foreign policy. The President may exempt a country from this criteria and the Congress would need to affirm that decision. Over 100 national organizations in the United States support this code of conduct.

A Commission of Nobel Peace Laureates, made up of 16 Nobel Peace Prize winners, have called for an international code of conduct on arms transfers. This commission includes such individuals as Oscar Arias, the former President of Costa Rica; the Dalai Lama; Jose Ramos-Horta from East Timor; Lech Walesa of Poland; Archbishop Desmond Tutu from South Africa; Holocaust survivor and author Elie Wiesel; Mairead Maguire, the champion of peace in Northern Ireland; Rigoberta Menchu, Mayan Indian and human rights advocate from Guatemala; human rights and development champion, Adolofo Perez Esquivel of Argentina; Amnesty International; the American Friends Service Committee; the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; and several others.

Certainly the United States should be the leader on such an important international policy.

Yet for some reason, the United States has abrogated its responsibility to be the world leader on this issue. Instead, of the countries that comprise 80 percent of the world's arms exports, only France and the United States remain uncommitted to a policy of denying arms to dictators and human rights abusers.

Codes of Conduct on Arms Transfers: An Opportunity for the United States and Its European Allies to Work Together The European Union (EU) and the United States together account for 80 percent of the global arms trade. There is clearly a need for a more responsible, principled approach to arms exports on the part of the major suppliers. More specifically, increased coordination on arms export policy between the United States and the European Union would better allow the allies to work in concert in their efforts to promote democracy and international stability. A coordinated export policy should emphasize regional and international security considerations, as well as human rights and development, and not allow such critical foreign policy concerns to be overshadowed by short-sighted commercial interests. The EU has already agreed to eight common criteria governing arms exports, and there is significant progress on expanding the criteria. Specifically, there is growing support among European governments, including the UK and Germany, for an EU-wide

Code of Conduct on the arms trade setting high common standards for weapons exports for all EU countries. In addition:

The new UK Government has pledged that it will `work for the introduction of an EU Code of Conduct setting high common standards to govern arms exports from all European Union Member States.'

The German government `favours the most binding application possible of the fundamentals contained in the EU Code of Conduct on the arms trade.'

The proposed EU Code of Conduct text drafted by the British American Security Information Council, Saferworld, and the World Development Movement.

THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION

Focusing narrowly on maintaining market share, to date, no country has been willing to take unilateral steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's leading suppliers, the EU and the United States work together to implement restraint. Building on common guidelines already agreed by the EU and by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the U.S. and EU should institute parallel Codes of Conduct on arms transfers. Together, these Codes would:

Protect European and American military personnel. Lack of restraint and common policy on arms exports places our armed forces at risk in overseas operations. This weapons `boomerang' endangered European and American troops who faced weapons supplied by their own governments during peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Allied troops also faced an Iraqi army heavily armed as a result of arms exports from the UK and France during the 1980s.

Prevent undercutting. In response to concerns over controversial weapons sales, weapons manufacturers often take the focus away from the policy implications of these transfers by arguing that `if we don't sell, someone else will.' As a result, threats of lost market share have overshadowed the real consequences of these transfers--even in the most controversial weapons sales.

Cooperation on export policy will prevent either U.S. or European companies from undercutting one another in pursuit of sales, and as a result will allow governments to take a more measured look at the foreign policy and human rights implications of proposed transfers.

Reduce discrepancies on human rights and regional stability. The `if we don't sell, someone else will' argument used by the defense industry also misses the point that weapons sales are not just like any other commodity sold on the international market. Governments deal with weapons transfers differently precisely because the impact that weapons transfers can have is so vast. As major suppliers, the U.S. and EU have a special responsibility to ensure that the perceived economic gain of a weapons transfers does not take precedence over key foreign policy concerns, and that weapons transfers do not contribute to instability and global violence.

Codes of Conduct on Arms Transfers: An Opportunity for the United States and Its European Allies to Work Together The European Union (EU) and the United States together account for 80 percent of the global arms trade. There is clearly a need for a more responsible, principled approach to arms exports on the part of the major suppliers. More specifically, increased coordination on arms export policy between the United States and the European Union would better allow the allies to work in concert in their efforts to promote democracy and international stability. A coordinated export policy should emphasize regional and international security considerations, as well as human rights and development, and not allow such critical foreign policy concerns to be overshadowed by short-sighted commercial interests.

The EU has already agreed to eight common criteria governing arms exports, and there is significant progress on expanding the criteria. Specifically, there is growing support among European governments, including the UK and Germany, for an EU-wide Code of Conduct on the arms trade setting high common standards for weapons exports for all EU countries. In addition:

The new UK Government has pledged that it will `work for the introduction of an EU Code of Conduct setting high common standards to govern arms exports from all European Union Member States.'

The German government `favours the most binding application possible of the fundamentals contained in the EU Code of Conduct on the arms trade.' The proposed EU Code of Conduct text drafted by the British American Security Information Council, Saferworld, and the

World Development Movement.

THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION

Focusing narrowly on maintaining market share, to date, no country has been willing to take unilateral steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's leading suppliers, the EU and the United States work together to implement restraint. Building on common guidelines already agreed by the EU and by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the U.S. and EU should institute parallel Codes of Conduct on arms transfers. Together, these Codes would:

Protect European and American military personnel. Lack of restraint and common policy on arms exports places our armed forces at risk in overseas operations. This weapons `boomerang' endangered European and American troops who faced weapons supplied by their own governments during peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Allied troops also faced an Iraqi army heavily armed as a result of arms exports from the UK and France during the 1980s.

Prevent undercutting. In response to concerns over controversial weapons sales, weapons manufacturers often take the focus away from the policy implications of these transfers by arguing that `if we don't sell, someone else will.' As a result, threats of lost market share have overshadowed the real consequences of these transfers--even in the most controversial weapons sales.

Cooperation on export policy will prevent either U.S. or European companies from undercutting one another in pursuit of sales, and as a result will allow governments to take a more measured look at the foreign policy and human rights implications of proposed transfers.

Reduce discrepancies on human rights and regional stability. The `if we don't sell, someone else will' argument used by the defense industry also misses the point that weapons sales are not just like any other commodity sold on the international market. Governments deal with weapons transfers differently precisely because the impact that weapons transfers can have is so vast. As major suppliers, the U.S. and EU have a special responsibility to ensure that the perceived economic gain of a weapons transfers does not take precedence over key foreign policy concerns, and that weapons transfers do not contribute to instability and global violence.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, might I reclaim my time by saying that the gentleman portrays the very best of that spirit and I was offering the correction only in the sense of humor.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I rise in strong support of my colleagues' amendment. I am pleased to have worked with them for many years now on the issue of demilitarization around the world. By promoting demilitarization we are able to help insure our own Nation's security interest.

In 1995, I joined with Dr. Oscar Arias, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, to launch the Year 2000 Campaign. This campaign seeks to have industrialized nations condition their aid to promote demilitarization. I believe that we should condition U.S. foreign assistance on the size of a country's military budget.

Last Thursday, Dr. Arias joined Betty Williams of Northern Ireland, Elie Wiessel the Holocaust survivor, the Dalai Lama, Desmond Tutu of South Africa, and ten other winners of the Nobel Peace Prize to announce their support for the International Code of Conduct, which is based on the McKinney-Rohrabacher bill.

I do not believe that the U.S. tax dollars should be used to help subsidize a country's military expenditures when that country does not have a democratically elected government or it spends more on weapons than on health care or nutrition or education.

Non-democratic governments received 84 percent--nearly $50 billion--of the $59.1 of American weapons that were transferred to developing countries through foreign aid or Pentagon administered corporate sales during the past 5 years.

Developing countries received 67 percent of the $88.5 billion total of U.S. arms transfers during the past 5 years.

Perhaps Indonesia provides the best example of what we ought not to be doing. The Indonesian Armed Forces have become a military mafia, receiving $1.6 billion every year in United States backed loans from the World Bank--equal to that country's entire reported military budget. Yet it is no secret that the Indonesian military under-reports its military expenditures by somewhere between 25 and 50 percent.

In Indonesia we see a military economy, dictatorship, human-rights abuses, and the illegal occupation of East Timor.

The army controls massive private and state-run corporations. They systematically shake-down the wealthy ethnic Chinese business community. The military maintains a shadow government controlling life from the national level to the smallest village.

This amendment would end United States military support for Indonesia. And, after last month's fraudulent elections in which only one party was allowed to campaign and opposition leaders were harassed and jailed, it is about time that the United States end support for Indonesia.

The code of conduct required foreign governments to promote democracy through a free, open, and fair elections. It requires them to promote the rule of law. It requires them to respect human rights. It requires them not to be engaged in armed aggression that violates international law. And it requires them to fully participate in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.

These are all ideals which all Americans share. Shouldn't our foreign aid policy reflect these ideals?

Mr. Chairman, the United States has a great deal of power. We also have a great deal of responsibility. We should help foster democracy and freedom in the world. I urge all my colleagues to vote yes on this amendment.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the McKinney-Rohrabacher amendment to establish an arms sales code of conduct.

After more than 30 years of the cold war with record high peacetime defense budgets and a tremendous amount of global arms exports, the United States has left the world armed to the teeth with millions of tons of bombs, jets, submarines, and artillery. The world is awash in weapons.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the Rohrabacher amendment to H.R. 1757, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which would deny United States foreign assistance to Russia to prevent the transfer of missile technology to China and Iran.

While I am a strong supporter of nonproliferation measures, and measures to increase stability in the Asia-Pacific region,

I firmly believe this amendment would have exactly the opposite effect of what it intends: it would, in fact, encourage the illegal transfer of technology by Russia.

The primary reason for the transfer of such technology in cash-strapped Russia is to obtain hard currency. To deny

United States aid would make Russia's dire economic circumstances worse. The inevitable response by desperate business interests will be to seek even more illicit trade.

We are all aware of allegations that have recently surfaced regarding Russian technological assistance to rogue nations that would enable them to build advanced missiles capable of targeting our friends and allies.

These allegations must be taken seriously, by the administration and Congress. I have written to and called our National

Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, on several occasions and he has arranged several excellent briefings for Members. He has also assured me that President Clinton took up these issues with President Yeltsin at the May 27 Paris summit, follow-up continues, and further efforts will be made at the highest levels later this summer.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is well intended but misses the mark. We must provide appropriate aid to Russia to help it monitor proliferation, and to rebuild its economy so the impulse for illicit proliferation is reduced.

In this case, less is less. Less aid means less control and less security. I urge my colleagues to vote `no.'

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. McKinney].

The amendment was agreed to.


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