CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS CONCERNING THE LAOTIAN CRISIS.

FOURTH INSTALLMENT: 1 JUNE TO 31 DECEMBER 1961

HISTORICAL DIVISION
JOINT SECRETARIAT
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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that it would not be Communist-dominated. US policy, continued the US Ambassador, had been clearly expressed by the President when he had told General Phoumi in Washington (see item 29, 30 June 1961) that the US would have to reserve its judgement until it could "look at the entire package."

(S) Msg, Vientiane to SecState, 114, 21 Jul 61.

21 Jul 61  The British Minister in Washington informed the Secretary of State of Lord Home's "increasing concern" about developments in Laos. The UK Foreign Secretary thought it possible that Phoumi's unyielding attitude might, for example, result in the collapse of the cease-fire. Since progress at Geneva went hand in hand with progress at Ban Nam Ome and among the Princes, the Conference might be unable to restore the shattered truce. Phoumi might then attempt to partition the country, with southern Laos being held by SEATO.

Concern over this possible sequence of events prompted Lord Home to suggest that the US, UK, and France urge Phoumi and Boun Oum to be flexible in negotiations. The British Foreign Secretary considered the formation of a coalition government headed by Souvanna to be the key to a peaceful solution of the Laoitan problem. The RLG, however, was not to be encouraged to give in to unreasonable demands.

(S) Ltr, Br Min in Wash to SecState, 21 Jul 61, OASD (ISA), FER/SEA Branch files.

23 Jul 62  CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that consideration be given to providing the RED EYE weapon (a heat-seeking ground-to-air rocket) to the Meo or selected FAL regular units, for use against the Soviet airlift into Laos (see item 13 August 1961).

(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 230011Z Jul 61.