MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) STINGER Missile and Gripstock Inventory Standardized Procedures (DSCA Policy Memorandum 05-10)

REFERENCE: Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) Visit Policy (DSCA Policy Memorandum 04-11)

DSCA Policy Memorandum 04-11, 2 April 2004, delineated EUM visit responsibilities in support of the Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) program. This policy was incorporated into Chapter 8 of the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). In-country visits to assess and evaluate EUM compliance programs are an important part of the Golden Sentry program and will continue for the foreseeable future with an emphasis on Stinger missile and gripstock accountability. Attached to Policy Memorandum 04-11 was a DRAFT Stinger checklist. Since publication of that memorandum in April 2004, the EUM team conducted two Tiger Team visits to Greece and Bahrain validating the checklist.

This memorandum replaces the former DRAFT checklist with the validated checklist and provides more refined procedures for Stinger Missile and gripstock inspection requirements. Additionally, this memorandum mandates all USG representatives adhere to the standards within the checklist in the conduct of Stinger missiles and gripstock inventories. This action complies with the recommendations included in GAO’s May 2004 report: “Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems.” As Stinger missile and gripstock inspections continue, we will update this checklist as required.

Combatant Commands should include the attached checklist in their EUM Directives/Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)/Guidance. If you have any questions regarding these changes, my point of contact is Ms. Jill R. Fong at (Voice) 703-604-6596 (DSN 664), (FAX) 703-602-1059 (DSN 332), NIPRNET (unclassified) email address Jill.Fong@dsca.mil, and SIPRNET (classified) e-mail address Jill.Fong@dsca.osd.smil.mil.

Freda J. Lodge
Director
Policy, Plans & Programs

Attachment:
1. EUM Stinger Checklist (April 2004)
## CHECKLIST AND GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR STINGER MISSILE/MANPADS END-USE MONITORING COMPLIANCE

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<td>5. Letter of Offer and Acceptance and other implementing agreements, e.g., MOU/MOA which allow the transfer of MANPADS</td>
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## INVENTORY AND COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST FOR MANPADS ON HAND OVER 12 MONTHS.

| 1. Does the SAO have a copy of the LOA that contracted the sale of the Stinger Missiles and MANPADS components? |         |
| 2. Does the SAO have a copy of all the serial numbers and model numbers for Stinger missiles and gripstocks sold to the host country? If not what actions has the SAO taken to obtain the list from the Implementing Agencies? |         |
| 3. Has the SAO read and understood the security requirements as indicated in the LOA for the Stinger missiles and gripstocks? If understanding is not complete, what actions has the SAO taken to resolve any questions? |         |
| 4. Has an inventory of all serial numbers of Stinger missiles and gripstocks been conducted within the last 12 months by matching the serial numbers on the known list with the serial numbers on the MANPAD component or from the outside of its sealed container? If not what are the reasons? |         |
| 5. Were all serial numbers accounted for? If not was a report of the loss provided by the SAO/host nation (as appropriate) and forwarded to the Army and DSCA? |         |
| 6. Were there indications of intrusion to the box/container or compromise of the items? A. Wire lead/aluminum seal broken on the container or box B. Humidity indicator a light, medium or dark pink C. Lighter than normal weight of boxes/containers D. Lack of serial numbers on the outside of the box |         |
| 7. If the container is opened, and the serial number of the MANPADS components verified, are there any indicators of intrusion or compromise to the container found in accordance with paragraph 2C? |         |
| 8. Did the SAO, review the recipient government’s records of monthly, quarterly and/or semi-annual two-man verifications? If they were not |         |
9. Does the SAO have a copy of the **last serial number inventory** on file?

10. What were the actions taken to correct discrepancies noted in the last inventory and last observations of physical security deficiencies?

**FOR MANPADS OR COMPONENTS ARRIVED WITHIN THE PAST 12 MONTHS ADD THE FOLLOWING:**

1. Did the US Army notify the SAO when delivery of the missiles began?

2. Were serial numbers provided to the SAO for missiles and gripstocks, shipped to and received by the foreign government?

3. Did the SAO conduct the first physical inventory within 30 days after the US Army notified the SAO of delivery of missiles? If not explain.

**STINGER MISSILES:**

1. **SECURITY:** This is a CAT 1-missile/explosive, that must be secured and inventoried IAW the following requirements:
   
   A. **DEPOT, POST OR INSTALLATION STORAGE**—General requirements follow:
      
      1.) 2 high security padlocks.
      2.) 2-person rule. Each person is authorized on a specific access roster for a specific key only. The same person cannot be on the access roster for both keys. Thus it should require 2 persons to unlock the door. Review the access rosters for compliance.
      3.) Chain link fence 6ft high with a 1 foot slanted barbed wire overhang.
      4.) Real estate permitting; 12ft free zone outside fence & 30ft inside fence.
      5.) Minimum gates. If not guarded, secured with adequate locking devices. Underground drains, etc barred if > 96 sq in.
      6.) Lights. Lights around perimeter and over door must be adequate to detect unauthorized personnel. Light switches must be controlled.
      7.) Storage bunker must have an intrusion detection system (IDS), a closed circuit television, or constant, on site guard with radio/communications with its headquarters. If IDS is used does someone call in before going into the magazine, if not, does a reaction force respond as though this was an unauthorized intrusion?
      8.) Missiles will typically be stored in original containers, sealed and banded together.

   B. **DEPLOYED UNIT STORAGE**- Unit storage is for those missiles, which are deployed in a tactical or operational environment. Storage requirements are much the same as for missiles stored in a depot, but commanders may post a letter in the storage facility that indicates they have chosen for operational reasons to store the missiles in an alternate security location. When this happens the minimum security
requirements apply:
  1.) Missile containers/boxes will be banded together in a manner that easily shows signs of tampering.
  2.) Stored in an approved container such as a SEAVAN, MILVAN, or stored in a totally enclosed building.
  3.) Doors must be secured with two padlocks (medium or low security padlocks are okay.)
  4.) Two-person access rule applies.
  5.) Must have 24hrs armed guard surveillance and the guard must have communications with its headquarters. (When these types of storage facilities are used, IDS or closed circuit TV cannot be a substitute for the 24hr armed guard surveillance.)
  6.) Note: MANPADS missiles cannot be left in vehicles, aircraft, or ammunition holding areas.
C. WAIVERS/EXCEPTIONS/COMPENSATORY MEASURES: When compliance is not met, are there any approved waivers, exceptions, or compensatory measures in place?

### COMPLIANCE INSPECTION OF THE SECURITY FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS USED FOR THE MANPADS

#### MISSILE SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST

1. Were the following security requirements taken from the LOA or MOU complied with?

| A. Guards | Is there a full time guard force? |
| B. Fencing | Chain link fence 6ft high with a 1 foot slanted barbed wire overhang at the top. Real estate permitting, 12ft free zone outside the fence & 30ft inside. |
| C. Lighting | Is lighting provided to illuminate the magazine/arms room/vault door during the hours of darkness or reduced visibility? Is lighting provided along the perimeter of the fence line for the missile storage area? |
| D. Building/magazine | The requirement is for a reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered magazine. Storage in other types of structures may be permitted if the structure used would provide the same time delay equivalent as the earth covered magazine or igloo.
| E. Door of Class V steel vault specifications | Steel used on these doors is approximately twice the thickness of a good steel wall locker. It should be of double wall construction with reinforcing in between. If should not be easy to open with an axe of other such cutting tool. |
| F. Shrouded Hasps | Hasps which have a heavy metal cover over and around the top of the hasp which when in place prevents easy access to the cutting of the pad lock’s shank. |
| G. 2 Hi-security Pad Locks | Must be used that are operated by key. |
| H. 2 person Key Control | Are two persons required to open the door |

Make a special note for Army if any structure other than an earth covered magazine or igloo is used. Beyond the security issue of using other structures, there could be an explosive safety issue.
and are they continuously present? Lock & key procedures need to be in place to insure no single person can obtain access to the storage site. **EXAMPLE OF QUESTIONS TO ASK TO DETERMINE IF A GOOD LOCK & KEY PROCEDURES ARE IN PLACE:** Is a key/lock inventory list being maintained which depicts a list of all keys/locks, key/lock serial numbers and the number of keys maintained for each lock? Do all keys have a **serial number** stamped or inscribed on them? Are **master keyed** or multiple keyed systems used (not allowed?)? Is the key **depository** located in a room where it is kept under 24-hour surveillance around-the-clock or in a room that can be (and is) locked during non-duty hours? Is each person of the two person team necessary to open the doors kept on separate rosters and allowed to have access to only one each of the two keys necessary to open the door (secured by two different hi-security pad locks?)

I. Seals on containers/boxes intact?
J. Is the intrusion detection system (IDS) or closed circuit television operational, or is the magazine/arms room/vault under 24-hour surveillance by a guard?
K. Were compensatory measures used or considered when full compliance with the LOA security measures not met? If so what were the compensatory measures? [Photo 3].
L. If all security requirements are not to standard has a request for **exception/waiver** regarding structural or security deficiencies been submitted if required? If a waiver/exception has been granted, is it available and reviewed as required, and is the unit complying with any required compensatory measures?

### 2. MISSILE INSPECTION:
A. The missile should be in a metal container or wire bound wooden box ([Photos 4 & 5]). The box will have the serial number on the outside.
B. Except for missiles deployed to hostile areas, the SAO will **physically** inventory 100 percent annually of in-country Stinger missiles **(by looking within the launch tube)**, gripstocks, and other essential components, e.g. batteries. The inventory must include review of the recipient’s records of monthly two-man verifications as required by the Stinger/MANPADS LOA or other arms transfer document note, e.g. MOU. Unless problems indicate the necessity for such action, the manufacturer’s sealed containers should not be opened during the inventory. There must be a manufacturer’s seal on at least one of the bent wire closures (wooden box) [Photo 6] or at least one of the metal containers’ latches ([Photo 7]).
C. **SIGNS TO LOOK FOR TO SEE IF A MISSILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM A BOX AND THE BOX RETURNED**
### TO A PALLET:

1. Manufacturer’s banding is not bounding the missile pallets ([Photo 8]).

2. Look at the ends of the wooden boxes. One will have a window that should show a humidity indicator ([Photo 9]). The humidity indicator should be blue ([Photo 10]). If the indicator is missing or cannot be seen or if the indicator shows an unacceptable level of humidity (pink shades of color indicates level of humidity), it is an indication that the missile is missing or that the packaging and desiccant is unserviceable and must be opened and repackaged and desiccant replaced ([Photo 11]).

3. A method of gaining access to the missile inside of the wooden crate without breaking the wooden crate’s seal, is to: a) cut the banding wire of the missile pallet, b) remove a missile container from the pallet, c) cut the bottom of the wooden container, d) remove the missile and launch tube from the bottom of the wooden container ([Photo 12]), e) repack the remnants into the wooden container, f) put the wooden crate back into the middle of the pallet ([Photo 5]).

4. Broken seals. Seals are easily broken ([Photo 13]). If in a wood wire bound box, remove the inner plastic sealed cardboard box from the wooden box and check for cuts or unusual sealing techniques in the sealed wrapping ([Photo 14]). If it feels and looks original and normal, assume the missile is inside and replace in the wire bound box and reseal with a DSCA approved seal ([Photo 15]) or label ([Photo 16]). If it looks questionable or its weight is light, the plastic must be removed and the missile physically inventoried ([Photo 12]).

5. If in a metal container ([Photo 17]), check the latches for manufacturers ([Photo 7]) or DSCA approved seal ([Photo 15]) or label ([Photo 16]) and that the humidity indicator is blue ([Photo 18]). If the seals look original, and the humidity indicator is blue, assume the missile is inside. If the container looks questionable or its weight is light, the container must be opened and the missile physically inventoried ([Photo 19]).

### GRIPSTOCK SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST

Note the grip stock is a Category III weapon. Security requirements are not spelled out in the LOA but customer nations are required to meet the Army’s minimum-security requirements.

| 1. a. If stored at a Depot: are the gripstocks stored separate from the stinger missiles in an enclosed room? ([Photo 20]) | With a metal door or metal covered solid wood door, and two high security padlocks? Door |

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hinges on the inside? [Photo 3] Windows barred? Is there security lighting over the door?

b. If stored in an arms room: are the grips stocks secured in a metal secondary container inside the room? If the container with gripstocks inside weighs less than 500lbs is it secured to the floor or walls with chain and locks? [Photo 21]

2. Is there controlled access to the keys and entry to the storage facility?

3. Are the grips stocks secured in a metal container inside the room? [Photo 22]. If not, are the gripstocks in their original packing? [Photo 23]. If the packing does not show signs of tampering, do not open. If the packing shows signs of being opened, the gripstock must be visually inventoried [Photo 24] by serial number [Photo 25].

**MANDATORY NOTES**

**MANDATORY NOTES FOR LOAs (AMENDMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS) FOR SALES OF MANPADS TO NATO, NATO NATIONS, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND:**

“Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army may approve modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions.

a. Physical Security. The [insert appropriate missile] will be stored in magazines that are at least equivalent in strength to U.S. Army requirements as specified in subparagraph (1) below. The purchaser also agrees to comply with U.S. Army specified requirements for lighting, doors, locks, keys, fencing, and surveillance and guard systems. Specific requirements will be agreed upon and installed prior to delivery of the missile system. U.S. Army representatives will be allowed to verify security measures and procedures established for implementation of these requirements.

1. Magazines. Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to the requirements of Chapter 5, DoD 6055.9-STD, “Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards,” July 1984, will be used for storage (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

2. Lighting. Lighting will be provided for exterior doors and along perimeter barriers. Security lighting requirements will conform to the ammunition and safety requirements of U.S. Army Technical Manual 9-1300-206, Appendix C (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

3. Doors, Locks, and Keys. Exterior doors will be class five steel vault
doors secured by two key-operated high security padlocks and a high security shrouded hasp. Keys will be secured separately to ensure effective two-man control of access (i.e., two authorized persons must be present to enter). Use of a master or multiple key systems are prohibited.

4. Fencing. Fencing will be six foot (minimum) steel chain link with a one-foot overhang mounted on steel or reinforced concrete posts over firm base. Clear zones will be established 30 feet inside and 12 feet outside the perimeter fence (provided there is adequate space).

5. Surveillance and Guard. A full-time guard force or combination guard force and intrusion detection system (IDS) will be provided. When the IDS is not operational, 24-hour guard surveillance is required.

6. Access to Storage Facilities. Two authorized persons will be required to be present during any activity that affords access to storage facilities containing [insert missile/system]. Lock and key procedures will be developed to ensure that no single individual can obtain unescorted or unobserved access to [insert missile/system] storage facilities.

b. Accountability

1. A 100 percent physical inventory of [insert items required to be inventoried], when applicable, will be taken monthly by the purchaser. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken quarterly of [insert items] issued at the operational unit level. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken semiannually of [insert items] stored or retained at installation, depot, post, or base level. To ensure verification, two people must conduct all inventories. [Insert items] expended during peacetime will be accounted for by serial number.

2. The [insert appropriate foreign country SAO] will be permitted to conduct a U.S. inspection and inventory of [insert items] by serial number annually. As appropriate, [insert items] are required to be inventoried annually by physical count. Inventory and accountability records maintained by the purchaser will be made available for review.

c. Transportation. Movements of [insert appropriate missile] will meet U.S. standards for safeguarding classified material in transit as specified by the USG in DoD 5100.76-M (current revision), “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Munitions, and Explosives” (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser), and paragraph h below.

d. Access to Hardware and Classified Information.
1. Access to hardware and related classified information will be limited to military and civilian personnel of the purchasing Government (except for authorized U.S. personnel as specified herein) who have the proper security clearance and who have an established need to know the information in order to perform their duties. Information released will be limited to that necessary to perform assigned responsibility and, where possible, will be oral or visual only.

2. Maintenance that requires access to the interior of the [insert missile, operational system, etc] beyond that required of the operator, and maintenance or repair that requires access to the interior of the guidance assembly of [insert item(s)] will be performed under U.S. control.

e. Compromise, Loss, Theft, and Unauthorized Use. The purchaser will report through the security assistance office and country team to the DoS by the most expeditious means any instances of compromise, unauthorized use, loss or theft of any [insert missile and any other materiel] or related information. This will be followed by prompt investigation and the results of the investigation will be provided through the same channels.

f. Third-Party Access. The recipient will agree that no information on [insert appropriate missile] will be released to a third-country Government, person or other third-country entity without U.S. approval.

g. Damaged/Expended Materiel. Damaged [insert systems, materiel] will be returned to the U.S. Army for repair or demilitarization.

h. Conditions of Shipment and Storage for [insert missile system]. Principal components (missiles and, as applicable, gripstocks or launchers) of the [insert missile system and any other items requiring separate storage] will be stored in at least two separate locations and will be shipped [insert how; e.g., in separate containers, separately]. The storage locations will be physically separated sufficiently so that a penetration of the security at one site will not place other sites at risk.

i. Conditions of Use. Assembly of the system will not be permitted for field exercises or deployments wherein the use of the [insert appropriate missile] system is simulated. In such cases, inert training devices may be used. The recipient will use information on the [insert appropriate missile] only for the purpose for which it was given.”

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AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND:
“Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. Modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions may be approved by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army.

a. Physical Security. The [insert appropriate missile] will be stored in magazines that are at least equivalent in strength to U.S. Army requirements as specified in subparagraph (1) below. The purchaser also agrees to comply with U.S. Army specified requirements for lighting, doors, locks, keys, fencing, and surveillance and guard systems. Specific requirements will be agreed upon and installed prior to delivery of the missile system. U.S. Army representatives will be allowed to verify security measures and procedures established for implementation of these requirements.

1. Magazines. Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to the requirements of Chapter 5, DoD 6055.9-STD, “Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards,” July 1999, will be used for storage (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

2. Lighting. Lighting will be provided for exterior doors and along perimeter barriers. Security lighting requirements will conform to the ammunition and safety requirements of U.S. Army Technical Manual 9-1300-206, Appendix C (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

3. Doors, Locks, and Keys. Exterior doors will be class five steel vault doors secured by two key-operated high security padlocks and a high security shrouded hasp. Keys will be secured separately to ensure effective two-man control of access (i.e., two authorized persons must be present to enter). Use of a master or multiple key system is prohibited.

4. Fencing. Fencing will be six foot (minimum) steel chain link with a one-foot overhang mounted on steel or reinforced concrete posts over firm base. Clear zones will be established 30 feet inside and 12 feet outside the perimeter fence (provided there is adequate space).

5. Surveillance and Guard. A full-time guard force or combination guard force and intrusion detection system (IDS) will be provided. When the IDS is not operational, 24-hour guard surveillance is required.

6. Access to Storage Facilities. Two authorized persons will be required to be present during any activity that affords access to storage facilities
containing [insert missile/system]. Lock and key procedures will be developed to ensure that no single individual can obtain unescorted or unobserved access to [insert missile/system] storage facilities.

b. Accountability

1. Each month, the purchaser will take a 100 percent physical inventory of [insert items required to be inventoried], when applicable. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken quarterly of [insert items] issued at the operational unit level. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken semiannually of [insert items] stored or retained at installation, depot, post, or base level. To ensure verification, two people must conduct all inventories. [Insert items] expended during peacetime will be accounted for by serial number.

2. The [insert appropriate foreign country SAO] will be permitted to conduct a U.S. inspection and inventory of [insert items] by serial number annually. As appropriate, [insert items] are required to be inventoried annually by physical count. Inventory and accountability records maintained by the purchaser will be made available for review.

c. Transportation. Movements of [insert appropriate missile] will meet U.S. standards for safeguarding classified material in transit as specified by the USG in DoD 5100.76-M (current revision), “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Munitions, and Explosives” (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser), and paragraph h below.

d. Access to Hardware and Classified Information.

1. Access to hardware and related classified information will be limited to military and civilian personnel of the purchaser (except for authorized U.S. personnel as specified herein) who have the proper security clearance and who have an established need to know the information in order to perform their duties. Information released will be limited to that necessary to perform assigned responsibility and, where possible, will be oral or visual only.

2. Maintenance that requires access to the interior of the [insert missile, operational system, etc.] beyond that required of the operator, and maintenance or repair that requires access to the interior of the guidance assembly of [insert item(s)] will be performed under U.S. control.

e. Compromise, Loss, Theft, and Unauthorized Use. The purchaser will report through the security assistance office and country team to the DoS by the most expeditious means any instances of compromise, unauthorized use, loss or theft of any [insert missile and any other
materiel] or related information. This will be followed by prompt investigation and the results of the investigation will be provided through the same channels.

f. Third-Party Access. The recipient will agree that no information on [insert appropriate missile] will be released to a third-country Government, person or other third-country entity without U.S. approval.

g. Damaged/Expended Materiel. Damaged [insert systems, materiel] will be returned to the U.S. Army for repair or demilitarization.

h. Conditions of Shipment and Storage for [insert missile system]. Principal components (missiles and, as applicable, gripstocks or launchers) of the [insert missile system and any other items requiring separate storage] will be stored in at least two separate locations and will be shipped [insert how; e.g., in separate containers, separately]. The storage locations will be physically separated sufficiently so that a penetration of the security at one site will not place other sites at risk.

i. Conditions of Use.

1. The two principle components of the [insert appropriate missile system and any other items] may be brought together and assembled under the following circumstances:

   (a) In the event of hostilities or imminent hostilities.

   (b) For firing as part of regularly scheduled training; however, only those rounds to be fired will be withdrawn from storage and assembled.

   (c) For lot testing; however, only rounds to be tested will be withdrawn from storage and assembled.

   (d) When systems are deployed as part of the point defenses of high priority installations or activities (e.g., key Government buildings, military headquarters, essential utilities, air defense facilities).

2. The purchaser will advise the U.S. Security Assistance Organization in advance of any assembly of the various missile and [insert any other items] for the [insert appropriate missile] for training or lot testing.

3. The U.S. Government will be notified of deployments through the Security Assistance Organization.”
Photo 1

Photo 2
(The purchaser elected to construct a secondary barrier in lieu of two high-security shrouded hasp padlocks.)

Photo 3

Photo 4
Photo 5

Photo 6
Photo 7

Photo 8
Photo 9

Photo 10
Photo 13

Photo 14
Photo 15

U.S. INVENTORY EQUIPMENT
WARNING: IF SEAL IS BROKEN OR SHOWS SIGNS OF TAMPERING NOTIFY U.S. EMBASSY OR SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFICE

Photo 16
Photo 17

Photo 18