Background Briefing

Thursday, October 7, 1999 - 10:00 a.m.
Subject: Subject: Unified Command Plan
Presenter: Attributable to Two Senior Defense Officials

RADM. QUIGLEY: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us. We have a background briefing set up this morning to discuss the 1999 revisions to the Unified Command Plan. This is intended to help you frame some of the pieces that may result from Secretary Cohen's remarks at the name-changing ceremony at Norfolk, Virginia this afternoon, where both the chairman and the secretary will be down there, from Atlantic Command changing to the Joint Forces Command. So we'll be talking a little bit about the process, and we can go into that as much detail as you want. I really want to play that part by ear. If you want a description of the process, we can go into as much detail as you want. If you think you don't want that or have an understanding of the process, we can touch that very lightly and then move on to the contents of this year's.


RADM. QUIGLEY: Well, this is -- a process that we think is important, Bob. And we think it's one that has --

Q: Let's start with -- (inaudible) -- and move down to the process, how about that?

RADM. QUIGLEY: If you'd like to start that way, we could do it in the other order. We could -- (inaudible) -- the process part.

Q: (Off mike.)

RADM. QUIGLEY: Okay. These are the two individuals that will be discussing this with you this morning. And for attribution, a Senior Defense Official and a Senior Military Official. Both are very much involved in the process of this year's UCP revisions. So -- .

Q: Can you hold up those times for the -- (off mike)?

RADM. QUIGLEY: Yes. You bet.

All yours.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Good morning. As I think most of you are aware, back in 1986, when the Congress adopted the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a provision was put in place which gave instruction to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on at least an every other year basis to review the structure and responsibilities of the unified commanders. During the QDR process, as you're aware, and in subsequent activities Secretary Cohen has articulated a strategy for the Department of Defense which translates into a national military strategy that the chairman articulates to meet the challenges that we face in today's world, the security challenges, as well as to lay a path for transforming both the Department of Defense and the United States armed forces to meet the challenges of the future.

The UCP revision that has been recommended by the chairman and approved by the secretary and forwarded to the president undertakes some changes in the missions and responsibilities and structures of unified commands to better meet this strategy that the secretary has articulated and which he then transformed into national military strategy. And we can talk about that in some more detail.

As has already been mentioned, we have the Joint Forces Command, which is being set up today, which is very much a part of this effort to meet the challenges of the future. There are some other changes as well specified in the UCP revision for '99. And also the UCP for '99 has in it an annex that points to the future; UCP '21 it's called.

And before going into any details on it, I want to turn it over to my Joint Staff colleague to talk about a little bit of the process, to educate you. And hopefully there will be some interest in that, even if it's not the most newsworthy item. And then we can come back to the substance of it and talk about some of the hopefully newsworthy elements of it.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thank you, (name of briefer deleted).

Just to talk about the process a little bit -- (laughter).

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: You blew my cover! (Laughter.)

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: (Laughing.) Well, everybody knows anyway, sir. I apologize. (Laughter.) But thank you, "Defense Official." Excuse me. That's what I meant to say.

In terms of the process, again, by Goldwater-Nichols, this was mandated to the chairman to make this review in an interval that's not any greater than two years. But he looks at this as more than a two-year process, particularly in this cycle, which was his first as chairman.

He wanted to ensure that changes that we made did in fact adapt to the emerging security environment, that it's got some longevity, it's got flexibility, and it'll meet all our requirements and the secretary's requirements for this national military strategy.

It is a two-year process, and the discussions almost took that long. It's been a good 12 to 15 months of discussions with the unified CINCs, with the service chiefs.

The chairman, early on, in consultation with the secretary and his staff, established his priorities; information, operations, joint forces, asymmetric threats to the homeland were all concerns of his, and he used those priorities as the lens to focus the efforts here. Using the CINCs conferences, which occur every six months, tank sessions with the service chiefs, occasional VTCs with the CINCs themselves, and a lot of discussion with their staffs, he gleaned from them their collective wisdom on how to proceed with the development of UCP '99 and a vision. So we got pretty much -- in fact, a consensus from all. And the CINCs and service chiefs are excited about this, again, because it does lead the threat, it's adaptable, it's flexible, and it holds us in good stead in protecting the United States.

Now, some of the changes, in addition to the Joint Forces Command, that we looked at were the regional CINCs. You won't see much in terms of major changes there. There were adjustments in some water space to accommodate efficiencies for command and control. But we felt like the regional CINCs are postured fairly well, and their situation remains intact and they meet the requirements for those regions.

The functional command piece is where the focus of attention was, with Joint Forces Command and also with SPACECOM. The Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense, which originally resided here with DISA, is going to migrate and shift out to Space Command. We feel like it's important for a Unified CINC, who supports others -- the Regional CINCs -- to take this, take the reins to develop doctrine, develop tactics, training, procedures to work with all the joint agencies and commands that are involved with (CND), to bring that all together to again ensure that the warfighters are best supported and were most efficient in the means to do that. So the computer network warfare piece or information support piece, which is defense as all as the attack piece that we'll look at in the future, will be the responsibility of U.S. Space Command. So adjustments to the Joint Force Command, some water, space adjustments for the regional commands, and then the computer warfare aspect that will be formalized and folded under the wings of the Space Command.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: (Inaudible) -- couple more comments on Joint Forces Command is that it does go to the transformation element. Joint Forces Command today is being stood up as a successor to the Atlantic Command. We think this demonstrates that we, in fact, are committed to the transformation of our forces to meet the challenges both today and in the future. In terms of the near-term challenges, by standing up Joint Forces Command, I think we make Joint Forces more effective, we strengthen the voice of the joint warfighter in training and in force integration for the long-term transformation of the armed forces. The Joint Forces Command will be responsible for an aggressive program of joint conflict development and experimentation.

In addition, Joint Forces Command will help to establish and enforce interoperability norms -- for example, for our C4ISR systems -- to help ensure that they can communicate with each other, which is increasingly important as information technology infuses itself in all aspects of military equipment. You've seen that, I think, in the most recent operation, the importance of that. In addition, it will be training Joint Task Force headquarters, enabling them to work together more effectively.

With regard to the conflict development and experimentation, we think this is important to help make sure that our forces stay ahead of the curve, develop new operational conflicts for themselves, and also be prepared for what others might do and make sure that we're not taken by surprise by technology changes or other changes or other changes in their operations.

Part of this, of course, will be the experimentation process. They have already conducted their first experiment, which relates to attack on time-critical targets projected out into the 2015-year time frame. This, for example, refers to trying to identify, locate and attack in real time mobile missiles, as an example. That's an example of real-time targets. It's a critical mission. We saw in the Gulf War the difficulty of doing this, and we think that by approaching it in a joint fashion, bringing the different skills and assets the different services have together in a joint and unified way, that the ability to accomplish that mission will be greatly enhanced. And this experimentation that's been done has been a big step forward in that.

They'll be pursuing other experiments. For example, there will be work on rapid deployment operations that they'll be focusing on in the future.

And in addition, within the Joint Forces Command, there will be established a Joint Task Force for Civil Support, which will provide support to lead federal agencies which are not DOD, in the event of WMD incident in the United States which requires significant consequence management. And that will be an activity which the Joint Task Force/Civil Support will be responsible for, do the planning work, doing integration of DOD support to civilian lead federal agencies. It will be headed by a two-star officer from the Reserve component. He will have a small staff of about three dozen people. And I think this is something you've heard Dr. Hamre speak to in the past.

With that, I think if you have any questions --

Q: I have a couple of questions. I wanted to ask about that last point -- does that -- a two-star is the head of the Joint Task Force, or is he going to be the head of the support within Joint Forces Command, supporting the response to an incident?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Within the Joint Forces Command, which will be headed up by a four-star officer just as ACOM is today, it will be a Joint Task Force for Civil Support. That Joint Task Force will be headed up by a two-star officer who will be drawn from the Reserve component.

Q: Off mike.)

Q: At one point, Dr. Hamre said that the Joint Task Force/Civil Defense would be here in the building. I take it that's going to be down in Norfolk?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes. The intention right now is to have that reside in Norfolk. It's a matter of convenience and efficiency; because you have the command center for Joint Forces Command there. The command-and-control piece of it is important. There's a link with all the components and with agencies just to be alerted of a potential incident and respond to it. So it's important for it to reside there in Norfolk for now.

Q: Can I just ask a quick follow-up. That wouldn't be just limited to weapons of mass destruction? Would it be anything like the Hurricane Andrew-type scenario or -- Is that also something they would cover?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: They will assist, but that's going to remain the primary responsibility of DOMS here in the building to do that or to respond to that. Now, having said that, DOMS works with the joint staff to Joint Forces Command, to have access to forces to respond to hurricanes and earthquakes. But the focus of JTF/Civil Support is, again, support to the lead federal agency to respond to weapons of mass destruction events.

Q: Could you talk at least a little bit more about the homeland defense mission and where it came from, where it's going? It's, I think, a year ago that the focus was on actually giving one of the two four-stars, either SPACECOM or ACOM, sort of this CINC USA responsibility. Is that in fact what has happened, or is this a step back from that? And if it's a step back, why is it a step back?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think that what you're referring to is speculation, perhaps, among some of the media and some elsewhere. I'm not sure that really was ever the focus within the department. I think the focus within the department's very much on how do we more effectively provide support to civilian agencies -- for example, the FBI or FEMA -- when they are undertaking their consequence-management activities. And so that's been the focus all along. We have had many discussions over the last year about how best to do that, discussions that included the civilian side as well, to see what it was that they thought they would need.

The result is this Joint Task Force for Civil Support, which again is very much in a support role, with a small headquarters staff to do planning, and to interface with the rest of the government through DOD on what it is that DOD could best do in an event of a WMD incident that required support beyond what the civil agencies themselves could provide for consequence management.

Q: Are you saying the -- I'm sorry. Are you saying the CINC USA concept was never discussed, was never brought up?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Within my office, that was never a focus.

Q: Why not go with that concept? What are the reasons not to consider that approach?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Because the role of the Department of Defense is a supporting role to civilian agencies -- FBI and FEMA, for example. Primarily they have responsibility for having the lead in responding to these kinds of incidents. Our role is support when their assets are overdrawn, overstretched. And so the focus all along has been how best and most efficiently to provide that support.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I'm going to help him out --

Q: What I'm getting at here -- oh, go ahead. Go ahead, if you --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, if you're thinking in terms of a homeland defense, that's multidimensional. It's the asymmetric threats of a, you know, weapons of mass destruction event. It's land defense. It's maritime defense, air defense, and space defense. And right now those missions are distributed among the CINCs. And again, we feel for now that that's sufficient, that, you know, we're covered adequately. Now, there's always that potential, and we'll monitor the changes in the strategic environment. And by virtue of this two-year review we do that. But that's the chairman's primary responsibility, or one of his primary responsibilities is to do that. And we'll monitor the emerging threat.

You know, I mean, that idea is, you know, operative and is considered by many who put thoughts into this. There may be a potential to go to that at some point. But again, only potential, and it's depending on the security environment. But we feel like defense is adequately covered for today.

Q: Is the concern for civil -- the civil liberties concerns the reason that you would not go with idea at this time?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No, again, it's multi-dimensional. So --

Q: I'm asking if you feel like this would impinge on civil liberties, but that people would raise complaints along those lines.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It's really determined by the security environment.

Q: Can I ask a question, please? If there were riots, for instance, in Los Angeles, like there were -- (inaudible) --, where would the -- would this new joint task force be involved with it? Would this new command be involved with this? The only way that this new command would be involved with an emergency would be if it's weapons of mass destruction or a natural disaster?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes. It's not a task for the JTF civil support, it's civil support in that kind of circumstance, the weapons of mass destruction. So DOMS is the primary avenue still by which other elements of support would be provided to other agencies.

Q: Right, it's the primary, secondary. But I just want to get a sense of what it's going to be involved with in sort of lay language. Primary responsibility would be weapons of mass destruction; some sort of secondary involvement with natural disasters?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: That again will still be within the domain of DOMS.

Q: What else in terms of just making this sort of -- in a half-CINC, how -- what else will it be involved with regarding the continental United States?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Okay. Well, you know, we don't want to get confused between Joint Forces Command and his primary responsibilities for Joint Force training, providing integration experimentation. And then as a subset of that, he has the JTF civil support, which again is at the two star level. Now, their organization will come together and will establish links with federal agencies and start to work on the uniform side on doctrine, tactics, training, procedures, and how to best support -- when requested from the federal agencies, how to best support them.

And also, you need to think about it in terms that some of these forces will be responsible -- the same forces now will respond to out-of-CONUS weapons of mass destruction events. You know, they may support our regional unified commanders. So it's important, because of that threat, the potential for that threat and those incidents, to now put greater emphasis on it through this JTF civil support. But the by-product of that is you also have additional forces who can deploy and support our other unified (commands).

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Let me just reiterate, particularly because of the way you asked your question, Elizabeth, that the primary motive here in transforming the Atlantic Command to the Joint Forces Command has to do with the things ****** (briefer's name deleted) mentioned; joint training, for example, and joint concept development, joint experimentation; looking at changes in doctrine; leveraging lessons learned from both real operational -- real world operational experiences and training scenarios. So that is the focus of that transformation; it builds on steps that have been taken earlier.

In May of last year, the secretary gave special responsibilities to the CINC for the Atlantic Command for joint experimentation. We are building upon that, providing further responsibilities there. That's the transformation of ACOM to Joint Forces Command.

Q: Is this the first time that this task is going to be under one organization? And if so, why do you feel -- could you spell out why you think that it's necessary to do that now?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, it's joint. Joint Forces Command has component commands from each of the services --

Q: No, I mean -- I'm referring to the Task Force in case of WMD.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, and that idea still applies. It will be joint in that we'll have the resources from all the services to respond, and we'll integrate them in training, and they can respond en masse. And if you think about weapons of mass destruction, it doesn't take much for this to really get out of hand. The magnitude of an event like that is going to be immense, and we just want to be prepared.

And, you know, by virtue of having this JTF, again we bring the resources from all the services together; we have the command and control; we have the lift, we have the technical expertise, we have the combat support for it to offer, again, assistance and to support our federal and local agencies.

Q: And up till now that's been scattered throughout the military? Or --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, yes and no. There's pieces in each of the services, and we just -- again, because of the potential threat, we want to pull that together.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: You're well aware that in May of last year, the president signed PDD-62, was which was based upon increased concern of a threat of this kind of WMD incident occurring. And in that PDD, he instructed the interagency to better organize itself to be able to respond to such a threat.

Q: When was that?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: May of last year. And as part of that, the Department of Defense, working with the interagency, has been trying to identify how we can better provide support to the FBI and to FEMA and to the rest of the civilian side in responding to these kinds of incident.

Now, the unique asset the Department of Defense brings to this, of course, is the ability to mobilize quickly a large response capability. The other agencies have some response capability. But in an event of a WMD incident, unlike a hurricane, say, almost certainly they're going to be overwhelmed and they will be calling upon DOD. So we need to think about that in advance and do advance planning, you know, think through the scope and type of support that might be required to meet what FEMA or the FBI calls upon us to do. So that's the purpose of this small headquarters staff of about three dozen people; to think through those things, interface with the other agencies, do planning so that when they ask for support, we're ready to do that.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Let me just interject and make a comment, and we've already made reference to here but, you know, we want to think about UCP '99 in its overall context. And remember again, JTF civil support is a subset of this Joint Forces Command, and there's -- you know, JTF -- excuse me, the Joint Forces Command we feel like is a big deal for our war-fighting capability. It will make us more interoperable, more lethal, and more quickly able to respond to the world situation. But just keep in mind, JTF civil support is a subset below that.

Q: Can I ask you about --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think we need to head -- go all the way to the left and we'll come back to you.

Q: I've got to ask, is there a Y2K role for this civil support?


Q: No? No involvement at all, even though potentially the effects could mimic some of what could happen?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The intention is not now to have them support.

Q: And could you just state -- ACOM had responsibility for like Iceland and Greenland. That has been transferred to whom? Do they still have it?

Q: They had lots of regional responsibilities -- (inaudible) -- ACOM.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Help me on this one.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: There has been a shift of certain waters. That's what's shifted.

Q: So ACOM is still a regional war-fighting command?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Pam, when you leave, we've got a blue top or a map of the world that show you some of the water shifts.

Q: Okay.

Q: Since all CINCs are joint, how do you explain how this is particularly joint? I mean, all CINCs are -- they're joint forces, are they not?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It has been the case more recently that all CINCs are unified and have components underneath them. This CINC has special responsibilities for the development of joint doctrine, joint training, interoperability, concept development and experimentation on the joint side. So that's the distinction; the functional responsibility.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: He trains, exercises, ensures interoperability and then he supports the other CINCs, so -- and we feel like we can do a little bit better in that respect. Again, the doctrine, the tactics, the training, the procedures, the command and control. And we want him as the force provider -- this is Joint Forces Command, now -- him as the force provider, to pull that all together to ensure that those support personnel, or actually combat personnel, are best able to support our other CINCs.

Yes, you're right, all unified CINCs are joint. They have members from all services there, but in terms of the actual operational aspect of it, we want Joint Forces Command to hone their skills to ensure that they're best able to support the other CINCs.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: That is two elements there. One is, as -- was describing today, which is as a force provider to make sure the forces are trained properly and be able to provide forces to support the other CINCs, but also as a role for tomorrow, which is, again, the conflict development, the experimentation, being the advocate for standards to promote interoperability within the acquisition process, for example. All of those elements are focused on transforming the force to make sure that it is prepared for tomorrow's challenges.

Q: How much authority is this guy going to have in the procurement process?


SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: He will be a CINC. He will enjoy that same kind of role. He will have -- he will be viewed as an advocate for interoperability, for example. That will be something distinct.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: (Off mike) -- all the CINCs have input to the procurement due to JROC, the CINCs integrated priority list, et cetera. Joint Forces Command, through joint experimentation and their role validating, sort of, what the JROC has already said; there's a valid requirement for this system, they'll then put those systems to test in a joint environment. That'll be fed back into the JROC process as well, to ensure that what these services are buying under their Title X responsibilities will in fact perform as advertised in the joint war-fighting environment. So in that respect, there will an input, as well.

Q: Can I ask a question about the Space Command? You mentioned they are taking on the mission or the responsibility for computer network defense?


Q: Does that reflect increasing concern about the threat of hackers or information warfare or combat use of information warfare?


Q: Can you talk a little --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: All the above.

Q: You mentioned the attack part of it coming later. That's not their current responsibility?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: As part of this iteration in UCP99, they will look at and take on the role of computer network attack. Now, you need a -- initial standup will be in the year 2000, October 1st of 2000.

Q: Does this mean they get a special cell or something, a task force or --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, as they develop their implementation plan, there's a good likelihood they will have, you know, a central element -- they're located at Colorado Springs, but because of the nature of the business, they have all the other agencies, whether it be DISA, NSA and folks like that lashed up with them and can use their resources.

But, you know, we want to explore that potential. If you look at the battle space, integrated air defenses, you know, today our adversary's defenses are dependent on computer technology and leading edge technology too, and we want to explore the potential of defeating them in different ways other than the kinetic way.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: But as I mentioned earlier, you know, information technology is infusing all the armed forces. All of our military equipment is becoming more and more dependent upon information technology, and the next generation fighter aircraft, almost half its value will be in the avionics. Our logistics system is becoming dependent upon information technology. So, yes, the vulnerability that we potentially might face is a very big concern. And I think that you've gotten some information in the past about Eligible Receiver. You've heard Dr. Hamre give addresses on this topic. We are, in fact, quite concerned about our own vulnerability. We want to stay ahead of any potential threat. So this migration from DISA out to the CINC we think will be one of a number of things that we're doing which will help improve our information assurance.

Q: When you refer to computer attack, though, are you talking about a cell to develop offensive capabilities, or just defensive capabilities?



SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, it's inevitable. We've got to have that capability. And that's part of this experimentation from Joint Forces Command: working with SPACECOM, looking at ways to do that. And if there is more efficient ways to attack an adversary's integrated air defense than a kinematic way, we need to explore that option, that potential there. So --

Q: And why with the present Space Command?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, for right now, much of what is done in terms of network defense goes through their medium, through the assets that we have in space. So it's -- right now it's a natural selection to put it out there.

Q: You seem to rename it Cyberspace Command. (Laughter.)

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Functional Command, Supporting Command. It makes sense for a number of reasons.

Q: A point of clarification: Did you say the October 2000 was for the attack part, or for the whole -- ?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The attack part.

Q: Okay.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This gentleman I think hasn't asked a question.

Q: Two questions, actually. The Joint Forces commander will still be the SACATLANTIC, too? He'll still remain dual --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes. For now.

Q: Okay. And when -- for each one of these, when do you transfer the water areas around, or whatever, when do you transfer, when do you stand up JTF Computer Network Defense end, when do you actually stand up civil support?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, when the president signed the UCP-99 last week, it became effective. So --

Q: Yeah, but when does the --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: (Off mike) -- implementation plans for some of the stand-ups, of course. But for the transfer of a (inaudible) -- it's 1 October.

Q: (Off mike.)

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No, we have diagrams that depict them.

(Cross talk - off mike.)

Q: This is somewhat arcane, but giving DOMS CA responsibilities, does that make SPACECOM a war-fighting CINC?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: He's in support of -- right now, still in support of.

Q: There will still be a case when he has the CA responsibility?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, again, we're looking at that. And he'll develop that doctrine, and we'll see what the requirements are in terms of, quote, "the security environment" at that point. But for now, he is in support of the other CINCs and the agencies.

I would note that, as I mentioned and the admiral mentioned earlier, UCP-99 has this brief addendum, "UCP-21 Vision," which begins to point the direction for future UCP-revisions. I should really defer to the admiral's Joint Staff activity. But it's a flexible, not binding -- it's evolutionary. And I think that, as the admiral mentioned -- (inaudible) -- very much for dealing with UCP-99 as a step and a process leading to the future, which we can't fully define today in all its details but which he has begun to try to define to some extent, with the decision for UCP-21.

Q: Thanks a lot.

STAFF: One more?

Q: Yeah. On joint forces training -- it's ACOM -- how will the other folks that aren't right now funneling through ACOM, benefit from that? Like how would Pacific Command benefit from the joint doctrine work and the experimentation that former ACOM would be doing? How will that migration happen? How will it, not just there, and whoever got their forces from that region?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, the interoperability teams, obviously they'll benefit from because those resources of hardware and equipment that are developed will be deployed to his AOR.

Q: Doctrine and war-fighting and that stuff that migrates?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Now, he is going to develop a doctrine and make the recommendations to the chairman. So the chairman still is going to approve doctrine, which will be all-encompassing. That will apply to all the unified CINCs. So from that respect, he benefits from it.

Also, the training objectives, standardization; still those forces that are in the Pacific Command's AOR have to adhere to those also. So --

Q: Unless he develops them within the chairman of the Joint -- (inaudible)?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes. And in the experimentation round, obviously, if he determines and finds through experimentation, a new concept of operations, a new way to attack normal targets, a better way to move things quickly in this rapid deployment -- experimentation is worthwhile, then the department as a whole will pursue it.

Q: Did you say the mobile-target experiment has already happened, or that's the first one scheduled?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It's already happened.

STAFF: Thank you.


SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I enjoyed it. Thank you. (Laughter.)