February 3, 2000
TO: Honorable Senate Committees and House Committees
and Honorable Government Officials
FROM: Dr. Nira Schwartz
2800-187 Plaza Del Amo
Torrance, CA. 90503
Email: [email protected]
- Qui-Tam Case CV96-3065 RAP Federal Court Los Angeles Related to Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) Contract # DASG60-90-C-0165.
- Government Fraud and False Project/Technologies
- Please have the Government intervene in my Qui-Tam Case
- Please investigate the "Crime" and "covering-up" created by BOEING/TRW/NRC and some Government employees
Dear Honorable Officials,
I need your help to prevent the Government fraud and false EKV project/technologies. Please intervene in my Qui-Tam case. So far the Government declined to intervene in this Qui-Tam Case. I do believe that the Government employees that elected not to intervene in my case are not representing the true interest of the Government and/or our Nation.
- Nutshell Description
- For over ten years Contractor BOEING/TRW/NRC provided fraud and false technologies relative to a project known as Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). Contract # DASG60-90-C-0165. Exo-atmospheric-kill-vehicle.
- BOEING/TRW/NRC provided to the Government false EKV performance reports, false test results, false test procedures, false robustness evaluation, false Risk Reduction test results and analysis. False discrimination performance that was based on alleged prior knowledge that was stated by the Government Technical Requirement Document (TRD) not to be available.
- Mr. Roberson at GBI/ARMY Huntsville Alabama sabotaged the DCIS/SCHWARTZ investigation, and concealed the Kalman Filter (KF) discrimination technology test results that pointed to performance that did not comply with the Government TRD performance requirements. This to cover up for the BOEING/TRW/NRC milking the Government for over ten years. Also to cover up for his wrong doing, of not reading the performance reports properly.
- Mr. Boster at GBI/ARMY Huntsville Alabama sabotaged the DCIS/SCHWARTZ investigation and openly refused to read the DCIS reports created by Special Agent Samuel Reed. Mr. Boster authorized false flight tests of the EKV project, and removed from the attacking scenarios deployed lethal objects that he became aware that the BOEING/TRW/NRC technologies will not discriminate, while reporting to his superiors of no problems.
- BOEING/TRW/NRC/POET reported false excellent EKV discrimination performance with the IFT-1A flight data. While their test result show that the PAT (Probability to Assign a Target) was less than 40% of what they falsely reported to the Government, with no way to correct it.
- Mr. Kith Englander and Mr. Charles Rando BMDO/DOD at Defense Pentagon in Washington knowingly approved and accepted false test performance results that were based on after the fact analysis. Approved discrimination of technology that must relay on parameters and their values not available in combat. Mr. Englander approved discrimination technology for over 10 years that must get close to the object within xx seconds to make discrimination but too late to maneuver to another object if it was the wrong object. Both approved kinetic interception knowingly that will not perform when the deployed objects are with xx attachment and/or yy attachment and/or with zz deployed motions. All defined within the TRD. Both ignored any conclusions from the Chinese missiles.
- LtCol. John B. Hoffman, United Sates Army Legal Services, Arlington VA, and Mr. Dennis Egan DOJ (Tel: 202-307-0240) wrote a letter on behalf of the Government decline intervention in SCHWARTZ Qui-Tam case that was based on lies.
- The project was originated in and about 1990. DCIS/SCHWARTZ investigation lasted since 1996 until 1999. Schwartz personally met the people listed above. For years SCHWARTZ also wrote to Secretary of Defense Honorable William S. Cohen, DIRKSEN, Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000, and to Senate members but was ignored.
Even though Government officials and Army Generals are aware of the False BOEING/TRW/NRC EKV technology, million of dollars are still spend on flights testing this fraud. False interceptions with alleged missiles are provided to the public, while they were ‘arranged’ and that in real life with the use of enemy missile/deployment hardware/conditions these interceptions will not occur.
- Why not to develop a true technology. Why spending the public time and money on technology known not to work?
- The Result of the covering up by Government officials is that BOEING was awarded the EKV Lead System Engineer (LSI) and TRW was awarded the System Engineer of the EKV program. Both companies were awarded nine billion dollars as a price for their "crime" and "covering up" as Special Agent Reed of DCIS reported on 1999 (enclosed) and was forced to retire, and the Government Officials harassed and retaliated against SCHWARTZ, and declined intervention in her case based on lies. [Government and Government officials are endangering the Public safety for their own political benefits].
- The Problem is that the Government officials that are suppose to bring the fraud and false companies and technologies to Justice are part of the fraud.
- The performance reports of BOEING/TRW/NRC of the EKV program were false. To continue the cover up, Mr. Englander of DOD/BMDO falsely elected POET companies (such as Lawrence Livermore, MIT, and Aerospace Corporation) to be independent evaluator of the EKV BOEING/TRW/NRC. While Mr. Englander carefully selecting these companies to assure their final evaluations will be within his "request", since all of these companies were retained by BOEING/TRW to perform work on the same EKV project, or worked intensively with BOEING/TRW. Special Agent Reed requested to perform independent evaluation of the EKV technology and was denied, by lack of money.
- The EKV discrimination based on an IR sensor does not work and will not work. The BOEING technology will not discriminate the lethal object deployed out of the decoys. The EKV will not destroy/intercept with an object that has an "xxx" (classified shape that the enemy use), or a "yyy" (classified shape that the enemy use) or posses zzz motion, that the enemy missiles deployed objects have, or have the enemy deployed mechanism, in a kinetic impact. All are a large percentage of the enemy lethal deployed objects inventory, and identified within the Government TRD (Technical Requirement Document).
- A Qui-Tam case #CV96-3065 Honorable Judge Paez, federal Court Los Angeles. Where the Government declined to intervene.
- The Honorable Judge Paez Los Angeles Federal Court dismissed the Qui-Tam case unless SCHWARTZ finds a lawyer within 30 days from today.
- Local Rule 2.1 does not allow SCHWARTZ as a Pro se to represent the Government in a Qui-Tam case.
- SCHWARTZ may be connected at Tel: 310-787-8557, fax: 310-782-9074, Email: [email protected], or at 2800-187 Plaza Del Amo, Torrance, CA. 90503.
- SCHWARTZ has DCIS/DOD-IG documents to support her allegations. SCHWARTZ has tests result she performed, the POET performed, and BOEING/TRW performed.
- SCHWARTZ requests to have the Government intervene in the Qui-Tam Case. Investigate and stop the fraud, and punish the Companies and Government officials that knowingly supported the fraud.
- Please initiate a congressional investigation reflecting these above issues.
- No point writing the Inspector General of the Defense Department DOD-IG requesting a renewed investigation. They are aware of the problem, and were part of causing/forcing Special Agent Reed to retire. The only person that was honest and lost his job within the Government to protect our Nation.
- For ten years we tested technologies that do not work, and will not work. The enemy is improving his Deployed objects, while we are playing interception with out-dated deployed objects, and with technologies that will not work, and known not to be working since 1979.
- Enclosed are three documents. Mr. Roy Danchick Declaration, Special Agent Reed reports.
Please intervene in my Qui-Tam case. Please investigate and stop the fraud in the EKV project/program.
Dr. Nira Schwartz
CC: Mr. Egan – DOJ Fax: 202-514-7361
Mr. William S. Zanca-DOD Fax: 703-614-5407
FBI- Mr. Kerry Hadaway Fax: 310-996-3359
Here are computer-scanned documents for your information. The documents are unclassified.
1. First documents, Mr. Danchick declaration.
I Roy Danchick, hereby declare as follows:
1. I am a retired TRW senior staff engineer. My retirement date
was September 1, 1998. I have personal knowledge of facts stated
herein and could and would testify competently thereto if sworn as a
2. I have a B.A. in Mathematics from U.C.L.A granted in February
1959. 1 have an M.A. in Mathematics from U.C.L.A granted in June
1 963. 1 have published a number of papers in numerical analysis,
tracking, and astrodynamics in reviewed scientific and engineering
journals as well as presented papers at local, national, and
international conferences. I am a member of the national honorary
mathematical society, Pi Mu Epsilon, and belong to the American
Mathematical Society and the Society for Industrial and Applied
3. 1 have worked in the aerospace industry for forty years,
almost sixteen of which were at TRW, and finished a recent contract
assignment at Boeing in Downey, California. As an applied
mathematician and aerospace systems engineer my areas of
technical competence include estimation theory, statistics,
tracking, data fusion, and discrimination. I have successfully
developed a number of Kalman Filters for attitude determination,
electrooptical surveillance sensor, electrooptical interceptor, and
radar systems applications. I was designated by TRW's Systems
Integration Group as 1991 Technologist of the Year for my design,
development, and implementation of the Backup Attitude
Determination System for the Defense Support Program. I also hold
a patent for an Infrared Surveillance Tracking System.
Prior to my participation on the Exo-atmospheric
Kill Vehicle (EKV) program I had developed effective ballistic
missile typing algorithms on both Internal Research and
Development ([R&D) programs and Department of Defense contracts
such as Brilliant Pebbles and Brilliant Eyes. To develop these
algorithms I familiarized myself with and became competent in
the physics and phenomenology underlying discrimination
4. My work on the EKV program began in or about June, 1 992
prior to the contract awarded to the Boeing/TRW team. I wrote those
parts of the proposal technical volume that dealt with tracking and
data fusion. After the contract w a s awarded I worked part-time on
the EKV program for about two years. From about January, 1994 1
worked f u II time on the EKV program f u II time.
5.. I was the chief tracking and data fusion algorithm designer
on the EKV program. I was also responsible for the interfaces
between the tracking and fusion functions and the discrimination
function. In these capacities I supervised and monitored the
development, implementation, integration, and testing of a
tracking and fusion software. I also did hands-on work in the
integration and testing of two discrimination algorithms, the Bulk
Classifier and the Kalman Feature Extractor (KFE).
6. It was in these supervising, monitoring, testing, and
integration duties that I first developed strong suspicions about the
the effectiveness of both the KFE and the Baseline Algorithms (BLA)
for discriminating genuine targets from decoys. These suspicions
arose even while TRW was telling Boeing and the U.S. government in
various reports and Technical interchange Meetings (TIMS) that the
KFE was a technological breakthrough that would work for near and
far-term threats and that the BLA would meet a II near-term threat
7. My doubts about the KFE's underlying theory arose for three
reasons. First, on phenomenological grounds, it is well- known that
intensity signals are characterized by a continues band-limited
spectrum. The underlying KFE model assumes a discrete two-point
spectrum arising from a pure sinusoid plus d.c. term. Second, the
KFE does its time-invariant parameter estimation recursively while
my experience shows that batch estimation is far more effective in
extracting such constants from the signal. Third, the KFE developers
were vague about initialization, handling data gaps, outlier
detection,. and divergence control. These are critical issues in the
development of any effective estimation algorithm.
8. My suspicions were heightened at a TRW internal TIM in
September, 1995 at which Dr. John Tang and Mr. Wallace Beitzel
September, 1995 at which Dr. John Tang and Mr. Wallace Beitzel
gave a presentation on the KFE. The presentation compared the
performance of the KFE and two competing approaches, one based on
the Fast Fourier Transform, the other on the Maximum Entropy
Method. Dr. Schwartz was one of the meeting attendees. I found the
presentation both technically unconvincing and too much of a high-
pressure sales job. Dr. Raymond Maddalone urged me to sign-off with
my approval as a technical peer on the effectiveness of the KFE as a
discrimination algorithm. I declined. After the meeting I had several
discussions with Dr. Schwartz in which we shared our doubts about
KFE effectiveness and whether it would work at a II with the more
complex signal spectra which would be encountered in real world
9. I became sure that the KFE was a failure despite contrary
claims made by Mr. Robert Hughes, Dr. Maddalone, Dr. Clifford
Freiler, Mr. Beitzel, Dr. Henry Crowder, et al, when TRW terminated
Dr. Schwartz's employment in February, 1996. Subsequently, I
read her letter to TRW management in which she described how the
KFE had f ailed when she had subjected it to a more rigorously valid
scientific testing. This letter was circulated by TRW EKV program
management to several of its senior staff.
10. During the Spring of 1996 1 was involved in the integration
of the KFE into TRW's Tracking, Fusion, and Discrimination (TFD)
software and testing the KFE. The testing personnel also included
Dr. George Newnam and Mr. Norman Maclean. Our unanimous
conclusion was that the KFE required speed and memory resources
which would not be available in the EKV onboard processor. No
determination could be made as to its effectiveness for
discrimination because only one simulated test case was provided
by Dr. Freiler, the algorithm's original designer.
11. Shortly thereafter TRW officially removed the algorithm
from its TFD baseline software and re-inserted the original BLA.
12. Dr. Schwartz contacted me by phone in or about March,
1996. 1 told her that I believed that she had been wrongfully
terminated and that I shared her conclusions about the
ineffectiveness of the KFE. We stayed in periodic phone contact
13. 1 was interviewed by the Department of Defense Criminal
Investigation Service (DCIS) in the late Spring or early Summer of
1996. I told the investigators that I was sure that the KFE would not
work but I couldn't be sure whether the BLA would work or not. I
suspected that it wouldn't.
14. My suspicions about the BLA were borne out in the Fall of
1996 after TRW received telemetry data from the June seeker f light
test. I was heavily involved with the reduction and processing of the
data with the TFD prototype software. I observed at first-hand TRW
discrimination personnel (Mr. Beitzel et al) attempts to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the BLA in selecting the correct object by both
impermissibly manipulating the Mission Data Load (MDL) and
censoring the test data. This MDL manipulation and data censoring
was the case even though TRW had contractually certified that the
MDL and discrimination software were flight-ready.
15. After my retirement at the end of August, 1998 I supported
Dr. Schwartz's analysis of the BLA performance on the flight test
data as a voluntary member of a DCIS team. I reviewed and analyzed
TRW reports over a two month period. I concluded that the BLA does
not meet contractual performance requirements as specified in the
government's Technical Requirements Document and that TRW
knowingly and impermissibly manipulated and censored the flight
test data to hide the BLA's failure.
16. I also reviewed several reports produced by the Phase One
Engineering Team ( POET) in their review of the BLA and KFE as well
as a Nichols Research Corporation KFE test report. I concluded that,
while there ports in general state in their executive summaries
that TRW's discrimination algorithms work, this assertion is not
supported at all by a careful reading of the bodies of the reports.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
Executed this 18th day of May, 1999 at Los Angles , California.
1. Second document, Special Agent Reed document (DCIS/DOD-IG).
DEFENSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
WESTERN FIELD OFFICE
26722 PLAZA ST., SUITE 130
MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691-6300
February 01, 1999
Mr. Keith Englander,
In our last correspondence we provided what we feel is absolute irrefutable scientific
proof that TRW's discrimination technology does not cannot, and will not work, and falls
far-short of meeting the TRD/contract requirements. After reviewing the POET draft report
we feel even stronger about that statement. We have just received the final version of-the
POET report but have not had time to review it in detail.
I would like to start by highlighting a few areas of the four-page "Executive
Summary" from the POET draft report which are extremely supportive in exposing the
serious flaws in the TRW discrimination technology. These statements fully corroborate
our findings and reiterate what we have been saying for over two years.
Starting with the first paragraph of the "Executive Summary" (page iii), last
sentence, it states "Target discrimination and selection must be done with or without
handover information about the target from the rest of the NMD system " The second
paragraph, first sentence, states "TRW has developed an onboard autonomous
discrimination architecture and a set of algorithm for the Boeing EKV "
The first indented paragraph on page iii, #1, states "Overall, the Baseline
Algorithm(s) (BLA) are well designed and) work properly, with only sonic refinement or
redesign required to increased robustness of the overall discrimination functions. " We
feel this statement is misleading and incomplete, and contradictory of later material in the
report. The indented paragraph #4, page iv, states "The Performance of the discrimination
architecture may be fragile. Training, (data sets that closely match actual threats are
crucial to the performance of the multimodal Bayesian quadratic classifier (MBOO for
the fine (i.e., precision) discrimination function. Performance may degrade significantly
if incorrect prior knowledge regarding target signatures is used in the classifier database.
The target signatures are heavily influenced by threat type, target characteristics, sensor-
to-target geometry, and engagement timeline. Therefore, unexpected targets in the threat
may challenge the performance of the MBOC It would be desirable to expand the
current discrimination architecture to make it more robust by including, for example, real-
time adaptation capability and certain threat-type-based system-level discrimination.
We definitely agree with the above statement which totally supports and
corroborates what we have been saying, and contradicts indented paragraph 91 which states
"Overall the BL4 are well designed and work properly, etc" along with the statement that
TRW's discrimination architecture is autonomous. The Technical Requirements Document
(TRD) requires that the discrimination technology be capable of operating with or without
knowledge of threat types. The POET clearly indicates that TRW's discrimination BLA is
not robust, and it is crucial that the training data sets closely match actual threats for the
fine discrimination function.
The POET's statement of "Overall, the BLA(s) are well designed and work
properly" would be accurate if stated that TRW's BLA's are well designed and work
properly if and only if the training data sets, loaded in the Mission Data Load (MDL),
closely match the actual threats for the fine discrimination function. We have always
contended that prior knowledge can improve algorithm performance to a certain
extent but it is critical that a discrimination algorithm perform independently, to the
maximum possible extent, with limited or no prior knowledge. A discrimination
algorithm has to be capable of adjusting to unpredictable and unknown target objects
from classes that are not expected. It has to be capable of adjusting to the situations in
which an object from an expected object class is missing. The TRD specifically states
that "Included in the scenarios are accidental and unauthorized launches by the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, formerly the Soviet Union) and China, and
limited strikes by China and the Rest of World (ROW) countries" (page A-2). Also, the
BLA must perform when an object from an expected object class does not perform
nominally. TRW's discrimination algorithms have never been able to function in this
situation. Their algorithms are heavily dependent on prior knowledge, or they adjust
their discrimination results by using, Post Flight data in order to show acceptable
results. It is scientifically impermissible to use unknowable information to correct
experimental results after the fact.
On pace vi of the Executive Summary, the last sentence on the page states "If targets
are deployed nominally in IFT-3, it is the POET team's assessment that the TR WBLA
will successfully select the MR V as the intercept taro et, even for the most stressing target
suite. " It also states in the body of the same paragraph "The most stressing target suite for
EKV discrimination contains the same ten targets as those deployed in IFT-IA. " This
contention seems questionable because TRW requested the removal of one of the objects
from the target suite for the EFT-3. This information surfaced at the July 21 & 22, 1998,
meeting with TRW at the Aerospace Corporation. The reason for the removal of the object
was that its off-nominal deployment caused TRW's BLA significant problems. This
confirms the POET's statement "The performance of the discrimination architecture may
On page vi of the Executive Summary, third paragraph, it states "One of the most
important criticisms raised by DCIS is that during the IFT-IA postmission analyses TRW
unjustifiably shifted the preflight feature distribution ellipses between the 45-day report
and the 60-day report in order to increase the BL4 's discrimination Performance. As
previously noted, TRW’s explanation that an improperly constituted GFA caused the
discrepancies appears to be correct." In TRW's report titled "(U) POET Review Of EKV
Discrimination Algorithms" dated July 21 & 22,1998, they state "The primary differences
between the 45 and 60-Day MDL was in the settings for the available track length".
"Gap Filling did not affect the measured signatures because of the start time of 1752
for the hand-tracked object reports. Features are calculated from the measured
signatures and compared with the MDL." The explanation by TRW that an
improperly constituted GFA caused the discrepancies referring to the shifting of the
ellipses between the 45 and 60-Day reports is totally incorrect (pages 156 and 173
refer). The real difference between the discrimination performance result (PAT)
provided by TRW in the 45-Day Report, compared to the 60-Day PAT, was the
shortening of available flight data track length to 16 seconds for the 60-Day, versus 47
seconds used for the 45-Day Report. Additionally, it appears the training of the OSC
code by TRW with the actual IFT-lA flight data, was used to generate the 60-Day
The very high PAT provided in the 60-Day Report is a direct result of the
extremely close match between the OSC code trained with EFT-IA flight test data and the
IFT-IA flight test data results. It is certainly clear that the IFT-3 actual results will not be
available as a training set until the flight test has been completed.
In our March 25, 1998, report we provided our views regarding- the Gap Filling
Algorithm (GAP) and the serious adverse of using this consequence algorithms We related
that both NRC and GBI representatives informed us, during our December 1997 trip to
Huntsville, that they do not understand how TRW's GFA for the signatures works and that
TRW has never explained or validated the method. We explain that TRW's GFA attempts
to fill in missing data points in the EKV sensor signal output by using values from the
OPTISIG library. However, the intended program inadvertently used zero values for the
data points. This resulted in the "anomalistic" behavior of the signal outputs analyzed by
'INRC during their testing of TRW's discrimination technology, wherein every signature had
an unexplained dip. Additionally, TRW artificially chopped the amplitude of the sensor
signal output which results in arbitrarily forcing the signal mean to a predetermined value.
This resulted from the sensor output noise level being too high for the baseline
discrimination algorithm to process. It has been shown by TRW that the GFA manipulates
data in such a way to give artificial results. TRW showed this in their correction to the 60-
Day Status Report by changing the location of the center of the ellipses, changing the shape
of the ellipses, and by changing two of the features. This allowed an artificial improvement
in the Probability of assigned Target (PAT). The PAT should be solely dependent on the
actual measurement of data from the real signature(s), versus creating a signature(s)
with gaps of missing data and filling in this data artificially to increase the value of the
calculated PAT. This GFA process is done outside of accepted statistical scientific
methods. Prior td the down-select TRW stated they were not going to use the GFA for the
IFT-3 which is also stated in the POET's report. This can only raise the question of how
would TRW handle any gaps in the actual IFT-3 signatures.
On page vi the POET states "Another important issue concerns the "improper"
concept of ranking probability used by TRW for selecting an intercept target. It is clear to
the POET team that all points raised concerning this issue were based on
misunderstanding of Bayes rule and misinterpretation of TRW’s approach. " Our
understanding of TRW's ranking scheme is that it selects the object with the highest
probability of belonging to the RV class given the object's extracted feature vector. This is
the case even though it is possible that the particular object selected may have a higher
posterior probability of belonging to another class. It can also be the case, that another
object with lower PAT than the highest-ranking object could actually have the largest
probability of being the RV among the classes. The table below is a simple illustration of
OBJ-ECT OBJ-ECT CLASSES
RV MB LB
1 0.40 0.60 0.00
2 0.39 0.305 0.305
We do not misunderstand Bayes rule. We apply it differently than TRW does in its
MBQC. Rather than assuming that each tracked object surely belongs to one of five
different classes with a given prior hypothesis probability per object class, we assume the
equally likely prior hypotheses that one of the tracked objects is surely the RV. In addition
we view the set of extracted independent feature vectors as comprising the compound
Given our hypothesis and event structure, our Monte Carlo analysis (1000 samples)
yielded an estimated probability of correct RV selection that is within a few percentage
points of the POET'S. The Confusion Matrix, displayed on page 18 of the POET draft
report, shows their probability of correct RV selection. The POET results and ours are
consistent and mutually supportive. The difference between the two is well within the
Monte Carlo sampling error.
The last paragraph, page vi, of the Executive Summary the POET states "It is a
legitimate concern that the robustness of the BLA's discrimination function could be
compromised by the assumption that threat-typing, information would be available for use
in the MDL database and that target characteristics, motion parameters, and engagement
geometry would be known for a given threat system. Reliable prior knowledge on many Of
the threat types included in the TRD cannot be obtained. The POET study did not evaluate
to what extent the BLA may be used to meet the general requirements described in the YRD
beyond the ability to determine which object among a threat cloud is lethal (given that the
threat type is known). However, the POET team's concerns regarding the potential lack
of robustness of the current BLA have been indicated earlier. The POET team also
recognizes that the concept of threat typing can have significant impact on EKV
discrimination performance and that such impact should be examined carefully in the
context of overall NMD architecture design and threat assessment Within the EKV
scenario setting it may be important to structure the discrimination architecture to take
advantage of threat-typing information while at the same time reducing potential risk "
We agree with the sense of this paragraph even more strongly than as stated by the POET.
In reviewing the POET report we noted that part of the report focused on the Kalman
Filter (KF) performance. We reviewed the Statement of Work (SOW) generated by Dr.
Frank Handler for the POET but did not see anything about the KF. Our concern is when
did this become part of the SOW? Why weren't we notified? Why didn't we get a
copy of the new SOW? and Why didn't we get a chance to provide some input? In
reviewing the reference list for the POET report we noted that the "I-SETAC ANALYSIS
OF ROCKWELL KALMAN FILTER FEATURE EXTRACTION CONCEPT (LD" dated
November 14, 1996 was not identified. The Nichols Research Corporation (NRC), which is
the technical advisor to the Ground Base Interceptor (GBI) Office in Huntsville, Alabama
authored this report. We feel that before the POET made any comments regarding the KF
they should have had all immediately available reports concerning the matter.
From reviewing the POET draft report, the TRD requirements, and all the other
accumulated relevant documents we will summarize a number of points on why the TRW
BLA is not, nor has it ever been basically sound or capable of meeting the contract
(1). Almost all features are only descriptive statistics which wash out any intrinsic
physics and spectral information contained in the intensity signatures. Moreover, the
features are not functionally independent.
(2). The features, for all object classes, are assumed to be constant over time; they
are not. Feature time variability is artificially compensated by lumping it into the apriori
feature error covariance matrices. Lumping feature time varying effects into these
covariance matrices creates large regions of overlap in the feature spaces of different object
classes. These overlap regions grow as mission elapsed time increases because of the
secular trends in the features. Such trends, reflected in the extracted features, are highly
likely to cause one detected object's extracted feature vector to wander close to the center of
the apriori error ellipse family for a different object class. Depending on the actual
engagements object-by-object materials, temperatures, aspect angle temporal variation, etc.
the RV's extracted feature vector will, with uncomfortably high probability, travel out of the
apriori likely RV class region into the likely region of another object class; conversely the
extracted feature vector for another object class is likely to "walk" close to the RV apriori
feature vector mean. We can predict with some certainty that such confusion will grow
overtime as more object-by-object data is accumulated. This is exactly what a sound
algorithm should not do. A sound algorithm should be able to select the RV with greater
and greater confidence as the object-by object data spans increase.
(3). TRW's BLA, while computing a feature extraction error covariance matrix
for each tracked object, does not use this matrix in its Baysean Likelihood calculations.
This omission is both statistically incorrect and computationally inefficient. We can only
speculate that the required use of this matrix as a summand was left out because to include it
would generate larger total error overlap and selection performance degradation.
(4). The strictly recursive feature extraction approach is questionable. Recursive
computations have appreciable startup transient times and preclude the exploitation of
spectral methods, which require a batch of data over an appropriate time span. Batch
estimation is more appropriate than recursive estimation for truly time invariant parameters.
(5). With one exception the total feature set has nothing to do with the underlying
physics, thermodynamics and mechanics.
(6). To paraphrase one of the POET's main finding's, apriori threat identification
data will not always be available. Even if accurate missile typing data is transmitted from
surveillance assets to the GBI via the BMC 3 element, there is no assurance whatsoever that
the corresponding MDL would faithfully represent the set of objects, RV and decoys,
carried by the missile's PBV, nor all likely variations in the actual object-by-object
composition, temperature distribution, deployment geometry, rotational dynamics
(7). Given (1) to (6) one can expect that the BLA performance will be exquisitely
sensitive to feature extraction start times, data spans, non-nominal object deployments,
irradiance data gaps, dips, and spikes of whatever origin. Such dips and spikes can arise
from particle and gamma ray events, sensor electronic anomalies, or actual rapidly time
varying aspect angles as well as the individual objects projected area, shape, and body
element material composition changes.
(8). As for robustness, we assert that the BLA is, instead, extremely fragile, This
contention is borne out in both the POET's and our results as shown in the table on page
66 of the draft report titled "Independent Review of TRW Discrimination Techniques", 7-8
December 1998, by Dr. Ming Tsai et al (page 67 of the POET final report refers).
(9). It is clear from our reading and analysis of the documentation cited in the
POET's bibliography that TRW heavily censored the IFT-IA signature data, deleting
approximately the first 20 seconds and the last I I seconds to go from poor results in its 45-
Day Report, to excellent results in its 60-Day Report Addendum. Removal of the last I I
seconds is especially critical because we have evidence to believe that in this interval of
time the RV's PAT fell dramatically and dropped below another object's rising PAT.
Additionally, TRW generated the MML used for the 60-Day Report analysis by training the
OSC code with the detailed knowledge from EFT- IA flight data since that information was
used in constructing the MDL. The very high PAT achieved in the 60-Day Report is a
direct result of this close match and has nothing to do with the GFA. Such after-the-fact
censoring, is impermissible as any kind of empirical evidence that the BLA meets TRD
specified near term discrimination performance requirements.
(10). We also suspect that early data was censored to hide the difficulty the BLA
was having with real signature spikes, not Boeing/GBI sensor-induced spikes. These
signature spikes were actually induced by object attitude motion as verified by the_
Airborne Sensor Testbed (AST) data. In addition the use of impermissible after the fact
knowledge by TRW to switch features in mid-data stream was also noted, and previously
reported to the POET.
(11). TRW's BLA cannot be well designed if it is lacking, a critical component
such as an effective Gap Filling Algorithm.
Putting together all these instances of impermissible use of after-the-fact
knowledge, early data censoring to remove difficult data, late data censoring to make sure
that the RV was selected, and a missing key algorithm, can only cast grave suspicion about
the ineffectiveness and fragility of TRW's BLA's capability to meet contract requirements.
There is no crime in producing a failed algorithm during a Research and
Development project. That's all part of the acceptable risk in order to eliminate the non-
viable approaches. The crime is in producing a failed algorithm and knowingly covering up
In conclusion, we are looking forward to meeting with you and the POET this week.
I request that this correspondence not be disseminated outside your office or members of the
POET. I want to thank for your time and interest in this matter.
Samuel W. Reed - Group Manager, DCIS
1. Third document, Special Agent Reed document (DCIS/DOD-IG).
DEFENSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
WESTERN FIELD OFFICE
26722 PLAZA ST., SUITE 130
MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691-6300
9610701Z-18-JUN-96-50LA-E0QT March 15, 1999
Redondo Beach, CA
RECEIPT OF ARMY CORRESPONDENCE: On March 8, 1999,
Department of Justice (DOJ) Attorney Dennis Egan faxed
reporting agent a copy of a letter from the Department of
the Army, United States Army Legal Services Agency,
Arlington, VA. The letter is addressed to Mr. Michael F.
Hertz, head of the Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, DOJ Washington, D.C. The letter is dated February
26, 1999, and recommends against DOJ intervening in this
case. One of the reasons for not intervening was based upon
conversations with the investigators handling the case.
This statement has no factual basis as reporting agent is
the only investigator assigned to the case, and has not
spoken with any Army representative regarding not
intervening in the case.
1. Army Letter dated February 26,1999.
Prepared by SA Samuel W. Reed, SO-Western Field Office